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Key Concepts
Our study of externalities and public goods/bads suggested that viewed through the lens of economics the key problem with pollution is that there is no price signal that accurately reflects the full social costs and benefits of pollution
In light of this logic, the simplest remedy proposed by economic theory is for the government to establish such a price An emission fee is a price or fee paid by a polluter to a regulatory entity for every unit of emissions the polluter emits
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or when the marginal costs of the different components (production, emission fees) of total cost are equalized: = = () where is the marginal change in production costs from a higher level of pollution and marginal savings (()) is the amount of money saved in reduced production costs by emitting one more unit of pollution also defined as the negative of marginal cost, or the marginal cost of abatement.
FIGURE 12.1 Firm choice of emissions/abatement when faced with emission fee, p.
With multiple firms, marginal cost of abatement will be equal across firms if all face the same emission fee.
This implies that they will do different amounts of abatement if they have different marginal costs.
Equimarginal Principle
Aggregate costs of pollution control must be minimized if all sources of pollution face the same fee and seek to minimize their private costs. This is another way of understanding the equimarginal principle from our past discussions Polluters with marginal costs that rise steeply will do less abatement than polluters with marginal cost curves that are shallower What factors would influence the steepness of the marginal abatement cost curve?
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Pigouvian Fees
Recall that there are really two types of efficiency in the pollution control that we focus on:
1. 2. The equimarginal principle is the first ensures that a given amount of pollution reduction is done in the most efficient (least costly) way The second principle of efficiency requires that the level of pollution (or abatement) maximizes the net benefits of pollution control (or minimizes the total costs of pollution) to society
A Pigouvian fee (named after Arthur Pigou, a British economist from the early 20th century) is an emission fee set at a level that equals the marginal social damage of pollution when the level of pollution is at efficient levels.
( )
In words, the efficient level of pollution equates the savings to the firm of an extra unit of pollution with the damage of that extra unit to the exposed.
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FIGURE 12.3 The case of two polluters. MS1 (x), marginal savings from emitting firm 1; MS2(x), marginal savings from emitting firm 2; MS(x), aggregate marginal savings from emitting; MD(x), marginal damage from emitting; p*, Pigovian fee; x*, total amount of emissions with Pigovian fee; x1*, emissions from firm 1 with Pigovian fee; x2*, emissions from firm 2 with Pigovian fee.
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Fees vs Subsidies
Subsidies are much easier to motivate politically than fees
Q: Is it possible to get the same nice properties of the emission fee from an appropriately designed emission subsidy?
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Fees vs Subsidies
Total costs are now defined as:
= ( ) where s is the subsidy per unit of abatement and is the benchmark (prereguation level of pollution of the firm. Minimizing costs within the firm requires that:
+ = 0 or = = ()
which is exactly what we found under the fee.
If = () for all polluters, then aggregate costs of pollution control must, again, be minimized.
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Fees vs Subsidies
A couple important parts of the story are missing from the preceding analysis:
If some firms are more profitable than others, then the subsidy may result in some firms that are not profitable in the absence of the subsidy continuing to operate if subsidy is designed to be contingent on operation better to keep producing then shut down. If benchmark emissions are uncertain than firms may have an incentive to overstate to get a larger subsidy
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Imperfect Competition
Monopolist in Goods Market
Electricity producers prices electricity as an unregulated monopolist: MR(Q*) = MC(Q*) Pollution is produced in proportion to electricity output
Imperfect Competition
FIGURE 12.7 Imposing a Pigovian fee on a goods monopolist. MCU, marginal private cost of producing steel; MCT, marginal social cost of producing steel; D, demand for steel; MR, marginal revenue for steel; SU, steel output level, unregulated; ST, steel output level with 17 Pigovian tax; S*, socially optimal output of steel.
Imperfect Competition
Monopolist produces too little output and pollution ( ) relative to the efficient level ( ) in the absence of the fee.
When the fee is introduced, the under-provision becomes even worse ( )!! Ideally, we would have two instruments to correct two market failures one to correct the monopoly output problem, one to correct the pollution problem.
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Imperfect Competition
Monopolist in Bads Production
Competitive market for output (natural gas market) Monopoly producer of pollution (single shale gas developer polluting local water supply)
Imperfect Competition
FIGURE 12.8 Monopolist in provision of pollution. MS, marginal savings from polluting; MD, marginal damage from polluting; MT, marginal emission fee payments; t*, Pigovian fee; tm, monopoly emission fee level; s*, efficient amount of smoke; sm, monopoly emissions of smoke.
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Imperfect Competition
As we discussed before, the efficient level of pollution is where the marginal savings of using more pollution (MS) to the polluter is just equal to the marginal damages to society (MD), .
Because the polluter is a monopolist in pollution, it realizes that it can affect the size of the Pigouvian fee the regulator chooses through its choice of output.
Reducing emissions will provoke a lower emission fee Polluter will choose the level of pollution that minimizes its costs of compliance taking this fact into account.
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Imperfect Competition
Akin to the curve in the analysis of an output-market monopolist, let () be the marginal emission fee payments curve of the polluter. It describes the effect of a small change in S on the amount of fees the polluter must pay when fee is set at Pigouvian rate. In this face, total fees, (), is defined as = ()
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Imperfect Competition
Because the polluter realizes the effect of its choice of on (), it can minimize total costs by choosing to equate () and (), resulting in pollution level . This results in an under-provision of pollution.
How could we have too little pollution? Isnt pollution bad?
Remember efficiency requires balancing competing interests too little pollution means that the cost to society in lost output by the firm is too high from an efficiency perspective.
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Strong version of the hypothesis says that the second effect is big enough that the net cost of pollution regulation is negative.
Politically important if true because it means that we ought to be pursuing the regulation even if we think the benefits of pollution control are zero.
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FIGURE 12.9 (a,b) Effect on leisure from environmental tax. VMPL, value of marginal product of labor; tL, tax on labor; w, wage rate; H*,L*, supply of leisure and labor with tX = 0; tX, tax on X; H+, quantity of leisure with tX > 0; BCDE, wage tax revenue loss from tX > 0.
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FIGURE 12.10 Supply and demand of polluting good. MCsocial, marginal costs of producing X, including pollution damage; MCprivate, marginal costs of producing X, excluding pollution damage; X*, production without internalizing externality; tX, product tax necessary to internalize externality; X+, production with tax tX.
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FIGURE 12.9 (a,b) Effect on leisure from environmental tax. VMPL, value of marginal product of labor; tL, tax on labor; w, wage rate; H*,L*, supply of leisure and labor with tX = 0; tX, tax on X; H+, quantity of leisure with tX > 0; BCDE, wage tax revenue loss from tX > 0.
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Double Dividend
Introduction of environmental tax causes labor supply to shrink. With smaller tax base, revenues from labor tax fall.
Implies that tax interaction effect between environmental and labor taxes means labor tax can be reduce by less in a revenue-neutral swap than in the absence of this effect, which works against the likelihood of a strong double dividend.
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Double Dividend
Three effects:
1. Pigouvian Effect emissions reduced to socially desirable levels (+) 2. Tax Interaction Effect new fee makes other taxes less effective (-) 3. Revenue-Recycling Effect other distortionary tax rates fall to hold govt revenue neutral (+)
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Widely used:
Europe carbon North American sulphur dioxide Multiple regions -- fisheries
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