CI Boom 2013 Jan To March

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Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan to Mar2/5/2014 10:36:38 AM
Critical Infrastructure Disasters 2013 Jan to Mar

News etc. digested by Alister William Macintyre This time line (CI Boom 2013 Jan to March) tracks critical infrastructure disasters, formerly in larger research notes, date ranges split into smaller, digestible chunks, while what can be done to mitigate these disasters are in main related analysis document.1 Last updated 2014 Feb 05
Version 1.42
Table of Contents, thru level 3 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 2 Notable CI disasters 2013 Jan-Mar..................................................................................... 2 2013................................................................................................................................. 3 Jan-03 Thu Oh, OK..................................................................................................... 3 Jan-04 Fri Il Tx, .......................................................................................................... 4 Jan-08 Al, NYC .......................................................................................................... 4 Jan-10 Scranton Pa...................................................................................................... 4 Jan-11 In, Tx ............................................................................................................... 4 Jan-13 Ca, In ............................................................................................................... 5 Jan-16 Sissonville ....................................................................................................... 5 Jan-19 Chippewa Falls WI.......................................................................................... 6 Jan-22 British home .................................................................................................... 6 Jan-23 GAO report on pipeline response........................................................................ 6 Jan-23 GAO Statistics................................................................................................. 8 Jan-23 GAO Background............................................................................................ 8 Jan-23 GAO lists variables an operator can control ................................................. 11 Jan-23 GAO lists variables outside operator control ................................................ 11 Jan-24 Spectra Energy pipeline repairs NOT / In ..................................................... 12 Jan-26 Il .................................................................................................................... 12 Jan-28 US Senate field hearing..................................................................................... 12 Jan-28 NRDC............................................................................................................ 16 Jan-30 Ca .................................................................................................................. 16 Jan-31 Mexico........................................................................................................... 17 2013 Feb........................................................................................................................ 17 Feb-12 Maine ............................................................................................................ 17 Feb-16 ....................................................................................................................... 18 Feb-19 KC-KS .......................................................................................................... 18 Feb 20 IN .................................................................................................................. 19 Feb 25........................................................................................................................ 19 Feb-27 MI ................................................................................................................. 20 2013 March ................................................................................................................... 20 March-4 Ark IN ........................................................................................................ 20 March-12 LA ............................................................................................................ 20 March-16 AZ ............................................................................................................ 20
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/114094060/Indy-Boom
Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar
Here is the main document: http://www.scribd.com/doc/114094060/Indy-Boom
March-17 CO ............................................................................................................ 20 March-18 WA ........................................................................................................... 20 March-19 CO ............................................................................................................ 21 March-20 CA NJ....................................................................................................... 21 March-22 NYC PA WV............................................................................................ 21 March 25 EPA........................................................................................................... 22 March-27 MN ........................................................................................................... 22 March-28 IA IN ........................................................................................................ 22 March-29 Ark............................................................................................................ 23 Continued in more documents .......................................................................................... 24
Summary
5 Tags: Man made disasters, negligence, oil spill, investigations, statistics, Certain behaviors cause disasters again and again, all over USA, and the world. People smell gas, dont have a clue what to do. Then the leak turns into an explosion fire, building destruction. Construction companies often dig up pipelines, which rupture, explode. Some state laws exempt some companies from safety standards. When gas line needs to be shut down, due to leak or rupture, implementing this can take hours to implement. There are tons of tales of ruptures where the gas company employees lacked training to interpret alarms telling them about the leaks. The company only finds out because witnesses in the real world see whats happening, and contact them. Government investigations have shown that is the reality for over 50% of the leaks, of which there are hundreds of incidents every year. Should we criminalize corporate negligence, like we have criminalized drunk driving? Most homes now have smoke detectors, with local ordinances demanding that residents know what to do about them. Do we need similar technology to detect leaks?
Notable CI disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

Here is part of my incident time line for my notes on Critical Infrastructure (CI) disasters. I collect info about many disasters, see what they have in common, then consider what improvements could be made in efforts to mitigate risk of high damage in the next similar incident, or even reduce the frequency in which they occur. My overall analysis and mitigation evaluation is in a separate parent document, from these incident time-line chunks.2 Scribd loses statistics when we change document name, so I kept the original name Indy Boom because I first started looking into this topic on the occasion of a gas explosion which demolished a housing sub-division of Indianapolis.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/114094060/Indy-Boom
That incident turned out to be deliberate sabotage for insurance fraud, which is not the typical cause of these industrial disasters. There seem to be many causes, such as unintentional criminal negligence, a lack of public education to get witnesses to promptly report leak odors and a lack of enforcement of national safety standards for companies mis-managing these dangerous chemicals. The events, in this time line segment, occurred in: Mexico; USA. Incidents listed here include: Construction work can damage pipelines unless they are carefully and accurately marked, construction crews trained in recognizing those markings, and in how to protect the fuel line from any damage, and there is proper inspection to identify any damage, or risk of damage, and get it resolved before that leads to a disaster. In most every time line segment, including this one, there are lapses in that safety standard. Critical Infrastructure personnel have awesome duties, whether they work air traffic control, operate nuclear power plants, or control pipelines. They can be overwhelmed with data and alarms. The companies need systems to wisely manage the data and alarms, such as color coding, and the personnel need good training in interpreting what the data and alarms are telling them. Many disasters occur for lack of such support. Land in the USA is being used for just about every purpose imaginable: residential; industrial; agriculture; national parks, cemeteries. It may not matter where a pipeline rupture, explosion, fire, occurs. The damage will be catastrophic and emotionally disturbing. If we are going to destroy chunks of our land use, which type of land use would we prefer to have the pipelines run under? Witnesses smell the distinct odor of a leak. They fail to notify authorities. The leak ultimately leads to a disaster.
2013
According to Bloomberg, within a sample of 76 American publicly traded companies that self-report these sorts of incidents, there were 3,885 total chemical spills in 2013 alone. Ten different companies self-reported over 100 spills each.3 I do not know exactly when in January this story occurred. Iran lost a natural gas platform, as it was being constructed.4
Jan-03 Thu Oh, OK

