Fictional Minds

Book by Alan Palmer; University of Nebraska Press 2004. 27 !"s.

Parts of this volume previously appeared in The Construction of Fictional Minds, Narrative 10 (1) !"#$%& ' !00$ (y the )oard of *e+ents of the ,niversity of -e(ras.a /ll ri+hts reserved Manufactured in the ,nited 0tates of /merica 1 2i(rary of Con+ress Catalo+in+3inPu(lication 4ata Palmer, /lan, 1560# Fictional minds 7 /lan Palmer& p& cm&#(Frontiers of narrative) 8ncludes (i(lio+raphical references and inde9& 80)- 03"0:!3:;$:3< (cl& al.& paper) 1& Fiction#Techni=ue& !& Characters and characteristics in literature& :& 8ntellect in literature& 8& Title& 88& 0eries& P-::":&C$P:6 !00$ "05&:>5!;#4C!! !00:015;00

Contents /c.no?led+ments 1& 8ntroduction 1& )ac.+round 2. Summary 3. Some Definitions and Assumptions $& @hat the )oo. 8s -ot 6& / -ote on the Te9ts !& 0ome -arratolo+ical /pproaches 1& 0tory /nalysis 2. Possible Worlds 3. Characterization $& Co+nitive 0cience and Frames 6& FocaliAation :& The 0peech Cate+ories 1& 0ummary !& The Prosecution :& The 4efense $& Thou+ht *eport $& The @hole Mind . !unctionalism 2. "an#ua#e 3. Non$verbal Consciousness %. Non$consciousness &. Dispositions '. (motions

vii 1 1 5 1% !1 !6 !" !" :! :% $$ $" 6: 6: 6; %5 ;6 "; "; 5! 5; 10$ 10" 11!

). Action "& First3Person /scription 6& The 0ocial Mind 1& Pu(lic Thou+ht !& Third3Person /scription :& The 4evelopment of Purposive Thou+ht $& 4ialo+ic Thou+ht 6& The Mind )eyond the 0.in %& The Fictional Mind 1& 0ummary !& The Continuin+3Consciousness Frame :& Bm(edded -arratives $& The 0tory?orld ;& The Fictional Mind in /ction 1& )ac.+round !& Thou+ht and /ction :& 8ntermental Thou+ht $& 4ou(ly Bm(edded -arratives "& Further /pplications )i(lio+raphy 8nde9 3vic3 Acknowledgments

11" 1!$ 1:0 1:1 1:; 1$; 16! 16; 1;0 1;0 1;6 1": 15$ !06 !06 !10 !1" !:0 !$0 !$5 !%:

8 ?ould li.e to than. the follo?in+ my motherC )rian and 0heila )arfordC Denneth Par.erC 0usannah *adstoneC 2inda *oAmovitsC Molly /ndre?s and Corinne 0=uire of the Centre for -arrative *esearch at the ,niversity of Bast 2ondonC Eames PhelanC 2isa FunshineC CouAe Genn,

for his thou+htful +uidance and encoura+ementC Marie32aure *yan, for tellin+ me a(out the theorytheory7simulation de(ateC ,ri Mar+olin, for some stimulatin+ and very helpful email discussionsC )rian Din+ for his ri+orous and sensitive copyeditin+C and the editors of the ,niversity of -e(ras.a Press for their invalua(le assistance& There are three people to ?hom 8 o?e a particularly lar+e de(t of +ratitude& *o(ert Chase and 4avid Herman have (een e9tremely conscientious and amaAin+ly enthusiastic and supportive mentors& )oth have (een unfailin+ly +enerous ?ith their time, advice, assistance, and support& The pure, disinterested scholarship of )o( and 4avid has (een an inspiration& Finally, 8 ?ould li.e to dedicate this (oo. to my partner, 0ue sine *ua non&

1 Introduction
@e never .no? them ?ell, do ?eI @hoI *eal people& @hat do you mean, >real people>I /s opposed to people in (oo.s, Paola e9plained& They>re the only ones ?e ever really .no? ?ell, or .no? truly&&&& May(e that>s (ecause they>re the only ones a(out ?hom ?e +et relia(le information&&&& -arrators never lie& # 4onna 2eon, / 0ea of Trou(les

1. Background
Fictional Minds is a(out people in (oo.s& 8n particular, it is a(out the amount, ran+e, variety, and relia(ility of the information on the fictional minds of people in (oo.s that ?e are a(le to o(tain from those (oo.s& / little personal history may (e helpful here in order to e9plain the purpose of this (oo.& 8 (e+an studyin+ fictional minds in 1556& 8 did this (y loo.in+ at the )o9 Hill chapter in Eane /usten>s (mma and the @aterloo (all chapter in @illiam Ma.epeace Thac.eray>s +anity !air to see ho? the minds of the characters in those chapters ?ere constructed& 8 chose those t?o te9ts (ecause 8 thou+ht that it ?ould (e interestin+ to e9amine the consciousnesses of characters interactin+ in +roups& /t that time, 8 am ashamed to say no?, 8 ?as not even a?are of the e9istence of narrative theory, or narratolo+y, althou+h as it happened this direct approach to primary te9ts turned out to (e an a(solutely inspired idea& Then once 8 had discovered that there ?as such a thin+ as narrative theory, 8 thou+ht that it ?ould (e interestin+ to find out ?hat it said a(out my chosen area of study& /fter all ?hat could (e more central to the theoretical analysis of fiction than the ?or.in+s of characters> mindsI My first encounter ?ith narrative theory ?as ?ith ?hat 8 ?ill call the speech cate#ory approach, and 8 ?as immediately struc. (y the fact that it did not provide a convincin+ e9planation or even description of ho? the ?hole minds of characters in action ?ere constructed& 8t seemed to me that there ?as a +ood deal that ?as +oin+ on in the /usten and Thac.eray chapters that had not (een captured (y classification of the specific e9amples of direct access to fictional minds into the various speech cate+ories& 8 felt as thou+h 8 had stum(led into a lar+e, fascinatin+ field that 8 very much ?anted to e9plore further& / small corner of it had (een tended and retended ?ith, perhaps, o(sessive care, ?hile the rest of it appeared to me at that time to (e ne+lected& 8 read more ?idely ?ithin narrative theory and soon discovered the concept of focalization or ?hat used to (e called point of vie,& 0o another small corner of the field had (een cultivated& FocaliAation ?as informative, (ut it ?as still only a small part of the story& The third corner turned

out to (e story analysis#the structuralist study of the (asic elements of plot structures& -e9t 8 came across characterization and, in particular, ho? the reader (rin+s to the te9t pree9istin+ cultural and literary stereotypes in order to construct satisfyin+ patterns of (ehavior and convincin+ fictional personalities& Finally, and ine9cusa(ly late in the day, 8 encountered possible$,orlds theory& This has proved very helpful indeed, althou+h 8 soon found out that in certain ?ays it is not that ?ell suited to the study of fictional minds& (Jou may have noticed that there are five corners# it is an irre+ularly shaped field&) 0o, the corners of the field are ?ell tended, (ut in the middle there remains a very lar+e and apparently une9plored patch of land that still loo.s Kust as interestin+ to me today as it did at the (e+innin+& )ut the oddest thin+ of all, as 8 continued my search ?ithin narrative theory for a comprehensive treatment of the ?hole of my area of interest, ?as that 8 found very little reco+nition of the fact that there ,as an area of interest at all& The various corners adKoin other fields and appear to (e vie?ed primarily as adKuncts to those other fields the analysis of spo.en speech in the case of the speech cate+oriesC various aspects of discourse analysis in the case of focaliAationC interte9tuality in the case of characteriAationC classical structuralism in the case of story analysisC and modal lo+ic in the case of possi(le3?orlds theory& This seemed stran+e to me then, and it still does no?& 8n fact, it is this continued sense of stran+eness that drives this (oo.& Bven no?, 8 still thin., @hy don>t other people as. themselves ?hat aspect of literary theory could (e more important than fictional mindsI This study is an attempt to mar. out the (oundaries of the field as a ?ell3defined su(Kect area in its o?n ri+ht (y lin.in+ to+ether the previously ?ell3trodden parts of it and (y tendin+ a fe? ne? patches of my o?n& 8 decided on the title !ictional -inds, instead of other possi(ilities such as .he Presentation of Consciousness 3!3 in the Novel, (ecause it sounds to me as much the name of a ne? su(Kect area ?ithin narrative theory as it does the title of a sin+le study& 8 ?ill descri(e my e9ploration of the field ?ith the use, 8 am afraid, of another and final a+ricultural metaphor& 0ome?here (8 have (een una(le to find the e9act reference) the philosopher 2ud?i+ @itt+enstein su++ests that there are t?o ?ays of e9plorin+ a piece of land such as a hill& Lne ?ay is to attempt to define it (y esta(lishin+ its (oundaries ?ith precision& 8n this ?ay once you have dra?n an e9act line around the land in =uestion, you can say ?ith confidence that the hill consists of all the land ?ithin the (order created (y the line and ?hatever lies outside the (oundary is somethin+ else& The other ?ay to do it is to e9plore the hill (y criss3crossin+ it from various directions& That ?ay you +et to .no? it intimately, and you have a fairly clear idea a(out ?hat is the hill and ?hat is not, even thou+h you do not ever dra? a precise line around it& Bach method has its o?n .ind of value, and of course they are not mutually e9clusive& Perhaps he had in mind a comparison (et?een the early ?or.in+ method of the .ractatus "o#ico$Philosophicus and the later, very different approach of the Philosophical 8nvesti+ations& 8 ?ould say that the

modus operandi of Fictional Minds is the criss3crossin+ of the field, rather than the strict delineation of its e9act (orders, althou+h 8 hope that it ?ill (ecome clear that the (oundaries of the fictional mind in discourse e9tend much further than have previously (een reco+niAed& 4urin+ my studies, 8 discovered reader response theory, ?hich proved to (e of +reat value& 8 ?ill pic. out one specific issue here the sheer scale of the input re=uired from readers in constructin+ minds from novels& Have you ever, ?hile rereadin+ a novel containin+ a scene or a character that had a profound effect on you ?hen you first read it, (een surprised at ho? little there actually ?as to that scene or character and ho? fe? ?ords ?ere used to descri(e themI Jou thin., 4oes that scene really last for only a pa+eI Lr, 4oes that character really only appear in only those scenesI (/ particularly +ood e9ample of this phenomenon is Lrson @elles>s Harry 2ime character in the film .he .hird -an& 2ime does not appear until after the (est part of an hour and says almost nothin+ apart from the famous cuc.oo3cloc. scene&) Ln rereadin+ a scene of this sort, you find yourself surprised that your ima+ination, as it then ?as, contri(uted so much to flesh out the ?ords in the te9t, and it can sometimes happen that your current ima+inative state does not do the same& 8t is almost as thou+h the te9t is simply the scaffoldin+ on ?hich you (uild the vivid psycholo+ical processes that stay ?ith you for so lon+ after?ard& 8 recently felt this sort of disappointment 3:3 ?hile rereadin+ ,m(erto Bco>s novel .he Name of the /ose, ?hich is ironic since he is a leadin+ reader response theoristM 8t can also happen ?ith historical narrative, as it did for me ?ith Bmmanuel 2e *oy 2adurie>s -ontaillou& 8 find that the same sensation can also occur ?hen someone recommends that 8 read an episode in a novel or see a scene in a film& 8 thin., 8 am not really sure that there is enou+h here for me to feel that it Kustified the (uild3up that it +ot& There is a +ood deal that has (een (rou+ht to this scene (y the other person, and 8 am not sure ?hat it is& /ll this is an illustration of ?hat the narratolo+ist Moni.a Fluderni. refers to in the vivid phrase the human ur+e to create si+nificance (155:, $6;)& @hat 8 am descri(in+ is one of those rare occasions ?hen you are acutely a?are of the creative nature of the readin+ process in +eneral and the stran+eness of character construction in particular& /ny theory that attempts to e9plain this process, or a part of it, has to reco+niAe the intense po?er of reader response to fictional minds& 8 decided at an early sta+e that it ?ould (e re?ardin+ to illuminate the study of fictional minds (y ma.in+ use of the insi+hts of some of the disciplines relatin+ to real minds& For e9ample, 8 noticed ri+ht at the (e+innin+ that durin+ my analyses of the Bmma and Ganity Fair passa+es 8 ?as findin+ it difficult in a num(er of cases to separate out presentations of consciousness from descriptions of action, and 8 ?as a?are that an illuminatin+ perspective on this issue could (e derived from the philosophy of action& ()y the ?ay, this point is a perfect illustration of the (enefits of theoriAin+ a(out novels (efore readin+ literary theory the theory that 8 read later appeared to assume that dividin+ the t?o ?as entirely unpro(lematical, ?hile the naNve reader that 8 then ?as could spot immediately that this ?as not the case&) 8n addition to philosophy such

as the philosophy of mind as ?ell as the philosophy of action, this (oo. also ma.es use of other real3mind disciplines such as co+nitive science, psycholo+y, and psycholin+uistics& 8 hope that the result is a rich, fle9i(le, sensitive, and inclusive paradi+m of the fictional mind that is ?ell suited to capturin+ as much information as possi(le from fictional te9ts& !ictional -inds is an interdisciplinary proKect that is in a sense desi+ned to (e a source (oo. for non3specialists of some of the ideas a(out the mind that are current in the various real3mind discourses& Ho?ever, it is ?orth pointin+ out ri+ht from the start that a +ood deal of humility is re=uired ?hen theoriAin+ a(out the mind& The relationship (et?een .no?led+e and its representation in the (rain ?as characteriAed (y the psycholo+ist @illiam Eames ((rother of the novelist Henry Eames) in 1"50 as the most mysterious thin+ in the ?orld (15"1, !1%)& /nd for every mystery that has (een dispelled since Eames>s time, three more seem to arise to ta.e its place& 3$3 Lne particular aspect of my approach is ?orth emphasiAin+ here& The entry (y Col?yn Trevarthen in .he -assachusetts 0nstitute of .echnolo#y (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences (1555) (from no? on referred to as -0.(CS) on the topic of intersu(Kectivity descri(es t?o different perspectives on the mind the sub1ective first and the intersub1ective first& The @estern philosophical tradition (as e9emplified (y *enO 4escartes and 8mmanuel Dant) +enerally assumes that human minds are inherently separate in their purposes and e9periences, see.in+ rational clarity, autonomous s.ills, and self3(etterment&&&& PPeopleQ construct an a?areness of the self in society (ut remain sin+le su(Kectivities&&&& @e ?ill call this vie? of intelli+ent and civiliAed cooperation as an artificial ac=uisition the &&& su(Kective first position&&&& / different conception of human consciousness &&& perceives interpersonal a?areness, cooperative action in society, and cultural learnin+ as manifestations of innate motives for sympathy in purposes, interests, and feelin+s#that is, that a human mind is e=uipped ?ith needs for dialo+ue PandQ intermental en+a+ement ?ith other similar minds&&&& @e ?ill call this vie? of ho? human cooperation arises the &&& intersu(Kective first position& (1555, $1;) Mine is very much an intersu(Kective first approach to fictional minds, (ut not (ecause 8 deny the importance of the su(Kective first approach& 8t is important to stress that (oth perspectives are e=ually valid, informative, and, indeed, necessary& The reason ?hy this study favors the intersu(Kective first approach is that the su(Kective first position has (ecome the dominant paradi+m for the study of consciousness ?ithin narrative theory, and the (ias contained in this (oo. is intended to redress the (alance a little& For a contrastin+ and very su(Kective first approach

to the relationship (et?een the novel, narrative theory, and co+nitive science, see Consciousness and the Novel (!00!) (y the narrative theorist and novelist 4avid 2od+e& 8t is pro(a(ly the case that anyone ?or.in+ in the field of narrative theory has a ?or.in+ definition of narrative that they may ma.e e9plicit or that may remain implicit& To ma.e thin+s easier for you, 8 ?ill no? ma.e mine e9plicit& My thesis is a fundamental one narrative fiction is, in essence, the presentation of fictional mental functionin+& 8 state my thesis here in this (ald, star. manner for purposes of clarity& The full implications of it ?ill emer+e later on& 8f 8 am ri+ht, then it follo?s that the study of the novel is the study of fictional mental functionin+ and also that the tas. of theorists is to ma.e e9plicit the various means (y ?hich this phenomenon is studied and analyAed& This is another ?ay 363 of ma.in+ the point made earlier that the study of fictional minds should (e esta(lished as a clearly defined and discrete su(Kect area ?ithin literary theory& 8 do not .no? ho? many narrative theorists ?ill a+ree or disa+ree ?ith my claim re+ardin+ the centrality of fictional minds to any informative definition of fictionality, althou+h 8 refer to some potential s.epticism in the ne9t section& 8 hope that it ?ill stri.e some as o(viously true, even thou+h 8 am a?are that the ?orld is full of people ?ho have advanced theories that they thou+ht ?ere o(viously true (ut then found to their astonishment that they ?ere (itterly contested& )ut, true or not, and o(vious or not, 8 am not a?are that it has (een e9plicitly formulated (efore, ?ith the possi(le e9ception of Moni.a Fluderni.>s emphasis on her notion of e2perientiality in .o,ards a 3Natural4 Narratolo#y (155%)& My thesis has al?ays (een implicit in discussions of fictionality, and should (e made e9plicit& /s the narratolo+ist 4orrit Cohn points out, in narratolo+y, as else?here, norms have a ?ay of remainin+ uninterestin+, often even invisi(le, until and unless ?e find that they have (een (ro.en#or ?ant to sho? that they have not (een (ro.en (1555, $:)& The description of fictional mental functionin+ has (een re+arded as an uninterestin+ and even invisi(le norm ?ithin narratolo+y, and it ?ould (e of (enefit to the discipline if it ?ere +iven the central place ?ithin the conceptual frame?or. of the su(Kect that it deserves& 0ome scholars in other disciplines tend to re+ard literary theory as arid, ?illfully o(scure, solipsistic, dreary, stultifyin+, and literature3hatin+& The list is discoura+in+ly lon+& @hether or not this vie? is true of literary theory +enerally, as a picture specifically of narrative theory, it is completely mis+uided& 8t ta.es no account of the very lar+e (ody of thorou+h, illuminatin+, and e9citin+ ?or. that is simply the result of systematic and ri+orous analyses of narrative te9ts& Ho?ever, all literary theorists, includin+ narrative theorists, have a responsi(ility to reach out to the rest of the academic ?orld (y ma.in+ literary theory as reader3friendly as possi(le& 2iterary theory should spea. to, and (e shared ?ith,

other scholars& /lthou+h this study is aimed primarily at specialists in literary theory in +eneral and narrative theory in particular, it also tries to (e +enuinely helpful to scholars in other fields, for e9ample, researchers into and teachers and students of Bn+lish and other literatures& 8 (elieve that the interdisciplinary reconceptualiAation that is e9plored here ?ill (e of real value not only to research in fields that involve the practical criticism of fictional te9ts (ut also to the teachin+ of practical criticism& 0uch criticism depends on the a(ility to use the availa(le evidence to pronounce ?ith confidence on characters> thou+ht processes& My ?or. is concerned ?ith e9aminin+ precisely ho? this a(ility is 3%3 made possi(le& The sort of =uestionin+ that 8 have in mind could occur not only in courses on literary theory (ut also ?ithin sessions of practical criticism& 8n this ?ay, 8 su++est, theory and practice could +enuinely interpenetrate and syner+istically enrich one another& 8 am a?are that this approach does not appear to fit easily ?ithin current literary3studies approaches, (ut is it such a (ad thin+ for a discipline to =uestion some of the foundations on ?hich it is (asedI 0urely literature studies ?ould +ain ne? insi+hts from a perspective that is (oth radically innovative and also directly relevant to all other perspectives on the novel& 8n 15"1, ?hen revie?in+ 4orrit Cohn>s (rilliant ?or. on thou+ht representation .ransparent -inds (15;"), the narratolo+ist )rian McHale commented that the history of our poetics of prose is essentially a history of successive differentiations of types of discourse from the undifferentiated >(loc.> of narrative prose& He then added that there is still a siAea(le (loc. of undifferentiated prose left (15"1, 1"6)& 8n my vie?, no one has yet responded to McHale>s challen+e, and a +ood deal more ?or. is re=uired (efore the siAea(le (loc. of undifferentiated prose that is related to characters> minds is reduced any further& /s far as 8 .no?, Cohn>s is still the only full3len+th study devoted solely to this topic& /ll the other full3len+th studies of ?hich 8 am a?are refer to speech as ?ell as thou+ht or are concerned ?ith narratolo+y +enerally& 8t is no? a lon+ time since Cohn ?rote her pioneerin+ ?or. and since McHale ?rote his ?holly Kustified praise of it, and yet there has (een no successor in the sense that there has (een no other (oo. ?holly devoted to her su(Kect& Riven the o(vious importance of this issue for any formal study of the novel, this seems e9traordinary& The purpose of !ictional -inds is to (e+in the attempt to theoriAe a part of the (loc. of prose that remains undifferentiated the aspect of narrative fiction that is concerned ?ith the ?hole of the social mind in action& This enterprise is intended to fit comforta(ly ?ithin the perspective on narrative that is offered (y the Frontiers of -arrative series& The editor of the series, the narrative theorist 4avid Herman, in advocatin+ an approach that he calls postclassical narratolo#y, contends that ?e have recently ?itnessed a small (ut unmista.a(le e9plosion of activity in the field of narrative studiesC si+ns of this minor narratolo+ical renaissance include the pu(lication of a spate of articles, special issues, and (oo.s that rethin. and reconte9tualiAe classical models for narratolo+ical research

(1555a, 1)& He also remar.s that postclassical narratolo+y is mar.ed (y a profusion of ne? methodolo+ies and research hypothesesC the result is a host of ne? perspectives on the forms and functions of narrative itself (1555a, !#:)& The narratolo+ist Rerald Prince a+rees ?ith Herman that 3;3 the very domain of narratolo+y is (and has (een) in flu9 and the discipline .eeps on chan+in+ as its (oundaries are (re)dra?n (155%, 1%0)& Herman also ma.es the heady claim that recent ?or. in narrative theory has displaced and transformed the assumptions, methods, and +oals of structuralist narratolo+y (1555a, !) and that this research has hi+hli+hted aspects of narrative discourse that classical narratolo+y either failed or chose not to e9plore (1555a, !)& This is precisely ?hat !ictional -inds attempts to do& 8t does so (y usin+ concepts and ideas dra?n from a variety of different disciplines (ecause, as Herman says, postclassical narratolo+y is an inherently interdisciplinary proKect (1555a, !0)& My ar+ument lays +reat stress on the need to e9amine ho? fictional minds ?or. ?ithin the conte9ts of the story?orlds to ?hich they (elon+& Postclassical narratolo+y>s attempt to (rea. free from the structuralist purity of classical narratolo+y is also concerned ?ith the =uestion of conte9t& For e9ample, Rerald Prince, in considerin+ the role of +ender in narratolo+y, maintains that narrative poetics ou+ht to (e more sensitive to the role of conte9t & & & in the production of narrative meanin+ (155%, 1%:)& Prince has in mind the various real3?orld, sociocultural conte9ts in ?hich narratives are produced& Ho?ever, 8 ?ill use the notion of conte9t in a more narro? sense to focus on (oth the conte9t of the ?hole fictional mind durin+ the analysis of a particular part of that mind and also on the social and physical conte9t of the story?orld ?ithin ?hich that mind functions& The follo?in+ passa+e illustrates the .ind of fictional mental functionin+ that 8 am interested in& 8n it a policeman is confrontin+ a suspect )runetti ?atched as Murino a(sor(ed this information, then ?aited as the other man (e+an to consider ?hat his visi(le response should (e& /ll of this too. only seconds, (ut )runetti had (een o(servin+ the process for decades and ?as familiar ?ith it& The people to ?hom he presented himself had a dra?er of responses ?hich they thou+ht appropriate, and part of his Ko( ?as to ?atch them as they sifted throu+h them one at a time, see.in+ the ri+ht fit& 0urpriseI FearI 8nnocenceI CuriosityI He ?atched Murino flip throu+h them, studied his face as he considered, then discarded various possi(ilities& He decided, apparently, on the last& JesI /nd ?hat ?ould you li.e to .no?, CommissarioI (2eon 155%, 155)

/t this point, 8 ?ill simply say that, for the reasons set out in chapters ! and :, current narratolo+ical approaches do not do a +reat deal to (rin+ out the full si+nificance of this passa+e& 8 ?ill refer to it a+ain at the end of chapter ;, (y ?hich time 8 hope that, ?hen you read it there in the li+ht of chapters $ 3"3 to ;, much more of its si+nificance ?ill have (een revealed& Lf course, there is nothin+ to stop you +oin+ strai+ht there no? e9cept possi(ly the feelin+ that you mi+ht have missed some interestin+ stuff alon+ the ?ayM 2. Summary This summary of the ar+ument of the (oo. is placed here to assist readers ?ho ?ish to read the rest of the (oo. and ?ho ?ill find it helpful to see from the (e+innin+ the purpose of the theoretical +round?or. that is laid in later chapters, readers ?ho are not yet sure ?hether or not they ?ish to read the rest of the (oo. and may find a summary of the ar+ument helpful in decidin+, and readers ?ho are sure that they ?ill not read the rest of the (oo. (ut ?ho ?ill ?ant to .no? ?hat they are missin+& @hat do ?e mean ?hen ?e tal. a(out the presentation of consciousness in fictionI 8t is clear ?hat 4orrit Cohn has in mind ?hen she refers to her predilection for novels ?ith thou+htful characters and scenes of self3communion (15;", v) and her interest in moments of lonely self3 communion minutely tracin+ spiritual and emotional conflicts (1555, "$)& /nd, as 8 ?ill su++est in chapter :, her li.in+ for private and heavily introspective thin.in+ is shared (y other narrative theorists& 0elf3communin+s lend themselves to the hi+hly ver(aliAed, self3conscious form of thou+ht that is .no?n as inner speech, and the theoretical predilection for fictional introspection is accompanied (y a decided preference for this form of thou+ht& /s the eminent narratolo+ist Rerard Renette has ar+ued in Narrative Discourse (15"0), the novelistic convention, perhaps truthful in this case, is that thou+hts and feelin+s are no different from speech, e9cept ?hen the narrator underta.es to condense them into events and to relate them as such (15"0, 1;1)& B9amples of self3communin+ characters ?ho are popular ?ith narrative theorists include 4orothea )roo.e in Reor+e Bliot>s -iddlemarchC 8so(el /rcher in Henry Eames>s Portrait of a "adyC 0tephen 4edalus, 2eopold )loom, and Molly )loom in Eames Eoyce>s 5lyssesC and Mrs& *amsay in Gir+inia @oolf >s To the 2i+hthouse& This emphasis on the privacy of thou+ht e9plains ?hy it is customary in studies of this sort to refer to the (asic reality of our lives that ?e do not have direct access to the thou+hts of others& *& 4& 2ain+ put the point memora(ly your e2perience of me is invisible to me and my e2perience of you is invisible to you& 8 cannot e9perience your e9perience& Jou cannot e9perience my e9perience& @e are (oth invisi(le men& /ll men are

invisi(le to one another (15%;, 1%, =uoted in 8ser 15;", 1%6)& 8n contrast, the vast maKority of novels present directly to readers their main characters> thou+hts, and ?e have learned to accept this as 353 perfectly natural& Lne of the pleasures of readin+ novels is the enKoyment of (ein+ told ?hat a variety of fictional people are thin.in+& /s Paola e9plains in the epi+raph for this chapter, ?e +et relia(le information& This is a relief from the (usiness of real life, much of ?hich re=uires the a(ility to decode accurately the (ehavior of others& 8t is ?orth d?ellin+ on the stran+eness of this activity for a moment& 8n one sense to read she felt happy is the most natural thin+ in the ?orld ?e .no? ?hat it is to feel happy& 8n another sense, it is the oddest ?e do not .no? and can never .no? ?hat it is to e9perience directly ho? another person can feel happy& The literary critic Reor+es Poulet captures the peculiar =uality of readin+ a(out the thou+hts of others in this ?ay )ecause of the stran+e invasion of my person (y the thou+hts of another, 8 am a self ?ho is +ranted the e9perience of thin.in+ thou+hts forei+n to him& 8 am the su(Kect of thou+hts other than my o?n& My consciousness (ehaves as thou+h it ?ere the consciousness of another (15%5, 6%)& )ut ho? does this intensely private, individualistic vie? of the mind account for the follo?in+ scene in the sit3com FriendsI Lne friend, Phoe(e, lets slip to another, *achel, that all the other friends thin. that she, *achel, is still in love ?ith *oss& *achel protests that this is not true and that she is over him, (ut then eventually a+rees that yes, all ri+ht, she is still in love ?ith him& )ut ?hy didn>t you tell meI *achel demands to .no?& )ecause ?e thou+ht you .ne?M e9claims Phoe(e& @hat this e9chan+e appears to sho? is that *achel>s feelin+s a(out *oss ?ere more accessi(le to the other friends than they ?ere to her& They all .ne? that she ?as still in love ?ith *oss even thou+h she herself did not .no?& Ln the other hand, ?e should not +o too far in this direction (ecause the conversation also sho?s that the .no?led+e that people have of the inner states of others can (e patchy& *achel did not .no? that the other friends .ne?, and the others did not .no? that *achel did not .no?M 8n a sense, the humor in this scene is a ne? ta.e on the familiar, clichOd old Ko.e a(out the t?o psychiatrists (or the t?o (ehaviorists, dependin+ on your preKudice) ?ho say to each other ?hen meetin+, Jou>re fine, ho? am 8I Ho?ever, the !riends scene is more interestin+, it seems to me, for t?o reasons it ac.no?led+es that all of us, not Kust specialists in the study of the mind, have some sort of access to the thin.in+ of othersC and it also ac.no?led+es that thou+ht can (e private and inaccessi(le as ?ell as pu(lic and shared& 0o, ?hat ?ould happen to the narratolo+ical study of private and introspective fictional minds if ?e applied to it some of the various discourses on real mindsI @ell, the philosopher Ril(ert *yle su++ests that to tal. of a person>s mind is &&& to tal. of the person>s a(ilities, lia(ilities, and inclinations to do and

3103 under+o certain sorts of thin+s, and of the doin+ and under+oin+ of these thin+s in the ordinary ?orld (15%:, 150)& This is an alternative picture that consists of the social mind in action ?hile en+a+ed in purposive mental functionin+ in a physical conte9t& Lther disciplines share this vie? of the mind& @ithin anthropolo+y, Clifford ReertA ar+ues that thou+ht is consummately social social in its ori+ins, social in its functions, social in its forms, social in its applications& /t (ase, thin.in+ is a pu(lic activity#its natural ha(itat is the houseyard, the mar.etplace, and the to?n s=uare (155:, :%0)& /nother anthropolo+ist, Rre+ory )ateson, discusses the e9tent of the individual mind in these vivid terms 0uppose 8 am a (lind man, and 8 use a stic.& 8 +o tap, tap, tap& @here do 0 startI 8s my mental system (ounded at the handle of the stic.I 8s it (ounded (y my s.inI 4oes it start half?ay up the stic.I 4oes it start at the tip of the stic.I )ut these are nonsense =uestions& The stic. is a path?ay alon+ ?hich transforms of difference are (ein+ transmitted& The ?ay to delineate the system is to dra? the limitin+ line in such a ?ay that you do not cut any of these path?ays in ?ays ?hich leave thin+s ine9plica(le (15;!, $%6)& These vie?s lead the psycholin+uist Eames @ertsch to remar. in Goices of the Mind that, to (orro? from theorists such as Rre+ory )ateson & & & and Clifford ReertA &&& mind is vie?ed here as somethin+ that >e9tends (eyond the s.in> (1551, 1$)& This social perspective on ?hat mi+ht (e termed the mind (eyond the s.in sho?s that the stran+eness of the device of direct access should not allo? us to for+et that the reader>s e9perience of the minds of characters in novels does not depend solely on that device& Eust as in real life the individual constructs the minds of others from their (ehavior and speech, so the reader infers the ?or.in+s of fictional minds and sees these minds in action from o(servation of characters> (ehavior and speech& 8n one sense, as 2ain+ says, ?e are invisi(le to each other& )ut in another sense the ?or.in+s of our minds are perfectly visi(le to others in our actions, and the ?or.in+s of fictional minds are perfectly visi(le to readers from characters> actions& Most novels contain a ?ide variety of evidence on ?hich readers (ase their conKectures, hypotheses, and opinions a(out fictional minds& This study su++ests that narrative theory has (een concerned for too lon+ primarily ?ith the privacy of consciousness and that an emphasis on the social nature of thou+ht mi+ht form an informative and su++estive perspective on fictional minds& *educed to the very minimum, a character is simply a collection of the ?ords that relate to a particular proper name occurrin+ at intervals ?ithin the lon+ series of ?ords that ma.es up a narrative& The perspective that 8 am advocatin+ mi+ht help provide the (e+innin+ of an ans?er to =uestions 3113

li.e these Ho? precisely do these +roups of ?ords (ecome the reco+niAa(le fictional minds that are clearly contained in fictional te9tsI -arratives are a(out the minds of characters, (ut ho? are these minds constructed (y the narrator and the reader of the te9tI L(viously these are hu+e =uestions that a sin+le study of this sort cannot hope to ans?er& 8nstead, 8 ?ill focus in particular on some of the areas of fictional mental functionin+ that have not (een e9plored ?ithin narratolo+y& 8n doin+ so, 8 ?ill ?or. ?ithin the possi(le3?orlds frame?or. that is e9plained in chapter !, section !& / leadin+ possi(le3?orlds theorist, 2u(omSr 4oleTel, asserts that from the vie?point of the reader, the fictional te9t can (e characteriAed as a set of instructions accordin+ to ?hich the fictional ?orld is to (e recovered and reassem(led (15"", $"5)& My ar+ument is that ?e need to loo. more closely at the sets of instructions that relate to mental functionin+ in fictional te9ts& !ictional -inds ar+ues that the constructions of the minds of fictional characters (y narrators and readers are central to our understandin+ of ho? novels ?or. (ecause, in essence, narrative is the description of fictional mental functionin+& Ho?ever, narratolo+y has ne+lected the ?hole minds of fictional characters in action& /t first si+ht, this may seem to (e an implausi(le claim& 0urely characters> minds are considered ?ithin a num(er of the su(Kect areas that ma.e up narrative theoryI For e9ample the study of ho? narrators +ive readers direct access to characters> thou+hts (the speech cate+ory approach)C the analysis of the structure of narrative stories in ?hich characters are considered as units or functions ?ithin the structureC the concept of focaliAation or point of vie?C and the issue of characteriAation, or ho? narrators and readers use the various sorts of .no?led+e of character types that are +ained from real life and other novels in order to (uild a sense of a character>s personality& My ans?er is that these perspectives do not add up to a complete and coherent study of all aspects of the minds of characters in novels& @hat is re=uired is a holistic vie? of the ?hole of the social mind in action that avoids the fra+mentation of the approaches listed earlier& 8t is a functional and teleolo+ical perspective that considers the purposive nature of characters> thou+ht in terms of their motives, intentions, and resultin+ (ehavior and action& This ?ill involve some provisional and tentative typolo+y, (ut as )rian McHale o(serves, ?e should not underestimate the usefulness of >mere> typolo+y& )efore a phenomenon can (e e9plained it must first e9ist for those ?ho ?ould e9plain it, ?hich means that it must (e constituted as a cate+ory ?ith (oundaries and a name (15"1, 1"6)& This discussion ?ill ta.e us a lon+ ?ay from analyses of lonely introspective selfcommunin+s in terms of the speech cate+ories& )ut this is Kust as ?ell perhaps, as 31!3 the characters in a lar+e num(er of novels are not +iven to intense introspection, and the narrators of many novels ma.e little use of the speech cate+ories of free indirect thou+ht or direct thou+ht that are descri(ed later&The si9 chapters that are sand?iched (et?een this introductory chapter and the concludin+ one can (e +rouped into three pairs& Chapters ! and : are concerned ?ith e9istin+ narratolo+ical approaches to?ard fictional minds, chapters $ and 6 consider the implications of real3mind discourses for fictional minds and lay the theoretical (asis for a ne? approach to?ard this area of narrative theory, and chapters % and ; e9plore the ne? approach in various specific directions&8n chapter !, 0ome

-arratolo+ical /pproaches, 8 ?ill refer to a fe? of the ?ays in ?hich some narratolo+ical su(Kect areas can (e (rou+ht to+ether ?ithin a ne? theoretical perspective and there(y contri(ute to?ard a coherent study of fictional minds& 8n chapter :, The 0peech Cate+ories, 8 ?ill consider in a little more detail the pro(lems inherent in one particular area that 8 have referred to several times already the speech cate+ory approach to?ard fictional consciousness& 8 use the term speech cate+ory approach (ecause the narratolo+ical analysis of characters> thou+ht processes is (ased on the assumption that the cate+ories that are applied to fictional speech can (e unpro(lematically applied to fictional thou+ht& The main cate+ories, ?hich are e9plained in more detail in chapter :, section 1, are these U direct thou#ht The train pulled a?ay& He thou+ht, @hy the hell am 8 still ?aitin+ for herI (@hen unta++ed and ?ithout =uotes, this is free direct thou#ht&) U thou#ht report The train pulled a?ay& He ?ondered ?hy he ?as still ?aitin+ for her& U free indirect thou#ht The train pulled a?ay& @hy the hell ?as he still ?aitin+ for herI This approach does not +ive an ade=uate account of the form or the function of presentations (y narrators to readers of fictional characters> minds& 8n summary, the follo?in+ pro(lems occur 8t privile+es the apparently mimetic cate+ories of direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht over the die+etic cate+ory of thou+ht reportC vie?s characters> minds as consistin+ primarily of a private, passive flo? of consciousness (ecause of its overestimation of the importance of inner speechC and ne+lects the thou+ht report of such states of mind as emotions, sensations, dispositions, (eliefs, attitudes, intentions, motives, and reasons for action& 8 devote a separate chapter to these pro(lems (ecause the 31:3 speech cate+ory approach has (ecome the dominant theoretical discourse on fictional consciousness and, therefore, it has to (e addressed (efore 8 +o on to (uild up ?hat 8 hope is a richer and more informative discourse on the ?hole of fictional mindsC (ecause its shortcomin+s form an illuminatin+ conte9t ?ithin ?hich the (enefits of the ne? perspective ?ill (ecome clearC and (ecause the +rip of the verbal norm (that is, the preoccupation ?ith inner speech) is stron+ and has to (e loosened (efore the ne? perspective is fully understood& The re=uired reconceptualiAation of fictional minds (ecomes an interdisciplinary proKect in chapter $ (ecause it ma.es use of ?hat 8 shall call the parallel discourses on real minds, such as co+nitive science, psycholin+uistics, psycholo+y, and the philosophy of mind, in order to study ?hat 8 shall variously call the ,hole mind, the social mind, and the mind in action& *eal3mind discourses are invalua(le here (ecause they can (e used to provide e9planations that are fuller than those that are currently availa(le ?ithin narrative theory as to ho? the reader can recuperate meanin+ from fictional te9ts& They are parallel discourses (ecause they contain a very different .ind of picture of consciousness from that provided (y narrative theory, and as far as 8 .no?, the t?o pictures have not yet (een (rou+ht to+ether in =uite the ?ay in ?hich they are here& For e9ample,

in chapter $, The @hole Mind, 8 attempt to enlar+e our picture of the ?hole fictional mind in a num(er of the different directions that are su++ested (y real3mind discourses& These include the functionalist approach of co+nitive scientists to?ard human mental functionin+ (that is, studyin+ ?hat thin.in+ is for)C ho? the vie?s of psycholo+ists and philosophers vary on the e9tent of the relationship (et?een lan+ua+e and thou+htC the importance not only of non3ver(al conscious events (ut also of entirely non3conscious mental statesC the pivotal role of dispositions in any picture of the ?hole mindC the role of emotions in mental life and in particular their relationship ?ith co+nitionC the lessons to (e learned from the philosophy of action ?hen considerin+ the relationship (et?een thou+ht and (ehaviorC and, finally, first3person ascription and in particular the unrelia(ility of many self3ascriptions of motives and intentions& (*emem(er the !riends scene that ?as discussed earlierI) 8 move the ar+ument on in chapter 6, The 0ocial Mind, (y considerin+ the ?hole mind that is descri(ed in chapter $ no? put in its social conte9t& 8 start (y e9aminin+ the considera(le e9tent to ?hich our thou+ht is pu(lic and social in nature& 8 then pic. up the discussion a(out unrelia(le first3person ascription at the end of chapter $ and contrast it ?ith the relia(ility of a +ood deal of third3person ascription (the !riends scene a+ain)& /fter a (rief section on the ?or. of *ussian psycholin+uists on the development of purposive thou+ht, 8 31$3 continue ?ith the *ussian tradition (y focusin+ on the insi+hts of the +reat discourse theorist Mi.hail )a.htin on the dialo+icality of thou+ht& Finally, in a section entitled The Mind )eyond the 0.in, 8 e9plore the fascinatin+ issue of the socially situated or distri(uted nature of much of our co+nition, action, and even identity& The purpose of chapter %, The Fictional Mind, is to relate this ?or. more specifically to the fictional mind& 8 (e+in (y (uildin+ on the discussion in chapter !, section $ of co+nitive frames and narrative comprehension (y applyin+ these issues in more detail to mental action in novels& 8 ar+ue that one of the .ey frames for comprehendin+ te9ts is ?hat 8 refer to as the continuin#$consciousness frame& 8n other ?ords, readers create a continuin+ consciousness out of the isolated passa+es of te9t that relate to a particular character& 8n this ?ay, ?e assem(le ?hat 8 call an embedded narrative the ?hole of a character>s various perceptual and conceptual vie?points, ideolo+ical ?orldvie?s, and plans for the future considered as an individual narrative that is em(edded in the ?hole fictional te9t& 8n usin+ this term 8 am follo?in+ the narratolo+ist Marie32aure *yan, ?ho introduces it in an article entitled Bm(edded -arratives and Tella(ility (15"%) and later in her (oo., Possi(le @orlds, /rtificial 8ntelli+ence, and -arrative Theory (1551)& 8 then relate the em(edded narrative notion to the concept of teleolo+y, or the investi+ation of narrative in terms of its final purpose or endin+& Finally, the various ideas introduced in this chapter are considered in the conte9t of the aspectual nature of the story?orld, ?hich is only ever vie?ed under particular aspects or from individual and therefore limited points of vie?&

8n chapter ;, The Fictional Mind in /ction, 8 e9plore some of the specific implications of the +eneral ideas that ?ere introduced in the previous chapter& ,sin+ a num(er of e9amples from a specific te9t, Bvelyn @au+h>s +ile 6odies, 8 consider some of the su(frames of the continuin+3consciousness frame& Lne su(frame concerns the relationships (et?een fictional thou+ht and fictional action and ho? these relationships are presented in fictional discourse& 8n particular, the term the thou#ht$action continuum is introduced to dra? attention to the fact that the distinction (et?een thou+ht and action in fictional te9ts is not as clear3cut as narrative theorists have assumed& 4ra?in+ on the ?or. in chapter 6 on the social mind, 8 +o on to discuss another su(frame the prevalence in novels of ?hat psycholo+ists call intermental thou#ht, or shared, +roup, or Koint thin.in+& 8n order to consider the third su(frame, 8 introduce the term doubly embedded narratives in order to convey the idea that versions of characters e9ist ?ithin the minds of other characters and that the relationships (et?een these versions determine to a +reat e9tent the teleolo+y of the plot& To finish the (oo., 3163 8 devote the last chapter, Further /pplications, to some tentative su++estions for further historical applications of the ideas summariAed earlier& 8n summary, !ictional -inds descri(es a theoretical frame?or. that considers the ?hole of a particular fictional mind, there(y avoidin+ the fra+mentation referred to earlierC vie?s characters> minds, not Kust in terms of passive, private inner speech in the modes of direct or free indirect thou+ht, (ut in terms of the narrator>s positive lin.in+ role in presentin+ characters> social en+a+ed mental functionin+, particularly in the mode of thou+ht reportC analyAes in functional and teleolo+ical terms the purposive nature of characters> thou+ht their motives, intentions, and the resultin+ (ehavior and actionC hi+hli+hts the role of the reader in constructin+ characters> em(edded narratives (y means of a series of provisional conKectures and hypotheses a(out their mental functionin+C and sho?s ho? readers read plots as the interaction of those em(edded narratives& 0everal of the devices that are used in the constructions of fictional minds (y narrators and readers, such as the role of thou+ht report in descri(in+ emotions and the role of (ehavior descriptions in conveyin+ motivation and intention, have yet to (e defamiliariAed& /s He+el puts it, ?hat is >familiarly .no?n> is not properly .no?n, Kust for the reason that it is >familiar> (15:1, 5!)& The narratolo+ist Manfred Eahn refers in a different conte9t to a num(er of interestin+ co+nitive mechanisms that have lar+ely remained hidden (elo? (oth the reader>s and the narratolo+ist>s threshold of a?areness (1555a, 1%")& 8n my vie?, this num(er includes some of the mechanisms that produce the illusion of fictional minds& Ho?ever, ?ithin the em(edded narratives frame?or., these devices can (e fully defamiliariAed and there(y made more visi(le& 3. Some Definitions and Assumptions

Narratolo#y and narrative theory& 8 ?ill use these terms interchan+ea(ly& 0ome theorists distin+uish (et?een them (y reservin+ the former term for the type of thin.in+ a(out narrative that arose from the structuralist movement of the 15%0s, 15;0s, and (eyond and (y usin+ the latter term in a much (roader sense to cover all theoretical ?ritin+ on the nature of narrative& Ho?ever, althou+h this distinction may seem attractive in theory, 8 thin. that it ?ould (e difficult to maintain in practice& .he narrator and the implied author& 8 ?ill use the term narrator to descri(e the a+ency responsi(le for the ?ords on the pa+es of fictional te9ts& 8 shall not refer to the actual author, (ecause 8 am studyin+ only the fictional te9ts themselves and not their historical circumstances& The other term that is used in this conte9t, implied author, ?as made famous (y the literary critic 31%3 @ayne C& )ooth in .he /hetoric of !iction (ori+inally pu(lished in 15%1) and further developed (y a num(er of narratolo+ists since& The term is defined in Rerald Prince>s Dictionary of Narratolo#y (15";) as the implicit ima+e of an author in the te9t, ta.en to (e standin+ (ehind the scenes and to (e responsi(le for its desi+n and for the values and cultural norms it adheres to (15";, $!)& Prince e9plains that the narrator must (e distin+uished from the implied author& The former recounts the situations and events and is inscri(ed in the te9t as a tellerC the latter is ta.en to (e accounta(le for the selection, distri(ution, and com(ination of the events and is inferred from the te9t& )ut, Prince concedes, ?hile the distinction is clear in the case of first3person narrators, it can (e pro(lematical in other cases (15";, $!#$:)& The concept of the implied author is a valid and informative ?ay to refer to responsi(ility for the values and cultural norms that can plausi(ly (e inferred from a te9t, su(Kect to the caveat that different readers may infer different implied authors from the same te9t& Ho?ever, durin+ the discussions of a ?ide variety of novels that are contained in the follo?in+ chapters, 8 have not found it possi(le to maintain a coherent distinction (et?een the a+ency that is responsi(le for selectin+ and or+aniAin+ the events (as Prince descri(es the role of the implied author), and the voice that recounts them (the narrator)& For e9ample, ?hich one decides that direct access is +iven to the thou+hts of one character and not anotherI @hich one decides on the len+th and e9tent of access or ?hether it is +iven in direct or free indirect thou+ht or in thou+ht reportI @hich one decides on the precise de+ree to ?hich the lan+ua+e used in the discourse e9plicitly or implicitly conveys the motivation of a particular characterI )ecause 8 have not (een a(le to ans?er these =uestions, 8 ?ill refer only to the narrator& Non$narrated narration& 0ome narratolo+ists (elieve that it is possi(le for narration to occur ?ithout a narrator& For e9ample, in .he !ictions of "an#ua#e and the "an#ua#es of !iction (155:), Moni.a Fluderni. asserts that there can be narration ?ithout a narrator& That is to say, in pure reflector mode narrative there cannot (e any indication of a narrative voice (155:, $$:)& (The term reflec tor mode descri(es a novel such as Henry Eames>s .he Ambassadors in ?hich the action is reflected throu+h the consciousness of a reflector character&) Ho?ever, other

narratolo+ists are e=ually insistent that all narratives must necessarily have a narrator& For the narratolo+ist Mie.e )al, as she e9plains in Narratolo#y (155;), the statement BliAa(eth felt some?hat tired that day should (e read as 8 narrate &&& >BliAa(eth felt some?hat tired that day> (155;, !6)& There is a very comple9 and technical de(ate (ehind these t?o positions, and it ?ould ta.e me a lon+ ?ay out of my ?ay to Kustify my (elief that reflector novels such 31;3 as .he Ambassadors contain plenty of evidence of the presence of a narrator& For this reason, 8 ?ill simply say that one of the assumptions (ehind this (oo. is that )al is correct to say that all narrative has a narrator& (For more on this issue, see the hi+hly illuminatin+ discussion in *ichard /cAel>s article, Hearin+ Goices in -arrative Te9ts P155"Q&) .he reader& 8 refer fre=uently throu+hout this (oo. to the reader& Here 8 mean ?hat is meant (y the term implied reader the theoretical construct of the ideal, informed, or model reader that is implied (y or can (e constructed from the te9t& -evertheless, 8 hope that my +eneraliAations are also true to a fairly lar+e e9tent of the psycholo+ical activities of real readers& /fter all, it is necessary to presuppose a hi+h de+ree of correlation (et?een implied and real readers in order to e9plain the incontroverti(le fact that most fictional te9ts are readily understood (y real readers& Ho?ever, 8 have to o?n up to the fact that 8 have done no empirical research at all on ho? real readers read& Story and discourse& This is a standard narratolo+ical distinction& /s defined (y Prince, the story is the content plane of narrative, the ?hat of a narrative, the narrated (15";, 51)& The discourse is the e9pression plane of narrative, the ho? of a narrative, the narratin+ (15";, !1)& The t?o elements are often referred to in *ussian formalist terms as the fa(ula and the sKuAhet& There are also many other names for this pair of concepts, (ut as some terms are used (y different people to si+nify (oth sides of the dichotomy, 8 ?ill not confuse you (y listin+ them here& 8t is a pro(lematical distinction& Many theorists have pointed out that any attempt to tell the story simply results in another discourse& 8t is never possi(le to arrive at a pure unmediated story, and each reader>s story ?ill (e su(tly different from every other reader>s& 8n some cases, say (mma, the differences mi+ht focus on the personality of the heroine& 8n other cases such as Henry Eames>s .he .urn of the Scre,, readers mi+ht differ =uite su(stantially over ?hat events too. place in the story& /lso, the literary critic Eonathan Culler (15"0) ma.es the important point that ultimately the t?o concepts are entirely incompati(le planes of e9planation& Bmma marries Dni+htley (ecause she falls in love ?ith him is a story e9planationC Bmma marries Dni+htley (ecause that is the endin+ that (rin+s to a satisfactory conclusion the various themes and meanin+s of the novel is a discourse e9planationC and these t?o e9planations cannot (e reconciled& Finally, 8 have found that it can often (e difficult to decide ?hether an issue such as the motivation for an action (elon+s to the story plane or the discourse plane& -evertheless, the distinction

(et?een the events and situations in the story and the presentations of them in the ?ords on the pa+es of the fictional te9t is a valua(le one& 0ome narratolo+ists use models that 31"3 as .he Ambassadors contain plenty of evidence of the presence of a narrator& For this reason, 8 ?ill simply say that one of the assumptions (ehind this (oo. is that )al is correct to say that all narrative has a narrator& (For more on this issue, see the hi+hly illuminatin+ discussion in *ichard /cAel>s article, Hearin+ Goices in -arrative Te9ts P155"Q&) .he reader& 8 refer fre=uently throu+hout this (oo. to the reader& Here 8 mean ?hat is meant (y the term implied reader the theoretical construct of the ideal, informed, or model reader that is implied (y or can (e constructed from the te9t& -evertheless, 8 hope that my +eneraliAations are also true to a fairly lar+e e9tent of the psycholo+ical activities of real readers& /fter all, it is necessary to presuppose a hi+h de+ree of correlation (et?een implied and real readers in order to e9plain the incontroverti(le fact that most fictional te9ts are readily understood (y real readers& Ho?ever, 8 have to o?n up to the fact that 8 have done no empirical research at all on ho? real readers read& Story and discourse& This is a standard narratolo+ical distinction& /s defined (y Prince, the story is the content plane of narrative, the ?hat of a narrative, the narrated (15";, 51)& The discourse is the e9pression plane of narrative, the ho? of a narrative, the narratin+ (15";, !1)& The t?o elements are often referred to in *ussian formalist terms as the fa(ula and the sKuAhet& There are also many other names for this pair of concepts, (ut as some terms are used (y different people to si+nify (oth sides of the dichotomy, 8 ?ill not confuse you (y listin+ them here& 8t is a pro(lematical distinction& Many theorists have pointed out that any attempt to tell the story simply results in another discourse& 8t is never possi(le to arrive at a pure unmediated story, and each reader>s story ?ill (e su(tly different from every other reader>s& 8n some cases, say (mma, the differences mi+ht focus on the personality of the heroine& 8n other cases such as Henry Eames>s .he .urn of the Scre,, readers mi+ht differ =uite su(stantially over ?hat events too. place in the story& /lso, the literary critic Eonathan Culler (15"0) ma.es the important point that ultimately the t?o concepts are entirely incompati(le planes of e9planation& Bmma marries Dni+htley (ecause she falls in love ?ith him is a story e9planationC Bmma marries Dni+htley (ecause that is the endin+ that (rin+s to a satisfactory conclusion the various themes and meanin+s of the novel is a discourse e9planationC and these t?o e9planations cannot (e reconciled& Finally, 8 have found that it can often (e difficult to decide ?hether an issue such as the motivation for an action (elon+s to the story plane or the discourse plane& -evertheless, the distinction (et?een the events and situations in the story and the presentations of them in the ?ords on the pa+es of the fictional te9t is a valua(le one& 0ome narratolo+ists use models that

31"3 contain three or even four elements, usually (y splittin+ the discourse plane into such aspects as te9t, narration, and te9tuality& .he !ictions of Discourse (155$) (y Patric. L>-eill contains a +ood summary of the various models (155$, !0#!1)& 8 have added the concept of story,orld# see chapter !, section !#to the story and discourse distinction to create a three3part model& The mind& Renerally, 8 use the term mind in preference to alternatives such as consciousness and thou#ht& The use of the latter t?o terms is often accompanied (y a tendency to see mental life mainly in terms of inner speech& 8n addition, consciousness can have the implication of self3 consciousness, ?hich 8 ?ant to avoid (ecause it deflects attention from non3consciousness and latent states of mind& The important point is that the mind refers to much more than ?hat is normally thou+ht of as consciousness or thou+ht& For e9ample, it is possi(le to drive s.illfully ?hile thin.in+ a(out somethin+ else& This is the mind in action, (ut it is not thou+ht or consciousness in action& The terms mental event and states of mind are very useful& -ental functionin# and mental action are particularly ?orth?hile for their emphasis on the functional nature of mental activity& For comments on the terms stream of consciousness and interior monolo+ue see the ne9t section& The inclusive use of the term mind em(races all aspects of our inner life not Kust co+nition and perception, (ut also dispositions, feelin+s, (eliefs, and emotions& Lf course, the term is so ?ide that its use can shade off into such notions as character and personality, (ut 8 re+ard its doin+ so as desira(le& / ran+e of terms, includin+ thou+ht and consciousness, ?ill (e used throu+hout the te9t for the sa.e of variety, (ut my paradi+m term for the a++re+ate of mental states and events is the mind& 8 am particularly interested in the various ?ays in ?hich the interrelations (et?een different types of thou+ht are presented in fiction& 8 ?ill anticipate my ar+ument (y mentionin+ a fe? random e9amples of ?hat 8 have in mind& Psycholo+ists such as Eon Blster in Alchemies of the -ind (1555) continually stress the interconnections (et?een co+nition and emotion and ar+ue that in practice they are difficult if not impossi(le to disentan+le& Co+nitions tend to have a stron+ emotional element and vice versa& They also relate closely in causal terms a character>s an+er mi+ht (e caused (y a co+nition of some sort that in turn results in further emotions and then other co+nitions& /lso, (oth are necessary to ?ill and motivation& Philosophers tal. of actions arisin+ from or (ein+ caused (y (or ho?ever e9pressed) an interrelationship of desires and (eliefs& 8 desire 9 and 8 (elieve that 8 can achieve 9 (y doin+ y& The philosophers Eohn *& 0earle and 4aniel 4ennett, the neuroscientist /ntonio 4amasio, and the psycholin+uist 0teven Pin.er all su++est that our mental events and states, includin+ co+nitions, 3153

come ?ith a particular mood, tone, or color& For e9ample, 0earle refers to the pleasure7unpleasure dimension to all consciousness (155!, 1$1)& 4amasio stresses the continuity of the melodic line of (ac.+round emotion (!000, 5:)& 8 am sure that an investi+ation of these various relationships ?ill illuminate a +ood deal of fictional thou+ht& (mbedded narratives& /s e9plained in the previous section, a central concept in this (oo. is one that 8 la(el embedded narratives, the use of ?hich has the undenia(le dra?(ac. that many theorists attach a completely different meanin+ to the term& 8ts more familiar meanin+ is a self3 contained narrative that is em(edded ?ithin a so3called frame narrative& For e9ample, in .he Arabian Ni#hts, the stories that 0heheraAade tells her hus(and every ni+ht are em(edded ?ithin the frame narrative of her attempts to delay her threatened e9ecution& The creation of an additional use is re+retta(le (ut, on (alance, Kustified (ecause the term vividly illustrates a num(er of the important features of fictional minds to ?hich 8 ?ish to dra? attention& Mimesis and die+esis& These t?o terms are staples of literary theory, (ut unfortunately (oth contain a ?ide variety of meanin+s& Prince>s dictionary reflects some of the drift in use& His lon+ entry for the term mimesis (15";, 6!#6:) contains, in summary, these three meanin+s sho?in+ (as opposed to tellin+), ?hich is defined else?here in his (oo. as a mode characteriAed (y the detailed, scenic renderin+ of situations and events and (y minimal narratorial mediation (15";, ";)C the direct speech of a characterC and an accurate representation of life& Lne pro(lem is that these completely separate meanin+s# to+ether ?ith several others, identified, for e9ample, (y the narratolo+ist Meir 0tern(er+ (15"!)# are often confused ?ith each other& /nother pro(lem is that the partner term, die#esis, is sometimes used in opposition to mimesis and sometimes used in completely separate senses& /ccordin+ to Prince (15";, !0), die+esis has t?o meanin+s tellin# (as opposed to sho?in+), ?hich is defined as a mode characteriAed (y more narratorial mediation and (y a less detailed renderin+ of situations and events than sho?in+ (15";, 5%), and the story?orld in ?hich the narrated situations and events occur& L(viously, the first meanin+ for die+esis is used in opposition to mimesis (ut the second is not& / further complication is that some definitions of mimesis, Moshe *on>s, for e9ample (15"1, 1") and Fluderni.>s (155:, $65, $%:), have inflated its meanin+ so far that it completely encompasses the notion of die+esis& For these reasons, it seems to me that the t?o terms are (eyond precise definition& 8 ?ill use them only ?hen other theorists commonly do& For e9ample, narratolo+ists re+ularly refer 3!03 to direct thou+ht as the most mimetic mode of thou+ht presentation, and thou+ht report as the most die+etic&

