DAMAGES IN DOG-BITE AND OTHER ANIMAL-RELATED LITIGATION Joan Schaffner 1

Introduction Classification of Damages Compensatory Damages Loss to the Animal Loss to the Owner Economic Property Loss Common Law Statutory Law Noneconomic Loss Common Law Property Loss Personal Loss Statutes Animals Covered Conduct Establishing Liability Damages Allowed Exemptions Punitive Damages

Associate Professor of Law, George Wshington University Law School, Director, Animal Law Program. May 2013. A version of this paper will be published in the Mid-Atlantic Lyceum.

Introduction Damages in dog-bite and other animal-related private-law litigation may involve personal injury to humans caused by animals as well as injury to animals caused by other animals or humans. The situations that may give rise to such cases are far-ranging. Dogs may injure humans, or may get into a fight with another dog or cat and injure or kill them. There are a seemingly endless variety of cases where humans harm animals. They range from the most heinous cases of a person deliberately and maliciously killing an animal, to the pet food manufacturer that markets tainted food and kills thousands of animals, to the police officer who shoots a dog without cause, to the veterinarian who negligently treats an animal causing injury or death to the animal, to the shelter worker who accidentally places a dog on the kill list in the shelter, killing the dog before their owner is able to reclaim him. These are just a few examples of the variety of cases that result in injury or death to a human or animal and for which the wrongdoer may be held liable for damages. The law regarding damages for the injury caused by animals to humans, including physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, or death, is no different than any other case in which a human is injured by the tortious conduct of another. However, the law regarding damages for the injury or death to an animal is in flux, controversial, and of specific interest in the area of animal law. Animals are deemed personal property under the law of every state and this classification dictates the damages available. Some states limit the value of an animal to their fair market value, others allow for veterinary expenses that exceed the animals fair market value whether the animal is injured or killed. Some jurisdictions allow for the actual value to the owner, which may include sentimental or intrinsic value of the animal, while others may allow for the owners emotional distress or punitive damages if the animal is killed by the intentional act of another. Determining the proper damages to be awarded for the injury or death of an animal under the law is important both to provide proper compensation to the owner for their loss and to provide the proper incentive for persons to act with care to avoid harming animals. The following will discuss the various types of damages that may be awarded for the injury or death to an animal. Classification of Damages Fundamentally, damages are classified by two characteristics: their inherent nature and the functions they serve. First, the inherent nature of damages may be classified as either economic or noneconomic. Economic damages are damages that may be objectively measured in monetary termsfor example the fair market value of an animal, breeding potential, and the cost for veterinarian services or special training of the animal. Noneconomic damages are damages that are intangible and thus not easily measured in monetary termsfor example damages for emotional distress, pain and suffering, lost companionship or to punish. Second, damages are designed to serve two functionscompensation and punishment. 2
A third function, restitution, is not specifically discussed here as they are not directly relevant to the debate over the proper damages for the loss of a companion animal. Restitutionary damages are designed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant resulting from their wrongful conduct. Thus for example, if a defendant wrongfully took a show dog from the owner and received money from showing the dog, the owner could recover not only the dog but the profits defendant received from showing the dog. The focus of this article is on the proper compensation for the loss of an animal who is injured or killed by the defendant. In such a situation the defendant,
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Compensatory damages are the most common function for damages in a civil suit and are designed to compensate individuals for their loss and to regulate behavior by establishing the proper level of incentive to avoid harm. Compensatory damages are calculated based on the value of the loss to the injured partieshere, the owner and the animal. The level of incentive to comply with the law, for example to act reasonably under the tort system, is a function of the compensatory damages for which the alleged wrongdoer will be held responsible if found liable. The level of culpability of the wrongdoer is irrelevant to the measurement of compensatory damages. Compensatory damages may be economic or noneconomic in nature. Punitive damages generally are allowed only when the wrongdoer acted with malice. The purpose of punitive damages is to deter egregious conduct and punish the wrongdoer. Thus punitive damages are calculated based on an evaluation of the level of culpability of the wrongdoer and what amount is necessary to serve the goals of deterrence and punishment for this defendant and others. Thus, punitive damages are noneconomic in nature. Compensatory Damages Loss to the Animal The animal does not have separate standing under the law to seek damages thus no court has allowed recovery for the animals pain and suffering. For