A natural gas explosion levels a home in SW Oklahoma City Ok, and severely damages three others.5 Apparently a contractor hit a natural gas line, while
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-22/forget-west-virginia-dot-chemical-spills-are-anamerican-tradition This article is referring to the 2014 Jan 9 chemical spill which contaminated W Va water. 4 http://www.joboilrig.com/2013/01/natural-gas-platform-for-40-million.html 5 http://www.news9.com/story/20500248/evacuated-okc-residents-respond-to-explosion http://www.news9.com/story/20498547/crews-on-scene-of-house-fire-possible-explosion-at-sw-okc-home

Oklahoma Natural Gas company workers were, in the area, trying to repair a gas leak. As usual, initial news stories are a bit confusing. o See Labeling Causes chapter. o If the contractor error is a correct story, then this could have been avoided via: o Utility Line Mapping; o Training standards for contractors. A natural gas explosion, of a CNG storage container of compressed natural gas, was heard for miles around Boston Heights, Akron Ohio.6
Jan-04 Fri Il Tx,

A gas line explosion which injured two propane workers last week in Manor Texas has been ruled an accident.7 See Dec 27. A building was partially destroyed in a fire after a natural gas explosion in Rockford Illinois.8
Jan-08 Al, NYC

A pipeline company is seeking permission from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to build a controversial new natural gas distribution pipeline through national park land to bring additional natural gas supply into New York City.9 Consider what a mess that will cause if it ruptures, like so many other pipelines have been doing. A carjacking ended with a car crashing into a gas pump in Saraland Alabama.10
Jan-10 Scranton Pa
Info came out about a gas explosion last month in downtown Scranton Pennsylvania. It was caused when a power line failed, causing sparks, which ignited a pocket of gas.11
Jan-11 In, Tx
One of the suspects in the Indianapolis explosion is a Registered Nurse. The state of Indiana is now moving to suspend her license. 12 Meanwhile, she has gotten a better attorney.13
http://www.okcfox.com/newsroom/top_stories/videos/kokh_vid_9014.shtml 6 http://www.firehouse.com/news/10848867/large-natural-gas-explosion-in-ohio-heard-for-miles 7 http://www.kvue.com/news/local/Manor-gas-explosion-ruled-accidental-185682642.html http://www.kvue.com/home/Manor-gas-explosion-ruled-accidental-185682642.html 8 http://www.wrex.com/story/20505441/2013/01/04/natural-gas-explosion-causes-fire-at-rockford-condo 9 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1709 10 http://www2.wkrg.com/news/2013/jan/08/8/breaking-small-gas-explosion-saraland-ar-5323221/ 11 http://www.standard-journal.com/news/state_news/article_b3abb08e-dde9-58d5-9724ac98b59c2e59.html 12 http://www.indianasnewscenter.com/news/local/130111-emergency-license-suspension-for-explosionsuspect-186545071.html 13 http://fox59.com/2013/01/11/woman-at-center-of-house-explosion-case-hires-high-profile-indy-attorney/

A backhoe caused a gas leak explosion which leveled a duplex in Lewistown Texas.14 Three people injured. o I have heard this story before, from other communities. It is a man made avoidable risk. If gas lines are properly sign posted above ground, and people doing construction, properly trained to recognize the signs, then this should not happen. o See Labeling Causes chapter. This could have been avoided via: Utility Line Mapping; Training standards for contractors.
Jan-13 Ca, In
The San Bruno Ca 2010 Sep disaster has been a learning experience for some communities and public utilities, which do not want anything similar to happen to them. The California State University (CSU) system has drawn up a plan, how to deal with any future pipeline crisis. The CSUCI gas pipeline emergency plan was named "Best Emergency Plan for the County" by the Ventura County Emergency Planning Council.15 More than 200 Indianapolis family members gave thanks Sunday night to about 100 representatives of local police and fire departments, the Department of Homeland Security and emergency medical services at a First Responders Dinner at Southport Presbyterian Church.16
Jan-16 Sissonville
NTSB has released preliminary info on the 2012 Dec 11 event, 17 which destroyed 3 homes, damaged additional homes, and damaged 1,100 feet of Interstate 77. Controllers at NiSource received 16 "pressure-drop alerts" before, and a phone call from another company reporting to them about their Sissonville natural gas pipeline blowing up. Individual news stories seem to have clarity, but collectively their different interpretations make the big picture confusing. 12.41 p.m., Dec 11, the first call to 911 about the explosion, was made by a person at a nearby retirement home.
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http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/lewisville/headlines/20130112-lewisville-man-stillin-critical-condition-after-gas-explosion-that-leveled-duplex.ece http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/national-international/NATL---COPY-Natural-Gas-Explosion-LevelsLewisville-Duplex-186588251.html http://www.dentonrc.com/local-news/local-news-headlines/20130111-explosion-injures-three.ece http://thescoopblog.dallasnews.com/2013/01/explosion-destroys-at-least-one-home-on-e-main-street-inlewisville-injuries-confirmed.html/ 15 http://www.vcstar.com/news/2013/jan/13/csu-channel-islands-gas-pipeline-disaster-plan/ 16 http://www.indystar.com/article/20130114/LOCAL18/301140310/Richmond-Hill-explosion-s-survivorshonor-their-rescuers 17 http://www.statejournal.com/story/20605202/preliminary-report-outlines-first-findings-of-sissonvilleexplosion http://wvgazette.com/News/201301160139 http://www.wchstv.com/newsroom/eyewitness/130116_13134.shtml

12.53 p.m. was first notification to NiSource. It came from a Cabot Oil and Gas controller, who had received a report of a rupture and fire from a field technician, near the accident location. NTSB is looking into what triggered the alerts, and how well NiSource controllers responded to them.
Jan-19 Chippewa Falls WI

A rural church explosion and fire, 9 pm Saturday, has been traced to an LP gas tank.18 A church worker had smelled an odor, but lacked the education to know what to do about it. She called the president of the church council, who came out to investigate. He also smelled the gas odor. Apparently no one called authorities until it was too late to save the church.
Jan-22 British home