4. What the Book s !ot Lccasionally you read (oo. revie?s in ?hich the chief criticism is that the ?ron+ (oo. ?as ?ritten& @hy oh ?hy did the author not see that ?hat the ?orld really needs is a completely different study ?ith, possi(ly, Kust the ori+inal title survivin+I Typically, these revie?s, follo?in+ faint praise for the (oo. for (ein+ so short, contain a lon+ list of additional topics that if included ?ould have tripled its siAe& *eaders of these revie?s often sense that the list is in effect the (oo. that the revie?er ?ould have li.ed to have ?ritten, had he or she thou+ht of it or had the time to do it& The follo?in+ section is intended to assist such a revie?er (y providin+ a chec.list of the topics that comprise the (oo. that this is not& This chec.list is particularly necessary as the title !ictional -inds is so +eneral that it can (e e9plored in a ?ide variety of very different directions& Fiction and non3fiction& 8 ?ill not (e addressin+ the various issues relatin+ to the definitions of and the (oundaries (et?een such cate+ories as narrative, fiction, non3fiction, history, and the novel& /nyone interested in this fascinatin+ topic should consult such authorities on narrative theory as Hayden @hite (15;", 15";), Michael McDeon (15";, !000), Marie32aure *yan (155;), and 4orrit Cohn (1555)& 8 have simply ta.en as a +iven the e9istence of a num(er of te9ts that are +enerally accepted as novels and have tried to see ho? they ?or.& "iterary criticism& 2iterary critics are concerned ?ith the ?ide variety of strate+ies that are used (y novelists to +ive meanin+ and form to the narrative, such as the use of sym(olic structures of motifs, metaphors, metonymies, and so on& They then fre=uently relate these sym(olic structures to the historical circumstances of the novels that they are analyAin+& / study of the relationship (et?een these issues and the su(Kect of this study ?ould focus on the means (y ?hich narrators construct characters> em(edded narratives and, therefore, in a++re+ate, the plot, in order to achieve these effects& 8t is my intention to theoriAe an aspect of the process of readin+ and not the end product& The em(edded narrative approach is primarily an attempt to e9plore fully the ?or.in+s of dense and comple9 fictional te9ts& This is the process& The end products are the various purposes to ?hich these e9plorations mi+ht (e put& .he historicized approach& 8 ?ill not address the issue of ho? presentations of fictional minds have developed and chan+ed over time& Ho?ever, chapter " ma.es some su++estions a(out ho? it ?ill (e possi(le to historiciAe 3!13 the ne? approach& For e9ample, put simply, the device of direct presentations of characters> minds ?as the su(Kect of a fierce de(ate in the middle to late ei+hteenth century, (ecame naturaliAed in the early to middle nineteenth century, ?as pro(lematiAed to?ard the end of the nineteenth century, and (ecame the su(Kect of various sorts of e9periments in the t?entieth century& Ho?ever, the purpose of the present study is

to esta(lish and Kustify my (asic approach first in order to ensure that as much evidence as possi(le on the presentation of fictional minds has (een made availa(le (efore attemptin+ to trace these sorts of historical developments& -arratives from the )i(le on?ard presented characters> minds (y means of descriptions of (ehavior and action, and so em(edded narratives can (e esta(lished purely on this (asis& 8t is only ?hen the roles of the reader, narrator, and character in this process have (een completely understood that the development of the device of detailed direct access in the late ei+hteenth and early nineteenth centuries can (e put in its full historical conte9t& /eception theory& *eception theory is the attempt to understand literary ?or.s in relation to specific readerships, reconstructin+ the chan+in+ e9pectations ?hich condition the responses of successive +enerations, or of different su(3cultures at the same time ()aldic. 155%, 1;1)& 8n my terms, reception theory is the study of the historical relationship (et?een real and fictional minds or ho? real minds have in the past received presentations of fictional minds& This .ind of study ?ould (e enriched (y the theory su++ested here, ?hich could help to esta(lish the precise means (y ?hich fictional minds have (een constructed (y the historical readers of particular periods& Renres and interte9tuality& 8nterte9tuality may (e defined as the sum of the myriad relationships that e9ist (et?een different te9ts& These include adaptation, imitation, parody, as ?ell as the less o(vious relationships that have (een e9plored (y poststructuralist critics such as Eulia Dristeva& 8nterte9tual factors also include the role that readers> e9pectations ?ith re+ard to +enres such as the thriller, the romance, and the Rothic novel play in the constructions of the fictional minds that are contained ?ithin those fictional te9ts& 8n discussin+ (riefly in chapter !, section :, the sensitive and ima+inative analysis of interte9tuality and +enre (y such critics as ,m(erto Bco in .he /ole of the /eader (15"1) and Eonathan Culler in Structuralist Poetics (15;6), 8 e9plain that in my vie? this vitally important perspective has (een thorou+hly e9plored and ?ell ac.no?led+ed and that the purpose of this (oo. is to +o in some different directions& /ealism& /s this (oo. is a(out the relationship (et?een real minds and fictional minds, it may appear that 8 am concerned ?ith the issue of realism 3!!3 in the novel& For e9ample, you mi+ht thin. that 8 ?ill (e ar+uin+ that fictional minds are realistic ?hen they are similar in some specified ?ay to real minds and unrealistic ?hen they are not& This is not the case& 8 am ar+uin+ that the approach proposed in this (oo. applies to all novels, apparently realist or not& 8 do not distin+uish (et?een realist and non3realist te9ts& / reasona(ly plausi(le definition of the concept of realism ?ould consider the e9tent to ?hich a fictional discourse is consistent ?ith the dominant scientific and other .no?led+e3(ased discourses at the time of ?ritin+ and at the time of readin+& Ho?ever, the issue of consistency is not one that 8 ?ill (e e9plorin+ here as it implies that the real3life

discourses are to (e re+arded as the norm from ?hich fictional3mind discourses may or may not deviate& My ?ay of ?or.in+ is the other ?ay round as far as fictional minds are concerned, 8 re+ard fictional discourses as the norm, and 8 then investi+ate ?hether or not the use of real3mind discourses can illuminate our study of them& 8n my vie? real3mind discourses assist the study of such non3realist te9ts as the postmodernist novel and fantasy fiction Kust as much as the realist novel& 8t may appear that 8 am predisposed to realist fiction (ecause, as it happens, most of my e9amples (elon+ in that cate+ory& Ho?ever, this is not si+nificant as 8 am concentratin+ on canonical novels that Kust happen to (e realist te9ts& 0ee the ne9t section for more on this point& .he unconscious& 8n chapter $, section $ 8 consider the non3conscious activities of the mind, (ut 8 say very little there a(out the unconscious, the central concept of Freudian psychoanalytical theory& This may seem surprisin+& Lne reason for the omission is that, as e9plained in the openin+ section, 8 see this (oo. as a counter?ei+ht to the current (iases in narrative theory, and as psychoanalytical approaches are ?ell esta(lished ?ithin the theory, there is no pressin+ need for further comment here& The other reason is that 8 am personally =uite s.eptical of Freudianism and have al?ays found it puAAlin+ that a school of thou+ht could (ecome so ?ell esta(lished on the (asis of so little empirical evidence& Ho?ever, to have ar+ued this vie?point ?ould have (een a distraction from the main purpose of the (oo., and so it seemed (est simply to put the =uestion to one side& Stream of consciousness and interior monolo#ue& 8 suppose these t?o terms mi+ht (e the most surprisin+ omissions& Ho? can a (oo. a(out consciousness in fiction have so little to say a(out themI The ans?er is simple li.e mimesis and die+esis, they are (eyond precise definition& /lthou+h the t?o terms have different ori+ins, they have no? (ecome ine9trica(ly lin.ed& Stream of consciousness ?as first used in 1"50 (y @illiam Eames in Principles of 3!:3 Psycholo#y& 8t is thou+ht that interior monolo#ue ?as pro(a(ly initially used to descri(e 5lysses& 8nterestin+ly, althou+h the formal or theoretical definitions for these terms vary ?idely, the ostensive or practical definitions are very precise& That is to say, apart from occasional references to earlier novelists (for e9ample, Bdouard 4uKardin), theorists define the t?o phrases in relation to the modernist novels of Eoyce, Gir+inia @oolf, @illiam Faul.ner, and 4orothy *ichardson& The e9amples used to illustrate the terms are invaria(ly ta.en from 5lysses or, less often, from @oolf >s To the 2i+hthouse or Mrs& 4allo?ay& 0ome of the theoretical definitions descri(e the types of fictional thou+ht that occur in the minds of characters in the story& /lthou+h most emphasiAe the random, associative, illo+ical, and seemin+ly un+rammatical free flo? of thou+ht, others mention more controlled and directed

thou+htC non3conscious, (ut also conscious thou+htC ver(al, (ut also non3ver(al thou+ht& 0ome specify co+nition only, ?hile others include various com(inations of co+nition, perception, sensations, and emotions& Confusin+ly thou+h, other theoretical definitions refer to a completely separate issue the techni=ues of thou+ht and consciousness presentation in the discourse& Most of these definitions stress an apparently unmediated presentation in the mode of free direct thou+ht& Ho?ever, this can (e misleadin+& Many illustrative passa+es contain a dense mi9ture, often in e=ual proportions, of surface description of the physical story?orld to+ether ?ith all three modes of thou+ht presentation thou+ht report, free indirect thou+ht, and direct thou+ht& For e9ample Made him feel a (it pec.ish& Pthou+ht reportQ The coals ?ere reddenin+& Psurface descriptionQ /nother slice of (read and (utter three, four ri+ht& Pfree direct thou+htQ 0he didn>t li.e her plate full Pfree indirect thou+htQ (Eoyce 15"%, $6)& To add to the confusion, there is no clear consensus on the relationship (et?een the t?o terms& 0ome theorists use the terms interchan+ea(ly& Lthers re+ard one as a particular type or su(set of the other& 0ome attach different and separate meanin+s to each& Perhaps the most common distinction is this 0tream of consciousness descri(es the thou+ht itself and7or the presentation of thou+ht in the sort of third3person passa+e that 8 have Kust =uoted and that is characteristic of @oolf and the early episodes in 5lysses& 8nterior monolo+ue descri(es the lon+ continuous first3 person passa+es or ?hole te9ts that contain uninterrupted, unmediated free direct thou+ht such as Penelope (Molly )loom>s famous monolo+ue in the last episode of 5lysses) or the first three sections of Faul.ner>s .he Sound and the !ury& For e9ample 8 suppose she ?as pious (ecause no man ?ould loo. at her t?ice 8 hope 8ll never (e li.e her a ?onder she didnt ?ant us to cover our faces (Eoyce 15"%, %0")& 3!$3 0ome ?riters, after commentin+ on the re+retta(le confusion, +ive firm advice a(out ho? the t?o terms should (e used in the future& /s these su++estions invaria(ly +o unheeded, the advice that 8 ?ould other?ise have (een tempted to +ive (do not use the t?o terms at all) ?ill not (e +iven& ". A !ote on the #e$ts /s my interest is solely in narrative fiction, all of my primary sources are novels& 8 ?ill not (e considerin+ formal non3fiction narratives such as histories, (io+raphies, auto(io+raphies, and memoirs, or informal or natural narratives such as spo.en life histories, testimonies, conversation, stories, and Ko.es& -arrative has (ecome a very fashiona(le heuristic tool ?ithin such social sciences as sociolo+y, cultural studies, and anthropolo+y, and 8 ?ould (e very e9cited if my conclusions ?ere of interest to scholars ?or.in+ in these fields, (ut, as 8 say, my focus is on fiction&

8 have tried to ma.e use of a ?ide ran+e of canonical novels ?ritten in Bn+lish from /phra )ehn to Thomas Pynchon& My claim, ri+ht or ?ron+, is that the aspect of the readin+ process ?ith ?hich 8 am concerned is fundamental to all narrative fiction& 8n tal.in+ a(out narrative as the description of fictional mental functionin+, 8 may sound as thou+h 8 am tal.in+ a(out the consciousness novel of Henry Eames or the stream of consciousness or interior monolo+ue novels descri(ed earlier& )ut nothin+ could (e further from the truth& 8 am tal.in+ a(out the novel as a ?hole (ecause all novels include a (alance of (ehavior description and internal analysis of characters> minds& 8n addition to the canon, 8 have made +ood use of thrillers& 8 read thrillers (ecause 8 enKoy them& )ut 8 find that 8 cannot follo? the plot of a thriller unless 8 have a fairly clear conception of the mental functionin+ of the main characters (?ho .no?s ?hat and ?ho is tryin+ to achieve ?hat at any +iven point in the story)& 8t is this operation of attemptin+ to follo? the lines of their thin.in+ that ena(les me to follo? the lo+ic of their actions and, therefore, the t?ists and turns of the plot& 8n +eneral, 8 ?ill concentrate on third3person novels and ?ill pay much less attention to first3person novels& That is to say, my priority is the heterodie#etic narrator (one ?ho is not a character in the story (ein+ narrated) and not the homodie#etic narrator (one ?ho is a character in the story (ein+ narrated)& There are various comple9ities inherent in this apparently simple distinction& 8t is ?ell .no?n that some heterodie+etic narrators of third3person novels (the famous e9ample is Henry Fieldin+>s .om 7ones) do not let the fact that they are not participants in the story?orld inhi(it them from ma.in+ li(eral use of the 8 pronoun ?hen lettin+ us have their vie?s on a ?ide variety of 3!63 su(Kects& Conversely, some homodie+etic narrators of first3person novels (such as /nthony Po?ell>s A Dance to the -usic of .ime series) are so uno(trusive that there is fre=uently very little use of the 8 pronoun for lon+ stretches of te9t& 8t is e=ually ?ell .no?n that there are al?ays t?o first persons in any homodie+etic narrative the one ?ho e9periences the events and the one ?ho later recounts them& The Pip ?ho is the narrator of Charles 4ic.ens>s 8reat (2pectations is much older and ?iser than the Pip ?ho e9periences the events& Lther comple9ities include a first3 person narrator disappearin+ and (ein+ replaced (y a third3person narrator (as in Rustave Flau(ert>s -adame 6ovary)& /lthou+h, as 8 say, 8 discuss very fe? first3person novels, 8 thin. that it is =uite li.ely that my approach ?ill prove to (e as ?ell suited to them as to third3person novels& 8n particular, the variety of evidence that is availa(le for the construction of character (action and (ehavior as ?ell as direct access to thou+hts) ?ould e9plain ho? first3person narrators construct other characters& For e9ample, it ?ould sho? ho? (oth the older and the youn+er Pip differently construct the character of Eoe despite neither havin+ direct access to his thou+hts& 8n addition to the primary te9ts, a ?ord of e9planation is also re=uired for the secondary te9ts& There has (een a truly vast amount of ?or. done on real minds in such fields as co+nitive science, philosophy, psycholo+y, and psycholin+uistics& 8t ?ould not (e possi(le for a sin+le ?or. to do

Kustice to it all& /ny selection of the vast source material availa(le in these fields is (ound to (e ar(itrary& / lar+e num(er of (oo.s could (e ?ritten on my su(Kect ?ithout any overlap at all in the choice of real3mind studies& Jou may finish this (oo. sayin+, @hy on earth didn>t he mention 9 or yI (add name of philosopher, psycholo+ist, or co+nitive scientist of choice)& 8f you do, my initial position is that 8 am referrin+ to real3mind discourses only in so far as they are a(le to illuminate fictional minds and that the t?o phenomena, real minds and fictional minds, are very different thin+s& My fall3(ac. position is the 4r& Eohnson defense @hen as.ed (y a ?oman of his ac=uaintance ?hy he had incorrectly defined the ?ord pastern as the .nee of a horse, he replied 8+norance, madam, pure i+noranceM Finally, 8 should add that 8 have made e9tensive use of M8TBC0, the encyclopedia of the co+nitive sciences that 8 referred to earlier& 8t is an invalua(le source(oo., and 8 recommend it stron+ly#it is much less intimidatin+ than it soundsM Conclusion 8n 5nspea9able Sentences (15"!), the narrative theorist /nn )anfield declares that the lan+ua+e of narrative has the resources for a picture of the activities 3!%3 and states of the mind commensurate ?ith the most sophisticated theories of .no?led+e and consciousness (15"!, !10)& 8 (elieve that she is ri+ht& Ho?ever, 8 also thin. that our theories a(out the presentations of the pictures of the activities and states of the mind that are contained in narrative fiction need to (ecome more sophisticated than at present if they are to reflect the richness and comple9ity of current theories of .no?led+e and consciousness& 3!;3 2 Some !arratological Approaches Many of the pro(lems that are discussed in this (oo. arise from the fact that narratolo+y has created clear (oundaries (et?een various aspects of fictional minds, even thou+h the fictional te9ts themselves sho? that these (oundaries are not clear at all& B9amples include those (et?een individual minds and their conte9t, (et?een thou+ht and action, and also, ?ithin minds, (et?een different types of thou+ht& They have come

a(out (ecause different (ranches of the discipline of narrative theory have developed in different directions& Clear (oundaries and ri+orous typolo+y are understanda(le and necessary, especially in the early sta+es of a discipline& Ho?ever, disciplines mature, and ?hen they do, the heuristic and peda+o+ic tools that have (een historically useful have to (e reconsidered and, if necessary, remolded& 8n the case of fictional minds, the time has come for the map to (e redra?n& %. Story Analysis There is a discourse ?ithin narrative theory that is concerned ?ith ?hat is variously called narrative +rammar, narrative structure, the analysis of story, the functional classification of action se=uences, and so on& 8 ?ill refer to this (ranch of narrative theory as story analysis& 8t is associated ?ith the *ussian theorist Gladimir Propp>s seminal study of *ussian fol. tales, -orpholo#y of the !ol9 .ale: ?hich ?as ori+inally pu(lished in *ussia in 15!" and proved hi+hly influential on the ?or. of French hi+h structuralists such as Claude )remond (15;:), /& E& Rreimas (15":), and TAvetan Todorov (15;;) ?hen it ?as (elatedly discovered (y them in the 15%0s and 15;0s& Propp>s purpose ?as to identify the common elements in the narrative patterns contained in nearly t?o hundred *ussian fol. tales& The constant features ?ere a(stracted from the more contin+ent aspects of the stories and ?ere descri(ed as functions& / function is an act of a character, defined from the point of vie? of its si+nificance for the course of the action (Propp 15%", !1)& Propp identified thirty3one such functions& They occur in various com(inations in the tales (ut, interestin+ly, al?ays in e9actly the same order& He also devised a model of the dramatis personae ?ho act in ?ays that em(ody these functions& 4urin+ the 15%0s and 15;0s, structuralist theorists such as )remond, Rreimas, and Todorov developed various models that closely follo?ed Propp in this respect and that ?ere (ased on the concept of an actant / fundamental role at the level of narrative deep structure (Prince 15";, 1)& 8n essence, these models ?ere typolo+ies of the types of characters ?ho fulfill the various recurrin+ functions that are found in narrative& / typical model contains the follo?in+ si9 actants su(Kect, o(Kect, sender, receiver, helper, and opponent& /s is clearly apparent, this sort of analysis, ?hich tries to identify features of all narratives, is necessarily carried out at a very hi+h level of a(straction& )efore attemptin+ to place this su(Kect area ?ithin my ar+ument, 8 ?ould li.e to ma.e a +eneral point in passin+ Propp analyAed some fol. tales& He did not analyAe all types of fol. talesC he did not analyAe other sorts of *ussian narrativesC he did not analyAe narratives from other national traditions& 8t is my +uess that he mi+ht have (een surprised if he had .no?n of the conceptual ?ei+ht that no? rests on his slim empirical findin+s& 8t ?ould (e interestin+ to .no? ?hether someone ?ho did not .no? a(out Propp or the French structuralists and ?ho attempted to construct a typolo+y of narrative story forms could arrive at an account that ?ould loo. nothin+ li.e Propp>s (ut that ?ould fit an e=ually lar+e num(er of stories& 8 do not have anythin+ in mindC 8 simply as. ?hether the thou+ht is implausi(le& 8f no one has constructed such a typolo+y so

far, then that itself is an important piece of evidence, (ut 8 do not find the thou+ht that someone could do so entirely inconceiva(le& This is certainly not a criticism of Propp& 8t is simply a su++estion that possi(ly too much use has (een made of his pioneerin+ and seminal ?or. and that less reliance on it in the future mi+ht result in a richer and more complete picture of narrative form& To return to my ar+ument a +ood deal of hi+hly technical, re?ardin+, and ori+inal ?or. has (een done on the analysis of story structure& Ho?ever, ?hen narrative is considered from the point of vie? of fictional minds, story analysis can seem rather ri+id, mechanical, and uninformative& There can (e a tendency to force particular narratives into a straitKac.et that does not necessarily illuminate them& Ho? much does it help our understandin+ of -adame 6ovary to (e told that the actants in it are these su(Kect V BmmaC o(Kect V happinessC sender V romantic literatureC receiver V BmmaC helper V 2eon, *odolpheC and opponent V Charles, Jonville, *odolphe, Homais, and 2heureu9 (Prince 15";, !)I 8t is temptin+ to ?onder ?hether this is an o(vious area in ?hich the structuralist ori+ins of the discipline have had a limitin+ effect& /s 4avid Herman e9plains, PsQtructuralist narratolo+ists, interested in formulatin+ a 3!53 >+rammar> of narrative, ?anted to shift attention from characters as >(ein+s> to characters as re+ularly recurrin+, typifia(le >participants> in the synta+matic unfoldin+ of the narrated action (1555(, !::#:$)& /lso, the narratolo+ists *uth Rins(ur+ and 0hlomith *immon3Denan point out that in classical narratolo+y characters ?ere related neither to ?orld vie? nor to time3space, (ut#la(elled >functions>#?ere su(ordinated to the succession of events (1555, "0)& Ho?ever, if the ?ays in ?hich characters are constructed (y readers are to (e fully understood, they have to (e re+arded as fictional (ein+s that are related to ?orld vie? and time3space in a fuller and more holistic manner than story analysis envisa+es& 8n particular, the ?ay in ?hich the concept of action is used ?ithin story analysis is rather limited and impoverished& /ction is crucial to this study, and it is discussed at a num(er of points, for e9ample, in chapter $, section ;C chapter 6, section 6C and chapter ;, section !& 8 e9plore different aspects of the concept of action at various sta+es in my ar+ument in order to deepen and ?iden our understandin+ of the term (eyond the story analysis use& The analysis of narrative structures is clearly dependent on a +ood deal of indirect inference a(out fictional minds throu+h e9aminations of the function and si+nificance of the physical actions caused (y those minds& @hat ?as the purpose, motivation, intention, and so on (ehind the decision to ta.e the actionI Ho?ever, this methodolo+y is rarely e9plicitly descri(ed (y story analysts in terms of mental functionin+ (ecause the minds of characters tend to (e re+arded as a +iven rather than ac.no?led+ed as a discursive construct& This point is (orne out (y the follo?in+ discussion of the story analysis notion of an event&

There is a noticea(le emphasis on events in a num(er of proposed definitions of narrative& For e9ample, a narrative is the semiotic representation of a series of events, meanin+fully connected in a temporal and causal ?ay (Lne+a and 2anda 155%, :)C narration is a discourse representin+ one or more events (Prince 15";, 6;)C and narrative fiction is the narration of a succession of fictional events (*immon3Denan 15":, !)& Mie.e )al defines an event as the transition from one state to another state, caused or e9perienced (y actors (155;, 1"!)& )al>s last point is an important one& Bvents only have si+nificance if they are e9perienced (y actors& 8t is difficult to ima+ine a narrative that consisted entirely, for e9ample, of descriptions of natural events in ?hich no person ?as present to e9perience those events& Lne+a and 2anda refer to events (ein+ meanin+fully connected in a causal ?ay, and the causal lin.s (et?een events are nearly al?ays formed (y fictional minds& Bvents cause or are caused (y mental states and mental episodes& 8n fact, one could ar+ue that to tal. of events does 3:03 not accurately convey ho? fictional narrative ?or.s& 8n practice, nearly all of the physical events descri(ed in novels are perceived (y characters and have an impact on their mental functionin+& Lther?ise, ?hy mention themI B9ceptions to this rule mi+ht include the historical events that are referred to (y narrators in novels (y ?riters such as 0ir @alter 0cott and Reor+e Bliot and that are not e9perienced (y the characters, (ut in +eneral, 8 ?ould maintain that my +eneraliAation holds true& 8t ?ould in a sense, therefore, (e more accurate and more revealin+ a(out the function of physical event descriptions in narratives to refer to them not as events (ut as e2periences& 8n addition, many events are actions that are performed (y individuals ?ho e9perience the mental episodes that constitute the motives, intentions, and so on that cause the action& These mental events have to (e recovered (ri+htly or ?ron+ly) (y the reader from the discourse as part of the operation of assem(lin+ characters> purported mental functionin+& This is an essential element in the readin+ comprehension process& For actants and functions to (e understood, they must (e translated into lan+ua+e that refers to the consciousnesses of the fictional (ein+s in the story& / =uest (y a hero is not Kust a =uest, it is a decision ta.en (y the hero to +o on the =uest& 8n addition, the discourse may reveal that the decision is ta.en Koyfully, re+retfully, fearfully, or ?hatever& 0tory analysis relates primarily to the structures contained in the story, ?hile any comprehensive consideration of fictional minds must focus (oth on the action contained in the story and also on the presentation of the accompanyin+ consciousness in the discourse& 8t is revealin+ that the lan+ua+e of actants and functions is totally alien to the lan+ua+e of fictional minds and consciousness& @hen characters are not seen as (ein+s, issues of consciousness do not arise& Lf course, characters are elements in the narrative structure as ?ell as (ein+s, (ut 8 su++est in chapters % and ; that there is a ?ay of ac.no?led+in+ this aspect of fictional minds that is not reductive and mechanistic& The .ind of perspective that 8 envisa+e addresses the +ulf (et?een the story and discourse sides of narratolo+y& Lne+a and 2anda su++est that most theories of narrative privile+e either story or discourse (155%, !6)& Ho?ever, it is possi(le that further research mi+ht sho? that there is a ?ay of (rin+in+ to+ether the story and the

discourse sides of the discipline& For e9ample, the presentation of action in the discourse has received little attention to date (ecause action is seen primarily as a story, not a discourse, issue& 8t is unfortunate that discourse analysts tend to +ive the appearance of not (ein+ interested in action, and story analysts appear to (e e=ually uninterested in consciousness& -evertheless, it is perfectly possi(le to create a theory of the presentation of consciousness 3:13 and action in fiction that applies e=ually ?ell to (oth the story and the discourse& There is some evidence of potential s.epticism to?ard the approach that 8 am advocatin+& 8n discussin+ definitions of narrative of the sort referred to a(ove, the narrative theorist Meir 0tern(er+ holds, in a discussion of ho? to conceptualiAe narrativity, that the most popular approach since /ristotle &&& locates it in a represented action, event3line etc (!001, 11%)& He then refers in a footnote to assorted variants of this approach and remar.s, Contrast the odd appeal to >e9perientiality> instead in Fluderni. (!001, 1!!)& (B9perientiality is the term used (y Moni.a Fluderni. in .o,ards a 3Natural4 Narratolo#y P155%Q for su(Kectivity, consciousness, and ?hat 8 call fictional minds&) )ut ho? can actions, event3lines and so on (e understood e9cept in terms of the e9perientiality of the characters involved in those actions and eventsI @here else does the lo+ic in an event3line lieI 8 find it very difficult to conceive of a narrative that does not involve fictional mental functionin+ or e9perientiality, and 8 therefore find it odd that 0tern(er+ finds it odd that Fluderni. should ar+ue that e9perientiality is fundamental to narrative& 8n conclusion, 8 do not ?ish to sound too critical of story analysis, and it is important not to lose si+ht of the many insi+hts that have resulted from it& 8t has an important place in the study of ?hole fictional minds& 4avid Herman has pointed out that it has +reat value ?ithin the co+nitive3 science approach that is discussed in section $ of this chapter Jet the concept of actants has prompted later researchers to ar+ue that characters in a narrative can (e vie?ed as constructs modelled on processors> pre3stored e9pectations a(out human (ein+s and human (ehavior&&&& -arrative actants, in other ?ords, can (e characteriAed as the output of inferences tri++ered (y +rammatical cues in storiesC those inferences are +rounded in (ehavioral paradi+ms that form part of the (roader co+nitive repertoire of story3tellers and their audiences#of lan+ua+eusers +enerally (1555(, !:$)& This use of the actants concept as a (asis for the study of co+nitive frames is an insi+ht that 8 ?ish to e9plore in section $ and in later chapters& 8t is a valua(le e9ample of ho?, (y com(inin+ various approaches ?ithin innovative ne? perspectives, ?e can arrive at a clearer understandin+ of ho? fictional minds ?or.& )ut to do this, ?e have to (e as ima+inative as possi(le a(out the precise e9tent and scope of these co+nitive repertoires&

2. &ossi'le Worlds The concept of possi(le ?orlds (e+an life ?ithin analytical philosophy& 8t ?as developed initially (y such philosophers as 0aul Drip.e (15"0) and 4avid 2e?is 3:!3 (15;:) in order to deal ?ith various technical issues in modal lo+ic, the (ranch of lo+ic that is concerned ?ith necessity and possi(ility& 0o, for e9ample, necessity can (e defined in terms of propositions that are true in all possi(le ?orldsC possi(ility in terms of propositions that are true in at least one possi(le ?orldC and impossi(ility in terms of propositions that are not true in any possi(le ?orld& The idea ?as then adapted and e9tended (y such narrative theorists as 2u(omir 4oleTel (;eterocosmica, 155"), Thomas Pavel (!ictional Worlds, 15"%), and Marie32aure *yan (1551) to refer to the possi(le ?orlds that are created in ?orlds of literature and that are also .no?n interchan+ea(ly as fictional ?orlds, narrative ?orlds, te9t ?orlds, and story?orlds& (0ee also Paul @erth>s .e2t Worlds P1555Q for a more lin+uistics3(ased perspective&) These theorists, ho?ever, to+ether ?ith others such as *uth *onen in Possible Worlds in "iterary .heory (155$), are careful to emphasiAe the differences (et?een the ori+inal philosophical model of possi(le ?orlds and the ne? narrative model of story?orlds& From no? on, 8 ?ill (e considerin+ only story?orlds& 4iscussions on ho? fictional minds are constructed have to (e put in the conte9t of possi(le?orlds theory& The purpose of this section is to ma.e a fe? introductory remar.s a(out the concept (efore later chapters develop the idea in relation to fictional minds in more detail& /lthou+h the story analysis strand of narrative theory that ?as discussed in the previous section has as its (asis the concept of story (as opposed to discourse), it is 4oleTel>s vie? that the (asic concept of narratolo+y is not >story,> (ut >narrative ?orld,> defined ?ithin a typolo+y of possi(le ?orlds (155", :1)& 0tory?orlds are possi(le ?orlds that are constructed (y lan+ua+e throu+h a performative force that is +ranted (y cultural convention& @hen a third3person narrator ma.es a statement a(out a character it is, accordin+ to speech act theory, a performative utterance it creates ?hat it says in the act of sayin+ it& This is ?hy the =uote ?ith ?hich 8 started the (oo. su++ested that it is only fictional people a(out ?hom ?e +et completely relia(le information& Renerally, third3person narrators never lie (althou+h some self3conscious e9periments in the French -ouveau *oman have played ?ith the idea of the unrelia(le thirdperson narrator)& The =uestion of the unrelia(le narrator that ?as made famous (y @ayne C& )ooth in .he /hetoric of !iction is a completely separate issue that relates to first3person narrators&

Possi(le3?orlds theory has made a profound contri(ution to narratolo+y in a num(er of ?ays& Lne relates to its focus on the =uestion of access to fictional ?orlds& 8n other ?ords, ho? do readers comprehend fictional te9ts sufficiently to (e a(le to enter the story?orld that is descri(ed in the te9tI This line of 3::3 in=uiry (uilds on the ?or. that ?as done ?ithin the earlier tradition of reader response theory& @ithin possi(le3?orlds theory, readin+#and therefore access to the story?orld#has three elements the source domain, the real ?orld in ?hich the te9t is (ein+ processed (y the readerC the tar+et domain, the story?orld that constitutes the output of the reader>s processin+C and the system of te9tual features that tri++ers various .inds of reader3held real3?orld .no?led+e in a ?ay that proKects the reader from source domain to tar+et domain& The reference to the utiliAation of real3?orld .no?led+e in the readin+ process ?ill (rin+ us in section $ to the contri(ution that co+nitive science can ma.e to an understandin+ of the readin+ process& 4oleTel maintains that fictional ?orlds are accessed throu+h semiotic channels and (y means of information processin+ and that readers can do this (y crossin+ someho? the ?orld (oundary (et?een the realms of the actual and the possi(le (155", !0)& The reconstruction of the story?orld (y the reader inte+rates fictional ?orlds into the reader>s reality (4oleTel 155", !1)& My thesis is that the main semiotic channels (y ?hich the reader accesses fictional ?orlds, and the most important sets of instructions that allo? the reader to reconstruct the fictional ?orld, are those that +overn the reader>s understandin+ of the ?or.in+s of characters> minds& Lnce this central point has (een esta(lished, then ?or. can (e done on the differences (et?een the sets of instructions that are characteristic of various +enres and su(+enres such as, for e9ample, the psycholo+ical novel and the thriller& The same point applies to different historical periods of the novel& 0ee chapter " for further details& 0tory?orlds differ onto lo+ically from the real ?orld (ecause they are incomplete& (Lntolo+y is the study of e9istence, the nature of (ein+, and the essence of thin+s&) Bvery story?orld contains ontolo+ical +aps or spots of indeterminacy in a phrase of *oman 8n+arden>s (15;:, !$%) that ?as later (orro?ed (y @olf+an+ 8ser (15;", 1;0)& These +aps constitute the difference (et?een, on the one hand, the com(ination of the story and the discourse that constitutes the te9t and, on the other hand, the story?orld& -o discourse could ever (e lon+ enou+h to say in its story all that could (e said a(out the ?hole story?orld& 0o, fiction is necessarily incomplete and full of (lan.s ?here nothin+ is said a(out a part of the story?orld and +aps ?here somethin+ (ut not everythin+ is said& (8 ?ill use the term #aps to cover (oth (lan.s and +aps&) L(viously, the nature of the +aps varies& 0ome +aps are temporary (for e9ample, the identity of the murderer in a ?hodunit) and are filled in later in the discourseC others are permanent, and it is these +aps that ?e are tal.in+ a(out here& 4oleTel distin+uishes (et?een +aps in terms of implicitness& He states that implicitness

3:$3 (ased on presupposition is a maKor source of fictional3?orld construction and reconstruction (155", 1;6)& The meanin+ of all te9ts is a composite of overt and covert semantic constituents (4oleTel 155", 1;!)& He then introduces a threepart distinction e9plicit te9ture constructs determinate fictional facts, implicit te9ture constructs indeterminate facts and Aero te9ture creates +aps (1556, !05)& 8n terms of Bmma @oodhouse>s mind, it is e9plicitly stated at the end of the novel that she loves Dni+htleyC it is implied throu+hout that she has al?ays loved himC there is Aero reference to her vie?s on the French *evolution& Marie32aure *yan (rin+s to+ether the t?o issues of access and +aps (y ar+uin+ that one important semiotic channel for accessin+ fictional ?orlds and for creatin+ the implicit te9ture that closes ontolo+ical +aps is ?hat she terms the principle of minimal departureC that is, ?hile readin+ a te9t and reconstructin+ a story?orld from it, the reader assumes the minimal possi(le departure from the actual ?orld unless such a departure is specified or stron+ly indicated (y the te9t& 0o the reader ?ill assume that Bmma has one head, t?o arms, t?o le+s, and so on unless told other?ise& 8 ?ill e9plore in chapter % ho? the theoretical treatment of +aps has to ta.e account of the special nature of fictional minds& 4oleTel refers at some points to the semiotic procedures for the creation and re3creation of fictional minds, commentin+ that for the semantics of fictional narrative, inferences re+ardin+ aspects and constituents of actin+ are of special si+nificance (155", 1;6)& He then cautions us in this ?ay Jet many precautions have to (e ta.en ?hen inferrin+ the mental traits of fictional persons from their actions (4oleTel 155", 1;%)& )ut is his ?arnin+ necessaryI 0urely ?e ta.e many precautions in inferrin+ the mental traits of real persons from their actions& The ta.in+ of these precautions is second nature& 8t is precisely those inferential s.ills, an e9ample of the real3?orld .no?led+e referred to a(ove, that ena(le us to read at all& 0o ?hy is the ?arnin+ necessaryI The ans?er is fairly o(vious 4oleTel is reinforcin+ the distinction referred to a(ove (et?een the e9plicit story?orld3creatin+ .no?led+e that is infalli(ly supplied (y the third3person narrator and the implicit .no?led+e that is all too falli(ly inferred (y the reader from the te9t& 8 am not =ueryin+ this entirely valid distinction, (ut 8 do ?onder ?hether too much emphasis on it can cause us to lose si+ht of the variety of ?ays in ?hich readers construct fictional minds& 0ome of these ?ays are uni=ue to the creation of fictional minds the performative utterances of the narrator re+ardin+ individual characters and also the fact that readers have fre=uent direct access to fictional minds& Lther ?ays have features in common ?ith real minds ?e ?ei+h the vie?s of others ?hen comin+ to our vie? a(out an individual, and also, as 4oleTel says, ?e infer mental traits from actions& My 3:63 concern is that possi(le3?orlds theorists appear to privile+e the first ?ay, the self3creatin+ statements of the narrator, at the e9pense of the others&

/s story?orlds are called into (ein+ throu+h the unrestricted creative po?er of fictional lan+ua+e, possi(le3?orlds theorists lay a +ood deal of emphasis on the ar+ument that the limits of the fictionally possi(le are the limits of the e9pressi(le or ima+ina(le& 8t is =uite true that the ran+e of fantasy ?orlds created in ima+inative literature is e9traordinary& 0cience fiction, science fantasy, and ma+ical realist novels are nota(le e9amples& Ho?ever, 8 ?ill su++est in chapter %, section $ that the special nature of fictional minds places limits on the e9tent to ?hich story?orlds are a(le to depart from the actual ?orld& 8 referred in chapter 1 to different parts of narrative theory as different corners of a lar+e field& -arrative theorists have (een a?are for some time of these divisions& 4oleTel has convincin+ly advanced the vie? that the concept of a story?orld ena(les us to leave (ehind the split that traditional narratolo+y created (y separatin+ story from character& / narrative semantics (ased on action theory radically psycholo+iAes the story and, at the same time, features fictional characters as persons for and in actin+ (155", 66)& The possi(le3?orlds approach forms a promisin+ ?ay to unify previously diver+ent approaches to fictional minds& 8t is interestin+ that the foremost possi(le3?orlds theorist should see the potential for that theory to deepen and enrich the story analysis treatment of fictional minds& 8n the follo?in+ section 8 ?ill sho? ho? narrative theorists such as ,ri Mar+olin have made clear the implications of possi(le3?orlds theory for the su(Kect area of characteriAation& 3. Characteri(ation / +ood deal of illuminatin+ ?or. has (een done ?ithin narrative theory on characteriAation (y, for e9ample, ,m(erto Bco (15"1), Eonathan Culler (15;6), 0hlomith *immon3Denan (15":), Mie.e )al (155;) and ,ri Mar+olin (15"%, 15";, 15"5, 1550, 1556a, 1556(, 155%a)& The follo?in+ passa+e contains an e9cellent summary of the sort of ?or. that has (een done to date& Characters, it states, can (e more or less te9tually prominent, dynamic or static, consistent or inconsistent, and simple, t?o3dimensional, and hi+hly predicta(le or comple9, multi3 dimensional, and capa(le of surprisin+ (ehaviorC they are classa(le not only in terms of their conformity to standard types (the (ra++art, the cuc.old, the femme fatale) or their correspondin+ to certain spheres of action (ut also in terms of their acts, ?ords, feelin+s, appearance, and so onC and their attri(utes can (e directly and relia(ly stated (for e9ample, in a set3piece presentation) or inferred from their (mental, emotional and physical) (ehavior (Prince 15"!, 3:%3 1!$)& Ho?ever, theorists have consistently e9pressed dissatisfaction ?ith the current state of characteriAation theory at the time of their ?ritin+& For e9ample, accordin+ to Patric. L>-eill, the multifarious ?ays in ?hich characters emer+e from the ?ords on the pa+e, in ?hich story?orld actors ac=uire a personality, is one of the most fascinatin+ and least systematically e9plored aspects of narrative theory and narrative practice

(155$, $5)& Mie.e )al contends that no satisfyin+, coherent theory of characteriAation is availa(le (155;, 116)& 8n my vie?, these comments do not ta.e sufficient account of the ?or. done (y ,ri Mar+olin& 8n a lon+ series of articles pu(lished (et?een 15"% and the present, he sets out a comple9, ri+orous, and comprehensive conceptual frame?or. for the study of character& These essays, ?hich contain numerous e9amples of typolo+ies that comprise the essential features of various different aspects of characteriAation, are a rich, full, and su++estive resource for future researchers in the field of characteriAation&Lne of Mar+olin>s maKor contri(utions is to e9plain ho? the various definitions of character have emer+ed out of contrastin+ te9tual approaches& These definitions can (e summariAed as follo?s (for more detail, see Mar+olin 15";, 10;#"C 15"5, 1#6C 1550, "$:#$;) a& 8rammatical person& The character as a topic entity of a discourse, the su(Kect of referrin+ e9pressions such as noun phrases, proper names, and pronouns& 0u(Kect area te9t lin+uistics& 8 ?ill not (e concerned directly ?ith this approach e9cept in so far as it underpins (c) speech position& (& "iterary device& The character as part of the desi+n of a literary ?or. of art, one of many means of achievin+ aesthetic effects& 0u(Kect area literary criticism& /s 8 say in chapter 1, section $, 8 ?ill not (e addressin+ the issues that arise from this su(Kect area& c& Speech position& The character as a constitutive role in the process of narrative transmission or communication& These roles include te9tual spea.er and also narrative instance or level such as narrator and focaliAer& 0u(Kect area narratolo+y& 8 discuss focaliAation in section 6 of this chapter and the speech cate+ory approach in detail in the follo?in+ chapter& d& Semes& The character as standin+ for a thematic element, a semantic comple9, or macrosi+n composed of semes and unified (y a proper name (as descri(ed in *oland )arthes>s S<=)& 0u(Kect area semiotics& 0ome aspects of this approach are discussed later in this section& e& Actant& The character as a role or element in the story structure& 0u(Kect area story analysis& This approach ?as discussed in section 1 of this chapter& 3:;3 f& Non$actual individual& The character as a non3actual (ein+ ?ho e9ists in a possi(le ?orld and ?ho can (e ascri(ed physical, social, and mental properties& 0u(Kect area possi(le3?orld semantics& This is the paradi+m that ?as introduced in the previous section and that is adopted throu+hout this study&

The non3actual individual approach seems to me to (e far richer and more informative than the others, althou+h it must (e ac.no?led+ed that they all have their place& @hile descri(in+ this approach, Mar+olin refers to the importance of the mental dimension, the features of ?hich he lists as follo?s co+nitive, emotional, volitional, and perceptual events, and inner states such as .no?led+e and (elief sets, attitudes, ?ishes, +oals, plans, intentions, and dispositions& He calls the sum of these mental phenomena interiority or personhood (15"5, $)& The same =uestion

applies to Mar+olin>s notion of interiority as ?as applied to Fluderni.>s notion of e9perientiality in section 1 of this chapter& Ho? can ?e come to a full understandin+ of ho? characters come into e9istence in the reader>s mind ?ithout an ac.no?led+ement of the importance of the mental dimensionI /nd if the non3actual individual approach allo?s for a +reater ac.no?led+ement of the importance of interiority and personhood than the others, then it has a prima facie case to (e considered as the (est approach& 8nteriority, e9perientiality, and fictional minds are, after all, a +ood part of ?hat ?e read novels for& Mar+olin>s vie?s on the relationships (et?een, and the relative merits of, the si9 approaches chan+e over time, and it is instructive to follo? the development of his thou+ht& 8n 8ntroducin+ and 0ustainin+ Characters in 2iterary -arrative he does not comment on the relationships (et?een the approaches or refer to their relative value he says only that the discussion in the rest of his essay ?ill focus on the non3actual individual approach (15";, 10")& 8n 0tructuralist /pproaches to Character in -arrative (15"5), he is much more e9plicit in sayin+ that the various perspectives have incompati(le features and irreconcila(le presuppositions (15"5, !)& -o t?o of them can (e translated into each other or reduced to a common denominatorC nor can they (e synthesiAed in any meanin+ful ?ay (15"5, 6)& He also appears to +ive them e=ual value each seems to command a certain de+ree of theoretical le+itimacy, and each of them ena(les us to see and say thin+s ?e could not have other?ise (15"5, 6)& -o concept of character can conse=uently raise a claim to an ultimate, e9clusive, or o(li+atory theoretical status (15"5, ;)& Ln the other hand, he declares that the 3:"3 notion of a character as a non3actual individual is ar+ua(ly the closest to our cultural intuition, fle9i(le and open3ended, and at the same time, theoretically ?ell3+rounded (15"5, 10), and so, as in 15";, he devotes the rest of his essay to it& Ho?ever, (y 1550 he seems to (e more outspo.en& @hile discussin+ three of the approaches he su++ests that the non3actual individual approach is superior to the speech position and actant approaches in terms of conceptual comprehensiveness, theoretical depth, e9planatory po?er, and the diversity of te9ts to ?hich it is applica(le& For e9ample, unli.e the other t?o, the non3actual individual approach can handle ontolo+ically pro(lematical as ?ell as ontolo+ically strai+ht story?orldsC that is, it can account for postmodernist as ?ell as for realist constructions of character& He descri(es the speech position and actant approaches as accepta(le (ut hi+hly partial, selective, and ?ea. on the intuitive notion of character (1550, "$6#$%)& He also comes to a different vie? on the relationship (et?een the approaches and ar+ues that, as the speech position and actant approaches implicitly presuppose the e9istence of story?orlds ?hile the nonactual individual approach ma.es such an e9istence e9plicit, the possi(le3?orlds approach can include as su(sets the predicates of the other t?o (1550, "$6)&

Manfred Eahn certainly supports the su(sumin+ of the actant approach under the non3actual individual approach, pointin+ out that, ?hile in early structuralist accounts, literary characters are Kust >roles,> >functions> or as )arthes calls them, >paper (ein+s,> in fact, a reader must proKect a pra+matic identity on fictional characters in order to understand description and narrated perception, speech, and action (1555(, 1;)& 8 ?ould put the point even more stron+ly in case Eahn>s list implies that there are some aspects of narrative that do not need such a proKection in order to (e understood& 8n my vie?, there are essentially no aspects of narrative that can (e understood ?ithout the semiotic operation to ?hich Eahn refers& Mar+olin ma.es the point that the non3actual individual approach is suita(le for various different .inds of te9ts& 8t is my vie? this approach may (e the only one that is suita(le for all te9ts& /s Mar+olin su++ests, a theory of character chan+e, or ho? characters develop in various ?ays over the course of a narrative, should (e (ased on a ?ide corpus, em(racin+ a ma9imal num(er of types of narrative, ancient and modern, realistic and fantastic, hi+h and popular, ?ithout privile+in+ the realistic psycholo+ical model (1556a, 6)& The theory of character as non3actual individual is suita(le for all of these and not Kust for the realistic psycholo+ical model (ecause it e9plains ho? ?e read all narrative& Mar+olin>s point a(out character chan+e is a +ood e9ample& 8t is a centrally important aspect 3:53 of narrative, and it is much more amena(le to the story?orld perspective than to the others (ecause the others do not have the necessary fle9i(ility, fluidity, and comprehensive reach& CharacteriAation is a continuin+ process& 8t consists of a succession of individual operations that result in a continual patternin+ and repatternin+ until a coherent fictional personality emer+es& *eaders create fictional people on their first encounter ?ith them, and these (ein+s continue to e9ist until they leave the narrative, the narrative ends, or they die& 4urin+ an initial act of characteriAation, ?hen ?e first meet a character, ?e mi+ht say to ourselves, That ?as a selfish act& Ln the other hand, particularly if ?e have an e9pectation that this mi+ht (e a character that ?e ?ill meet a+ain, ?e are also =uite li.ely to say somethin+ li.e, He must (e a selfish person& The (uildin+ of a ?hole personality starts happenin+ immediately, even durin+ the first act of characteriAation& CharacteriAation is an inference from an individual action, then, to?ard a supposed disposition or trait, and these are states of mind that e9tend over time& 8n the same ?ay, su(se=uent actions are interpreted (y the reader in the conte9t of the ?hole of the character>s mind as hypothesiAed up until that point& Eud+ments are then adKusted (y the interpretation placed on the action, and a ne? frame is formed ?ithin ?hich future actions can (e interpreted& This process is not easy to theoriAe ?ithin the non3story?orld approaches& 8 mentioned in the previous section that much of the discussion of the role of the reader ?ithin the possi(le3?orlds perspective echoed the conclusions of earlier reader response theory& 8t may therefore (e helpful at this point to consider some of the aspects of that theory that are relevant to the reader>s constructions of ?hole characters& ,m(erto Bco has used the thou+ht3provo.in+ phrase, the cooperative principle in

narrativity (15"1, !6%)& 8n effect, the meanin+ of a te9t ?ill not unfold unless the necessary cooperation e9ists (et?een the reader and the narrator, and this principle of cooperation applies in particular to the specific and central issue of the construction of characters> minds& The main thrust of @olf+an+ 8ser>s ar+uments in .he Act of /eadin# (15;") is that a readin+ causes a ?or. to unfold its inherently dynamic character& /s the reader uses the various perspectives offered (y the te9t in order to a?a.e responses in himself or herself, the te9t may not +o far enou+h, resultin+ in (oredom for the reader, or may +o too far, resultin+ in overstrain for the reader& The development in the mind of the reader of a net?or. of the em(edded narratives of various characters is an essential factor in the dynamic process that 8ser descri(es& Ln the (asis of the initial information contained in the 3$03 te9t and o(tained from the various sources descri(ed in this study, the reader ?ill form initial hypotheses a(out the past (that is, the character>s memories and feelin+s a(out the past), the present (the character>s decisions a(out (ehavior and action), and the future (lon+er3term intentions, plans, and +oals)& These hypotheses ?ill then (e modified in the li+ht of further information a(out the development of other em(edded narratives and the relationships (et?een them in the conte9t of the ?hole story?orld& Too much information a(out fictional minds, as 8ser says, means that the reader has too little to do to construct that mind& Poorly ?ritten novels often fail on this point& Too little information, and the construction of minds (ecomes difficult& This last point is, of course, not necessarily a pro(lem& Thrillers and ?hodunits depend for their effect on the sense of mystery that results from a paucity of mental3life information& Many modern novels use a variety of modernist, postmodernist, and (ehaviorist techni=ues in ?hich this information is at a premium& @hen readers say that such novels are difficult, it is often this feature that they have in mind& 8ser ar+ues that, as part of the dynamic process that he descri(es, the un?ritten outlines of the te9t, its +aps, dra? the reader into the action and influence the interpretation of the ?ritten te9t& The ?ritten te9t imposes certain limits on the un?ritten in order to prevent the ?hole e9perience from (ecomin+ too haAy and (lurred& Ho?ever, the un?ritten implications ?or.ed out (y the reader>s ima+ination endo? the ?ritten te9t ?ith far +reater si+nificance than it ?ould other?ise possess (15;", 1;0#;5)& There is a lar+e num(er of constraints on the amount of evidence that the narrator can ma.e availa(le in the discourse for any one character, even a prota+onist& /s only a certain num(er of the ?ords on the pa+es of the te9t can refer to a particular character, it is part of the competence of the reader to construct, (oth from this ?ritten te9t and from the un?ritten implications that comprise the +aps ?ithin the ?ritten te9t, a continuin+ consciousness for that character& Havin+ accomplished that initial and (asic tas., the reader then has to interpret all the availa(le evidence, not Kust that ?hich is made availa(le (y direct access, in order to plot the detail and direction of that character>s em(edded narrative&

The topics of +enre and interte9tuality form the (asis of a +ood deal of the discussions on character& 8n terms of the real3?orld .no?led+e that readers (rin+ to an understandin+ of a story?orld, these issues relate to readers> .no?led+e of other story?orlds& 8t is much easier to access a story?orld if the reader can apply .no?led+e of other story?orlds that are constructed in similar ?ays& Renre is a common and useful (asis of similarity (et?een individual novels& For 3$13 e9ample, it helps to .no? that one is readin+ a romance rather than a thriller in order to use previously e9istin+ .no?led+e of other romances to interpret the various +enre3related te9tual cues that invaria(ly arise& 0imilarly, the ?ideran+in+ and comple9 interrelationships (et?een discourses that fall under the headin+ of interte9tuality are of +reat (enefit to the reader ?hile attemptin+ to construct coherent and satisfyin+ fictional personalities& Eonathan Culler ma.es several very interestin+ points on characteriAation that are primarily concerned ?ith interte9tuality (15;6, !:0#:")& Culler remar.s that character is not simply a con+lomeration of features, it is a directed, teleolo+ical set (ased on cultural models& @e do not simply add to+ether the actions and attri(utes of an individual character, dra?in+ from them a conception of personality and role& /ccordin+ to Culler, ?e are +uided (y formal e9pectations a(out the roles that need to (e filled& He emphasiAes that it is not necessary that characters should precisely fit stoc. types, (ut that these models +uide the perception and creation of characters, ena(lin+ readers to compose situations and attri(ute intelli+i(le roles (15;6, !:6#:;)& The notion of interte9tuality ma.es an important contri(ution to our understandin+ of ho? readers construct characters& Ho?ever, 8 ?ould ar+ue that the vitally important aspect of reader construction of character that has come to (e .no?n under this la(el has (een +iven much more attention than the complementary and specifically te9tual approach that 8 have in mind& Culler, Bco, and others have convincin+ly e9plained the precise nature of such e9trate9tual material as the cultural and literary codes that readers use to construct notions of character, (ut 8 am a?are of very little ?or. on ?hat mi+ht (e called the intrate9tual evidence in the discourse that is used (y readers for the same purpose& 8t mi+ht (e a +ood idea to com(ine (oth approaches so that the intrate9tual evidence that is made availa(le ?ithin the em(edded narrative approach can (e interpreted in terms of the interte9tual models that Culler descri(es& Lf course, it is an oversimplification to dra? such a sharp distinction (et?een the t?o& Culler indicates that the interte9tual process is dra?n (oth from non3literary e9perience and literary conventions& *evealin+ly, as an e9ample of the former, he comments that, as soon as the (asic outline of a character (e+ins to emer+e, one can call upon any of the lan+ua+es developed for the study of human (ehavior in order to structure the te9t in those terms (15;6, !:;)& This descri(es perfectly the use that 8 am tryin+ to ma.e of the parallel discourses of philosophy, psycholo+y, and co+nitive science& )ut, althou+h 8 am usin+ these discourses, in effect, as interte9tual models, 8 ?ould still maintain that a distinction can (e made, as my approach encoura+es more attention to

3$!3 the evidence that is availa(le ?ithin the discourse than the approaches that commonly come under the name of interte9tuality& 4espite the first3rate =uality of the research that has (een done so far on characteriAation theory, only a fraction of ?hich ?as discussed (riefly earlier, a serious concern remains& 8t is that a fault line has developed ?ithin narrative theory (et?een the study of characteriAation and the study of the presentation of consciousness& For e9ample, in her e9cellent study, Narrative !iction (15":), 0hlomith *immon3Denan devotes t?o fine chapters to the su(Kect of characteriAation and one to speech representation that includes some discussion of thou+ht presentation& Ho?ever, there is no reference at all in the characteriAation chapters to thou+ht presentation, apart from a passin+ reference to the fact that the consciousnesses of Mrs& 4allo?ay and Molly )loom are presented from ?ithin (15":, $!)& B=ually stri.in+ly, there is no reference at all in her chapter on speech and thou+ht presentation to characteriAation& This seems stran+e& Ta.e a sentence such as this /s usual in these circumstances, he (ecame an+ry and defensive& This is the sort of statement that recurs continuously in narrative te9ts and often fulfils a pivotal role in +uidin+ the direction of the narrative& 8t presents an episode of immediate consciousness (the emotion of an+er) ?ithin the conte9t of the character>s disposition to an+er& The disposition in part causes the episode& The episode is a manifestation of the disposition& The event and the state are indissolu(ly lin.ed& 8t is (y interpretin+ episodes of consciousness ?ithin a conte9t of dispositions that the reader (uilds up a convincin+ and coherent sense of character& 8t is throu+h the central lin.in+ concept of dispositions that characteriAation and thou+ht presentation can (e seen as different aspects of the same phenomenon& Ho?ever, ?ithin narrative theory, dispositions (elon+ to the su(Kect area of characteriAation, and mental events (elon+ to the su(Kect area of thou+ht presentation& The a(sence of a holistic approach ma.es a reco+nition of the ?hole mind very difficult to achieve& 8n 15"5 ,ri Mar+olin advanced the vie? that the theory of character as nonactual individual had, up until that time, (een treated as ancillary and as some sort of post scriptum to more fundamental theories such as actantial patterns and narrative situations& He su++ested, thou+h, that the situation had recently improved due to the formulation of semantic models for fictional ?orlds and non3actual individuals, as ?ell as the +radual ela(oration of co+nitive models for the selective representation of information frames for te9ts& He concluded ?ith a fine flourish (y sayin+ that the tas. is (efore us (15"5, !:)& 8 hope that this (oo. can, ho?ever imperfectly and incompletely, ma.e a contri(ution to the response that is still re=uired to Mar+olin>s challen+e& 3$:3