example, in Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assoc. Animal Hospital, 785 N.E.2d 811 (Oh. Ct. App. 2003), Poopis owners took her to the vet to have her teeth cleaned, however, while under anesthesia, the vet tried to spay her although she had already been spayed as a puppy. Poopis owners sought recovery for Poopis own emotional distress of being wrongfully spayed twice. The court stated succinctly: Although Poopi was obviously directly involved in the incident, a dog cannot recover for emotional distressor indeed for any other direct claims of which we are aware. We recognize that animals can and do suffer pain or distress, but the evidentiary problems with such issues are obvious. As a result, the claims on Poopis behalf were . . . not viable. Id. at 814. Loss to the Owner Economic Property Loss Common Law The owner may recover the property loss of their animal which traditionally is the fair market value (FMV), if any, and some special or pecuniary [economic] value to the owner, that may be ascertained by reference to the dogs usefulness and services of the dog. 3 If the animal is injured, the recovery is the difference between the FMV before and after the harm or the costs to repair, e.g. veterinary costs. Generally, the recovery for injury to the pet is the cost of veterinary treatment. Courts also may award the veterinary costs and cost of cremation or burial when the animal is killed. Some courts, however, limit the total amount of the recovery to the animals FMV. 4 Courts have recognized
generally, will not have gained financially from their wrongful conduct and thus restitution is not relevant. 3 Petco v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tx app.-Austin 2004) (citing Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex. 1891)). 4 See e.g. Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1985); Nichols v. Sukaro

that limiting recovery to FMV generally provides minimal compensation because most pets have little or no market value. There are, of course, cases where the animal is economically valuable. For example, if the animal is pedigreed and/or used to breed, or the animal provides special services to a disabled owner, the economic loss is considerable and recoverable if properly supported with evidence of such loss. Further, a consequential loss to the owner may include the lost income likely to have been received by the owner from the animal. It is difficult to establish potential future earnings from the animal, however, evidence of past income received and demonstration of the likelihood of continued income may suffice. In the case of animals used for breeding, courts generally refuse to compensate for the loss of future progeny as too speculative but may include the animals breeding potential in the valuation of the lost animal. Other losses that may be recoverable include reimbursement for money spent on the animal for training, micro-chipping, or other similar expense. Additional consequential damages that an owner may incur include the costs for searching for the animal and caring for the animal, including lost wages or hired home care. For example, in Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368 (Tx app.-Houston (1st Dist.) 1994), the defendant shot a dalmation and Australian shepherd, owned by the Hamels. Both dogs were relatively young, two and three years old, respectively, purebred, and registered with reputable clubs. The Hamels introduced evidence that they had purchased the dogs with the intent to breed them, they had already picked out a male for the Australian shepherd, the dogs could be expected to breed once per year and produce six to eight puppies, and the market price for the puppies. In this case the dogs had not yet been bred. The court allowed the introduction of the evidence to assess the value of the two dogs themselves but disallowed recovery for prospective progeny. The court upheld the trial courts damage award of $1825 as legally and factually sufficient. In Petco v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554 (Tx app.-Austin 2004), Licorice, a 14-month-old miniature schnauzer, slipped her leash and ran away from a Petco employee who had taken her out for a bathroom break during her grooming, and was ultimately killed in traffic. The owner recovered the replacement value (FMV) of Licorice ($500), her expenses to send Licorice to training school ($892), and for microchip implantation ($52.40). The court denied Schuster lost wages she incurred while searching for Licorice ($857.68) stating that such damages are recoverable only for personal injury claims not for damage to property. Statutes States with statutes providing for damages for the injury or death of a pet or companion animal may limit recovery to economic damages. For example, in Maryland, Md. Code Cts. and Jud. Proc. 11110 governs damages for the injury or death of a pet. The statute defines pet as a domesticated animal but excludes livestock and allows for compensatory damages when another tortiously causes an injury or death to a pet. The statute defines compensatory damages for the death of a pet as the fair market value of the pet before death and the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care and for injury to the pet as the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care. The statute limits compensatory damages to $7500. Virginia, on the other hand, defines all dogs and cats as personal property and allows recovery for the value thereof or the damage done thereto in an appropriate action at law . . . . Va. Code 3.2-6585. Nevada expressly disallows recovery for punitive or other noneconomic damages for the injury or death
Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 61 A.L.R.5th 883 (Iowa 1996); Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).

