1AC

Advantage 1 is Terrorism
Comparative studies prove that indefinite detention increases the motivation for terrorism and the likelihood of an attack. Roberts, Associate Professor of Philosophy at East Carolina University, 11
*Rodney, Utilitarianism and the Morality of Indefinite Detention, Criminal Justice Ethics, Vol. 30, No. 1, RSR]
Finally, there

is no evidence that preventive detention works . Comparative studies of terrorism

stretching back more than 20 years have concluded that draconian measures* such as prolonged detention without trial*are not proven to reduce violence, and can actually be counterproductive . 30 Since it may contribute to the underlying factors [that] are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement, namely, injustice and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness, there is a sense in which indefinite detention can be selfdefeating*it may increase the likelihood of future attacks .31

The threat of terrorism is a politicized concept used to spur social action Egerton, 2009 ( Frazer received his Ph.D. from the Department of International Politics, University of
Wales, Aberystwyth. His most recent publications are 'The Internet and Militant Jihadism: Global to Local Reimaginings', in A. Karatzogianni (ed.) Cyber Conflict and Global Politics , London: Routledge (2008) and (with Nicholas J. Wheeler) 'Precious' commitment or a failure in action: the responsibility to protect after the 2005 UN World Summit, Global Responsibility to Protect 1 (1): 2009 , A Case for a Critical Approach to Terrorism https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=a801bad751&view=lg&msg=129ae8ffac17829a ) Terrorism is a word that solicits many definitions. Schmid and Jongman (1988) note that even two decades ago there were at least 109 different definitions of terrorism. There are certain to be far more today. Moreover, it inspires such strong emotions that some (Sayyid, 2003) question its use while others (Smyth, 2007) do so only with disclaimers. I do not share the same degree of apprehension here any more than I do with the wealth of concepts whose meaning is contested and usage is political. Terrorism is a strategy aimed at producing terror among a population who are not directly engaged in violence with the aim of securing political ends. It should be clear from this definition that the study of terrorism that focuses on the narrow world of state security, threatened and secured through the use of force, is wholly inadequate. No
convincing defence can be offered for viewing terrorism as the preserve of any one actor. Nor is a sole focus on military practices appropriate.

The reciprocal bombing of innocent populations is only one form of terrorism. Other acts that must also be categorised as terrorism would include global economic practices that condemn populations to a life marked by desperate poverty, predatory state policies that treat citizens as dispensable spoils of office and violent and masculinist 'cultural' rituals and practices. Many more examples might be added.

Their impact claims of war and conflict are not objective they are produced by the specific history of the observer and the drive for state security
David Grondin 2004 (Masters in Political Science and Ph.D. Candidate University of Ottawa, (Re)Writing the National Security State, Center for United States Studies, p. 12-17)

Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as national security have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, *+ it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the real world, a world that only exists in the analysts own narratives. In this light, Barry Posens political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security
conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. *+ Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peac e and order in the commons

[d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. *+ Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as the state is a rational unitary actor, the state is the main actor in international relations, states pursue power defined as a national interest, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derians genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot refer to the essentially contested nature of realism and then use realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations):
(Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, *+ the rejection of a correspon dence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere relativism and/or to endless deconstruction in wh ich anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neu tral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality

. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech

acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that coconstitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what
distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sen se, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of national security. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the Cold War. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the reality of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as reality. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical const ruction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state appar atus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it make *it+ any less real or less significant for being rhetorical (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dange rs as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a national security state.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term national security state designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology the discourse that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to

A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined Americas national identity by reference to the un-American other, usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge it would have amounted to an act of disloyalty (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes
grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the new national security ideology. It posits an American way, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state tha t was shaped as much by the countrys democratic political

I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still
culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which to say is to do, that is, from a perspec tive that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, *+ the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was a complex space where various representations and representatives of t he national security state compete to draw the boundaries and

security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious national unity on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence a power socially constructed, following Max Webers work on the ethic of responsibility to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the unified Self, the national
dominate the murkier margins of international relations (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War

society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the states very conditions of existence are generated18.