A home explodes, in Hartelpool UK, in what is suspected of being a gas explosion, with one victim rushed to hospital.19
Jan-23 GAO report on pipeline response

The GAO released a study report, Jan-23, about transmission pipeline facility operators' ability to respond to a hazardous liquid or gas release. 20 Summary of GAO report.21 Detail GAO report.22 50 pages.23 References in this section:
DOT = Department of Transportation GAO = Government Accountability Office NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board o NTSB role is to determine cause of accidents PHMSA = Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration24
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http://chippewa.com/news/local/gas-explosion-levels-rural-church/article_a8d25592-5eaa-11e2-a87d0019bb2963f4.html 19 http://www.hartlepoolmail.co.uk/news/local/resident-injured-in-suspected-gas-explosion-1-5339627 http://www.sundaysun.co.uk/news/breaking-news/2013/01/22/firefighters-called-to-gas-explosion-inwingate-72703-32653621/ 20 Pipeline Safety: Better Data and Guidance Needed to Improve Pipeline Operator Incident Response, GAO-13-168, January 23 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-168 http://ohsonline.com/articles/2013/01/14/senate-field-hearing-to-review-state-of-pipelinesafety.aspx?admgarea=news 21 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-168 http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651409.pdf This info should be included in the detail report. 22 http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651408.pdf I downloaded this, to study. 23 I am summarizing what I consider to be some highlights of the various reports, so I recommend that other people use my link citations to read the whole thing. Yall may have different take -aways what is most interesting to you.

o PHMSA role is to verify regulations are being obeyed
Automated shut down, pros and cons:

Source: GAO analysis of research and industry stakeholder opinions.
Advantages via Improved response time:
Can reduce injuries and fatalities for some locations, such as hospitals or prisons, where people cannot evacuate quickly. Can reduce the amount of damage by limiting the amount of fuel for secondary fire(s) and environmental cleanup. Can allow operator personnel and emergency responders to access the affected segment more quickly and safely. Can reduce the potential monetary cost of an incident for the operator by limiting the amount of product lost.
Disadvantages - Accidental closures
For natural gas pipelines, accidental closures can result in the loss of service to utilities and critical customers (e.g., winter-time outages can leave people without heat). For hazardous liquid pipelines, accidental closures can cause an incident, when a valve closes and the subsequent pressure buildup causes the pipeline to rupture.
Disadvantages - Monetary costs
Requires operators to purchase equipment, including devices to remotely communicate or sense pressure drops, actuators to close the valve, and power sources for this new equipment. Requires operators to take on installation costs, which can involve temporarily shutting down the pipeline, purging the product from the pipeline, and pulling product from the market. Operators may also have costs related to accessing the valve location (e.g., right of way, permitting, and physical space to install the new equipment) and updating their leak detection technologies. May require operators to incur additional recurring costs to train staff, maintain the valves, increase security, and conduct inspections of the new valve.
According to GAO: DOTs PHMSA has an opportunity to improve the ability of pipeline operators to respond to incidents by developing a performance-based approach for incident response times. The ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidentssuch as leaks and rupturesis affected by numerous variables, some of which are under operators control. However, PHMSA must first improve data it collects on incident response times. These data are not reliable both because pipeline operators are not required to fill out certain time-related fields in the reporting form, and because operators told GAO they interpret these data fields in different ways. Reliable data would improve PHMSAs ability to measure incident response, and assist the agency in exploring the feasibility of developing a performance-based approach for improving operator response to pipeline incidents.
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In its regulations, PHMSA refers to release of natural gas from a pipeline as an incident (49 C.F.R. 191.3) and a spill from a hazardous liquid pipeline as an accident. (49 C.F.R. 195.50). For simplicity, the GAO report refers to both as incidents.
GAO recommends: DOT should (1) improve incident response data and use these data to evaluate whether to implement a performance-based framework for incident response times and (2) share guidance and information on evaluation approaches to inform pipeline operators decisions. DOT agreed to consider these recommendations.
Jan-23 GAO Statistics

Of incidents which occurred in 2010 and 2011: Hazardous liquid pipeline operators did not report date and time for two of these
variables when incident identified, and when operator resources arrived on site for 26% (178 out of 674). o They did not identify whether a shutdown took place 16% (108 out 674).. Natural gas pipeline operators did not report data when operator identified incident, and resources arrived on site, in 3% (6 out of 191). o They did not identify whether a shutdown took place 2% (3 out of 191).
When pipeline operator knows they have an incident.
For some it is when they are called by a witness, or first responder, or whoever. For some it is when their personnel are on site, and actually confirm it.
Jan-23 GAO Background

To minimize the risk of a pipeline incident, pipeline operators are required to develop leak detection methods and emergency response plans.
Operators with pipelines in highly populated or environmentally sensitive areas (called high-consequence areas) are subject to supplemental risk-based regulations under
PHMSAs integrity management program.25 One mitigation measure operators can take26 based on the results of the risk assessment is to install automated valves, which in the event of an incident, close automatically or are closed remotely by operators in a control room.27 Since 1971, NTSB has made recommendations that DOT develop standards and requirements for automated valves. Following the San Bruno incident,28 NTSB recommended that DOT require natural gas pipeline operators install automated valves in all high consequence areas.29
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High-consequence areas are defined differently for hazardous liquid and natural gas. For natural gas, such areas typically include highly populated or frequented areas, such as parks.
For hazardous liquid, high-consequence areas include highly populated areas, other populated areas, navigable waterways, and areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage. 26 Note this is not required under current regulations. 27 For the purposes of this GAO report we use the term install an automated valve to refer to any actions that allow the operator to remotely or automatically close a valve. Such actions do not necessarily mean an operator is installing a completely new valve. For example, operators may install an actuator and communications at an existing valve location. 28 San Bruno, see incident 2010 Sep 9; NTSB report 2011 Aug 30; NTSB follow-up 2012 June 17; more info 2012 July 18. 29 See NTSB, Pipeline Accident Report: Pacific Gas and Electric Company Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire, San Bruno, California, September 9, 2010, NTSB/PAR-
Three main types of pipelines carry hazardous liquid30 and natural gas from producing wells to end users (residences and businesses) and are managed by about 2,500 operators: Gathering pipelines collect hazardous liquid and natural gas from production areas and transport the products to processing facilities, which in turn refine and send the products to transmission pipelines. These pipelines tend to be located in rural areas but can also be located in urban areas. PHMSA estimates there are 200,000 miles of natural gas gathering pipelines and 30,000 to 40,000 miles of hazardous liquid gathering pipelines. These pipelines are not under federal oversight.
Transmission pipelines carry hazardous liquid or natural gas,

