McDermott Iranian Rescue Mission

Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission Author(s): Rose McDermott Reviewed work(s): Source:
Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, Special Issue: Prospect Theory and Political Psychology (Jun., 1992), pp. 237-263 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791680 . Accessed: 12/03/2013 22:17
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PoliticalPsychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992
in International Relations: Theory Prospect The IranianHostageRescueMission

Rose McDermott1
a descriptive Thisarticleusesprospect under theory, theory ofdecision-making the in Iran in risk,to examine failed rescuemission of theAmerican hostages is that President was ina domain Carter April1980. Theargument oflossesboth at thetimeof thecrisis.In thiscontext, and domestically loss internationally risksto secure the release of the himto take military aversionpredisposed havebeenwilling thathe wouldnotordinarily topursue.Thisarticle hostages between and also discussestherelationship riskin theoptions political military at thetime. thatwereconsidered
ofgains/losses; loss aversion; domain KEY WORDS: risk; Presidecision-making; prospect theory; Iranian crisis. dentCarter; hostage
INTRODUCTION The renewed theinvolvement of theReagancamcontroversy surrounding in the Iranian crisis fuels new interest in the oftheCarter activities paign hostage administration to securethehostages'release.After all exhausting diplomatic channels forachieving thisgoal for oversix months, President Carter undertook a dramatic in rescue of 1980. Carter's action was notonly military attempt April to his humanitarian in worldpolitics butwas a contrary completely emphasis from a as well. military highly risky prospect standpoint How can Carter's in light actionsbe explained of his predilection forthe ofconflict? resolution How is itpossible to understand thenature ofthe peaceful risksCarter was willing to run,bothmilitarily and politically, in order to force thereleaseofthehostages from Iranian control? Thisarticle that argues prospect
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theseseemingly anomalousand theory providesthe best way to understand events in theCarter administration. incomprehensible two elements. The first is a framing theory Prospect encompasses phase, information is received which andprocessed in a waythat during placesemphasuchas whether sis on particular or notittakesplace in a aspectsof a problem, of gainsor losses. Gainsor losses arejudgedrelative situation to thereference in many circumcases, thisis thestatus quo. However, point.In most important a leaderwillrefuse to accepta newstatus and stances, quo as thereference point thuswill clingto theold status reference quo as the "appropriate" point.The inshort, secondevaluative that tobe risk-seeking in segment argues, peopletend of losses and risk-averse thedomain in thedomain of gains(Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). The application ofprospect to anycase in theinternational environtheory a two-stage ment thusnecessitates The beginning to analysis. stagecorresponds thefirst, In thispart, theparticular of the editing, phaseof thetheory. framing relevant issuesand questions are investigated at a substantive level in order to discern differences in thepolitical and of various The emphases goals players. of theevaluation secondphaseconsists thespecific domain of phase,whereby riskpropensity, either or is disaverse, gainsor losses, and relative acceptant cussedand analyzed. Thisprocess allowsfora comparison between thepredictions ofthetheory and theoutcomes of actualevents.The critical variable hereis thesubjective of domainand risk. While theseare clearlytied to, and often assessments derivative are notalways,or necessarily, assessments, of,objective they totally analogous. The framing andevaluation ofPresident Carter's decision to underJimmy take a rescuemissionof the American in Iran in of hostages April 1980 is here. The is to use the of to help investigated hope flashlight prospect theory illuminate a case that otherwise more dominant might proveinexplicable using in political science. paradigms The failed rescuemission of thehostages is inexplicable from theperspective of a structuralist Structuralism would that it is highly paradigm. suggest for a like the United States to in unlikely superpower get caught a hostage with a small like Iran. But once structuralism would relationship power engaged, that thepowerdiscrepancy in theinternational wouldplayto the predict system oftheUnited States.The United States should havebeenabletofind a advantage to use its to coerce the Iranians into the way power returning hostages. However, theUnited Statesdid notgo intoIranwith a largeshowof force; Carter indeed, was widely in thepressat thetimefor criticized America in rendering impotent thefaceoftheIslamicstudents. theCarter administration to Whydidn't respond Iranwith moredirect force from theoutset? Structuralism no adequate provides response.
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The rescueattempt tookplace at theverynadir ofthecrisis, the following withIranian moderates like Bani-Sadr French collapseof negotiations through itoffers a superb case forinvesti(Sick, 1986). As a result, legal intermediaries from theperspective ofprospect becauseittakesplaceexclusively theory gation can offer in thedomain of losses. Prospect bothexplanation andanalysis theory is seemingly for an action that from a morestructural incomprehensible perspective.Indeed,no other wouldpredict thisbehavior as accurately as prostheory pecttheory. DOMAIN One of the mostdramatic eventsthatoccurred Carter's tenure as during was theIranian crisis.On November of 4, 1979,inthecontext hostage president a broader Islamicrevolution, as many as 3,000 Iranian students seizedtheU.S. in Tehran, 66 Americans embassy taking hostagein theprocess.The students themselves undertook thisattack as a symbolic and expected thetakegesture, overto lastonlya matter of days;they werequitesurprised whenthey received thevociferous andbenedictions oftheImamandproceeded to settle in blessings fora longerepisode thanoriginally of the (Sick, 1986). Thirteen anticipated all either blackorfemale, weresubsequently on November released 18 hostages, and 19 (Sick, 1986). The remaining 532 were keptfor444 days untiltheir release on January intothe Reagan 20, 1980, abouttwo minutes negotiated presidency.3 The Carter administration to negotiate consistently sought diplomatically forthe releaseof the hostages,although theysimultaneously developedconaction (Brzezinski, 1985). The actualrescuemission plansformilitary tingency itself tookplace on April24, 1980. This mission resulted in thedeaths of eight American withfour additional American and failed to soldiers, injuries, bring aboutthereleaseof anyof thehostages.
Richard on July 2Oneof thehostages, reasons that were 11, 1980,formedical Queen,was released laterdiagnosedas multiple sclerosis. Sick has recently claimedthat theReagancampaign was independently with the 3Gary negotiating Iranian Counciloverthetiming of thehostages' release.He arguesthat theCarter Revolutionary administration was unaware oftheseillicit theexchange ofhostages for arms negotiations involving Israeli intermediaries. See GarySick, "The ElectionStoryof the Decade," New York through incollaboration with theFinancialTimes Times, ofLondon, April15, 1991. ABC NewsNightline, has conducted a seriesof investigations on theseallegations. muchof theevidencein Although of Sick's claimsis circumstantial, there aremany indications that thebasisofhisargument support In a classic case of underestimating the base rate,muchof thediscussion has may be correct. focused on thewhereabouts of William andlater headoftheCIA. chief, Casey,Reagan'scampaign The problem withthisfocus is thatit failsto investigate how frequently Casey's locationwas is no base rateinformation there on his absencefrom thepubliceye. To theextent unknown; that location was a rareeventforCasey,it becomesmorediagnostic information. havingan unknown