4. Cogniti)e Science and *rames 8t appears that the term co#nitive science is used in rou+hly t?o senses, one narro? and one (road& 8n the (road sense, the term is used for the study of human co+nition& 8t comprises those aspects of the disciplines of philosophy, psycholo+y, neuroscience, artificial intelli+ence, lin+uistics, and, sometimes, anthropolo+y that relate to co+nition& The increasin+ use of the plural term co#nitive sciences (as in the title of -0.(CS) seems to involve an ac.no?led+ement of this (road usa+e& The development of this ne? discipline is often dated to the 1560s and lin.ed to the emer+ence of -oam Choms.y>s theory (15%6) that the system of rules underlyin+ our lin+uistic competence is hard3?ired into our (rains as part of our innate +enetic endo?ment& 8n the narro? sense, the term refers specifically to the study of the computational theory of the mindC that is, it comprises only those aspects of the disciplines listed earlier that (ear on ho? the neural information processin+ of (rains can (e studied in the same ?ay that the information processin+ of computers can (e studied& The (rain is treated as thou+h it is a .ind of computer, althou+h the e9tent of the claimed relationship (et?een (rains and computers varies from ?riter to ?riter& Gie?s also vary on the nature of the relationship (et?een the (road and narro? tendencies& )road co+nitive science is uncontroversial& Bveryone a+rees that co+nition should (e studied and that there is still a +ood deal that ?e do not .no? a(out it& Ho?ever, narro? co+nitive science is very controversial indeed& 0everal ?riters, includin+ Eohn 0earle in philosophy and /ntonio 4amasio in neuroscience, disa+ree ?ith much of the computational theory of the mind& These and other ?riters say simply that the (rain is not a computer& Lr, in a more nuanced o(Kection, they say that ?e do not learn very much a(out the (rain (y studyin+ it as thou+h it ?ere a computer or similar to a computer& 8t is clear from 4amasio>s emphasis in .he !eelin# of What ;appens (!000) on the importance of consciousness and the emotions that he feels that the (rain is too comple9 and its nature too elusive for the computational theory of the mind to (e of much help in descri(in+ ho? it ?or.s& 0earle is a ?ell3.no?n s.eptic, and in .he /ediscovery of the -ind (155!), he asserts (luntly that there are (rute, (lind neurophysiolo+ical processes and there is consciousness, (ut there is nothin+ else &&& no rule follo?in+, no mental information processin+, no unconscious inferences, no mental models, no primal s.etches, no ! 17!4 ima+es, no threedimensional descriptions, no lan+ua+e of thou+ht, and no universal +rammar (155!, !!"#!5)& His list of ?hat does not ta.e place in the (rain is a co+nitivescience tool .it& Ho?ever, it seems to me that, not?ithstandin+ 0earle>s concerns, (road co+nitive science has a lot to offer narrative theory& *eaders ?ho are in 3$$3 terested in e9plorin+ the diverse ?ays in ?hich the t?o disciplines can enrich and illuminate each other are recommended to read Narrative .heory and the Co#nitive Sciences (!00:), edited (y a pioneer in the field, 4avid Herman& 8n Herman>s very persuasive vie?, ?hich is also e9plained in Story "o#ic (!00!), narrative theory should (e re+arded as a (ranch of co+nitive science (!00!, !)& Ta.in+ the relationship (et?een

co+nitive science and narrative theory in a related direction, ,ri Mar+olin, in an essay in Narrative .heory and the Co#nitive Sciences entitled Co+nitive 0cience, the Thin.in+ Mind, and 2iterary -arrative, applies some of the conceptual tools of co+nitive science in a most illuminatin+ ?ay to such traditional narratolo+ical notions as the narrator, the implied author, focaliAation, and defamiliariAation& 8 am concerned more specifically in this (oo. ?ith the ?ays in ?hich co+nitive science can add to our understandin+ of fictional minds& 2uc.ily, 8 ?ill (e s.irtin+ around some of the more contentious and controversial issues that are raised (y narro? co+nitive science and ?ill, instead, (e focusin+ on some of the contri(utions that can (e made to narrative theory (y the (road variety& / num(er of philosophers and others (such as 4avid 2od+e in Consciousness and the -ovel) have deep concerns that the issue of consciousness has (ecome mar+inaliAed& For e9ample, 0earle ?ishes to rescue the notion of consciousness from the ne+lect or even hostility of co+nitive science& 8t is his ar+ument that PmQore than anythin+ else, it is the ne+lect of consciousness that accounts for so much (arrenness and sterility in psycholo+y, the philosophy of mind, and co+nitive science (155!, !!;)& /nd one senses that co+nitive science is chief amon+ the (arren and sterile culprits& 8t is fair to say that the Kury is still out on this point& 8 ?ill refer to 0earle>s concerns in later chapters, (ut it seems to me that an interest in co+nitive science is not at all incompati(le ?ith a reco+nition of the importance and centrality of fictional consciousness& -arratolo+ists have made +ood use of a num(er of co+nitive3science concepts that can help to e9plain the readin+ process& 8n 15"%, Thomas Pavel ?rote that PcQontemporary lin+uistics has +radually&&& shifted its attention from semiosis#the ar(itrary lin. (et?een meanin+ and sound# to lan+ua+e universals, innate +rammars, and the lin.s to co+nitive psycholo+y& This shift has failed to ma.e itself felt in literary theory (15"%, 11%)& Ho?ever, althou+h he may have (een ri+ht at the time of ?ritin+, co+nitive science has had a su(stantial impact on literary theory in the years since& Theorists such as 4avid Herman (155;, !00!, and !00:(), Rilles Fauconnier (155;), Mar. Turner (1551), and Moni.a Fluderni. (155%) have contri(uted a +ood deal to our understandin+ of the readin+ process (y usin+ the techni=ues of co+nitive science& !ictional -inds 3$63 is an attempt to (uild on their ?or. (y focusin+ on my specific area of interest& 8t ?ill do this primarily (y concentratin+ on the concepts of frames, plans, and scripts& 8n Scripts: Plans: 8oals: and 5nderstandin# (15;;), the co+nitive scientists *o+er 0chan. and *o(ert /(elson e9plain that ?e use specific .no?led+e to interpret and participate in events ?e have (een throu+h many times (15;;, :;) and that the reader (rin+s a lar+e repertoire of PtheseQ .no?led+e structures to the understandin+ tas. (15;;, 10)& They call the .no?led+e structures frames& /nother very influential co+nitive scientist, Marvin Mins.y, accordin+ to -0.(CS, proposed or+aniAin+ .no?led+e into chun.s called frames& These frames are supposed to capture the essence of concepts or stereotypical situations, for e9ample (ein+ in a livin+ room or +oin+ out for dinner, (y clusterin+ all relevant information for these situations to+ether& This includes information a(out ho? to use the frame, information a(out

e9pectations (?hich may turn out to (e ?ron+), information a(out ?hat to do if e9pectations are not confirmed, and so on (-e(el 1555, :!$)& -0.(CS ela(orates on the =uestion of e9pectations and assumptions as follo?s Frames are .no?led+e structures that contain fi9ed structural information& They have slots that accept a ran+e of valuesC each slot has a default value that is used if no value has (een provided from the e9ternal ?orld ()re?er 1555, ;!5)& @e assume that a restaurant ?ill serve food at a price unless ?e are informed other?ise& The default value of the food slot ?ithin the restaurant frame is availa(ility for payment& Marie32aure *yan>s principle of minimal departure is a description in different terms of the default values contained in the frames that ?e apply to te9ts& Lur assumption that the story?orld ?ill not depart from the real ?orld unless ?e are told other?ise is a default position& Lther co+nitive3science concepts have a num(er of similarities ?ith frames& For e9ample, mental models the mind constructs >small3scale models> of reality to anticipate events, to reason, and to underlie e9planation (Eohnson32aird 1555, 6!6)C frame,or9s a frame?or. is an interconnected set of (eliefs, notions and predispositions ?hich >frames our ?orld3vie?> (Freeman 1556, ;5)C and inner maps ?e navi+ate our ?ay throu+h our social and physical ?orld (y constructin+ an inner representation, an inner map of that ?orld, and ?e plot our course from that inner map and from our representation of ?here ?e ?ant to +et to (0terelny 1555, $61)& @ithin our co+nitive frames, ?e use scripts and plans to +uide our everyday (ehavior& / script is a stereotypical se=uence of events, and a plan is a stereotypical set of ?ays of reactin+ to stereotypical situations and events& There is a natural mi9ture of scripts and plans in day3to3day functionin+& 0cripts and 3$%3 plans also include the default mechanism that is characteristic of frames& For e9ample, plans provide the mechanism for understandin+ events a(out ?hich there is no specific information (0chan. and /(elson 15;;, 5;)& They do this (y allo?in+ us to use default assumptions a(out ?hat is li.ely to happen in particular situations in the a(sence of specific information& 8t is only ?hen our assumptions are proved ?ron+ that ?e have to improvise& 8t is si+nificant that much of the description of frames, scripts, and plans is functionalist in the sense that the descriptions emphasiAe the function or purpose of these phenomena& 0ee chapter $, section 1 for more on the notion of functionalism& 8n particular, frames et cetera are lin.ed to +oals for the future& 0cripts and plans serve as +uides for individual actin+ & & & and (ecome indispensa(le in the pursuit of comple9 social activities (4oleTel 155", %6)& / plan is made up of +eneral information a(out ho? actors achieve +oals (0chan. and /(elson 15;;, ;0)& 0cripts are or+aniAed (y +oal structures that are used to ma.e sense of the need for them (0chan. and /(elson 15;;, !!;)& Finally and

particularly interestin+ly, 0chan. and /(elson discuss this issue in terms that ma.e real people sound li.e characters in novels or, in my terms, that ma.e real minds sound li.e fictional minds 8n a role theme, a particular actor>s +oals are determined (y his role&&&& Lnce a role theme is invo.ed, it sets up e9pectations a(out +oals and actions (15;;, 1:!#::)& 8n chapters % and ; 8 ?ill e9plore the ?ays in ?hich co+nitive frames ena(le readers to comprehend the fictional minds contained in te9ts& The purpose of the present discussion is simply to indicate in +eneral terms some of the ?ays in ?hich frames ?or.& My final point here is that co+nitive frames e9plain ho? readers fill +aps in story?orlds& /ccordin+ to the ?ell3.no?n psycholin+uist 0teven Pin.er, ?ritin+ in ;o, the -ind Wor9s (155;), the mind refle9ively interprets other people>s ?ords and +estures (y doin+ ?hatever it ta.es to ma.e them sensi(le and true& 8f the ?ords are s.etchy or incon+ruous, the mind charita(ly fills in missin+ premises or shifts to a ne? frame of reference in ?hich they ma.e sense& @ithout this >principle of relevance,> lan+ua+e itself ?ould (e impossi(le& The thou+hts (ehind even the simplest sentence are so la(yrinthine that if ?e ever e9pressed them in full, our speech ?ould sound li.e the convoluted ver(ia+e of a le+al document (155;, 66!)& Jou ?ill notice that Pin.er tal.s of the real3?orld +aps in our .no?led+e of other minds& He as.s, @hat is the nature of the purported mental functionin+ that ?ill ma.e sense of other people>s +esturesI /nd he also as.s of lan+ua+e specifically, @hat is the nature of the purported mental functionin+ that ?ill ma.e sense of other people>s ?ordsI These =uestions apply e=ually ?ell to fictional minds& 3$;3 ". *ocali(ation -arratolo+ists have developed and made much more systematic, ri+orous, and comprehensive the concept that ?as once .no?n as point of vie,, and have +iven it the name of focalization& 0ince the term ?as first introduced (y Rerard Renette (15"0), it has under+one a series of su(stantial adKustments su++ested (y such theorists as Mie.e )al (155;), 0hlomith *immon3Denan (15":), Patric. L>-eill (155$), and Manfred Eahn (1555c)& 4avid Herman has, for e9ample, introduced a helpful ne? cate+ory entitled hypothetical focalization (!00!, :10)& This continual process of chan+e has (een accompanied (y an undercurrent of s.epticism from theorists such as Moni.a Fluderni., ?ho thin.s that focaliAation is a cate+ory ?hose precise definition has &&& never (een a+reed upon and is still open to remappin+ (155%, :$$)& Ln account of these inconsistencies, she feels, it may (e ?ell to scrap the concept of focaliAation in its traditional confi+urations (155%, :$%)& 8n summary, focaliAation is the perspective, an+le of vision, or point of vie? from ?hich events are related& 8n Renette>s famous formulation, it must (e distin+uished from the act of narration in the follo?in+ ?ay @hen you read a discourse and as. @ho spea.sI or @ho narratesI, you are concerned ?ith narration& @hen you as. @ho seesI or @ho thin.sI then you are concerned ?ith focaliAation& 0ometimes an a+ent

sees and spea.s at the same time, and sometimes the a+ent ?ho sees is different from the a+ent ?ho spea.s& Garious typolo+ies of focaliAation have (een created, (ut perhaps the (est .no?n is Renette>s ori+inal model zero focalization occurs in the traditional novel of the omniscient narrator ?here the events are not focaliAed throu+h a sin+le character (ut are clearly focaliAed throu+h the narratorC internal focalization occurs ?hen the events are, in +eneral, focaliAed throu+h a sin+le character or characters in turnC and e2ternal focalization occurs ?hen descriptions are limited to characters> e9ternal (ehavior (in ?hat is called (ehaviorist narrative) (15"0, 1"5#50)& 8t is clear that the concept of focaliAation is crucially relevant to the study of fictional minds (ecause it is concerned ?ith the decisions that readers ma.e a(out ?hich consciousness is (ein+ presented in the te9t at any one time& The concept of focaliAation has a +ood deal of potential as one tool amon+ others for the e9amination of the presentation of fictional minds& 8n particular, focaliAation is an opportunity to e9plore in detail the precise methods (y ?hich a narrator uses a character>s consciousness as the perceptual vie?point or an+le from ?hich the narration ta.es place& @ithin the speech cate+ory approach, this techni=ue is called free indirect perception& Ta.e this e9ample He sat on the 3$"3 (ench& The train pulled a?ay& /t first +lance, the second sentence loo.s as if it is as much a simple physical description as the first sentence& Ho?ever, it can also (e read as the character>s perception of the physical event and, even more importantly, (y e9tension, the character>s e9perience of the psycholo+ical implications of the event& /s 8 said in section 1 of this chapter, physical events should (e considered as character e9periences& The conte9t may sho? that he ?as ?aitin+ for the person he loves ?ho ?as not on the train& Free indirect perception involves the recovery of those parts of the discourse that initially appear to (e pure narratorial report (ut that, on reflection, can (e read as descriptions of events or states in the story?orld as e9perienced (y a particular fictional mind& / free indirect perception readin+ ta.es responsi(ility for su(Kectivity a?ay from the narrator, ?here it initially appears to (e, and +ives it to a character& 8nternal focaliAation readin+s can naturaliAe as a character>s perception a +ood deal of discourse that appears at first si+ht to (e pure narratorial description& )y this means, the ?hole consciousnesses of characters can (e e9panded to include descriptions of aspects of the story?orld that are seen from their perceptual, co+nitive, and evaluative point of vie?& This interface (et?een characters and their story?orld is a hi+hly informative ?ay to lin. the internal consciousnesses of characters to their e9ternal social and physical conte9t& Ho?ever, 8 thin. that there are some pro(lems ?ith the concept of focaliAation& For e9ample, it ?as envisa+ed primarily for, and ?or.s very ?ell for, one aspect of mental functionin+#perception& 8t is noticea(le that theorists of focaliAation are much more comforta(le tal.in+ a(out perception than a(out other areas of mental life, and most of the e9amples used in e9planations of focaliAation are of perception& Ho?ever, the

notion ?or.s much less ?ell for the other aspects of consciousness that are descri(ed in chapter $& @hen other types of thin.in+ such as co+nition or the emotions are discussed, the conceptual frame?or. can (ecome rather cum(ersome, uninformative, and even misleadin+& For e9ample, ?hen thou+ht presentation occurs, the character ?ho is havin+ the thou+hts is (oth the focaliAer and the focaliAed o(Kect& @ithin )al>s scheme, in first3person novels the introspectin+ character has three functions as the narrator, as the internal focaliAer (155;, 1$"), and as ?hat she calls the non$perceptible focalized ob1ect (155;, 16:)& 8n the case of third3person narration, the narrator has at least one function as e9ternal narrator& The character has at least one function the non3percepti(le focaliAed o(Kect& Lpinion is divided on ?ho has the e9ternal focaliAer function& 8n the case of 8 felt happy (first3person narration), this means that there is a lot of conceptual apparatus to e9plain a very simple sentence& There are 3$53 three elements the 8 ?ho is reportin+ the feelin+C the 8 ?ho is havin+ the feelin+C and the 8 ?ho is introspectively a?are of the e9istence of the feelin+& 8ntuitively, one feels that only t?o and not three elements are needed the 8 ?ho is reportin+ the feelin+ and the 8 ?ho is (oth havin+ the feelin+ and is a?are of the feelin+& 0earle has convincin+ly demonstrated that introspection cannot (e understood in terms of one entity doin+ the introspectin+ and another entity e9periencin+ the o(Kect of the introspection& The 8 ?ho is feelin+ happy cannot (e separated from the same 8 ?ho is introspectively a?are of the feelin+ of happiness& 8n 0earle>s terms, such a vie? of the faculty of introspection re=uires a distinction (et?een the o(Kect spected PsicQ and the spectin+ PsicQ of it, and ?e cannot ma.e this distinction for conscious states (155!, 1$$)& To relate 0earle>s point to the lan+ua+e of focaliAation, the distinction (et?een the internal focaliAer and the non3percepti(le focaliAed o(Kect is a false one& 8n the case of He felt happy (third3person narration), as 8 said, there appears to (e some confusion over ?ho is the focaliAer& *immon3Denan says firmly that it is the e9ternal narrator3focaliAer& Ho?ever, other theorists ar+ue that the narrative is focaliAed here from the point of vie? of the character& The difference is, 8 thin., a result of the varyin+ levels of fluidity in the concept& The first approach is to re+ard focaliAation as a feature that is fairly fi9ed and constant throu+hout the ?hole len+th of a te9t then the focaliAer in the case of He felt happy is considered to (e the e9ternal narrator3focaliAer& (/n e9ception is the reflector novel, ?here the focaliAation is considered to (e fi9ed ?ith the reflector character for the len+th of the novel&) The second approach is to use the concept in a very fle9i(le and fluid ?ay the identity of the focaliAer often then chan+es from sentence to sentence& L>-eill uses the concept in this ?ay& Ta.e this e9ample He felt happy and she felt happy too& @ithin the first approach, the focaliAer is the e9ternal narrator3focaliAer& @ithin the second approach, there are t?o focaliAers the internal character3

focaliAer he for the first part of the sentenceC and the internal character3focaliAer she for the second part of the sentence& This confusion over such a (asic element in the conceptual frame?or. seems to me to (e unsatisfactory& / further concern is that focaliAation is defined in terms of the distinction (et?een the a+ent ?ho spea.s and the a+ent ?ho sees& )ut is this distinction ?or.a(leI Ho? is it possi(le Kust to spea., as opposed to seein+ then spea.in+I 0urely spea.in+ involves seein+ ?hat it is that you ?ish to spea. a(outI 8t seems to me that the =uestion @ho spea.sI should really (e reformulated in part, and in the case of third3person te9ts, as @ho is the narrative a+ent ?ho sees 3603 that a character a+ent seesI That is, it may (e the character ?ho sees, (ut it is the narrator ?ho sees that the character sees& 8t is only then that the narrator is a(le to spea.& This issue arises in particular ?ith the mode of thou+ht report& This mode is usually descri(ed as character focaliAation, (ut in practice, it is often clear that it is the narrator ?ho sees that the character is seein+ (or not seein+)& -arrators often report mental processes that a character is not a?are of, or only dimly a?are of& This point is an e9ample of the fact that the concept of focaliAation can sometimes conceal a +ood deal of the comple9ity of narrative& The la(elin+ can often (e uninformative or even misleadin+& The statement, the narration is focaliAed throu+h character 9, covers a very ?ide ran+e of cases& /t one end of the scale is the case ?here the narration follo?s a character around so that there are no scenes in ?hich 9 does not appearC 9 is the perceptual vie?point from ?hich the narration ta.es place, (ut there is little information a(out the ?or.in+s of 9>s mind& /t the other end of the scale is the case ?here the reader is +iven a full and detailed analysis of every aspect of 9>s mental functionin+, includin+ not Kust perception (ut also co+nition, dispositions, and so on& /nd, of course, there is an infinite num(er of +radations alon+ this scale& @hat is needed, therefore, is a typolo+y that distin+uishes (et?een cases in a much more sensitive and discriminatin+ ?ay than the conceptual frame?or. does at present& FocaliAation can (e re?ardin+ly reconsidered ?ithin the conte9t of fictional minds& / +ood e9ample is contained in Mie.e )al>s famous story of the lau+hin+ mice (155;, 1$$#$%)& )al descri(es a lar+e (as3relief in 8ndia in ?hich mice are sho?n lau+hin+ at a cat in a yo+a position& 0he e9plains that it can only (e understood once the narrative is focaliAed throu+h the mice and the vie?er realiAes that they are lau+hin+ (ecause they .no? that the cat ?ill not no? chase them& Ho?ever, this point can also (e made in terms of fictional minds& The vie?er thin.s that the mice thin. that the cat thin.s and so the mice thin. &&& and so on& Most narrative theorists (althou+h not, for e9ample, Rerald Prince) accept that the concept of focaliAation applies to the discourse the same story can (e presented in different discourses from different points of vie?& Ho?ever, ?hat 8 ?ill do in later chapters is to e9plore the ?ider concept of aspectuality (used in the philosophical and not the +rammatical sense) as it applies to the story?orld& Mie.e )al e9plains that ?henever events are presented, they are al?ays presented from ?ithin a certain vision

(155;, 1$!)& )al develops this insi+ht into the discourse ?ithin the conceptual frame?or. of focaliAation& My rather different point is that, ?henever events occur in the story?orld, they are 3613 al?ays e9perienced from ?ithin a certain vision& 8 ?ill call this feature of the story?orld aspectuality, and 8 ?ill ta.e it in the various directions indicated (y later chapters& Conclusion / recurrin+ theme throu+hout this chapter has (een that, althou+h the approaches discussed earlier all have their o?n individual stren+ths, their value ?ould (e even +reater if it ?as e9plicitly reco+niAed that they ?ere concerned ?ith fictional minds& 8 ?ill ta.e three e9amples at random /c.no?led+ements of the importance of causal connections (et?een events in definitions of narrative (ecome even more valua(le ?hen it is reco+niAed that these causal connections relate to the ?or.in+s of fictional minds& /lso, the inferences and hypotheses to ?hich reader response theorists +ive =uite Kustified importance involve, in the main, readers> analyses and Kud+ments of characters> thou+ht processes& Finally, many of the co+nitive frames that ?e use to ena(le comprehension of te9ts to ta.e place are concerned ?ith fictional mental functionin+& The narratolo+ical approaches descri(ed in this chapter do not, ta.en to+ether ?ith the speech cate+ory approach descri(ed in the ne9t chapter, form a coherent and complete perspective on fictional minds& Ho?ever, they ?ill ma.e invalua(le contri(utions to?ard one (ecause they can all (e inte+rated into the frame?or. descri(ed in the later sta+es of this study& 36!3 3 #he Speech Categories %. Summary )ecause the speech cate+ory approach of classical narratolo+y is (ased on the assumption that the cate+ories that are applied to fictional speech can (e unpro(lematically applied to fictional thou+ht, it is concerned primarily ?ith the part of the mind .no?n as inner speech, the hi+hly ver(aliAed flo? of selfconscious thou+ht& For this reason, it does not do Kustice to the comple9ity of the types of evidence for the ?or.in+s of fictional minds that are availa(le in narrative discourseC it pays little attention to states of mind such as (eliefs, intentions, purposes, and

dispositionsC and it does not analyAe the ?hole of the social mind in action& The purpose of this chapter is to sho? ho? narratolo+ical approaches to consciousness have (een distorted (y the +rip of the ver(al norm& Chapters $ to ; ?ill (e concerned ?ith the areas of the mind that have (een +iven insufficient attention ?ithin the speech cate+ory approach& They ?ill adopt a functional and teleolo+ical perspective on those areas and ?ill not simply try to find a ta9onomic e=uivalent to the speech cate+ories& The mind that is studied in this alternative ?ay is not passive, (ut activeC it is not isolated in individuals, (ut is social and conte9tualC it is not simply the o(Kect of discourse, (ut is the a+ent of action& Typical para+raphs of fictional te9ts tend to (e made up of densely ?oven fra+ments of a ?ide variety of different modes& They are not streams of direct thou+ht ?ith interruptions, or flo?s of free indirect thou+ht ?ith intrusions& Wuite simply, they are typically comple9 in their portrayal of the fictional mind actin+ in the conte9t of other minds (ecause fictional thou+ht and real thou+ht are li.e that& Fictional life and real life are li.e that& Most of our lives are not spent in thou+htful self3communin+s& -arrators .no? this, (ut narratolo+y has not yet developed a voca(ulary for studyin+ the relationships (et?een fictional minds and the social situations ?ithin ?hich they function& This chapter has (een ?ritten ?ith reluctance& 0ections ! and : are necessarily rather ne+ative and occasionally rather e9asperated in tone, and so, if you are ?illin+ to ta.e my ?ord for it that the distortions that 8 have referred to have occurred, you mi+ht ?ish to s.ip these middle sections and +o strai+ht to section $ and the more positive chapters that follo?& Lne difficulty in discussin+ the speech cate+ory account is that there is a ?ide ran+e of models to choose from& They +o from t?o speech cate+ories, to the standard num(er of three, to )rian McHale>s ?idely adopted seven3level model as contained in his influential article Free 8ndirect 4iscourse / 0urvey of *ecent /ccounts (15;", !6"#%0), and even to Moni.a Fluderni.>s particularly ela(orate construct, ?hich, in total, contains no fe?er than thirty elements (155:, :11)& /nother pro(lem, often referred to at this sta+e in the discussion, is that each cate+ory has several different names& 2i.e 4orrit Cohn, 8 thin. that there are three fundamental cate+ories to ?hich, unli.e her, 8 have +iven very simple names direct thou+ht, thou+ht report, and free indirect thou+ht& For reasons that should (e clear (y no?, it is vital to use names for the thou+ht cate+ories that separate them from speech& 8 descri(ed the three cate+ories (riefly in chapter 1, section !, (ut 8 ?ill no? discuss them a+ain in more detail& 4irect thou+ht is the narrative convention that allo?s the narrator to present a ver(al transcription that passes as the reproduction of the actual thou+hts of a character (for e9ample, 0he thou+ht, @here am 8I)& 8t (ecame conventionaliAed in the formal, mannered, and styliAed solilo=uy of the ei+hteenth3 and early nineteenth3century novel& Bventually it developed into free direct thou+ht, in ?hich =uotation mar.s and ta+s (such as she thou+ht) are not used, durin+ the early part of the last century ?ith modernist ?riters such as Eames Eoyce and Gir+inia @oolf& 4irect

thou+ht is also .no?n as *uoted monolo#ue and private speech (and also interior monolo#ue and stream of consciousness, thou+h remem(er the caveats in chapter 1, section $)& .hou#ht report is the e=uivalent of indirect speech, in ?hich narrators present characters> thou+hts in the narrative (for e9ample, 0he ?ondered ?here she ?as&)& 8t is the most fle9i(le cate+ory and can (e used for a num(er of purposes, some of ?hich are listed in section $& Lne important feature is that it can present thou+ht as mental action (for e9ample, 0he decided to ?al.&)& This mode is also .no?n as psychonarration, internal analysis, narratorial analysis, omniscient description, submer#ed speech, and narratized speech& !ree indirect thou#ht is, to put it simply, a com(ination of the other t?o cate+ories& 8t com(ines the su(Kectivity and lan+ua+e of the character, as in direct thou+ht, ?ith the presentation of the narrator, as in thou+ht report& For e9ample, 0he stopped& @here the hell ?as sheI The second sentence can (e read as free indirect thou+ht (ecause it presents the su(Kectivity of the character (the narrator .no?s ?here she is) and the lan+ua+e of the character (@here the 36$3 hell), (ut in the third person (she) and past tense (?as) of the narrator>s discourse& !ree indirect discourse (that is, referrin+ to (oth speech and thou+ht) is also .no?n as free indirect style, le style indirect libre, erlebte /ede, narrated monolo#ue, substitutionary speech, represented speech and thou#ht, dual voice, narrated speech, immediate speech, simple indirect thou#ht, and narrated thou#ht& The len+th of the list of names sho?s the e9tent of the hold that this su(tle, e9citin+, and fle9i(le techni=ue has e9ercised over the discipline of narratolo+y& McHale>s seven3point scale, ?hich has (een adopted (y 0hlomith *immonDenan amon+ several others, can (e collapsed into the three3mode model in the follo?in+ ?ay 4ie+etic summary 2ess purely die+etic summary 8ndirect content3paraphrase 8ndirect discourse Free indirect discourse 4irect discourse X thou+ht report X X X X free indirect thou+ht X direct thou+ht

Free direct discourse

@ith re+ard to direct thou+ht, 8 have com(ined direct discourse and free direct discourse (ecause it is not important for my purposes ?hether or not direct thou+ht is ta++ed& Many narratolo+ists ma.e a sharp distinction (et?een the t?o types& Ho?ever, 8 a+ree ?ith 4orrit Cohn that the distinction that is made (et?een the rhetorical, rational, deli(erate solilo=uy and the associative, illo+ical, spontaneous free direct thou+ht unhelpfully o(scures the t?o .ey factors that they have in common the reference to the thin.in+ self in the first person and the reference to the narrated moment in the present tense (Cohn 15;", 1!#1:)& @ith re+ard to thou+ht report, 8 have com(ined the four points on the scale into one mode (ecause the differences (et?een the four points are not relevant to my ar+ument, and in any event, they can (e very difficult to tell apart& For e9ample, the lin+uists Reoffrey 2eech and Michael 0hort illustrate in Style in !iction (15"1) their su(division of thou+ht report into indirect thou#ht and narrative report of a thou#ht act ?ith these e9amples He ?ondered if she still loved him (indirect thou+ht)C and He ?ondered a(out her love for him (narrative report of a thou+ht act) (15"1, ::;)& /lthou+h it is dan+erous to (e too do+matic a(out other readers> perceptions, 8 ?onder ?hether some 3663 people ?ould find this a fine distinction, and possi(ly a little too flimsy for the ta9onomic ?ei+ht that is restin+ on it& The precise nature of free indirect discourse has (een the su(Kect of a len+thy, technical, and fiercely contested narratolo+ical de(ate for a num(er of years& /lthou+h it is a s?amp that 8 had ori+inally intended to avoid completely, 8 ?ill#on reflection and pro(a(ly a+ainst my (etter Kud+ment#ma.e one small intervention& 8 said earlier that free indirect thou+ht com(ines the su(Kectivity and the lan+ua+e of the character ?ith the discourse of the narrator& 8f neither the character>s su(Kectivity nor the character>s lan+ua+e is present, then it is clearly thou+ht report& )ut ?hat do ?e do if only one or the other is presentI My su++estion is this if the character>s su(Kectivity is present (ut not the character>s lan+ua+e, then the passa+e should (e re+arded as free indirect thou+ht& For e9ample, 0he stopped& @here ?as sheI 8f the character>s lan+ua+e is present (ut not the su(Kectivity, it should (e re+arded as colored thou#ht report& For e9ample, 0he ?ondered ?here the hell she ?as& 8n this case, the narrator>s lan+ua+e has (een colored (y the idiom of the character, (ut it is still thou+ht report (ecause it is still the narrator>s su(Kectivity& 8 mention this point (ecause, ?hen 8 read initial definitions and su(se=uent e9planations of free indirect discourse, 8 am often not clear ?hether the ?riter has su(Kectivity or lan+ua+e in mind&

The relationship (et?een the three modes of thou+ht presentation and the areas of the mind presented (y them can (e put in the follo?in+, very simple terms direct thou#ht can (e used only for inner speechC free indirect thou#ht is e=ually suita(le for inner speech (ut in addition, accordin+ to some theorists (ut not others, can have an am(i+uous, hypothetical =uality that ma.es it suita(le for the presentation of some other areas of the mindC and thou#ht report is suita(le for presentin+ all areas of the mind, includin+ inner speech& 8t is also ?orth e9plainin+ at this point the type of thou+ht report .no?n as narratized speech& Prince defines it as a type of discourse ?here(y a character>s utterances or ver(al thou+hts are represented, in ?ords that are the narrator>s, as acts amon+ other actsC a discourse a(out ?ords uttered (or thou+hts) e=uivalent to a discourse not a(out ?ords (15";, %$)& Renette descri(es it (y sayin+ that the narrator can condense ver(al thou+hts into mental events in a narrative of thou+hts, or narratiAed inner speech (15"0, 1;1)& This concept usefully descri(es one, (ut only one, of the many uses of the versatile techni=ue of thou+ht report in this case, its a(ility to summariAe inner speech and present it as mental action& -arratiAed speech can (e an invalua(le element in the discourse& For e9ample, He thou+ht, >8 ?ill lift the ?heel&> can seem rather 36%3 clumsy unless there are particular reasons for that formulation& The alternative, in narratiAed speech, is He decided to lift the ?heel& This is sharper and ?ill perhaps more often fit the needs of the narrative& Ho?ever, there is a dan+er inherent in the concept of narratiAed speech& 8f one accepts the vie? that thou+ht is indeed speech, then it must lo+ically follo? that all thou+ht report is narratiAed speech and that this is its only function& Ho?ever, there is very often no evidence in the narrative for the reader to suppose that e9amples of thou+ht report are narratiAed speech& The second e9ample ?as used as an illustration of inner speech, (ut it is unli.ely that a reader ?ould read it as such, (ecause it is +enerally not important ?hether or not this mental event involved inner speech& 8t is more interestin+ to classify it as a decision and therefore as an e9ample of mental functionin+ or mental action in a social and physical conte9t& 2. #he &rosecution 8t seems to me that there are at least five pro(lems ?ith the use of the speech cate+ories to analyAe presentations of fictional thou+ht& 1& The privile+in+ of the apparently mimetic and rather +lamorous cate+ories of free indirect thou+ht and direct thou+ht over the die+etic and seemin+ly uninterestin+ cate+ory of thou+ht report&

/ +ood deal of (rilliant, ima+inative, and su(tle ?or. has (een done on free indirect thou+ht and direct thou+ht (ut very little has (een done on thou+ht report& Lnly 4orrit Cohn in her seminal and still e9citin+ study .ransparent -inds +ives e=ual ?ei+ht to thou+ht report despite the fact that it is the most si+nificant mode in terms of amount of use& The ?ords that narratolo+ists tend to use a(out the role of the narrator and therefore a(out thou+ht report are ne+ative ones such as narratorial interruption, intrusion, interference, and distortion& 8nstances of thou+ht report are re+ularly simply mista.en for free indirect thou+ht& Passa+es of narrative that are la(eled interior monolo+ue or stream of consciousness often contain a +ood deal of thou+ht report that is simply not +enerally reco+niAed (y theorists& !& .he overestimation of the verbal component in thou#ht& The favored cate+ories of direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht tend to sho? only that part of a character>s mind that is the hi+hly ver(aliAed and self3conscious flo? of consciousness .no?n as inner speech& 0o, inner speech (ecomes the paradi+m of the mind, even thou+h it is only a very small part of the total activity of fictional minds& Perception is the only other part of the mind that has (een analyAed in any detail& The mind is seen in metaphorical terms primarily as a stream or flo? of self3conscious mental events& )ut this 36;3 metaphor is too linear and one3dimensional& The mind is a three3dimensional container& )etter still, +iven the e9istence of latent states that e9ist over time, it is actually four3dimensional& :& .he resultin# ne#lect of the thou#ht report of characters> states of mind & Many of the episodes of current consciousness that occur in characters> minds are not inner speech& Consider, He suddenly felt depressed& B9amples of such mental phenomena include mood, desires, emotions, sensations, visual ima+es, attention, and memory& Characters> minds also contain latent mental states& The truth or falsehood of +eneral statements a(out these states is independent of the person>s feelin+s at the time that the statements are made& Consider, He is prone to depression& That statement can (e true even if the person is happy at the time ?hen it is made& B9amples of such states include dispositions, (eliefs, attitudes, Kud+ments, s.ills, .no?led+e, ima+ination, intellect, volition, character traits, and ha(its of thou+ht& 0uch causal phenomena as intentions, purposes, motives, and reasons for action can (e either immediate mental events or latent states, dependin+ on ?hether or not they are present in consciousness at any particular moment& 8 hope that these lon+ lists +ive an indication of the vast areas of the mind that are not suita(le for analysis under the speech cate+ory approach& Presentin+ these various phenomena is a lar+e part of the role of the narrators of novels, (ut it has received very little attention ?ithin the speech cate+ory account (ecause of the first t?o pro(lems& / conse=uence is that narratorial references to latent states of mind such as dispositions and (eliefs are usually discussed under the entirely separate headin+ of characteriAation& 8t

is an important part of my ar+ument to =uestion this entirely artificial distinction& CharacteriAation and consciousness should (e (rou+ht to+ether under the ?ider headin+ of mind& $& .he privile#in# of some novels over others: and some scenes in novels over others& 8 referred at the start to 4orrit Cohn>s predilection for novels ?ith thou+htful characters and scenes of self3communion (15;", v) and for moments of lonely self3communion minutely tracin+ spiritual and emotional conflicts (1555, "$)& 8f you ?ere to rely on classical narratolo+y>s speech cate+ories for your picture of fictional minds in Bn+lish literature, you mi+ht find that it consisted to a surprisin+ly lar+e e9tent of thou+htful characters in scenes of lonely self3communion& For e9ample, ei+hteenth3century novels, 4ic.ens, Thac.eray, Hardy, and the formal conservatives of the t?entieth century such as Rraham Rreene and Bvelyn @au+h are underrepresented (ecause they are not entirely suita(le for speech cate+ory analysis, althou+h they respond ?ell to the approach that is descri(ed in the follo?in+ chapters& Fluderni.>s ar+ument that /phra )ehn has 36"3 a crucial role in the development of ?hat she calls the consciousness novel (155%, 1%"#;!) is a ?elcome e9ception& The ?ay that narrators of 4ic.ens>s novels construct characters> minds is different from, say, the narrators of Eane /usten and Reor+e Bliot (ecause the former use more surface (ehavior, +aps, and indeterminacies and less direct access& Therefore, different demands are made upon the reader&6& .he tendency to #ive the impression that characters> minds really only consist of a private passive flo, of consciousness & (The final pro(lem is perhaps the most important one&) @hat is missin+ is an e9plicit reco+nition that much of the thou+ht that ta.es place in novels is the purposeful, en+a+ed, social interaction that is discussed in later chapters&Moni.a Fluderni. uses the follo?in+ passa+e from .om 7ones to illustrate the use of thou+ht report for ?hat she descri(es as +eneral and distant descriptions of consciousness (155:, !5;)& 8t descri(es Captain )lifil>s plans for the future These Meditations ?ere entirely employed on Mr& /ll?orthy>s FortuneC for, first, he e9ercised much Thou+ht in calculatin+, as ?ell as he could, the e9act Galue of the @holeC ?hich calculations he often sa? Lccasion to alter in his o?n Favour /nd secondly, and chiefly, he pleased himself ?ith intended /lterations in the House and Rardens, and in proKectin+ many other 0chemes, as ?ell for the 8mprovement of the Bstate as of the Rrandeur of the Place (1556, ;!, =uoted in 155:, !5;)& Her comment on this passa+e can (e related to the five pro(lems ?ith the speech cate+ory approach as follo?s 1& The passa+e ?ill seem +eneral and distant if the paradi+ms for the presentation of thou+ht are the modes of direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht& !& B=ually, it seems +eneral and distant if the paradi+m for thou+ht is inner speech&

:& $& 6&

The comment does not ta.e into account the riches to (e discovered in the analyses of states of mind in the mode of thou+ht report (see section $ of this chapter)& Bi+hteenth3century novels such as .om 7ones do not (enefit from speech cate+ory analysis in the ?ay that later novels do& @hen the passa+e is seen as a description of active mental functionin+ rather than as a summary of a private and passive flo? of consciousness, it (ecomes the opposite of +eneral and distant&

-arrative theorists mi+ht say of the five pro(lems, )ut 8 don>t thin. these thin+sM 8 am not sayin+ that they do& My point is that, althou+h narratolo+ists 3653 mi+ht a+ree ?ith my ar+uments if as.ed, the theory as ?ritten does not ta.e sufficient account of them& /nalyses of particular passa+es of free indirect thou+ht or direct thou+ht ?ill necessarily reveal the social conte9t of the thou+ht under discussion& )ut 8 am sayin+ that the relationship (et?een the thou+ht and the conte9t is not e9plicitly theoriAed& L(viously no narratolo+ist thin.s that readin+ Eane /usten or Reor+e Bliot is the same as readin+ Gir+inia @oolf or Eames Eoyce& Ho?ever, is it too far3fetched to suppose that, (ecause of the emphasis in the theoretical literature, a reader of speech cate+ory narratolo+y ?ho had not previously read any of these novels mi+ht (e surprised to find that neither (mma nor -iddlemarch ?as a @oolfian or Eoycean stream of consciousnessI B=ually, no narratolo+ist (elieves that 5lysses consists entirely of passa+es of stream of consciousness or interior monolo+ue& Ho?ever, a reader of speech cate+ory narratolo+y ?ho had not previously read the (oo. ?ould, 8 thin., have difficulty reco+niAin+ it, particularly the latter t?o3thirds of it, from the theoretical descriptions& The chief characteristic of the (oo. as a ?hole is the increasin+ prevalence of more and more outlandish and (iAarre narratorial voices, (ut ?ho ?ould +uess it from the theoryI The rest of this section is devoted to the first and second pro(lems, startin+ ?ith the first& Lnce those parts of the mind that are most ver(al have (een privile+ed over those that are least, then it follo?s that the speech cate+ories that are most suited to the apparently mimetic representation of inner speech ?ill (e privile+ed over the cate+ory thou+ht report that is most suita(le for the presentation of all the other areas of the mind& For e9ample, 4ere. )ic.erton tal.s of the supersession of thou+ht report (y free indirect thou+ht (15%;, !:%)& 0ome theorists of free indirect thou+ht such as *oy Pascal (15;;) and 2ouise Flavin (15";) do not even mention the e9istence of thou+ht report& Lthers use terms such as narratorial description and do not ma.e it clear ?hether they mean surface description of the physical story?orld or thou+ht report& Paul Hernadi ar+ues that the si+ns of authorial narration in the mode of thou+ht report are ar(itrary in a ?ay that the other t?o modes are not& The conse=uence, accordin+ to his revealin+ly hostile description of thou+ht report, is that it treats mental events as thou+h they are alto+ether non3

ver(al& For this reason, accordin+ to Hernadi, there is a static, often lifeless =uality in much thou+ht report (15;!, :5)& There are at least three pro(lems here& First, thou+ht report is a(le to descri(e inner speech in non3ver(al terms ?hen the techni=ue of narratiAed speech is used, (ut this is not the same as treatin+ inner speech as thou+h it is non3ver(al in ori+in& 0econdly, some mental events are alto+ether 3%03 non3ver(al& Thou+ht is a continuum, and thou+ht report is fle9i(le enou+h to present all the different varieties of it in a lar+e num(er of different ?ays that are suita(le to the needs of particular narratives& Finally, the result is static and lifeless only if it is done (adlyC it is full of movement and life if it is done ?ell& Hernadi also su++ests that (y usin+ free indirect thou+ht the narrator avoids renderin+ thou+ht from an e9ternal perspective and analytical distance (15;!, :5)& @hy should this (e a techni=ue to (e avoidedI 8t is part of the function of the narrator to analyAe psychic life and very often it is most appropriate for the narrator to do this (y renderin+ thou+ht from an e9ternal perspective and ?ith analytical distance& These practices are not necessarily to (e avoided& @hile emphasiAin+ that free indirect discourse is not uni=ue to literature, )rian McHale su++ests that it is distinctively literary &&& (ecause the essential character of literature itself is inscri(ed in miniature ?ithin it (15;", !"$)& Michael McDeon, ?ho lavishes similar praise on free indirect discourse in his Theory of the -ovel (!000), refers to its strictly >literary> character (!000, $"%) and descri(es it as an e9clusively >literary> style (!000, $"6) despite the lar+e (ody of evidence to the contrary that is contained in Fluderni.>s The Fictions of 2an+ua+es and the 2an+ua+es of Fiction& /s someone ?ho uses free indirect discourse re+ularly in my (decidedly non3literary) ?or., 8 am a(le to say from personal e9perience that McDeon is mista.en& 8 la(or the point only to stress that the hi+h re+ard in ?hich free indirect discourse is held can lead theorists into inaccuracy& Much thou+ht has (een +iven to the +ray area (et?een free indirect thou+ht and thou+ht report& This de(ate arises (ecause it is sometimes not clear ?hether the su(Kectivity (ein+ e9pressed in a particular passa+e is the character>s or the narrator>s& Ho?ever, as far as 8 .no?, the issue is only ever discussed in terms of ?hether or not the passa+e is free indirect thou+ht, not ?hether or not it is thou+ht report& 8nterest is lost if it is esta(lished that it is not free indirect thou+ht& -o one ever refers to the delicious uncertainty and am(i+uity of thou+ht report in the same terms as free indirect thou+ht& )ut ?hy notI 8f free indirect thou+ht tends to (e fascinatin+ and su(tle and thou+ht report is potentially static and lifeless, ?hy can they (e so difficult to tell apartI Lf course, la(els are Kust means to ends, and in itself, it is of little si+nificance ?hether a particular passa+e is la(eled in one ?ay or another& 8n a sense, there may (e no ri+ht or ?ron+ a(out these decisions& *eaders read discourses in different ?ays, and this is particularly true of a discursive phenomenon such as free indirect thou+ht that is so dependent on the interpretive decisions of readers& Ho?ever, it does (ecome a pro(lem ?hen theoretical decisions are ta.en that contain a

3%13 (ias that impoverishes our understandin+ of the richness, su(tlety, and variety of the various means (y ?hich characters> consciousnesses are presented to readers& Lne result of the cate+ory (ias is that the concept of free indirect thou+ht +ro?s and +ro?s and is then applied inappropriately& Fluderni. has ri+orously analyAed one e9ample (155:, "1#"!)& Manfred Eahn has discussed another& He says this a(out a study (y 0usan Bhrlich (1550) (8 ?ill use my o?n terms for the three cate+ories in order to avoid confusion) To ma.e matters ?orse, Pfree indirect thou+htQ is further e9tended (y Bhrlich to cover even direct thou+ht and indirect thou+ht&&&& Lne of the immediate effects of Bhrlich>s no? seriously overe9tended Pfree indirect thou+htQ is that, cuc.oo3li.e, it has cro?ded out all its si(lin+s&&&& )ut, it may (e as.ed, is it not e9actly @oolf >s conscious modulation, her orchestration of all of the techni=ues, that produces the remar.a(le depth3effects and rhythmic =uality of her novelsI B9tended Pfree indirect thou+htQ not only provides no ans?erC the =uestion itself is pointless if almost everythin+ is Pfree indirect thou+htQ (155!, :%0)& Wuite& 4iscussions a(out the relative fre=uency of the three modes ?ill have only a limited value until careful empirical studies are done that use precise and universally a+reed criteria for the modes (for e9ample, see 0hort, 0emino, and Culpeper 155%)& -evertheless, it is still ?orth ma.in+ one or t?o +eneral points ?hile ?e a?ait the empirical evidence& Fluderni.>s perspective on the issue is that, in the representation of consciousness, direct discourse is the least common techni=ue (e9cept in the interior monolo+ue of the t?entieth3century novel), ?ith a traditional preponderance of Pthou+ht reportQ and, in second place, free indirect discourse, ?hich comes close to competin+ ?ith Pthou+ht reportQ in late3 nineteenth3 and early3t?entieth3century fiction (155:, !51)& 8 a+ree ?ith her vie? that thou+ht report is the most common mode, (ut 8 ?ould dispute the ?ei+ht that she +ives to interior monolo+ue& 8n my e9perience, ?hat is called interior monolo+ue often contains as much thou+ht report as the other t?o modes, as ?ell a +ood deal of narratorial surface description of physical conte9t& 8 ?ould also dispute the ?ei+htin+ +iven to free indirect thou+ht and ?ould su++est that it can only (e arrived at (y classifyin+ a +ood deal of colored thou+ht report as free indirect thou+ht& /s 8 said, thou+h, this can only (e a very impressionistic discussion at this sta+e& Follo?in+ is a (rief indication of the amount of attention that has (een +iven to the three modes and to focaliAation in a random (honestlyM) selection of classic narratolo+ical articles and full3len+th studies& This sort of approach is very crude, (ut it does +ive a fairly accurate indication of ?here the interest lies& 3%!3

!ree indirect discourse ,ith a bias to,ard speech )anfield 15"!, 4illon and Dirchhoff 15;%, Flavin 15";, Fluderni. 155:, Hernadi 15;!, McHale 15;", McHale 15":, -eumann 15"%, Pascal 15;;, *on 15"1, @ein(er+ 15"$ (total 11)& !ree indirect thou#ht )ic.erton 15%;, )rinton 15"0, 4ry 15;; (total :)& Direct thou#ht Friedman 1566 (total 1)& Narratolo#y survey ,ith direct thou#ht bias Chatman 15;" (total 1)& Narratolo#y survey ,ith no bias Cohn 15;", Fluderni. 155%, McHale 15"1 (total :)& -arratolo+y survey ?ith focaliAation (ias )al 155;, Renette 15"0, Renette 15"", L>-eill 155$, Prince 15"! (total 6)& Thou+ht report none& Narratolo#y survey ,ith thou#ht report bias none& @hat this list sho?s is that there is, so far as 8 am a?are, no (oo. or article that is devoted specifically to thou+ht report, and no survey of narratolo+y that is (iased to?ard thou+ht report& Cohn is the only narratolo+ist ?ho is scrupulous in +ivin+ e=ual ?ei+ht to all modes& 8n Transparent Minds, each mode is +iven a separate chapter& The chapter on thou+ht report is first and is of the same len+th as the others& Here are the results of another survey& 8 have identified ninety3five separate episodes of direct access to the thou+hts of characters in chapter !5 of Thac.eray>s +anity !air and have classified them as follo?s direct thou+ht# 1C free indirect thou+ht#$C thou+ht report#50& 8t is easy to see ?hy there are fe? analyses of the presentation of the mind in +anity !air in the current narratolo+ical literature& 8f the response to this point is, @ell, the presentations of fictional minds in +anity !air are not that interestin+, my response is, Ho? do ?e .no?I Concernin+ the second pro(lem, there are numerous e9amples ?ithin narratolo+y of the assumption that thou+ht can (e treated simply as internal speech& For e9ample, the narrative theorist 0eymour Chatman claims in Story and Discourse (15;") that the most o(vious and direct means of handlin+ the thou+hts of a character is to treat them as >unspo.en speech> (15;", 1"!)& Renette asserts that the novelistic convention, perhaps truthful in this case, is that thou+hts and feelin+s are no different from speech (15"0, 1;1)& Renette also declares that >Thou+ht> is indeed speech (15"0, 1;"), addin+, some?hat o(scurely, (ut at the same time this speech, >o(li=ue> and deceitful li.e all the others, is +enerally unfaithful to the >felt truth>#the felt truth ?hich no inner monolo+ue can reveal 3%:3 and ?hich the novelist must ultimately sho? +limpses of throu+h the concealments of (ad faith, ?hich are >consciousness> itself (15"0, 1;")& ,ri Mar+olin ?rites that ?m@ental acts share many features ?ith ver(al ones, especially in narrative, ?here they must une9ceptionally (e ver(aliAed in the form of inner speech (15"%, !16)& Mar+olin also refers to thou+ht a num(er of times as inner ver(aliAation (for e9ample, !000, 65!) and as su(vocal (for e9ample, 15"%, !1")& Mie.e )al dra?s out a very important implication ?hen she maintains that PuQnspo.en

?ords#thou+hts, interior monolo+ues#no matter ho? e9tensive, are not percepti(le to other characters (155;, 16:)& This statement sho?s very clearly ho? the ver(al (ias ?or.s a+ainst an understandin+ of the social and pu(licly accessi(le nature of thou+ht& *emem(er ho?, in the scene from !riends, *achel>s thou+hts ,ere percepti(le to Phoe(e and the othersI @ith re+ard to the t?o statements from Renette that are =uoted in the precedin+ para+raph and that are ta.en from Narrative Discourse (15"0), he concedes in his later -arrative 4iscourse *evisited (15""), that Cohn le+itimately insists on ma.in+ a place for the nonver(al forms of consciousness, and 8 ?as certainly ?ron+ to classify as >narratiAed inner speech> a statement such as >8 decided to marry /l(ertine,> ?hich is (y no means necessarily tied to a ver(aliAed thou+ht (15"", %0)& This is +ood& )ut he then comprehensively loses any +round that he mi+ht have +ained (y sayin+ the follo?in+, ?hich illustrates the +rip of the ver(al norm even (etter than any restatement of the ori+inal vie? could have done 4orrit Cohn>s Kustifia(le reservation a(out a possi(le nonver(aliAed consciousness holds +ood only partly for one of her three cate+ories& 2et us ar(itrarily fi+ure this part at 17! Cohn>s reservation holds +ood for 17% of her o?n system (15"", %1)& He is ma.in+ t?o points here, (oth of ?hich are Kustified& 8t is the conclusion that he dra?s from them that is so revealin+ly mista.en& First, he is sayin+ that direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht are necessarily tied to inner speech (thou+h many theorists disa+ree ?ith him a(out the latter), and so it is only ?ith thou+ht report that the issue of non3ver(al thou+ht arises& 0econd, the concept of narratiAed speech means that some of the thou+ht presented in the mode of thou+ht report could have (een of ver(al ori+in& He then ar(itrarily su++ests that this narratiAed speech mi+ht account for half of all thou+ht report, and so the o(Kection only applies to half of one3third of Cohn>s system& To esta(lish precisely ho? specious this ar+ument is, it is (est to approach the point from completely the opposite direction& 8 have emphasiAed throu+hout this discussion that there are vast areas of the mind that are not addressed ?ithin the speech cate+ory approach& /s it is these areas that ?e are tal.in+ a(out here, from my perspective the pro(lem loo.s much lar+er 3%$3 than one that affects Kust one3si9th of the ?hole& *eversin+ the proportions and sayin+ that Cohn>s reservations hold +ood for five3si9ths of the fictional mind mi+ht (e nearer the mar.& The ver(al (ias is clear ?hen ?e loo. at some of the terms used (y narrative theorists& The title of 0hlomith *immon3Denan>s chapter on the su(Kect is -arration 0peech *epresentation, and ?ithin it, she never e9plicitly addresses the =uestion of thou+ht presentation as opposed to speech presentation at all& *oy Pascal uses the phrase free indirect speech throu+hout his (oo. to refer to thou+ht as ?ell as speech& /nother narrative theorist, Helmut )onheim, e9plains the thin.in+ (ehind this policy (y sayin+ that the narrative mode speech, then, includes not only speech in the narro?er sense of ?ords supposedly spo.en aloud (ut also a variety of ?ays in ?hich thou+hts and perceptions can (e conveyed

(15"!, 61)& Ho?ever, he also concedes that, since a particular character under discussion is not supposed to (e spea.in+ &&& all the terms for Pfree indirect thou+htQ ?hich su++est speech are a little misleadin+ ()onheim 15"!, 6:)& Manfred Eahn has dra?n our attention to a curious aspect of /nn )anfield>s term for free indirect discourse, represented speech and thou+ht -othin+, strictly spea.in+, is ever a representation of speech and thou+ht& Thou+ht, as opposed to speech, is non3discursive, private, non3communicative, non3pra+matic and semi3ver(al, to list Kust a fe? differential properties (155!, :60)& )anfield>s term is especially surprisin+ (ecause she is emphatic that she does not e=uate thou+ht ?ith inner speech& (Thou+ht is not lin+uistic in form P)anfield 15"!, "0Q&) /s Eahn points out, for )anfield, the assumption of >inner speech> is a fallacy (15":, 6)& )ut if )anfield thin.s that thou+ht is never ver(al, ?hy does she yo.e thou+ht and speech to+ether in the same termI 8 am not a?are that she ever separates them out, sometimes as represented speech and at other times as represented thou#ht& 8t mi+ht (e thou+ht that 8 ?ould a+ree ?ith )anfield a(out thou+ht not (ein+ lin+uistic, +iven the direction of my ar+ument, (ut this is not the case& 8n my vie?, the position is very simple sometimes thou+ht is hi+hly ver(aliAed and can accurately (e descri(ed as inner speechC sometimes it is not and so cannot& )anfield>s do+matic antiver(al approach is Kust as mista.en as the e=ually infle9i(le prover(al vie?s discussed earlier& /s 8 said at the end of section 1, ?hen te9ts are analyAed, the e9tent of the ver(ality of a character>s supposed thou+ht event is not only often unclear, it is usually not relevant& For e9ample, 0he felt e9cited& The temptation to re+ard the putative ver(ality of fictional thou+hts as spots of indeterminacy (remem(er the discussion on +aps in the story?orld section in chapter !I) should usually (e resisted& 8n most cases, an attempt to close this particular +ap is not necessary& 3%63 The reader does not need to speculate on the ver(ality of a fictional mental event such as 0he felt e9cited& 8t is much more informative to analyAe the thou+ht in terms of motives and intentions, (ehavior and action& )y contrast ?ith such discussions, speculations on the ver(ality of putative mental events are rather sterile and scholastic& /n e9tended e9ample may (e of value here& 4ere. )ic.erton ar+ues in his article Modes of 8nterior Monolo+ue / Formal 4efinition that the methods used to present inner speech are compara(le to the methods used to present ordinary speech (15%;, !:!)& 8n the case of direct thou+ht, the lin. is o(vious, as the use of direct thou+ht in the e9ample He thou+ht, >8 ?ill lift the ?heel> is the e9act +rammatical e=uivalent of direct speech, as in He said, >8 ?ill lift the ?heel&> Ho?ever, )ic.erton +oes further and maintains that thou+ht report is inner speech rendered in indirect speech (15%;, !:")& There are t?o o(Kections to this ar+ument Lne is that his reference to inner speech i+nores the other areas of the mind& The other is that thou+ht report only sometimes resem(les the +rammatical form of indirect speech& 8n the e9ample He thou+ht that he ?ould lift the ?heel, the thou+ht report does indeed resem(le indirect speech, as in He said that he ?ould lift the ?heel& Ho?ever, in He decided to lift the ?heel, the +rammatical form of the thou+ht report (ears no resem(lance to indirect speech& 8t loo.s more li.e a report of a physical action, such as He lifted the ?heel (ecause He decided to lift the ?heel is the

thou+ht report of mental functionin+ or mental action, not of inner speech& 8t is therefore not true that thou+ht can only (e represented (y one of the methods for renderin+ spo.en speech&8n the first para+raph of his article, )ic.erton refers to the need for novelists to convey characters> inner lives& Ho?ever, (y his second para+raph, this need has (ecome solely identified ?ith the use of interior monolo+ue (15%;, !!5)& )ic.erton uses a passa+e from Reor+e Bliot>s -iddlemarch, a summary of 2yd+ate>s inner life, to conclude that in it the inner speech is summariAed (15%;, !:6)& 8 ?ill =uote the first para+raph of this passa+e, in my o?n formattin+, in order to sho? that this identification of thou+ht report ?ith narratiAed speech is simply ?ron+& My comments apply e=ually ?ell to the second para+raph, ?hich is omitted solely for reasons of space a& 2yd+ate (elieved himself to (e careless a(out his dress, and he despised a man ?ho calculated the effects of his costumeC (& it seemed to him only a matter of course that he had a(undance of fresh +arments c& #such thin+s ?ere naturally ordered in sheaves& 3%%3 d& 8t must (e remem(ered that he had never hitherto felt the chec. of importunate de(t, and he ?al.ed (y ha(it, not (y self3criticism& e& )ut the chec. had come (15;;, $0%#;, =uoted in 15%;, !:6)& The content of the thou+ht in this passa+e is not inner speech, and the form in ?hich it is presented is neither narratiAed speech nor the e=uivalent of indirect speech& a& descri(es 2yd+ate>s states of mind, specifically his dispositions& The first statement is a (elief, and the second statement is an attitude or preference& )oth are true descriptions of his mental life ?hether or not he is consciously thin.in+ a(out them& 8t is unnecessary to postulate an ori+inal occurrence of inner speech durin+ ?hich they may have (een formulated& (& is also a state of mind and is even further removed from inner speech& 8t ?ould (e perfectly possi(le to preface it ?ith a statement such as @ithout consciously thin.in+ a(out it, it seemed to him &&& c& has an uncertain status& 8t can (e read as indefinite free indirect discourse ?hat the character mi+ht have out?ardly said or in?ardly thou+ht, althou+h no specific occurrence of inner or spo.en speech can (e identified& (There is more information on this phenomenon in the ne9t section&) Ho?ever, it can also (e re+arded as colored thou+ht report& d& departs even further from inner speech than (a), ((), or (c)& Ho? can a sentence (e descri(ed as a character>s inner speech ?hen it consists of the narrator remindin+ the reader first that somethin+ had never happened to that character, and then that he ?as in the ha(it of not thin.in+ a(out such thin+sI e& is the narrator>s summary of the events that had happened to 2yd+ate to modify his dispositions&