The process of security leads to unending violence and wars against populations of created threats Duschinski 2009 Assistant Prof of Sociology and Anthropology, Ohio University (Haley, Destiny
Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley. Anthropological Quarterly, Volume 82, Number 3, Summer 2009, Project MUSE) Patterns of war emerging in particular local worlds are tied to larger transformations in political-military economies of violence operating on a global scale (Lutz and Nonini 2000:79). The expansion of neoliberal market capitalism since World War II has fed the growth of permanent war economies while also creating large surplus populations that are considered peripheral to the workings of capitalist economies. "State armies, multilateral armed forces (IFOR, the United Nations), private armies, militarized police, and parasitical militias have come to wage a systematic form of 'low intensity warfare,' often against stigmatized populations 'outside the grids' of global capitalist activity and superfluous to labor, [End Page 693] capital, and consumption markets" (Lutz and Nonini 2000:78). These interlinked processes of neoliberalism and privatization, ethnic and racial discrimination, and jingoism and militarism have led to the proliferation of infinite and indefinite wars that consolidate collectively imagined national communities at the same time that they violently exclude certain categories of people from participation in the life of the nation. As Victoria Sanford argues, national security states are based, not on the outwardly focused defense of national territory, but rather on a national security ideology that " is grounded in the recourse of coercion and has no room for the participation or consent of civil society" (2003:394-395). Through such ideological work, national security states erase the everyday realities of violence and power their shadow zones and sensitive peripheries in the name of national integrity and cohesion and in the interest of wartime profit.This state practice of carving out differential patterns of citizenship through the waging of perpetual warfare leads to a blurring of boundaries between "crimes of war" and "crimes of peace," producing a continuum of violence that scales from the routine violence of everyday social spaces, such as emergency rooms, court rooms, prisons, detention centers, and schools, to the spectacular violence of hot zones, such as border clashes, ethnic conflicts, and frontiers in the global war on terror (ScheperHughes 2002, 2008). These sites of exclusion and concentration provide for the encapsulation and confinement of those forms of political life that have been stripped of rights, cast into a "zone of social abandonment" (Biehl 2005), and subjected to the brutal violence of the state. Such conceptual tools enable us to move past distinctions between " the exception" and "the rule" and examine patterns of militarization that define forms of social suffering for communities living in various domains of threat and "legitimate" destruction: marginalized peasants cast as indigenous rebels in the Oaxaca and Chiapas regions of contemporary Mexico (Stephen 2000); Latino communities cast as drug runners and illegal immigrants along the US-Mexican border (Nagengast 2002); foreign nationals cast as enemy combatants in US military prisons in the War on Terror (Feldman 2005); Catholic nationalist women cast as paramilitary insurgents in the prisons of Belfast (Aretxaga 1997); Black youth cast as criminals in post-Apartheid South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006); and Puerto Rican men cast as gang members in the barrios of East Harlem (Bourgois 2002). Comparative ethnographies of the political and

juridical [End Page 694] conditions that similarly delimit possibilities of life in these and other heavily militarized zones leads to a better understanding of "how dominant representations of the dangerous, the subversive, the worthless, the marginal, and the unimportant become linked to making particular groups of people susceptible to violence abuses that allow them to be treated with less than human respect and dignity" (Stephen 2000:823).

Advantage 2 is Torture
Now is key to set the global standard for human rights protection Suzanne Nossel 12 is executive director of Amnesty International USA, "Time for a Reset on Human
Rights," 11-7-12, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/07/time_for_a_reset_on_human_rights?page=0,1, DOA: 722-13, Y2K In 2008, Barack Obama's election thrilled many human rights activists. For eight years under George W. Bush, the U.S. government had used torture, held hundreds in long-term detention without trial , and committed abuses at
wartime prisons such as Iraq's Abu Ghraib. Rights advocates hoped -- and, based on many of Obama's election-season remarks, reasonably expected -- that the unlawful renditions,

Although Obama faced truculent political opposition in his first term, his weak record on human rights cannot be explained away by economic exigencies or even congressional defiance. Obama now openly
secret prisons, and unfair trials would give way to a new American commitment the Constitution and international law.

embraces

the concept of

a global "war on terror" as grounds to override

international

human rights norms and

reinterpret the Constitution. Osama Bin Laden's killing was not only the chief talking point of his campaign but a synecdoche for his approach to the terrorist threat, one in which the administration writes its own rules. Although preventing attacks on U.S. soil represents an important human rights victory, this should not overshadow the worrisome direction of U.S. human rights policy and its long-term consequences.