sometimes over hundreds of miles, to communities and large-volume users, such as factories. Transmission pipelines tend to have the largest diameters and operate at the highest pressures of any type of pipeline. PHMSA has estimated there are more than 400,000 miles of hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines across the United States.
Distribution pipelines split off from transmission pipelines to transport

natural gas to end usersresidential, commercial, and industrial customers. There are no hazardous liquid distribution pipelines. PHMSA has estimated there are roughly 2 million miles of natural gas distribution pipelines, most of which are intrastate pipelines.
Break for diagram of transmission pipelines.
11/01 (Washington, D.C: Aug. 30, 2011). According to NTSB, PHMSA is in the process of responding to this recommendation. Specifically, in August 2011, PHMSA began a rulemaking process that could address the extent to which operators will be required to install automated valves. 76 Fed. Reg. 53086 (Aug. 25, 2011). 30 Hazardous liquid products include petroleum (crude oil, condensate, natural gasoline, natural gas liquids, and liquefied petroleum gas); petroleum products (flammable, toxic, or corrosive products obtained from distilling and processing of crude oil, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, blend stocks, and other miscellaneous hydrocarbon compounds); and anhydrous ammonia.
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Break for diagram of steps operators take when responding to an incident.
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Jan-23 GAO lists variables an operator can control

Speed of response to an incident, depends on multiple variables. Here are some the pipeline operator can control. Leak Detection how fast the operator detects a leak, the sooner they know there is a problem requiring their attention. o Operators have a variety of ways to detect leaks: instruments; aerial surveillance; gas smell for customers. Location of qualified operator response personnel. Company may need to send personnel to the scene. Those personnel need to have the authority, training, and tools, to evaluate the situation, shut down the pipeline. Type of Valves: can be shut down automatically; need someone to manually shut them down; close in proximity to normal staffing. Control room management. They need to have the authority, and training, to act swiftly when they learn of a problem. Relationships with local first responders. If there has been advance training, such as mock disasters, and pre-established good communications, then response to an incident can go more smoothly, and rapidly. I might add more to this collection. Pipeline personnel lack proper training, to recognize what alarms mean. 31 Alarms not relayed to secondary backup sites, so after crisis, people can figure out what the heck happened.32 SCADA not protected from interference, such as by radar, hacking, sun spots.
Jan-23 GAO lists variables outside operator control

GAO identified variables which influence a pipeline operators ability to respond to an
incident, but are beyond an operators control: Type of release.
o A slow leak, takes a while to figure out, have one, and where it is. o A rupture, lots of damage quite rapidly, easier to detect and locate.
Time of day.
o Traffic patterns can impact speed of personnel getting to the scene.33 o Theres also patterns of when people are likely to be asleep or awake, at
home, at work place, influencing likelihood of witnesses observing, then phoning in an incident promptly. Weather conditions.
o Like traffic, this can impact ability to get to the scene.
31
Such as pipeline pouring into river, for almost a day, before it dawns on pipeline company personnel what the heck is happening. 32 BP Gulf Oil Spill for example. 33 I have suggested elsewhere, that pipeline operators should have a helicopter to deliver personnel rapidly to crisis scenes, instead of being stuck in traffic jams. Perhaps they can get a ride along in an emergency vehicle, sirens and lights going, to clear traffic out of the way.
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o Remember super storm Sandy shut down electric power needed for pipeline instruments and controls to function.
Other operators pipeline in the same area.

o In a crisis, it may not be immediately obvious which companys pipeline is experiencing the problem.
I might add some more to the collection: Property owner, or contractor for property owner, is doing some construction work, in ignorance of safety for the pipeline. Deliberate fraud or sabotage.
Jan-24 Spectra Energy pipeline repairs NOT / In

According to Natural Gas Watch, Jan 24, 2013:34 QUOTE Spectra Energy,35 the company that is currently constructing a large, highpressure natural gas transmission pipeline between New Jersey and lower Manhattan, allegedly put off critical repairs and maintenance to its natural gas transmission system in Pennsylvania for more than four years, from July 2008 to August 2012, even though the companys own testing indicated a potential problem, according to documents36 obtained by NaturalGasWatch.org. UNQUOTE In other news, a suspect in the Nov-10 Indy bombing, wants a change of venue.37 The jury trial is scheduled for March 4.
Jan-26 Il
Jan 26 there was an explosion in Grayville in Southern Illinois, which hospitalized 2 oil company workers. An acetylene tank exploded in a workshop at the Goff & Pruitt Drilling Company yard. Investigators think a wood-burning stove overheated, causing the tank to explode.38
Jan-28 US Senate field hearing