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In applying to any case in the international arena,it is prospect theory establish theoperative domainas one of either crucialto first gainsor losses. to actuallyget insidethe head of the relevant While it may be impossible it is possibleto use other to assess his subjective decision-maker perspective, the mostlikelydomainof action.To take a simple to determine indicators wanted to knowwhether a decision-maker ifan investigator felt hotor example, he couldlook at a thermometer to makea cold and wasn'table to ask directly, was 100 degrees, chancesare thedecision-maker bestguess. If thetemperature chances aretheperson hot.Ifthethermometer read32 degrees, felt felt cold. In a touse external indicators todetermine, ingeneral, similar how way,itis possible a president assessedhis domainof action. ina domain oflossesatthetime was clearly ofthedecision Carter operating a situation to go ahead withtherescuemission, where were confronting things to getworsewith thepassageoftime.Thisis obvious bad andclearly continuing faceda revolutionary from indicator: Carter Islamicpowerthat refused to every withhim, an increasingly frustrated and hostileAmerican negotiate directly senseof desperation members of Congress amongnumerous public,a growing aboutthesafety officials andrelease ofthehostages, andother and governmental andcredibility. Carter international couldonlyhaveseenhimdeclining prestige in a domain of losses, bothdomestically and internationally. selfoperating On thedomestic Carter's was declining One poll front, popularity rapidly. thehostage crisisbegan,reported from June1979,evenbefore that only20% of of Carter's thepopulation Times,June 25, foreign approved policy(New York to a Timepollconducted thelasttwo 1979). Moreto thepoint, according during weeksof March,60% of theAmerican Carter was too softon publicfeltthat Iran. Carter's reelection was goingbadly.During thelast Moreover, campaign weekof March, to the rescue Carter had sustained two mission, justprior large losses in theNew Yorkand Connecticut to Senator EdwardKennedy. primaries he wontheWisconsin on April1, there werepress that Although primary reports crisisto manipulate that he usedthehostage victory byprematurely announcing release.According to bothHamilton Jordan's good newsabouttheir impending andJody Powell'sreports, thepresident's statement on April1 hadbeenpromptas a genuine ed bywhat was viewed inthenegotiations andwas not breakthrough totheprimaries inWisconsin andKansasthat related the day.Indeed, pollsprior to April I showedthepresident witha solid 15-point lead in Wisconsin even theannouncement was madeconcerning before thehostages. In addition, itwas thefirst time that Carter hadslipped belowReaganinthe election Carter had held a 2 to lead over in December. 1 polls; Reagan ByMarch, almost halfofthepeoplewhosupported Carter did so "without enthuhowever, siasm." Moreover, 81% of thepopulation said theyfeltthatAmericawas in
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itwas timefor a changein the andabout70% said they serious trouble, thought (Time,April14, 1980). presidency withCongress was deteriorating as well. Presidential Carter's relationship from declined 81.4 to 73.3 percent in theSenate on votesin Congress victories and 1980. in the Senatefor alone between1979 Moreover, Republican support fellbelow 50% (Ornstein, Carter's 1984). positions crisisforABC Newsfrom whocovered thehostage Pierre Paris, Salinger, of thesituation: a good summary provides
wereweighing than Other factors on thePresident. Better knewhowthe Carter anyone, in other crisishad paralyzed his administration's efforts ifonlybecauseit fields, hostage diverted his own attention and energies so greatly. he was twice therefore, Politically, wounded-first and againbyitsimpact on hisprograms. His campaign for bythecrisis, of theAmerican reelection thefrustrations fortunes registered public.Whilehispolitical thetaking ofthehostages, hadrisen after he was beginning toslipinthepollsandhadlost in New Yorkto Senator a keyprimary EdwardKennedy. was now in the Carter Jimmy of a fight midst forhis life,and itlookedas ifhe was losing.A military that freed option woulddramatically altertheodds. (Salinger, thehostages 1981)
It is significant that notesherethat a military that freed the Salinger option could somehow all thelosses and perhaps evenrestore or imhostages rectify status thatthings would quo. In otherwords,it appeared provetheprevious continue togetworseunlesssomething was actively donetorectify thesituation. The view from insidethe administration was equallybleak, as National Advisor Security GarySick commented:
The imageofU.S. weakness ofhumiliating setbacks andfrustrations generated bymonths was nothealthy forrelations withallies or adversaries. In domestic continued politics, notonlycondemned thePresident to self-immolation in thepolls butit risked passivity infavor a popular backlash offorces whoopposed VanceandCarter generating everything (Sick, 1986) represented.
As Sick mentions, the international impactof the hostagecrisiswas as forCarter as werethedomestic of StateCyrus problematic pressures. Secretary Vancehad had greatdifficulty in trying to gettheallies to cooperate withthe UnitedStates in joiningand enforcing economicsanctions Iran. For against a U.N. Council resolution Iran had been vetoed Security example, against bythe in theyear.Grievances Sovietsearlier Iran the in the U.S. brought against by World Court wereslow to reachfruition. Even after theIranians wereconvicted in thisCourt,there was no real mechanism to enforce thepenalties imposed. Carterhad been warnedby President AnwarSadat of Egyptthat Moreover, America's "international was being damagedby "excessivepasstanding" (Brzezinski, 1985). sivity" was man who had sustained tremendous losses to personal Thus, Carter national and international interests when the were honor, popularity, hostages taken.By thetimeof therescuemission, Carter was a leaderreadyto takea
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to the status quo, withthe hostages things safelyat home, gambleto return honor andhispolitical fortunes national turned restored, prideand international upward.He was not willingto definethe new statusquo as an acceptable cost himhis reelection, reference might pointbecause thatconcession among he was a manoperating In terms of prospect in the othercalamities. theory, domainof losses. THE FRAMING OF OPTIONS totheIranian itis necesIn seeking to applyprospect crisis, theory hostage that wereconsidered inorder bytherelevant players, saryto analyzetheoptions of each. Assessments riskiness theperceived relative of riskcan to determine of successfora particular calculations of theprobability involveeither choice of each option. and/or theutility for President wereframed Carter The waythese is an options byhisadvisors to GarySick, there was a consensus element. within the According important on thehierarchy of riskpresented administration Risk by thevariousoptions. of success as well as the costs and benefits here meantboththe likelihood involved.The main disagreement suramong advisorsand decision-makers one fortheUnited which levelof riskwas an acceptable rounded States to take. was madewas thehighest levelof riskthat In theend,thechoicethat President himself was willing to accept(Sick, personal Carter communication). fivebasic options wereconsidered Fromtheoutset, forbringing aboutthe and ending thediplomatic releaseof thehostages stalemate. From thelowest to thehighest level of risk,theseoptions wereto do nothing; in minimal engage anddiplomatic undertake a rescue mine theharbors; sanctions; mission; political and engagein an all-out strike. military in each option The relative benefits andrisksinvolved willbe discussed in turn. As National Advisor Brzezinski it (1990) comments, is Security Zbigniew crucial to keep in mindthe distinction betweenmilitary and politicalrisks this In risks these are related. Morecases, throughout analysis. many inversely between domestic and international costs and over,thereis oftena trade-off as well. benefits The first was to do nothing andwaitfortheinternal situation in Iran option to stabilizeand resolvethe crisisby itself.This was the optionthatVance The strategy herewas to continue with andmilitary supported. political pressure butnotto offer new initiatives until after the Iranians had formulated their any a new political into coherent structure. The of benefit this was system strategy thatit did notriskantagonizing theIranians further. In Vance's view,this any was most to the from further harm. likely protect hostages approach
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a domestic risksof thispolicyfrom The political are obvious. perspective wouldbe charged withineffectiveness and be accusedof beingpushed Carter thepersonal around More importantly, senseof angerat the by theAyatollah. was running Iraniansin the administration at veryhigh the time. Fromthe of central it was toconceive of decision-makers, virtually impossible perspective international humiliation in deliberate the face of such abominable accepting without inresponse. In short, Iranian action there was a univerdoingsomething thesituation sal sensethat was intolerable. and frustration addedto Deep anger was no strategic or political thebeliefthatthere reasonwhytheUnitedStates to be pushed around shouldallow itself fanatical state in bya third-rate religious risks ofdoingnothing theMiddleEast. Thus,whilethemilitary wererelatively riskswerehigh. low,thedomestic political The secondoption was to up theanteslightly butonlythrough diplomatic means.This meant and economic relations with theIranians, breaking political on shipments of military Iranian citizens sales, expelling placingan embargo from theUnited Statesand so on. Everyone assumed that these would be things all wereeventually, andthey werenotregarded as particularly done,as they risky or a military from either a political In fact, these actions amounted to standpoint. moreshow thansubstance. The real goal in undertaking theseactionswas to on theEuropeans to join in thesanctions Iran. bring pressure against Thispolicyamounted to a balancing actbetween American interests inIran with and U.S. relationships reluctant allies. The measures European diplomatic ingaining successful weresomewhat However, European cooperation. European to theAmerican accommodation was more a result oftheimplicit threat position of the use of U.S. military forcethanof genuineinterest in sanctioning the After therescuemission tookplace, theEuropeans Iranians. feltbetrayed, althesediplomatic initiatives did serveas a good cover forthe rescue though missionpreparations. The third that was seriously considered was therescue mission itself. option This was really an intermediate in terms of political butit was riskiness, option that couldbe taken theriskiest without in an outright option militarily engaging act of war.The mission was intended to workby stealth, and thegoal was to minimize casualtiesand bring aboutthereleaseof thehostages.Everyone inittobe a clever volvedintheplanning considered andcarefully outplan. thought Eventhosewhonowhavethebenefit ofhindsight, suchas Sick andBrzezinski, have been subtle, sophisticated, considerthe plan to and likely to have succeeded. to Sick, all thedecision-makers understood theserious According military in undertaking risksinvolved themission, butit stilloffered theonlyreal posof rescuing mostof the hostagesalive. The planners knewthatthe sibility of success was not 100%, but theybelievedthatthe riskswere possibility