The +rip of the ver(al norm is a very ti+ht one indeed ?hen an e9ample of narrative discourse that is so far removed from summariAed inner speech can (e presented as such& The three cate+ories are value3free tools to (e used ?hen appropriate& 8t is perfectly possi(le to criticiAe an author for an unima+inative or unrevealin+ use of a discursive tool ?ithin the pra+matic needs of a particular discourse, (ut it is foolish to claim that t?o of the modes are inherently superior to the third& 8t is unclear ?hy narrative techni=ues have to (e valued at all e9cept in the conte9t of the specific and different narrative effects for ?hich they are desi+ned& The presentation of thou+ht in Harle=uin or Mills and )oon 3%;3 romances is su(stantially in free indirect thou+ht and is static and lifelessC in Henry Fieldin+, it is su(stantially in thou+ht report and is full of life and movement& Ho?ever, this is no reason for me to claim that thou+ht report is intrinsically superior to free indirect thou+ht& Mar+olin claims that modern @estern literary narrative &&& has a clear preference for the rich, detailed, and unmediated presentation of individual human inner life on all levels of consciousness (!000, %0%)& 8 am not sure that 8 a+ree& 8 ?onder ?hether it is more that narrative theory has that preference& The .ey is in the ?ord unmediated& Much of the confusion descri(ed earlier can (e traced (ac. to the privile+in+ of sho?in+ over tellin+ in the de(ate initiated (y Henry Eames in his prefaces, continued (y Percy 2u((oc. in .he Craft of !iction (15!1), and criticiAed (y @ayne C& )ooth in .he /hetoric of !iction& The )lifil and 2yd+ate passa+es =uoted earlier are (oth (latant e9amples of the dis+raceful practice of tellin+ rather than sho?in+& *immon3Denan has perceptively commented on this preference for sho?in+ over tellin+ Ho?ever interestin+ this normative de(ate is, it is ultimately irrelevant for a theoretical and descriptive study of narrative fiction& & & & PTQhere is nothin+ inherently +ood or (ad in either tellin+ or sho?in+& 2i.e any other techni=ue, each has its advanta+es and disadvanta+es, and their relative success or failure depends on their functionality in the +iven ?or. (15":, 10;#")& Theorists are =uic. to see the irrelevance of a normative de(ate ?hen it is put in terms of sho?in+ and tellin+ perhaps (ecause those terms (etray the historical conte9t of that de(ate& Ho?ever, there can (e a tendency on the part of some to see less clearly the irrelevance of the fascination ?ith direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht at the e9pense of thou+ht report& The conte9t in ?hich these difficulties can (est (e understood is that of the ideolo+ical distrust of the narrator& /s Fluderni. points out, mimesis, particularly in the tellin+ vs& sho?in+ opposition, then comes to privile+e the seemin+ly >unmediated> te9t of >pure> mimesis in direct contrast to the Platonic +roundin+s of the distinction, and this development relates directly to the discreditin+ of narratorial >interference> at the end of the nineteenth century (155:, $65)& Fluderni. also advances the vie? that, in the areas of (oth speech and thou+ht representations, narratolo+ists

distrust the narrator>s discourse as a lin+uistically and ideolo+ically distortive medium, placin+ a premium on >o(Kective> description and on the use of direct (or at least free indirect) speech (155:, $65)& 8t is in this ?ay that the vital role of thou+ht report is devalued& 8t is seen as a departure from the unmediated ideal, as distortion, as interference, and as interruption& Fluderni. asserts that authorial narrative is most familiar to us in 3%"3 the form of a relia(le +uide to human affairs& There is a consolin+ a(ility to .no?, to see into characters> minds & & & and to uncover life>s rules and re+ularities&&&& 8t ma.es possi(le ?hat is naturally impossi(le (155%, 1%6#%%)& Ho?ever, this consolin+ly relia(le role of the narrator is no? distrusted as authoritarian and repressive& 8t is in this conte9t that Renette, in referrin+ to free direct thou+ht, ar+ues that one of the main paths of emancipation of the modern novel has consisted of pushin+ this mimesis of speech to its & & & limit, o(literatin+ the last traces of the narratin+ instance and +ivin+ the floor to the character ri+ht a?ay (15"0, 1;:)& This is speech, accordin+ to Renette, that is emancipated &&& from all narrative patrona+e (15"0, 1;$)& These are very revealin+ e9pressions emancipation, free, o(literatin+, patrona+e& This is a very clear e9pression of hostility to the controllin+, distortin+, interferin+, and patroniAin+ narrator ?ho needs to (e o(literated and from ?hom the reader re=uires freedom and emancipation& )efore the role of the narrator can (e discussed in such value3laden terms, it must first (e accurately identified and fully understood& The narrator has an essential and (asic lin.in+ function that is fundamentally necessary to the ?ay in ?hich fictional narrative ?or.s and that can only very rarely (e dispensed ?ith& For e9ample, it is not needed in Penelope, the famous final episode of ,lysses, for the o(vious reason that Molly is lyin+ in (ed in the dar.& )ut this is a very rare case ?here the conte9t in ?hich the thou+ht is ta.in+ place is so minimal and non3social that the lin.in+ function of the narrator is not necessary& 8t is this crucial, conte9tual function of the narrator that must (e reco+niAed (efore the ideolo+ical implications of other aspects of the role can (e denounced& 8t is (y such means as thou+ht report and surface description of the story?orld that the narrator lin.s the thou+ht of characters to the social and physical conte9t& This lin.in+ function has (ecome so naturaliAed and familiariAed that it is no? partially invisi(le not only to ordinary readers (ut also to some analysts& 3. #he Defense .he ad1ustment ar#ument& @hile readin+ the ne9t fe? para+raphs, you may (e thin.in+ that they have (een put in the ?ron+ place and that they should have +one in the previous section& @ith a defense li.e this, ?ho needs a prosecutionI My reason for puttin+ these vie?s here is that they form ?hat mi+ht (e called an ad1ustment ar#ument, ?hich +oes as follo?s all ri+ht, the fit (et?een speech and thou+ht is not a perfect one, and

difficulties do arise, (ut ?hen suita(ly adKusted, it is still informative to analyAe thou+ht in terms of the speech cate+ories& 8t is this line of thin.in+ that lies (ehind the phenomenon of narrative theorists 3%53 referrin+ to the disKunction (et?een speech and thou+ht, emphasiAin+ the need for +reat care and then, in effect, carryin+ on re+ardless& 4orrit Cohn has +one further than most in dra?in+ attention to the difficulties that are inherent in the speech cate+ory approach& 0he ar+ues that the lin+uistically (ased approach &&& oversimplifies the literary pro(lems (y carryin+ too far the correspondence (et?een spo.en discourse and silent thou+ht (15;", 11)& 0he mentions that one of the dra?(ac.s of the speech cate+ory account is that it tends to leave out of account the entire nonver(al realm of consciousness, as ?ell as the entire pro(lematic relationship (et?een thou+ht and speech (15;", 11)& Cohn says of thou+ht report that lin+uistic3structuralist critics, (y reducin+ the techni=ue to an unvoiced indirect discourse, disre+ard its various functions precisely (ecause it is not primarily a method for presentin+ mental lan+ua+e (15;", 1!)& 0he concludes, unsurprisin+ly, that thou+ht report is the most ne+lected of the (asic techni=ues (15;", 1!)& 8 include her vie?s here, thou+h (ecause despite these reservations she has ?ritten the (est account of the speech cate+ory approach& Moni.a Fluderni. is the narratolo+ist ?ho has the most radical reservations& 8n her vie?, the scale model is =uite una(le to deal ?ith the functional differences (et?een the representation of utterances and that of consciousness& /lthou+h apparently the same means of lin+uistic e9pression are at one>s disposal in the utterance and consciousness domains, their discourse effect is entirely incompati(le (155:, :10#11)& 2eech and 0hort also ma.e the same point that the discourse effects produced (y particular cate+ories durin+ the presentation of thou+ht can (e very different from their effects in speech presentation (15"1, :1", :$!#$")& Fluderni. o(serves that the traditional tripartite schema & & & is hopelessly inade=uate to the empirical te9tual evidence (155:, :16) and e9plains that the tripartite model (rea.s do?n entirely in relation to thou+ht representation, ?here the parameters for the reportin+ of speech events are no lon+er operative (155:, ;")& /+ain, thou+h, her vie?s are contained in this section (ecause her solution in .he !ictions of "an#ua#e and the "an#ua#es of !iction is to create a very ela(orate model of over thirty elements that is intended to remedy this inade=uacy& Bven so, it still involves a +ood deal of ?hat she calls fuAAiness (155:, :1$# 16)& The moral appears to (e that more and more ela(orate ta9onomies simply result in diminishin+ returns& 0i+nificantly, (y 155%, Fluderni.>s solution in .o,ards a 3Natural4 Narratolo#y is a much more radical one as it involves a reconte9tualiAation of the ?hole concept of narrative, and this reconte9tualiAation is (ased on the notion of consciousness& 8 hope that the ar+uments in my later chapters are consistent ?ith hers& 3;03

8 should mention here another of Fluderni.>s responses to the pro(lem of speech cate+ory (ias& Follo?in+ )anfield (15"!), she descri(es ?hat she calls the direct discourse fallacy as the mista.en (in+rained) (elief that direct discourse is in every sense of the ?ord primary or ori#inary to other types of =uotation (155:, !"1)& 8n her vie?, fiction fre=uently su(verts the convention that direct discourse is a primary source from ?hich indirect =uotation can (e derived& The lo+ical conse=uence is this ar+ument Contrary to the standard approach to speech and thou+ht representation, in ?hich the characters> direct discourse is the most relia(le part of the fictional universe and in ?hich the narrator>s or narrative>s mediation is (y definition al?ays already a distortion, the approach that 8 have (een advocatin+ re+ards narrative discourse as a uniform one3 levelled lin+uistic entity ?hich (y its deictic evocation of alterity#?hether in the form of Pdirect thou+ht, free indirect thou+ht, or thou+ht report, includin+ colored thou+ht reportQ#pro1ects a level of lan+ua+e ?hich is not actually there (ut is implied and manufactured (y a .ind of lin+uistic hallucination (155:, $6:)& 8n other ?ords, direct discourse is not to (e privile+ed over the various indirect forms& Ln the discourse plane, this is a coherent and satisfyin+ e9planation& )ut the difficulty arises ?hen it is considered in the conte9t of the story?orld, ?here characters use speech, includin+ sometimes inner speech& @ithin this perspective, there must (e speech and inner speech events that ta.e place in the story?orld, that can (e directly =uoted, and that form a primary ver(al source from ?hich indirect =uotation is derived& 8t is re+retta(le that Fluderni.>s solution is not compati(le ?ith the concept of fictional ?orlds, (ut 8 cannot see any ?ay round it& .he hypothetical ar#ument& This ar+ument has t?o aspects althou+h the discourse may appear to present the actual ?ords of inner speech, it is in fact presentin+ a reconstruction (y the narrator that is hypothetically (ased on ?hat characters ?ould have said that they ?ere thin.in+, had they (een as.edC and althou+h the discourse may appear to present an actual episode of inner speech, it is really presentin+ a summary of several possi(le such episodes& The hypothetical approach +oes (eyond the representation of individual episodes of the hi+hly ver(aliAed mental events of inner speech and descri(es the elusive, am(ivalent =uality of some passa+es of thou+ht presentation, mainly in free indirect thou+ht& This approach sho?s a partial ?ay out of the e9a++erated concern ?ith the de+ree of ver(ality of the putative ori+inal mental event& 8t also +oes part of the ?ay to?ard an interest in more re?ardin+ aspects of thou+ht presentation such as the need for vivid presentations of states of mind and the role of the reader in (uildin+ up a sense of sta(le and continuous 3;13 characters& Ho?ever, the limitation of the ar+ument is that theorists tend to see the alternative to a sin+le mental event as (ein+ a series of mental events, there(y missin+ the point that ?hat hypothetical thou+ht presentations often represent are states of mind& Fluderni. asserts that ?hen free indirect thou+ht is used to render a character>s consciousness, it si+nifies more than Kust an internal speech act (y that person, and no transcription of a thou+ht act need (e implied (155:, ;;)& /lthou+h she does not specify ?hat this more mi+ht (e, she

appears to (e ed+in+ to?ard a reco+nition that free indirect thou+ht can (e used as a summary of a num(er of inner speech episodes& )ut perhaps these episodes reflect a particular state of mind& Free indirect thou+ht can appear, for the sa.e of vivid immediacy, to present a state of mind as thou+h it is a sin+le mental event& For e9ample, durin+ a passa+e of free indirect thou+ht, the statement 0he .ne? that he loved her may occur& 8n that conte9t, the reader can read this as a sin+le mental event, say a sudden rea?a.enin+ of that feelin+, even thou+h no specific mental event of this sort is e9plicitly descri(ed& )ut, in other conte9ts, it may (e clear that the statement is simply the report of a permanently held (elief& )anfield ar+ues that represented consciousness is not a realistic reproduction of the mind at ?or.& 8n a rather pointed reference to the title of Cohn>s (oo., she claims that narratives do not create transparent minds The mind is never transparent, not even to >omniscient narrators&> *ather, its contents are hypothetically reconstructed and represented in a lan+ua+e sensitive to its various modes (15"!, !11)& 4illon and Dirchhoff have a similar perspective& They feel that, in +eneral, the material that appears in Pfree indirect thou+htQ is to (e understood as a representation of a character>s e9pressions or thou+hts as he ?ould e9press them, not necessarily as a >ver(atim> renderin+ of >internal speech> (15;%, $:1)& The .ey phrase is as the character ?ould e9press them& They are su++estin+ that it is part of the narrator>s role to reduce the comple9ity of the mind to a form that ?ill meet the need for the fictional discourse to (e understood (y the reader& This form is the one that ?ould result if the character could self3consciously respond to the =uestion @hat ?ere you thin.in+ Kust no?I )ut any such summary, to (e a plausi(le picture of the ?hole mind, ?ould have to include reference to states of mind as ?ell as inner speech& Cohn feels that free indirect discourse, (y leavin+ the relationship (et?een ?ords and thou+hts latent, casts a peculiarly penum(ral li+ht on the character>s consciousness, suspendin+ it on the threshold of ver(aliAation in a manner that cannot (e achieved (y direct =uotation (15;", 10:)& This note of mystery encapsulates (eautifully the inade=uacy of the speech cate+ory picture of the mind& Cohn>s 3;!3 point can (e prosaically re?orded (y sayin+ that free indirect thou+ht is +ood at presentin+ states of mind such as (eliefs and attitudes almost as if they are sin+le mental events (ut ?ithout the narrator (ein+ specific as to the e9act occasion on ?hich these events mi+ht have ta.en place& 8n this ?ay, free indirect thou+ht can (e used to solve the formal pro(lem of ho? to present latent states of mind in an immediate, forceful, and active ?ay& There is no mystery to this, and it is not necessary to shroud the discussion in peculiarly penum(ral li+hts& The narratolo+ist /nne @aldron -eumann has attempted to provide a conceptual frame?or. that can account for the hypothetical nature of free indirect discourse& -eumann defines free indirect discourse as that mode of indirectly reported speech or thou+ht ?hich =uotes ?hat ?e feel could (e at least some of the ?ords of a character>s actual utterances or thou+ht, (ut ?hich offers those ?ords inter?oven ?ith the narrator>s lan+ua+e &&& ,ithout e2plicitly attributin# them to the character in *uestion (15"%, :%%)& 0he e9plains that the study of reported speech and

thou+ht in fiction may necessitate reconstructin+ or hypothesiAin+ ?hat ?as actually uttered in the story from ?hat is reported in the discourse& To read a sentence as free indirect discourse, ?e must use our in+enuity and infer ?ho is =uoted and ?hich ?ords in the sentence are =uotations& @e are left to +uess ?hether the ?ords in the discourse ?ere ever uttered in the story and, even if ?e thin. that the ?ords did occur, ?hether they ?ere spo.en or ?ere thou+ht (15"%, :%"#%5)& 8n her vie?, there are three types of free indirect discourse definite, ?hen ?e are certain that the ?ords ?ere used (y the characterC almost definite, ?hen ?e .no? that ?ords ?ere used and that they ?ere the sort of thin+ that the character ?ould say or thin. in that situationC and indefinite, ?hich uses lan+ua+e characteristic of the character (ut leaves it unclear ?hether the ?ords ?ere spo.en or thou+ht or ?hether it only reports the sort of thin+ that they ?ould say or thin.& @e can correctly identify it ?ith the character in the discourse, (ut its status in the story is uncertain (15"%, :;0, :;%)& 8 thin. -eumann>s account is valua(le for its stron+ emphasis on the active role of the reader, its a?areness of the hypothetical nature of much free indirect discourse, and its ac.no?led+ement that a +ood deal of narrative discourse is indeterminate in status& Ho?ever, her ideas can (e developed further& /s ?ith Cohn, the distance and am(i+uity that -eumann refers to can (e e9plained (y the fact that ?hat is (ein+ represented is states of mind& /lso, the points that she ma.es re+ardin+ indefinite free indirect discourse can provide a startin+ point for an analysis of the precise means (y ?hich the reader (uilds up a sense of a sta(le and predicta(le fictional character& For e9ample, ho? is a reader 3;:3 a(le to say ?hether or not lan+ua+e is characteristic of a fictional person, is the sort of thin+ that they ?ould say or thin.I 8n the follo?in+ section 8 ?ill =uote short passa+es of thou+ht report that illustrate the relationship (et?een the presentation of consciousness and characteriAation& This is the frame?or. ?ithin ?hich readers can ma.e interpretive decisions a(out characters and there(y recuperate meanin+ from such discursive phenomena as indefinite free indirect discourse& .he pra#matic ar#ument& This is the vie? that ?e are simply tal.in+ a(out convenient assumptions a(out ho? the mind ?or.s and the accepted conventions (y ?hich fictional minds are represented in narrative fiction& /s =uoted in chapter 1, section ! and in section ! of this chapter, Renette ar+ues that the narrative convention is that thou+hts and feelin+s are no different from speech (15"0, 1;1)& 8t is )onheim>s vie? that thou+ht may (e, or at least in the conventions of narrative usually is represented as, a process ?hich can (e considered ver(al (15"!, ;0)& The ar+ument is that, in sayin+ that it is a convention that all thou+ht is ver(al (ecause it is assumed that thou+hts and feelin+s are inner speech, ?e are simply relatin+ convenient assumptions a(out the nature of consciousness to the particular needs of narrative discourse& 0tern(er+ here ma.es e9plicit the assumptions (ehind the pra+matic approach no(ody is li.ely to deny that much narrative thou+ht sho?s elements other than ver(al, and that all thou+ht, in order to pass from unuttered to communica(le form, must (e mediated and +iven physical shape (y a reporter& -ot even

the most speechli.e interior monolo+ue offers a pure, reporter3free transcript& Many such monolo+ues involve transmutin+ impression and sensation into lan+ua+eC some are openly styliAed, artificial, multi3voiced (15"!, 1:$)& He is sayin+ that, pra+matically, thou+ht has to (e treated as speech in order for it to (e +iven physical shape in the discourse& 0ee the earlier discussion on narratiAed speech on ?hy this is not the case& 4espite the apparent attractiveness of the pra+matic approach, it causes at least t?o pro(lems& Lne is that, ?hile narratolo+ists may assume that the fictional convention is that all or most thou+ht is indeed speech, it is simply not true to say that fictional narrators share that assumption& @hat is speechli.e a(out the )lifil and 2yd+ate passa+es =uoted earlierI The second pro(lem is the dan+er that the o(servation of literary conventions can easily harden into convictions a(out ho? the mind actually ?or.s& Renette undermines his point (y addin+ that the convention is perhaps truthful in this case(15"0, 1;1)C )onheim is e=ually am(ivalent& Care should (e ta.en ?ith notions of novelistic conventions& 8t is very easy for them to solidify initially into ?or.in+ assumptions and then into firm conclusions#for e9ample, that 3;$3 thou+hts and feelin+s really are no different from unspo.en speech or that the o(vious and direct means of handlin+ fictional thou+hts are the only means& Chatman holds that ?hat is important for narrative theory is only ?hat authors & & & and their audiences assume the mind to (e li.e& Their assumptions may (e =uite ?ron+ scientifically and still function verisimilarly, as a cultural commonplace (15;", 1"1)& Put (luntly, it is not a pro(lem for readers and narrators to have a mista.en vie? of the ?ay in ?hich the mind ?or.s, as lon+ as they share that vie?& 8 a+ree& Ho?ever, it does (ecome a pro(lem ?hen readers and narrators share a rich and comple9 vie? of the mind (that may (e ri+ht or ?ron+), ?hile the speech cate+ory approach imposes on narrative an oversimplified and impoverished mind picture that does not do Kustice to the practice of narrators and the e9perience of readers& /s it happens, 8 thin. that the parallel discourses of co+nitive science, psycholin+uistics, and philosophy have a lot in common ?ith the mind pictures of (oth readers and narrators#it is the speech cate+ory theory that appears to (e out of step& 8n summary, 8 have descri(ed three related defenses a+ainst the criticisms contained in the previous section& The three ar+uments appear to +o some ?ay to ameliorate the crudities of the speech cate+ory account& Ho?ever, they do not affect the five (asic pro(lems that ?ere descri(ed earlier (the privile+in+ of free indirect thou+ht and direct thou+ht over thou+ht reportC the overestimation of the ver(al component in thou+htC the resultin+ ne+lect of thou+ht report of characters> states of mindC the privile+in+ of some novels over others and some scenes in novels over othersC and the impression that characters> minds really only consist of a private, passive flo? of thou+ht)& The adKustment ar+ument is little more than an ac.no?led+ement of the e9istence of the pro(lemsC the hypothetical ar+ument does not +o far enou+hC and the pra+matic ar+ument, thou+h superficially attractive, has dan+erous pitfalls& @hat is re=uired is not to try to modify the speech cate+ory account, (ut to step outside its

limitations alto+ether& The three vie?points then (ecome unnecessary& The reader does not need to adopt either a hypothetical or a pra+matic vie? to?ard the supposed ver(ality of the fictional mental events reported in statements such as He ?as overKoyed or 0he decided to ?al.& -either does the reader have to ?orry a(out ho? the speech cate+ories can (e adKusted to ta.e account of these statements& They are simply reports of states of mind and mental functionin+& 4. #hought +eport @hile revie?in+ 4orrit Cohn>s .ransparent -inds, )rian McHale dre? attention to the ne+lect of thou+ht report& 8n the analysis of third person te9ts, 3;63 Pthou+ht reportQ has al?ays (een the poor relation, ne+lected in favor of the more +lamorous, more mimetic techni=ues of Pdirect thou+ht and free indirect thou+htQ& @e have (y and lar+e (een content to treat Pthou+ht reportQ as a sort of de+ree Aero of psycholo+ical realism& -o? Cohn has effectively le+itimiAed Pthou+ht reportQ, delimitin+ its (oundaries, outlinin+ its devices, functions, potentialities& 0he has put it on the map of psycholo+ical techni=ues once and for all (15"1, 1"%)& This section is an attempt to (uild on Cohn>s achievements& The concept of fictional minds transcends the speech cate+ory approach, (ut if it is to (e considered in terms of the three modes, it privile+es the mode of thou+ht report& 8 ?ill propose here an approach to?ard thou+ht report that ?ill, rather than mar+inaliAe it, put it at the center of the presentations (y narrators to readers of the contents of fictional minds in their social and physical conte9t& 8t is an approach to?ard narrators> presentations of the ?hole mind that focuses on (oth states of mind and inner speech and that ac.no?led+es the indispensa(le and pivotal role of thou+ht report in lin.in+ individual mental functionin+ to its social conte9t& The presentation of the mind in narrative fiction is a dynamic process, a ne+otiated relationship (et?een the narrator, the character, and the reader in ?hich a set of formal conventions is +iven meanin+ (y the reader& Much of ?hat the reader does in usin+ presentations of characters> minds to construct from the discourse those aspects of the story that relate to these minds is done (y means of thou+ht report& @ith re+ard to the distinction (et?een story and discourse, it is important to stress that the story contains mental as ?ell as physical events& 8t consists of characters> reasons for action as ?ell as the actions themselves& 8n fact, a distinction cannot really (e made (et?een the t?o, (ecause the concept of an action necessarily contains ?ithin it mental phenomena such as intentions and reasons& These reasons, intentions, motives, and so on form an indispensa(le part of characters> em(edded narratives that can (e recovered (y readers from the discourse, in part ?ith the help of direct presentations of minds& / vital part of this ?hole process is the use of the mode of thou+ht report& 8n particular, it has ?hat 8 shall call a

lin9in# function, ?here(y the narrator, in presentin+ a character>s consciousness, connects it to its surroundin+s& The use of this device emphasiAes the nature of consciousness as mental action and there(y (rin+s to+ether consciousness and physical action& The mode of thou+ht report is ideally suited to informative presentations of the purposive and directive nature of thou+ht as ?ell as its social nature& The other t?o modes are much less suited to this lin.in+ function, ?hich forms such a lar+e part of the richness and comple9ity of the novel& 3;%3 @hen the mind is re+arded as a private, passive flo? of consciousness, the e9plicit presence of the narrator appears to (e unnecessarily o(trusive and distortin+& Ho?ever, most characters> thou+ht ta.es place in a social conte9t of action and interaction ?ith others& For this aspect of the novel, thou+ht report is the most suita(le mode of presentation& 8t is not an interruption, an intrusion, or a distortion& )ecause thou+ht report provides a (ac.+round, lo?3level flo? of conte9tual information, its presence in the discourse is often overloo.ed& Theorists tend to see the use of thou+ht report as increasin+ the audi(ility and prominence of the narrator& 0ince its presence in discourse is so often disre+arded, my inclination is to dra? the opposite conclusion& 8n any event, my chief concern is ?ith the almost continuous form of thou+ht report that uno(trusively and, it appears, almost inaudi(ly, lin.s characters to their conte9t& This is very different from the prominent Kud+ments or commentaries that narratolo+ists tend to identify ?ith thou+ht report& Part of the purpose of this section is to defamiliariAe this completely naturaliAed device& The resonant last fe? ?ords of Culler>s Structuralist Poetics are as yet ?e understand very little a(out ho? ?e read (15;6, !%6)& @e ?ill understand a little more once ?e pay more attention (oth to the presence and also to all the functions of thou+ht report& Thou+ht report can of course +o (eyond the simple reportin+ of thou+ht and shade into commentary or ethical Kud+ment on that thou+ht& Ho?ever, the t?o activities, reportin+ thou+ht and commentin+ on it, are lo+ically distinct from each other& 8 am concerned only ?ith the issues raised (y the apparently simple device of the reportin+ of thou+ht and not ?ith the other =uestions raised (y narratorial Kud+ments& This point is important (ecause, as 8 have said, it is possi(le that much of the preKudice a+ainst the o(trusive narrator can (e traced (ac. to a disli.e of the Kud+mental and moraliAin+ narrator& )ut (ecause insufficient care has (een ta.en to distin+uish (et?een the different functions of the prominent narrator, this disli.e has also attached to the entirely separate function of the reportin+ of thou+ht& The irony of the intrusion preKudice is that the sort of thou+ht report ?ith ?hich 8 am particularly concerned is so lo? level that it is all (ut invisi(le& 8t is almost parado9ical that 8 am tryin+ to raise the visi(ility of thou+ht report ?hile com(atin+ the ?idespread perception of its alle+ed intrusivenessM The mode of thou+ht report is normally assi+ned ?hat mi+ht variously (e called a default, supplementary, safety net, or stop+ap function& 8t appears to (e assumed that the narrator uses thou+ht report only ?hen the more prefera(le techni=ues are not suita(le for a particular conte9t& 8t is necessary to turn this

3;;3 ne+ative approach on its head and e9plore positively the real and important functions of thou+ht report& Thou+ht report is a mediation (y the narrator (et?een the character and the reader& /t certain points in the te9t, the pra+matic re=uirements of the narrative may indicate the need for a hi+h level of mediation, for e9ample, ?hen it is necessary for the narrator to indicate to the reader the various conte9ts in ?hich the thou+ht of the character is ta.in+ place& /t other times, lesser levels of mediation are re=uired, for e9ample, ?hen the conte9t is not important, or ?hen it has already (een esta(lished or is to (e .ept deli(erately va+ue& The other modes can then (e used& )ut, ?ithin this approach to mind presentation, the mode of thou+ht report is the norm (ecause the lin.in+ function is such a vital contri(ution to ?hat can plausi(ly (e descri(ed as the purpose of the novel the e9ploration of the relationship (et?een individuals and the societies ?ithin ?hich they live& Thou+ht report is not the only means of placin+ characters> minds in conte9t& For e9ample, the narrator may use a passa+e of e9ternal description that sets the scene, follo?ed (y a passa+e of direct thou+ht that relates in some ?ay to that scene& The relationship (et?een the t?o ?ill (e implicit (ut can still (e perfectly clear& /lso, 8 refer to the lin.in+ function of free indirect perception later& Ho?ever, althou+h thou+ht report is not the only ?ay to connect thou+ht ?ith conte9t, it is the mode that is most suited to this function& 0o, the =uestions to as. are functional ones @hat factors affect the decisions of the narrator relatin+ to presentation of conte9tI @hy are different levels of mediation re=uired at different points in the narrationI @hat are the different ?ays in ?hich the three modes contri(ute to the lin.in+ functionI @hat effects relatin+ to mediation and conte9t are specific to thou+ht reportI 0ome theorists have commented (riefly and in passin+ on the lin.in+ function, thou+h ?ithout +ivin+ it the emphasis that it ?arrants& Chatman implicitly refers to the need for it, o(servin+ that critics have noted the difficulty of unrelieved pure interior monolo+ue, of conveyin+ the outer action and situation of a character if the te9t is totally loc.ed up in his mind& 8nferences can only +o so far (15;", 1"6)& )ut notice that pure unmediated thou+ht presentation is the norm and that thou+ht report is the departure from the norm that is re=uired only ?hen inferences can finally +o no further& )ic.erton also refers to the conte9tual function in a rather ne+ative ?ay, statin+ that it ena(les the narrator to incorporate (ac.+round and narrative material into the monolo+ue (15%;, !:6)& /+ain, the norm is the character>s monolo+ue, and thou+ht report is sometimes necessary in order to incorporate other material into it& The rela 3;"3 tionship (et?een consciousness and situation is a process that can (e analyAed in a much more dynamic and positive ?ay than simply the incorporation of (ac.+round material into a monolo+ue&

Cohn dra?s attention to ?hat she calls the dovetailin+ function as it relates to the presentation of characters> perceptions on the (orderline (et?een thou+ht report and free indirect perception& 0he comments that descriptions of characters> perceptions (lur the distinction (et?een the e9ternal and the internal scene and neatly dovetail the representation of (oth inner and outer reality (15;", $5)& This point is pursued ?ith +reat su(tlety and insi+ht in Reor+es Poulet>s article, The Circle and the Center *eality and -adame 6ovary (1566)& He uses the famous discussion (y Brich /uer(ach in -imesisA .he /epresentation of /eality in Western "iterature of a para+raph from -adame 6ovary that vividly e9presses Bmma )ovary>s perception of, and consciousness of, her physical environment& The passa+e is this one )ut it ?as a(ove all at mealtimes that she could (ear it no lon+er, in that little room on the +round floor, ?ith the smo.in+ stove, the crea.in+ door, the ooAin+ ?alls, the damp floor3 tilesC all the (itterness of life seemed to (e served to her on her plate, and, ?ith the steam from the (oiled (eef, there rose from the depths of her soul other e9halations as it ?ere of dis+ust& Charles ?as a slo? eaterC she ?ould ni((le a fe? haAel3nutsC or else, leanin+ on her el(o?, ?ould amuse herself ma.in+ mar.s on the oilcloth ?ith the point of her ta(le3.nife (=uoted in /uer(ach 156:, $":C Poulet 1566, :5!)& 8t is a comple9 mi9ture of thou+ht report (the feelin+s risin+ from the depths of her soul), free indirect perception (her a?areness of the room), and action (ni((lin+, ma.in+ mar.s) that is hi+hly informative a(out Bmma>s states of mind& Poulet>s vie? is that, if Flau(ert had simply decided to paint Bmma from the outside, she ?ould merely (e an o(Kect amon+ o(Kects& 8f, on the other hand, he had ?anted to ma.e her a purely su(Kective (ein+, then nothin+ ?ould have (een left e9cept the sensations and emotions caused in Bmma (y the surroundin+ o(Kects& There ?ould then have (een no a?areness on the part of the reader of Bmma as a person standin+ a+ainst a (ac.+round of thin+s, since she ?ould have (een reduced to the status of a stream of thou+hts and feelin+s (Poulet 1566, :5:)& Poulet>s ar+ument is that Flau(ert succeeded in devisin+ a ne? ?ay of presentin+ the relations (et?een the mind and the surroundin+ reality (1566, $06)& He contends that -adame 6ovary has an inner coherence (ecause thin+s are constantly fused to+ether in the unity of a sin+le, perceivin+ mind and also (ecause this mind, conversely, is .ept from disappearin+ into its o?n consciousness (y the o(Kectivity of a ?orld ?ith ?hich it is in constant 3;53 touch& There is not only a theoretical representation of reality, there is also a concrete medium throu+h ?hich this representation has (een received (that is, Bmma>s perceptions) (Poulet 1566, :5:)& Poulet ar+ues that Flau(ert achieves his purpose of conveyin+ vividly the interrelation of a consciousness and its environment (y sho?in+ somethin+ purely and intensely su(Kective, Bmma>s mind, located ?ithin a place and surrounded (y a lon+ enumeration of details of the environment that are o(Kective in themselves (ut are also endo?ed ?ith affective po?ers (Poulet 1566, :5:#5$)& Poulet>s point is that narrators have to find ?ays of com(inin+ t?o very different o(Kectives the need to convey the su(Kective process of a sin+le consciousness and the need to descri(e the social and physical environment ?ithin ?hich that consciousness is functionin+& The narrator has to

present a consciousness as fully as possi(le ?hile conveyin+ the surroundin+s ?ithin ?hich it is placed& The com(ined use of thou+ht report and free indirect perception allo?s the t?o o(Kectives to (e met simultaneously& Minds do not function in a vacuum& -ot many fictional minds are at ?or. ?hile completely divorced from any interaction ?ith other minds or the stimulus of an active physical environment (li.e Molly )loom in the Penelope episode in ,lysses)& There are many ?ays in ?hich this lin.in+ can (e done, and not all of them are (y thou+ht report& /s 8 said, this passa+e includes free indirect perception& @hile the narrator is descri(in+ Bmma>s perception of her environment, he is simultaneously descri(in+ her consciousness, her physical environment, and the comple9 and dynamic relationship (et?een the t?o& /nother ?ay of tyin+ to+ether consciousness and environment is the description of action, ?hich is (oth a private mental event (Bmma amusin+ herself) and a physical happenin+ in the pu(lic ?orld (ma.in+ mar.s)& Bmma ma.es mar.s on the ta(lecloth as a response to her intolera(le situation& The distance (et?een the narrator and the character that is created (y thou+ht report, as opposed to the t?o less3mediated modes, is often the ?ay in ?hich a fictional consciousness can (e situated ?ithin its environment& Furthermore, this situatin+ process is usually an inte+ral part of the plot3formin+ aspect of narrative& Bmma>s feelin+s a(out the environment ?ithin ?hich she is situated so vividly (y the narrator ?ill lead to the tra+edy at the end of the novel& Here are some of the specific ?ays in ?hich thou+ht report can fulfill the lin.in+ function that 8 have Kust descri(ed& 0ome of my comments are very s.etchy (ecause 8 e9plore the related issues in more detail else?here in the (oo.& 8t seemed useful nevertheless to +roup to+ether some of the .ey attri(utes of thou+ht report in one place& 3"03 Presentation of variety of mental events & 0ection ! contained a lon+ list of mental events#includin+ inner speech, perception, sensations, emotions, visual ima+es, attention, tone or mood#that are suita(le for presentation in the mode of thou+ht report& Many are less or not at all suita(le for presentation in the other t?o modes& This is particularly noticea(le in the case of emotions& The narratolo+ical ne+lect of the importance of the emotions is e9traordinary until it is remem(ered that they cannot occur as such in inner speech& 8 develop this point and the follo?in+ t?o points in the ne9t chapter& Presentation of latent states of mind& /+ain, as listed in section !, the fictional mind consists of a lar+e num(er of areas or aspects that include attitudes, Kud+ments, evaluations, (eliefs, s.ills, .no?led+e, character traits, tendencies of thou+ht, memory, intellect, volition, mood, ima+ination, and desires& The philosopher 4aniel 4ennett uses the memora(le phrase mind3ruts (1551, :00) to descri(e the ?ay in ?hich +roups of mental events can coalesce into tendencies of thou+ht&

Presentation of mental action& This point arose durin+ the discussion of narratiAed speech& More +enerally, it is related to the mental causal net?or. (ehind actions that includes motives, intentions, and reasons for action& Thou+ht report is the mode that is (est suited to the ascription of particular motives, intentions, and so on& / particularly unfortunate conse=uence of the speech cate+ory account is the assumption that the division (et?een thou+ht and action is unpro(lematical& / +ood deal of the interest that novels have for us lies precisely in the pro(lematical comple9ities that arise ?hen the relationship (et?een thou+ht and action is studied& The follo?in+ =uote from .he -on9 (y Matthe? 2e?is is a +ood e9ample of the amount of information on motives and intentions that can (e conveyed in Kust a fe? ?ords (y thou+ht report The lady ?as perfectly satisfied ?ith the conversation ?hich had passed (et?een themC she loo.ed for?ard ?ith satisfaction to the prospect of his (ecomin+ her son3in3la?C (ut prudence (ade her conceal from her dau+hter>s .no?led+e the flatterin+ hopes ?hich herself no? ventured to entertain (2e?is 155", 150)& 8f you cast your mind (ac. to the )lifil passa+e, you ?ill see a similar picture of +oals and intentions (ein+ ?or.ed into plans for the future& Presentation of character and personality& 8n the )lifil and 2yd+ate =uotes used earlier in the chapter, and also in the passa+e from .he -on9, you ?ill see that thou+ht report is startin+ to shade into characteriAation& 8n fact, puttin+ it in those terms is misleadin+& Ho? could ?e +o a(out esta(lishin+ ?here the thou+ht report ended and the characteriAation (e+anI @ithin my approach to fictional minds, this sort of passa+e is the norm and not the 3"13 meetin+ of (oundaries (et?een t?o different phenomena& 8t is one of the .ey strate+ies for readin+ te9ts (ecause it lin.s the present thou+hts of the character ?ith earlier Kud+ments and hypotheses re+ardin+ that character and, in this ?ay, provides the (asis for predictions re+ardin+ the future course of the narrative& 8t is difficult to ima+ine ?hat readin+ narrative ?ould (e li.e ?ithout the use of this strate+y& Summary& Cohn points out that thou+ht report is the most fle9i(le mode, particularly in temporal terms, (ecause it is suita(le (oth for summary and for the e9pansion of a si+nificant moment (?hich is referred to later)& 8t can summariAe an inner development over a lon+ period of time usin+ a panoramic vie? or telescopic perspective& Cohn refers to three different rhythms of time condensation iterative, ?hich or+aniAes events into a pattern of recurrence (for e9ample, very often, occasionally)C durative, ?hich or+aniAes events into a pattern of persistence (for e9ample, continued, still)C and mutative, ?hich, unli.e the others, refers to chan+es over a time span (15;", :6)& Cohn descri(es the capacity of thou+ht report to present mental descriptions in a lar+e time frame (15;", :$) and also refers to it as a .ind of panoramic vie? of PanQ inner self (15;", :$), an inner development over a lon+ period of time (15;", :$), a distant perspective, loo.in+ over the entire time span that the narrator recounts (15;", :6), and a psychic syndrome continuin+ over an e9tended time period (15;", :%)& 0tates of mind such as (eliefs and

dispositions necessarily e9ist over time, and so for their presentation in narrative, summary (ecomes the norm& / len+thy time period ?ill seem +eneral and distant, to use Fluderni.>s description of the )lifil passa+e, only if you are approachin+ the mind in terms of a series of discrete mental events& Presentation of bac9#round information& This is a ?ide cate+ory that includes such features as ne+ative .no?led+e, physical conte9t, presupposition, and other conte9tual information& -e+ative .no?led+e& This is ?hat the character does not .no? (ut the narrator does, and it is particularly si+nificant in the conte9t of motives and intentions& 0ometimes it is clearly si+naled as in, He had not realiAed yet ho? much he loved her& /t other times the issue is less strai+htfor?ard He left (ecause he ?as an+ry& Here, it is not clear ?hether it is the narrator or the character ?ho is esta(lishin+ the causal relationship& People ?ho act ?hen they are an+ry often do not .no? until after?ard, if then, that they acted because they ?ere an+ry& 8t is very common in passa+es of this sort to find that the character>s self3conscious .no?led+e of their o?n states of mind, and in particular of the causal relationships (et?een them, is difficult to esta(lish ?ith precision& The 3"!3 use of thou+ht report leaves the =uestion open& The other t?o modes are much less fle9i(le their use ma.es it clear that the character is self3 consciously a?are of the state of mind& Physical conte2t& / +ood e9ample appears in the openin+ para+raph of .he ;ouse of -irth (y Bdith @harton 0elden paused in surprise& 8n the afternoon rush of the Rrand Central 0tation his eyes had (een refreshed (y the si+ht of Miss 2ily )art (15;5, 6)& 8t is very common for sentences to consist (oth of thou+ht report and also of surface description of the physical story?orld& There is more in chapter ; on this point& Presupposition& Chatman defines presupposition as the part of a sentence that is a +iven, that +oes ?ithout sayin+, and that is already understood& For e9ample, this is the first sentence in Bdmund @hite>s .he -arried -an that directly descri(es the main character>s consciousness /ustin thou+ht there mi+ht (e more action in the pool and the sho?er rooms, (ut he didn>t li.e s?immin+ and he>d sort of +iven up on cruisin+ (!001, 1)& 8t is le+itimate to presuppose that /ustin is +ay& / clichOd e9ample of presupposition is the =uestion @hen did you stop (eatin+ your ?ifeI Chatman remar.s that it is a po?erful device for hintin+ that the character ?hose consciousness is (ein+ presented is deluded and self3deceivin+ (15;", !05#11)& Presupposition is, therefore, an important element in the interpretation and Kud+ment su(function that is mentioned later& Lther forms of presupposition, this time involvin+ characters rather than readers, are illustrated ?ith e9amples from +anity !air& 8n one e9ample, they

understood each other perfectly ?ell (155$, !";), a state of affairs is descri(ed#an a+reement or understandin+ (et?een t?o characters#that presupposes .no?led+e (y (oth characters of the other>s mind& Presupposition can also relate to the feelin+s of an individual the pair, ?hose conduct has so chafed the Kealous Reneral (155$, !"6)& The description of the actions of t?o people presupposes the mental functionin+ of a third person& /nother e9ample that is also closely related to action is Reor+e said to his ?ife, ?hom he could leave alone ?ith less scruple ?hen she had this society (155$, !"!)& / relationship (et?een t?o characters that results in a course of action (ein+ ta.en in certain circumstances is mentioned in passin+& 8t presupposes the prior .no?led+e of (oth their minds that ?ould e9plain the conte9t to this arran+ement& These e9amples sho? that the device of presupposition is often closely related to intermental thin.in+& Presentation of intermental thin9in#& 8 ?ill ar+ue in chapter ;, section : that the use of thou+ht report for the presentation of intermental or +roup, Koint, or shared thou+ht is one of the most important aspects of the construction of fictional minds& 8t has (een ne+lected (ecause of the ver(al (ias& 3":3 (2pression of consensus& 8n commentin+ on a particular e9ample of thou+ht report, Chatman notes that it contains the su++estion of a .ind of >in>3+roup psycholo+y &&& a sense of the (roader social conte9t& 8t is indistin+uisha(ly the thou+ht of one or all of the family, or ?hat one of them said to the others, or the narrator>s Kud+ment of the situation (15;", !0;)& The reason ?hy it is not possi(le to distin+uish (et?een the various possi(ilities for the source of ?hat is e9pressed is (ecause everyone is in a+reement& 2oo.ed at another ?ay, there is a certain sort of dou(le3 voiced discourse that may loo. li.e an e9pression of opinion (y an intrusive narrator (ut that on closer inspection turns out to (e the e9pression of a consensus, a shared vie? ?ithin a particular social +roup& 2eech and 0hort say of an e9ample of thou+ht report that it need not (e associated ?ith a particular character, (ut may (e the e9pression of PaQ communal point of vie? (15"1, :$5#60)& McHale calls this phenomenon the idiom of the +roup (15;", !;0)& 8n 4iscourse and the -ovel, )a.htin tal.s a(out the common vie? (15"1, :01#!)& Mar+olin, in discussin+ Fluderni.>s idea of the typification, schematiAation, or contraction of reco+niAa(le shared stances, perspectives, vie?s, or common opinions held (y numerous mem(ers of the +roup, unfortunately refers to it as collective inner speech (!000, %06#%)& Fluderni. also uses the term communis opinio, (ut she seems more interested in the implicit use of this concept as a deictic center, or vie?point on action, rather than the e9plicit e9pression of communal opinion (y a narrator (155%, 15!)& 4avid 2od+e =uotes the follo?in+ sentence from -iddlemarch, /nd ho? should 4orothea not marryI#a +irl so handsome and ?ith such prospectsI and as.s ?here the =uestion comes from& -ot from 4orothea, he su++ests, and not even from the narrator& 2od+e concludes that it is the voice of Middlemarch that is evo.ed here (y the narrator, the voice of provincial (our+eois ?isdom (1550, "6)&

+anity !air contains several similar e9amples of the apparently intrusive narrator in reality simply e9pressin+ a communal vie? a little troop of horsemen, consistin+ of some of the very +reatest persons in )russels (155$, !"1) and 8t ?as almost li.e Lld Bn+land (155$, !"!)& Lne ?ay to identify the consensus type of thou+ht report is to listen for the note of irony that it often contains& 8n these t?o e9amples, it is =uite li.ely that the narrator does not thin. that the horsemen ,ere the very +reatest persons in )russels or that it ,as almost li.e Lld Bn+land& The e9pression of the vie? of the consensus is another aspect of the presentation of intermental thin.in+& 0nterpretation: analysis: and 1ud#ment& 8 ?ill not discuss these uses here 3"$3 as they have (een ?ell covered already in a num(er of studies, particularly in 0eymour Chatman>s Story and Discourse (15;", !!%#6:)& 8n all of these su(functions of the lin.in+ function of thou+ht report, the thou+ht processes of individual characters are connected (y the narrator to their environment, there(y illustratin+ in very concrete and specific ?ays the social nature of thou+ht& These various aspects of thou+ht report also tend to emphasiAe the active nature of thou+ht as mental functionin+& /s 8 said earlier, it is much less easy to e9plore these aspects of consciousness ?hile usin+ other modes (ecause it is in thou+ht report that the narrator is a(le to sho? e9plicitly ho? characters> minds are operatin+ in a social and physical conte9t& For the sa.e of completeness, and to emphasiAe the versatility of the mode, 8 ?ill also (riefly mention another function of thou+ht report, ?hich is not mentioned earlier (ecause it is not related to its lin.in+ function& 8t is ?hat Cohn calls the e2pansion of the moment& /s Cohn e9plains, thou+ht report can e9pand or ela(orate a mental instant that is of particular si+nificance& This techni=ue is popular in the modern novel& Proust is the o(vious e9ample& B9pansion is often achieved throu+h the use of ?hat Cohn terms psycho3analo+ies& These are tropes that are used to e9press consciousness& 0he =uotes this e9ample from Gir+inia @oolf /s a person ?ho has dropped some +rain of pearl or diamond into the +rass and parts the tall (lades very carefully (15;", $$)& Cohn su++ests that it is sometimes difficult to tell ?hether the analo+y is (ein+ used (y the narrator or (y the character (althou+h not perhaps in the case of that @oolf e9ample)& Psycho3analo+ies are often sprin.led into passa+es of ?hat is other?ise free indirect thou+ht, ?hen in Cohn>s ?ords the narrator is un?illin+ to entrust the presentation of the inner life to the character>s o?n ver(al competence (15;", $$)& The e9pansion of the moment is particularly useful for Cohn>s favorite use of thou+ht report#the e9ploration of ?hat she calls the nether depth (15;", 1$0)&

Conclusion 8 hope that 8 have not +iven the impression that 8 thin. that the speech cate+ory approach is (eyond repair& Ln the contrary, as ?ith the other approaches considered in chapter !, 8 thin. that it has an essential place in the study of fictional minds& My point is simply that it is only one amon+ a lar+e num(er of perspectives on this crucially important aspect of narrative discourse& The distortions arise ?hen it is thou+ht to (e the only one& There is time for one last hymn to the virtues of thou+ht report& 8t tends to (e centrifu+al in nature, 3"63 ?hile direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht tend to (e centripetal it directs the reader>s attention out?ard into the conte9t of social situation and action, ?hile the others direct the reader>s attention in?ard into scenes of thou+htful self3communion& 2et us no? travel further in the centrifu+al direction indicated (y the mode of thou+ht report and +o on to consider first the ?hole mind and then the social mind& 3"%3 4 #he Whole ,ind Lur mental (usiness is carried on much in the same ?ay as the (usiness of the 0tate a +reat deal of hard ?or. is done (y a+ents ?ho are not ac.no?led+ed& # Reor+e Bliot, /dam )ede 8 ?ill no? (e+in the process of ?idenin+ and deepenin+ our concept of the fictional mind (eyond the phenomenon of inner speech& /lthou+h this chapter and the ne9t are mainly a(out real minds, 8 try to relate the ar+uments at re+ular intervals to the fictional sort& 8t is in order to o(tain a variety of perspectives on the means (y ?hich readers construct fictional minds that the parallel discourses of co+nitive science, philosophy, psycholo+y, and psycholin+uistics are e9amined in this chapter and the ne9t& /s 2u(omir 4oleTel remar.s, in order to (uild a theory of interactin+ in fictional ?orlds, narrative semantics has to tap other sources of inspiration#social psycholo+y, sociolo+y, cultural semiotics, and so on (155", 5;)& 8n addition, 8 hope that these t?o chapters are of interest in themselves to students of literary theory ?ho may not previously have encountered some of the real3mind discourses discussed in them& The notion of (alance ?ill recur throu+hout this chapter& 8n attemptin+ to (rin+ to+ether parallel discourses, each of ?hich tends to emphasiAe one aspect of the mind at the e9pense of others, 8 am tryin+ to achieve a full

picture of fictional minds& 8 su++est that the (est ?ay to produce a rich, informative, and +enuinely heuristic perspective on the consciousnesses of characters in novels is to find a (alance (et?een these different vie?s& %. *unctionalism This section descri(es a functionalist approach to?ard the areas of the mind that are considered later in this chapter (ecause it is ?ithin a functional perspective that these aspects of the mind can (est (e understood& 2u(omir 4oleTel points out that PaQll mental faculties, from sensory perception to emotionality to thin.in+ to remem(erin+ and ima+ination, operate (et?een the poles of intentional actin+ and spontaneous +eneration (155", ;:)& 8t is the latter pole, ?hich em(races such phenomena as contemplation, daydreams, fantasies, and free associative thin.in+, that has (een the focus of attention ?ithin traditional narratolo+y& Thin. of the deep interest in stream of consciousness and interior monolo+ue& The attempt to redress the (alance a little ?ith a functional focus on the pole of intentional actin+ starts here& )roadly spea.in+, there are t?o uses for the term functionalism& 0tron+ functionalism is the doctrine that Pf Qunctional .inds are not identified (y their material composition (ut rather (y their activities or tendencies (Maloney 1555, :::) and that minds are functional .inds& 0tron+ functionalists conclude from this that it is possi(le for ro(ots or computers to have minds, even thou+h the machine supportin+ this mental functionin+ is made from a completely different su(stance than that of human (rains& 0o (rains can (e made out of machinery& @ithin co+nitive science some theorists adopt a (ottom3up approach that is determined (y the (iolo+y of the (rain this is the ?ay the (rain ?or.s and that is ?hat ?e ?ill study& Conversely, stron+ functionalists adopt a top3do?n approach that is derived from the computational theory of the mind& 8t considers the outputs of mental functionin+ and studies the (rain only in a very a(stract manner as, in effect, the information3processin+ machine that produces those outputs& This is a contentious and controversial position to ?hich there are a num(er of co+ent o(Kections& 0earle, for e9ample, re+ards stron+ functionalism as one of a num(er of approaches to the mind that deny the reality of su(Kective consciousness& 8 am not usin+ the term functionalism in this very stron+ sense, (ut in a much ?ea.er sense to mean an emphasis on the activities and tendencies of minds that as.s the =uestion @hat is thin.in+ forI 0tron+ functionalism is not relevant to the purpose of this (oo. (ecause, as fictional minds e9ist only in a semiotic and not in a physical sense, the =uestion of ?hat they are made of does not arise& @ea. functionalism, ho?ever, is very relevant indeed& 8t is a (asic, operational, ?or.in+ assumption of co+nitive scientists that the mind is an information3processin+ device& 4aniel 4ennett, one of the foremost philosophers of co+nitive science, su++ests that ?hat ma.es somethin+ a mind & & & is not ?hat it is made of, (ut ?hat it can do and

that ?hat minds do is process information (155%, %")& 0teven Pin.er uses very similar ?ords The mind is ?hat the (rain doesC specifically, the (rain processes information, and thin.in+ is a .ind of computation (155;, !1)& These comments illustrate the functional vie? of the mind that analyAes ?hat it does and ?hat it is for, rather than as.in+ ?hat the (rain is made of& @ithin this conte9t, the approach of co+ 3""3 nitive science to?ard the phenomenon of consciousness is very illuminatin+& The first surprise is that co+nitive scientists see consciousness as only a small part of their study& The second surprise is that they can even entertain the possi(ility that the centrality and importance of consciousness can (e =uestioned at all& Most of us unthin.in+ly re+ard it as a +iven consciousness is ?hat ma.es us ?hat ?e are, ?hat ma.es us human& 8t Kust happens& )ut co+nitive scientists are a?are that many or+anisms survive perfectly ?ell ?ithout consciousness in the human, self3 conscious sense, and so they as., @hat is consciousness forI 8 am sure that this ?ould stri.e most of the rest of us as a very odd =uestion& Ho?ever, you ?ill (e relieved to hear that the ans?er is a positive one& For e9ample, the neuroscientist /ntonio 4amasio>s ans?er to the =uestion is that the devices of consciousness handle the pro(lem of ho? an individual or+anism may cope ?ith environmental challen+es not predicted in its (asic desi+n such that the conditions fundamental for survival can still (e met (!000, :0:)& Consciousness allo?s us to adapt intelli+ently to our environment& @e ?ould not adapt so ?ell ?ithout it& This is ?hat it is for& The psycholo+ist @illiam Eames is no? famously associated ?ith the phrase stream of consciousness& This term is related to the pole of spontaneous +eneration that 4oleTel refers to& )ut M8TBC0 stresses his interest in the opposite pole of intentional actin+& Eames emphasiAed the adaptive nature of co+nition the fact that perception, memory, and reasonin+ operate not simply for their o?n sa.e, (ut to allo? us to survive and prosper in our physical and social ?orld& Furthermore, Eames reco+niAed that the hallmar. of an intelli+ent (ein+ is its a(ility to lin. ends ?ith means#to select actions that ?ill achieve +oals (Holyoa. 1555, 9lii)& 8t is ironic that Eames>s actual approach is a lon+ ?ay from the narrative term no? associated ?ith his name& 8t is note?orthy that Eames applied this functional perspective to the concept of intelli+ence, ?hich 0teven Pin.er defines as the a(ility to attain +oals in the face of o(stacles (y means of decisions (ased on rational (truth3o(eyin+) rules & & & Pthat is,Q specifyin+ a +oal, assessin+ the current situation to see ho? it differs from the +oal, and applyin+ a set of operations that reduce the difference (155;, %!)& 8ntelli+ence clearly re=uires a minimum amount of .no?led+e a(out the environment and appropriate plannin+ to chan+e the environment& Roal3 directed action of this sort involves not only close attention to conte9t (ut also a clear focus on the future& The concept of a +oal involves a +ap