of an animal. Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.740. Noneconomic Loss Common Law Property Loss Most jurisdictions refuse to include noneconomic damages as a component of the animals intrinsic value. However, a few jurisdictions recognize the sentimental or intrinsic value of the animal to the owner based on the special bond and companionship shared between the animal and the owner. 5 Such recognition generally is consistent with the jurisdictions property damage scheme whereby they recognize the sentimental or intrinsic value of certain types of property, such as heirlooms, when such property otherwise has no market value. On April 5, 2013, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Fort Worth appellate courts decision in Medlen v. Strickland, 353 S.W.3d 576 (Ct App. Tex-Ft Worth 2011) awarding the plaintiff the intrinsic companionship value of Avery, their dog. Strickland v. Medlen, 2013 WL 1366033 (Tex.). The Fort Worth court reviewed 120 years of Texas case law since the Texas Supreme Court case of Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931 (Tex. 1891) in which the court noted that dogs were of a special value to the owner that exceeded market value. The Medlen court stated that such special value may be derived from the attachment that an owner feels for his pet. 353 S.W.3d at 580. The court explained that to allow intrinsic value for inanimate property such as heirlooms but not for sentient companion property is illogical and held that the special value of mans best friend should be protected. Id. at 581. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed and held that the human-animal bond, while undeniable, is uncompensable, no matter how it is conceived in litigationas a measure of property damages . . . as a personal-injury claim for loss of companionship or emotional distress, or any other theory. 2013 WL 1366033 at *10. Other courts, agreeing with the Restatement (Second) of Torts 911, comment e (1965) that market value is an insufficient measure of damages for the loss of a pet, have awarded actual value to the owner, noting that such value may include noneconomic value. 6 Personal Loss A few courts allow the owner to recover for their own emotional injury caused by the loss of their pet under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress while virtually all jurisdictions decline to
Adam P. Karp in Cause of Action for Loss of or Injury to Animal by an Animal, 38 COA2d 281 (Updated March 2013) presents select representative awards made and settlements reached in litigation in Washington State to recover for the injury or death of an animal by an animal. Westerhold v. Costa, King Cy. Dist. Ct. No. 45-6392 (Feb. 7, 2005, Linde, J.) (accepting claims for loss of companionship, intrinsic value depreciation, and emotional distress resulting from dog attack on dog in the sum of over $15,000); Roemer v. Gray, King Cy. Dist. Ct. No. 45-9514 (May 2, 2005, Linde, J.) (default judgment, $45,480.12 for $30,000 intrinsic value/loss of use, $15,000 emotional distress for killing of plaintiff's cat by defendant's dog); Hane v. James, King Cy. Sup. Ct. No. 05-2-31243- KNT (July 10, 2006, Darvas, J.) (allowing intrinsic value and loss of use); Long v. Lewis, King Cy. Dist. Ct. No. 6502476 (Nov. 20, 2006, Linde, J.) (allowing intrinsic value and loss of use in case of cat killed by two dogs; settled for $6,500); Zauper v. Lababit, Kitsap Cy. Sup. Ct. No. 06-2-01591-8 (Nov. 20, 2006, Haberly, J) (default judgment, $75,501.09 for $50,000 intrinsic value/loss of use and $25,000 emotional distress for killing of plaintiff's cat by defendant's dog); Van de Ven v. Hardt, Whatcom Cy. Sup. Ct. No. 05-2-02686-0 (July 21, 2006, Daniel Warner, arbitrator) (awarding $6,700 for value of cat killed by dog). 6 See e.g. Anzalone v. Kragness, 826 N.E.2d 472, 478-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
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award damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 7 This is so because such claims typically are available only for the loss of a close human family member and/or when the plaintiff was within the zone of danger. Note that damages for emotional distress or lost companionship here are sought under claims for personal-injury, e.g. negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress and not under a claim for property loss. Claims for emotional distress are of recent vintage and controversial even when compensating for human injury. Historically courts denied recovery for emotional distress when the plaintiff suffered no physical injury. In 1948 the Restatement (2d) of Torts first recognized the separate tort for the intentional infliction of emotional distress which is characterized by outrage, conduct