Jan-28: U.S. Senate Commerce Committee39 held a field hearing = "Pipeline Safety: An On-the-Ground Look at Safeguarding the Public" in Charleston, W.Va.,40 15 miles from
34 35 36
http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1724 http://www.spectraenergy.com/
http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/enforce/CaseDetail_cpf_120131001.html?nocache=3135#_TP_1 _tab_2 37 http://www.pal-item.com/article/20130124/UPDATES/130124009/Indianapolis-house-explosionsuspect-seeking-change-venue http://www.theindychannel.com/indianapolis-explosion http://www.theindychannel.com/news/local-news/monserrate-shirleys-attorney-asks-for-change-of-venuein-for-trial-in-indianapolis-home-explosion http://www.wibc.com/news/story.aspx?ID=1870667 38 http://tristatehomepage.com/fulltext-news?nxd_id=581202 http://www.tristate-media.com/drr/news/local_news/article_3a5052ec-696b-11e2-b58a-0019bb2963f4.html 39 http://commerce.senate.gov/public/
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the Dec-11 disaster, with Chairman Jay Rockefeller, D-W.Va. Rockefeller, who has announced he will not run for re-election in 2014, has made pipeline safety a priority during his four years as chairman of the panel. The horses mouth = the organizers of an event. Sometimes info about an event, in news media, and social media, are from other end of the horse. o Here is general info about the hearing, from the horses mouth. 41 o Statement, relevant to this hearing, by Senator John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV Chairman of U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.42 KEY QUOTES: Todays hearing provides an opportunity to examine where we stand in regard to the safety of our nations pipeline system. Year after year, excavation damage is the leading cause of pipeline accidents. Removing exemptions from who has to call before you dig will reduce this problem. o UNQUOTE o Opening Remarks by Ms. Sue Bonham Resident of Sissonville, West Virginia, where the Dec-11 gas explosion occurred.43 o Here are the witnesses on Panel One: o The Honorable Deborah Hersman Chairman of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);44 Pipeline Safety is now on NTSBs top 10 transportation safety challenges. Recurring safety issues in many pipeline accidents: Automatic and/or remote control shut-off valve installation; NTSB has been recommending this since 1971. PHMSA regulations currently leave this up to the Pipeline operator. In-line, or internal, inspection tools; This is a device which can travel inside the pipeline, checking for cracks and other risk of leak or rupture. It is believed to be 90% effective in detecting such problems,
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http://ohsonline.com/articles/2013/01/14/senate-field-hearing-to-review-state-of-pipelinesafety.aspx?admgarea=news http://www.theintelligencer.net/page/content.detail/id/580075/Preventing-Gas-PipelineAccidents.html?nav=511 41 http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=bd20ede9-b3a9-461586ea-6cd471388d31 42 http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=bd20ede9-b3a9-461586ea-6cd471388d31&Statement_id=bf1f595b-239f-40ac-939f-6538f5c082b2&ContentType_id=14f995b9dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39af-e033-4cba-9221de668ca1978a&MonthDisplay=1&YearDisplay=2013 43 http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=bd20ede9-b3a9-461586ea-6cd471388d31&Statement_id=b24bb154-d3d5-4d35-bbf3ef8bce4c951e&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39af-e0334cba-9221-de668ca1978a&MonthDisplay=1&YearDisplay=2013 I downloaded her statement into my National Security doc collection, calling it: US Senate Pipeline Bonham 2013 Jan. It is a horror story of how she tried to escape, and how she was rescued, thanks to people on the phone with her. 44 I downloaded her testimony, calling it: US Senate Pipeline NTSB 2013 Jan. I tried to highlight sections of the text to quote, but it seems like it is an all or nothing proposition.
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which is vastly superior to other technologies now in general usage. Older pipelines would have to be modified to support this technology. NTSB has been recommending this to PHMSA since San Bruno. Integrity management; Legislation just over a year ago, required US Secretary of transportation to evaluate whether safety standards in the PIPES act of 2006 should be expanded beyond High Consequence Areas (HCAs), and if so, issue relevant regulations. SCADA training. NTSB reviewed the role of SCADA training in 13 hazardous liquid line accidents investigated 1992-2004. In 10 of the accidents, there was a delay in control center operators recognizing the leak. Consequently PHMSA upgraded requirements in Dec 2009. However inadequate SCADA training allowed: o 2010 July 26 Marshall Mi pipeline rupture went undetected for 17 hours; o 2010 Sep 9 San Bruno personnel were untrained in how to deal with emergencies. o The Honorable Cynthia Quarterman Administrator of Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA);45 In addition to legislative mandates, they are working on open recommendations: 26 from NTSB; 9 from OIG; and 4 from GAO. The statement includes where they are on implementing all of this. Some state laws exempt certain excavators from calling for underground facilities to be located and marked before they begin digging. PHMSA has discussed them with NAPSR and OCSI.46 A public hearing is scheduled for March 2013, on damage prevention issues. o Ms. Susan Fleming Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, at US Government Accountability Office (GAO);47 The GAO report reviews recent GAO investigations of pipeline safety, and reiterates their recommendations.48
45
I downloaded her testimony, labeling it: US Senate Pipeline PHMSA 2013 Jan. It has a pretty high density of acronyms and technical references.
46
NAPSR = National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives. OCSI = One Call Systems International. 47 Pipeline Safety: Better Data and Guidance Could Improve Operators Responses to Incidents, GAO-13-284T, January 28 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-284T I downloaded labeling it: US Senate Pipeline GAO 2013 Jan. It is in standard GAO report format. 48 I shall endeavor to have all relevant investigations referenced in this research document. In fact, much of the content is so familiar, I suspect I have in fact downloaded and read much of this before. I just need to cross-index with this chapter, where that stuff ended up.
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GAO recently issued two reports related to the safety of certain types of pipelines. The first, GAO-12-388, reported on the safety of gathering pipelines, which currently are largely unregulated by the federal government. The second, GAO-12-389R, reported on the potential safety effects of applying less prescriptive requirements, currently levied on distribution pipelines, to lowstress natural gas transmission pipelines.49
The National Response Center, managed by the United States Coast Guard, is the sole federal point of contact for reporting oil and chemical spills 50 o Mr. Jimmy Staton Executive Vice President and Group CEO of NiSource Gas Transmission and Storage, which is the parent company of Columbia Gas Transmission;51 He reviewed what the company has done so far about the terrible accident Dec-11 in Sissonville WV, in which fortunately no one was seriously injured. Their company has a modernization project, in response to US Department of Transportation Secretarys Call to Action.52 o Mr. Rick Kessler President of the Board of The Pipeline Safety Trust.53 They have often testified to Congress on whats needed to improve Pipeline Safety, and here they are again, repeating the same story. Since specific details on the Dec-11 disaster have not yet been released, they focus here on: Response times to pipeline ruptures; In a perfect world, built in leak/rupture detection systems would alert a pipeline controller of a rupture immediately and allow for the quickest response to shut down the pipeline. However, according to PHMSA report Leak Detection Study DTPH56-11-D-000001, that happens less than 16% of the time, and less than 50% of leaks are discovered by pipeline personnel, prior to getting a call about the emergency they have caused. They join NTSB in the call for automatic shut down capabilities for pipelines in high consequence areas, like cities. Expanding & clarifying integrity management requirements; Inadequate federal and state resources;
49 50
For full report text, go to www.gao.gov