(et?een an actual and present state of affairs and a counterfactual and future state of affairs that is more desira(le& /s 4ennett puts it in t?o very stri.in+ phrases in Consciousness 3"53 (2plained, the fundamental purpose of (rains is to produce future (as the poet Paul GalOry ori+inally said), and all (rains are, in essence, anticipation machines (1551, 1;;)& This .ind of interaction ?ith the ?orld is clearly not a private or passive process& 8t is en+a+ed and interactive& Co+nition is neither copyin+ nor constructin+ the ?orld& Co+nition is, instead, the process that .eeps us active, chan+in+ creatures in touch ?ith an eventful, chan+in+ ?orld (*eed 155%, 1:)& 8 su++est a functional approach to?ard fictional minds& Ta.e Pip in 8reat (2pectations& He is an adaptive, +oal3directed, information3processin+ device& This sort of tal. may seem deeply alienatin+, depressin+ly mechanistic, and chillin+ly antihumanist, (ut ?hyI 8nformation processin+ is concerned ?ith perception, daydreams, and contemplation as ?ell as ?ith an active en+a+ement ?ith the social and physical conte9t& The lan+ua+e may (e unfamiliar and possi(ly even repellent, (ut the reality is .no?n to us all& Pip>s mind processes the information that he receives from the other minds around him and from other aspects of his physical and social environment& He learns, in particular from Bstelle and Miss Havisham, that he ?ants to (e different& He develops +oals, such as ?antin+ to (e a +entleman, that conflict ?ith his current situation& He then learns from Her(ert, Mr& Ea++ers, and so on ho? to adapt and ho? to (ecome a +entleman& His mind adapts differently to all of the various minds ?ith ?hich it interacts& Finally, he learns the most difficult lesson of all#that (ecomin+ a +entleman is not enou+h and that he has another +oal he has still to learn ho? to (e a +ood person& /t every sta+e he esta(lishes ?hat his present situation is, ?hat his desired situation is, and ho? (est to reconcile the t?o& Pip has plans for the future, (ut these have to (e adapted and continually updated to deal ?ith the various surprises that confront him& The surprises are lin.ed, and (ecome a plot, throu+h the plans that he adapts in the li+ht of them& Lf course, you ?ill (e thin.in+ (y no?, Pip is not an information3processin+ device at allM He is a character in a novel, a collection of ?ords on the pa+e& 0o ?hat 8 am really sayin+ is that the reader must read those ?ords as if they refer to an information3processin+ device& Ho? else can ?e follo? the plot of the novelI Lnce this point is +rasped, it is clear that a functional perspective on real minds is the (asis of a teleolo+ical perspective on fictional minds& Teleolo+ical analysis is the study of narrative in terms of its ultimate purpose and overall desi+n& The teleolo+ical analysis of a te9t is (ased on the assumption that its parts function coherently to?ard a comprehensi(le end purpose& The plots of novels are +oal3directed in the sense that they have, or should have, coherent and satisfyin+ endin+s or, alternatively, they deli(erately frustrate readers> desires 3503

for such endin+s& The chan+in+ +aps (et?een Pip>s current situations and his various +oals define the structure and desi+n of the narrative& They comprise its teleolo+ical shape& Lnce the unfamiliarity of thin.in+ of fictional minds in terms of co+nitive science has ?orn off, the parallels continue to (e instructive and a rich source of insi+hts into mental functionin+ in novels is revealed& The theorists in the parallel discourses themselves are a?are of the value to (e +ained from pursuin+ these parallels& This is 0teven Pin.er a+ain Lnce the fictitious ?orld is set up, the prota+onist is +iven a +oal and ?e ?atch as he or she pursues it in the face of o(stacles& 8t is no coincidence that this standard definition of plot is identical to PmyQ definition of intelli+ence&&&& Characters in a fictitious ?orld do e9actly ?hat our intelli+ence allo?s us to do in the real ?orld (155;, 6$1)& B=ually, some narrative theorists are also a?are of the value of a similarly functional approach to fictional minds& 4oleTel descri(es very clearly the pole of intentional actin+ that is referred to earlier (y statin+ that the concepts of intentionality and motivation define the >out?ardly> oriented domain of the mind, the practical mind directin+, controllin+, and monitorin+ actin+ and its results&&&& The operations of the practical mind, such as practical reasonin+, decision ma.in+, calculation, plannin+, scriptin+, and the li.e, are prototypes of mental acts (155", ;!#;:)& Marie32aure *yan has divided the repertory of mental re+isters of characters into five cate+ories& T?o of them, (the epistemic ?orld of characters containin+ their (eliefs, proKections, and introspections and the desires, fears, li.es, and disli.es of characters) are at the private and introspective pole& The other three (the individual o(li+ations of characters that are created (y promises and the social o(li+ations of characters that are created (y la?sC the active +oals of charactersC and the plans throu+h ?hich characters see. to fulfill their active +oals) (1551, !!$) are functional in that they relate to ho? people plan ahead, adKust in the li+ht of circumstances, and operate +enerally in a social conte9t& Finally, 8 ?ould li.e to end this section ?ith a tentative su++estion& @riters sometimes complain a(out the tyranny of teleolo+y and the artificiality of careful plottin+& /ealism is, of course, a notoriously slippery concept, (ut, for e9ample, the modernist emphasis on stream of consciousness and interior monolo+ue has often (een descri(ed as more realistic than ?ritin+ that is +eared to the intentional actin+ pole& Ho?ever, perhaps the time has come for a re3evaluation of this de(ate& 8t is possi(le that the functionalism of real3mind discourses su++ests that the teleolo+ical nature of traditional fictional3mind representations may not (e so unrealistic after all& 3513 2. -anguage This section ?ill consider a ran+e of vie?s on the relationship (et?een lan+ua+e and thou+ht and, in particular, on the importance of lan+ua+e in the formation and development of the mind& 8t sho?s that there is a +ood deal more s.epticism ?ithin the co+nitive sciences re+ardin+ the role of

lan+ua+e than there is ?ithin literary theory& 8n his (oo. "iterary .heory (15":), Terry Ba+leton refers to lan+ua+e, ?ith its pro(lems, mysteries, and implications, as (oth paradi+m and o(session for t?entieth3century intellectual life (15":, 5;)& The first sentence of "an#ua#e and -aterialismA Developments in Semiolo#y and the .heory of the Sub1ect (15;;) (y *osalind Co?ard and Eohn Bllis is this Perhaps the most si+nificant feature of t?entieth3century intellectual development has (een the ?ay in ?hich the study of lan+ua+e has opened the route to an understandin+ of man.ind, social history, and the la?s of ho? a society functions (15;;, 1)& This is a lar+e claim and one that 8 certainly do not feel e=uipped to comment on& My ar+ument is simply that, ?hatever the value of the study of lan+ua+e +enerally, an undue emphasis on the role of lan+ua+e has inhi(ited our understandin+ of fictional mental functionin+& The previous section provided a +ood illustration of this point& The functional approach is not primarily interested in the de+ree of ver(ality in thou+ht& 8 am sure that you noticed that there ?as not a sin+le reference to inner speech in the discussion of the mind in the previous section& There is a continuin+ de(ate on the e9tent of our need for lan+ua+e in order to learn a(out the ?orld and, therefore, its role in formin+ the conceptual frame?or. for our thou+ht& @hat is at issue is the e9tent to ?hich the ?hole of our co+nitive universe is determined (y the lan+ua+e and culture ?ithin ?hich ?e are socialiAed and, therefore, the e9tent to ?hich all of the thou+ht of an individual is culture3specific& The position that an individual>s thin.in+ is to a lar+e de+ree determined (y his or her culture is often called the Sapir<Whorf hypothesis, after the /merican anthropolo+ists Bd?ard 0apir and )enKamin 2ee @horf& 8 am not primarily concerned ?ith this de(ate (ut ?ith the much more limited point that inner speech is Kust one part of the ?hole mind& To use a+ain the simple e9ample of drivin+ a car inner speech is not necessary to the ?or.in+s of the mind ?hile drivin+, (ut it is not possi(le to learn to drive a car ?ithout lan+ua+e& 8 am interested, then, not in the role of lan+ua+e in ho? ?e learn to thin., (ut in the supposed ver(ality of fictional mental events& First, 8 ?ill descri(e some perspectives on the nature of thou+ht that do?nplay the role of lan+ua+e& The s.epticism that e9ists ?ithin co+nitive science re+ardin+ the e9tent to ?hich lan+ua+e is involved in day3to3day thou+ht is not a ne? phenomenon and has e9isted ?ithin psycholo+y throu+hout the 35!3 t?entieth century& /s the popular3science ?riter Eohn McCrone points out, the (elief that ?ords can only clothe thou+ht has seemed so a9iomatic that until a rediscovery of Gy+ots.y>s ?or. in the late 15"0s, it ?as e9ceptional to find a recent @estern philosophy or psycholo+y te9t that even mentioned the possi(ility that lan+ua+e mi+ht ma.e a difference& /nd in truth, introspection seemed to su++est that ?ords are indeed mostly secondary (1555, !"5)& The reference to introspection here raises an interestin+ point& 0ome people>s introspections seem to tell them that, on the contrary, ?ords are indeed mostly primary& 8ntrospection is clearly a tric.y (usiness& /lso, althou+h 2ev Gy+ots.y (a *ussian

psycholin+uist active in the late 15!0s and early 15:0s) (rou+ht the notion of inner speech to the center of psycholo+y, he ac.no?led+ed that, even if recorded in full ?ith the help of some supersensitive phono+raph, the inner speech ?ould remain a((reviated and incoherent (15"%, !:6) and admitted that inner speech (ecomes so fra+mented that it is (arely lan+ua+e at all& He refers to inner speech as practically ?ordless (15"%, !$:), speech almost ?ithout ?ords (15"%, !$$), and to a lar+e e9tent thin.in+ in pure meanin+s (15"%, !$5)& 8 say more a(out Gy+ots.y in chapter 6, section :& / num(er of psycholo+ists have as.ed ?hether the loss or reduction of intellectual functions invaria(ly accompanies a maKor impairment of lan+ua+e competence, and so ?hether thou+ht is dependent on an intact lin+uistic function& The importance of this =uestion is that if the t?o can (e separated, then thou+ht is possi(le ?ithout inner speech& 0everal studies of +roups of patients ?ith aphasia (that is, loss of speech) have reported that the patients have unimpaired levels of non3ver(al reasonin+ and intelli+ence& There are several ?ell3.no?n cases of severely aphasic people ?ho are una(le to understand or respond to even the simplest ?ords or phrases and ?hose speech is (a((le, (ut ?ho can underta.e a variety of comple9 tas.s, learn ne? s.ills, and maintain +ood social relations& The *ussian psycholin+uist /le9ander 2uria reported the case of the composer 0he(alin, ?ho suffered a serious stro.e, the result of ?hich ?as severe difficulty in spea.in+ and understandin+ speech, (ut ?ho continued to produce remar.a(le music (Bllis and )eattie 15"%, !;1#;!)& 8t appears that a person can (e virtually ro((ed of lan+ua+e yet still perform intelli+ently in other areas& The lan+ua+e of co+nitive science refers to mental spaces, (lends, scripts, frames, plans, and so on& This is not a conceptual frame?or. that allo?s ?ith any ease for a central role for lan+ua+e in thou+ht& -one of these concepts is concerned ?ith inner speech& This point can (e illustrated very easily& There are $;1 entries in -0.(CS, (ut only a very fe? of them consider the role of lan+ua+e in thou+ht, apart from the small +roup of entries that are specifically concerned 35:3 ?ith lan+ua+e& 8n particular, the entry on consciousness (4avies 1555, 150# 5!) does not refer to lan+ua+e in +eneral or inner speech in particular at all apart from a (rief passin+ reference to spo.en speech& 8n a (oo. of :1: pa+es on the ?or.in+ of the (rain, 8oin# 0nsideA A .our /ound a Sin#le -oment of Consciousness (1555), Eohn McCrone does not +et around to tal.in+ a(out lan+ua+e until pa+e !;"& Terry /u>s entry in -0.(CS on lan+ua+e and thou+ht is also =uite cool on the impact of the 0apir3@horf hypothesis @hile the Kury is still out for the 0apir3 @horf hypothesis, it is pro(a(ly safe to say that important aspects of our ?orldvie? are unli.ely to (e at the mercy of ar(itrary aspects of our lan+ua+e (1555, $$6)& He reinforces the point (y assertin+ that recent findin+s on lan+ua+e3specific impairments su++est that lan+ua+e and

co+nition can (e decoupled&&&& PTQhere is some evidence for our co+nition and perception shapin+ the evolution of our lan+ua+e& Bvidence for influence in the opposite direction, ho?ever, seems more elusive (1555, $$$)& There is astonishin+ly little a(out inner speech in /ntonio 4amasio>s (oo. a(out consciousness, ?hich shares the relentlessly unconvinced tone of other real3mind discourses& For e9ample, lan+ua+e, he maintains, is a translation of somethin+ else, a conversion from nonlin+uistic ima+es ?hich stand for entities, events, relationships, and inferences&&&& PTQhere must (e a nonver(al self and a nonver(al .no?in+ for ?hich the ?ords >8> or >me> or the phrase >8 .no?> are the appropriate translations, in any lan+ua+e (!000, 10;#")& He also refers to the core self PthatQ must (e in place for its translation into a suita(le ?ord to occur (!000, 1"%) and to the ima+ed, nonver(al narrative of core consciousness (!000, 1";)& Here 8 ?ill =uote a lon+ passa+e from .he "an#ua#e 0nstinct (155$) in ?hich 0teven Pin.er e9plains his vie?s on the matter in no uncertain terms& 8t is ?orth =uotin+ in full in order to +ive a flavor of the depth of the hostility that e9ists amon+st some co+nitive scientists on this issue& The idea that thou+ht is the same thin+ as lan+ua+e is an e9ample of ?hat can (e called a conventional a(surdity a statement that +oes a+ainst all common sense (ut that everyone (elieves (ecause they dimly recall havin+ heard it some?here and (ecause it is so pre+nant ?ith implications&&&& Thin. a(out it& @e have all had the e9perience of utterin+ or ?ritin+ a sentence, then stoppin+ and realiAin+ that it ?asn>t e9actly ?hat ?e meant to say& To have that feelin+, there has to (e a ?hat ?e meant to say that is different from ?hat ?e said& 0ometimes it is not easy to find any ?ords that properly convey a thou+ht& @hen ?e hear or read, ?e usually remem(er 35$3 the +ist, not the e9act ?ords, so there has to (e such a thin+ as a +ist that is not the same as a (unch of ?ords& /nd if thou+hts depended on ?ords, ho? could a ne? ?ord ever (e coinedI Ho? could a child learn a ?ord to (e+in ?ithI Ho? could translation from one lan+ua+e to another (e possi(leI (155$, 6;#6") To +et around these difficulties, some co+nitive science is (ased on the controversial and contested assumption that ?e thin. in a very a(stract, sym(olic lan+ua+e form that is called mentalese& /ccordin+ to Pin.er, ?e do not thin. in a natural lan+ua+e such as Bn+lish (ecause natural lan+ua+es are full of am(i+uities and ?hatever ?e thin. in cannot (e am(i+uous (ecause that is not the ?ay our mental functionin+ ?or.s& /lso, spo.en lan+ua+es are full of ?hat he calls +rammatical (oilerplate, ?hich is not necessary for the lan+ua+e of thou+ht& 0o, Pin.er concludes, the statements in a .no?led+e system are not sentences in Bn+lish (ut rather inscriptions in a richer lan+ua+e of thou+ht, >mentalese> (155;, ;0)&

/s 8 said, this is a continuin+ de(ate, and there are some co+nitive scientists ?ho emphatically stress the centrality of lan+ua+e to thou+ht, althou+h these vie?s are often related more to the po?erful role that lan+ua+e plays in formin+ our minds, rather than the role of lan+ua+e in everyday thou+ht& 4aniel 4ennett ma.es the point a(out co+nitive formation that lan+ua+e infects and inflects our thou+ht at every level&&&& The structures of +rammar enforce a discipline on our ha(its of thou+ht, shapin+ the ?ays in ?hich ?e pro(e our o?n >data3(ases&> & & & P@Qe can see ho? the po?erful voices that a lan+ua+e unleashes in a (rain can (e e9ploited (1551, :01)& Co+nitive scientists have dra?n methodolo+ical conclusions a(out the study of the mind from this ar+ument& *ay Eac.endoff o(serves that any theory of the semantic structure of lan+ua+e is ipso facto a theory of the structure of thou+ht (15":, !05) and that to study semantics of natural lan+ua+e is to study co+nitive psycholo+y (15":, :)& Rilles Fauconnier ma.es a similar point& )ecause ?e .no? lan+ua+e to (e intimately connected to some important mental processes, ?e have in principle a rich virtually ine9hausti(le source of data to investi+ate some aspects of mental processes (155;, !#:)& Ho?ever, Fauconnier also offers this important caveat 2an+ua+e data suffers ?hen it is restricted to lan+ua+e, for the simple reason that the interestin+ co+nitive constructions underlyin+ lan+ua+e use have to do ?ith complete situations that include hi+hly structured (ac.+round .no?led+e, various .inds of reasonin+, on3line meanin+ construction, and ne+otiation of meanin+ (155;, ;#")& 8t is surely deeply si+nificant that this ?arnin+, althou+h it 3563 relates to the study of the real mind, uncannily echoes the ar+ument of this (oo. re+ardin+ the need to study the fictional mind in the conte9t of the complete situations that are descri(ed in novels& 8 mentioned earlier that the results of introspection can vary ?ildly& 4ennett evocatively descri(es the sensation of inner speech in a ?ay that, to me certainly, rin+s very true -ot only do ?e tal. to ourselves silently, (ut sometimes ?e do this in a particular >tone of voice&> Lther times, it seems as if there are ?ords, (ut not heard ?ords, and at still other times, only the faintest shado?s or hints of ?ords are someho? >there> to clothe our thou+hts (1551, 65)& Ho?ever, in a ?ay that is characteristic of philosophers ?hen discussin+ consciousness, he provides a familiar reservation 8n any event, the phenomenolo+y of vivid thou+ht is not restricted to tal.in+ to oneselfC ?e can dra? pictures to ourselves in our mind>s eyes, drive a stic.3shift car to ourselves, touch sil. to ourselves and savor an ima+inary peanut3(utter sand?ich (1551, 65)& My e9perience of ?or.s of philosophy and psycholo+y is that they tend to sound more comforta(le ?hen descri(in+, for e9ample, the visual aspects of consciousness than ?hen they are discussin+ the lin+uistic aspects& /n important characteristic of the pro3lan+ua+e perspective is its functional emphasis on the purposive nature of lan+ua+e the use ?e ma.e of lan+ua+e to direct and mana+e our thou+ht and action& Here are four different perspectives on this issue From a neurolo+ical perspective, it

appears that scanner ima+es sho? that the structure of lan+ua+e penetrates many parts of the (rain and not Kust )roca>s and @ernic.e>s areas, the t?o that are most closely associated ?ith the use of lan+ua+e& 8n the normal course of events, ?hen ?e learn lan+ua+e ?hile youn+, ?hen the (rain is fairly plastic, the hard?irin+ of the (rain is crucially affected (y lan+ua+e& From a developmental perspective, 4ennett su++ests that the practice of as.in+ oneself =uestions could arise as a natural side effect of as.in+ =uestions of others, and its utility ?ould (e similar it ?ould (e a (ehavior that could (e reco+niAed to enhance one>s prospects (y promotin+ (etter3informed action3+uidance (1551, 156)& That is, tal.in+ to oneself is a ?ay of (uildin+ a >virtual ?ire> (et?een the relevant su(systems (1551, 15%)& Here 4ennett follo?s the Gy+ots.ian line of thin.in+ on ho? outer, directive speech +oes under+round and (ecomes inner speech& He concludes that the +reater virtues of sotto voce tal.in+ to oneself ?ould (e reco+niAed, leadin+ later to entirely silent tal.in+ to oneself (1551, 15;)& This idea is discussed in +reater detail in chapter 6, section :& From the perspective of situated, distri(uted, or shared co+nition (see chapter 6, section 6), the philosophers /ndy Clar. and 4avid Chalmers assert in their 35%3 article The B9tended Mind (155") that the maKor (urden of the couplin+ (et?een a+ents is carried (y lan+ua+e& @ithout lan+ua+e, ?e mi+ht (e much more a.in to discrete Cartesian >inner> minds, in ?hich hi+h3level co+nition relies lar+ely on internal resources& )ut the advent of lan+ua+e has allo?ed us to spread this (urden into the ?orld (155", 1")& 8 discuss in chapter 6 the insi+ht that lan+ua+e is one co+nitive tool amon+ others, al(eit the most important of them& Finally, the narratolo+ical perspective& /ccordin+ to 2u(omir 4oleTel, PiQnner conflict is located in the mental domain of the actin+ personC it arises from contradictory intentions, desires, +oals, strate+ies, and so forth& 8t manifests itself in the form of interior monolo+ue, a (asic ver(al e9pression of mental tension (155", 105)& This is a ?elcome functional approach to?ard the role of lan+ua+e in fictional thou+ht& Ho?ever, the ver(al e9pression of mental tension is only one form of e9pression amon+ a ?ide ran+e of others, and ?e miss a +ood deal of other evidence of fictional mental functionin+ if ?e place e9cessive reliance on the purely ver(al .ind& 8t is interestin+ to note that none of the theorists discussed earlier consider the possi(ility that the e9tent of ver(ality of thou+ht, the importance of inner speech, may vary from individual to individual& There is an illuminatin+ discussion on this point (y /nn @aldron -eumann in ?hich she compares the ta+s used to descri(e BliAa(eth )ennet>s and 2ydia )ennet>s thou+ht processes in Eane /usten>s Pride and Pre1udice& -eumann comments that the narrator uses the term sa, fre=uently ?hen conveyin+ 2ydia>s inner life in order to su++est a very simple primarily visual consciousness, ?hile BliAa(eth>s thou+ht is more hi+hly developed and sophisticated and much more closely related to inner lan+ua+e& /lthou+h

this is a useful idea, 8 am not sure that 8 ?ould accept these value3laden terms, and it is predicta(le that -eumann should conclude ?ith the remar. that 2ydia su++ests a nearly total a(sence of thou#ht (15"%, :":)& Thou+ht that occurs in hi+hly visual terms is still thou+ht& 3. !on.)er'al Consciousness 8 dre? attention in the previous section to the non3ver(al nature of the terms that are used (y co+nitive science theorists to descri(e aspects of consciousness& There are several other e9amples of similar terms& Lne that is fre=uently used (y philosophers is the term *ualia The felt or phenomenal =ualities associated ?ith e9periences, such as the feelin+ of a pain, or the hearin+ of a sound, or the vie?in+ of a colour ()lac.(urn 155$, :1:)& -ote the non3lin+uistic nature of the three e9amples& Philosophers also use the term ,hat it>s li9e as a near synonym for =ualia& /nother e9ample is this repeated reference to feelin#s 35;3 Consciousness (e+ins as a feelin+ & & & consciousness feels li.e a feelin+ & & & a feelin+ of .no?in+&&&& The mysterious first3person perspective of consciousness consists of ne?ly3minted .no?led+e, information if you ?ill, e9pressed as feelin+ (4amasio !000, :1!#1:)& The term ima#es is yet another e9ample& Many of us, 8 thin., ?ill have e9perienced a deeply unpleasant memory as a visual ima+e com(ined ?ith an almost physical pain& 4amasio tal.s repeatedly of mind events as ima+es, and althou+h he stresses that these need not (e visual, his terminolo+y undou(tedly mar+inaliAes the role of lan+ua+e in thou+ht& /ccordin+ to M8TBC0, ima+ery played a central role in theories of the mind for centuries (Dosslyn and *a(in 1555, :";)& /lso, PsQtill other evidence for thin.in+ ?ithout lan+ua+e has to do ?ith mental ima+es& 0cientists and ?riters as ?ell as visual artists have claimed that some of their most creative ?or. ?as inspired (y their mental ima+es&&&& 8t seems, then, (rilliant as ?ell as mundane thou+ht is eminently possi(le ?ithout lan+ua+e (/u 1555, $$$)& Finally, ?ith re+ard to purposive and functional mental activity, 4ennett>s vie? is that PtQal.in+ aloud is only one possi(ility& 4ra?in+ pictures to yourself is another readily appreciated act of self3 manipulation (1551, 15;)& For e9ample, 4oc McCoy had a fairly +ood map of the ,nited 0tates in his mind, surprisin+ly detailed, and as up3 to3date as he could .eep it (Thompson !00!, 55)&8n the follo?in+ ta9onomies of consciousness, notice ho? little attention is +iven to the lin+uistic elements& 0teven Pin.er identifies three different uses of the term consciousness as follo?s 1& self$9no,led#e self3a?areness or self3consciousness& !& access to information the information relatin+ to mental events that can (e accessed (y the systems> underlyin+ ver(al reports, rational thou+ht, and deli(erate decision3ma.in+& This .ind of consciousness has four features a rich field of sensation (colors, shapes, sounds, smells, pressures, and aches)C portions of this information fallin+ under the spotli+ht of attention, +ettin+ rotated in and out of short term memory, and feedin+ deli(erative co+itationC sensations havin+ an emotional flavorin+ (pleasant or unpleasant, interestin+ or repellant,

:&

e9citin+ or soothin+)C and an e9ecutive, the 8, ?hich ma.es choices and pulls the levers of (ehavior& sentience or =ualia, su(Kective e9perience, phenomenal a?areness, ra? feelin+s, ?hat it>s li.e to do somethin+ and so on& (Pin.er 155;, 1:$#:5)

8n ?hat 4aniel 4ennett refers to as a (rief tour of the phenomenolo+ical +arden (1551, $6), he pic.s out the follo?in+ items e9periences of the >e9ternal> ?orld such as si+hts, sounds, smells, slippery and scratchy feelin+s, 35"3 feelin+s of heat and cold, and of the positions of our lim(sC e9periences of the purely >internal> ?orld, such as fantasy ima+es, the inner si+hts and sounds of daydreamin+ and tal.in+ to yourself, recollections, (ri+ht ideas, and sudden hunchesC and e9periences of emotion or >affect>&&& ran+in+ from (odily pains, tic.les and >sensations> of hun+er and thirst, throu+h intermediate emotional storms of an+er, Koy, hatred, em(arrassment, lust, astonishment, to the least corporeal visitations of pride, an9iety, re+ret, ironic detachment, rue, a?e, icy calm& 4ennett stresses that this ta9onomy o?es more to superficial similarity and du(ious tradition than to any deep .inship amon+ the phenomena (1551, $%), and his (oo. is in fact an attempt to replace this fol.3psycholo+y version of the mind ?ith a more counterintuitive version& -evertheless, 8 refer to it here (ecause, li.e Pin.er>s, it is a ?idely accepted vie? of the mind in ?hich the emphasis is very much on the non3ver(al aspects of consciousness& The rest of this section is ta.en up ?ith a fairly detailed e9ploration of a third ta9onomy of consciousness to+ether ?ith illustrations from a fictional te9t& Eohn 0earle lists in The *ediscovery of the Mind (155!) ?hat he calls t?elve +ross structural features of normal everyday mental reality (155!, 1!")& 8t is his attempt to descri(e ?hat the e9perience of consciousness is actually li.e& 8 have reor+aniAed and simplified his list in order to sharpen its relevance to narrative& 8t is si+nificant that only one part of one of 0earle>s t?elve features refers to inner speech& 8 have illustrated 0earle>s cate+ories ?ith =uotes from .he Cryin# of "ot %B (y Thomas Pynchon& 8 noticed after 8 had chosen the e9amples that they are all in the mode of thou+ht report, althou+h one or t?o are on the (orderline ?ith free indirect thou+ht& 0earle refers first to ?hat he calls finite modalities& These include the si9 senses, includin+ (alanceC (odily sensations such as pain and the sensory a?areness of the position of one>s (odyC and the stream of thou+ht& The stream of thou+ht contains feelin+s and emotions such as a sudden sur+e of an+erC ?ordsC visual ima+esC and other elements that are neither ver(al nor ima+es& For e9ample, a thou+ht can occur suddenly in a flash and in a form that is neither ?ords nor ima+es (0earle 155!, 1!")&8t is si+nificant that, even ?ithin the aspect that 0earle calls the stream

of thou+ht, he emphasiAes non3ver(al elements such as emotions and visual ima+es at the e9pense of inner speech, ?hich is completely mar+inaliAed& The ne9t feature is unity& 0earle ar+ues that conscious states come to us as part of a unified se=uence& @ithout a sense of unity, ?e could not ma.e sense of our e9periences& (0earle and 4amasio tend to emphasiAe the unity +iven (y the sense of the selfC conversely, 4ennett and also Ralen 0tra?son P155;Q stress the +appiness and discontinuity of consciousness&) Gertical unity is the (indin+ of disparate elements into a unified column 8 have simultaneous e9periences of various separate thin+s as part of one and the same conscious event& HoriAontal unity is the remem(ered present, the or+aniAation of conscious e9periences throu+h short stretches of time 8 am a?are of the (e+innin+ of the sentence that 8 am no? finishin+ (0earle 155!, 1!5#:0)& B9ample of vertical unity Ledipa stood in the livin+ room, stared at (y the +reenish dead eye of the TG tu(e, spo.e the name of Rod, tried to feel as drun. as possi(le (155%, 6)& B9ample of horiAontal unity Throu+h the rest of the afternoon, throu+h her trip to the mar.et & & & then throu+h the sunned +atherin+ of her marKoram &&& into the layerin+ of a lasa+na & & & eventually, oven on, into the mi9in+ of the t?ili+ht>s ?his.ey sours &&& she ?ondered, ?ondered, shufflin+ (ac. throu+h a fat dec.ful of days (155%, 6#%)& This feature could (e used to as. several =uestions of fictional te9ts @hat techni=ues, if any, does the narrator use to convey this sense of the unity of characters> consciousnessesI @hat are the difficulties in conveyin+ vertical unity, +iven the relentlessly linear nature of narrative discourseI 4o some narrators convey it more than othersI 8f these differences e9ist, ?hat ?ould (e their si+nificanceI For e9ample, a +ood deal of t?entieth3century fiction can (e understood in terms of its evident desire to disrupt or pro(lematiAe the sense of the unified nature of e9perience and to portray clearly non3unified states of consciousness& This comment also applies to several of the other features later descri(ed& 0earle then discusses the technical, philosophical concept of intentionality& 8n this conte9t, intentionality means that a conscious state is directed at, or is a(out, somethin+ or other& Most consciousness is intentional, (ut not all& 8f 8 am depressed a(out somethin+, this is an intentional state& 8f 8 am depressed, (ut not a(out anythin+ in particular, then this state is not intentional (0earle 155!, 1:0#:1)& He ela(orates further and introduces a concept that ?ill assume +reater and +reater importance ?ithin this study& He says that every intentional state has ?hat he calls an aspectual shape& This means that my conscious e9periences are al?ays from a particular point of vie?, are al?ays perspectival& 0eein+ an o(Kect from a point of vie? consists of seein+ it under certain aspects and not others& /ll seein+ is seein+ as (0earle 155!, 1:1)& B9ample of an intentional state ?or.in+ hours ?ere e9=uisite torture to him (155%, ;)& B9ample of a non3intentional state (?here the conte9t ma.es it clear that the state is not a response to the surroundin+s) He +aAed at her & & & PhisQ face no? smooth, amia(le, at peace (155%, 55)& The narratolo+ical implications of this analysis are

31003 fascinatin+& 8ntentional states of consciousness ?ould tend to relate to events and situations that have already (een esta(lished in the story& These events and situations ?ould form reasons, causes, and motives for the resultin+ states of mind and ?ould therefore have an o(vious teleolo+ical value& For e9ample, a character may (e depressed (ecause of a reversal in fortunes& -on3intentional states ?ould ?or. in a different ?ay (ecause they ?ould not have e9ternal causes (ut could themselves function as causes of future events& For e9ample, (ecause the character ?as depressed for no reason, he ?ent on a Kourney that made him feel (etter& Lne of the most pervasive features of ordinary conscious a?areness is the aspect of familiarity& 0earle ar+ues that the prior possession of an apparatus that is sufficient to +enerate or+aniAed consciousness automatically +uarantees that the aspectual features of conscious e9perience ?ill (e more or less familiar& @hen 8 ?al. do?n the street, o(Kects are familiar to me as trees, houses, and so on& Perhaps most important of all, 8 have an inner sense of ?hat it feels li.e to (e me, a feelin+ of myself (0earle 155!, 1::#:$)& This aspect of familiarity ma.es possi(le much of the or+aniAation and order of my conscious e9perience& Consciousness involves cate+oriAation, (ut the cate+ories have to e9ist prior to the e9perience (ecause they are the conditions of possi(ility of havin+ the e9perience& They ena(le us, to varyin+ de+rees, to assimilate our e9periences, ho?ever novel, to the familiar (0earle 155!, 1:6#:%)& B9ample of familiarity 0he .ne? the pattern (ecause it had happened a fe? times already (155%, :0)& Lf course, narrators tend to (e more interested in a character>s lac. of familiarity ?ith their surroundin+s& This sort of unfamiliarity has a +ood deal of potential for various sorts of psychic distur(ance and conflict ?ith others& B9ample of unfamiliarity 0he moved throu+h Pthe campusQ carryin+ her fat (oo., attracted, unsure, a stran+er, ?antin+ to feel relevant (ut .no?in+ ho? much of a search amon+ alternative universes it ?ould ta.e (155%, ;1)& 0earle also comments on ?hat he descri(es as the fi#ure$#round or #estalt structure of conscious e2perience& Restalt psycholo+y sho?s that our perceptual e9periences come to us or+aniAed as a fi+ure a+ainst a (ac.+round& For e9ample, 8 see the s?eater a+ainst the (ac.+round of the ta(le on ?hich it is lyin+& 8 do not perceive mere undifferentiated shapes, (ecause our normal perceptions are al?ays structured in this ?ay& Ho?ever, 0earle ar+ues that this seems to (e true not only of perception (ut also of consciousness +enerally& @hen 8 focus my attention on somethin+, it is a+ainst a (ac.+round that is not the center of attention& /ll seein+ is seein+ asC all perceivin+ is perceivin+ asC and all consciousness is consciousness of somethin+ as such and such (0earle 155!, 1:!#::)& 8t is ?ithin 31013

this conte9t that 0earle focuses on the =uestion of attention and introduces the notions of the center and the periphery& @ithin the field of consciousness, some thin+s are at the center of our attention, and some thin+s are at the periphery& @e are conscious of a very lar+e num(er of thin+s that ?e are not attendin+ to or focusin+ our attention upon& -onetheless, all of these phenomena are part of our conscious a?areness (0earle 155!, 1:;#:")& 0earle emphasiAes that ?e need to distin+uish the center of attention7periphery distinction from the conscious7unconscious distinction& @hen 8 drive, my attention may (e on other thou+hts, (ut 8 do not drive unconsciously& There are different levels of attention ?ithin conscious states& 4urin+ a drive, my hi+hest level of attention is on my thou+htsC at a lo?er level, (ut still attention, 8 am payin+ attention to my drivin+C in addition, there are many other thin+s that 8 am peripherally a?are of (ut that are no?here near the center of my attention& Ho?ever, it is not true to say that 8 am unconscious of these thin+s& He concludes in a functionalist manner that attention +oes to ?here it is needed and +oes a?ay from ?here it is not needed (0earle 155!, 1:"#:5)& B9ample 0he stood in a nearly deserted par.in+ lot, ?atchin+ the headli+hts of MetA+er>s car come at her, and ?ondered ho? accidental Pa previous incidentQ had (een (155%, 6$)& Her ?onderin+ is at the center of her attention, and the car is at the periphery& )ut if the car ?ere to come too close, attention ?ould +o to ?here it is needed, and the car ?ould then (ecome the center of her attention& /nother e9ample 0he +ot in and rode ?ith him for t?o miles (efore realiAin+ that & & & the disc Koc.ey tal.in+ ?as her hus(and, Mucho (155%, 6$#66)& The radio pro+ram is at the periphery of her attention (ut comes into the center once the aspect of familiarity is reco+niAed& 0earle>s use of the philosophical concept of attention is fle9i(le and illuminatin+ in part (ecause it is a continuum, not a dichotomy& 8t is often not possi(le and not interestin+ to say ho? conscious or unconscious a character is of a particular mental event& 8t may (e easier and more re?ardin+, as in these e9amples, to analyAe fictional thou+ht in terms of the center and periphery of attention& /lthou+h 8 have used the term non$consciousness in the headin+ to the ne9t section (ecause it is the +enerally accepted term, 8 thin. that 0earle>s terminolo+y is in many ?ays prefera(le& /nother important feature of everyday mental reality ?ith e9tensive implications for narrative discourse is the e9istence of boundary conditions& 4urin+ the stream of thou+ht, 8 tend not to thin. a(out ?here 8 am located, ?hat day of the month it is, and so on& This is part of the situatedness, the spatiotemporal, socio3(iolo+ical location of my present conscious states& /ny state 310!3 of consciousness is characteristically located in this ?ay, althou+h the location may not (e the o(Kect of consciousness, even at the periphery& The pervasiveness of the (oundary of consciousness is most noticea(le in cases of (rea.do?n& / sense of disorientation occurs ?hen one cannot remem(er ?here one is or ?hat day it is (0earle 155!, 1:5)& -ovels tend to (e a(out crises in characters> lives, and so the (oundaries that 0earle descri(es are often reached& Therefore, the description of fictional minds e9periencin+ this (rea.do?n is common in a ?ide ran+e of novels& 8n

particular, it is not surprisin+ that a postmodern novel such as The Cryin+ of 2ot $5 has several e9amples& P0Qo in her first minute of 0an -arciso, a revelation also trem(led Kust past the threshold of her understandin+ (155%, 16)C /t some point she ?ent into the (athroom, tried to find her ima+e in the mirror and couldn>t& 0he had a moment of nearly pure terror (155%, !;)C 0omethin+ came to her viscera, danced (riefly, and ?ent (155%, 6:)C feelin+ li.e a flutterin+ curtain in a very hi+h ?indo?, movin+ up to then out over the a(yss (155%, 106)C and 0he stood &&& in the ni+ht, her isolation complete, and tried to face to?ards the sea& )ut she>d lost her (earin+s (155%, 1!!)& 0earle also refers to the overflo?& )y this he means that conscious states tends to refer (eyond their immediate content& They spill over to connect ?ith other thou+hts in lon+, associative series& 8f 8 loo. out of the ?indo? at the trees, the la.e, and so on, and 8 am then as.ed ?hat 8 have seen, my ans?er ?ill have an indefinite e9tendi(ility (0earle 155!, 1:;)& B9amples @hat the road really ?as, she fancied, ?as this hypodermic needle, inserted some?here ahead into the vein of a free?ay (155%, 1%) and )ut she>d only (een reminded of her loo. do?nhill this noontime& 0ome immediacy ?as there a+ain, some promise of hierophany printed circuit, +ently curvin+ streets, private access to the ?ater, )oo. of the 4ead (155%, !0)& 8t is in these ?ays that narrators ma.e re+ular use of associations in thou+ht processes such as the chains of correspondences in ?hich memories and sensations accompany immediate e9periences& 8t can form an important part of the presentation of mind, not Kust in stream of consciousness novels, (ut also in more plot3oriented fictions such as .he Cryin# of "ot %B& Finally, 0earle comments on mood& / mood, (y itself, never constitutes the ?hole content of a conscious state& *ather, it provides the tone or color that characteriAes the ?hole conscious state& @e are al?ays in a particular mood if the ?ord is defined (roadly enou+h to include a tone to our e9periences, even if it is sometimes a neutral tone& 8t is characteristic of moods that they pervade all of our conscious e9periences, and it is typical of normal conscious life that ?e are al?ays in some mood or other& Moods need not (e consciously 310:3 directed at any intentional conditions of satisfaction (0earle 155!, 1$0)& / related feature is the pleasure<unpleasure dimension& 8f ?e ta.e the ?hole of a conscious state, a slice out of the flo? of consciousness that is (i+ enou+h to have some unity and coherence, then there is al?ays a dimension of pleasure or unpleasure (0earle 155!, 1$1)& 0ometimes this can (e intentional (in the philosophical sense descri(ed earlier) such as findin+ it unpleasant to see somethin+ dis+ustin+ and sometimes not as in (odily sensations (0earle 155!, 1!5)& The description of characters> moods is clearly an important element in narrative discourse& B9amples There had hun+ the sense of (uffetin+, insulation, she had noticed the a(sence of an intensity, as if ?atchin+ a movie, Kust percepti(ly out of focus, that the proKectionist refused to fi9 (155%, 1!) and 0he could carry the sadness of the moment ?ith her that ?ay forever, see the ?orld refracted throu+h those tears, those specific tears (155%, 1:)& Ho?ever, 8 found it si+nificantly more difficult to illustrate this feature from the Pynchon novel than 8 did the others& This may (e (ecause it should often (e

unnecessary for the narrator to specify in literal terms a character>s mood& 8t can emer+e naturally for the reader from information on all aspects of that character>s em(edded narrative& For e9ample, in a su(tle and o(li=ue novel such as The Cryin+ of 2ot $5, it ?ould (e inappropriate for the narrator to state in (ald and e9plicit terms that Ledipa>s moods pro+ress from restlessness, curiosity, e9citement, and unease to an9iety, fear, and terror& 4. !on.consciousness -o? ?e can move (eyond the =uestion of immediate consciousness, ?hich can (ecome a straitKac.et& There is much more to the mind than consciousness, as the ne9t three sections ?ill sho? in some detail& This point is particularly important (ecause, as the philosophers /ndy Clar. and 4avid Chalmers point out, many identify the co+nitive ?ith the conscious (155", 10) and so ?ill find the idea of the e2tended mind unconvincin+& This term relates to notions of social and intermental thin.in+, ?hich are e9plained in chapter 6, section 6 and ?hich are pivotal concepts ?ithin the structure of this (oo.& Therefore, an appreciation at this sta+e of the importance of a ?ide variety of states of mind in mental functionin+ ?ill help to ma.e the idea of the e9tended mind, ?hen it is e9plained in more detail later, more palata(le& 8 have deli(erately used the term non$consciousness and not the more familiar term, the unconscious& 8 mentioned in chapter 1 that 8 ?ish to +et a?ay from the Freudian overtones of the latter term& There has (een a tendency in the past to identify the t?o, and this has hampered a full understandin+ of ho? much can 310$3 (e encompassed ?ithin the (roader headin+ of non3consciousness& Ho?ever, it is noticea(le that theorists are careful to ac.no?led+e the de(t to Freud in this area& /s Freud emphasiAed, much of information processin+ ta.es place at an unconscious level& @e are a?are of only a small portion of our overall mental life, a tip of the co+nitive ice(er+ (Holyoa. 1555, 9lii)& /ntonio 4amasio is very informative a(out the ran+e of the non3conscious and also puts this ?ide ran+e in the conte9t of the familiar notion of the unconscious The unconscious, in the narro? meanin+ in ?hich the ?ord has (een etched in our culture, is only a part of the vast amount of processes and contents that remain nonconscious, not .no?n in core or e9tended consciousness& 8n fact, the list of the not3.no?n is astoundin+& Consider ?hat it includes 1& all the fully formed ima+es to ?hich ?e do not attendC !& all the neural patterns that never (ecome ima+esC

:& $& 6&

all the dispositions that ?ere ac=uired throu+h e9perience, lie dormant, and may never (ecome an e9plicit neural patternC all the =uiet remodelin+ of such dispositions and all their =uiet renet?or.in+#that may never (ecome e9plicitly .no?nC and all the hidden ?isdom and .no?3ho? that nature em(odied in innate, homeostatic dispositions&

/maAin+, indeed, ho? little ?e ever .no?& (!000, !!") 8tems three, four, and five of 4amasio>s list are dispositions that are dealt ?ith in the ne9t section& The points that 8 ?ish to ma.e on non3consciousness can perhaps (est (e illustrated (y the narratolo+ist /nn )anfield>s comments on )ertrand *ussell>s An 0n*uiry into -eanin# and .ruth (15$0), from ?hich she =uotes as follo?s 0uppose you are out ?al.in+ on a ?et day, and you see a puddle and avoid it& Jou are not li.ely to say to yourself >there is a puddleC it ?ill (e advisa(le not to step in it&> )ut if some(ody said >?hy did you suddenly step asideI> you ?ould ans?er >(ecause 8 didn>t ?ish to step into that puddle&> Jou .no?, retrospectively, that you had a visual perception &&& and &&& you e9press this .no?led+e in ?ords (*ussell 15$0, $5, =uoted in )anfield 15"!, 15;#5")& )anfield uses this e9ample to illustrate the conceptual distinction (et?een ?hat she calls reflective or ver(al thou+ht and ?hat she calls non3reflective consciousness, ?hich she appears to identify primarily ?ith perception& Her uncontroversial ar+ument is that perception is not dependent on ver(al or conscious thou+ht& /s she and *ussell a+ree, people do not say to themselves, There is a puddle 31063 and 8 ?ish to avoid it& Ho?ever, the ri+idity of the ver(al (ias prevents )anfield from ta.in+ the e9ample further& 0he misses the full force of it (y focusin+ only on the visual perception of the puddle as an e9ample of non3ver(al thou+ht& The much more interestin+ conclusion to (e dra?n from this e9ample is that the individual does not Kust have a perception of the puddle and there(y ac=uires the 9no,led#e that it is a puddle that they see& The person also adopts the belief that steppin+ into the puddle ?ill (e unpleasant, forms the intention to avoid the puddle for the purpose of not +ettin+ ?et, ma.es a decision to avoid the puddle, and then performs the action of ?al.in+ around the puddle& 8t is very si+nificant that )anfield edits out of her =uote from *ussell a reference (y him to action& The ori+inal passa+e reads Jou .no?, retrospectively, that you had a visual perception, to ,hich you reacted appropriately (*ussell 15$0, $5C emphasis added)& This is an e9ample, not Kust of passive, private perception, (ut also of mental action in a physical conte9t& This mental functionin+ involves a sophisticated co+nitive process, comprisin+ several elements, involvin+ various areas of the mind in addition to perception, and all ta.in+ place at the periphery of the su(Kect>s attention& /ccordin+ to )anfield, ?hat forces consciousness to (ecome reflective is the su(Kect (ein+ as.ed ?hat he or she is doin+ a re=uest for lin+uistic information is the catalyst (ecause to spea. of somethin+ al?ays implies reflective consciousness of it (15"!, 15")& Thou+h true, this is very

misleadin+& 8n the case of the very artificial and hi+hly unli.ely e9ample of a conversation a(out a puddle, it is the re=uest for information that forces the mental event to (ecome conscious and therefore hi+hly ver(al& Ho?ever, in reality, there is an infinite num(er of other reasons ?hy non3self3conscious mental events (ecome conscious and ?hy they then cease to (e self3conscious (y no lon+er (ein+ at the center of an individual>s attention& There is a ?ide spectrum of attention alon+ ?hich mental events move, and this movement to and fro alon+ the scale of attention is very fluid& The ri+id dichotomy of reflective and non3reflective thou+ht does not reflect the comple9ity and the fluidity of the mind that ?as sho?n in the 0earle ta9onomy, ?hich ?as discussed in the previous section& )anfield>s e9ample is also interestin+ ?ith re+ard to the presentation of action in the discourse& Most attempts to list episodes of presentations of mind in a particular passa+e of fiction ?ould not include a sentence such as 0he avoided the puddle& 8t is much more li.ely that this statement ?ould (e classified simply as a narrative description of an event in the story?orld& This is pro(a(ly ?hy )anfield leaves out of her =uotation the ?ords that relate to the action ta.en& )ut 8 ?ill ar+ue in section ; of this chapter and also in chapter ;, section ! that descriptions of 310%3 actions should (e re+arded, in part, as descriptions of the net?or. of mental states and events such as intentions, (eliefs, and decisions that lie (ehind the physical (ehavior and form part of the philosophical concept of action& 8t is throu+h descriptions of actions that narrators portray the social minds of characters in their pu(lic and physical conte9t& The distinction (et?een descriptions of action and of consciousness can often (e difficult to see& /ntonio 4amasio is very +ood on the sensation of realiAin+ that nonconscious processes have (een at ?or. ?ithin our minds ?ithout our .no?in+ it& He reminds us that ?e often realiAe =uite suddenly, in a +iven situation, that ?e feel an9ious or uncomforta(le, pleased or rela9ed, and it is apparent that the particular state of feelin+ ?e .no? then has not (e+un on the moment of .no?in+ (ut rather sometime (efore (!000, :%)& The non3conscious includes not only feelin+s that ?e (elatedly (ecome a?are of and the processes involved in automatically avoidin+ puddles (ut also lar+e and important mental events& For e9ample, sometimes ?e ma.e up our mind a(out a (i+ decision ?ithout realiAin+ it& Consciously, ?e are torn (et?een choice / and choice )& Ho?ever, ?e (e+in to notice that, unconsciously, all our plannin+ a(out the future is predicated on the assumption that ?e ?ill choose )& @hen ?e then finally and consciously choose ), ?e .no? instantly that it is the ri+ht thin+ to do& @e do not e9perience the dou(ts that ?e thou+ht ?e ?ould have& @e feel a sense of li+htness and relief (ecause ?e had made up our mind some time a+o (ut had not realiAed it& For e9ample, 0he had feared that (ein+ on her o?n a+ain ?ould (e painfulC instead, she had (e+un to realiAe, she felt rather li.e that +ull it hadn>t li.ed the ?ay it ?as treated, so it had ta.en fli+ht and soared a?ay (2eon !001, 116)& @hen ?e say, 8 did that ?ithout thin.in+M and 8 didn>t put much thou+ht into itM ?hat ?e often mean is that all the thou+ht ?as put in (eforehand& Picasso, near the end of his career, ?hen as.ed ho? lon+ it had ta.en him to do a very simple s.etch, replied that it had ta.en him si9ty years& Ln

a less e9alted plane, this is ho? s.ills of many sorts are developed& 8ndeed, PmQany of our unthin.in+ activities, such as drivin+ a car, could (ecome unthin.in+ only after passin+ throu+h a lon+ period of desi+n development that ?as e9plicitly self3conscious (4ennett 155%, 166)& Lur dispositions, (eliefs, and attitudes are unconscious for most of the time unless activated for some reason *eli+ion, )runetti reflected, as he stood on the steps, thou+h he had never realiAed this until Paola had pointed it out to him, al?ays made him uncomforta(le (2eon !001, 160)& Much of the non3conscious nature of our mental functionin+ can (e e9plained (y the functional approach to the notion of attention& Co+nitive science 310;3 sho?s that the (rain>s preference is to ma.e as much as possi(le of its activity non3conscious& This .ind of mana+ement (y e9ception is more efficient than consciousness (ein+ involved in activities for ?hich it is not re=uired& /s 0earle says, attention +oes to ?here it is needed& This ?ay, consciousness is reserved for surprises and can deal ?ith the une9pected& 4amasio o(serves that only a fraction of ?hat +oes on mentally is really clean enou+h and ?ell lit enou+h to (e noticed& 8n fact, it is advanta+eous not to notice yourself .no?in+ (!000, 1!5#:0)& 4ennett and 4amasio (oth ma.e this point in sli+htly different terms Most of our intentional actions are performed ?ithout Pela(orate practical reasonin+Q, and a +ood thin+ too, since there ?ouldn>t (e time (4ennett 1551, !6!)& The lac. of dependence on conscious survey automates a su(stantial part of our (ehavior and frees us in terms of attention and time#t?o scarce commodities in our lives#to plan and e9ecute other tas.s and create solutions for ne? pro(lems (4amasio !000, :00)& This emphasis on the need to reserve attention for ?hen it is re=uired to deal ?ith surprises fits in ?ell ?ith the need for narrators to focus on fictional events that, in order to form a plot, ?ill surprise (in the ?idest sense) the characters& Pip is livin+ a settled and uneventful life that does not re=uire all his attention until he e9periences the surprise that Ma+?ich>s return +ives him& His dilemma re=uires his full attention, and the plot (ecomes eventful& ". Dispositions Philosophical (ehaviorists maintain that mental events are lo+ical constructions out of dispositions to (ehave in certain ?ays& This is a very stron+ claim that amounts, in non3philosophical lan+ua+e, to sayin+ that, ?hen ?e tal. a(out mental events, ?e are tal.in+ only a(out dispositions to (ehave& 8 am not concerned ?ith the truth or falsity of this position or ?ith ?hether or not its truth or falsity could ever (e esta(lished& 8 simply ?ant to point out that it is odd that narrative discourse analysis has ne+lected phenomena such as dispositions that are so central to other discourses that are also related to the mind& 4ispositions play an especially important role in the ?or.in+s of the fictional mind (ecause they are the primary lin. (et?een the study of characters> immediate consciousnesses and the area of characteriAation& Currently, as 8

said in chapter !, there is surprisin+ly little cross3fertiliAation (et?een these t?o areas, and 8 hope that this state of affairs ?ill come to seem increasin+ly stran+e as ?e continue throu+h this chapter& 8 ?ish to (uild up a perspective on the mind in ?hich it is seen, in Patricia Hi+hsmith>s ?ords, as not an event, not a moment, (ut a condition (15%", 1;:)& 310"3 The term dispositions covers a very ?ide ran+e of mental phenomena& /s 4amasio remar.s, ?hat ?e usually descri(e as a >personality> depends on multiple contri(utions &&& anythin+ from trivial preferences to ethical principles (!000, !!!)& Clifford ReertA contends that the term mind denotes a class of s.ills, propensities, capacities, tendencies, ha(its (155:, 6")& These are states of mind or dispositions that, 4amasio claims, are records ?hich are dormant and implicit rather than active and e9plicit, as ima+es are (!000, 1%0)& 8n the vivid and very informative phrase that 8 used in chapter :, 4aniel 4ennett calls them mind3ruts (1551, :00)& B=ually important to an e9panded narratolo+ical vie? of fictional states of mind is 0earle>s concept of the bac9#round, ?hich has somethin+ in common ?ith the notion of dispositions& He points out that some mental states sound unnatural ?hen descri(ed as (eliefs& For e9ample, 8 may have a (elief that the system of con+estion char+in+ that has recently (een imposed in 2ondon (that is, char+in+ motorists to drive into the center of the city) ?ill (enefit the center of 2ondon& )ut 8 do not, in the same ?ay, have a (elief that o(Kects are solid& 8 simply (ehave in such a ?ay that 8 ta.e the solidity of o(Kects for +ranted& 8t is part of my net?or. of (ac.+round suppositions& @hat 0earle calls the (ac.+round consists of the mental capacities, dispositions, stances, ?ays of (ehavin+, .no?3ho?, and so on that manifest themselves in, for e9ample, intentional actions, perceptions, and thou+hts (155!, 15%)& 0earle is tal.in+ a(out some (asic states of minds that, to+ether ?ith more sophisticated states such as (eliefs and attitudes, are as much a part of ?hole fictional minds as immediate consciousness& To ta.e 0earle>s concept in a sli+htly different (ut related direction, it is necessary for readers to ma.e use of a similar net?or. of (ac.+round suppositions in order to put to+ether coherent fictional minds out of scattered references to particular characters in the te9t& 0ome aspects of the (ac.+round ?ere included in the alternative approach to consciousness that ?as discussed in section :& /ntonio 4amasio descri(es the differences (et?een immediate, sin+le mental events and states that continue over time in terms of t?o selves the seemin+ly chan+in+ self and the seemin+ly permanent self (!000, !1;), ?hich he also refers to as the core self and the autobio#raphical self& He su++ests that, in core consciousness, the sense of self arises in the su(tle, fleetin+ feelin+ of .no?in+, constructed ane? in each pulse& Ln the other hand, PeQ9tended consciousness still hin+es on the same core >you,> (ut that >you> is no? connected to the lived past and anticipated future that are part of your auto(io+raphical record (!000, 15%)& 8n the conte9t of this discussion, mental events happen to the core self, and states are attri(utes of the auto(io+raphical self& 8ncidentally, 4amasio uses 31053

this notion of the t?o selves to shed a little li+ht on one of the +reat mysteries of life ?hy ?e feel that ?e are al?ays chan+in+ ?hile simultaneously feelin+ that ?e al?ays stay the same& 8n his vie?, it is the core self that causes the feelin+ of chan+e and the auto(io+raphical self that causes the feelin+ of sameness& Memory is clearly an important aspect of the picture of the mind that is descri(ed in this chapter, includin+ (oth memory stores that hold information for very (rief periods of time and lon+3term memories that ?e carry ?ith us al?ays (ut may never retrieve for years at a time& 0earle ar+ues a+ainst a simplistic vie? of memory, pointin+ out that (oth lan+ua+e and culture tend to force on us a picture of memory as a storehouse or li(rary of propositions, ima+es, and representations& 0earle thin.s that it is more comple9 than that& @e should thin. of memory rather as a mechanism for +eneratin+ current performance, such as conscious thou+hts and actions, (ased on past e9perience (0earle 155!, 1";)& This notion of memory as a mechanism rather than a (i+ storeroom is completely consistent ?ith the functional and dynamic conception of characters> minds as em(edded narratives& )oth convey a sense of the causal process or relationship that e9ists (et?een memories of the past, (ehavior in the present, and plans for the future& 8n (oth cases the past is seen as actively causin+, or +eneratin+, the present and the future& -ot?ithstandin+ 0earle>s ?arnin+ that ?e should (e careful a(out an oversimplistic use of mental metaphors such as storerooms, the fact remains that ?e do use metaphors of this sort in order to conceptualiAe mental functionin+& Riven that ?e do, the metaphor that is most suita(le for the ?hole mind is not that of the stream or flo? of consciousness, (ut that of the mind as a container& The former tends to lead us to thin. of immediate consciousness as the norm ?hile the latter ma.es room for all aspects of the mind& For e9ample, spea.ers often tal. a(out ideas as if they ?ere physical o(Kects at different physical locations in the mind conceived of as a physical container& This commonsensical vie? is the ?ell3 .no?n M8-43/03CL-T/8-B* metaphor& 8t is manifested in sentences such as >Jolanda put the idea into <avier>s mind> and >8n some dar. corner of his mind, <avier .ne? he ?as ?ron+> ()arnden 1556, !$")& / num(er of other metaphors are also derived from the container model& 8t is si+nificant that ?e tal. of havin+ somethin+ at the (ac. of our minds& This is a fol.3psycholo+y reco+nition of the fact that the mind is a three3 or four3dimensional, not a t?odimensional phenomenon& There are other fol.3psycholo+y formulations that are e=ually revealin+ turn my mind to it, it ?ent out of my mind, he ?as out of his mind, in my mind>s eye, and off the top of my head& 8nterestin+ly, many of them lend themselves very ?ell to third3person formulations& The 31103 tendency to conceptualiAe the mind as a multidimensional container, not as a t?o3dimensional stream, +ets support from 4amasio, ?ho says that in the (rain there is an ima+e space and also a dispositional space& The dispositional space is that in ?hich dispositions contain the .no?led+e

(ase and the mechanisms ?ith ?hich & & & the processin+ of ima+es can (e facilitated& 8n other ?ords, they are a(stract records of potentialities (4amasio !000, ::1#:!)& The terminolo+y already e9ists ?ithin narrative theory that can reflect the distinction (et?een immediate mental events, and dispositions and states of mind that e9ist over time& /s a num(er of dichotomies are availa(le for this purpose, it ma.es it all the more surprisin+ that the opportunity has not (een ta.en to apply the terminolo+y in any systematic ?ay to mental life& The event7state, event7e9istent, and the dynamic7static oppositions are standard ones in narratolo+y& 0tates and e9istents are those thin+s that e9ist throu+h time, and events are the chan+es that occur to e9istents& Thou+hts are dynamic events and states of mind or dispositions are static states or e2istents& The same distinction can (e put in terms of stasis (in this conte9t, states of mind) and process (mental events)& To illustrate this relationship, 8 ?ill use t?o e9amples from Ganity Fair First, /?ay ?ent Reor+e, his nerves =uiverin+ ?ith e9citement at the ne?s so lon+ loo.ed for, so sudden ?hen it came (155$, !5!)& Here, process modifies stasis& The stasis is the state of anticipatin+ the ne?sC the process is the reaction to the ne?s& 0econd, Lur Bmmy, ?ho had never hated, never sneered all her life, ?as po?erless in the hands of her remorseless little enemy (155$, !"5)& Here, stasis is the cause of process& The stasis is the disposition not to hate or sneerC the process is the current feelin+ of po?erlessness& The current (ias ?ithin the study of fictional minds to?ard events at the e9pense of states appears to (e a reflection of a ?ider (ias that affects the presentation of fictional ?orlds +enerally& Marie32aure *yan has pointed out that, ?hile events are usually represented in +reat detail in narrative discourse, the confi+uration of states is hardly ever fully e9plicited P sicQ (15"6, ;1")& B=ually si+nificantly, from my point of vie?, *yan ar+ues that, althou+h events +et more attention on the level of discourse & & & they receive their meanin+ from the states (et?een ?hich they mediate, and the specification of the latter is of e=ual importance on the level of plot (15"6, ;15)& /lthou+h she is tal.in+ +enerally here, this sounds to (e li.e a very accurate description of the relationship (et?een mind events and mind states& -ot all narrative theorists are fi9ated on mental events, ho?ever& *ichard E& Rerri+, ?hen considerin+ the factors that influence characters> actions, dra?s a sharp distinction (et?een the dispositional factors that are internal to individuals and the situational factors that are e9ternal to 31113 individuals (155:, 6$)& This distinction raises fascinatin+ =uestions such as, @hat e9actly are the means (y ?hich ?e (uild up the detailed and coherent sense of a character>s disposition that ena(les us to ma.e the distinctionI / response to this =uestion mi+ht then (lur Rerri+>s distinction (ecause it may (e that it is often characters> dispositions that +et them into particular situations& 8t is this rich and comple9 relationship (et?een events, dispositions, and conte9ts that is at the heart of novel readin+& @e as. ourselves continually, Riven the sort of disposition that this

particular character has, ho? ?ill he or she react in this specific situationI The ans?ers to this =uestion ?ill then modify to a +reater or lesser e9tent the initial hypotheses that ?e have formed re+ardin+ that character& /. 0motions 8n this section 8 ?ill attempt to demonstrate the importance of the emotions in any analysis of the ?hole of the fictional mind and to su++est some of the ?ays in ?hich fictional emotion can (e studied& 8n the conte9t of fictional minds, 4oleTel maintains that emotions have re+ained their status as po?erful motivational factors (ut continue to elude theoretical +rasp (155", %6)& @hile discussin+ real minds, 4amasio refers to the scientific ne+lect of emotion (!000, :5) (ut reassures us that, in recent years, (oth neuroscience and co+nitive neuroscience have finally endorsed emotion (!000, $0)& -o? is the time for narrative theory to follo? suit& /fter the )o9 Hill e9pedition in (mma, Dni+htly reprimands Bmma for (ein+ rude to Miss )ates Bmma recollected, (lushed, ?as sorry, (ut tried to lau+h it off (155%, :05)& @hen he has finished his reprimand, this happens He had misinterpreted the feelin+s ?hich had .ept her face averted, and her ton+ue motionless& They ?ere com(ined only of an+er a+ainst herself, mortification and deep concern& 0he had not (een a(le to spea.C and, on enterin+ the carria+e, sun. (ac. for a moment overcome#then reproachin+ herself for havin+ ta.en no leave, ma.in+ no ac.no?led+ement, partin+ in apparent sullenness, she loo.ed out ?ith voice and hand ea+er to sho? a difference, (ut it ?as Kust too late& He had turned a?ay, and the horses ?ere in motion&&&& 0he ?as ve9ed (eyond ?hat could have (een e9pressed#almost (eyond ?hat she could conceal& -ever had she felt so a+itated, mortified, +rieved, at any circumstance in her life& 0he ?as most forci(ly struc.& The truth of his representation there ?as no denyin+& 0he felt it at her heart& Ho? could she have (een so (rutal, so cruel to Miss )atesM#Ho? could she have e9posed herself to such ill 311!3 opinion in anyone she valuedM /nd ho? suffer him to leave her ?ithout sayin+ one ?ord of +ratitude, of concurrence, of common .indnessM Time did not compose her& /s she reflected more, she seemed (ut to feel it more& 0he never had (een so depressed &&& and Bmma felt the tears runnin+ do?n her chee.s almost all the ?ay home, ?ithout (ein+ at any trou(le to chec. them, e9traordinary as they ?ere& (155%, :10) This passa+e contains very vivid descriptions of several stron+ emotions&