that is intolerable in a civil society and that results in severe emotional injury that no reasonable person would be expected to endure. Several jurisdictions have allowed recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 8 For example, in the Florida case of Knowles Animal Hospital v. Wills, 360 So.2d 37 (Fla. App. 1978), following an operation, the dog was severely burned after being left unattended on a heating pad for well over 24 hours. The dog ultimately was euthanized. The court awarded Wills $13,000 finding proof that the hospital displayed great indifference to the property of the plaintiff. Id. at 38-39. For less outrageous conduct the owner must base their claim on negligent infliction of emotional distress which is quite limited as it generally requires that the plaintiff, as bystander, be within the zone of danger and witness the injury or death of a human family member. Courts generally do not allow for the recovery of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 9 One state, Illinois, allows for recovery of
See generally M. Zitter, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Due to Treatment of Pets and Animals, 91 A.L.R.5th 545, (2012) (collecting cases). 8 Amicus Curiae Brief of the No Kill Advocacy Center in Support of Respondents Kathryn and Jeremy Medlen, Strickland v. Medlen, No. 12-0047 (Texas, Jan. 13, 2013) (citing Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 546 (Wa. Ct. App. 2006) ([W]e hold malicious injury to a pet can support a claim for, and be considered a factor in measuring a persons emotional distress damages.); Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 812-13 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming award of compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress for conversion and slaughter of plaintiffs horses); Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for killing pet); Richardson, 705 P.2d at 456 (recognizing cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for killing pet); Peloquin v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 367 So.2d 1246, 1251 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (damages for destruction of plaintiffs cat include awards for mental anguish, humiliation, etc., as well as special and/or actual damages); Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (awarding damages for plaintiffs shock, mental anguish and despondency due to wrongful destruction and loss of [her] dogs body); Banasczek v. Kowalski, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 94, 97 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1979) (we think the more enlightened view is to allow recovery for emotional distress in the instance of the malicious destruction of a pet); La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So.2d 267, 267-69 (Fla. 1964) (we feel that the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing and that the malicious destruction of a pet provides an element of damage for which the owner should recover, irrespective of the [market] value of the animal). see also Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (Simply because a claim involves an animal does not preclude a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.); Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 311 (Alaska 2001) (acknowledging a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for the intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal); Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276,1277 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (permitting claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on defendants shooting of plaintiffs donkey); Thompson v. Lied Animal Shelter, 2009 WL 3303733, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2009) (noting claim for the value of the dog plus damages for emotional harm and permitting claim to proceed based on professional negligence)). 9 Amicus Curiae Brief of the No Kill Advocacy Center in Support of Respondents Kathryn and Jeremy Medlen, Strickland v. Medlen, No. 12-0047 (Texas, Jan. 13, 2013) (citing McMahon v. Craig, 176 Cal.App.4th
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emotional distress via statute. 10 Nevertheless, even if courts refuse to award damages for emotional distress they may recognize the special value that companion animals provide to their owners. 11 Last year the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly addressed this issue in McDougall v. Lamm, 211 N.J. 203, 48 A.3d 312 (N.J. 2012) holding that while an owner may recover the intrinsic value of their pet as property, they would not allow recovery for emotional distress caused by observing the traumatic death of their pet. In McDougall, Angel, a 9-year old maltipoo was killed by defendants dog. McDougall was walking with Angel when the Lamms large dog ran out from their house, grabbed Angel by the neck, and shook her several times
