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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of the Honorable Henry Allen Holmes

Type of Event: Interview
Date: December 23, 2003
Prepared by: Bonnie D. Jenkins
Classification: Top SecFst
Team Number: 3 (Counterterrorism Policy)
Location: 2100 K Street
Participants - Non-Commission: Allen Holmes
Participants - Commission: Bonnie Jenkins, Dan Byman, Len Hawley

(U) This is the second interview of Allen Holmes. Holmes wanted to return and
cover three issues that were not addressed during his earlier interview. Holmes
assumed office as Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD), Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) in 1993 and left that office in January 1999.

(U) Jenkins asked Holmes how decisions made at the Counteterrorism Security
Group (CSG) were pushed up to the Deputies level. How was the Deputies
Committee involved in counterterrorism policy issues? Holmes responded that
the CSGwas a policy and recommendation making body. It did not make
decisions. Holmes would report the outcome of these meetings to the under
secretary of defense for policy, the deputy secretary of defense, or the secretary of
defense (SecDef). Most of the time Holmes went to Walter Slocombe (the under
secretary for policy). Holmes said his statutory responsibility was peculiar to the
position of ASD SO/LIC. He could report directly to the secretary of defense
whereas other assistant secretaries did not necessarily have that access. However,
Holmes did not bother the SecDef very often except maybe on two or three
occasions. Holmes would sometimes accompany the Dep SecDef to the Deputies
Committee meetings where counterterrorism issues would be discussed in more
detail.

(U) Len Hawley noted that the CSG appeared to sometimes act as a quasi
Deputies Committee. Research has shown that sometimes the Deputies did not
seem particularly active and issues went directly to principals. Richard Clarke
would go directly to the principals and the Deputies did not have a lot of
engagement on some of these issues. Holmes agreed but also noted that he
always informed his DoD colleagues what was going on in the CSG. The process
whereby Richard Clarke (the CSG Coordinator) would go to the principals
developed as the CSG went along. He acquired more personal authority and he
had the ear of the president. The president liked and respected Clarke because
the president believed Clarke would get things done.
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CU)Holmes noted that in reality, Clarke did not bypass the Deputies. The CSG
knew Clarke would go to the principals. He made sure his colleagues in the CSG
knew what he was going to do, and other times it was assumed he would go the
principals. It was very clear that each of the CSG members would brief their
principals.

CU)Holmes said he has a lot of respect for Clarke, who was his successor at the
Department of State. He did have some differences with Clarke and a couple of
times Holmes took him to task. Holmes said Clarke had a habit of telephoning
directly the Commander, Joint Special Operations Command CJSOC) or the
COm ander, Special Opeations Command CCINCSOC).Holmes would hear from
the CINCSOC that Clarke called him directly. Holmes would tell Clarke that he
could not directly contact the combatant commanders and the military did have a
chain of command. Clarke would only make himself more unwelcome to the
military and endanger his relations with military leaders. However, over a space
of five years, that happened only two or three times.

CU)Regarding contact with Secretaries of Defense, Holmes said in the first

Clinton administration, he had more direct contact with Secretary of Defense
William Perry than afterwards. Secretary of Defense Cohen was more formal and
more of a "hierarchical person", Holmes said. Perry wanted to talk to the people
who knew the issues.

CU)At the beginning of Holmes's tenure at SOLIC. Frank Wisner was the Under
Secretary for Policy. Wisner essentially left Holmes alone and said Holmes knew
what he is doing, and that Holmes should go to Wisner only when Holmes had a
problem. That was almost the same situation when Slocombe assumed office.
When issues became more political, Slocombe was much more engaged. When
there were military or technical issues at hand, Slocombe was less interested and
relied on Holmes.

Snatch Operations (Renditions)

CU)Holmes said the U.S. is good at snatching individuals. The belief at the time
was that the renditions were working well. However, an essential element is
intelligence. It is important to have operational and tactical intelligence that is
current. In most places in the world, that is not possible. Many times the U.S.
local network of spies and informants are not very good. This was the situation in
Mogadishu where the U.S. had closed its embassy and thereby reduced
opportunities to find opportunities to acquire actionable intelligence. Noone who
was working with the U.S. was trained, tested and reliable. The same thing
occurred in Bosnia. There was no network. The same is occurring now in
Baghdad. It takes a long time to recruit, test, and polygraph a network of reliable
people who also know how to take care of themselves. The essential missing
element is intelligence. The U.S. must get better at collecting, processing and
then using intelligence. The U.S. must work with allied intelligence capabilities
to address the terrorist global threat. It is a political, diplomatic, domestic,
foreign, and law enforcement problem.