There are no descriptions of Dni+htley>s feelin+s, (ut the reader ?ill pro(a(ly infer from the conte9t that he feels an+er and disappointment mi9ed, perhaps, ?ith a little self3ri+hteousness& / lar+e num(er of Bmma>s feelin+s are e9plicitly la(eled sorro?, an+er, mortification, concern, self3reproach, ve9ation, a+itation, +rief, and depression& 0everal conclusions can (e dra?n from the passa+e U The emotions are reported in the mode of thou+ht report (ecause this is the mode (est suited for the presentation of emotion& Bmotions e9plicitly contained in the other t?o modes (ecome first3person ascription and the pro(lematical issues surroundin+ this form of ascription are discussed in section " of this chapter& There is some free indirect discourse in the passa+e (the sentences (e+innin+ The truth, Ho? could she, and /nd ho? suffer) that is used for Bmma>s remonstrations ?ith herself& U Her feelin+s are visi(le and pu(lic they result in out?ard si+ns of (ehavior such as turnin+ a?ay, (ein+ una(le to spea., (lushin+, and cryin+& Ho?ever, they are also inaccessi(le and private Dni+htley misinterprets her feelin+s and thin.s that she is unconcerned& U The emotions are ine9trica(ly lin.ed ?ith co+nition& Dni+htley>s (implicit) emotions arise out of his (eliefs a(out Bmma>s conduct and his decision to share them ?ith her& Bmma>s emotions arise out of her (elief that Dni+htley is ri+ht and that she has acted (adly& 0he thin.s that Dni+htley has misinterpreted her actions& 0he decides on the (asis of her feelin+s to (ehave differently in future and so on& U The passa+e also sho?s that the presentation of emotion plays a vital part in the creation of character& Dni+htley>s an+er and disappointment arise from his hi+h standards of conduct& 8t is a demonstration of his love for Bmma that he allo?s these feelin+s to sho?& 8t also sho?s that Bmma is (asically a +ood person ?ho re+rets the results of her hi+h spirits and her desire to sho? off& 0he ?ill try harder in future to (e more considerate and to help Dni+htley to thin. (etter of her& 311:3 U Finally, the passa+e has an important teleolo+ical value in that, thou+h the ar+ument temporarily drives them far apart, it ?ill ultimately (rin+ them to their marria+e at the end of the novel&

Lne noticea(le feature of ?or. in psycholo+y on the emotions is that there are numerous typolo+ies that tend to (e similar to one another (ut not identical& /lthou+h 8 ?ill mention t?o here (riefly, out of interest, 8 ?ill not pursue the point as 8 am not sure that a collection of typolo+ies is the most interestin+ approach to the su(Kect& / more functional approach, ?hich considers ho? emotions lin. ?ith co+nition to produce mental functionin+ and ho? these interrelations are presented in fictional te9ts, seems to me to (e a more re?ardin+ perspective& /ccordin+ to 4amasio, a distinction can (e made (et?een primary, secondary (or social), and bac9#round emotions& The primary emotions are happiness, sadness, fear, an+er, surprise, and dis+ust& The secondary or social emotions include em(arrassment, Kealousy, +uilt, and pride& 4amasio collects to+ether a lon+ and very interestin+ list of (ac.+round emotions that includes the feelin+s of ?ell3(ein+, malaise, calm, tension, fati+ue, ener+y, e9citement, ?ellness, sic.ness, rela9ation, sur+in+, dra++in+, sta(ility and insta(ility, (alance and im(alance, harmony and discord, ed+iness,

discoura+ement, enthusiasm, do?n3ness, lo?ness, and cheerfulness (!000, 60#6:, !"%)& Eon Blster ta.es a more minimalist approach in Alchemies of the -ind and limits himself to the follo?in+ an+er, hatred, fear, shame, pity, indi+nation, +loatin+, envy, malice, and contempt (1555, %1)& Blster comments ?ith commenda(le understatement that this is a mostly dar. list (1555, %1)& 4oleTel lists a num(er of other lists in ;eterocosmica (155", %;#%5)& Bmotions last for varyin+ periods of time& @hen they are short3term, they are emotional eventsC medium3term, they tend to (e called moodsC as lon+3term states, they are closer in nature to dispositions& Bmotions therefore fit easily into the event7state frame?or. esta(lished earlier He ?as an+ry is an eventC and He is an an+ry person is a state& 8n the construction of a fictional mind, different sorts of information play different roles& Bmotions can (e e9plicitly la(eled or inferred from mental events that appear to em(ody an emotion such as an+er& For e9ample, if one character says of another, He>s an+ry, this has a different status from a direct presentation (y the narrator of a stream of an+ry thou+hts& 8mplicit information or e9plicit information such as a sin+le3?ord la(el li.e selfish may have more or less impact on the reader, dependin+ on the conte9t& Certainly, the e9plicit la(elin+ in the Bmma passa+e has a very dramatic effect& 311$3 8n the vie? of /ntonio 4amasio, consciousness and emotion are not separa(le (!000, 1%)& 8 thin. ?e should pause for a moment here and consider the implications of this statement& / +ood deal of ?or. has (een done ?ithin narrative theory on fictional consciousness, and as far as 8 am a?are, very little has (een done specifically on the emotions& )ut, accordin+ to an eminent neuroscientist, the t?o are not separa(leM Lf course, one could ar+ue that the many discussions of consciousness in narrative theory necessarily involve a consideration of emotions, (ut that is not my point& The issue of fictional emotion has not (een e2plicitly reco+niAed as an indispensa(le element in fictional consciousness& To reinforce his point a(out insepara(ility, 4amasio stresses the pervasiveness of emotion& 0ome level of emotin+ is the o(li+ate accompaniment of thin.in+ a(out oneself or a(out one>s surroundin+s&&&& PGQirtually every ima+e, actually perceived or recalled is accompanied (y some reaction from the apparatus of emotion (!000, 6")& For e9ample, ?e continuously have emotional feelin+s &&& sometimes lo? +rade, sometimes =uite intense, and ?e do sense the +eneral physical tone of our (ein+ (4amasio !000, !"6#"%)& His attempt to convey some of the ?hat it>s li.e =uality of consciousness is very reminiscent of the 0earle typolo+y and the e9amples from The Cryin+ of 2ot $5 in section : of this chapter& /s ?e sa? in the Bmma passa+e, emotion is one of the more o(vious ?ays in ?hich our thou+ht can (ecome pu(lic& )oth -0.(CS and 4amasio dra? a distinction (et?een the pu(lic and the private aspects of the concept& The former states that in current usa+e, the concept of emotion has t?o aspects& Lne pertains to a certain .ind of su(Kective e9perience, >feelin+&> The other relates to e9pression, the pu(lic manifestation of feelin+ ()rothers 1555, !;1)& 4amasio proposes that the term feelin# should (e reserved for the private, mental e9perience of an emotion, ?hile the

term emotion should (e used to desi+nate the collection of responses, many of ?hich are pu(licly o(serva(le (!000, $!)& 4oleTel is also preoccupied ?ith the importance of (ehavior and dra?s attention to the fact that emotions are often accompanied (y spontaneous physiolo+ical events&&&& @hen the events are o(serva(le ((lushin+, spar.lin+ eyes, +estures) or audi(le (lau+hin+, cryin+, e9clamation of pain, tone of voice), they (ecome si+ns (indices) of emotions (155", %")& /s ?ith all such ideas, 8 am not sure that the su++estion of different uses for the terms emotions and feelin#s is ?or.a(le, (ut the distinction is certainly ?orth ma.in+& 8n the ne9t chapter 8 ?ill tal. more +enerally a(out the pu(lic nature of thou+ht& The relationship (et?een co+nition and emotion is ?orth e9plorin+ further, as most philosophical ?or. on emotions has (een co+nitive (Latley 1555, !;$)& 31163 Co+nition causes emotion& Bmma>s emotions arise from her (eliefs a(out ?hat she has done& Consider a situation in ?hich 8 am s?immin+, see a shar., and feel the appropriate emotions of fear, horror, and so on& Here, the emotions arise out of co+nitions (the (elief that the shar. ?ill eat me), physiolo+ical reactions (increased (lood pressure), feelin+s (say, of terror), and action (+ettin+ a?ay from the shar.)& The emotion of fear is playin+ a co+nitive role it is a rational and appropriate response to the situation& Bmotion can (e a mode of vision or reco+nition& /lso, as 4amasio and 0earle su++est, co+nitions nearly al?ays have some sort of emotional component& 8n addition, theorists lay stress on the directive and co+nitive role of attention ?hen discussin+ the emotions& 4amasio tells us that sometimes ?e (ecome .eenly a?are of PemotionsQ and can attend to them specifically& 0ometimes ?e do not, and attend, instead, to other mental contents (!000, !"%)& 8 referred in the discussion on nonconsciousness to the importance of the notion of attention and to the fact that it +oes to ?here it is needed& /ny mental functionin+ that can efficiently (e dealt ?ith ?ithout attention tends to proceed as non3consciousness& Ho?ever, ?hen somethin+ une9pected happens, ?hen ?e are surprised, ?e attend to our response& Bmotions often have a role to play in this process& Fear is o(viously a maKor factor in directin+ attention to possi(le dan+er, so the emotion has a co+nitive function here& 2ess dramatically, althou+h stress is often considered to (e an inhi(itin+ factor ?ith re+ard to performance in e9aminations, its ena(lin+ role is less ?ell reco+niAed& Personally, 8 cannot sit at a des. and ?rite continuously for three hours ?ithout the presence of stressM *evealin+ly, the su(title of Blster>s (oo. /lchemies of the Mind is *ationality and the (motions& This lin. is pursued to the point ?here even the distinction (et?een emotion and reason is =uestioned& /ccordin+ to 4amasio, the presumed opposition (et?een emotion and reason is no lon+er accepted ?ithout =uestion& For e9ample, ?or. from my la(oratory has sho?n that emotion is inte+ral to the processes of reasonin+ and decision ma.in+ (!000, $0#$1)& Patients ?ho have lost a certain class of emotions have also lost their a(ility to ma.e rational decisions (!000, $1)&

These findin+s su++est that selective reduction of emotion is at least as preKudicial for rationality as e9cessive emotion (!000, $1)& @ell3 tar+eted and ?ell3deployed emotion seems to (e a support system ?ithout ?hich the edifice of reason cannot operate properly (!000, $!)& 4amasio provides this simple (ut very tellin+ e9ample of the co+nitive si+nificance of emotion if you are told t?o stories of compara(le len+th that have a compara(le num(er of facts, differin+ only (ecause in one of them the facts have a hi+h emotional content, you ?ill remem(er far more detail from 311%3 the emotional story than from the other (!000, !5$)& -ovels tend to (e stories ?ith a hi+h emotional content and are therefore often deeply memora(le for that reason& Bven stories that are ?ritten in a flat unemotional style often use this stylistic device to hei+hten the emotion (for e9ample, to emphasiAe the fear and horror in Daf.a>s Metamorphosis)& /lso, novels such as Camus> ">(tran#er +ain their po?er (y contrastin+ a nota(le lac. of emotion in a character (in this case, lac. of sorro? at the death of a mother) ?ith a stron+ social norm (the e9pectation that one should feel sorro? at the death of a mother)& Bmotions are important in +uidin+ our +oal mana+ement, and this fact has important teleolo+ical implications for fictional minds& @e o(tain our +oals throu+h action, and Eon Blster considers emotions as action tendencies (1555, %0#%1, !"1#":)& Much of the literature on the emotions stresses their importance for the formation and achievement of +oals& 0teven Pin.er, ?hile ma.in+ this point, also a+rees ?ith 4amasio that the distinction (et?een thou+ht and feelin+ should (e =uestioned The emotions are mechanisms that set the (rain>s hi+hest3level +oals& Lnce tri++ered (y a propitious moment, an emotion tri++ers the cascade of su(+oals and su(3su(+oals that ?e call thin.in+ and actin+&&&& P-Qo sharp line divides thin.in+ from feelin+, nor does thin.in+ inevita(ly precede feelin+ or vice versa (155;, :;:)& These vie?s are e9amples of the comple9 interrelatedness of mental phenomena that 8 have dra?n attention to several times already& Bmotions, co+nitions, +oals, action, conte9t, and so on, they all flo? into one another until, as Pin.er and 4amasio ar+ue, the distinctions are difficult to maintain& 8n chapter 6, section 6 8 ?ill discuss ?hat is called distri(uted or situated (or Koint, +roup, or shared) co+nition and action& 8 ?ill Kust (riefly mention here the notion of distri(uted or situated emotion& Consider the follo?in+ 2utA ar+ues that the 8falu. of Melanesia do not conceive of emotions as somethin+ occurrin+ ?ithin an individual person, (ut as a relation (et?een several individuals in ?hich the emotion e9ists independent of (and outside) the psyche of any one person& The notion of persons as uni=ue self3oriented entities, in its turn, has (een analyAed as arisin+ from the specific cultural and political3economic environments of -orth /merica and Burope (0per(er and Hirschfeld 1555, c99vii# c99viii)& The su++estion that emotions can (e socially distri(uted amon+ individuals in a +roup Kust li.e other aspects of the mind such as co+nition is reminiscent of the ?ritin+ of such anthropolo+ists as Bd?ard 0apir, )enKamin 2ee @horf, Mar+aret Mead, and *uth )enedict, all of

?hich is no? deeply unfashiona(le& /s 0per(er and Hirschfeld point out, li.e all relativist ideas, these vie?s are controversial (1555, c99viii)& /t one time, it appeared that the 311;3 idea that the 8nuit Bs.imos had a hundred ?ords for sno? (or ho?ever many# it +re? in the tellin+M) ?as the academic e=uivalent of an ur(an myth, and it ?as thou+ht that in fact they had the same num(er as ?e do& Ho?ever, there seems to have (een a (ac.lash, and it is no? claimed once more that they do have many more ?ords for sno? than ?e do& @hatever the truth of the matter, 8 thin. that it is ?orth reco+niAin+ that these ideas are sufficiently plausi(le for ?ell3respected anthropolo+ists to have held them& /s such, narrative theory should (e conceptually ?ell e=uipped to ta.e account of them& 0ome of the ?or. that 8 do in chapter 6 and chapter ; on real and fictional intermental thin.in+ mi+ht, 8 hope, ma.e the idea of socially distri(uted emotion seem less outlandish than it may do at the moment& 1. Action This section provides an introduction to the philosophy of action& 8n section 6 of the follo?in+ chapter 8 ?ill loo. at the sociocultural approach to action, and in chapter ;, section ! 8 ?ill introduce a novel approach to descriptions of action in narrative discourse that 8 hope ?ill (e of value to future research in the field& /ction arises ?hen an a+ent ?ants to chan+e some aspect of their environment and (elieves that an action ?ill successfully (rin+ a(out that chan+e& The a+ent sees (oth the ?orld as they (elieve it to (e and also the ?orld as they desire it to (e& /ction is re=uired ?hen there is a disparity (et?een the t?o, and it is necessary to ali+n the ?orld as it is (elieved to (e ?ith the ?orld as it is desired& Philosophers sometimes refer to this process as practical reasonin# and also as the action plannin#<decision system& The action plannin+ system can (e run online, ?hile ?e are ta.in+ action in the present, or off$line, ?hen ?e are plannin+ action for the future& L(viously, novels are full of e9amples of characters ?ho act on3line and ?ho also +o throu+h hypothetical, ?hat3if situations in their mind ?hile plannin+ future action& 8t is common for characters in thrillers to run throu+h a variety of scenarios in their minds in order to anticipate potential o(stacles& The philosophy of action separates the class of actions from the more +eneral class of doin+s or (odily movements& For a doin+ to (e an action, the physical movement must (e (rou+ht a(out (y the conscious individual himself or herself and not, say, (y someone else causin+ their unconscious (ody to move& 4oin+s are not actions if they are performed ?ithout the intention to perform them and ?ithout havin+ a specific purpose& /n action consists of (oth a mental event of intention and a (odily movement& )ecause a definition of action in purely

311"3 (ehavioral terms such as (odily movement is impossi(le, mental notions such as a?areness, .no?led+e, (elief, desires, intention, and purposes are necessary& Lne issue that is of particular interest in the philosophy of action is the difficulty of definin+ an action& 8n the case of a death (y shootin+, do you define the action of the .iller as the t?itchin+ of the fin+er, the pullin+ of the tri++er, the firin+ of the +un, the .illin+ of a person, or the murderin+ of a personI These descriptions differ to the e9tent to ?hich they ascri(e consciousness to the a+ent, ta.e account of the conse=uences of the physical movement, and assi+n responsi(ility to the a+ent for those conse=uences& The philosophy of action approaches these =uestions (y loo.in+ at the technical issues relatin+ to the net?or. of mental events that lies (ehind the physical events of action and (ehavior& /ny analysis of descriptions of consciousness, (ehavior, and action in fiction needs to ta.e account of these issues (ecause they relate to the =uestions of personal responsi(ility that are at the heart of readers> responses to novels& 8t is part of our readin+ of (mma that Bmma initially refuses to ta.e responsi(ility for the conse=uences of her actions (ut then learns ho? to do so& Hurtin+ Miss )ates ?as an unintended conse=uence of Bmma>s action at the )o9 Hill picnic, (ut it ?as still her responsi(ility& The novel can (e read as the process (y ?hich she learns, ultimately, to ta.e responsi(ility in this ?ay& This is uncontroversial, (ut it is important to have a theoretical frame?or. for esta(lishin+ in precise and ri+orous terms e9actly ho? the reader is a(le to use the concept of action in order to read the novel in this ?ay& /ny theoretical account of action has to unite the physical and mental sides of the concept and ac.no?led+e that the relationship (et?een the physical and mental is motivational& 8n other ?ords, the mental side has to provide the motive, reason, intention, and so on for the physical movement& @ithin the mental domain, philosophers typically isolate t?o (asic types of thou+ht processes that +o to ma.e up intentions to act (eliefs and desires& 4esires can include immediate volitions, settled o(Kectives, and +oal3directed action plans& 4esires move you in ?antin+ to ta.e the action, and (eliefs +uide you in ho? to ta.e it& / distinction can (e made (et?een intrinsic and e9trinsic desires the former ?e ?ant for their o?n sa.es, the latter as a means to an end& /s is fre=uently pointed out, the concept of intention is a comple9 and slippery one& 4ennett holds that it must involve consciousness Mere (odily complicity does not ma.e for an intentional action, nor does (odily complicity under the control of structures in the (rain, for a sleep?al.er>s (ody is manifestly under the control of structures in the sleep?al.er>s (rain& @hat more must (e added is consciousness, the special in+redient that turns mere happenin+s into 31153 PactionsQ (1551, :1#:!)& )ut even ?ithin conscious action, there are different sorts of intentions& 8ntendin+ to do / is different from doin+ / intentionally& The latter can (e a side3effect action that is an undesired conse=uence of an intended action& 8n slammin+ a car door, ?e do not

intend to distur( the nei+h(ors, (ut ?e still slam the car door intentionally& Bmma intended to say ?hat she did, (ut she did not hurt Miss )ates intentionally& 8n contrast to the (elief7desire (rea.do?n of intention, 4oleTel>s position is that the notion of intention should (e considered as an irreduci(le primitive that cannot (e (ro.en do?n any further into constituent elements& He feels that intention is a puAAlin+ notion, and its lo+ical status and psycholo+ical correlative have caused much disa+reement& The needs of narrative semantics ?ill (e satisfied if >intention> is accepted as a primitive notion, irreduci(le to other mental factors of actin+, such as desires, reasons and (eliefs (155", 6")& 8t is understanda(le ?hy 4oleTel should feel this ?ay, althou+h the analysis of intention into desires and (eliefs does seem attractive and is surely useful in analyses of narrative te9ts& Pip>s intention to help Ma+?ich escape comprises his desire that Ma+?ich should +et a?ay, to+ether ?ith a set of (eliefs re+ardin+ the (est ?ay for him to do so& 8n the Philosophical 8nvesti+ations, 2ud?i+ @itt+enstein =uotes the sentence, 8 noticed that he ?as out of humour, and as.s, is this a report a(out his (ehavior or his state of mindI (156", 1;5)& 8 ?ill return to this =uestion throu+hout the (oo.& He is dra?in+ attention to the fact that the mental and physical sides of action and (ehavior coe9ist and interpenetrate to the point ?here they are difficult to disentan+le& ,ltimately, as Clar. and Chalmers su++est, it can (ecome impossi(le to separate physical actions from the mental net?or. that lies (ehind them& 8n considerin+ ?hat is involved in playin+ 0cra((le, they claim that, in a very real sense, the rearran+ement of tiles on the tray is not part of action, it is part of thou#ht (155", 10)& 8 refer to this phenomenon in chapter ;, section ! as the thou#ht$action continuum& The mental structure (ehind action includes memories of the past, motives and reasons related to the present, and intentions and decisions related to the anticipated conse=uences in the future& 8n this ?ay, a continual process of action#and, therefore, of thou+ht#is created (y narrators and (y readers ?hen, (et?een them, they construct characters ?ith continuin+ consciousnesses& / .ey feature of this mental decision ma.in+ is that the performance of an action re=uires that ?e ma.e assumptions a(out the actual situation in ?hich ?e are actin+, the future situation that is the intended result of the action, and also the future (ut counterfactual situation that ?ould (e the case if ?e do not act& To use 31!03 some of the e9amples su++ested (y the lin+uist Teun van 4iK., 8 try to prevent a +lass of ?ine fallin+ (ecause 8 can see that it is tippin+ over (actual situation), (ecause 8 ?ant to drin. it later (desired future situation), and (ecause 8 do not ?ant it to stain the carpet (counterfactual future situation) (15;%, !56)& The counterfactual nature of em(edded narratives is si+nificant (ecause characters spend much of their time ima+inin+ the conse=uences of alternative courses of action& The fact that characters thin. in terms of these stories is part of the reason ?hy Marie32aure *yan chose the term embedded narrative to descri(e a fictional mind& Characters create their o?n narratives, their o?n perspectives on the story?orld

of the novelC and the e9tent to ?hich their o?n narratives are consistent ?ith the narratives of the narrator and of readers ?ill o(viously vary& @hat ?ill also vary is the relationship (et?een the various counterfactual em(edded narratives of characters as they relate to the future (@hat ?ould happen if 8 did thisI) and ?hat actually does happen in the series of events in the story?orld& 8 ?ill no? consider the more specific issue of descriptions of actions in narratives& 8ntention is a crucial concept in this conte9t, (ut it has (een ne+lected (y narrative theory& /s 4oleTel has noticed, ?e are faced ?ith a curious discrepancy ?hile in the philosophy of action the pro(lem of intentionality is at the center of interest, empirical studies of actin+, includin+ narratolo+y, have hardly noticed its e9istence (155", %:)& Gan 4iK. descri(es narrative discourse as a form of natural action description, and therefore an interestin+ empirical testin+ +round for the theory of action (15;%, !";)& He sho?s that this is so (y relatin+ the concept of action to the o(servation and resultin+ descriptions of actions& -otice that @itt+enstein>s =uestion ?as a(out the reportin+ of (ehavior& This perspective on action can (e used to hi+hli+ht the role of the narrator in presentin+ such o(servations and descriptions in the discourse& The relationship (et?een the actor and the o(server, in the case of natural action, is similar to the relationship, in the case of fictional action, (et?een the character and the narrator and also the character and the reader& Lur .no?led+e of the structure of action is closely lin.ed to the ?ay in ?hich ?e descri(e actions and doin+s& /n action for ?hich an o(server does not have a concept remains for that o(server a mere doin+& 8t is si+nificant that a num(er of the discussions of actions (y philosophers refer to onloo.ers (for e9ample, L>0hau+hnessy 155;, 6%)& This insi+ht can (e related to the role of the narrator, the reader, and of other characters in considerin+ a character>s actions& /ll three are onloo.ers in very different senses& )y ascri(in+ an action to someone, ?e either have access 31!13 to their intentions and purposes, or ?e ma.e informed assumptions a(out their intentions and purposes (ased on conventional inferences& Lf course, in fiction narrators can if they ?ish use direct access to characters> minds in order to ma.e motivation e9plicit, (ut they need not do so, (ecause the motivation ?ill often (e clearly implicit& Gan 4iK. ar+ues that e9amples of ?hat are clearly action descriptions necessarily imply purpose and intentionality (for e9ample, /nn carefully cleaned, )ar(ara accused him, and 2arry refused)& B9amples that are clearly not descriptions of actions include state descriptions (leaves are +reen, Peter is ill)C motion ver(s ?ithout an animate su(Kect (the Paris train arrives soon)C process ver(s (Eohn recovered =uic.ly)C and patients of event ver(s (Mary could not pay)& 4u(ious and less o(vious cases include descriptions of mental events (0heila never realiAed)C events ?here there is some dou(t over the de+ree of control e9ercised (y the a+ent (Harry found a (riefcase)C and (odily states that may or may not have (een (rou+ht a(out intentionally (2aura stared, Reor+e hesitated) (van 4iK. 15;%, :00)& These distinctions can (e related to the role of the reader& To adapt the remar. made earlier, an action (y a character for ?hich a reader does not have a concept remains for that reader simply a doin+& 8t is

part of the competence of the reader to ascri(e consciousness to surface (ehavior& Therefore, the decisions made (y the reader on van 4iK.>s mar+inal e9amples ?ill depend on the ?illin+ness of the reader to ascri(e the necessary mental events to the character& Conte9t ?ill often help& 8t may (e clear from the situation in ?hich they are actin+ ?hether 2aura>s starin+ and Reor+e>s hesitatin+ are actions or doin+s& @ith re+ard to his clear e9amples, 8 ar+ue in chapter ; that there is a continuum and not a sharp divide (et?een action descriptions and consciousness descriptions, and it seems to me that these cases are ed+in+ to?ard the middle of that continuum& The mental events, processes, and states that distin+uish actions from mere doin+s are crucial to the concept of em(edded narratives& / description (y a narrator of a character>s action is a description of the development of that character>s em(edded narrative& The reasons, motives, intentions, purposes, and so on (ehind the action may (e e9plicitly specified (y the narrator, they may (e implicit (ut understood (y the reader, or they may remain mysterious& Ho?ever, they are al?ays there in the story?orld& The core of the em(edded narrative approach is the systematic analysis of the structure of mental events that lies (ehind the decisions that lead to actions and, specifically, of ho? this is presented in the discourse (y the narrator& This causal, mental process is the em(edded narrative in action& 8n addition, physical action is the point at 31!!3 ?hich different characters> em(edded narratives entan+le& 4escriptions of Koint actions in particular reveal the enmeshin+ of the various mental net?or.s of t?o or more characters& 8 ?ill finish this section ?ith a fe? ?ords a(out action and characteriAation& 2u(omir 4oleTel has e9plained very clearly the lin. (et?een the t?o& Motivational factors, he says, (ecause they are ha(itual features of a person>s character, produce re+ularities in actin+, modes of actin+ characteristic of individuals and personality types&&&& PMQotivation is the .ey to understandin+ the diversity of actin+, the ?hy and ho? of actions& The study of motivational factors is to (ecome an important part of a semantics of fictional narrative (155", %:)& /s 4oleTel e9plains, one hi+hly informative ?ay of formin+ a sense of a fictional character or personality is (y o(servin+ re+ularities in (ehavior and then (y (uildin+ up hypotheses a(out the li.ely motivation for the (ehavior& Ho?ever, analyses of action can (e handicapped (y the occasional invisi(ility of the concept of action ?ithin narratolo+ical discourse analysis& Jou ?ill remem(er ho?, in the )ertrand *ussell puddle e9ample discussed in section :, /nn )anfield edited out *ussell>s reference to an action& Here are t?o more e9amples 8n chapter :, section $, 8 discussed a short passa+e from Madame )ovary that has (ecome famous from discussions of it first (y Brich /uer(ach and then (y Reor+es Poulet& Jou mi+ht thin., therefore, that there is little left to add, and nothin+ of any si+nificance left to s=ueeAe out of it& Ho?ever, 8 ?ould li.e to ma.e one further comment on it& 8t consists of t?o sentences& The first, on ?hich nearly all of the commentary has concentrated, consists of Bmma>s perceptions of the .itchen and her resultin+ revulsion in the modes of thou+ht report and free indirect perception& The second sentence, as 8 said durin+ the discussion, is a

description of three actions (eatin+ slo?ly, ni((lin+ nuts, and ma.in+ mar.s ?ith a .nife) and is not a direct presentation of consciousness (althou+h the phrase amuse herself is mar+inal)& That this sentence is an action description is a very simple point, (ut neither /uer(ach nor Poulet, durin+ their sensitive and intricate analyses of Bmma>s consciousness, ac.no?led+e it& Finally, Patric. L>-eill advances the vie? that there are t?o types of te9tual indicator of character& Lne, direct definition, is die+etic tellin+C the other, indirect presentation, is mimetic sho?in+ that operates (y sho?in+ characters en+a+ed in action (155$, $5#60)& L>-eill then =uotes a passa+e of characteriAation from 4ic.ens>s ;ard .imes as an illustration of direct definition as opposed to presentation of action& The character )ounder(y is descri(ed as follo?s He ?as a rich man (an.er, merchant, manufacturer, and ?hat not& PThen a description of his appearance&Q / man ?ho could never sufficiently 31!:3 vaunt himself a self3made man& / man ?ho ?as al?ays proclaimin+, throu+h that (rassy spea.in+3trumpet of a voice of his, his old i+norance and his old poverty& / man ?ho ?as the )ully of humility (1556, !1, =uoted in L>-eill 155$, 60)& There is a lot of action here for a passa+e that is supposed to contrast ?ith descriptions of actions& )ein+ a (an.er, merchant, and manufacturer means ha(itually actin+ in certain ?ays& Gauntin+ and proclaimin+ are speech acts& )ein+ a (ully means (ehavin+ in a (ullyin+ ?ay& Presuma(ly L>-eill>s distinction is (et?een a description of a sin+le action and a description, li.e this one, of a series of actions& )ut the differences should (e put in those terms& /lthou+h action description shades into characteriAation, it should still (e reco+niAed as action& Eust as thou+ht report and the emotions can (ecome invisi(le, so can action& 2. *irst.&erson Ascription This section ?ill continue the discussion on intention and motivation (y loo.in+ at first3person ascription#ho? ?e ascri(e motives and intentions to our o?n actions& 8 ?ill consider the issues raised (y third3person ascription#ho? ?e ascri(e motives and intentions to the actions of others#in the follo?in+ chapter& The use of the ?ord ascri(e in the first3person conte9t may sound surprisin+ly rounda(out and indirect surely ?e Kust .no? directly and immediately ?hat our mental states areI Ho?ever, as 8 hope to sho?, the process can (e more pro(lematic than it first appears& The (ac.+round to the de(ate a(out ascription is the o(Kective, third3person conception of the mental that ?as employed (y traditional (ehaviorist psycholo+y& This approach tried to study the mind as if it consisted simply of o(serva(le and measura(le phenomena and i+nored any notion of consciousness that could (e accessed from the first3person point of vie? of introspection& 8t therefore reversed our fol.3

psycholo+y privile+in+ of first3person access in favor of third3person reportin+& The follo?in+ passa+e considers the t?o forms of ascription to+ether First, research on introspection and self3.no?led+e has raised =uestions a(out ho? direct our .no?led+e of our o?n mental states and of the self is, and so called into =uestion traditional conceptions of first3person .no?led+e of mentality& 0econd, e9plorations of the theory of mind, animal communication and social play (ehavior have (e+un to e9amine and assess the sorts of attri(ution of mental states that are actually Kustified in empirical studies, su++estin+ that third3person .no?led+e of mental states is not as limited as has (een thou+ht& Considered to+ether, this research hints that the contrast (et?een first3 and third3person .no?led+e 31!$3 of the mental is not as star. as the pro(lem of other minds seems to intimate& (@ilson 1555(, 9viii) Put simply, first3person ascription can (e less relia(le, and third3person ascription more relia(le, than is commonly supposed& @ith re+ard to first3person ascription, ?e are often ?ron+ a(out the nature of our mental functionin+& Brrors of very different sorts occur#from hallucinations ri+ht throu+h to ina(ilities to understand our true motivations& ,nconscious motivation is a part of our everyday commonsense vie? of the mind& @e ?ould all, 8 thin., reco+niAe the truth of such statements as, 8 realiAe no? that it ?as really frustration ?ith myself that made me so an+ry ?ith him& / +ood e9ample of the falli(ility of first3person direct access is the feelin+ of (ein+ depressed (ut not .no?in+ ?hy& Jou have immediate access to that feelin+ and no one else has& To that e9tent it is inaccessi(le to others and infalli(le& Ho?ever, someone ?ho .no?s you ?ell mi+ht .no? that it is caused (y an9iety a(out somethin+ unpleasant comin+ up& Jou mi+ht then say, Jes, 8 suppose it is (ecause of thatM 0ometimes, ?e can (ecome intuitively a?are that our first3person ascription is not as different from third3person ascription as ?e usually suppose& 8ma+ine that you are discussin+ ?ith your spouse or partner ?hether or not you should do somethin+ in the future& They mi+ht say, @ell you didn>t enKoy the similar thin+ that you did last month& Jou reply, )ut that ?as different in some ?ays and so 8 thin. that it ?on>t (e li.e that this time& They retort, Jou al?ays say that and 8>m never convinced and you conclude, May(e, (ut 8>m fairly sure this time 8>ll (e ri+ht, and so on& That sounds li.e =uite a plausi(le conversation to me& /nd it is noticea(le that there is not much difference (et?een the first3 and third3person ascription contained in it& )oth are (est +uesses related to pro(a(ilities (ased on past (ehavior& 8n fact, if there is a difference, the third3person ascription sounds if anythin+ rather more confident than the first3person sort& These +aps in our a?areness of ourselves can affect our perceptions of our (ehavior& 8 recently heard of someone ?ho thou+ht that he had (een e9tremely rude to a collea+ue ?hen he told her that he could not do somethin+, (ecause he ?as Kust +oin+ to a Ko( intervie?& 8n fact he had (een perfectly polite to her, had

+iven her the information that she ?anted, and had not mentioned the intervie?& Bven ?hen told this, he ?as still convinced that he had referred to the intervie?& His mental state ?as so over?helmin+ that he ?as not a?are of the (ehavior that had resulted from it& 0earle has helpfully descri(ed at least three ?ays in ?hich ?e can (e mista.en a(out our o?n mental events self3deception, ?hen the a+ent has a motive or reason for not admittin+ to himself or herself that he or she is in a certain mental 31!63 state (for e9ample, shame at +ettin+ an+ry)C misinterpretation (for e9ample, thin.in+ that our feelin+ for someone amounted to love and later discoverin+ that ?e ?ere mista.en)C and inattention, ?hen ?e do not notice until later that our states of mind have chan+ed in some ?ay (for e9ample, not noticin+ for a ?hile that ?e no lon+er love someone) (155!, 1$;#$5)& 8n discussin+ first3person error, many have referred to the +ray area (et?een the honest mista.es of 0earle>s second and third cate+ories and the dishonesty of the first& Dno? thyselfM 8f 8 .ne? myself 8>d run a?ay, said Roethe& Henry 4avid Thoreau thou+ht that it is as hard to see one>s self as to loo. (ac.?ards ?ithout turnin+ round& 0teven Pin.er reminds us, uncomforta(ly, that sometimes ?e have +limpses of our o?n self3deception& @hen does a ne+ative remar. stin+, cut deep, hit a nerveI @hen some part of us .no?s it to (e true& 8f every part .ne? it ?as true, the remar. ?ould not stin+C it ?ould (e old ne?s& 8f no part thou+ht it ?as true, the remar. ?ould roll offC ?e could dismiss it as false (155;, $!:)& /ntonio 4amasio emphasiAes that sometimes ?e use our minds not to discover facts (ut to hide them& @e use part of the mind as a screen to prevent another part of it from sensin+ ?hat +oes on else?here (!000, !")& Mista.es a(out our mental functionin+ are often associated ?ith Freudian psychoanalysis& Ho?ever, this is not the end of the story& /s M8TBC0 indicates, in addition to the misrepresentations of one>s o?n mental states discovered (y 0i+mund Freud, other ?or. & & & sho?s that introspective Kud+ments fre=uently result from confa(ulation& People literally invent mental states to e9plain their o?n (ehavior in ?ays that are e9pected or accepta(le& 4aniel 4ennett (1551) in effect see.s to +eneraliAe this findin+ (y ar+uin+ that all introspective reports can (e treated as reports of useful fictions& & & & /t (est, introspection is one tool amon+ many for learnin+ a(out the mind (*osenthal 1555, $!0)& The reference to fictions is a reminder of ho? often real3mind discourses turn to the lan+ua+e of narrative to illustrate ho? the mind ?or.s& This is 4ennett himself /m 8 sayin+ ?e have a(solutely no privile+ed access to our conscious e9perienceI -o, (ut 8 am sayin+ that ?e tend to thin. ?e are much more immune to error than ?e are& People +enerally admit, ?hen challen+ed in this ?ay a(out their privile+ed access, that they don>t have any special access to the causes and effects of their conscious e9periences&&&& )ut althou+h people may say they are claimin+ authority only a(out the isolated contents of their e9periences, not their causes and effects, they often overstep their self3imposed restraints (1551, %")& He ma.es the important distinction that 8 referred to earlier (et?een the direct e9perience of immediate consciousness that only the

31!%3 first person has direct access to and the ascription of reasons for the state of mind and motives for and intentions of the resultin+ action& 8n the latter case, the picture is much more (lurred& @e may .no? that ?e feel depressed, (ut the first3person ascription involved in attri(utin+ the reasons for this state of mind is often much less easy& 8n any case, as 4ennett points out, the distinction (et?een the state and the causes of it can (e difficult to maintain in practice& The assumption that direct first3person ascription has a privile+ed status that is denied to the apparently more indirect third3person ascription is sometimes referred to as Cartesianism, follo?in+ the introspective methodolo+y employed (y 4escartes in his -editations& (Ho?ever, it should (e noted that this la(el is often disputed (y scholars ?ho claim that it is an unnecessarily reductive vie? of 4escartes> actual ar+uments&) Many philosophers and psycholo+ists no? ar+ue that the sort of privile+ed first3person access that is implied (y the term Cartesianism is an illusion and that the sole interpretative device that ?e have for e9aminin+ our o?n internal mental states is a theory of mind that is (ased on our o(servation of others& -0.(CS adopts a (alanced vie? on the =uestion of introspection 0elf3.no?led+e can arise in many ?ays& Traditional Cartesian mentalism treated the mind as fully transparent and open in all its si+nificant properties to a faculty of conscious introspection or reflection, ?hich ?as conceived of (y later empiricists as a form of inner perception& Thou+h introspection is no? re+arded as falli(le, incomplete, and theory3laden, it nonetheless remains a maKor source of self3.no?led+e (van Rulic. 1555, ;:%)& 8f ?e turn no? to the implications of this de(ate for narrative theory, ?e see that Moni.a Fluderni. perceptively o(serves that to ?rite one>s o?n life re=uires a sustained /u+ustinian effort to construct from the random succession of remem(ered scenes & & & PaQ ?ell3structured tale ?ith teleolo+ical shape& Cther people>s lives, parado9ically, are .no?a(le and tella(le much more easily (155%, $;)& This ar+ument can (e intri+uin+ly compared to 4aniel 4ennett>s su++estion that introspections are useful fictions& 4ennett illustrates his point ?ith this account of people>s (ehavior in the la(oratory& He tells us that there are circumstances in ?hich people are Kust ?ron+ a(out ?hat they are doin+ and ho? they are doin+ it& 8t is not that they lie in the e9perimental situation, (ut that they confa(ulateC they fill in the +aps, +uess, speculate, mista.e theoriAin+ for o(servin+&&&& To sum up, su(Kects are un?ittin+ creators of fiction (1551, 5$)& Fluderni.>s description of a ?ell3structured tale ?ith teleolo+ical shape and 4ennett>s description of useful fictions (oth ac.no?led+e the indirect, ascriptive =uality of first3person testimony& /lthou+h Fluderni. is discussin+ 31!;3

non3fictional narrative, her point is easily applied to third3person novels& This neat reversal of our usual assumptions a(out the ease ?ith ?hich individuals can e9plain the ?or.in+s of their o?n minds, as opposed to the minds of others, interestin+ly echoes the philosophical ar+ument that third3person ascriptions of mental states are Kust as important as first3person ascriptions to our ac=uisition of the concept of consciousness& 8t is, of course, true that narratolo+ists have al?ays ac.no?led+ed that characters deceive themselves and that ?hat is contained in the inner speech that is reported in the mode of direct thou+ht is not necessarily to (e relied upon as an accurate report of the actual states of affairs in the mental domain of the story?orld& )ut my purpose in reemphasiAin+ the point is to place it in the different conte9t that is provided (y the ?hole ar+ument of this (oo.& To +ive an idea of the scale of the paradi+m shift that is re=uired, have a loo. at the follo?in+ three o(servations (y ,ri Mar+olin in ?hich he sets out ?ith characteristic clarity the assumptions on ?hich the traditional narratolo+ical account of first3 and thirdperson ascription is (ased Bach narrative PindividualQ identifies himself from inside a center of consciousness in an immediate, non3inferential ?ay ?hich is not +rounded on pu(lic evidence, especially not (odily criteria (1556a, !6# !%)C / (asic convention of literary narrative is that every personaliAed spea.er has direct, immediate access to his o?n mental states (ut not to those of his coa+ents, ?hich he must infer (falli(lyM) from their intersu(Kectively accessi(le (ehavior and statements (!000, 655)C and 8n the actual ?orld ?e can .no? a(out another person>s decisions &&& re+ardin+ himself only throu+h his pu(lic claims to this effect (1556a, !%)& /s 8 have said, ?hile it is true that ?e have immediate access to some parts of our o?n current mental ?orld, in other ?ays ?e have less access to our minds that other persons do& 8 may thin. that 8 am an easy3+oin+ .ind of person ?ith a sunny disposition, (ut everyone else may say that 8 am +rumpy and difficult to live ?ith& 0o 8 accept, ?ith difficulty, that there may (e a lot of truth in ?hat they say and try to (e (etter (ehaved& /m 8 not then identifyin+ myself in an inferential ?ay that is +rounded on pu(lic evidenceI Ta.e Pip in 8reat (2pectations& The ?hole novel is (uilt on the fact that he is falli(le a(out his mental states (for e9ample, his sno((ery and feelin+s of shame to?ard Eoe)& )iddy, on the other hand, .no?s the ?or.in+ of Pip>s mind much (etter than Pip himself does& 0he and Eoe simply ?ait till Pip .no?s himself (etter& @ith re+ard to Mar+olin>s third =uote, surely ?e often .no? a(out people>s decisions from o(servin+ their (ehavior& 8f you say, That>s not really 9no,in#, then ?hat a(out the possi(ility of insincere or simply mista.en first3person reports a(out 31!"3 the motives for our o?n decisionsI The capacity for error in the analysis of our mental states applies particularly to perceptions of our motives for the actions that ?e ta.e& This is ?hy it is such an important part of the role of the narrator to supplement the self3conscious, and possi(ly self3 servin+, flo? of inner speech ?ith analyses in thou+ht report that can supply an alternative and more relia(le account of the true motivation for characters> actions&

31!53 " #he Social ,ind Chapter $ considered a ?ide ran+e of mental phenomena ?ithin the traditional internalist perspective on the mind, althou+h at several points and especially in the sections on emotion, action, and ascription, 8 referred to the social conte9t ?ithin ?hich minds have to (e considered& This chapter ?ill no? develop the ar+ument further (y e9plorin+ the implications of an e2ternalist vie? of the mind& 8t ?ill start ?ith a +eneral overvie? of the e9tent to ?hich thou+ht is social, pu(lic, and o(serva(le& 8t then pursues this approach in four specific directions third3person ascription, purposive thou+ht, dialo+icality, and situated thou+ht& 8 also try to sho? that the social mind is the su(Kect of a +ood deal of narrative discourse and that an a?areness of it is a su(stantial aid to our understandin+ of the su(Kect matter of novels& The terms internalism and e2ternalism correspond to the su(Kective first7intersu(Kective first distinction that ?as descri(ed in chapter 1, section 1& -0.(CS defines internalism (or individualism) in the follo?in+ terms 8ndividualists vie? the distinction (et?een the psycholo+ical states of individuals and the physical and social environments of those individuals as providin+ a natural (asis for demarcatin+ properly scientific, psycholo+ical .inds& Psycholo+y in particular and the co+nitive sciences more +enerally are to (e concerned ?ith natural .inds ?hose instances end at the (oundary of the individual (@ilson 1555a, :5;)& 8t then defines e2ternalism as follo?s Those reKectin+ individualism on empirical methodolo+ical +rounds have appealed to the situated or em(edded nature of co+nition, see.in+ more +enerally to articulate the crucial role that an or+anism>s environment plays in its co+nitive processin+ (@ilson 1555a, :5")& 0per(er and Hirschfeld re+retfully conclude that too often, ho?ever, these t?o perspectives are adopted (y scholars ?ith different trainin+, very different theoretical commitments, and therefore a limited ?illin+ness and a(ility to interact fruitfully (1555, c9v)& 8t ?ill (e clear, 8 thin., that 8 (elon+ very firmly to the e9ternalist tendency& -arrative theory tends to adopt an internalist perspective on fictional minds, and so an e9ternalist vie? may (e of value in providin+ some (alance& 8 am sure, thou+h, that, unli.e real3mind theorists, narrative theorists of (oth persuasions ?ill (e ?illin+ and a(le to interact fruitfully& The .ey to this chapter, and indeed the ?hole (oo., is contained in the final ?ords of 0earle>s (oo., .he /ediscovery of the -ind ?e need to rediscover the social character of the mind (155!, !$")& 0earle su++ests that the role of society in the study of consciousness is seriously ne+lected (ut concedes that 8 do not yet .no? &&& ho? to analyse the structure of the social element in individual consciousness (155!, 1!")&

0uch refreshin+ honesty is a reminder to us all that this is not an easy area to e9plore& @hat follo?s in this chapter and the remainin+ ones is only a first attempt at s.etchin+ out some of the issues involved in analyAin+ the social element in fictional consciousnesses& %. &u'lic #hought 8n 0ir @alter 0cott>s /ob /oy, 4iana Gernon tells Francis Ls(aldistone that she ?ill read his mind& Ho?ever, she insists that 8 do not ?ant your assistance, 8 am conKuror enou+h to tell your thou+hts ?ithout it& Jou need not open the casement of your (osomC 8 see throu+h it (1556, 60)& )ecause the youn+ man>s mind is pu(lic and accessi(le to her, she is completely accurate in her descriptions of its ?or.in+s& This a(ility to decode other minds ?ithout havin+ direct access to them is not confined to fictional characters& 8t is a vitally important element in the readin+ process& The reader is not +iven any direct access to the mind of one of the most vivid and hauntin+ characters in popular fiction& 8n fact, the reader never meets her, (ecause she dies (efore the (oo. (e+ins& )ut the mind of *e(ecca survives in the minds of the other characters in 4aphne du Maurier>s novel /ebecca and ma.es a deep and lastin+ impression on most readers of the novel& Bdith )ellenden in 0cott>s Cld -ortality remar.s that Rod only can Kud+e the heart#men must estimate intentions (y actions (15;6, ::!), and ?e often find that accurate estimates result& / simple description of surface (ehavior can (e as informative as the most direct inside vie? of a character>s consciousness& 8n the passa+e from (mma that 8 discussed in section % of the previous chapter, Dni+htley =uarrels ?ith Bmma over her treatment of Miss )ates& The narrator tells the reader that Bmma tries to apolo+iAe, (ut he had turned a?ay and the horses ?ere in motion (155%, :05)& 4irect access to his mind could not ma.e Dni+htley>s an+er and disappointment more vivid for the reader& @itt+enstein famously commented that the human (ody is the (est picture of the human soul (156", 1;")& The fact that our minds are pu(lic and social is 31:13 .no?n to us all& @e say of our friends, family, partners, and collea+ues that they .no? us (etter than ?e .no? ourselves& Lthers often supply more convincin+ e9planations of our past (ehavior than ?e do, and often predict our future (ehavior (etter than ?e do& 8 mentioned in chapter : /nn )anfield>s ?aspish reference to the title of 4orrit Cohn>s (oo., .ransparent -inds& 0he ?as disputin+ that fictional minds ?ere transparent, even ?ith the aid of direct access to them& 8 ?ish to ar+ue here that not only can fictional minds (e transparent to readers, there is a stron+ sense in ?hich real minds can (e transparent to other people& 4aniel 4ennett ma.es the point that your (ody can vi+orously (etray the secrets you are

desperately tryin+ to .eep#(y (lushin+ and trem(lin+ or s?eatin+, to mention only the most o(vious cases (155%, "0)& The issue of (ody lan+ua+e is one that recurs fre=uently in novels& Pip can see, can directly e9perience, Eoe>s discomfort ?hile +ivin+ him tea in his rooms (4ic.ens 15%6, !$1#$;)& The pu(lic nature of thou+ht is as true of pure co+nition as it is of emotions such as +uilt and em(arrassment& 8n the Hitchcoc. film Dial - for -urder, the villain, played (y *ay Milland, is led into a trap in ?hich he ?ill (etray himself if, ?hile standin+ in the hall?ay tryin+ to ?or. out ?hat has happened to his spare .ey, he remem(ers that it is still under the stair carpet& @e literally see the villain>s mind at ?or. as he carefully thin.s throu+h the steps that ?ill lead him to loo. for the .ey under the stair carpet and so prove his +uilt& -ear the end of his remar.a(le and (eautifully ?ritten (oo. .he !eelin# of What ;appens, /ntonio 4amasio discusses the privacy of personal e9perience and consciousness& He says that he is often as.ed ?hether ?e ?ill eventually (e a(le to +ain access to each other>s e9periences and concludes, My ans?er to the =uestion has lon+ (een no, and my opinion has not chan+ed (!000, :06)& He +oes on to e9plain the reasons for his opinion, and in the conte9t of current neuroscience, in so far as 8 can Kud+e, they appear to ma.e perfect sense& Ho?ever, at the very (e+innin+ of his (oo., 4amasio tells a story that in contrast illustrates the apparent accessi(ility of consciousness to others& He descri(es ho? from his office ?indo? he sees an old man tryin+ to +et to a ferry (efore it leaves He finally reaches the ship& He clim(s ?ith difficulty the tall step needed to +et on the +an+plan. and starts on his ?ay do?n to the dec., afraid of +ainin+ too much momentum on the incline, head movin+ (ris.ly, left and ri+ht, chec.in+ his surroundin+s and see.in+ reassurance, his ?hole (ody seemin+ly sayin+, 8s this itI /m 8 in the ri+ht placeI @here to ne9tI /nd then the t?o men on dec. help him steady his last step, ease him into the ca(in ?ith ?arm +estures, and he seems to (e safely ?here he should (e& My ?orry is 31:!3 over& The ship departs (!000, 6)& 4amasio maintains that consciousness is an entirely private, first3person phenomenon ?hich occurs as part of the private, first3person process ?e call mind (!000, 1!)& Ln the other hand, he also points out that consciousness and mind are closely tied to e9ternal (ehaviors that can (e o(served (y third persons& )oth ?isdom and the science of the human mind and (ehavior are (ased on this incontroverti(le correlation (et?een the private and the pu(lic#first3person mind on the one hand, and third3person (ehavior, on the other (!000, 1!#1:)& 0o, in a sense, as this passa+e sho?s, our minds can (e perfectly visi(le to others& /s he ?atched from his ?indo?, 4amasio .ne? ?hat ?as +oin+ on in the old man>s mind& Jou may say that he ?as only inferrin+ (elief from the old man>s (ehavior and that this is sho?n (y his use of the ?ord seemin+ly& This is true& )ut, as 8 as.ed in the previous chapter, do ?e al?ays 9no, ?hat is +oin+ on in our o?n mindsI 0upposin+ someone close to 4amasio said to him, 8t>s clear to me that you ?ere so interested in that old man (ecause he reminded you of your fatherC and 4amasio had then replied, 4o you thin. soI That never occurred to me& Jou may (e ri+htM This conversation does not sound implausi(le, does itI 8t is the sort of thin+ that people re+ularly say& 0o the =uote sho?s that, in practice, 4amasio is more confident than he

appears to thin. he is a(out the ?or.in+s of another mindC and the plausi(ility of the ima+inary conversation sho?s that it is possi(le that 4amasio may (e less confident than he appears to thin. a(out the ?or.in+s of his o?n mind& There is a famous scene in the 0herloc. Holmes story The *esident Patient in ?hich Holmes and @atson are sittin+ in silence in their study& Then Holmes concludes @atson>s line of thou+ht for him& @atson, suddenly realisin+ ho? he had echoed the innermost thou+hts of my soul (15"1, $!:) is +ratifyin+ly thunderstruc.& 8t transpires that Holmes ?as a(le to follo? @atson>s silent thou+ht processes (y ?atchin+ his eye movements and constructin+ a plausi(le narrative (ased on ?hat he had (een loo.in+ at& Jou may thin. that this is a parlor3tric. that is suita(le only for pulp fiction& 0o ta.e a loo. at the character of 2ady 4eadloc. in 6lea9 ;ouse, ?ho is +iven to lon+ and lonely self3communin+s and ?ho in a different sort of novel mi+ht have (een the su(Kect of detailed, direct presentations of her consciousness& 8n such a case, ?e ?ould pro(a(ly (e presented ?ith her feelin+s of +uilt a(out her dead lover and her lon+3lost dau+hter and so on& Ho?ever, as she is actually in a very different sort of novel, this is ho? the narrator descri(es her in a very early sta+e in the narrative 0he supposes herself to (e an inscruta(le )ein+, =uite out of the reach of and .en of ordinary mortals#seein+ herself in her +lass, ?here indeed she loo.s so& Jet, every dim little star revolvin+ round her, from her maid to the mana+er of 31::3 the 8talian Lpera, .no?s her ?ea.nesses, preKudices, follies, hau+htinesses, and capricesC and lives upon as accurate a calculation and as nice a measure of her moral nature, as her dressma.er ta.es of her physical proportions (15;1, 65)& /s usual, a (alance is re=uired& Her dispositions and many of her states of mind are accessi(le to othersC her secret feelin+s a(out her lover and dau+hter are not& 8n some ?ays she is as inscruta(le as she thin.s she isC in many other ?ays, she is not& Further (alance is provided (y the follo?in+ passa+e, ?hich amusin+ly descri(es the falli(ility of third3person ascription (ased on physical and (ehavioral clues& The hero of (pitaph for a Spy (y the +reat thriller ?riter Bric /m(ler is sittin+ in a restaurant rehearsin+ the appearance that he ?ants to +ive durin+ a forthcomin+ confrontation ?ith an adversary -o, too clumsy& Perhaps a moc.in+ smile ?ould (e (est& 8 e9perimented ?ith a moc.in+ smile and ?as in the middle of my fourth attempt ?hen the ?aiter cau+ht my eye& He hurried over an9iously& There is somethin+ ?ron+ ?ith the co= au vin, MonsieurI (15"$, 6$)

8t is clear then that a +ood deal of fictional narrative is (ased on the fact that thou+ht can (e pu(lic and availa(le to others as ?ell as private and accessi(le only to ourselves& /s the Proust narrator remar.s in 0?ann>s @ay, it is only ?ith the passions of others that ?e are ever really familiar, and ?hat ?e come to discover a(out our o?n can only (e learned from them& ,pon ourselves they react only indirectly (155%, 16$)& 0i+nificantly, 0i+mund Freud ?as also interested in the pu(lic nature of thou+ht& 8 say this (ecause it mi+ht have (een thou+ht that his analysis of the inaccessi(ility of motives and reasons for action ?ould ma.e such an interest unli.ely& )ut he ?rote that PhQe that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can .eep a secret& 8f his lips are silent, he chatters ?ith his fin+ertipsC (etrayal ooAes out of him at every pore& /nd thus the tas. of ma.in+ conscious the most hidden recesses of the mind is one ?hich it is =uite possi(le to accomplish (=uoted in Cohn 1555, 61)& @ith re+ard to the mental event7state dichotomy, ?e can dra? a distinction (et?een those states of mind that e9tend over time and that may (ecome very apparent to those ?ho .no? us ?ell or may (e ?ell hidden and the immediate and inner flo? of thou+ht that can (e private and inaccessi(le unless revealed, for e9ample, in an uncontrolled reaction to events& Ta.e this e9ample from +anity !air that 8 used in chapter $, section 6 /?ay ?ent Reor+e, his nerves =uiverin+ ?ith e9citement at the ne?s so lon+ loo.ed for, so sudden ?hen it came (155$, !5!)& There are three different time scales here The lon+est, so 31:$3 lon+ loo.ed for could ?ell refer to a very pu(lic state of mind& Presuma(ly, Reor+e Ls(orne ?ould have revealed his lon+in+ for (attle to his collea+ues and family (y his (ehavior and speech& The middle timescale is so sudden ?hen it came, and Reor+e>s feelin+ of the suddenness of the ne?s may also have (een visi(le to others& The shortest time scale is his nerves =uiverin+ ?ith e9citement, and this sounds as thou+h it ?ould also (e visi(le to others& /n e9cited state of mind ?ill usually result in e9cited (ehavior& Lr ta.e this e9ample Her presence used to e9cruciate Ls(orne (155$, !"!)& @hat is the ori+in of this .no?led+eI 8s it possi(le to .no? this fact a(out the story?orld ?ithout the privile+ed and direct access of the omniscient narrator to characters> mindsI 8t is possi(le for the reader to read this statement as strai+htfor?ard thou+ht report of Reor+e>s mind& B=ually plausi(ly, ho?ever, it can (e read as a description of Reor+e>s (ehavior and therefore as information that could (e availa(le to other characters in the story?orld& *emem(er @itt+enstein>s =uestion a(out ?hether a statement is a report of (ehavior or of a state of mind& The test for this uncertainty is to ima+ine ?hether another character (that is, ?ith no direct access to his mind) could say those ?ords& 8 ?ould su++est that in this case it is perfectly possi(le to ima+ine another character ma.in+ this statement (ased on o(servation of his (ehavior& The more the distinction (et?een fictional mind and action is (lurred, the more it can (e seen that the real o(Kect of study is the mind in action&