1502, 1509-1517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress claim in veterinary context); Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 629 S.E.2d 181, 186-87 (Va. 2006) (rejecting claim for emotional distress of automobile-accident victim due to concern over dog in vehicle at the time and noting that Virginia unlike Texasbars sentimental-value damages for the loss of any property including family heirlooms); Myers v. City of Hartford, 853 A.2d 621, 626 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (rejecting claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress); Kennedy v. Byas, 867 So.2d 1195, 1197-98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding pet owner may not recover emotional-distress damages for veterinary malpractice, but expressly distinguishing case from those involving malicious conduct towards pet); Pacher v. Invisible Fence of Dayton, 798 N.E.2d 1121, 1125-26 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting claim for emotional distress due to injury to property, but holding no intentional misconduct was demonstrated and expressly permitting recovery of veterinary expenses (presumably more than the pets market value)); Ammon, 113 S.W.3d at 187-88 (rejecting existence of loss-of-consortium claim, but expressly holding that [s]imply because a claim involves an animal does not preclude a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress) (emphasis added); Lockett v. Hill, 51 P.3d 5, 6-8 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (denying claim for emotional-distress damages because plaintiff presented no duty other than negligence upon which to attach such damages, and noting that plaintiff had already been awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages for negligence in mauling of pet cat); Holbrook v. Stansell, 562 S.E.2d 731, 733 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a person cannot recover for emotional distress from merely witnessing damage to another persons property) (emphasis added);; Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1144-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding public policy bars negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of companionship for pet, but noting facts did not present issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (noting Michigan never permits damages for emotional injuries allegedly suffered as a consequence of property damage); Rowbotham v. Maher, 658 A.2d 912, 913 (R.I. 1995) (holding statute did not permit emotional trauma damages and rejecting claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Soucek v. Banham, 503 N.W.2d 153, 163-64 (Min. Ct. App. 1993) (no proof of negligent infliction of emotional distress and expressly not reaching intentional infliction of emotional distress). 10 See infra section entitled State Statutes Allowing Recovery for Noneconomic Damages. 11 Amicus Curiae Brief of the No Kill Advocacy Center in Support of Respondents Kathryn and Jeremy Medlen, Strickland v. Medlen, No. 12-0047 (Texas, Jan. 13, 2013) (citing Naples v. Miller, No. 08C-01-093, 2009 WL 1163504, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2009) (rejecting claim for veterinary expenses and pain and suffering to owner, but expressly noting that actual value to owner might be recoverable for the loss of beloved pet), affd, 992 A.2d 1237 (Del. 2010); Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286, 1288-89 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that plaintiff only advanced claims for emotional distress and loss of companionship and society, and expressly not reaching whether emotional-distress damages may be recovered by persons who suffer the loss of a companion animal); Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 801-04 (Wis. 2001) (barring negligent infliction of emotional distress claim for loss of property but holding that plaintiff failed to prove elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and expressly not reaching issue of valuation of pet as property); Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Iowa 1996) (rejecting emotional-distress and intrinsic-value damages in pet-injury case, but expressly noting that no willful conduct was alleged and that injured dogs value as a pet was not diminished); Wright v. Edison, 619 S.W.2d 797, 801-02 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (not involving any claim for emotional-distress damages or sentimental value of pet; holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate pet cats future nervousness as a result of being locked in a room while on vacation).