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In other words,therisksherewereseen as beingmoreaboutthe manageable. success thanabout the politicalcosts and benefits of of probability military which seemed more the mission, acceptable. undertaking here is thatthe rescuemissionwas the best balanceof The key factor thehostages wouldbe free, risk.Ifitworked, Carter would andmilitary political would be be a hero, and America'sinternational credibility salvaged. Theto a to would have amounted return the old status a success quo as the oretically, the risks that were admitreference However, agreed military everyone point. of success low. and the relatively high, probability complete tedly was designed to minimize thesemilitary risks However, military planning was to enter Iranon a holiday the as muchas possible.The strategy weekend; under coverof darkness. wereto hithardand quickly The American rescuers is surrounded andno oneexpected itself noise bylarge grounds, embassy enough to arousesuspicion, with outside thecompound the use wouldtravel especially knewwhere thehostages on all weapons.The rescuers werebeing of silencers thestudents and they to be unprepared thebuilding, and held within expected no discussed one Iranian losses in combat. unskilled there was Although openly, of Iranian that students wouldbe killedin the largenumbers every expectation therisksto American soldiersand hostages courseof the mission.However, was madeto minimize and every effort weremorespecific, theselosses. Thus, seemedto be a particularly attractive whenthealtertherescuemission option to either to amount the natives wereperceived situation continue to fester letting war. or to go to all-out The fourth or to otherwise comoptionwas to minetheharbors interrupt Thiswas seentobe politically merce. becauseitwas theequivalent of quiterisky hadno intention an actofwar.The United States ofdeclaring warbutwanted to ships fromgoing into Iran without havingto physically prevent stop them. a passive sea blockade,and if well publicized, most Miningwouldconstitute to runtheriskof entering theminedarea. The goal was to try shipswouldn't on Iran'sexports have a significant and imports. negative impact was viewedas a sharp theharbors escalation. The fear was that the Mining Iranians wouldinvite theSovietsintotheregion tohelpwith and mine-sweeping that thisoffer wouldprovide theSovietswithan opening in theregion that the Stateswanted to prevent. United was seenas a significant, butnot Thus,mining an overwhelming, international risk.This option was certainly viewedas mana military self-destruct ageable from perspective. Usingmineswithautomatic mechanisms wouldallow someflexibility and thisoption was seriously considered.However, there was a military risk ofrepeatedly losing planesandshipsin such an action,and theother risksinvolved theregion political by inflaming were seen to be quite highas well. Most importantly, thisoptionwould do to further theprimary thehostages. nothing directly goal of releasing The lastoption availablewas an all-out attack. Thiswas extremely military
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and was neverseriously from botha politicaland a military standpoint risky thisoption was abanthemainreason As with theprevious considered. option, the back. It wouldinflame to getthehostages donedwas becauseitdid nothing to crisis without the and escalate entire doing anything bring directly region this was rejected aboutthereleaseofthehostages. option every Basically, stepof too and the risks were were too thewaybecausetheadverse great, consequences and and both internationally. domestically high politically militarily, that werepolitically more theoptions The mostimportant pointregarding neither offered the chance to return is that one the mission the rescue than risky the release of the about status to theformer situation quo by brining hostages. havebeengreater than oftherescuemission risks Thus,whilethemilitary might risks of a strike have domestic and the the harbor, might punitive political mining solution to thecentral offered an immediate issue neither beenless risky, option of contention. decision-makers the principal As mentioned, agreedon the optionsthat andpolitical risk.However, it relative levelsofmilitary wereavailableandtheir a different or tolerance that each advisor is also true threshold, level, possessed each framed his arguments to Carter in forwhatwas acceptable.As a result, are addressed below. These different perspectives ways. quite Framing with It was thecollapseoftheadministration's Prime Minister negotiations decision on April1 thatled to Carter's to Bani-Sadr undertake the subsequent The of rescuemission(Jordan, a 1982; Powell, 1984). possibility undertaking in to the crisis was raised a hostage military option response coupleofdaysafter the embassy was taken in Novemberof 1979. Under the instigation of ofDefense HaroldBrown, theJoint Chiefs ofStaff Brzezinski, Secretary through a Joint TaskForceandbeganplanning for a rescueattempt at (JCS) puttogether considered as an option,however, thattime. It was not seriously untilthe thecollapseof direct with theIranians. negotiations following April,after of memoirs and official Because of thenumber documents thatare availa number ofdifferent that werepresentable, itis possibletoexamine arguments to hisdecision to go aheadwith ed to President Carter therescuemission. prior that willbe examined The mainperspectives arethoseespoused of bySecretary Advisor StateCyrusVance,National and presiBrzezinski, Security Zbigniew Hamilton Jordan. In theend, Secretary dentialassistant of StateCyrusVance overthisepisode,becausehe believed that themission couldnotwork resigned becauseit was too dangerous. and shouldbe pursued be substantively affected theory arguesthatchoicecan often Prospect by in theframing trivial and construction of availableoprelatively manipulations
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tions.Forexample, thereference andthepresentation coding helpsdefine point, of options of contingencies defines theuniverse that are considered. One notable rescuemission case is that each advisor aspectof theIranian historical to drewon different analogies makehis pointand presshis position. fordefining a frame the reference These analogiesoffered point,as well as individual advisors about coursesof actionin a given instructing appropriate situation. Such historical as Jervis analogiescan be quiteinfluential, suggests:
in international Whatone learnsfrom is an important factor in deterkeyevents history theimagesthat of incoming information. shapetheinterpretation mining ... a statesman Previous international events witha rangeof imaginable situations provide and allowhimto detect andcausal links that can helphimunderstand hisworld. patterns 1976) (Jervis,
In thiscase, each advisor, from a different foresaw a differworking script, entprobableoutcome based on his chosenhistorical In some sense, analogy. theseanalogiesoffered aboutthemostlikely outcome of events for predictions each advocate.Conclusions reached andthepoliciespromoted varied according to thesimilarities that each advisor saw between andpastevents. Therepresent to examine theseanalogiesand their advice to fore,it is important proponent's Carter. One advisorwhoseanalogiesaffected his advice to President Carter was of Vance State Vance. was to the rescue Secretary Cyrus adamantly opposed from both a military anda political The mission, seeingitas toorisky standpoint. to attempt final decision therescue was madebyCarter mission andhisprincipal advisorson April 11 in a meeting thattookplace without Vance(Brzezinski, his return from what involved 1985; Vance,1982;Carter, 1983). Upon everyone as a "well-earned" described Vanceexpressed shockandconcern that vacation, sucha momentous decision hadbeenmadewithout hisinput. As a result, another of theprincipals was calledon April15, at which timeSecretary Vance meeting his objections. At that outlined Vance: meeting,
out that we had madesubstantial in gaining alliedsupport foreffective pointed progress sanctions outfurther that theformation oftheMajlis,to which ... [I] pointed Khomeini overthehostage had given couldbe a major a functioning crisis, jurisdiction steptoward whomwe couldnegotiate with in Iran. . . Eveniftheraidweretechnically government the missionwas almostcertain to lead to a number of deathsamongthe successful, the Iranians. The onlyjustification in mymindfora rescue hostages,not to mention was that thedanger to thehostages was so great itoutweighed that therisks of a attempt to be thecase. military option.I did notbelievethat I reminded thegroup that eveniftherescuemission did free someof theembassy staff, theIranians couldsimply takemore from theAmerican stillin hostages among journalists We wouldthen be worseoff Tehran. than andthewholeregion wouldbe severely before, inflamed interests in thewholeregion wouldbe inflamed byouraction.Ournational by I saidthere ouraction.Finally, was a realchancethat we wouldforce theIranians into the armsof theSoviets.(Vance, 1983)