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CU)The FBI is terrific but is always gathering evidence to use in a prosecution.

They are protecting that information and do not want to "contaminate it."
However, this administration has finally decided that the FBI have some of its
agents dedicated to intelligence. This has long been needed. It will take time to
change the mentality at the FBI, but it is a step in the right direction. Just
watching now how Special Forces and CIA agents are working in the field is light-
years from where the U.S. was in the past. This is a huge improvement.

CU)There were 13 renditions before September 11and on all those, the team
included FBI agents. So, there is already experience with FBI and Special
Operations Forces working together. The most important was Ramsee Yusef.
You get the perpetrator and get information from them. He is put away for life
and is not made a martyr.

Aircraft as Weapons
CU)Holmes is not aware of any training activities that entailed a scenario of
aircraft as weapons.

MANPADS
CU)Holmes referred to the small group that he chaired on the MANPAD threat to
civilian aircraft in the United States, which was an outgrowth on the Gore
Commission on Aviation Security C1996-1997. They examined whether shoulder
fired missiles were a threat to aviation in the United States. An interagency group
was established with the FAA,CIA, FBI, military, and industry individuals, and
examined the issue. The group's report concluded that the threat was low to
medium, but not high. The vulnerability of the aircraft was also examined and the
report suggested there be a pilot project to take maybe ten or twelve different
kinds of civilian aircraft that were most common in civilian and commercial
service and test what it would require to outfit them with the most advanced
missile evacuation technologies, such as flares and chaff. Most military aircraft
was already equipped with flares and chaff. However, the commercial sector was
not ready to pay for these and also noted that the report itself said the threat was
low to medium. It was also clear that airport security varied depending upon
where the airport was located. For example, the new airport in Denver, Colorado
is easy to patrol whereas the airport in Los Angeles is not. So, how to make some
airports could be made more secure and impervious to terrorists coming in a
using MANPADS was examined. That was the essence of the report. It was an
effort early on to find a solution to some aircraft security problems.

ITRAP
CU)Holmes also noted ITRAP (Interagency Terrorist Response Awareness
Program), which was an effort to get the interagency focused on simulations of
potential attacks in the United States. These were done the entire time Holmes
was in SOLIe. One was in preparation for the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. It
was well represented by federal, state and local level agencies, including the
military. At the end, Dick Clarke (CSG was in all of these, and Dick loved the

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• exercises) said the vice president would take part. What was learned was the
importance of unity of command. The big ITRAP was at the Cabinet level. This
had never been done before It was a three hour event. There were four scenarios
including a nuclear event in Washington, DC. There were nine cabinet officers
and a couple of Deputies. It was chaired by Sandy Berger. There was a desire to
force the examination by cabinet members of issues they would be dealing with in
the event of an attack.

(U) The military was very engaged in the 1996 Olympics. They provided
protection, they drove vehicles, manned gates, etc. Most of the military was from
the Georgia and contiguous state National Guards. There was also a small JSOC
contingent. There 'were liaison officers as well. In addition, there was authority to
lift posse comitatus restrictions. The Marine Corps CBRF (Chemical and
biological reaction force) was standing by. It was about the size of a reinforced
company and was ready to go.

~ The other issue Holmes wanted to tell the commission about was the
establishment of a group to work out response procedures in case there was a
WMD incident. The group met in Washington DC and General Hugh Shelton
(CINCSOC at the time) and Peter Schoomaker (JSOC commander attended. FBI
hosta e rescue team HRT re resentatives were there as well

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. It was
9/11 Classified Information

About that time, Jamie Gorelick was the Deputy Attorney.General under Janet
Reno. Holmes reported the result to his superiors and F~I reported the results to
Gorelick. They both helped work out the details. ':/

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