before dropping her and returning to his yard. McDougall testified that she paid $200 for Angel as a puppy and that to replace Angel with a new puppy would cost approximately $1400. She argued however, that limiting damages to replacement value would not properly compensate her given the close bond she had formed with Angel over the years. She described Angel as friendly, lively, energetic dog who loved children, was highly trained, and who was with her much of the time as she worked at home. The court agreed and awarded McDougall $5,000 recognizing the intrinsic value of Angel. The court expressly stated that pets are not fungible and analogized them to property that has special subjective value to their owners, much like heirlooms and family treasures. The court however refused to recognize a claim for emotional distress based on McDougall witnessing the traumatic death of Angel. McDougall argued that companion animals should be recognized as more than property as they are a close, loved member of the family and as such bystander liability should be extended to cover this situation. The Court refused to extend bystander liability for witnessing the death of a pet as prior cases have narrowly applied such liability to cases in which the bystander shared a close familial relationship or intimate, marital like bond with another human explaining that such an extension would elevate the loss of pets to a status that exceeds the loss of all but a few human beings. Finally, while most cases of companion animals involve dogs or cats, courts have recognized that humans may have a companionship relationship with other species of animals as well. In Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286 (Mass. App. 2002), the Krasneckys sought recovery of emotional distress damages for the killing of their companion sheep by the neighbors dog. Although rejecting the claims for emotional distress, the court accepted the owners characterization of the sheep as companions quoting from Tannenbaums Veterinary Ethics which defines companion animal as any nonhuman animal involved with one or more human beings in a relationship that is at the very least a continuous, bidirectional relationship . . . that brings a significant benefit to a central aspect of the lives of each, which is in some sense voluntary, and in which each party treats the other not just as something entitled to respect and benefit in its own right, but also as an object of admiration, trust, devotion, or love. Statutes In recent years, at least two states have enacted statutes that expressly allow for noneconomic damages for the loss of a pet. The basic elements of these statutes are: definition of pet or companion animal; conduct establishing liability; the damages allowed; and exemptions from liability. The statutes of Illinois, 70/16.3, and Tennessee, 44-17-403, are briefly summarized below. Animals Covered The statutes first establish which animals are covered for purposes of recovery. Tennessee allows recovery only for a pet defined as any domesticated dog or cat normally maintained in or near the household of its owner. Interestingly, Illinois allows recovery for any animal to which a person has a right of ownership, neither limiting the owners utility of the animal to that of companionship nor the species to dog or cat. Conduct Establishing Liability Illinois limits liability to a person who engages in an act of aggravated cruelty as defined under the criminal code or killed by a person acting in bad faith. Under Tennessees statute a person may

recover when their pet . . . is killed or sustains injuries that result in death caused by the unlawful and intentional, or negligent, act of another or the animal of another. However, in the case of negligence, the animal must have suffered the death or injury while on the property of her owner or under the control and supervision of her owner. Damages Allowed Each of these states allows economic and noneconomic damages within certain limits. Economic damages allowed include expenses for veterinary care, the fair monetary value of the companion animal, . . . burial expenses and other expenses incurred by the owner in rectifying the effects of the cruelty, pain and suffering of the animal. In Illinois, noneconomic damages include emotional distress suffered by the owner. Tennessee limits noneconomic damages to compensate for the loss of the reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection of the pet to five thousand dollars. Exemptions The state may also exempt certain actors from specific types of damages. Negligent veterinarians and not-for-profit entities and government agencies while acting on behalf of public health or animal welfare are exempt from liability for noneconomic damages in Tennessee. Punitive Damages Some jurisdictions have awarded punitive damages when a defendant intentionally kills a companion animal. 12 For example, in Propes v. Griffith, in a rural community in Missouri, Mrs. Griffith found her neighbors two dogs on her property near her sheep although there was no sign that they were chasing or otherwise harming her sheep. Mrs. Griffith refused an offer to take the dogs to animal control and instead shopped around for a veterinarian who would destroy the two dogs, lied to the veterinarian about her ownership of the dogs, and never notified the Propes that she had the dogs or had them killed. The court found clear and convincing proof of malicious conduct and awarded the Propes $4000 in punitive damages in addition to actual damages of $2000. 13 Some states via statute expressly allow recovery of punitive damages in limited circumstances. 14 Connecticut allows recovery for punitive damages for the intentional killing of a companion animal; Conn Stat. 22-351a; and Illinois allows recovery for punitive damages between $500 and $25000 for the killing of any animal if the defendant acted with bad faith or engaged in acts of aggravated cruelty or torture. Ill Stat 70/163. Veterinarians in Connecticut are exempt from punitive damages and attorneys fees while following accepted standards of practice of the profession. Moreover, state actors and animal-related nonprofits are similarly exempt from liability for punitive damages and attorneys fees. California provides For wrongful injuries to animals . . . committed willfully or by gross negligence, in disregard of humanity, exemplary damages may be given. Cal. Civil Code 3340.

See Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d at 812-13 (affirming award of compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress for conversion and slaughter of plaintiffs horses);La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964) (affirming an award that included punitive damages). 13 Propes v. Griffith, 25 S.W.3d 544, 546-47, 550-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 14 See infra section entitled State Statutes Allowing Recovery for Noneconomic Damages.

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