In spite ofVance'sobjections, thedecision togo aheadwith themission was reaffirmed. At thistime,Secretary Vancetendered his resignation to President
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who waitedto announce Vance'sdecisionuntil after therescuemission Carter, his decisionto resign as a matter of principle: had takenplace. Vanceexplains
in thepast,butaccepting I had disagreed with that menof forceful views policydecision totime, hadacquiesced wouldinevitably from time outofloyalty tothePresident disagree The decision I couldnotwinevery battle. to extract thehostages from knowing byforce thecenter of a cityof overfivemillion, morethansix thousand milesfrom theUnited overdifficult terrain was different: I was States,whichcould be reached onlyby flying was wrong andthat itcarried convinced thedecision risks for that thehostages and great forournational interests ... remain as Secretary of StatewhenI so strongly [I] knewthatI could not honorably went with a Presidential decision that as to what was best disagreed against my judgment forthecountry and forthehostages. Even ifthemission worked and I did not perfectly, believeit would,I wouldhaveto say afterward that I hadopposedit,givemyreasonfor criticize thePresident. Thatwouldbe intolerable forthePresiit, and publicly opposing I wouldhaveto resign dentand me. Thatday,I toldCarter ifthemission went forward. (Vance, 1983)
Vancewas closestto President Of all his advisors, both Carter, Secretary and ideologically (Sick, 1986; Carter, 1982). Indeed,bothVance's personally oftheinteraction accounts Vance'sresignation andCarter's arequite surrounding of thekindof tragedy and almostreminiscent associated witha failed moving It is thusparticularly love affair. thatPresident Carter decidedto significant override Vance'sarguments and pursue themilitary when he knewthat option to resign overit. Vanceobjectedstrongly enough thehostage Vanceargued crisisthat theUnited States Secretary throughout in order and negotiation shoulduse patience to gainthereleaseof thehostages His overriding concern was thelivesandsafety ofthehostages and,inthe safely. eventof the rescuemission,the lives of the American soldiersas well. He of mortality, framed in terms and everything was evaluated in terms of options that a particular actionwouldlead to thedeath thelikelihood of a human being. He also appeared to be more concerned aboutgaining andkeeping thesupport of allies thanother advisors. theEuropean In terms of theoptionspresented Vance'sthreshold forriskwas earlier, at the More first he wanted to do andwaitfor stage. really specifically, nothing in Iranto settle down.He believed situation theinternal that oncethis happened, the Iranians would no longerhave use forthe American and would hostages releasethem without additional from theU.S. From Vance's voluntarily pressure that to America do about the release anything might perspective, bring hostages' in themeantime couldonlyserveto further the Iranians and thus risk antagonize the of He also theultimate that action would safety hostages. thought military allies he had worked alienatetheEuropean so hardto reassure. He thussaw a rescue mission as unacceptably from both a risky political and military standpoint. It is significant to notethatthe AgnusWardincident was the historical whichVanceoperated. As Vancerecalls: analogyfrom
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McDermott thehostages would be released oncethey hadserved their that I also believed safely inIran. I found for this conclusion inwhat had intwo happened support purpose political caseswhere Americans were held were the Ward similar incident, hostage. They Agnus seizure ofour consular staff inMukden atthe endofWorld War the the II, and involving USS Pueblo. TheWard casehadmany similarities tothe seizure inIran, as is caseofthe clear from the memorandum ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaff toPresident Truman recommendtheuse of military force. I hadsent a copyof this memorandum to the ingagainst were taken. I was convinced as time the after thehostages President passed shortly tothe diminished. harm ofphysical chances (Vance, 1983) hostages
to support his viewthat Thus, Vanceused theWardand Puebloanalogies safeand be released unharmed as longas theUnited wouldremain thehostages in action, andwilling to negotiate. In other restrained Stateswas patient, words, thatthe new statusquo, while not optimal,was nonetheless Vance thought that as longas no one was killed.He feared American action would acceptable lead to theloss of lifeand thuswas notan advisablecourseof action.So, for that theUnited States tookwouldbe tomakea gainandnotto Vance,anyaction loss. a prevent was doomed to military, andthus Vancebelieved anyrescuemission politiof the risk of from the outset because to deaths, cal, failure high yethe refused cametrue.Rather, he was thefirst to offer Carter the gloatwhenhispredictions condolences the announcement of thefailedmission mostheartfelt following 1982). (Jordan, Vancehad held swayin mostof theearlyforeign of the policydecisions Carteradministration. of the However,he was not the only seniormember was equallyimportant Thereis team; Brzezinski decision-making politically. Brzezinski's was taken little doubt that Indeed, opinion quiteseriously byCarter. his importance to the president in quite compelling Gary Sick characterizes fashion:
ofCyrus Brzezinski wasthe antithesis Vance. very ... Thisrestless andpersistent offresh made Brzezinski a energy pursuit approaches natural alter Carter's activism. the two men were egotoJimmy Although psychologically different andnever became eachother in close, very really personally they complemented Carter wasdissatisfied with as they were andwasdetermined to very special ways. things usehisPresidency togenerate Brzezinski new ideas ata dazzling rate and change. sparked
refused to be constrained his strategies. Carter by thestatus quo in devising Although irreverent inventiveness that Brzezinski to anysubject.(Sick, 1986) brought
ofBrzezinski's more ideasthat heaccepted, heobviously valued the rejected probably
to GarySick, thereal shift in Carter's According policyallegiancefrom VancetoBrzezinski cameafter theSovietinvasion ofAfghanistan inlate1979.It is clear from Carter's statements thathe was deeplyshocked much-publicized and personally offended the Soviet by theSovietaction.Indeed,it was after invasion of Afghanistan thatVanceannounced that he wouldnotstayin office theelection. Itwas following this event that Carter's from beyond policy changed an emphasis on patience andnegotiation toonebasedmore on confrontation and at thistimefrom Indeed,a changein frame competition. gainsto lossesregard-
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inpolicyfrom in a noticeable resulted change appeaseingU.S.-Sovietrelations that thedecision thiscontext It was within abouttherescue ment to deterrence. mission was made (Sick, 1986). inthedecision toproceed with was a powerful force themission. Brzezinski Vance.His frame Brzezinski hadquitea different encomHowever, agendathan As Harold as well as thehostages' welfare. powerand prestige passednational of State forNear East and SouthAsia, notes, Saunders,Assistant Secretary was more concerned with national interest andhonor, while Cy "Zbig Brzezinski values" (Saunders,1985). In short, Vancewas the humane Vanceemphasized moreclassicalrealist idealist to Brzezinski's position. some kindof military rescuemission from favored theoutset, Brzezinski in therescue risks wereinvolved likeVance,he knewthat eventhough, military mission:
wouldbe unavoidable; in therescuemission casualties butwe also had My viewwas that that theattempt failaltogether. to face thepossibility (Brzezinski, 1982) might
was morewilling was thatBrzezinski to accepttheserisks The difference as more unavoidable Vanceandsaw them than (Brzezinski, 1985).His threshold of thecentral of riskon the list of optionswas thehighest decision-makers. far as to a raid he went so Indeed, Iran,in the military against support punitive Brzezinski was also the one who to faceofuniversal a began planfor opposition. two days after thefirst failure secondrescuemission, As (Brzezinski, 1985). was broader thelivesandsafety interest than Brzezinski's ofthehostages: noted,
I felt thequestion of thelivesof thehostages should that notbe ouronlyfocus In effect, as wellwhat needed to be doneto protect we should examine ourvitalinterests. I butthat at somepoint a choicebetween thetwomight was painfully awarethat evenhave perhaps to be made. (Brzezinski, 1985)
whophoned Brown on November 6 to gettheJCSto Indeed,it was Brzezinski Brzezinski was a rescue mission. the one who work on whether ornot questioned themissionshouldgo ahead withfivehelicopters after thehydraulic leak was in thecrucialsixthduring thecourseof therescuemissionitself. discovered on this event his into theconscious Indeed, commentary provides singular insight to influence a decision-maker: use of framing