If the president's legacy is to include reclaiming U.S. human rights credibility, he needs to face up to his troubling record, and fix it. The Obama administration has led in

some areas of human rights policy; examples include advancing gay and lesbian rights, bolstering U.N. human rights mechanisms, and promoting Internet freedom . But where human rights norms are pitted against counterterrorism tactics, it has fallen down . Blocked by Congress, Obama broke
his first-term promise to close Guantnamo. Four years later, that failure barely seems to register as a disappointment; 167 men languish in the prison, including 55 who are cleared for release but have not been transferred. Recent weeks have revealed details of an Orwellian "disposition matrix" -- a kill list of top terrorist targets that keeps getting longer. The administration claims the authority to kill those named, anytime and anywhere, based on secret information and unreviewable judgments. The administration has declared any man killed by a drone to be an enemy terrorist, and defends such killings regardless of resulting civilian casualties. With the U.S. withdrawing from Afghanistan, these extraordinary powers are detached from any major battlefield or conventional war. The administration is now backed into claiming that a war exists because it has convinced itself it cannot function without a broad license to kill. Short of al Qaeda suing for peace, this war may never end. The administration's reshaping of the concept of war risks undoing over 100 years of evolution of the laws of war, and the protections those laws have delivered.

The next four years will define whether this rewriting of the rules becomes a bipartisan "new normal" in the United States, and implicit permission for the rest of the world to sidestep human rights . Absent swift progress to close Guantnamo, the

men now held will likely die there of old age decades from now, since no future president is likely to renew Obama's ill-fated pledge to close the facility.
And even if the Guantnamo detainees are transferred to a U.S. prison, bringing indefinite detention onshore, it is hard to fathom the practice will not be used again to deal with future threats. The bipartisan affirmation of drone use will make those weapons routine for the United States and any other government with a kill list of its own.

US is key to global human rights protection---indefinite detention undermines US credibility. William F. Schulz 9 is Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, "The Future of Human Rights:
Restoring Americas Leadership," www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/10918.pdf, DOA: 723-13, y2k What has been far more problematic over the last few years than random disparities between domestic and international interpretations of human rights law has been a fundamental disparagement of the authority of the international community itself.
Such depreciation started early: in 2000 Condoleezza Rice, then foreign policy advisor to candidate George W. Bush, wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine, Foreign policy i n a Republican administrationwill proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory i nternational community *emphasis added+. Over the past seven years the U.S. has repeatedly demonstrated its contempt for that allegedly chimerical community by doing such thin gs as unsigning the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC); declaring the Geneva Conventions inapplicable to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and other so-called unlawful combatants; ignoring UN findings and resolutions in the run-up to the Iraq War; or refusing to stand for election to the UN Human Rights Council.

The consequences have been

devastating for the reputations both of the U.S . , which has seen its favorability ratings drop

precipitously around the world,5 and , paradoxically, of human rights themselves . The U.S. has long prided itself on being a champion of human rights and with much good reason. We would have had no
Universal Declaration of Human Rights had it not been for Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt; the U.S. pushed hard for the civil rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords, thereby contributing to the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe; the U.S. judicial system with its wide array of due process protections has been a model emulated by newly emerging countries around the world; U.S. diplomats have frequently intervened on behalf of political dissidents; the Kosovo War was spearheaded by an American commitment to prevent ethnic cleansing; and the annual State Department human rights reports have long been an invaluable resource to the cause of human rights. The current U.S. administrations

for the most powerful nation in the world, long looked to as a model of human rights virtue, to undermine the international system
commitment to battling HIV/AIDS in Africa and its outspokenness on Darfur are consistent with this tradition. But

itself the very framework upon which human rights are predicated is to cause immeasurable damage
to the struggle for liberty. Backtracking on our commitments to international treaties and norms in the name of defending human rights is not just ironic. One of the consequences of the Iraq War with its latter-day human rights rationale and of the War on Terror with its oft-stated goals of defending freedom and the rule of law is that

human rights to be conflated with, fairly or not, in the words of the critic David Rieff, the official ideology of American empire,6 only exacerbates the customary suspicion in which human rights have been held by some in the developing world who see them as a guise for the imposition of Western values. The truth is
human rights themselves have come to be identified with Americas worldwide ambitions. For

that if human rights and the U.S.s pursuit of them are discredited , American interests are put in
peril. Reserving the option to torture prisoners, denying them habeas corpus, sending them

into black site prisonsall this makes it harder to defend America against the charge of hypocrisy; t he claim that we are carrying out a war in defense of the rule of law by abandoning that very rule. Such a charge hands fodder for recruitment to our adversaries and makes the world less safe for Americans. No country can claim protection for its own citizens overseas (be they soldiers taken as prisoners, nationals charged with crimes, or corporations faced with extortion) if it fails to respect international norms at home. Global relations are based in good part on reciprocity . Nor can the U.S. offer effective objection to the human rights violations of others if it is guilty of those same violations itself or has shunned cooperation with international allies . No nation, no matter how powerful, can successfully pursue improvements in human rights around the world independent of the international community. Unilateral sanctions imposed upon a country to protest human rights
abuses will inevitably fail if they lack the support of others