I had seen this mentioned multiple places, was unsure until now, what agency it was within. Also I believe the Coast Guard plays a role in regulations for hazardous materials transported other than via pipelines. 51 I downloaded, naming it: US Senate Pipeline NiSource 2013 Jan. 52 Here is another reference I wish to find, and incorporate in these notes. 53 I downloaded, naming it US Senate Pipeline PST 2013 Jan.
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In Al Mac opinion, part of the solution is not to budget more money to individual government agencies, but to do a reorganization, to reduce duplicate efforts. Why does PHMSA need an Accident Investigation Team, independent of NTSB? We have organizations which are jointly run by private and public sectors. Can we have organizations which are jointly run by federal and state authorities? Non-regulated and under-regulated Gathering Lines; Poor facility response planning (hazardous liquids); Lack of clear jurisdiction for new pipeline approval and routing decisions; Pipe replacement programs (cast iron, bare steel, faulty plastics); Quantifying natural gas leak significance; Depth of cover at river crossings; Diluted bitumen study constraints; Regarding the Dec-11 gas explosion, which damaged over 1,000 feet of interstate 77, in addition to the usual damage to peoples homes, the Senate hearing was told that this was not in what federal regulators considered a "high consequence area," even though two pipelines owned by the same company and within a stone's throw of the exploded line were.54 Thus, it was subject to lower safety standards. o Deborah Hersman, the chairwoman of NTSB, which is investigating the Dec-11 explosion, said Columbia workers had to hand crank the valves to get them closed. Two workers had to take turns, applying 10-20 pounds of pressure to the valves, "scores" of times to shut off the flow of gas, which took about an hour. There were six valves to shut off. Two of the valves at the station required hand cranking, two were hydraulic and two were electric, Hersman said.55
Jan-28 NRDC
According to Jan-28 post by the environmental Natural Resources Defense Council, many workers in the oil and gas industry do not have health insurance. Thus, growth in local population due to this industrys development, can mean a drain on local resources by injured workers, who cannot pay their medical bills.56
Jan-30 Ca
Jan-30: An explosion ripped through Heritage Inn Sea World Hotel, near SeaWorld San Diego, from a room where authorities say a couple was extracting hash oil, in a makeshift drug lab.
54 55
http://www.dailymail.com/News/201301280132 http://www.dailymail.com/News/201301280132?page=2 56 http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amall/north_dakota_thanks_to_the_oil.html
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3+ injured, including the criminal couple, and a hotel guest in adjacent room.
Jan-31 Mexico
50+ story HQ Building in Mexico City, for the state oil company Pemex, had an explosion 4 pm, around shift change.57 This was the worst explosion inside Mexico City in 30 years. The company's administrative headquarters, does not officially have any processing of combustible material, but one of the many speculations what might have caused this, is gas leak. 33+ dead, mainly women 100+ injured 52+ hospitalized Rescuers searching for possible survivors This Pemex disaster reminds people of prior disasters, with the same company. Sept 2012 Pemex gas explosion, near northern town of Reynosa, thought to have been caused by a build-up of gas. 30+ dead 1984 a Pemex natural gas plant on the outskirts of Mexico City exploded. 300+ killed
1992 had a series of underground gas explosions in Guadalajara. An official investigation found Pemex was partly to blame. 200+ dead 1,500+ injured
2013 Feb
Table of Contents Navigation Aid.
Feb-12 Maine
News from: WCSH in Portland;58
57
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-21288214 http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/02/explosion-mexico-city http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2013/0131/Mexico-City-explosion-What-causedthe-deadly-explosion-at-Pemex-HQ-video http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/130201/gas-explosion-at-petroleosmexicanos-pemex-tower-kills-25 http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/01/world/americas/mexico-pemex-explosion/index.html http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2271703/Explosion-inside-Mexicos-Pemex-HQ-kills-25-leaves100-injured.html#ixzz2JdpN6C2W 58 http://www.wcsh6.com/news/article/231262/2/Investigators-Gas-leak-sparked-deadly-Bath-explosion
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Bath Maine experienced a gas explosion, which the fire marshal said was due to a leak in a propane line from an outdoor tank leading to heating units inside the two apartments. 1 death 1 injured
Feb-16
Feds investigate price fixing allegations in the natural gas market.59
Feb-19 KC-KS
News from: Kansas City Star;60 Los Angeles Times;61 Natural Gas Watch;62 NY Daily News;63 USA Today;64 and others which duplicate same info. JJs restaurant destroyed. 1 dead. 14-16+injured. 4+ critical. Some missing, news stories vary as some found. The explosion blew out windows up to block away. The explosion was heard up to 1 mile away.
An explosion then four-alarm fire started, officials initially thought after a construction vehicle struck a gas main outside JJs Restaurant, in Kansas City, MO. In any case, the fire engulfed an entire city block, in a shopping district west of Country Club Plaza, not extinguished for 90 minutes to 2 hours. Some witnesses report more than one explosion. Missouri Gas Energy said "early indications are that a contractor doing underground work struck a natural gas line." Early police reports said the fire started due to a car crash, but this story was later discounted. The Missouri Public Service Commission was expected to investigate because it has regulatory oversight. KC Police Dept's bomb squad and officials with the Bureau of
59 60
http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1740 http://www.kansascity.com/2013/02/19/4075290/two-alarm-fire-raging-westof.html#storylink=omni_popular http://www.kansascity.com/2013/02/20/4075905/response-to-explosion-wasquick.html#storylink=omni_popular 61 http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-kansas-city-fire-20130219,0,6620371.story 62 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1762 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1799 63 https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/9-injured-massive-kansas-city-fire-article1.1268334?localLinksEnabled=false&google_editors_picks=true 64 http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/19/kansas-city-gas-explosion/1931663/
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Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives were expected to investigate the accident after the search dogs finished looking for victims, KC Fire Dept Chief Paul Berardi said. Residents who live near JJs Restaurant reported that they smelled the odor of gas Tuesday afternoon and reported it to Missouri Gas Energy about an hour before the explosion rocked their homes, according to KCTV and KHSB. Bad weather could complicate search for the missing.65 Authorities investigating that blast, which injured 15 people and killed one, have released their report on the incident. You can read that report in its entirety here: KCFD Report on Natural Gas Explosion Feb19 2012 JJs. The Kansas City explosion, according to the report, was triggered by natural gas leaking into the restaurant from an outside line that had been compromised somehow. The gas built up until it eventually a pilot light in either the stove or a hot water heater touched off the blast.66 I dont see the 2012 date of the Topeka KS i ncident, but Kansas City Star reporter Steve Everly filed a report noting that state regulators in Kansas are close to settling with the Kansas Gas Service in connection with a natural gas leak in Topeka, Kansas, last year.67
Feb 20 IN
The two, who lived in the house where the Indianapolis explosion occurred, have asked that their trial be severed from their pal who is accused of actually blowing it up.68 They have been charged with multiple counts of: Arson Murder Insurance fraud Conspiracy
Feb 25
A gas leak is being blamed for the explosion that blew the top two floors off a Haddon Heights apartment building, the Camden County fire marshal said. 69
65 66
http://www.kansascity.com/2013/02/19/4074304/biggest-winter-storm-in-2-years.html http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1799 67 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1799 http://www.kansascity.com/2013/03/15/4123366/regulators-kansas-gas-settling.html 68 http://www.wishtv.com/dpp/news/crime/blast-suspects-ask-for-separate-trials