I stoodin front to hisdeskwith ShouldI pressthepresident to go ahead mymind racing: with HereI was, alonewith thePresident. I couldconvince onlyfivehelicopters? Perhaps togo in a daring himto abandon stroke for thebigprize,totake military single prudence, thehistoric chance.And at thesametime,a contrary flashed thought through mymind: wouldI notbe abusingmyoffice thismanintosucha quickdecisionafter by pressing of meticulous WouldI notbe giving months intoa romantic idea? planning? I had decidedto urgegoingaheadwith fiveonlyifColonelBeckwith was prepared to do thefieldcommander's concurrence. it,butnotto pressforit without (Brzezinski, 1985)
In thissequence, Brzezinski demonstrates a conscious awareness ofan advisor's topersuade andmanipulate a decision-maker, evenone so powerful as the ability theframing of options. through president,
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that hada great on Carter's The evidence Brzezinski thinksuggests impact with to the rescue mission. the memo he wrote to the In regard hostage ing the before the after Carter much mission, approved president day demonstrating Brzezinski reluctance earlier, argued:
of thegame, we mustresign is done to changethenature In short, unlesssomething thesummer or even of thehostages to thecontinued ourselves throughout imprisonment thefate ofthefifty Americans andconsider we haveto think the later. However, beyond ofa protracted effects andinternational deleterious stalemate, frustration, growing public of theU.S. (Brzezinski, humiliation 1985)
a different from that Brzezinski started setofassumptions Thus,itis evident drastic that would worse without believed thanVance. Brzezinski get things the At the while Vance believed the American action, exactly opposite. meeting that argued following day,Brzezinski
as possible to attempt therescueas early becausethenights We ought aregetting shorter; consider backwith that we should we wouldhavebargaining us, so that taking prisoners as hostages; and that in theeventthat theIranians seizedother Americans we leverage strikein the event the rescue failed. should considera simultaneous retaliatory 1985) (Brzezinski,
Brzezinski was influenced to notethat It is interesting by a quitedifferent for Brzezinski's model the than Vance. rescue mission historical was the analogy a smaller American Israeliraid on Entebbe.One of thereasonshe supported force grewout of thisexperience: helicopter
thatthemissionshouldhave been composedof, say, Some have arguedsubsequently haddiscovered themission as a result butiftheIranians ofthe twiceas many helicopters; theirairspace,we all would have doubtless been size of the air armadapenetrating with American to go in hard with excessive redundancy, unwillingness charged typically theIsraelisdid at Entebbe. and lean-the way,forexample, (Brzezinski, 1985)
theoperational oftheplanning, Brzezinski was quite Indeed, during aspects with theBay ofPigs.He was careful tosteer awareofa secondpowerful analogy had madeat that that time.As Brzezinski clearof themistakes Carter Kennedy it: describes
John interference with themilitary discussed He andI hadearlier for Kennedy's planning and Carter was clearly to makecertain determined thathis theBay of Pigs operation, withthemission's chancesof success. (Brzezinski, did notinterfere concerns personal 1985)
indeedbecamequitea salient forCarter. The Bay of Pigs analogy analogy to Sick, According
within was widely John F. Kennedy for on criticized, circles, especially military insisting in theCuban MissileCrisisdownto themost civiliancontrol overmilitary operations it was due to his disastrous minute detail.[LaterSick notes:"presumably at experience to insist on civiliancontrol of every detail theBay of Pigs thatled President Kennedy Johnson was similarly forasserting criticized theCubanMissilecrisis."]Lyndon during in Vietnam. downto theunitlevelduring Carter Presidential control operations Jimmy to avoidtheseextremes. (Sick, 1985) consciously attempted
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Brzezinski's historical toCarter's conscious analogies mayhavecontributed oftheoperational for the rescue decision togivecontrol mission over tothe plans hurt for This have chances the success of the mission strategy may military. withthechainof command thatmight becauseproblems haveemerged earlier civiliancontrol didn'tbecome salientuntilthe execution withstricter of the is ironic mission itself. that Carter a (This analogy particularly given requested the of of debacle from Powell speechfollowing Bay Pigs copy Kennedy's Cody of therescuemission,in orderto help himprepare after the failure his own for the See Jordan, 1982.) public. speech advisorto Carter A third thehostage rescuemission, at during important on domestic because of his emphasis leastpartly was considerations, political advisor.His memoirs the presidential Hamilton seem to be the most Jordan, ofbookswritten candidoftheplethora administration byCarter psychologically For example,Jordan wrote of Brzezinski's officials. the comments, following whichVance raisedhis objections, that "Cy is the during April 15 meeting ultimate exampleof a good man who has been traumatized by his Vietnam was obviously madein reference to (Jordan, 1982). This comment experience" of thearmy and deputy Vance's servicebothas secretary of defense secretary war. theVietnam during is quiteopenabouthisanger In fact, Jordan at Vancefor notbelieving early would and for thattherescue also Carter in his timeof succeed, abandoning needafter ithadfailed.His bookseemslessaffected inthis greatest byhindsight, way,thantheothers. in terms of its impacton the reelection Jordan tendedto framethings He madearguments basedon howparticular actions wouldaffect the campaign. domestic Jordan's is interesting appeal and popularity. perspective president's in light ofBrzezinski's claimsthat domestic considerations wereirrelespecially thistime: evantto Carter during
there was never discussion of therelationship between anyexplicit Perhaps surprisingly, whatwe might do in Iranand domestic neither thePresident norhis political politics: of whether advisoreverdiscussedwithme thequestion one or another of our Iranian or worsedomestic wouldhave a better effect. (Brzezinski, 1985) options political
in theway bestexemplified lacks self-awareness This recollection by the becausehe hadnever ofthemanwhodidn'tlikeparties beento one where story In other forsomeone he wasn'tin attendance. to discount words,it is difficult of hisownpresence on a situation. fortheimpact No one mayhave sufficiently around Brzezinski aboutdomestic becausethey talked knewhe politics perhaps about the subject.Nonetheless, it is clear fromJordan's wasn't concerned thatthe reelection an insignificant memoirs concern campaignwas farfrom Carter's this on theroad given pledgenottocampaign during period, particularly because of thecrisis.
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his own hopesconcerning Jordan therescuemission as follows: presents

As I listenedto GeneralPustay'spresentation (on March24, 1980), I began to be convinced that itwouldwork. After months ofwaiting andhoping, and maybe negotiating herewas a way to go in and snatch ourpeopleup and havethewholedamned failing, whatit woulddo forthePresident over! Not to mention and thenation.It would thing andourpolitical tothecolumnists that Carter was notan indecisive Chief prove opponents Executive whohadfailed toact. Itwouldbolster a world that was increasingly community mission aboutAmerican wouldright thegreat doneto skeptical power.A daring wrong ourcountry and itscitizens.(Jordan, 1982)
Jordan's sentiments areparticularly notable for their on righting a emphasis to back or somehow to or restore the former status normal, wrong, trying get quo as theappropriate reference all of the point.Once again,thegoal of recouping and international losses in one great national, personal, daring gambleemerges as highly from both a as wellas a psychological appealing, political standpoint. This is exactly wouldpredict in sucha situation. whatprospect theory THE DECISION of course,was President The mostimportant Carter himdecision-maker, are not self. Carter's notable for memoirs, although containing diaryentries, It is oremotional their levelofcognitive evident introspection. painfully throughwas a manwhodeeply that Carter thepersonal burden out,however, experienced He emerges as a sincerely of his globalresponsibilities. kind moral, genuinely abilitieswere seriously and caringman whose leadership challenged by the faced. the of the crises he Given of the and enormity complexity problem, the Carter it is of that to understand howhe received, challenging diversity opinions he madeconcerning therescuemission. reached thedecisionthat intohowall theinformation and allowsan examination A framing analysis a situation that Carter faced President Carter. wereassimilated clearly by options thepresiof a deleterious theimpact militated effect;4 groupthink-type against that his advisors in light ofthedifferent frames can be examined dent'smindset of broader is assumedto includehis own perception His mindset presented. considerations. and geopolitical domestic wouldpredict in thedomain of losses,Carter would that, Theory Prospect return thesituation to theformer status gamblethat might opt fora risky quo.