The inner7outer (alance is a very noticea(le characteristic of -0.(CS& Most of us ?ould pro(a(ly thin. that a (oo. called an (ncyclopaedia of the Co#nitive Sciences ?ould (e concerned primarily ?ith the neuroscience of the (rain, ?ith neurons, a9ons, dendrons, synapses, neurotransmitters, and the rest& L(viously, there is a +ood deal in the volume on the physical composition of the (rain& Ho?ever, it is perhaps surprisin+ ho? much of the (oo. is also devoted to the role of social conte9t and the de(ate a(out the pu(lic7private mind& )rian Cant?ell 0mith>s entry in -0.(CS on 0ituatedness7Bm(eddedness descri(es ho? the classical vie? of the mind sees it as individual, rational, a(stract, detached, and +eneral, ?hile the ne? approach sees it as social, em(odied, concrete, located, en+a+ed, and specific (1555, ;%5)& The current situation in co+nitive science points to a paradi+m shift under?ay PthatQ locates human lan+ua+e in the human (ody and postulates as its theoretic atom the conversational dyad PpairQ, rather than a monad PindividualQ ?ith a messa+e to transmit or receive&&&& The shift ?as foreshado?ed (y &&& Gy+ots.y &&& ?ho analysed communicative events as developin+ simultaneously on an >inter3> as ?ell as an >intra3psychic plane> (4uncan 1555 $$0)& Blse?here in M8TBC0, it is su++ested that the com 31:63 ple9ity of the social environment led Hirschfeld (155%) to propose the e9istence of specialiAed .no?led+e structures dedicated to social +roup understandin+ (Hirschfeld 1555, 6"1)& Hirschfeld also refers to mechanisms uni=ue to social reasonin+ (1555, 6"1)& The issue of pu(lic thou+ht has (een raised ?ithin possi(le3?orlds theory, althou+h the emphasis is more often on the individual at the e9pense of the social& For e9ample, 4oleTel indicates that the dialectic of social consciousness and private mind provides a fle9i(le model for understandin+ motivation in the multiperson ?orld the pressure of the +roup enforces social factors, (ut they have to (e >internaliAed,> appropriated (y the individual mind, in order to motivate the person>s actin+ (155", 10!)& 4oleTel ac.no?led+es the inner7outer (alance that is descri(ed in this chapter in his reference to the dialectic (et?een social consciousness and private mind& Ho?ever, it seems to me that there still remains a percepti(le (ias to?ard the private in the lan+ua+e that he uses& The individual consciousness is ta.en to (e primary& 8t is the norm that is then modified (y social factors& The picture of the mind that is painted in this chapter is intended to =uestion and even to su++est a reversal of these priorities& -arrative theory tends to assume that characters in novels do not .no? ?hat other characters are thin.in+ and feelin+& Ho?ever, as ?e have seen, philosophers and psycholo+ists say ?e can .no? these thin+s& -arrators say ?e can& Lnce a+ain, narrative theory appears to (e out of step& L(viously, this is a matter of emphasis only& 8 ?ould +uess that everyone ?ould a+ree that sometimes ?e have relia(le access to our o?n motives and intentions and sometimes ?e do notC and sometimes ?e have relia(le access to the motives and intentions of others and sometimes ?e do not& My point is simply that the paradi+m ?ithin narrative theory has up until no? (een one of infalli(le and direct access to our minds

rather than first3person ascription& / +ood e9ample of this emphasis is the follo?in+ remar. (y the philosopher /lain (the pseudonym of Ymile Chartier) =uoted (y 4orrit Cohn 8n short, there is no room for intimacy in historyC at (est it can (rin+ men to life as ?e see them in life, al?ays ma.in+ us move (ac.?ards from their actions to their motives& The peculiarity of the novel is its intimacy, an intimacy that cannot (e attested, that needs no proof, and that, in reverse of the historical method, ma.es actions real (Cohn 1555, 16%)& This line of thin.in+ seems to su++est that third3person ascription is less real than the direct access that narrators +ive us, that readers of novels do not have to move (ac.?ard from characters> actions to their motives, and that actions in historical narratives cannot (e made real& 8 ?ould =uestion all of these assertions& 31:%3 4orrit Cohn refers (riefly to the importance of conveyin+ character throu+h e9ternal description& 8n commentin+ on the nineteenth century, she descri(es ho?, ?hile prolon+ed inside vie?s ?ere lar+ely restricted to first person forms, third person novels d?elt on manifest (ehavior, ?ith the characters> inner selves revealed only indirectly throu+h spo.en lan+ua+e and tellin+ +esture&&&& 8n most ?or.s (y 4ic.ens, Tur+enev, Fontane and other masters of the novel of manners, character portrayal is far more >conte9tual> than >intrinsic> (15;", !1#!!)& 0i+nificantly, ho?ever, Cohn adds that conte9tual character portrayal moves in directions lyin+ outside the central compass of PherQ study (15;", !!)& 0he is e9plicitly ac.no?led+in+ that her su(Kect is the private and not the pu(lic mind& The pu(lic7private distinction is also (ehind Mar+olin>s division (et?een, on the one hand, the social, interactional, a+ential pu(lic role, the person in social spaceC and, on the other hand, the mental, the self, consciousness, self3consciousness, ?ill, and emotion (1556(, :;5)& This is on the face of it a useful and ?or.a(le distinction& Ho?ever, ?henever 8 am analyAin+ fictional minds, 8 am struc. (y the difficulties that 8 e9perience in practice ?hen tryin+ to .eep the social and the individual apart& Pip>s feelin+s a(out himself are private, (ut they are (ased on, determined (y, and +enerally enter into a variety of different relationships ?ith the feelin+s a(out him of Eoe and )iddy, Miss Havisham, Bstella, and the other characters in the Rreat B9pectations story?orld& The opportunity e9ists for narrative theory to develop specialiAed .no?led+e structures and mechanisms that are uni=ue to social reasonin+ and that ?ill allo? it to come to a +reater understandin+ of ho? fictional social +roups ?or. and ho? individual fictional minds function ?ithin those social +roups& 0ome possi(ilities for (uildin+ this sort of understandin+ are introduced in section 6 of this chapter and also in chapter ;& 8n my vie?, narratolo+y has suffered from the limitation on the study of fictional minds that is implied (y Cohn>s remar. a(out the compass of her study& The fictional mind does not have to (e divided up in this ?ay& The internal7e9ternal distinction is an e9cessively simplistic perspective from ?hich to analyAe mental functionin+& 8f ?e =uestion it, ?e can study the ,hole mind and also the social mind&

2. #hird.&erson Ascription This section continues the discussion of ascription that (e+an in the previous chapter (ut ?ith the emphasis this time on the third person rather than the first person& The attri(ution to the character (y the narrator of motives, dispositions, and states of mind is at the center of the process of constructin+ fictional minds and is central to the reader process of comprehendin+ te9ts& Thou+ht 31:;3 report is the chief mode for ascription& This section is closely lin.ed to the previous one as ?e have seen, the more pu(lic our thou+ht, the easier and more relia(le third3person ascription (ecomes& Bmpathy is the po?er of enterin+ into another>s personality and ima+inatively e9periencin+ their e9periences& 8t is an essential part of the readin+ process, and this discussion ?ill, 8 hope, provide some theoretical (ac.+round to this a(ility& Consider this statement (y Col?yn Trevarthen, in ?hich he compares the relative levels of relia(ility of first3 and third3person ascription Conscious monitorin+ of intersu(Kective motives is asymmetricC in normal circumstances ?e are more a?are of others> feelin+s and intentions than of our o?n inner states (1555, $1%)& Bven ?ith the (enefit of earlier discussions, you may still (e so ta.en a(ac. (y this statement that you ?ill ?ish to read it a+ain in order to chec. that you did not misread it& 8t states =uite (aldly that third3person ascription is the more relia(le .ind& 8t does not say that relia(ility varies sometimes one .ind is more accurate and at other times the other is& 8t says that in normal circumstances the accuracy of our vie?s a(out the mental states of others e9ceeds the accuracy of our vie?s a(out our o?n mental states& 0uddenly, the a(ility that ?e have as readers to construct fictional minds out of a minimum of information does not seem =uite so e9traordinary& -ot everyone develops the a(ility to ascri(e mental states to others& Lne of the chief symptoms of autism is mind3(lindness the ina(ility to reco+niAe that other people have minds& This is a severe and real form of the philosophical doctrine of solipsism, the vie? or theory that only the self really e9ists or can (e .no?n& -o? also, isolation, self3centeredness, selfishness (LB4)& 4escartes> famous Co+ito, er+o sum is the most famous practical demonstration of the theoretical solipsistic methodolo+y& Ho?ever, solipsism also ta.es ?hat mi+ht (e called a practical or operational form& /utism is the most severe variety, (ut it is also a ?ell3.no?n symptom of the milder /sper+er>s 0yndrome& 8n addition, there is the very lar+e num(er of people ?hose (ehavior is so selfish that they appear not to (elieve in the e9istence of other minds& 4rivin+ throu+h 2ondon in the rush hour (or at any time, in fact) ?ill illustrate this point =uite forci(ly& / num(er of philosophers have considered the role of (ehavior in formin+ ?hat they call the third3person nature of consciousness& /ccordin+ to them, it is a necessary condition of attri(utin+ states of consciousness to oneself that one must (e prepared to attri(ute them to others (ecause ?e cannot learn ho? to ascri(e mental states to ourselves only from our o?n case this a(ility depends on o(servin+ other people>s (ehavior& 8n a

familiar e9ample, it is impossi(le to ac=uire the use of the phrase in pain solely from one>s o?n case& Lne needs in addition to (e ac=uainted ?ith the pain (ehavior of others& This means that 31:"3 pain (ehavior is not merely a si+n of pain it constitutes to a lar+e e9tent the conditions under ?hich the phrase in pain has a use (Priest 1551, 1;5#"0)& The emphasis that these philosophers place on the o(servation and description of the (ehavior of others, and the su(se=uent ascription (oth to ourselves and to others of the mental states that appear to (e appropriate to that (ehavior, has si+nificant implications for the role of the narrator in presentin+ fictional minds& @hen the narrator states that a character is depressed, ?hat precisely is it that the narrator is descri(in+I Philosophers su++est that it is (oth an internal state of mind and e9ternal (ehavior& *emem(er @itt+enstein>s =uestion& They point out that states such as depression and pain are partly felt and partly sho?n, partly under+one and partly e9hi(ited in (ehavior& 8n the ?ords of the philosopher Peter 0tra?son, <>s depression is somethin+, one and the same thin+, ?hich is felt, (ut not o(served, (y <, and o(served (ut not felt (y others than < (1565, 105)& From this perspective, the distinction that is dra?n ?ithin narratolo+y (et?een the narrator>s e9ternal descriptions of (ehavior and the internal descriptions of mental states is no? pro(lematiAed& 8n practice it is often very difficult to say ?hether a particular phrase or sentence in a narrative te9t is thou+ht report or e9ternal description& Lnce it is understood that the mind e9tends (eyond the s.in, the inner7outer distinction (ecomes more and more difficult to sustain in every case& The train of thou+ht descri(ed earlier is deeply anti3Cartesian (ecause it reverses the Cartesian, first3person vie? that one ta.es meanin+ from one>s o?n case and then e9trapolates it to others& Third3person ascriptions are no? made conditions for first3person ascriptions& The need for (alance is re=uired yet a+ain& 8t may (e that Cartesians are ?ron+ to imply a certain autonomy for the self3ascriptive uses of statements relatin+ to consciousness, (ut it may also (e that (ehaviorists are ?ron+ to imply a similar autonomy for thirdperson uses& -either use is self3sufficient (ecause each type of use depends upon the other (Priest 1551, 1"1)& This (alance is characteristic of narrative discourse, ?hich typically contains a (alance of direct access to internal states (the fictional e=uivalent of first3person descriptions) and surface descriptions of characters> (ehavior (that is, third3person descriptions)& The (alanced approach is potentially anti3Cartesian (ecause an emphasis on (ehavior ma.es it clear that thou+ht is not only private and inaccessi(le (ut also pu(lic and availa(le as it can (e e9pressed in physical terms& Cartesian dualism, on the other hand, involves the strict division of reality into either the physical or the mental& 8t is possi(le that @itt+enstein is the source of much of this anti3 Cartesianism as, si+nificantly, the Philosophical 0nvesti#ations is preoccupied as 8 have said ?ith 31:53

the difficulty of distin+uishin+ (et?een descriptions of consciousness and of (ehavior& 0earle is =uite e9plicit that his vie?s are also an attac. on Cartesianism (155!, !6#!%, 1$5)& @hile a num(er of thin.ers in various disciplines share this pu(lic, and therefore social, perspective on thou+ht, the speech cate+ory account appears to ?or. ?ithin the frame?or. of Cartesian dualism (ecause of its strict division of narrative either into descriptions of the mind or into descriptions of the (ody& @hile ar+uin+ a+ainst the doctrine of (ehaviorism, 0earle contends that it is a mista.e to suppose that ?e .no? of the e9istence of mental phenomena in others only (y o(servin+ their (ehavior& The (asis of our certainty that do+s are conscious (ut cars are not is not (ehavior (ut rather a certain causal conception of ho? the ?orld ?or.s& Lther?ise, the (ehavior of cars could lead us to thin. that they are as conscious as do+s& 8n his vie?, the (ehavior of others only ma.es sense as the e9pression or manifestation of an underlyin+ mental reality (ecause ?e can see that the (ehavior is caused (y the mental (155!, !1#!!)& *eferrin+ to the (alanced vie? of the mind ?ith ?hich this chapter is preoccupied, he points out that, ?here our .no?led+e of other minds is concerned, (ehavior (y itself is of no interest to us& *ather, 0earle maintains, it is the com(ination of (ehavior, to+ether ?ith the .no?led+e of the causal underpinnin+s of that (ehavior that forms the (asis of our .no?led+e of other minds (155!, !!)& This (alance (et?een o(servation of (ehavior and a?areness of consciousness is as essential to the analysis of presentations of fictional minds as it is to the study of real minds& 8n the (ehaviorist narratives of Brnest Hemin+?ay, *aymond Chandler, and 4ashiell Hammett in ?hich very little direct access to minds is +iven, the (ehavior of the characters only ma.es sense ?hen it is read as the manifestation of an underlyin+ mental reality& Furthermore, the reader uses a variety of information a(out a character from ?hich to infer the underlyin+ mental reality that over the course of the novel (ecomes that character>s em(edded narrative& The reader is a(le to construct the continuin+ consciousness of a character simply from descriptions of (ehavior, even ?hen no direct access is +iven to that consciousness& The reader of /ebecca .no?s a +ood deal a(out the mind of *e(ecca ?ithout ever meetin+ her& 0earle ta.es a vie? of the mind that is different from some of the other theorists that 8 am discussin+& He repeatedly dra?s attention to ?hat he calls the first3person, su(Kective ontolo+y of minds& He does this in order to emphasiAe the reality of our immediate consciousness of our o?n mental states& 0earle stresses that it is a mista.e to suppose that the ontolo+y of the mental is o(Kective and that the methodolo+y of a science of the mind must concern itself only ?ith 31$03 o(Kectively o(serva(le (ehavior& 8n his vie?, mental phenomena are essentially connected to su(Kective consciousness and so the ontolo+y of the mental is essentially a first3person ontolo+y& )y contrast, it seems to me, fictional minds must al?ays (y definition have a third3person ontolo+y& /s fictional minds do not e9ist e9cept (y the semiotic operations of readin+ te9ts, it is only the reader ?ho can have an a?areness of a fictional

mind, and that a?areness can o(viously only (e third3person (althou+h it ?ill ta.e account of the first3person testimony of characters as +iven in the mode of direct thou+ht)& / fictional mind can only (e constructed (y means of third3person ascription& Ho?ever, 8 still thin. that 0earle>s perspective is valua(le in this conte9t (ecause it pic.s out very clearly an essential first3person element in the readerly process& The empathy of the reader is directed to?ard and focused on the first3person sensations of the character and so the reader must e9perience the o(Kective story?orld as far as possi(le from the various su(Kective vie?points of the characters ?ho inha(it the story?orld& 8n a stri.in+ly perceptive phrase, 0earle says (of real minds), @hen ?e study him or her, ?hat ?e are studyin+ is the me that is him or her (155!, !0#!1)& /nd 0earle>s point is as true of fictional minds as it is of real minds& @hen ?e study Bmma, ?hat ?e are studyin+ is the me that is Bmma& 0o, ?hen ?e are studyin+ the Bmma story?orld, ?hat ?e are studyin+ is that ?orld as su(Kectively e9perienced (y Bmma and also as su(Kectively e9perienced (y Dni+htley, (y Miss )ates, and so on& The fictional te9t is primarily seen not as the representation of an o(Kective story?orld, (ut as the interconnection of all of the su(Kective em(edded narratives of all the characters ?ho inha(it that fictional ?orld& @hen ?e study the fictional mind of, say, 2yd+ate in Middlemarch, ?e do not simply study the episodes of his inner speech that are presented in the three speech modes& @e study the story?orld of the novel as it is e9perienced from his su(Kective point of vie?& 8t is (y these means that ?e study the ?hole of his mind in action& @hen ?e study 2yd+ate in this ?ay, ?hat ?e are studyin+ is the me that is 2yd+ate& This point is really a restatement in different terms of )a.htin>s vie? that the novel should (e a polyphony of independent, su(Kective voices, and not a monolo+ical and o(Kective representation of others (y a dominant narrator& 8 pursue this point in section $ of this chapter& /s is no? clear, the primacy of first3 or third3person ascription forms a .een de(ate ?ithin the disciplines of philosophy and psycholo+y& Ln the one hand, some philosophers claim that in some circumstances some mental states of others can (e the o(Kects of direct perception (Heal 1556, 60)& This approach is, as 8 have said, associated ?ith the later @itt+enstein of the Philosophical 31$13 0nvesti#ations& 0tephen 2& @hite refers to the possi(ility that our access to the other su(Kects> a+ential characteristics may (e at least as direct as our access to their o(Kective ma.eup&&&& 8f this +eneral approach can (e sustained, then the =uestion ho? ?e can ascri(e mental properties to an o(Kectively characteriAed other is misleadin+& From the a+ential perspective the pro(lem is rather one of ac=uirin+ a more o(Kective conception (oth of one>s partner and of oneself (1555, ;:$)& This vie? lin.s closely ?ith @itt+enstein>s position that meanin+ is not inner, mysterious, private, and psycholo+ical, (ut outer, evident, pu(lic, and (ehavioral& Ln the other hand, some theorists such as 0earle appear to privile+e first3 person authority& Pin.er remar.s that ?e mortals can>t read other people>s minds directly& )ut ?e ma.e +ood +uesses from ?hat they say, ?hat ?e read (et?een the lines, ?hat they sho? in their face and eyes, and ?hat (est e9plains their (ehavior& 8t is our species> most remar.a(le talent

(155;, ::0)& 4espite his ?arm ?ords a(out the remar.a(le =ualities of third3person ascription, he seems to indicate that he +ives primacy to first3 person .no?led+e& /s stated earlier, /ntonio 4amasio adopts a similar perspective& He o(serves that the study of human consciousness re=uires (oth internal and e9ternal vie?s (!000, "!) and that the solution of the method pro(lem posed (y the privacy of consciousness relies on a natural human a(ility, that of theoriAin+ constantly a(out the state of mind of others from o(servations of (ehaviors, reports of mental states, and counterchec.in+ of their correspondences, +iven one>s o?n compara(le e9periences (!000, ":#"$)& Confusin+ly, ?hat is, in essence, the same de(ate also ta.es place in the completely different terminolo+y of ,hat it>s li9e and *ualia that 8 referred to in the previous chapter& 8n 15;$, the philosopher Thomas -a+el ?rote a famous article entitled @hat 8s 8t 2i.e to )e a )atI (8t is the su(Kect of some very amusin+ literary e9ercises in .hin9s . . . P!001, 50#5%Q, the novel (y 4avid 2od+e a(out the su(Kect of this (oo.# consciousness, co+nitive science, and the novel&) 8n it, -a+el ar+ued that the ?hat it>s li.e =uality of a (at>s consciousness is not accessi(le to third3person ascription& @e can never .no? ?hat it>s li.e to (e a (at& 8n the same ?ay, ?e can never .no? ?hat it>s li.e to (e someone else& The distinctive =uality of =ualia as e9perienced (y one individual is inaccessi(le to others& Ho?ever, as you mi+ht e9pect, others disa+ree& 8n particular, 4aniel 4ennett is =uite (lunt -a+el claims that no amount of third3person .no?led+e could tell us ?hat it is li.e to (e a (at, and 8 flatly deny that claim (1551, $$!)& 4ennett claims that such .no?led+e is possi(le (y means of a methodolo+y for(iddin+ly entitled heterophenomenolo#y, ?hich he defines as a method of phenomenolo+ical description that can (in principle) do Kustice 31$!3 to the most private and ineffa(le su(Kective e9periences ?hile never a(andonin+ the methodolo+ical scruples of science (1551, ;!)& 4ennett concludes that ?hen ?e arrive at heterophenomenolo+ical narratives that no critic can find any positive +rounds for reKectin+, ?e should accept them#tentatively, pendin+ further discoveries#as accurate accounts of ?hat it is li.e to (e the creature in =uestion (1551, $$:#$$)& Jet another de(ate e9ists ?ithin psycholo+y and philosophy on the nature of third3person ascription ?ith a completely different terminolo+y& 8t is called the theory3theory7simulation de(ate& ,nder the theory$theory, normal adult human (ein+s possess a primitive or >fol.>3psycholo+ical theory PthatQ postulates theoretical entities#in this case, mental states#and contains la?s ?hich relates the mental states to one another and to e9ternal stimuli (on the input side) and actions (on the output side)& @hen 8 predict ?hat someone ?ill do, or e9plain ?hy they have done somethin+, 8 do so (y deployin+ this theory (4avies and 0tone 1556, !)& -o one su++ests that ?hat people use is a self3conscious and fully ?or.ed theory& /ll a+ree that it is used intuitively and non3consciously& Much of the theory3theory has a social ori+in ?e do not Kust ?or. it out for ourselves independently of others& @e ac=uire it from our family, our friends, our education, and the +eneral social and cultural consensus ?ithin ?hich ?e have (een socialiAed&

/ccordin+ to the alternative account of the simulation theory, human (ein+s are a(le to predict and e9plain each others> actions (y usin+ the resources of their o?n minds to simulate the psycholo+ical aetiolo+y PcausationQ of the actions of others& 0o, instead of (ein+ theoriAers, ?e are simulators& @e are mental simulators, not in the sense that ?e merely simulate mentation, (ut in the sense that ?e understand others (y usin+ our o?n mentation in a process of simulation (4avies and 0tone 1556, :)& 0imulation is not ima+inin+ me in that situation it is ima+inin+ (ein+ the other in that situation& 8t means pretendin+ to have the same initial desires, (eliefs, and other mental states as the other person& @e feed these into our inferential co+nitive mechanism that then +enerates further mental states& For e9ample, a practical reasonin+ mechanism ?ill +enerate a choice or decision& @e then ascri(e to the other an occurrence of this state& Predictions of (ehavior proceed similarly& @e run our decision3 ma.in+ system off3line& 2i.e the application of the theory3theory, simulation is a completely social activity in the very o(vious sense that it is concerned ?ith attemptin+ to simulate the minds of others& /n e9ample that is often used in the de(ate concerns a missed plane (Rold 31$:3 man 1556, 1";)& T?o people arrive at the airport thirty minutes after the scheduled departures of their separate fli+hts& />s fli+ht left on time, (ut )>s fli+ht ?as delayed and left only five minutes (efore& -inety3si9 percent of those =uestioned said that ) ?ould (e more upset than /& The =uestion is, Ho? did the respondents arrive at their ascriptionsI /s 8 have pointed out on a num(er of occasions, real3mind theorists are themselves ?ell a?are of the many su++estive parallels ?ith fictional minds& *o(ert M& Rordon as.s, 4oes narrative (includin+ film narrative) create emotional and motivational effects (y the same processes that create them in real3life situationsI (1555, ;%%)& The missed plane does indeed sound li.e a scene from a Hitchcoc. film& )oth the theory3theory and the simulation theory can also (e applied to firstperson as ?ell as third3person ascription& /ccordin+ to simulation theorists, ?e run our decision3ma.in+ system off3line in order to attempt to predict ho? ?e ?ill react to certain situations in the future& /ccordin+ to theorytheorists, first3person simulation theory is mista.enly (ased on t?o aspects of the Cartesian theory of introspection (completeness and infalli(ility) that arise from the alle+edly privile+ed nature of access to first3person states& Ho?ever, in their vie?, self3 .no?led+e is as much of a theory as the .no?led+e of others, and theories can (e partial and falli(le& 0pea.in+ personally from the results of my o?n introspections, for ?hat they are ?orth, the theory3theory of firstperson introspection seems very plausi(le to me& Ho?ever, in order to remain consistent ?ith the lo+ic of my ar+ument, 8 should stress that my theory mi+ht (e partial and falli(leM

/ common reaction to this de(ate is to dou(t the validity of the distinction (et?een theory3theory and simulation and to ar+ue that simulation is simply the means (y ?hich ?e arrive at a theory& /ll ?e can ever have is a theoryC ?hat varies is the ?ay in ?hich ?e +et to that theory, and that is a purely empirical =uestion& 0imulation needs theory and theory needs simulation& 0imulation re=uires a theoretical (asis and theory re=uires an empirical (asis& To+ether, they form a coherent account of ascription& This (alanced approach illuminates t?o sides of the activities of the reader of fictional te9ts& Ln the one hand, the reader must have a .ind of (asic fol. theory a(out ho? minds ?or.& 8t is on this (asis that ?e .no? that motives and dispositions can (e ascri(ed to others& Ln the other hand, readers also simulate in their o?n minds the specific dilemmas faced (y characters in novels& @hen readin+ 8reat (2pectations, most readers ?ill, 8 ?ould +uess, as. themselves, Ho? ?ould 8 feel if 8 ?ere Pip, a ne?ly made +entleman ?ho found out that 8 ?as (ein+ supported not (y a ?ell(red lady (ut (y a convictI 8n the Kar+on of the de(ate, readers ?ill run their 31$$3 action plannin+ system off3line in order to simulate the ?or.in+s of Pip>s mind& Pursuin+ the point further, off3line thin.in+ a(out mental functionin+ is central to our understandin+ of novels& Ho? can the narrative of 8reat (2pectations (e comprehended e9cept (y the .ind of train of thou+ht descri(ed earlierI 0imulation is concerned ?ith seein+ the ?orld from another>s perspective& This is ?hat the reader has to do for fictional minds& The fictional ?orld cannot (e understood e9cept from the point of vie? of the characters& The plot of (mma can (e descri(ed as Bmma e9periencin+ the story?orld in one ?ay, Dni+htley e9periencin+ the story?orld in another ?ay, Mr& Blton e9periencin+ the story?orld in yet another ?ay, and so on& The story?orld is the amal+amation of all these different, individual, su(Kective, and aspectual story?orlds& The reader has to use (oth their theory of mind and their a(ility to simulate the mentation of others to follo? all of the different individual narratives and, therefore, the ?hole narrative& Much of the theory3theory7simulation de(ate is concerned ?ith the co+nitive development of children& /ccordin+ to /lison Ropni., the theory3 theory position on this issue is that children develop a succession of theories of the mind that they use to e9plain their e9perience and the (ehavior of themselves and others& 2i.e scientific theories, these intuitive or naNve theories postulate a(stract coherent mental entities and la?s, and they provide predictions, interpretations, and e9planations& The theories chan+e as the children confront counterevidence, +ather ne? data, and perform e9periments& Lne conse=uence of this vie? is that the philosophical doctrine of first3person authority is incorrect our .no?led+e of our minds is as theoretical as our .no?led+e of the minds of others (1555, "$0)& Ln the other hand, the simulationists have a different approach / second area of developmental research as.s ?hether children ascri(e mental states to themselves (efore they ascri(e them to others& Gersions of the simulation theory committed to the vie? that ?e reco+niAe our o?n mental states as such and ma.e analo+ical inferences to others> mental

states seem to re=uire an affirmative ans?er to this =uestionC other versions of the theory seem to re=uire a ne+ative ans?er& 0ome e9periments su++est a ne+ative ans?er, (ut de(ate continues on this =uestion (Rordon 1555, ;%6)& @ithin the de(ate, continual reference is made to some empirical false3(elief tests that have (een +iven to children& These tests are used (ecause psycholo+ists have found that very youn+ children have difficulty understandin+ the fact that the (eliefs of others can (e false& 8f very youn+ children .no? that 9 is the case, they cannot comprehend the possi(ility that others mi+ht mista.enly thin. that y is the case& L(viously, there is a point in the co+nitive development of 31$63 youn+ children ?hen they come to understand the e9istence of false (eliefs& The purpose of the tests is to find out ?hen this typically happens 8n one e9periment, for e9ample, children sa? a closed candy (o9& @hen they opened it, it turned out that there ?ere pencils inside it, rather than the candy they had (een e9pectin+& The children ?ere as.ed ?hat another person ?ould thin. ?as in the (o9 at first, (efore they opened it& Three year3olds consistently said that the children ?ould thin. there ?ere pencils in the (o9& They did not understand that the other person>s (elief could (e false (Ropni. 1555, ":5)& 0o, in a series of ?ell3.no?n tests, children are sho?n person P puttin+ an o(Kect L in place /& /fter P leaves, L is relocated in place )& 0o P has a false (elief that L is still in place / ?hen in fact it is no? in place )& @hen as.ed ?here P ?ill loo. for L ?hen he comes (ac., children a+ed under four ?ill ?ron+ly say ) they are una(le to infer a false (elief& Children a+ed over four ?ill typically +ive the ri+ht ans?er, /, althou+h the Kury is out on ?hether this is (ecause they have developed a theory of mind or ?hether they have simply +otten (etter at simulation& 8nfants demonstrate that they perceive persons as essentially different >o(Kects> from anythin+ nonlivin+ and nonhuman (Trevarthen 1555, $1%)& Children have to develop a sense of others& They have to (ecome accustomed to the fact that the ?orld is aspectual it is perceived under different aspects& 0ome people ?ill ?ron+ly thin. that there is candy in the (o9C others ?ill .no? that there are pencils& 0ome people ?ill thin. that o(Kect L is in place /, some in place )& These (eliefs e9ist independently of the actual presence of candy or pencils& To function efficiently, ?e have to appreciate, if only fleetin+ly, ?hat the ?orld is li.e for people ?ho thin. differently a(out it from us& 8n the same ?ay, readers read novels (y seein+ the story?orld as aspectual different characters e9perience the story?orld differently& Pip and Ma+?ich have shoc.in+ly disparate e9periences of their reunion& -arratives cannot (e understood unless the story?orld is understood as a comple9, ever3chan+in+ intermin+lin+ of the individual narratives of the various characters in it& -orman Freeman discusses ?hether or not youn+ preschool children can compute an a+ent>s false (elief in the conte9t of computin+ the a+ent>s action$plan (1556, "!)& / character>s action plan can only (e understood in terms of that character>s ?hole em(edded narrative&

This empathetic activity can (e thou+ht of as a .ind of adult play& /ccordin+ to 4ere. )olton, play can (e used to e9periment ?ith diverse circumstances, emotions, (eliefs, capacities, tas.sC to try out perspectives and activities different from the child>s o?n& The play is in a space (et?een reality and the ima+ination& 31$%3 The e9periments are neither in reality nor in thou+ht aloneC the simulations are neither on3 nor off3line (1556, !!0)& This sounds very li.e the activity of readin+ novels& The role of perspectives is crucial to (oth play and readin+& 8n (oth, ?e try out different perspectives to see ?hat they are li.e& @e enter the minds of characters necessarily in order to follo? the plot& )ut it is more than that ?e do it (ecause it is enKoya(le and (ecause it is +ood for us& 8n findin+ out more a(out the minds of others, ?e find out more a(out ourselves& To summariAe, there is a +roup of interrelated de(ates ?ithin philosophy and psycholo+y a(out the relative relia(ility of our .no?led+e of our o?n minds and our .no?led+e of the minds of others& There is a ?ide ran+e of vie?s and a consensus has not emer+ed& Lf course, all of this may seem to the s.eptical reader to (e a very ela(orate statement of the o(vious sometimes ?e are ?ron+ a(out our mental life and sometimes ?e are ri+ht a(out the mental life of others& )ut there is more to it than that& 8 ?ant to emphasiAe the e9istence of this de(ate in order to sho? that many theorists in the fields relatin+ to real minds do not re+ard first3person ascription as the norm from ?hich ?e sometimes accurately depart& They re+ard third3person ascription as the norm from ?hich first3person ascription is derived& @hile 8 am certainly not =ualified to add to that de(ate, 8 ?ould li.e to su++est that the ease ?ith ?hich readers are a(le to employ third3person ascription in order to (uild up a stron+ sense of fictional minds at ?or. su++ests, at the very least, that it is an e9tremely po?erful tool& Ho?ever, my main conclusion is that confident and cate+orical pronouncements a(out the nature of fictional minds should not (e made in i+norance of the rich, insi+htful, and e9citin+, (ut also (e?ilderin+, arcane, and difficult de(ates on the nature of real minds& 3. #he De)elopment of &urposi)e #hought This section and the ne9t ?ill consider fictional minds in the conte9t of the ?or. of four *ussian theorists 2ev Gy+ots.y and /le9ander 2uria on psycholin+uistics in this section and Mi.hail )a.htin and Galentin Golosinov (possi(ly a pseudonym for )a.htin) on discourse analysis in the ne9t& /ll four share the dominant characteristic of *ussian thou+ht follo?in+ the 151; revolution a functional emphasis on the social nature of thou+ht and on the pu(lic nature of apparently private mental life& Gy+ots.y remar.ed that every thou+ht fulfils a function, solves a pro(lem (15"%, !1")& He felt that, in order to e9plain the hi+hly comple9 forms of human consciousness, one must +o (eyond the individual& Lne must see. the ori+ins of conscious activity and (ehavior not in the recesses of the (rain or in the depths of the human spirit (ut in the e9ternal

31$;3 processes of social life and in the historical forms and practices of human e9istence (2uria 15"!, !6)& For )a.htin, a sin+le consciousness is a contradiction in terms consciousness is in essence multiple& He relates this approach more specifically to discourse analysis ?hen he ar+ues that ver(al discourse is a social phenomenon (15"1, !65)& This theme is developed in a satisfyin+ and lo+ical ?ay across a num(er of different disciplines& Gy+ots.y made the initial (rea.throu+h in the late 15!0s and early 15:0s ?ith his theory of the development of inner speech in onto#enesis (in this conte9t, the co+nitive development of children)& 2uria then developed this insi+ht (y relatin+ it to a lar+e num(er of different areas in psycholo+y and psycholin+uistics& To+ether, they provide a scientific perspective on the more sociolo+ical, political, discursive, and literary treatments of the social (asis of thou+ht in the ?or. of Golosinov and )a.htin& Golosinov dra?s out some of the philosophical and political implications in his theories of the dialo+ic nature of the utterance and relates these implications to analyses of various forms of discourse& )a.htin ta.es this approach one sta+e further durin+ his discussions of the te9ts of 4ostoevs.y and others& He uses the (asic theoretical underpinnin+ provided (y the other three in order to redefine the ta9onomies of fictional discourse and to raise a num(er of more +eneral issues relatin+ to the novel& The insi+hts of )a.htin on, for e9ample, dialo+icality and dou(levoiced discourse (enefit from (ein+ seen ?ithin the psycholin+uistic conte9t of Gy+ots.y and 2uria& 8n Gy+ots.y>s vie?, children are, from the very (e+innin+, social (ein+s& Gy+ots.y ar+ued that children use social speech ri+ht from the start, (oth for communicatin+ ?ith others and for solvin+ pro(lems (2uria 15"!, 106)& 0peech is a pro(lem3solvin+ tool& 2uria contends that for the child any mental act (e+ins as a material action such as the manipulation of an o(Kect& 2ater, inner speech creates the possi(ility of co+nitive action such as the formation of concepts& Therefore, volitional acts such as the manipulation of o(Kects are mediated (y the co+nitive structures formed in inner speech& 8n this ?ay, and as descri(ed in more detail later, mental action is seen as a process that is social in ori+in and structure (2uria 15"!, 10%)& 8n 2uria>s vie?, lan+ua+e has a third function in addition to its co+nitive function (the need to formulate thou+ht) and its communicative function (the communication of information in pu(lic speech) its directive function, the role of inner speech in monitorin+ and controllin+ our actions& He comments that the ?ord not only reflects reality, it also re+ulates our (ehavior (15"!, 50)& 8n their analysis of onto+enesis, Gy+ots.y and 2uria point out that the com 31$"3

municative (ehavior of the mother, such as la(elin+ and pointin+ +estures, focuses the child>s attention (y sin+lin+ out one particular o(Kect from other, e=ually attractive parts of the environment& The child>s attention ceases to o(ey the rules of natural and patterned refle9es and (e+ins to (e su(ordinated to the speech of the adult& The mother>s speech there(y (ecomes a stron+ social stimulus that +ives rise to a sta(le and orientin+ response in the child and that inhi(its the child>s more elementary and instinctive responses& They ar+ue that the care+iver>s speech does not +ain these po?ers immediately& The formation in the child of the directive function that is characteristic of adult inner speech +oes throu+h a lon+ and dramatic development (2uria 15"!, 50#51)& 4urin+ the ne9t sta+e of co+nitive development, the child transforms the interpsycholo+ical activity of the relationship to the mother into his or her o?n intrapsycholo+ical process of self3re+ulation& This is ?hen the child learns to spea. and (e+ins to +ive ver(al commands to him or herself& This speech is e9ternal and out loud, (ut it is still private speech in the sense that its purpose is not communication ?ith others, (ut re+ulation of oneself& Private speech is the term used for directive speech that is out loud& 8nner speech is the term used for directive speech that later +oes in?ard and (ecomes silent& /t first, this out loud private speech accompanies the child>s activity& /t a later sta+e, it precedes it, there(y ena(lin+ the child to plan activity in advance (2uria 15"!, "5#50)& Private speech (ecomes an important tool for self3re+ulation as children use lan+ua+e to plan, +uide, and monitor their activities& 8n the earliest sta+es of private speech, it cannot (e clearly differentiated in either its form or its function from social, communicative speech& The formal and functional differentiations (et?een the re+ulatory and the communicative roles occur only +radually& Ho?ever, as the /merican psycholin+uist Euan *amireA emphasiAes, the crucial point is that Gy+ots.y and 2uria esta(lished that out loud, private speech is the overt and o(serva(le precursor of covert, inner speech or ver(al thin.in+ (155!, 155)& Gy+ots.y ar+ues that this private speech disappears at a(out the a+e of five ?hen inner speech (e+ins to develop& From this, ?e can infer that private speech (ecomes inner speech& This is part of the transition from the collective activity of the child to more individualiAed (ehavior& Ho?ever, the functions of private speech and the later inner speech are the same& Gy+ots.y stresses that in (oth cases they do not merely accompany the child>s activity, they serve mental orientation and conscious understandin+, and there(y help to overcome difficulties (15"%, !!% #!")& Gy+ots.y states that speech for oneself ori+inates throu+h differentiation from speech ?ith others& /lthou+h the child>s first speech is speech to others, private speech derives from this early communicative speech& Lnce this 31$53 division of function occurs, the structural and functional =ualities of private speech (ecome more mar.ed as the child develops& 8n other ?ords, private speech (ecomes more and more different from communicative speech as time +oes on& /t three years old, there is no difference (et?een private and social speech& /t seven years old, they are totally dissimilar& /s the child +ro?s older, the vocaliAation of private speech (ecomes

unnecessary& 8n fact, as thou+ht (ecomes more comple9 and as the structural peculiarities of private speech +ro?, vocaliAation ultimately (ecomes impossi(le& /s Gy+ots.y puts it, speech for oneself cannot find e9pression in e9ternal speech (15"%, !!5#:0)& 2uria o(serves that, ?hen children encounter impediments, they first ma.e some attempt to solve the pro(lem in the practical sphere and then transfer these attempts to the ver(al sphere in the form of the co+nitive tool of private speech& This speech tends to (e used first to descri(e the settin+ and state the difficulty and then to (e+in to plan a possi(le solution& L(servation sho?s that private speech starts in a very e9panded form and then +radually (ecomes more and more a((reviated, finally turnin+ into ?hispered speech in ?hich children haltin+ly descri(e the difficulty of the situation in ?hich they find themselves& /s e9ternal, private speech disappears alto+ether, it is only (y ?atchin+ lip movements that the psycholo+ist can surmise that the speech has turned in?ard ?hile still retainin+ all its analytical, plannin+, and re+ulative functions (2uria 15"!, 10$#%)& The e9istence of the independent, volitional act essentially involves the su(ordination of the older child>s (ehavior, not any lon+er to the speech of an adult, (ut to their o?n inner speech& 2uria comments that for a lon+ time inner speech ?as mista.enly considered simply as speech to oneself that retained the +eneral structure of e9ternal speech (ut ?ith an unclear function (15"!, 10$)& The *ussian theorists ma.e it clear that in their vie? its function is selfre+ulation& 0o, private vocal speech, instead of disappearin+, +oes under+round durin+ the later sta+es of a child>s co+nitive development and (ecomes the co+nitive tool of inner speech& To summariAe, Gy+ots.y>s su(stantial contri(ution to our understandin+ of the development of thou+ht ?as threefold& First, he sa? that co+nitive activity is social as ?ell as individual& He asserted that hi+her mental functions appear first on the social, or >intermental> plane#often in the form of Koint adult3child# pro(lem3solvin+ activity#and only then emer+e on the intramental individual plane (@ertsch 1555, ";")& 0econd, he stressed the importance of cultural, mediational tools for co+nition& He formulated intermental and intramental functionin+ in terms of semiotic mediation (@ertsch 1555, ";5) (y developin+ a sociohistorical approach to co+nitive development that emphasiAed the ?ay 31603 in ?hich development is constructed throu+h social interaction, cultural practices, and the internaliAation of co+nitive tools (Holyoa. 1555, 9liii)& Finally, Gy+ots.y realiAed the particular importance of the tool of lan+ua+e in this process& He emphasiAed social interaction thou+h lan+ua+e in the development of children>s concepts (Holyoa. 1555, 9liii)& Gy+ots.y>s vie?s are intri+uin+ly reminiscent of this famous remar. (y @itt+enstein 8f a lion could tal., ?e could not understand him (156", !!:)& The (ac.+round to this characteristically +nomic remar. is @itt+enstein>s notion of forms of life& He ar+ues that to ima+ine a lan+ua+e means to ima+ine a form of life (156", ") and that the spea9in# of lan+ua+e is part of an activity, or of a form of life (156", 11)& The concept

of a form of life is really a restatement in different terms of the *ussian emphasis on the social situatedness of consciousness& The thou+ht and lan+ua+e of the individual arise out of, and are necessarily oriented to?ard, the social +roup to ?hich they (elon+& Their thou+ht and lan+ua+e can only (e +rasped in terms of an understandin+ of the ?ays in ?hich that social +roup functions and the means (y ?hich individuals ?ithin the culture relate to one another& 8f ?e do not understand the form of life of the lion, ?e ?ill not understand its lan+ua+e& 8f ?e do not understand the forms of life that e9ist in the story?orlds of fictional characters, ?e ?ill not fully understand their inner lan+ua+e, their use of co+nitive tools, or their intermental relations ?ith other characters& The le+acy of Gy+ots.y>s thou+ht is a fruitful one His insi+ht that historical, cultural, and institutional conte9ts condition learnin+ (y identifyin+ and e9tendin+ the child>s capacities animates several ecolo+ical approaches in psycholo+y (0per(er and Hirschfeld 1555, c99iii)& His influence on a ?hole school of psycholin+uists such as the /merican Eames @ertsch is immeasura(le& For e9ample, recent ?or. ?ith youn+ children su++ests that the notion +roup may developmentally precede the notion of self (Hirschfeld 1555, 6"0), and such ?or. is deeply influenced (y Gy+ots.y& Gy+ots.y>s influence also has implications for the first3 and third3person ascription de(ate referred to earlier& 8f the notion of a +roup developmentally precedes the notion of self, then it seems at least possi(le that the a(ility to ascri(e mental phenomena to others could precede the hi+hly self3conscious process of ascri(in+ them to oneself& 8t is @ertsch>s vie? that the discipline of psycholo+y seems less capa(le than ever of providin+ a coherent account of the human mind& 8n his vie?, psycholo+ists .no? a +reat deal a(out isolated mental processes and s.ills (ut seem incapa(le of +eneratin+ an overall picture of mental functionin+& Therefore, they have very little to say a(out ?hat it means to (e human in the modern ?orld 31613 (1551, 1)& @ertsch holds that one e9ample of an attempt to provide a coherent account can (e found in the ?or. of *ussian scholars (et?een the revolution of 151; and the 0talinist pur+es of the mid 15:0s& He su++ests that theorists such as Gy+ots.y and )a.htin tried to deal ?ith practical issues that e9tended across disciplinary (oundaries& /s a result, they com(ined ideas from a ran+e of ?hat are no? considered as =uite separate disciplines (@ertsch 1551, $#6)& 8t is ?elcome ne?s that the interdisciplinary approach that @ertsch advocates is no? (ein+ employed (y a variety of postclassical narrative theorists&

4. Dialogic #hought The (revity of this section is not a fair reflection of )a.htin>s importance in the study of the fictional mind& Ln the contrary, this section is short only (ecause )a.htin>s theories have (ecome ?ell .no?n and ?ell accepted, and the purpose of this (oo. is, as 8 have said, to introduce some unfamiliar ideas into narrative theory& The previous section concentrated on the psycholin+uistic approach of Gy+ots.y and 2uria to the =uestion of inner speech& This section ?ill (roaden the perspective and include some of the more +eneral discursive and literary ideas that are contained in the ?or. of Golosinov and )a.htin& 8 ?ill start ?ith Golosinov>s notion of the utterance& The term is intended to convey the fact that every speech event, (oth e9ternal and inner speech, ta.es place in a social conte9t, has an actual or potential audience, and, ultimately, has a political meanin+& 8t is an element in the never3 endin+ dialo+ue (et?een individuals in a social +roup& Therefore, the technical issues relatin+ to such phenomena as inner speech can only (e fully understood ?ithin the ?ider social conte9t& For e9ample, Golosinov ar+ues that it is only (y ascertainin+ the forms of ?hole utterances and the forms of dialo+ic speech that li+ht can (e shed on the forms of inner speech (15;:, :")& The perspective introduced (y the use of the term the utterance is important (ecause it relates internal consciousness to pra+matics, the study of the various uses of speech in their social and discursive conte9ts, and therefore (y e9tension also to the study of characters> motives, teleolo+y, and plot& For this reason, it is necessary to e9amine precisely ho? the inner utterance is situated ?ithin, and is oriented to?ard, the social +roup ?ithin ?hich it ta.es place& Lne interface is @itt+enstein>s notion of forms of life& The lan+ua+e and thou+ht of an individual can only (e understood (y studyin+ the ?hole form of life of that individual& /nother interface is action the point at ?hich characters> em(edded narratives meet in pu(lic and social conte9ts& These perspectives emphasiAe the dialo+ic nature of characters> em(edded narratives and the nature of the fictional story?orld as 316!3 a (attle+round ?ithin ?hich the thou+hts and actions of individuals contend and clash& Golosinov>s position is that the ?ord is al?ays oriented to?ard an addressee& 8n the a(sence of a real addressee, as in the internal ?ord of inner speech, the presupposed addressee is a normal representative of the spea.er>s social +roup& 0o, each person>s inner ?orld and thou+ht has its sta(iliAed social audience that comprises the environment in ?hich reasons, motives, and values are fashioned (Golosinov 15;:, "6#"%)& Golosinov>s use of the term audience must (e understood in =uite a ?ide sense not literally, as passive recipients of another>s ?ord, (ut more ?idely as the other participants in the relationships that the character forms in the story?orld& The lan+ua+e used (y Golosinov to descri(e

individual consciousness encoura+es the analyst of the fictional mind to loo. (eyond particular mental events ta.en in isolation and to e9amine the ?hole conte9t of mental action in the story?orld& This is the dialo+ic relationship (et?een consciousnesses, to use )a.htin>s term& /ccordin+ to )a.htin, consciousness never +ravitates to?ard itself (ut is al?ays found in intense relationship ?ith another consciousness& 8n this ?ay, every e9perience, every thou+ht that a character has, is internally dialo+ic, filled ?ith stru++le, and is open to inspiration from outside itself& 8t is never concentrated simply on itself, (ut is al?ays accompanied (y a continual side?ays +lance at another individual& He ar+ues that every thou+ht senses itself to (e from the very (e+innin+ a reKoinder in an unfinished dialo+ue (15"$, :!)& His dialo+ic ima+ination, to use the title +iven to a collection of his essays, is a lo+ical culmination of Gy+ots.y>s and 2uria>s theories on the ori+in and function of inner speech and Golosinov>s stress on the social situatedness of the utterance& )a.htin descri(es his notion of the dialo+ic or polyphonic novel (y notin+ that the chief characteristic of 4ostoevs.y>s novels is the +enuine polyphony that results from a plurality of independent, unmer+ed, and fully valid voices and consciousnesses& @hat unfolds in his novels, accordin+ to )a.htin, is not a multitude of characters and fates e9istin+ in a sin+le o(Kective ?orld that is illuminated (y a sin+le authorial consciousness& (This is the monolo#ic novel&) *ather, there are a num(er of consciousnesses ?ith e=ual ri+hts and each ?ith its o?n ?orld com(ined (ut not mer+ed in the events of the story?orld ()a.htin 15"$, %)& (This is the dialo#ic novel&) )a.htin means (y his use of the term voices not Kust a mi9ture of different le9ical re+isters or speech patterns, (ut also a clash of ?orld3vie?s and ideolo+ical positions& For e9ample, he states that a social lan+ua+e is a concrete, sociolin+uistic (elief system that defines a distinct identity for itself& 8n ?hat )a.htin calls an authentic novel (a synonym for the 316:3 dialo+ic and polyphonic novel), the reader can sense (ehind each utterance the elemental force of social lan+ua+es ?ith their internal lo+ic and internal necessity (15"1, :6%)& )a.htin lin.s this approach to the notion of the utterance (y su++estin+ that, ?ithin the arena of every utterance, an intense interaction and stru++le (et?een one>s o?n ?ord and the ?ord of another>s is ?a+ed, a process in ?hich they oppose or dialo+ically inter3animate each other (15"1, :6$)& These ideas are of +reat importance to the em(edded narrative approach to fictional minds& They sho? that )a.htin conceives of polyphony not simply as a com(ination of the characteristic speech patterns of the various characters in the story?orld, (ut as the presentation of the ideolo+ical stru++le (et?een the various ?orld vie?points of individuals ?ithin a social +roup& He also sees the narrator as en+a+ed in this stru++le and not aloof from it& For e9ample, he comments that the speech of another, once enclosed in a conte9t such as a narrative and no matter ho? accurately descri(ed, is al?ays su(Kect to certain semantic chan+es& The conte9t that em(races another>s ?ord is responsi(le for its dialo+iAin+ (ac.+round ()a.htin 15"1, :$0)& 8t is in this ?ay that narrators are al?ays en+a+ed ?ith, and there(y alterin+ the meanin+ of, the discourses of their

characters& These ideas form the (ac.+round to )a.htin>s famous notion of dou(le3voiced discourse& The comple9 meanin+s that )a.htin attaches to his notions of the ?ord, the utterance, dialo+icality, and polyphony all overlap to a considera(le e9tent ?ith the theory of em(edded narratives (oth the dialo+ic approach and the em(edded narrative approach situate individual consciousness in its social conte9tC use a functional approach to?ard characters> mindsC analyAe the ?hole of a character>s mind and not Kust his or her inner speechC esta(lish throu+h discourse analysis precisely ho? this is achieved in narrativesC and sho? ho? the novel can (e seen as an interconnection of the em(edded narratives, or dialo+ic consciousnesses, of its various characters& 8t is necessary here to refer to an important methodolo+ical issue that arises from the monolo+ic7dialo+ic distinction& 8n After 6a9htin, 4avid 2od+e su++ests that )a.htin started ?ith the vie? that the novel ?as (asically monolo+ic for most of its history and (ecame dialo+ic ?ith 4ostoevs.y& Ho?ever, over time, accordin+ to 2od+e, he chan+ed his vie? and came to re+ard the novel as inherently dialo+ic from the (e+innin+, seein+ the pre34ostoevs.ian novel as already a dialo+ic type of literary discourse& 2od+e ?rites of )a.htin>s first formulation of the notion of the polyphonic novel (in the early mono+raph Problems of Dostoevs9y>s Art) that P?Qhat then seemed to him to (e a uni=ue 316$3 innovation of 4ostoevs.y>s &&& he later came to thin. ?as inherent in the novel as a literary form (1550, !!)& /s an e9ample of the latter position, in the essay 4iscourse in the -ovel )a.htin states that there are t?o distinct lines of development ?ithin the history of the novel& The second line, to ?hich (elon+ the +reatest representatives of the novel as a +enre, incorporates hetero#lossia (yet another synonym for dialo+icality, polyphony, and authenticity) into a novel>s composition and fre=uently resists alto+ether any unmediated and pure authorial discourse (15"1, :;6)& 8 ?ould a+ree ?ith 2od+e that )a.htin never =uite mana+ed to reconcile these t?o accounts (1550, 65)& 8t seems to me that Problems of Dostoevs9y>s Poetics is still, despite his second thou+hts, fairly close to his ori+inal position that the dialo+ic and polyphonic novel (e+an ?ith 4ostoevs.y& 8t is ?ritten in an intensely prescriptive manner, clearly re+ardin+ 4ostoevs.y>s ?or. as intrinsically superior to the ?or. of others (ecause it is dialo+ic in nature ?hile the others are essentially monolo+ic& Ho?ever, li.e others, 8 am usin+ his ?or. at a very a(stract and theoretical level ?ithout referrin+ to his vie?s on particular novelists or historical developments e9cept ?here necessary& The field of vision is one of the most important aspects of the relationship (et?een the narrator and the characters in a narrative& )a.htin>s position is that the information contained in the discourse should (e presented not ?ithin the sin+le field of vision of the narrator, (ut ?ithin the various fields of vision of a variety of characters& 8n a crucially important statement, he contends that these individual fields of vision#this plurality of consciousness centers#?hich are not reduced to a sin+le ideolo+ical denominator, com(ine in the hi+her unity of the polyphonic novel (15"$, 1%)& 8n esta(lishin+ the importance of the narrator>s democratic treatment of the characters> various fields of vision, )a.htin is

emphasiAin+ that the narrator should not have any surplus of vision over and a(ove that ?hich is availa(le to the characters& His point is usually re?orded as sayin+ that it is desira(le for narrators to use internal focaliAation rather than Aero focaliAation or omniscient narration& Ho?ever, 8 thin. that the concept of the field of vision can (e e9tended in other, e=ually interestin+ ?ays& Eust as )a.htin>s concept of the ?ord can (e re?orded in terms of em(edded narratives, so can the notion of the field of vision& The ?ord of a character does not Kust mean a re+ional accent, and the field of vision does not simply mean visual perception& 8t means each character>s .no?led+e, (eliefs, perceptions, memories, ha(its of thou+ht, intentions, purposes, and plans& 8t is each character>s ?hole mind in action& 8t is ?hat determines a character>s actions and ?hat is then modified (y 31663 the conse=uences of those actions& 8t is the story of the narrative as it e9ists in the mind of each character& The narrative can therefore (e analyAed in terms of the intersectin+, evolvin+, and conflictin+ fields of vision that comprise it& )a.htin>s theories have implications for the study of teleolo+y (ecause they appear to do?n+rade its importance or at least redefine the term in a ?ay that is very different from its normal use& Ln the face of it, he seems to (e very dismissive of the notions of plot and desi+n& He states that the ordinary pra+matic lin.s at the level of plot#?hether o(Kective or psycholo+ical#are insufficient (ecause they presuppose that characters have (ecome fi9ed elements in the narrator>s desi+n& 0uch lin.s (ind and com(ine finaliAed ima+es of people in the unity of a monolo+ically perceived ?orld& )a.htin states of 4ostoevs.y that the ultimate clamps that hold his ?orld to+ether are different (ecause the fundamental event that is revealed in his novels does not lend itself to an ordinary pra+matic interpretation of plot (15"$, ;)& )a.htin>s point is that, ?hen characters are not o(Kects of authorial discourse (ut su(Kects of their o?n, they are not e9hausted (y the usual functions of characteriAation and plot development (15"$, ;)& There is nothin+ merely thin+3li.e, no mere matter, no o(Kects, there are solely su(Kects ()a.htin 15"$, !:;)& 8t is difficult to com(ine su(Kects into a plot structure ?ithout compromisin+ their su(Kectivity (ecause they ?ould then (ecome simply elements in a narrative frame?or.& This dan+er can (e avoided if the idea of plot includes some notion of the multiplicity of characters> discourses and therefore (ecomes a more or+anic and fle9i(le concept than the traditional approach& Part of the competence that is re=uired of the reader is to enter the story?orld of the narrative and there(y ta.e part in the illusion that fictional characters are individuals ?ith as much freedom and autonomy of movement as real people have& /t the same time, readers .no? that the narrative is a semiotic construction and that its endin+ has (een predetermined& 0o, it is possi(le to ar+ue that the reader must (e a(le to maintain simultaneously the t?o irreconcila(le elements of freedom and teleolo+y and that this a(ility is an inescapa(le and essential component of the a(ility to read novels& 8t could (e ar+ued that monolo+ic novels are those in ?hich readers ?ill find that desi+n predominates over freedom& 8n dialo+ic novels, readers ?ill find that a satisfyin+ (alance (et?een the

t?o elements can (e maintained& Freedom can (e discovered (y readers> constructions of characters> em(edded narrativesC desi+n can (e discovered (y readin+ the novel as a com(ination of those em(edded narratives& To summariAe, the ?or. of the four *ussian theorists provides part of the theoretical (asis for a ne? approach to?ard the analysis of presentations of 316%3 fictional minds in novels& /n essential element in this initial theoretical ?or. is the social (asis of thou+ht& /nother is the purposive and directive nature of consciousness& /n occurrence of inner speech is an utterance, a socially situated, pra+matic element in the continuous dialo+ue that e9ists (et?een all individuals in a social +roup (ecause it is an e9pression of an individual>s needs, desires, ?ishes, and hopes as defined a+ainst those of others& 8t is not possi(le to have intentions, purposes, and plans ?ithout specifyin+ them in terms of the competin+ intentions and plans of others& The ?or. of Gy+ots.y and 2uria on real minds can (e used for this purpose as can the ?or. of Golosinov and )a.htin on fictional minds in narrative discourses& ". #he ,ind Beyond the Skin Jou may remem(er that 8 first used this stran+e phrase in chapter 1, section !& 8 did so then so that it ?ould rever(erate in your mind until the time came to e9plain its meanin+ in more detail here& Gariants of the phrase have appealed to a num(er of theorists The s.in is not that important as a (oundary ()& F& 0.inner 15%$, "$)C The net?or. is not (ounded (y the s.in (ut includes all e9ternal path?ays alon+ ?hich information can travel ()ateson 15;!, :15)C 8 try to dissolve the (oundaries of the s.in and present navi+ation ?or. as a system of interactions amon+ media (oth inside and outside the individual (Hutchins 1556, 9vii)C and once the he+emony of s.in and s.ull is usurped, ?e may (e a(le to see ourselves more truly as creatures of the ?orld (Clar. and Chalmers 155", 1")& 8n +oices of the -ind (1551), the /merican psycholin+uist, Eames @ertsch has e9tended the ?or. of Gy+ots.y and )a.htin (y usin+ the notion of mediated action to e9plain ho? the mind can e9tend (eyond the s.in& Mediated action involves thou+ht ?ith the aid of tools& 8n this section, 8 ?ill refer initially and very (riefly to one tool, lan+ua+e, (ecause this topic has (een e9plored in considera(le detail already& /fter a rather lon+er discussion of the second tool, physically distri(uted co+nition, 8 ?ill devote more space to the third and most important for my purposes socially distri(uted thou+ht or intermental thin.in+&