Prisoners in Guantanamo Bay undertook a hunger strike to protest indefinite detention and torture. The guards are torturing and dehumanizing the prisoners by force-feeding them while they are strapped into a chair. Worthington 2013 (Andy, From Guantnamo, Hunger Striker Abdelhadi Faraj Describes the Agony
of Force-Feeding July 18th. http://www.worldcantwait.net/index.php/torture/8320-from-guantanamohunger-striker-abdelhadi-faraj-describes-the-agony-of-force-feeding) Although Ive been very busy for the last few months with a steady stream of articles about Guantnamo and the ongoing hunger strike, I havent been able to keep track of everything that has been made available. In terms of publicity, this is an improvement on the years before the hunger strike reminded the worlds media about the ongoing existence of the prison, when stories about Guantnamo often slowed to the merest of trickles, and everyone involved in campaigning to close the prison and to represent the men still held there was, I think it is fair to say, becoming despondent and exhausted. However, it is also profoundly depressing that it took a prison-wide hunger strike to wake people up to the ongoing injustice of Guantnamo, where 86 cleared men are still held (cleared for release in January 2010 by President Obamas inter-agency Guantnamo Review Task Force), and 80 others are, for the most part, held indefinitely without charge or trial. And it is just as depressing to note that, despite making a powerful speech eight weeks ago, and promising to resume releasing prisoners,

President Obama has so far failed to release anyone. With Ramadan underway, there has been a slight dip in the total number of prisoners on the hunger strike 80, according to the US military, down from 106, although there has been a slight increase in the number of prisoners being force-fed from 45 to 46. Yesterday, a judge turned down a motion submitted on behalf of three prisoners Shaker Aamer, the last British resident, and Ahmed Belbacha and Nabil Hadjarab, two Algerians asking the court to order the government to stop force-feeding prisoners, and giving them medication without their consent, following a similar ruling last week in the case of another prisoner, Abu Wael Dhiab, a Syrian. All four are hunger strikers, and amongst the 86 men cleared for release but still held. In last weeks ruling, Judge Gladys Kessler (a Bill Clinton appointee) did not seem entirely happy that judges in the court of appeals had tied her hands regarding jurisdiction over the prisoners, because of a previous ruling in 2009. She also acknowledged that medical authorities describe force-feeding as torture , and made a point of telling President Obama that he has the authority and power to deal with the hunger strike, and the force-feeding, as Commander in Chief. Yesterday, however, Judge Rosemary Collyer (a George W. Bush appointee) had no interest in criticizing anyone but the prisoners and their lawyers. In her opinion, she wrote that, although the prisoners had framed their motion as one intended to stop force-feeding, their real complaint is that the United States is not allowing them to commit suicide by starvation. She added, The right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments does not include a right to commit suicide and a right to assistance in doing so. She also wrote that there was nothing so shocking or inhumane in the treatment that it could be regarded as raising a constitutional concern. In response, Jon Eisenberg, one of the prisoners lawyers, said Judge Collyer was wrong to claim that the prisoners were demanding a right to commit suicide, as the Associated Press described it. She has misunderstood the purpose of the hunger strike. Its not to commit suicide, its to protest indefinite detention, Eisenberg said, adding that her opinion regarding force-feeding that it was not inhumane was not backed up by experts. Human rights advocates, medical ethicists and religious leaders say otherwise, he said. Judge Collyers ruling and her dismissive attitude to the force-feeding reminded me of a letter by Abdelhadi Faraj (aka Abdulhadi Faraj), another Syrian prisoner, which was published two weeks ago in the Huffington Post. Mr. Faraj (originally identified by the authorities as Abu Omar al-Hamawe) is one of the 86 men cleared for release but still held, and is in need of a new home because of the perilous situation in Syria. Moreover, he is one of four men captured together, who were all cleared for release, although only one of them was freed a man named Maasoum Mouhammed, who was given a new home in Bulgaria in May 2010. He is also one of the hunger strikers, and, moreover, is one of the 46 men being force-fed.