see Irving Janis(1982), who describes effect, thephenomenon 4Formoreon the Groupthink of as a "quickandeasywaytorefer toa modeofthinking that groupthink peopleengagein when they aredeeply involved in a cohesive when themembers' for override their ingroup, strivings unanimity motivation torealistically alternative course ofaction"(p. 9). Thisclearly didn't appraise in happen theCarter as evidenced differences inopinions administration, bythedrastic espoused byVanceand The reasonsforthisare no doubtmany Brzezinski, butare certainly amongothers. due in part to animosities between these as wellas thepersonal deeplyheldpersonal of some participants, styles suchas Brzezinski, who did notshyawayfrom confrontation. participants,
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wheretheprobability of Such a riskygambleis characterized by a situation other that offered but the of the outcome successis lowerthan by utility options, Iftherescuemission hadbeena success,Carter wouldhavegained is higher. the ofhisalliesandadversaries, therespect andthevotesof releaseofthehostages, he couldhaverecouped In other all hislosses,andmade hisconstituency. words, available offered this some gainsas well. No other option possibility. Whatis surprising, was however, giventhe debateamonghis advisors, inthelikelihood oftheplan'ssuccess.Evenafter confidence themission Carter's in theApril24-25 diary on itsviability failed,he insisted entry:
seriesof mishaps-almost The cancellation of our missionwas caused by a strange The operation itself was well planned.The men werewell completely unpredictable. of success,becauseno Iranian We had every alarmwas raiseduntil trained. possibility ourpeopleleft Iran. (Carter, hoursafter twoor three 1982)
is surprising confidence because of the complexity Carter's and retrospective as low estimates of of the task as well the success offered the JCS enormity by to themission. At thispoint, Carter's and others confidence is a however, prior to his to issue becauseitclearly decision central ahead with helped promote go themission. both andmotivational, for this Thereareseveral reasons, cognitive possible a of it could have been classic of case From thecognitive confidence. point view, that think the which demonstrates of theconjunctive people probability fallacy, of a number thecombination of smaller that totalsuccessforan event requires thatany one of thoseeventsalone will thanthe likelihood eventsis greater is psychologically becausepeoplethink thepossucceed.Thisnotion appealing of different of a number is of one than things happening greater the sibility any fail all theevents that one of those of chance only occurring; things they torealize occur for the event to In events must succeed. in thecumulative larger sequence success is as as such a combination, only likely the least complete requiring if one link the entire chainfailsas well. is because That event. fails, likely a for theoverconThe conjunctive explanation fallacy provides compelling of shuttle in failure the of 1986, to the that led fidence space Challenger January In the Iranian Carter have that the number of for situation, may thought example. a higher ensured of success supplies probability contingency plansand back-up thesheer number ofcontingencies was realistic, that than hadto given especially to work. in order for the entire succeed plan is also reminiscent of Jervis's This typeof confidence thatan argument leadsto theavoidance of consistency often of valuetrade-offs. irrational pursuit As Jervis notes,
itis supported a policyusually believe that bymany logically indepen[P]eoplewhofavor to one value, he is likely dentreasons.Whena personbelievesa policycontributes to to several other italso contributes there is no reason believethat values,eventhough why in sucha neatand helpful manner. This wouldnotbe theworldshouldbe constructed if in orderto agree witha proposition a personhad to affirm a number irrational of
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Butoften conditions. theperson holdsa number ofbeliefs, eachofwhich would necessary tojustify his policypreference. be sufficient (Jervis, 1976)
This avoidanceof value trade-offs characterized the positionsof both Brzezinski andVanceas wellas Carter in thecase oftherescuemission in Iran. Vance believedthemissionwas likelyto fail,wouldalienate allies, European in moreAmerican inflame theIslamicworld,result and hostages beingtaken, throw theIranians intotheSovietcamp,although these viewswerenotlogically Brzezinski andCarter believed related. themission wouldsucceed, the engender however ofalliedandArableaders, wouldnotlead toSoviet subdued, gratitude, infiltration of thearea, and notharm other Americans in theregion. Other for confidence are moremotivational Carter's possibleexplanations in nature. One might be simple wishful Carter that thinking. mayhavebelieved themission wouldsucceedbecausehe wanted it to succeed.However, there is evidenceto refute thisview.Carter was awareof themilitary risksinvolved in to rescuethehostages because Vancehad objectedto the mission attempting of on the the of failure and lostlives. Given highprobability precisely grounds awareness oftherisks Carter's itis difficult to sustain an argument that involved, he believedit wouldsucceedsolelybecausehe wanted it to work. Another forconfidence in theplanafter thedecision was made explanation have had to do with This is similar to the that may justification. phenomenon indissonance occurs when the of the alternatives experiments, "spreading apart" makesthechosenoption muchmoreattractive than therejected one, no matter how close in value they wereevaluated to actual choice 1957; prior (Festinger, & Carlsmith, & Brehm,1976). In thisway,disso1959; Wicklund Festigner nancereduction worksto justify thesuperiority of thechosenoption after the decision.This helpsto reduce even after the decision has to regret, long proved be suboptimal. in thelikelihood Carter's belief ofthemission's success,even perseverance after itsfailure, is also highly reminiscent ofthefindings ofFestinger, Riecken, andSchacter et al., 1956).Theytellthestory ofa religious cultled by (Festigner a womanwhopreached and prepared all herfollowers fortheimminent end of theworld.Proselytizing forthegroup tookplace onlyafter theoriginal predictionshad failedto come true.Festinger, et al. suggested that suchpost-failure belief is generated tojustify all thecostsincurred inespousing theoriginal belief consensual forsuch system.Moreover, proselytizing provides reality testing beliefs. It is plausible to arguethat Carter was affectively motivated tobelievein thelikelihood of themission's even after itsfailure, in order to justify success, thelives lostin itspursuit. intheprobability Carter's confidence ofsuccessis important becauseitflies in thefaceoftheestimated both in terms of livesandmaterial risk, lost,as well as estimates ofthelikelihood that thehostages wouldbe released. Thisis impor-
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thanmoreobjecwhich was greater thisconfidence, tant becauseit is precisely of success,that allowedCarter to decideto go of thelikelihood tiveestimates He understood the risk,but had ahead witha missionhe knewto be risky. of restoring the becauseof thepossibility thatit was worth confidence taking status as reference former point. quo to assimilate and integrate the his decision,Carter In making attempted him his advisors. He not offered to have been had been that may by opinions ofthewayinwhich this advicewas skewed aware,however, bythewayinwhich from his own. domain differed of theoperative their assessments did not see himself Vance as beingso obviously ofprospect In terms theory, his statements, he did notthink that in thedomainof losses. As is clearfrom unless America took worse to would positive steps prevent getdrastically things As his earlier he believedthatas longas the thathappening. quotesindicate, anddidnotuse force, wouldresolve Stateswas patient United themselves things over time.Moreover, Vance did not see theentire in America'sbest interest did.Thus, as deteriorating inquitethesamewayas Brzezinski situation political were worse than had been before the whileVanceknew were they things hostages to and indeed he seemed have the "renormalized" hostage taken, accepted as a newstatus situation Brzezinski, Jordan, quo "reference point"ina waythat ofthings did not.Thismayhavebeenbecausehe thought in terms andCarter of totherescue he saw the liveslost,andsinceno liveshadbeenlostprior mission, neutral. Thushe was notprepared as stillbeingrelatively to takerisks, situation himself as in the of he did not see domain losses. because acting himself as confronting an entirely different Brzezinski situation. perceived and the to be in the of serious viewedhimself realm He clearly losses. country in terms of threats to national things Again, thismay be because he framed rather thanin terms of lives lost. The UnitedStateswas and honor, prestige ina worsesituation tothese valuesthan ithadbeenbefore the according certainly weretaken.Thus,in a classiccase of loss aversion, he did notassimihostages or easily.Rather, Brzezinski was prepared late his losses quickly to takegreat to theformer status risksto return America'sstanding quo and to increase by aboutthereleaseof thehostages.He believedthatthesituation was bringing worseunlessAmerica tookdrastic boundto get significantly actionto prevent deterioration Brzezinski further Vance's right away.As a result, argued against Brzezinski believedthemission wouldsucceed,albeit Moreover, predictions. withcasualties:
of therescueplan by Brown,Jones, A verycomprehensive review and myself in midMarchled me to theconclusions that theplanhad a reasonably goodchanceof success, wouldprobably be casualties.. there though theadmittedly butincreasingly feasible rescuemission [W]e could undertake risky ... Withthepassageof time, we wereall becoming moreconfident that kinks were possible of success was increasbeing workedout of the rescueplan and thatthe probability 1982) ing . . . (Brzezinski,
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Brzezinski andtookissuewith almost all agreedwith By and large,Carter to Vance's objections on April 15, of Vance's concerns. Indeed,in response Carter replied:
welfare. Butmyobligation and am notunconcerned abouttheir is to those I understand . who represent me, you,and ourcountry! hostages, . . of thereaction to therescuemission.It if works, I disagreewithyourassessment our willbreathe a sighofrelief that it'soverandthat all overtheworld friends won'thave they The Moslemcountries further sanctions. to impose for maymakea fewpublicstatements butyouknowas wellas I do that thesakeofIslamicunity, Khomeini they despiseandfear at himbehind his back. (Jordan, and will be snickering 1982)
was also in therealmof losses,although notto thesameextent Carter as was really ofthehostages, concern thesafety Brzezinski. Carter's more primary ofAmerica. than theinternational Carter described this Indeed, prestige goal ina 10: of November diaryentry
no loss ofAmerican We want ittobe quick,incisive, lives,notinvolve surgical, anyother of theIranian minimal to increase their reliance on suffering country, peoplethemselves, sureof successand unpredictable. (Carter, 1982) imports,
theseas hisbasicgoals throughout thecrisis, Carter therescue and,in fact, kept mission cameclosertomeeting these goalsthan specific anyoftheother options. hiscomments that It is clearfrom Carter's thehostages goal was tobring explicit Thisis atleastpart theIranians. ofthereason therescue home,nottopunish why eventhough morerisky in terms of probability of success,was chosen mission, overtheother suchas mining theharbor orlaunching a punitive military options, In fact,Carter's threshold of riskon theearlier strike. listof options was at the level of therescuemissionitself.He was a man who found theuse of force to do something to freethehostages. He feltpressure he However, repugnant. himself to engagein an act of warsuchas mining could notbring theharbors, ifitwoulddo little to directly aboutthereleaseofthehostages. especially bring madea decisionon April11, following thefinal Thus,Carter collapseof on April 1, to proceedwitha rescuemission he believedwould negotiations succeedin releasing thehostages without theIslamic allies,inflaming alienating Iran into the Soviet or in the of world, pushing camp, resulting taking additional American In other he took a he to be words, hostages. gamble understood in order to a chance at losses and remilitarily risky grab recouping previous the earlier status establishing quo.