69
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/20130224_No_foul_play_suspected_in_Haddon_Heights_apa rtment_explosion.html
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Feb-27 MI
On Friday, March 15, Consumers Energy fired an undisclosed number of employees in connection with a natural gas explosion in Detroit, Michigan, that killed a man on Feb. 27 for failure to follow established procedures and policies. 70
2013 March
Table of Contents Navigation Aid.
March-4 Ark IN
Dozens of homes in Clinton, Arkansas, were evacuated on Monday, March 4, after an explosion and a fire at a natural gas compressor station in Van Buren County, according to recent media reports. No one was injured.71 The compressor station is owned by BHPBilliton. Jury trial scheduled for Indy Bombing.72 Sounds like postponed, due to various requests back and forth by the two sides.
March-12 LA
The captain of a Louisiana tugboat died on Friday, April 12, according to recent media reports, succumbing to severe burns he had suffered on March 12, after his boat struck a natural gas pipeline and touched off an inferno that burned for days. 73
March-16 AZ
Investigators in Phoenix, Arizona, believe natural gas factored into an explosion there that destroyed a house on Saturday, March 16.74
March-17 CO
A natural gas explosion tore apart an apartment building in Westminster, Colorado, an Xcel Energy territory injuring 6 people and forcing 80 others to evacuate their homes; according to recent media reports, 21 people remain homeless as a result of the blast.75
March-18 WA
A natural gas explosion in a the boiler room of a medical building in Spokane, Washington, sent one person to the hospital. According to a recent story in the Spokesman-Review, Spokeane Asst. Fire Chief Brian Schaeffer said a repairman was working on the boiler in the basement when there was a flash explosion. The explosion
70 71
http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1799 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1799 72 http://www.wibc.com/news/story.aspx?ID=1870667 73 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1929 74 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1799 75 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1844
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actually blew the doors off the entryway to the boiler room, Schaeffer told the newspaper.76
March-19 CO
A natural gas explosion in Grand Junction, Colorado, destroyed two homes and sent three people to the hospital according to recent media reports. The natural gas company, Xcel Energy, and the City of Grand Junction continue to monitor the area for additional natural gas leaks.77
March-20 CA NJ
An explosion at a natural gas-powered power plant in Long Beach, California, terrified area residents, according to recent media reports. According to recent story in Power, a trade journal for the power generation industry, a ruptured steam pipe at the natural gasfired AES Alamitos Generating Station caused the blast, which was heard by people for miles around.78 In Princeton, New Jersey, a natural gas fire burned for more than six hours and precipitated the evacuation of eight area homes, according to a recent media report. According to a NJ.com story, first responders were unable to extinguish the flames shooting from a six-inch gas line that had been punctured by a road-milling machine operated by a paving crew. The incident remains under investigation by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, and the owner of the paving company that owned the machine said the street was not marked to indicate the presence of a natural gas pipeline. 79
March-22 NYC PA WV
A fire at a natural gas compressor station in Bradford County, Pennsylvania, injured a worker at the facility, according to a recent media report describing the incident.80 The compressor station is owned and operated by Southwestern Energy. A 24-inch natural gas pipeline operated by Williams Partners ruptured on Reed Ridge, in Marshall County, south of Cameroon near Wheeling WV, in the NW portion of the state.81 Homes in the area were evacuated.
76 77
http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1844 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1844 http://www.gjsentinel.com/news/articles/gas-explosion-levels-2-homes 78 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1844 79 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1844 http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2013/03/pseg_natural_gas_fire_in_princ.html 80 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1844 81 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1844 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1833 http://www.theintelligencer.net/page/content.detail/id/582883/Pipeline-Ruptures-in-Marshall-County-Evacuates-Homes.html?nav=515 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/22/gas-pipeline-explosion-idUKL1N0CE9MO20130322
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This happened a few days after the Williams company rejected safety recommendations from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in connection with controversial new natural gas pipeline of similar diameter proposed for New York City. 82
March 25 EPA
The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) empaneled a group of industry experts to review the agencys coming report on hydraulic fracturing and the potential impact the controversial drilling technique might have on drinking water. 83
March-27 MN
Canadian Pacific had a derailment in western Minnesota spilling an estimated 15,000 gallons of oil 84 Winter weather is complicating the cleanup effort. The volume of oil transported by U.S. rail85 has surged to 233,811 carloads in 2012 from 9,500 as recently as 2008. Railroad-related oil incidents are soaring, with 112 oil spills reported from 2010 to 2012 compared to 10 in the previous three years.
March-28 IA IN
One of the men accused of the Indy Bombing, is now in more trouble because he allegedly tried to hire a hit-man to kill one of the witnesses, and make that look like a suicide.86 His plot failed, because he used a jailhouse phone, which is monitored, and an under cover federal agent was involved in hearing the proposed plot. A natural gas explosion injured a worker reportedly relocating natural gas lines in Des Moines, Iowa, Thursday, March 28, according to a recent media report. The Cedar Rapids Gazette identified the victim as 41-year-old Howard Russell, who was working for Q3 Contracting on the gas-line project.87
82
http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1833 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1818 83 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1857 84 http://www.kare11.com/news/article/1018945/14/Canadian-Pacific-lowers-estimate-of-oil-spill-in-Minnderailment 85 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323296504578396850749052848.html 86 http://www.wishtv.com/dpp/news/crime/possible-new-charges-in-indy-explosion http://news.sky.com/story/1071127/indianapolis-blast-suspect-sought-hitman http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-indianapolis-explosion-20130328,0,7135481.story http://abcnews.go.com/US/indianapolis-house-explosion-suspect-charged-murder-hireplot/story?id=18837371 87 http://www.naturalgaswatch.org/?p=1878
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March-29 Ark
The Exxon Mobile 65 year old Pegasus oil pipeline ruptured in Mayflower Arkansas, spilling an estimated 10,000 gallons.88 No one was doing any construction work in the area, which is one of many causes of these events.89 Local residents were evacuated. Interviews indicated most of them had no idea their homes were sitting on top of this thing. Many peoples lawns. Backyards, etc., in a housing development, are now black with oil.90 Local wildlife are being treated for being covered in oil, some have died.91 Exxon was fined, in 2010, for not maintaining the Pegasus pipeline up to federal standards.92 Some news stories say the oil is ordinary Canadian crude Some say it is Canadian Wabasca Heavy crude.93 Some commentators say it was carrying Canadian tar sand oil94 which environmentalists say does not float on water, but sinks to bottom, if it gets into rivers, which is part of the explanation why the 2010 July oil spill into the Kalamazoo river near Marshall Michigan was so expensive to clean up that type of oil.95 That is only part of the explanation. Other parts of the Enbridge disaster included: ignoring alarms for 17 hours; then sending out crews, who had zero training, nor relevant equipment, to deal with the actual situation. I suspect it is really Canadian Wabasca Heavy crude, and this oil spill has triggered more discussion about the Keystone project, then some news stories get confused about the different kinds of oil. News commentators are reminding us that Arkansas politicians in Washington DC have voted for the Keystone XL pipeline, plan to ask them if this incident affects their opinion on the topic. It does not matter if that pipeline is approved or not, that oil is coming into the USA.
88
http://www.vancouversun.com/business/energyresources/Exxon+Mobil+pipeline+rupture+spills+heavy/8175362/story.html 89 http://www.katv.com/story/21831082/authorities-oil-spill-in-mayflower-contained-lake-residents-safefor-now 90 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/04/pictures/130401-arkansas-oil-spill-pictures/ 91 http://www.katv.com/story/21845148/wildlife-affected-by-mayflower-oil-spill 92 http://news.yahoo.com/exxon-cleanup-arkansas-oil-spill-continues-pipeline-still-155432722-finance.html 93 http://news.yahoo.com/exxon-cleanup-arkansas-oil-spill-continues-pipeline-still-155432722-finance.html 94 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323296504578396850749052848.html http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/03/31/exxonmobil-still-working-to-stop-oil-spill-after-tar-sandspipeline-ruptured/ 95 See 2010 July 26 Enbridge oil spill, and 2012 July 10 NTSB report on the incident.
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Continued in more documents