Torture is a systematic oppression that kills agency and value to life. Its a technique of perpetual dying. Wolfgang 1999 (German Philosopher, Anthropologist- professor at Universities of Gottingen & Erfurt.
[Sofsky, "The endurance of impotence: The dynamics of persecutory violence," International Psychoanalysis Newsletter,) The prisoners will be incarcerated or put into camps and, not rarely, are there subjected to torture. As a method of punitive and loyal justice, torture has a long prehistory which goes back to the early tyrannies. However, in the 20th century, torture has been systematized as a means of national persecution terror and been handed over to special units of the police, the military or the militia. Its executors have invented a multitude of new methods and have freed torture from the aims of finding the truth. Contrary to a widely held view, torture is not a means to extort confessions, information or proofs. Whatever may be declared the official aim, torture is not an instrument of interrogation, for the ultimate aim of torture is not to get the victim to talk but rather to silence him. The model of the duel, of a trial of strength of the will, is a bagatellization. Torture eliminates action and breaks the person

through pain, panic and isolation. The victim is totally in the hands of the perpetrator and is at the mercy of his whims, rage, lust and destructive will. Any part of his body, any of his attitudes or stirrings can be used as a point of attack for the tormentors. Torture transforms the person into an organism, into a living piece of flesh. It tests physical reactions, generates pain and forces the tortured one to scream His insides are turned outwards, his language stifled in pain. The tortured person no longer experiences his body as a source of his own force for action. In the frenzy of pain, his own body itself becomes his enemy. It is his body which confronts him with the suffering from which he cannot escape, however much he grits his teeth. The mortal enemy is within himself, rages in his inside and destroys the final resistance. Torture is by no means restricted to external wounds. It splits the person through the centre into two parts. Since the victim's body becomes the accomplice of the torture, it destroys the somatic relation to himself and with it the foundation of his will, his speech, his soul, his psyche. Torture, therefore, is not a technique of killing but of perpetual dying. What torture is on a small scale, the concentration camp is on a large scale. It is not the sudden death which contains the meaning of this institution but the continuous presence of the torment. The camp is the central institution of persecutory terror in the 20th century. It serves the imprisonment of political enemies less than the transformation and extinction of those who are redundant. In the midst of society and set into a complex mesh of political and economical institutions, the concentration camp is a cosmos at the border of the social world, a universum of unparalleled destructivity

Dehumanization brings society to total damnation. The concentration camp is the brutal aftermath of this oppression. Fasching 1993 Professor of Religious Studies in the University of South Florida [Darrell J., Part II of
The ethical challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia?, Chapter 4 "The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima to Technological Utopianism", part 4 "The Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: From Sacred Morality to Alienation and Ethics", Ebooks] Although every culture is inherently utopian in its potentiality, the internal social dynamic through which its symbolic world-view is maintained as a sacred order has a tendency to transform it into a closed ideological universe (in Karl Mannheim's sense of the ideological; namely, a world-view that promises change while actually reinforcing the status quo) that tends to define human identity in terms advantageous to some and at the expense of others. Historically the process of dehumanization has typically begun by redefining the other as, by nature, less than human. So the Nazis did to the Jews, and European Americans did to the Native Americans, men have done to women, and whites to blacks. By relegating these social definitions to the realm of nature they are removed from the realm of choice and ethical reflection. Hence those in the superior categories need feel no responsibility toward those in the inferior categories. It is simply a matter of recognizing reality. Those who are the objects of such definitions find themselves robbed of their humanity. They are defined by and confined to the present horizon of culture and their place in it, which seeks to rob them of their utopian capacity for theonomous self-transcending self-definition. The cosmicization of social identities is inevitably legitimated by sacred narratives, whether religious or secular-scientific (e.g., the Nazi biological myth of Aryan racial superiority), which dehumanize not only the victims but also the victors. For to create such a demonic social order the victors must deny not only the humanity of the other who is treated as totally alien but also their own humanity as well. That is, to imprison the alien in his or her enforced subhuman identity (an identity that attempts to deny the victim the possibility of self-transcendence) the victor must imprison himself or herself in this same world as it has been defined and deny his or her own self-transcendence as well. The bureaucratic process that appears historically with the advent of urbanization increases the demonic potential of this process, especially the modern state bureaucracy