Riskiness ofChosen Option

The relative riskiness of undertaking therescuemission is bestevaluated relative to theother considered atthetime.Theseinclude thediplomatic options and military discussedabove. By April,almostall political, economic options and diplomatic sanctions on theIranian possiblehad beenunilaterally imposed
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Iranian andstudents bytheU.S. Theseincluded expelling diplomats government from an theU.S.; breaking on all exrelations; diplomatic imposing embargo for the shah but never material, delivered; including by weaponspaid ported financial Iranianassets in the U.S.; and making transactions in Iran freezing in order to U.S. the from there. citizens, including press, illegal prevent traveling Fromthestart, Carter believed that should be military options only pursued to the hostages'lives, if, forexample,the threat if therewas an immediate on trial andcondemned as threatened, or ifall negotiatIranians them, putthem This of in channels failed. failure is fact what occurred in April negotiations ing of 1980. At thattime,therescuemissionwas theoptionthatoffered thegreatest of all losses and to the status returning prospect recouping previous quo that before thehostages hadbeentaken in November. It was understood existed that a rescuemissionwerehigh,especially the politicalrisksof undertaking if it as mentioned, Brzezinski andCarter failed.However, felt that was doingnothing the evenmorerisky criticisms of especially given widespread politically, presithat werefloating around dential thepressat thetime.Everyone incompetence a successful mission couldredeem all losses.However, believed that thepolitical to assess in advance.Unfortunately, riskof a failedmissionwas difficult the of events outcome a failedmission could be: proved just how politically risky thehostages weredispersed losttheelection; Carter all overIranandnotreleased ninemonths; and America'sinternational foranother stature diminished even further. itis clearfrom From a military theprincipals' memoirs that the perspective, tobe theriskiest was understood rescuemission that was seriously considoption of likelihood of success,as well as in terms of lives and ered,bothin terms material that could be lost. The military itself knewofthehighrisks itwas undertaking inplanning the rescuemission. on themission states that"the Indeed,theJCS report explicitly was a highriskoperation. rescuemission werecalledon Peopleand equipment to perform at the upperlimitsof humancapacity and equipment capability" of (U.S. DefenseDept., 1980).Indeed,Admiral Holloway judgedthelikelihood successto havebeen about60% to 70% (Ryan,1985). Hamilton Jordan tellsa story abouta query from theJCS'sGeneral Jones-to the man who eventually CharlesBeckwith, led the mission,at the outsetof was askedtheprobability Beckwith of successandtherisks involved; planning. he responded," of successis zeroandtherisks are 'Sir,' I said, 'theprobability 1982). high.'" (Jordan, the confidence of the principals in the However,as mentioned earlier, successof therescuemission increased after thedecision was made.Evenafter Brownratestheprobability themission of successas highas failed,Secretary that themission 70%, arguing was well-planned (Jordan, 1982).
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that to note,however, theintelligence estimates of success It is interesting by the military may have been lowerthanunderstood planners. Salingerdeon March 16 that scribesan alleged CIA report Turner given to Stansfield forrescuemission successas follows: evaluated theprospects
ofloss among theAmembassy eachofthefive 6. The estimated during percent hostages majorphaseswas: (a) Entry/Staging Assumesno loss of cover :0%
:20% (b) Initialassault loss of thoseunder StateFSR and FSS coverand others Assumes. . . immediate :25% (c) Location/Identification Loss of Statepersonnel beforefullsuppression of resistance Problem accentuated since Amembassy notcollocated hostage to RH-53D's :15% (d) Evacuation insideand outside Assumesloss from and from AT snipers, Amembassy compound, and Apersmines. to C-130s (e) Transfer-RH-53s of sitesecurity Assumemaintenance : 0%
7. The estimate of loss rateof 60% fortheAmembassy thebest hostages represents estimate of CA and M & P staff. 8. It is presumed to be equallylikelythat theAmembassy rescueattempt wouldbe a success(100% of theAmembassy as itwouldbe a complete rescued), hostages complete failure rescued) (0% of theAmembassy hostages 9. Of specialnoteis thefactthatno analogouslarge-scale rescueattempts havebeen mounted in heavily urban areaswithin hostile thepast 15 years. populated territory during similar The onlyroughly (Son Toy-Nov. 1970; Mayaguez-May 1975; Enattempts ruralareas of hostileterritory tebbe-July 1976) were all made in lightly populated (Salinger,1981).
The story of thissupposedly secret was originally leakedto George report Wilsonat theWashington Post in August1980butwas denied CarlucbyFrank of theCIA. According director to Jody ci, thendeputy Powell,Carlucci'srein the sponseto Wilsonwas as follows:"I have been unableto findanything document that is either accurate or which CIA memoalleged approximates any Wilsonrefused to print randum we prepared." thestory, buta similar one was Anderson Jack several months later (Powell, 1984). by published theweekafter a Timereport therescuemission stated that However,
have adamantly officials deniedreports in Washington of a CIA estimate that Pentagon 60% of the53 hostages wouldprobably havebeenkilledin therescue ButTime attempt. has learned that initial estimates onceranas high as 200 fatalities, both casualty including and rescuers. The final envision thepossibility oflosingfrom hostages plandid, indeed, 15 to 20 hostages.(Time,May 12, 1980)
or nottheCIA document Whether was a forgery, thequestion of historical is albeit in a different context. The fact ofthe analogy againhighlighted, slightly matter is that rescueraidshavea highhistorical (base rate)failure rate;theIran
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an almost classicalexample of therepresentativeness rescuemission mayoffer where rates were base in light in foreign underestimated of a heuristic policy, that notable case was Entebbe, successful case. In thisinstance salient a rescue it tookplace in quitea different terrain. raid whichwas successful, although rescue the historical track In thecase ofAmerican record is dismal attempts, which atbest.The Son Toyraidon a Vietnamese included prisoner-of-war camp, in theIranmission, who laterparticipated failedbecausetheprisoners soldiers location to thearrival of therescueteam.The had been movedto another prior whotooknineIsraeliathletes the 1972 raidon thePalestinians hostages during all in the deaths of the and five resulted of the Munich hostages Olympics rightintheMayaguez The 39 hostages incident wereindeed but freed, wingterrorists. itappears that their releasewas underway to the rescue mission.5 Even so, prior thatmission cost thelives of 41 American and wounded another 50. soldiers, Another similar oftheHammelburg raidto release case, that relatively prisoners of war in Germany World War was successful as well II during onlypartly becausefighting withGerman forces to the raid was subsequent heavy. andMogadishu as relative In fact, Entebbe stand inthehistory anomalies of of missions, bothfortheir successandtheir thesekinds lackof casualties: three werekilledat Entebbe; and one Israeliofficer andthree terrorists were hostages in Somalia. The keyto boththesesuccessful killedby theWestGermans raids with a relatively was totalsurprise combined isolated areaof attack. In spiteof Entebbe was the thecritical for most differences, operative geographical analogy intheIranian oftheprincipals involved rescue mission et (Christopheral., 1953; Time,May 5, 1980; Ryan,1985). THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION of thedecision to rescue The actualoutcome thehostages in Iranhighlights ofthehugemilitary risk that thereality was involved intheundertaking. Indeed, of theoverwhelming the is a critical of assessment of complexity plan part any in thedecisionto undertake theriskinvolved therescuemission. The rescueattempt, codenamed Operation Eagle Claw (theplanning phase was called Rice Bowl), was a highly complexundertaking (Ryan, 1985; U.S. Defense RH-53Dhelicopters tobe launched Dept., 1980).Theplanwas for eight theaircraft carrier Nimitz from theArabian off sea andfly 600 milestoa landing as DesertOne, neara town field calledTabas.Thesehelicopters had designated to flyunder totalradiosilenceat a low altitude to avoidIranian radar detection, and verylimited inertial usingonlyvisualnavigation, guidance.At thedesignated wereto meet with sixC-130transport were site,thehelicopters planesthat
to Robert Jervis forclarification on thespecifics of thismission. 5Jam grateful