Time Line of these disasters to be continued in related documents to be named: CI Boom 0 thru 199996 CI Boom 2000 to 200697 CI Boom 200798 CI Boom 2008 to 2009 CI Boom 2010 to 2011 CI Boom 201299 CI Boom 2013 Jan-Mar CI Boom 2013 Apr100 CI Boom 2013 May-Dec CI Boom 2014 Jan W Va Water101 Later time lines, in history, shall be uploaded to the same SCRIBD Critical Infrastructure collection.102 Revision history will be maintained in the main parent document.
96 97
http://www.scribd.com/doc/203317455/CI-Boom-0-thru-1999 http://www.scribd.com/doc/203688481/CI-Boom-2000-to-2006 98 http://www.scribd.com/doc/204262969/CI-Boom-2007 99 http://www.scribd.com/doc/204042682/CI-Boom-2012 100 http://www.scribd.com/doc/204575461/CI-Boom-2013-April 101 http://www.scribd.com/doc/203973261/CI-Boom-2014-Jan-9-W-Va-Water 102 http://www.scribd.com/collections/4108500/Critical-Infrastructure
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Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan to Mar2/5/2014 10:36:38 AM

Critical Infrastructure Disasters 2013 Jan to Mar

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Notable CI disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Jan-03 Thu Oh, OK

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Jan-04 Fri Il Tx,

Jan-08 Al, NYC

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Jan-19 Chippewa Falls WI

Jan-22 British home

Jan-23 GAO report on pipeline response

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan to Mar2/5/2014 10:36:38 AM

Automated shut down, pros and cons:

Advantages via Improved response time:

Disadvantages - Accidental closures

Disadvantages - Monetary costs

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Jan-23 GAO Statistics

When pipeline operator knows they have an incident.

Jan-23 GAO Background

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Transmission pipelines carry hazardous liquid or natural gas,

Distribution pipelines split off from transmission pipelines to transport

Break for diagram of transmission pipelines.

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Break for diagram of steps operators take when responding to an incident.

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Jan-23 GAO lists variables an operator can control

Jan-23 GAO lists variables outside operator control

o Like traffic, this can impact ability to get to the scene.

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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Other operators pipeline in the same area.

Jan-24 Spectra Energy pipeline repairs NOT / In

Jan-28 US Senate field hearing

Critical Infrastructure disasters 2013 Jan-Mar

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