organized around the use of the most efficient techniques to control every area of human activity. The result is, as Rubenstein reminds us, the society of total domination in which virtually nothing is sacred, not even human life. The heart of such a bureaucratic social order is the sacralization of professional roles within the bureaucratic structure such that technical experts completely identify themselves with their roles as experts in the use of techniques while totally surrendering the question of what those technical skills will be used for to the expertise of those above them in the bureaucratic hierarchy. It is no accident that the two cultures that drew the world into the cataclysm of World War II, Germany and Japan, were militaristic cultures, cultures that prized and valued the militaristic ideal of the unquestioningly obedient warrior. In these nations, the state and bureaucratic order became one and the same. As Lewis Mumford has argued, the army as an invention of urban civilization is a near-perfect social embodiment of the ideal of the machine. 37 The army brings mechanical order to near perfection in its bureaucratic structure, where human beings are stripped of their freedom to choose and question and where each individual soldier becomes an automaton carrying out orders always "from higher up" with unquestioning obedience.

Plan
The United States Federal Government should require prosecution of terrorism suspects in federal district courts within 18 months of detention.

Solvency
Congressional action solves creates a credible regime that moderates the risk of our counterterrorism operations. Prieto 9 (Daniel, Council on Foreign Relations, War About Terror: Civil Liberties and National Security
After 9/11, February 2009, http://pubs.mantisintel.com/Civil_Liberties_WorkingPaper.pdf, RSR)
It is true that U.S. citizens hold the president ultimately accountable for national security, but it is also true that when

the president shares the burden of accountability with others, tough decisions and controversial policies gain credibility and legitimacy and become more sustainable. U.S. policy is strongest and most effective when it enjoys the broad support of Congress and the public. It is likely that many post-9/11 counterterrorism programs could have been strengthened by greater cooperation between the executive and legislative branches and by enabling legislation from the outset, not as a legal requirement, but as a prudential matter. Broader consultation, both within the administration and with Congress, and greater independent oversight of counterterrorism programs could have moderated the risk of overreach and errors in the realms of both detention and surveillance.

The United States should try suspects in federal district courts and transfer individuals to US facilities PHR 11 (Physicians for Human Rights, "Punishment Before Justice: Indefinite Detention in the US,"
www.judiciary.senate.gov/resources/transcripts/upload/022912RecordSubmission-Franken.pdf) The United States government must support trials in Article III courts for individuals detained at Guantnamo Bay and coordinate the various branches of government to ensure that civilian trials for detainees are a policy priority. As both recent and historic prosecutions of terrorist suspects demonstrate, United States federal district courts are well-equipped to secure convictions for terrorist activities, thus furthering the
governments interest in and obligation to protect the country, its citizens and military personnel from terrorism while meeting its obligation to do so in a timely manner that comports with national and international legal standards of justice. Federal

prosecutors have secured convictions against 400 individuals charged with acts of terrorism in federal courts since the attacks of September 11, 2001, alone. The recent trial of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian citizen who received a life sentence for his involvement in a conspiracy relating to the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, reaffirms that our legal system is fully capable of, and is a legitimate forum for, trying individuals charged with acts of terrorism. Beginning civilian trials for others currently detained at Guantnamo will end their indefinite detention and provide justice for victims. In order to facilitate civilian prosecutions for terrorism suspects, the United States Congress should end bans on funding transfers of individuals from Guantnamo Bay to facilities in the United States.

Federal courts are more legitimate than military trials international credibility Hathaway and Adelsberg et al 13 (Oona, Samuel, Spencer Amdur, Philireya Pitts, and Sirine
Shebaya, "The Power to Detain Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38: Issue 123, www.yjil.org/docs/pub/38-1-hathaway-the-power-to-detain.pdf) Federal courts are also generally considered more legitimate than military commissions. The stringent procedural protections reduce the risk of error and generate trust and legitimacy.245 The federal courts, for example, provide more robust hearsay protections than the commissions. In addition, jurors are ordinary citizens, not U.S. military personnel. Indeed, some of the weakest procedural protections in the military

commission system have been successfully challenged as unconstitutional.247 Congress and the Executive have responded to these legal challengesand to criticism of the commissions from around the globeby significantly strengthening the commissions' procedural protections. Yet the remaining gapsalong with what many regard as a tainted historycontinue to raise doubts about the fairness and legitimacy of the commissions. The current commissions, moreover, have been active for only a short periodtoo brief a period for doubts to be confirmed or put to rest.248 Federal criminal procedure, on the other hand, is well-established and widely regarded as legitimate.