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MasirahIsland,off thecoastof Oman.ThreeC-130scarried to flyin from the of about 120 the other three carried force fuel for the assault men; helicopters. theC-130sweretorefuel thehelicopters, After transfer thespecial meeting, andreturn tobase. The helicopters mentothem, werethen tofly on to operations of Tehran, in thehillsabout100 milessoutheast another location calledDesert theday untilthesurprise Two, wherethemenweregoingto hide out during which was planned for on theembassy, thefollowing Local sympaattack night. to the embassy. thizers had arranged After the ground transportation ground on theembassy, thehelicopters weregoingtopickup thesoldiers attack andthe from acrossthestreet theembassy at a stadium them toa hostages compound, fly at Manzariyeh, and flythem out of thecountry abandoned on airfield, nearby there. Each phasewas timed wereto meetthem to coincide. C-141s that to be risky, bothin terms ofthe Everystageoftheplanwas acknowledged of livesand material of success,as well as thelikelihood lost. The probability the aircraft intothe country initialphase of inserting without detection was of therescueteamto be themostdifficult considered by members aspectof the 1982). The advancedstagesof theplan nevercame to fruition plan (Jordan, at DesertOne because therewere too few because the missionwas aborted of themission. to carry outtherest Planners themission helicopters judgedthat of six helicopters in orderto complete the task; eight requireda minimum wereconsidered redundant for thesuccessof byall to be sufficiently helicopters thisnumber themission. to be inadequate andthemission was However, proved becauseonlyfiveoperational aborted reached DesertOne. helicopters thedecision to abort themission, theaccident that resulted in the Following American A helicopter casualties occurred. was refueling forthereturn flight, of sand,and accidentally kickedup a blinding amount flewintothenose of a C-130 and instantly werebadlyburned, exploded.Eightmenwerekilled,four andtherestwerequickly six three with sensitive evacuated, leaving helicopters, classified on theground for theIranians tofind. The Iranian material, policelater bombedthesehelicopters and tookpictures of them forpropaganda purposes. Evidencesuggests, that theIranians werenotawareof theattempted however, or of itsfailure, until informed of it by theCarter administration at I mission, a.m. Washington timeon April26 (Carter, 1982). CONCLUSIONS of therescuemissionin Iranin Aprilof 1980 was a tragedy The failure whosefailure on theprinciple decision-makers involved in its weighed heavily and execution. While Carter not have believed that the costs planning may associated with themission werehigh, he was wrong The failure of objectively. therescuemission did makethings worseforhim.Froma political standpoint,
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valuable inthepressfor costCarter thefailure political capital.He was criticized a well as for not movefrom as the making stronger military inadequate planning, made failure of the mission the more start. Moreover, anysubsequent attempt to releasethehostages andreaffirmed In short, Carter's difficult. his planfailed of From a more domestic the image impotence. personal perspective, growing soldierswas particularly difficult forPresident deathof the eightAmerican issuedon April In a statement Carter full Carter. 26, President accepted responsifor the bility episode:
theoperation was certain and I knew, that to be dangerous. We Our rescueteamknew, were all convinced thatif and whentherescuephase of theoperation had been comchanceof success.Theywereall volunteers; wereall menced,it had an excellent they . . . (Carter and Trimble, trained. 1989) highly
mission inIranwas madeduring toundertake therescue Thedecision a time is for the Carter administration. there no of extreme Indeed, question difficulty a domain ofloss for theadministration ingeneral ittookplaceduring andfor that This was trueon botha domestic and on an international in particular. Carter was a severe blowtoAmerican ofthehostages level.The taking power, prestige, scene.The lackofalliedandU.N. support on theinternational andcredibility for an insult. was considered Carter was sanctions an Moreover, facing increasingly at home.In a classicexample arduous reelection of operating in the campaign to lose in launching therescue domainof losses, it seemedthathe had little to gain shouldit succeed. In fact,had the mission missionand everything becauseitis easilyconceivable lookquitedifferent that succeeded, might history on thecrest of popularity couldhavewonreelection that wouldcertainly Carter sucha courageous have followed rescue,successfully completed. The choice of therescuemissionwas indeedtheriskiest military option interms Thisis true both oflikelihood ofsuccessas wellas considered. seriously of personnel and material costs. Othermilitary in terms optionswere uniebecausethey offered little ofsuccessfor rejected byCarter quivocally probability and involved overt actsof war.Nevertheless, thehostages Carter felt releasing he had to do something to return thehostages home. that can see that Ex postfacto,an analyst thebestoption had beenoffered by Vance. The hostages werereleasedessentially unharmed Secretary by theIrano longer served nianswhenthey Once therevolutionary anyfunction. governwereallowedto leave,although was secure,thehostages ment there mayhave involved in releasing themonlya fewminutes been some otherfactors after thepresident. was no longer Carter Carter was clearly unHowever, officially In somesense,Carter factors. other received the"right" awareofthese adviceto do nothing-from and takethemore Vance;he choseto ignore it,however, of therescuemission as risky, he risky military option.Even ifhe didn'tthink itwas morerisky than knewthat other that wereavailable to objectively options carried him.He knew themission coststhan theother it greater potential options;
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also promised benefits. In thissense,he tookthegamble in an attempt to greater win theprize. itwas difficult for thecrisis, toassessthe anyoftheparticipants Throughout risks.This was especiallythe case because balance of politicaland military national and international riskswereoften as inversely related as were political risks. it is clear that and Carter made a riskNonetheless, military political He had other choices that were both less choice. like militarily risky, seeking or less like additional the indirect harbors, risky, seeking politically mining he tooktheone gamble channels. that offered a However, negotiating diplomatic all the losses he had previously sustained to regainthe chance of recouping would certainly former statusquo. Had he succeeded,the payoff have been of success was the the and mission failed. low, However, probability great. such as not have Whileother offered the same negotiating, may options, potenmorelikely, and moreprofitable, in theend. tialpayoff, they proved is perfectly consistent This finding based on with,and even predictable, which makes little Moreover, theory. prospect theory insight provides prospect no other a structural would sensefrom such Indeed, perspective. theory predict in a bad situation. to his inclinations behavior the use of risky Contrary against a military mission ordered to rescuethehostages. Carter He saw himself force, and tooka seemingly a bad situation irrational to confronting gamblein order his losses and the status Thus the failed of rescue the regain previous quo. recoup inIranprovides a superb illustration oftheoperation ofprospect hostages theory in theinternational realm. REFERENCES
rescue mission. NewYork Times Brzezinski, (1982). The failed Zbigniew Magazine,April18,p. 2842. New York:Farrar, and Giroux. Brzezinski, (1985) Powerand principle. Strauss, Zbigniew communication. Brzezinski, (1990). Personal Zbigniew Carter, (1982). Keeping Jimmy faith.New York:Bantam. E. & Trimble P. (1989). International law casebook,forthcoming. Carter, Barry Warren et al. (1985). American Christopher, hostagesin Iran. New Haven,CT: Yale University Press. S. (1956). When MN: L., Riecken,H. W., & Schachter, Festinger, prophecy fails. Minneapolis, of Minnesota Press. University Leon (1957). A theory dissonance. CA: Stanford Press. Festinger, Stanford, ofcognitive University Leon & Carlsmith, M. (1959). Cognitive on forced Journal Festinger, consequences compliance. of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203-211. Boston:Houghton Janis, Mifflin (1982). Groupthink. Irving Company. Robert and misperception in international NJ:PrinceJervis, (1976). Perception politics.Princeton, tonUniversity Press. Hamilton Jordan, (1982). Crisis.New York:Putnam. Daniel& Tversky, A. (1984). Values, choicesandframes. American Kahneman, Psychologist, April. New YorkTimes,June 25, 1979, p. 1.
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et. al. (1984-5), Vitalstatistics on Congress,194-5. Washington, Norman American Ornstein, forPublicPolicyResearch 84. Institute Enterprise and Company, Inc. side of thestory. New York:WilliamMorrow Powell,Jody (1984). The other MD: NavalInstitute Press. Ryan,Paul (1985). TheIranianrescuemission. Annapolis, New York:Doubleday heldhostage.Garden andCompany. Pierre (1981). American Salinger, City, of theend. In Warren et al., American Harold(1985). Beginning in Saunders, hostages Christopher Press. Iran. New Haven,Ct: Yale University In Warren andconstraints. etal., American Sick,Gary(1985). Military hostages Christopher options in Iran. New Haven,Ct: Yale University Press. Books. Sick, Gary(1986). Allfall down.New York:Penguin Personal communication Sick, Gary, by phone,July1990. of thedecade.New York Times,April15. Sick, Gary(1991). The election story Time,April14, 1980. Time,May 5, 1980. Time,May 12, 1980. U.S. DefenseDepartment. (1980). The rescuemission report, August. Typescript. Vance,Cyrus(1983). Hard choices.New York:Simonand Schuster. Wicklund & Brehm, J.Perspective on cognitive dissonance. Hillsdale,NJ:Erlbaum.

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Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission Author(s): Rose McDermott Reviewed work(s): Source:

PoliticalPsychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992

in International Relations: Theory Prospect The IranianHostageRescueMission

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his own hopesconcerning Jordan therescuemission as follows: presents

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