/ fundamental assumption of @ertsch>s sociocultural approach to mind is that ?hat is to (e descri(ed and e9plained is human action& People are vie?ed as comin+ into contact ?ith and creatin+ their surroundin+s as ?ell as themselves throu+h the actions in ?hich they en+a+e (@ertsch 1551, ")& His is an approach to ho? the mind actually ?or.s in practice in the real ?orld& 8t ta.es the study of thou+ht out of the la(oratory and into the sorts of situations in ?hich actual thou+ht ta.es place& @ertsch stresses that (oth Gy+ots.y and )a.htin (elieved 316;3 that it is social and communicative practices that +ive rise to mental functionin+& He =uotes Gy+ots.y>s remar. that the social dimension of consciousness is primary in time and in fact& The individual dimension of consciousness is derivative and secondary (1551, 1:)& The sociocultural approach that Eames @ertsch applies to real minds can (e used to analyAe fictional minds& @ertsch points out that his approach (e+ins ?ith the assumption that action cannot (e separated from the milieu in ?hich it is carried out and that any analysis of it must (e lin.ed in some ?ay to specific cultural, historical, and institutional factors (1551, 1")& Lnce a fictional mind is vie?ed as a su(Kective narrative that is em(edded in the discourse that descri(es the ?hole story?orld of the novel, then an analysis of that mind must necessarily lin. it to the cultural, historical, and institutional aspects of the story?orld& Characters are elements in a fictional structure and have no meanin+ outside of it& The character of Bmma is simply a part of the structure of (mma& This can, in a sense, (e re+arded as the social dimension of fictional consciousness& Lf course, the character of Bmma is understood (y the reader to have private thou+hts, (ut this individual dimension of the character>s consciousness is derivative and secondary (ecause Bmma>s private thou+hts ac=uire meanin+ only as part of the story?orld of Bmma& @ertsch refers to the mind as a .it of mediational tools such as lan+ua+e and he ar+ues that the mind e9tends (eyond the s.in in several ?ays throu+h the notion of mediated action (1551, 1$)& He emphasiAes that mental functionin+ is shaped or even defined (y the mediational means that it employs& Bven ?hen individuals thin. in isolation, it is inherently social (ecause it ta.es place ?ith the help of mediational tools such as lan+ua+e and also other tools such as computers or num(er systems& Lf these, o(viously the shared social process of lan+ua+e is the most important tool (@ertsch 1551, 1$#16)& The diversity of these tools e9plains the hetero+eneity of ver(al thin.in+ and the co+nitive pluralism that can (e found (oth across and ?ithin different cultures& The tool .it approach allo?s +roup and conte9tual differences in mediated action to (e understood in terms of the array of mediational means to ?hich people have access and in terms of their patterns of choice in selectin+ a particular means for a particular occasion (@ertsch 1551, 5:#5$)& / study of characters> mental functionin+ necessarily entails a study of the mediational tools, includin+ lan+ua+e in the form of inner speech, that they use to achieve their ends& For e9ample, as 8 e9plained in chapter $, -eumann points out in her analysis of Pride and Pre1udice that BliAa(eth )ennet>s mind is presented as hi+hly ver(al, intelli+ent, rational, articulate, and self3conscious& )y contrast, 2ydia )ennet>s mind is visual, unselfconscious, and inarticulate (15"%, :"$)& Put in @ertsch>s

316"3 terms, 2ydia>s mediational tool.it is very different from and much more limited than BliAa(eth>s tool.it& Co+nition is the act or process of .no?in+ and ac=uirin+ .no?led+e, and physically distributed co#nition or situated co#nition can (e defined as follo?s 0ituated co+nition and learnin+ is the study of co+nition ?ithin its natural conte9t& This perspective emphasiAes that individual minds usually operate ?ithin environments that structure, direct, and support co+nitive processes& P8tQ ar+ues that the nature of co+nitive processin+ is uni=uely determined ?ithin its conte9t, and that it cannot (e studied in isolation ?ithout destroyin+ its definin+ properties&&&& The social environment also influences co+nition throu+h the presence of other minds to influence, assist, mislead, demonstrate, =uestion, and raise other perspectives (0eifert 1555, ;%;)& The psycholo+ist Bd?in Hutchins has demonstrated ho? the co+nitive processes involved in flyin+ a plane do not ta.e place Kust in the pilot>s head (ut are distri(uted throu+hout the coc.pit, in the mem(ers of the cre?, the control panel and the manuals (0per(er and Hirschfeld 1555, c99iv)& -ote ho? the physically distri(uted aspects (the coc.pit, the control panel, and the manuals) are considered to+ether ?ith the socially distri(uted aspects (the other mem(ers of the cre?)& /lthou+h they can (e difficult to separate in comple9 environments, it should (e (orne in mind that they are lo+ically distinct& For the moment then, 8 ?ill stay ?ith physically distri(uted co+nitive systems the use of the environment as an aid to co+nition& This does not Kust mean ta.in+ the environment as it is in order to aid co+nitions, it means in addition creatin+ an environment that acts as efficiently as possi(le as such an aid& /s Hutchins says in Co#nition in the Wild (1556), the environments of human thin.in+ are not >natural> environments& They are artificial throu+h and throu+h& Humans create their co+nitive po?ers (y creatin+ the environments in ?hich they e9ercise those po?ers (1556, 9vi)& 4istri(uted co+nitive systems consist in the main of co#nitive artifacts, ?hich are physical o(Kects made (y humans for the purpose of aidin+, enhancin+, or improvin+ co+nition (Hutchins 1555, 1!%)& 4avid Herman has ta.en the notion of co+nitive artifacts in an une9pected and thou+ht3provo.in+ direction in 0tories as a Tool for Thin.in+ (!00:) (y ar+uin+ that narrative itself is a mediational tool and a co+nitive artifact& 8n fact, he +oes further, and in ar+uin+ that narrative (rid+es self and other, he su++ests that it is a tool or artifact that aids the socially distri(uted or situated co+nition that 8 ?ill discuss later& 8n Herman>s ?ords, narrative teaches me that 8 do not .no? my ?orld if 8 consider myself someho? outside of or (eyond that ?orld (!00:, 1"6)& 31653 4aniel 4ennett puts situated co+nition at the center of human co+nition +enerally (y su++estin+ that the primary source of our intelli+ence is our ha(it of off$loadin# as much as possi(le of our co+nitive tas.s into the environment itself#e9trudin+ our minds (that is, our mental proKects and

activities) into the surroundin+ ?orld, ?here a host of peripheral devices ?e construct can store, process, and re3represent our meanin+s, streamlinin+, enhancin+, and protectin+ the processes of transformation that are our thin.in+ (155%, 1:$# 6)& For e9ample, the la(elin+ of o(Kects and our use of them as landmar.s reduce the co+nitive load on perception and memory& 4iscussin+ such tools as address (oo.s, paper and pens, li(raries, note(oo.s, and computers, 4ennett asserts that a human mind is not only not limited to the (rain (ut ?ould (e rather severely disa(led if these e9ternal tools ?ere removed (155%, 1$$)& /s a vivid e9ample of situated co+nition, he points out that old people often function much (etter ?hen they are still in their old home rather than in the ne? and unfamiliar environment of a nursin+ home (ecause of the presence of ultrafamiliar landmar.s, tri++ers for ha(its, reminders of ?hat to do, ?here to find the food and so forth& 4ennett>s conclusion is that PtQa.in+ them out of their homes is literally separatin+ them from lar+e parts of their minds (155%, 1:"#:5)& The concept of situated co+nition is a lot more than the simple acceptance of the fact that ?e use tools& 8t is a reco+nition of the fact that our minds e9tend (eyond the (oundary of our s.in and encompass the co+nitive tools that ?e use& ,ltimately, our minds are distri(uted co+nitive systems& /t the time of my ?ritin+ these ?ords, the computer that 8 am usin+ is as much a part of my mind as the neurons, a9ons, and synapses in my (rain& 8n fact, even ?hen 8 stop typin+, this @ord document ?ill remain a part of my mind& Considerin+ ho? much effort my mind has put into it, ho? could it not (eI 8n )alAac>s (u#enie 8randet, the old miser, Bu+enie>s father, is a +ood e9ample of a situated or distri(uted co+nitive system& His house, his estate, his (elon+in+s, and his hoard of +old comprise his mind in action& @ithout them, his mind ?ould shrivel to nothin+& 8n a sense, they are him& There are a num(er of different ?ays in ?hich the physically distri(uted =uality of fictional minds can (e e9pressed in the discourse& Lne is the mode of free indirect perception& The use of this mode emphasiAes that events in the physical story?orld are aspectual they are e9perienced (y characters& 0o physical events do not e9ist in isolation from characters> perceptions and resultin+ co+nitions, they e9ist in relation to them& /spects of the physical ?orld (ecome part of the individual narratives of the characters ?ho are perceivin+ them& The minds of those characters are e9tended in this ?ay to include ?ithin them the physical phenomena of the story?orld& 31%03 Clar. and Chalmers dra? out an important implication of the concept of situated co+nition& They e9plain that there is a +ro?in+ (ody of research in co+nitive science in ?hich co+nition is often ta.en to (e continuous ?ith processes in the environment& Thus, in seein+ co+nition as e9tended, one is not merely ma.in+ a terminolo+ical decisionC it ma.es a si+nificant difference to the methodolo+y of scientific investi+ation (155", 10)& 8n fact, one can ta.e their point further& The decision ?hether to consider the mind as somethin+ that is (ounded (y the s.in and that ma.es use of tools or ?hether to consider the mind as somethin+ that e9tends (eyond the s.in and that includes tools ?ithin its meanin+, is not simply a methodolo+ical choice& 8t determines ?hat is considered as a le+itimate su(Kect for study& @ithin narrative theory, re+ardin+ fictional minds as

e9tended ma.es a si+nificant difference to the methodolo+y of analysis of novels& 8n particular, it materially affects ?hat is considered as an e9ample of presentation of consciousness& 8 mention in my discussion of the novel +ile 6odies in chapter ; that many of my e9amples of presentations of fictional minds ?ould not (e considered as e9amples of fictional thou+ht at all ?ithin the speech cate+ory paradi+m& 8 ?ill no? (e concerned ?ith socially rather than physically situated or distri(uted thou+ht& This notion is a fundamental element in @ertsch>s conceptual frame?or.& He states, for e9ample, that the terms mind and mental action can (e used a(out +roups of people as ?ell as individuals (@ertsch 1551, 1$)& 0o, it is appropriate to say of +roups of people that they thin. or that they remem(er& /s @ertsch puts it, a dyad (that is, t?o people ?or.in+ as a system) can carry out such functions as pro(lem solvin+ on an intermental plane (1551, !;)& This is intermental thou+ht, as opposed to intramental thou+ht, ?hich is individual thin.in+& Clar. and Chalmers, for the (ul. of their illuminatin+ essay, discuss the physically distri(uted co+nition of tools such as computers and note(oo.s to illustrate their case& Ho?ever, they then as., @hat a(out socially e9tended co+nitionI Could my mental states (e partly constituted (y the states of other thin.ersI @e see no reason ?hy not, in principle& 8n an unusually interdependent couple, it is entirely possi(le that one partner>s (eliefs ?ill play the same sort of role for the other as a note(oo. plays for Pa sufferer of memory lossQ (155", 1;)& 0ocially e9tended co+nition seems to me to (e a necessary element in the ?ider notion of +enerally e9tended co+nition& 8n fact, 8 ?ould +o further than Clar. and Chalmers& They are limitin+ their e9ample to an unusually interdependent couple (ecause they are as.in+ ?hether an individual>s mental states can (e 31%13 partly constituted (y another>s& Ho?ever, ?e could also as. a much less ri+orous =uestion such as, Can t?o or more minds form a co+nitive unit of ?hatever sort, ho?ever casual and ephemeralI 8f ?e +o do?n that road, then this much more open and inclusive approach ?ill, 8 thin., produce a rich and su++estive (ody of evidence& The numerous e9amples of socially e9tended fictional thou+ht from +ile 6odies that are discussed in chapter ; are simply the start of the research pro+ram& Jou may remem(er that 8 said in chapter $, section 6 that the ?or. done there on states of mind ?ould +ain added si+nificance later ?hen an emphasis on dispositions rather than immediate consciousness ?ould ma.e the idea of the e9tended mind more palata(le& Clar. and Chalmers pursue the role of states of mind in the notion of socially e9tended thou+ht (y e9plorin+ the concept of an e2tended self 4oes the e9tended mind imply an e9tended selfI 8t seems so& Most of us already accept that the self outstrips the (oundaries of consciousnessC my dispositional (eliefs, for e9ample, constitute in some deep sense part of ?ho 8 am& 8f so, then these (oundaries may also fall (eyond the s.in&&&& P@e areQ (est re+arded

as an e9tended system, a couplin+ of (iolo+ical or+anism and e9ternal resources& To consistently resist this conclusion, ?e ?ould have to shrin. the self into a mere (undle of occurrent states, severely threatenin+ its deep psycholo+ical continuity (155", 1")& 8 ta.e the notion of the e9tended self another sta+e further later in pursin+ the notion of ?hat 8 call situated identity& @hat Clar. and Chalmers call the e2tended mind, other theorists call intersub1ectivity, a term that ?as introduced in chapter 1& Trevarthen defines intersu(Kectivity as the process in ?hich mental activity#includin+ conscious a?areness, motives and intentions, co+nitions, and emotions#is transferred (et?een minds &&& PitQ manifests itself as an immediate sympathetic a?areness of feelin+s and conscious, purposeful intelli+ence in others&&&& Ln it depends cultural learnin+, and the creation of a >social reality> of conventional (eliefs, lan+ua+es, rituals, and technolo+ies (1555, $16#1%)& For e9ample, 0per(er and Hirschfeld retell Eames @ertsch>s story of ho? his dau+hter had lost her shoes and ho? he helped her to remem(er ?here she had left them& @ertsch uses the story to as., @ho remem(ered in this caseI He didn>t since he had no prior information a(out the shoes> location, nor did his dau+hter since she ?as una(le to recall their location ?ithout his intervention (1555, c99iv)& For the purpose of findin+ the shoes, @ertsch and his dau+hter comprised a sin+le co+nitive unit& The e9tended mind can usefully (e related to the theories e9plored in the previous t?o sections& Jou may remem(er that Gy+ots.y and 2uria ar+ue that 31%!3 initially the voluntary act is shared (y t?o people as the child first encounters social speech in the form of the command of the adult& The lan+ua+e of the commands of others then develops into commands to the self, first in e9ternal speech, then in inner speech (2uria 15"!, "5)& Therefore, the directive function in speech develops out of the speech of another the self3commandin+ speech of the child emer+es out of the commands of the care+iver& This is a particularly si+nificant e9ample of intermental thin.in+ (ecause Gy+ots.y and 2uria are ar+uin+ that the very first e9amples of thou+ht in the child are intermental and not as one mi+ht have e9pected intramental thin.in+& 8t is easy to see ho? Golosinov and )a.htin developed their theories of the utterance and dialo+icality from the scientific (asis provided (y Gy+ots.y and 2uria& Put in )a.htinian terms, Gy+ots.y and 2uria>s ar+ument is that in onto+enesis thou+ht arises out of the child>s dialo+ical relationship ?ith its care+iver& @e need to understand the ?ays in ?hich our .no?led+e and our s.ills are constructed (y our dealin+s ?ith others and the technolo+ical and cultural ?e(s in ?hich ?e live, ?or., thin., and communicate& The pro(lem of unravelin+ ?hat is involved in a child>s learnin+ to master a culture and the technolo+y it +enerates is concerned ?ith interactions& Throu+h interactin+ ?e learn ho? to do thin+s and ?e realiAe ?hat needs to (e done& Lf the various types of representations used in the myriad different pro(lem3solvin+ e9ercises that ?e have to ne+otiate, some are internal and in our heads, some e9ist out in the ?orld, and some are in the heads of others& @hat ?e have to do is to e9plore

the many ?ays in ?hich these three types of information flo?, mer+e, alter, and interact and to e9plore ho? co+nition depends on these various relationships& /nd everythin+ that is said here is as true of fictional minds as it is of actual minds& B9amples of intermental thin.in+ ?ere contained in the discussions in chapter :, section $ on the consensus and presupposition su(functions of thou+ht report& This intermental thin.in+ (y +roups is often more po?erful than individual intramental thou+ht& For e9ample, t?o people doin+ a cross?ord to+ether ?ill, especially if they .no? each other>s minds ?ell, do (etter that the sum of their individual, separate efforts& The notion of intermental thin.in+ is o(viously essential to analyses of fictional presentations of close relationships such as friendship, family ties, and, especially, marria+e& These relationships may (e re+arded as intermental systems in the sense that the reader may have the e9pectation that the thin.in+ of the characters ?ho ma.e up the relationship ?ill (e shared on a re+ular (asis, althou+h it is often the role of the narrator to frustrate that e9pectation& 8t could (e plausi(ly ar+ued that a lar+e amount of the su(Kect matter of novels is the formation and (rea.do?n of intermental 31%:3 systems& The importance that ?e attach to this aspect of fiction is hauntin+ly and movin+ly conveyed (y this description of a marria+e in Pynchon>s .he Cryin# of 2ot $5 2i.e all their ina(ilities to communicate, this too had a virtuous motive (155%, :0)& The notions of situated co+nition, co+nitive artifacts, and distri(uted co+nitive systems contri(ute su(stantially to our a?areness of the importance of culture in influencin+ the relations (et?een individuals and their ?orld& 0per(er and Hirschfeld>s vie? is that co+nition ta.es place in a social and cultural conte9t& 8t uses tools provided (y culture ?ords, concepts, (eliefs, (oo.s, microscopes, and computers (1555, c9v)& 8n fact, they +o on to define culture in co+nitive terms& /ccordin+ to ?hat they term an epidemiolo#ical approach to culture, cultural facts are not mental facts (ut distri(utions of causally lin.ed mental and pu(lic facts in a human population& More specifically, chains of interaction# of communication in particular#may distri(ute similar mental representations and similar pu(lic productions (such as (ehaviors and artefacts) throu+hout a population& Types of mental representations and pu(lic productions that are sta(iliAed throu+h such causal chains are, in fact, ?hat ?e reco+niAe as cultural (1555, c99ii)& Bd?in Hutchins dra?s the same conclusion re+ardin+ culture as the one dra?n earlier re+ardin+ Clar. and Chalmers>s more narro?ly conceived notion of e9tended co+nition ho? you conceive of an o(Kect of study determines ?hat you consider as a le+itimate o(Kect of that study& 8f you define the study too narro?ly, you may miss important aspects of it& For e9ample, the ideational definition of culture prevents us from seein+ that systems of socially distri(uted co+nition may have interestin+ co+nitive properties of their o?n&&&& P0Qocial or+aniAational factors often produce +roup properties that differ considera(ly from the properties of individuals& Clearly, the same sorts of phenomena occur in the co+nitive

domain (Hutchins 1556, 9iii)& Jou may (e thin.in+ that no(ody ?ould disa+ree ?ith an ac.no?led+ement of the importance of the social aspects of life& )ut there is more to it than that& The temptation is to re+ard the individual aspects as primary and the social as secondary, al(eit a vitally important additional element& This chapter is as.in+ ?hether the opposite may (e true the social is primary and the individual is secondary& For e9ample, Hutchins emphasiAes that the study of situated or distri(uted co+nition is not simply an optional add3on, studied after the more central mind ,ithin the s.in has (een analyAed& 8n referrin+ to his (oo. on a ship>s navi+ational system, ?hich he considers as an e9ample of a socially and physically distri(uted co+nitive sys 31%$3 tem, Hutchins hopes to sho? that human co+nition is not Kust influenced (y culture and society, (ut & & & is in a very fundamental sense a cultural and social process& To do this 8 ?ill move the (oundaries of the co+nitive unit of analysis out (eyond the s.in of the individual person and treat the navi+ation team as a co+nitive and computational system (1556, 9iv)& (This is another si+htin+, (y the ?ay, of the s.in trope that ?as illustrated at the (e+innin+ of this section&) Clar. and Chalmers reinforce Hutchins>s point Lnce ?e reco+niAe the crucial role of the environment in constrainin+ the evolution and development of co+nition, ?e see that e9tended co+nition is a core co+nitive process, not an add3 on e9tra (155", 1!)& This ar+ument can (e related to narrative theory& For e9ample, in ;eterocosmica, 4oleTel starts his discussion of story?orlds ?ith a chapter on sin+le3person story?orlds (efore +oin+ on to consider multiperson story?orlds in a later chapter& 8n the li+ht of the earlier discussion, a su++estion that the order of chapters should have (een reversed may seem =uite plausi(le& ,ri Mar+olin has done valua(le pioneerin+ ?or. on +roup narratives and he has dra?n attention to a num(er of si+nificant aspects of the relationships (et?een individuals and cultures& For e9ample, his ?or. on +roups has sho?n ho? misunderstandin+s or radically different understandin+s of the same data (y people from different +roups, usually referred to as culture clash or different ?ays of vie?in+ the ?orld, can profita(ly (e redescri(ed in terms of dissonant co+nitive cate+ories and modes of reasonin+& 8t is at this point, in his vie?, that the individual and social dimensions of co+nition (e+in to shade into each other& )ut it is important not to limit unnecessarily the scope of this insi+ht& 8 am ar+uin+ that it is not Kust at the point of culture clash that the individual and social dimensions of co+nition (e+in to shade into each other, (ut that the shadin+ process (e+ins from the very start of our lives and that ?e are to a lar+e e9tent constituted (y this process& @hile criticiAin+ the ne+lect of action (y the disciplines of lin+uistics and psycholo+y, @ertsch ar+ues that the role of mediational tools such as lan+ua+e can only (e properly understood if they are considered as part of the concept of action& These tools have no ma+ical po?er in and of themselves& There is a ?idespread tendency in several disciplines to focus on lan+ua+e and other si+n systems in isolation from their mediational potential& 8n his vie?, this means that si+n systems have (ecome a(stracted from human action (1551, 115)& 8n order to put fictional action in the

sociocultural settin+ that @ertsch advocates, 8 ?ill summariAe his typolo+y of action and illustrate it ?ith e9amples, all in thou+ht report, from The History of the -un (y /phra )ehn& @ertsch>s 31%63 five types of action (in part derived from the ?or. of EZr+en Ha(ermas) are these a& .eleolo#ical action& / person attains an end or (rin+s a(out the occurrence of a desired state (y choosin+ the means that have the promise of (ein+ successful in a +iven situation and applyin+ them in a suita(le manner& The central concept is that of a decision amon+ alternative courses of action, (ased upon an interpretation of the situation, in order to realiAe an end (@ertsch 1551, 5#10)& The teleolo+ical implications of em(edded narratives are e9plored in chapter %, section :& B9ample 8sa(ella &&& thou+ht it time to retrieve the flyin+ lover, and therefore told Datteriena she ?ould the ne9t day entertain at the lo? +ate, as she ?as ?ont to do (155$, 1%!)& (& Dramatur#ical action& / person evo.es in their pu(lic audience a certain ima+e or impression of themselves (y purposefully disclosin+ their su(Kectivity& Bach a+ent can monitor pu(lic access to the system of their o?n intentions, thou+hts, attitudes, desires, feelin+s, and so on& Thus, the presentation of the self does not si+nify spontaneous, e9pressive (ehavior, it styliAes the e9pression of their e9perience ?ith a vie? to the audience& / person typically carries out this impression mana+ement ?ith strate+ic +oals#as in type a#in mind (@ertsch 1551, 10)& / character>s mana+ement of other characters> impressions of them is an important element in the ?ay in ?hich his or her mind ?or.s in action& 8mpression mana+ement is one of the points at ?hich different characters> em(edded narratives enmesh those of the mana+er and those of the mana+ed& 8t is possi(le to see this type, alon+ ?ith the others, as specific aspects of type a, in that they are all means to attain an end& B9ample Jet still she dissem(led ?ith a force (eyond ?hat the most cunnin+ practitioner could have sho?n, and carried herself (efore people as if no pressures had lain upon her heart (155$, 1%1)& c& Normatively re#ulated action& This refers not, as a and ( do, to the (ehavior of solitary individuals, (ut to mem(ers of a social +roup ?ho orient their action to common values or the norms that o(tain ?ithin a social +roup& The individual may comply ?ith or may violate a particular norm or +eneraliAed e9pectation of (ehavior (@ertsch 1551, 11)& This is a very clear statement of the social situatedness of action, and it is also a very precise statement of the plots of a lar+e num(er of novels in ?hich prota+onists initially comply ?ith and then violate the social norms of the story?orld& B9ample The rest of the nuns (e+an to as. Henault of ne?s &&& and he, & & & to conceal the present affair, endeavoured to assume all the +aiety he could (155$, 1%6)& 31%%3 d& Communicative action& This is the interaction of at least t?o persons& The actors see. to reach an understandin+ a(out the present

e&

situation and future plans in order to coordinate their actions (y ?ay of a+reement (@ertsch 1551, 11, follo?in+ Ha(ermas 15"$, "%)& This is a restatement ?ithin a different conte9t of the notion of intermental thin.in+& 8t is si+nificant that there is very little difference in practice (et?een the t?o terms intermental action and intermental thin9in#& B9ample they (oth resolved to +et up ?hat ?as possi(le for their support (155$, 1%5)& Mediated action& This type can (e seen as a more sophisticated restatement of type a& 2i.e type a it is +oal3directed, (ut it does not assume that the appropriate focus of analysis is the solitary individual or that there is a neat separation (et?een means and ends& 8t ta.es account of the fact that human action typically employs mediational means such as tools and lan+ua+e that shape the action in essential ?ays (@ertsch 1551, 1!)& Characters ma.e use of a ?ide ran+e of mediational tools in effectin+ their actions, one of ?hich is the use of the tool of inner speech in mental action& B9ample This ?as the de(ate& 0he (rin+s reason on (oth sidesC a+ainst the first, she sets the shame of a violated vo? (155$, 1%%)&

8t is noticea(le that most of these e9amples can (e used to illustrate more than one type of action& This su++ests that, althou+h @ertsch refers to them as alternative types of action, it may (e more accurate to descri(e them as, potentially, different perspectives on the same action& @ertsch relates all of them to situated and intermental thin.in+ (y pointin+ out that (oth individual actions and the actions of small +roups are components in the life, not Kust of that individual or +roup, (ut also of the ?hole social system& 8ntermental actions and the social interactions that ma.e them possi(le are defined and structured (y the (roader social and cultural system (@ertsch 1551, $;)& 8n the same ?ay, the actions of fictional individuals and +roups can only (e understood (y reference to the ?hole social and cultural system that comprises the story?orld of the novel& Gan 4iK. has supplied a philosophical perspective on this issue& He refers to communicative or intermental action as interactions (et?een several a+ents that include all forms of cooperative social (ehavior such as the use of lan+ua+e (15;%, !5%)& The simplest e9amples are those cases ?here t?o a+ents to+ether accomplish the same action ?hile havin+ the same intention& More comple9 are the cases ?here the intended actions are the same (ut ?here the purpose is different, and so the action is done for different reasons& /lternatively, the 31%;3 purposes may coincide, (ut the actions are different& For e9ample, the Koint action may (e preparin+ dinner, (ut each a+ent fulfils different tas.s ?ithin the overall action& 0ome actions can (e carried out (y either one or more a+ents, ?hile others, such as marryin+ or fi+htin+, must have at least t?o a+ents (van 4iK. 15;%, !5")& Fictional actions can (e analyAed in the same ?ay& 8nteraction is o(viously relevant to the construction of

plot in narrative fiction& @hen characters underta.e Koint actions, their em(edded narratives overlap durin+ the e9tent of their Koint purpose (efore diver+in+ a+ain& 8 ?ill conclude this section (y introducin+ the concept of situated identity& 8n the thriller 8iotto>s ;and (y 8ain Pears, the narrator tells us of the herodetective For the last ten days, it seemed, every(ody he>d met had (een tellin+ him to ma.e up his mind& He>d never really thou+ht of himself as (ein+ so fee(le, (ut maKority opinion seemed a+ainst him (!000, !6;)& 0o, ?hich is itI 8s he as decisive as he thin.s, or is he as indecisive as everyone else seems to thin.I @hich is more relia(le, his o?n first3person ascription of the attri(ute of decisiveness or the third3 person ascription to him of indecisivenessI /n aspect of his identity is under consideration, (ut ho? is it to (e determinedI @here is his identity situated, in his o?n vie?s a(out himself or in the vie?s of othersI 0o far in this section 8 have discussed the ideas of real3mind theorists on mediational tools, physically distri(uted co+nition, socially situated thou+ht, intermental thin.in+, and situated action& Ho?ever, 8 ?ould li.e to end (y ma.in+ a very stron+ claim derived from these conceptual tools that 8 shall call situated identity& This idea ?ill underpin much of the discussion in the ne9t t?o chapters& 8f you ?ant to find out a(out an aspect of someone>s mind, say ?hether or not they are selfish, ?ho do you as.I Certainly not Kust them, (ecause you .no? that you cannot (e sure that you ?ill +et a complete ans?er& 0elfish people are not li.ely to admit to (ein+ selfish& /lso, unselfish people may (e so laceratin+ly self3critical that they mi+ht admit to (ein+ selfish ?hen everyone else ?ould disa+ree& (There seems to (e a .ind of (eni+n Cretan liar type of parado9 at ?or. there&) @e are all reluctant to ta.e some(ody>s ?ord for the ?or.in+s of their o?n mind, and this seems to me to (e a tacit admission that there is a stron+ sense in ?hich our mind is distri(uted amon+ those other people ?ho have an ima+e of us in their minds& Ho? else can ?e say that someone is selfish ?hen there is no representation of selfishness in their mindI This ima+e is in the minds of others, (ut ?e are attri(utin+ it to this particular mind& 0urely then, our identity is distri(uted amon+ the minds of others& The concept of situated identity is also clearly related to the =uestion of action& 8n a sense ?e are not so much ?hat ?e say ?e are, (ut ?hat ?e do& /ction is 31%"3 pu(lic and so is a fairly relia(le, thou+h not infalli(le, (asis on ?hich other individuals can Kud+e the ?or.in+s of our minds& (Lf course, there is still room for a +ood deal of dou(t an apparently hostile act mi+ht result from hostility (ut mi+ht also (e a result of shyness&) 4urin+ the (ul. of 8reat (2pectations, Pip is noticea(ly lac.in+ in self3a?areness& Lnly a small part of his ?hole identity is contained ?ithin the ?or.in+s of his o?n mind& His identity is distri(uted amon+ all the various Pips that e9ist in the minds of )iddy, Eoe, Bstella, Miss Havisham, and so on and that are (ased on their Kud+ments of his actions&

Conclusion 8 ?ould as. you no?, havin+ read this chapter and the previous one, to flic. (ac. to chapter : for a moment& 8f the de(ates descri(ed there do not no? seem a lon+ ?ay a?ay, and rather (eside the point, then these t?o chapters ?ill have failed in their purpose& /ll that 8 have read in the real3 mind discourses of philosophy, psycholo+y, psycholin+uistics, and co+nitive science has convinced me that ?e can come to a fuller and deeper understandin+ of the construction of fictional minds only (y ma.in+ e9tensive use of them& Clifford ReertA stresses that thin.in+ is primarily an overt act conducted in terms of the o(Kective materials of the common culture, and only secondarily a private matter& 8n the sense (oth of directive reasonin+ and the formulation of sentiment, as ?ell as the inte+ration of these into motives, man>s mental processes indeed ta.e place at the scholar>s des. or the foot(all field, in the studio or lorry3driver>s seat (155:, ":)& -o? that chapters $ and 6 have placed fictional thin.in+ at the scholar>s des., the foot(all field, in the studio, and lorry driver>s seat, the ne9t t?o chapters ?ill consider in more detail the precise means (y ?hich ?e can study this thin.in+& 31%53 / #he *ictional ,ind %. Summary /s 8 e9plained at the (e+innin+, chapters ! and : (oth focused on e9istin+ narratolo+ical approaches to?ard fictional minds& Chapters $ and 6 considered the implications of real3mind discourses for fictional minds and laid the theoretical (asis for a ne? approach for this area of narrative theory& This chapter and the ne9t chapter ?ill no? outline the ne? approach& This one ?ill descri(e it in +eneral terms (y, in part, recapitulatin+ some of the findin+s of the previous four chapters, and chapter ; ?ill develop it further in three specific directions& -e9t thou+h, it may (e a +ood idea at this pivotal point in the (oo. to see some of the ideas discussed so far in action& 8 ?ill analyAe t?o very small pieces of narrative discourse in order to summariAe the current position&The first passa+e is from (mma the narrator is descri(in+ Bmma>s feelin+s a(out Fran. Churchill a& -ot that Bmma ?as +ay and thou+htless from any real felicityC it ?as rather (ecause she felt less happy than she had e9pected& (& 0he lau+hed c& )ecause she ?as disappointedC d& and thou+h she li.ed him for his attentions, and thou+ht them all, ?hether in friendship, admiration, or playfulness, e9tremely Kudicious, they ?ere not ?innin+ (ac. her heart& e& 0he still intended him for her friend (155%, :0$)&

The second passa+e ?as discussed in chapter :, section !, (ut 8 ?ill repeat it here& 8t is from .om 7ones These Meditations ?ere entirely employed on Mr& All,orthy>s FortuneC for, first, he e9ercised much Thou+ht in calculatin+, as ?ell as he could, the e9act Galue of the @holeC ?hich calculations he often sa? Lccasion to alter in his o?n Favour /nd secondly, and chiefly, he pleased himself ?ith intended /lterations in the House and Rardens, and in proKectin+ many other 0chemes, as ?ell for the 8mprovement of the Bstate as of the Rrandeur of the Place (1556, ;!)& The speech cate+ory approach is not very informative a(out the presentations of Bmma>s and )lifil>s minds in these short e9tracts& )ut it is clear that there are minds in action here& 0o, ho? do ?e reconstruct those mindsI /nd ho? do ?e descri(e that reconstructionI 8 su++est si9 o(servations (four here, t?o later in section :) that a reader mi+ht ?ant to ma.e on these passa+es that do not fit comforta(ly ?ithin classical narratolo+y, to+ether ?ith some initial indications of ho? the theory that is currently in e9istence in other fields can (e (rou+ht to+ether into a ne?ly e9panded, postclassical narratolo+y of the fictional mind& The discourses on real minds of co+nitive science, psycholin+uistics, psycholo+y, and the philosophy of mind are parallel discourses to narratolo+y in the sense that they consist of vastly different pictures of the mind from the one that tends to emer+e from narrative theory& Ho?ever, 8 do not see these disciplines as (ein+ in conflict ?ith narratolo+y& For e9ample, the speech cate+ory account is certainly not ?ron+, it is simply one method of analysis amon+ others& The dra?(ac.s that ?ere discussed in chapter : ?ill arise only if it is considered to (e the only perspective on minds in narrative discourse& 1& )oth passa+es are presentations of mental functionin+ and of dispositions to (ehave in certain ?ays& Bmma is decidin+ on her future relations ?ith Churchill on the (asis of her feelin+s a(out him, and )lifil is plannin+ ho? to ma.e as much money as possi(le out of 0=uire /ll?orthy& 8n sayin+ this, 8 am tal.in+ a(out ho? their minds are ?or.in+ and ?hat their thin.in+ is for& This is a functional approach to?ard consciousness& 8n the paradi+m of the mind that emer+es from the discourses of co+nitive science, psycholo+y, and the philosophy of mind, thou+ht is seen primarily as a mode of action in ?hich mental lan+ua+e is not privile+ed& The (ac.+round to Bmma>s and )lifil>s states of mind is their dispositions to (ehave in certain ?ays& )lifil has an avaricious disposition, ?hile Bmma>s is controllin+ and manipulative in her pleasure in matchma.in+, her attempts to e9ercise po?er over others, and her avoidance of ?orth?hile relationships& 0he is disposed for these reasons to (e pleased (y Churchill>s flirtatious attentions& The lan+ua+e of dispositions comes more naturally to philosophers than to narratolo+ists& 8t is odd that the discourse of narrative theory leaves so completely out of account a class of phenomena that are so central to another discourse on the mind& The mode of thou+ht report is much (etter suited to the characteristic interests of psycholo+y and philosophy than the other t?o modes 31;13

of direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht& For e9ample, dispositions are most easily presented in thou+ht report& !& .he passa#es consist of thou#ht report of a dense: comple2 layerin# of a ,ide variety of states of mind that comprise a causal net,or9 of reasons and motives for actions& )oth e9tracts illustrate the purposive, re+ulative role of mental functionin+ in plannin+, directin+, and monitorin+ our actions and contain the e9pressions of short3 and lon+3term intentions, plans, +oals, motives, and reasons for action& )lifil is e9ercisin+ his mind on plannin+ ?hat to do ?ith /ll?orthy>s fortune& Bmma>s mental functionin+ relates more to the mana+ement of her relationships ?ith others& The narrator of (mma presents the causal net?or. of reasons and motives (ehind this mana+ement ?ith +reat s.ill and sensitivity& 8 ?ill analyAe this presentation of the causal net?or. in some detail no? (ecause it is an e9ample of the .ind of standard thou+ht report of states of mind that has (een ne+lected (y narratolo+y (ut that contains a +ood deal of information a(out fictional mental functionin+& This information (ecomes clearly visi(le ?ithin the paradi+m that 8 am advocatin+& The follo?in+ discussion refers to the passa+e from Bmma& 8n part a, in Kust t?enty3three ?ords, the narrator refers to four states of mind +ay and thou+htlessC felicityC (ein+ less happyC and an e9pectation of happiness& The t?o present states (+ay and thou+htless, and (ein+ less happy) are compared to the t?o others& Lne of these is counterfactual (felicity), and the other refers to the past (e9pectation of happiness)& The fact that she is +ay and thou+htless is +iven a counterfactual or ne+ative e9planation as it is not due to the non3e9istent state of felicity& Then, the de+ree of her current state of happiness is defined (y reference to the past as it is less than her e9pectation had (een& 8n addition, a causal relationship is esta(lished (et?een the t?o present states& 0he is +ay and thou+htless (ecause her current level of happiness is less than she had, in the past, e9pected& Ln the face of it, this is a parado9, althou+h the meanin+ emer+es in part d& The name indicative description may (e +iven to descriptions of actions that appear to indicate an accompanyin+ state of mind& This term is e9plained further in chapter ;, section !& 0he lau+hed (() is indicative description (ecause it relates to (ehavior, lau+hter, that +enerally indicates an amused state of mind& Ho?ever, it is an important function of the device of indicative description that it can (e an inaccurate indicator of actual states of mind& The lau+hter may result from a (itter or sardonic state of mind& 8n this case, the lau+hter 31;!3 is =uite comple9& 8t appears to (e real lau+hter (ut ?ith an am(ivalent, rather (itters?eet =uality that suits the parado9ical nature of her thou+ht processes&

The state of mind in part c, disappointment a+ain has a causal function it is +iven as a reason or e9planation for the action of lau+hin+ and is another apparent parado9& The use of the feelin+ of disappointment here reinforces the issue of the inaccurate e9pectations that ?ere descri(ed in part a& 8t is possi(le to identify si9 more e9plicit states of mind in the t?enty3seven ?ords in part d, to+ether ?ith one implicit state, ma.in+ a total of t?elve in t?o short sentences& The e9plicit states are li.in+ for Churchill +enerallyC in particular, li.in+ for his friendshipC for his admirationC or for his playfulnessC (elief that his (ehavior is KudiciousC and the feelin+ or (elief that her heart is not (ein+ ?on (ac.& The state of mind that is implied (y all of these, (ut not e9plicitly stated, is the feelin+ of relief that her heart is not (ein+ ?on (ac.& The causal relationships (et?een these states are comple9& The li.in+ for him is caused (y the (elief in the Kudiciousness of his (ehavior& This pair of states is in turn caused (y the three possi(le or hypothetical e9planations for his (ehavior admiration, feelin+ of friendship, and feelin+ of playfulness& (Lf course, Bmma is mista.en, and the primary motive for his (ehavior is the desire to create a smo.escreen that ?ill conceal his secret en+a+ement to Eane Fairfa9&) Ho?ever, the use of the ?ord thou+h (alances all of these states a+ainst the (elief that her heart is not (ein+ ?on (ac.& This is the e9planation for the disappointed e9pectations conveyed (y parts a, (, and c& Finally, the state of relief (that her heart is not (ein+ ?on (ac.) that is implied (y the ?hole sentence is the (elated e9planation for the t?o apparent parado9es& Part e is the statement of an intention to act in a particular ?ay to?ard Churchill in the future& The function of the previous t?o sentences has (een to present the causal net?or. of states of mind that e9plains this intention& :& .he narrators refer to 6lifil>s and (mma>s actions and behavior as ,ell as to their consciousness& The description of Bmma>s mind includes action (lau+hter), (ehavior (?hich is +ay and thou+htless), and an intention to act (that is, to treat Churchill as a friend)& The acts that )lifil performs to further his interests are .ey in+redients in his narrative& 8n fact, the =uoted passa+e is in effect a list of actions and intentions to act, for e9ample, calculations of the siAe of the fortune, intentions to alter the house, and proKections for many other schemes& The relationship (et?een action and consciousness is e9plored (y the philosophy of action, ?hich is concerned ?ith the difference (et?een, on the one hand, ?illed actions and, on the other hand, mere doin+s, happenin+s, and events& 8t analyAes the mechanism 31;:3 of action the intricate relationships (et?een the various mental operations such as intentions, purposes, motives, and +oals and the resultin+ physical (ehavior& 8t follo?s from such a perspective that narratolo+ical e9aminations of fictional action need not involve Kust the study of

physical actions on the story level, it should also entail the systematic analysis of presentations of mental action in the discourse& The psycholo+ist Eon Blster discusses the role of the emotions in mental functionin+ and, specifically, ?hether or not emotions such as an+er can properly (e re+arded as action tendencies (1555, %0#%1, !"1#":)& Bmma>s pride and )lifil>s avarice mi+ht (e e9amples of such action tendencies& 8rrespective of the outcome of the de(ate on real minds, this notion is one of the ?ays in ?hich te9ts can (e interro+ated to find out ho? narrators and readers lin. to+ether presentations of immediate mental events such as e9plicitly la(eled or implicitly su++ested emotions, dispositions, and descriptions of physical (ehavior into causal chains (y means of such concepts as motives, intentions, and reasons for action& $& )oth passa+es are clear e9amples of the socially situated and dialo+ic nature of consciousness& Bmma>s and )lifil>s thou+hts are inescapa(ly part of their social conte9t& 8n particular, the t?o minds are seen as active, social, and pu(lic dialo+ues ?ith others& )lifil>s plans for the future include anticipations of, and therefore calculations a(out, the minds of others and are a(out such social issues as class and money& Bmma>s dialo+ue is discussed later& Mi.hail )a.htin e9plored ?ith +reat sensitivity the inherently dialo+ic nature of the inner utterance& He sho?ed that our thou+ht consists to a +reat e9tent of responses to and anticipations of the thou+ht of others& 8t is conditioned (y the culture in ?hich ?e live and is, therefore, in an important sense, a social and pu(lic dialo+ue ?ith others& His theories of the social nature of consciousness reveal that there are ?ays in ?hich inner speech is not really inner at all& 8t is a voice that is part of the continuin+ dialo+ue that ?e have ?ith other individuals in the culture ?ithin ?hich ?e live& Lur thou+ht is in many ?ays social, pu(lic, overt, and o(serva(le& / postclassical perspective on the construction of fictional minds should (e concerned ?ith this comple9 relationship (et?een the inaccessi(ility to others of a character>s thou+ht and the e9tent to ?hich the same thou+ht is pu(licly availa(le to others in the story?orld& This relationship is very clearly sho?n ?hen a character is anticipatin+, speculatin+ on, reconstructin+, misunderstandin+, evaluatin+, reactin+ to, and actin+ upon the thou+ht of another& Bmma>s thou+hts are in a fundamentally misconceived dialo+ue ?ith ?hat she ima+ines to (e Churchill>s thou+hts& /s 31;$3 Proust>s narrator remar.s, our social personality is a creation of the thou+hts of other people (155%, !0)& Bmma, ?ith Churchill>s assistance, has created a social personality for him that e9ists in a comple9 and interestin+ relationship ?ith the rest of his mind& For e9ample, he enKoys the +ame playin+ and the dissem(lin+ that is involved in his flirtation ?ith Bmma& To (e+in the process of considerin+ Churchill>s (ehavior in terms of the concept of mediated action, his attentions can (e re?ardin+ly analyAed in terms of @ertsch>s five types of socially situated action (1551, 5#1!)& His action is teleolo+ical in that it is +eared to the realiAation of a desired endC it is dramatur+ical (ecause it involves impression

mana+ement of an audienceC it is normatively re+ulated as it ?or.s ?ithin the social and moral norms that o(tain ?ithin the social +roupC it is communicative as Churchill is tryin+ to +ive Bmma a misleadin+ perception of his situationC and, finally, it is mediated (ecause the ends referred to earlier are mediated throu+h his use of the tools of lan+ua+e and (ehavior& 2. #he Continuing.Consciousness *rame 8n chapter !, section $ 8 discussed the relationship (et?een co+nitive science and narrative theory& My purpose ?as to (uild on the lar+e amount of hi+hly ori+inal and thou+ht3provo.in+ ?or. that has (een done recently on the application of co+nitive science techni=ues to a ?ide ran+e of issues relatin+ to narrative comprehension& 8 am thin.in+ particularly of such scholars as 4avid Herman (155;, !00!, !00:(), Manfred Eahn (155;, 1555a), Mar. Turner (1551), Rilles Fauconnier (155;), Moni.a Fluderni. (155%), and Catherine Bmmott (155;)& This section ?ill attempt to relate some co+nitive science notions to the specific area of reader comprehension of fictional minds& This is a companion section to the follo?in+ one on em(edded narratives& Here 8 am ar+uin+ that ?e are a(le to read a character>s mind as an em(edded narrative (y applyin+ ?hat 8 call the continuin#$consciousness frame& Co+nitive science can (e applied to the construction of fictional minds (y helpin+ narrative theory to analyAe the cues that ena(le readers to create the effect of characters> mental functionin+& *eaders use a ?ide ran+e of co+nitive frames and scripts in order to interpret te9ts& 0pecifically, the em(edded narrative approach can plausi(ly (e restated in terms of recent applications of frame theory to narrative (ecause a .ey frame is the ascription of consciousness to narrative a+ents& The reader uses e9istin+ or prestored .no?led+e of other minds in the actual ?orld in order to process the emer+ent .no?led+e that is supplied (y fictional3mind presentations& The ?or. that ?e put into constructin+ other real minds prepares us as readers for the ?or. of constructin+ fictional 31;63 minds& )ecause fictional (ein+s are necessarily incomplete, frames, scripts, and preference rules are re=uired to supply the defaults that fill the +aps in the story?orld and provide the presuppositions that ena(le the reader to construct continually conscious minds from the te9t& For e9ample, Herman has su++ested that current research indicates that ?e ?ould do ?ell to as., not Kust a(out story structure as such, (ut a(out the patterned, nonrandom ?ays in ?hich readers and listeners tend to impute structure to certain strin+s of events presented in discourse (1555a, ")& The processin+ strate+ies that are used (y readers to infer characters> inner lives are a central ?ay in ?hich structure is imputed to strin+s of events& The reader collects to+ether all of the isolated references to a specific proper name in a particular te9t and constructs a consciousness that continues in the spaces (et?een the various mentions of that character& The reader strate+y is to Koin up the dots& /s readers ?e stron+ly prefer to

read a te9t for ma9imum co+nitive payoff& @e al?ays try to +et as much information as ?e can from a te9t& This much is ?ell .no?n& )ut, in particular, the readin+ process is very creative in constructin+ coherent and continuous fictional consciousnesses from ?hat is often a (are minimum of information& @e fre=uently finish novels ?ith a stron+ sense of the individual personality of a particular character& Ho?ever, if ?e ?ere to ta.e the trou(le to count up the specific references to that character in the te9t, ?e mi+ht (e surprised at ho? little there is in the te9t on ?hich ?e have (ased our vivid impressions& 0o the =uestion is, Ho? can ?e tal. more informatively a(out this process of the reader brin#in# somethin# to the novelI The processin+ of fictional minds, and in particular the applications of the various frames and su(frames relatin+ to thou+ht, action, conte9t, causation, and so on are (idirectional and interactive in that the information flo?s are (oth top3up and (ottom3do?n& / character frame is esta(lished on meetin+ them or hearin+ of them for the first time (this is top3do?n)& 8t is then fed (y specific information a(out the character from the te9t (this is (ottom3up)& The reader then sets up some initial hypotheses (top3do?n) that are modified (y further information ((ottom3 up) and so further refined and so on& Minds are mapped from the source domain (the real mind of the reader and in particular their .no?led+e of other minds) to the tar+et domain of the story?orld ?ithin ?hich the reader perceives the fictional minds to function& /n e9ample that is used (y the co+nitive scientists *o+er 0chan. and *o(ert /(elson illustrates very clearly ho? the applications of the continuin+consciousness frame ?or.s& They maintain in Scripts: Plans: 8oals: and 5nderstandin# (15;;) that there has (een increasin+ reco+nition that conte9t is of over?helmin+ importance in the interpretation of te9t& 8mplicit real3?orld 31;%3 .no?led+e is very often applied (y the understander, and this .no?led+e can (e very hi+hly structured& The appropriate in+redients for e9tractin+ the meanin+ of a sentence, therefore, are often no?here to (e found ?ithin the sentence (15;;, 5)& They then illustrate this point ?ith the follo?in+ e9ample The policeman held up his hand and stopped the car& Their conclusion is that PsQomeho? in understandin+ this sentence ?e effortlessly create a driver ?ho steps on a (ra.e in response to seein+ the policeman>s hand& -one of the intermediate lin.s are mentioned in PtheQ sentence (15;;, 5)& Ho?ever, it seems to me that ?e can +o further than 0chan. and /(elson do in revealin+ the (asis of our understandin+ of the sentence, ?hich is that the reader has to use the availa(le information to try to create the consciousnesses of (oth the policeman and the driver& This inferential process mi+ht perhaps proceed alon+ the follo?in+ lines the policeman perceived the carC the policeman came to the (elief that he should stop the carC the policeman decided to stop the carC the policeman then undertoo. the action of holdin+ up his handC the driver perceived the

policeman holdin+ up his handC the driver understood the meanin+ of this si+nC the driver came to the (elief that he should comply ?ith the si+nC the driver decided to put on the (ra.esC and the driver then undertoo. the action of puttin+ on the (ra.es& 0omeho?, to e9tend 0chan.>s and /(elson>s conclusion, in understandin+ this sentence, ?e effortlessly create the supposed mental functionin+ of the policeman and the driver& Comprehension is simply not possi(le unless ?e have availa(le to us hypothetical versions of the minds of the actors that appear to account for the events descri(ed& (@e may (e ?ron+ of course, (ut that is another issue&) @e do not Kust create the driver, ?e create the driver>s mind and the policeman>s mind& -arrative is in essence the presentation of fictional mental functionin+& Lf course, it is not necessary to ma.e these steps e9plicit in such la(orious detail durin+ actual readin+ conditions& )ecause the process is usually automatic, as 0chan. and /(elson say, frames and scripts let you leave out the (orin+ details ?hen you are tal.in+ or ?ritin+, and fill them in ?hen you are listenin+ or readin+ (15;;, $1)& The tas. of the analyst ?ho ?ishes to add (ac. in the (orin+ details is to (rea. do?n a sentence into its minimal meanin+ units (15;;, 1%)& 8n chapter ; 8 ?ill (e attemptin+ to (rea. do?n a num(er of the sentences in +ile 6odies into some of the minimal meanin+ units that relate to the maintenance of characters> consciousnesses& 8 ?ill e9plain this process, ?hich 8 refer to as decodin# action statements into consciousness statements, more fully then& 0chan. and /(elson e9plain that their approach is oriented to?ards handlin+ actions (y +oal3oriented humans& Pro(lems in representin+ 31;;3 inner affective life &&& are issues still to (e dealt ?ith as ?ell& @e are not ready to handle novels, in other ?ords (15;;, 1%;#%")& 8 (elieve that there are ?ays of (rid+in+ the +ap (et?een the t?o discourses of co+nitive science and narrative fiction and that if not co+nitive scientists, then at the very least narratolo+ists usin+ the techni=ues of co+nitive science, are ready to handle novels& Ho?ever, if co+nitive science terminolo+y is to (e inte+rated successfully into narrative theory, it ?ill (e necessary first to deepen and enlar+e our understandin+ of the central role that fictional minds play in the functionin+ of narrative& Manfred Eahn (155;) successfully inte+rates the co+nitive science terminolo+y of frames and slots into FranA 0tanAel>s three narrative situations (15"$), (ut the other frames that can (e applied durin+ the readin+ process should not (e for+otten& /s the policeman e9ample sho?ed, the attempt to isolate the (asic elements of fictional3mind construction is similar to the need to ma.e as e9plicit as possi(le every step of an artificial intelli+ence (/8) pro+ram& Computers are completely literal machines that do only ?hat they are e9plicitly as.ed to do and are not a(le to use any initiative& 8f there is a +ap, they do not fill it& This is ?hy /8 pro+rams loo. so odd to readers ?ho use a +ood deal of initiative and creativity in Koinin+ up the dots ?ithout conscious thou+ht& The decodin+ of action statements into consciousness statements is almost li.e ?ritin+ an /8 pro+ram on ho? to read a narrative& @hen all the immensely sophisticated ?or. that the

reader does in constructin+ mental processes from surface descriptions is made as e9plicit as possi(le, the results necessarily loo. very stran+e& /s 0teven Pin.er remar.s, PrQo(ot desi+n is a .ind of consciousness3raisin+& @e tend to (e (lasO a(out our mental lives (155;, 1")& To the real reader, the implied reader, and the model reader should no? perhaps (e added the ro(ot readerM The continuin+3consciousness frame that is re=uired for constructin+ fictional minds from narrative is interestin+ly similar to 4aniel 4ennett>s concept of the intentional stance, ?hich he claims is re=uired for the construction of real minds and ?hich he defines as the strate+y of interpretin+ the (ehavior of an entity (person, animal, artifact, ?hatever) (y treatin+ it as if it ?ere a rational a+ent ?ho +overned its >choice> of >action> (y a >consideration> of its >(eliefs> and >desires&> &&& The intentional stance is the attitude or perspective ?e routinely adopt to?ards one another (155%, !;)& The ?or.in+ hypothesis that visi(ly coherent (ehavior is caused (y a directin+ consciousness in the actual ?orld is used (y e9tension in the application of the continuin+3consciousness frame to the story?orld& )oth are a ?ay of relatin+ the present event or action to past re+ularities and patterns of events and to e9pectations re+ardin+ future patterns& Much has (een ?ritten a(out the influence of past and future on the present 31;"3 ?or.in+s of real minds& Eohn McCrone discusses the point that, (ein+ dynamic, the (rain could (rin+ the full ?ei+ht of a lifetime>s e9perience to (ear on each moment as it ?as (ein+ lived (1555, !%")& The past is (rou+ht to (ear on the present in order to produce the future& /s 8 said earlier, 4aniel 4ennett points out that the tas. of a mind is to produce future& This line of thou+ht (rin+s us a+ain to a functional perspective on +oal3directed action& The psycholo+ist Philip Eohnson32aird has ar+ued that the plannin+ and control of intentional action re=uires a self model that e9plicitly represents one>s +oals, a(ilities, options, and current state (van Rulic. 1555, ;:%)& 8t is si+nificant that 0chan. and /(elson in a (rief di+ression on fictional minds continue the functional approach to?ard +oal3oriented activity that is characteristic of their approach to real minds& They o(serve that in stories ?ith a lot of conte9tual information a(out the main character &&& there are many e9pectations a(out li.ely events PthatQ are (ased on detailed .no?led+e of the +enesis and nature of particular +oals (15;;, 10!)& 0chan. and /(elson also refer to the personal scripts (15;;, %!) of the actors in a narrative, and it is these scripts that determine ?hich aspects of the story?orld are perceived (y those actors& Jet another perspective on this past3present3future relationship is provided (y the homeostasis7homeodynamics distinction that is used in neuroscience& Homeostasis descri(es those aspects of the (rain that maintain it in a steady state and ensure continuity (et?een the past, present, and future& ;omeodynamics descri(es those aspects of the (rain that allo? it to cope ?ith chan+e& The reader understands fictional minds as containin+ (oth homeostatic and homeodynamic features that allo? the minds to maintain stasis and cope ?ith chan+es to the environment& Cues re+ardin+ these features are also important for readers ?hen follo?in+ the chan+es and also the re+ularities and uniformities

in characters> em(edded narratives& /s ?ith 4amasio>s notions of the core self and the auto(io+raphical self (chapter $, section 6), characters have to remain sta(le entities (apart from perhaps certain fantasy, science fiction, and postmodern narratives), (ut they also have to chan+e in order to stay interestin+& The remainder of this section reflects the fact that a num(er of narrative theorists have referred to aspects of the continuin+3consciousness frame from ?ithin their o?n theoretical frame?or.s& Paul *icoeur remar.ed that narrative is the operation that dra?s a confi+uration out of a simple succession (15"$, %6)& @hat 8 am considerin+ are ideas that su++est that the .ey to the resultin+ confi+uration is the continuin+ consciousnesses of the characters in the narrative& /s 8 have said, Moni.a Fluderni. puts e9perientiality at the center of the perspective on narrative that she descri(es in .o,ards a 3Natural4 Narratolo#y& 31;53 /lso, Mie.e )al e9plains the difference (et?een the t?o editions of her (oo. Narratolo#y (15"6, 155;) in terms of a ne? and +ro?in+ emphasis on su(Kectivity This attention paid to su(Kectivity is, indeed, the (asic tenet of the theory presented in this (oo. (155;, 11)& B& M& Forster dre? a famous distinction in Aspects of the Novel (et?een a story and a plot& Forster>s terminolo+y is no? rather confusin+, and his point is perhaps (est stated in *icoeur>s terms as the distinction (et?een a succession of events (Forster>s story) and a narrative (Forster>s plot)& Forster stated that he defined a story as a narrative of events arran+ed in their time se=uence& / plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis fallin+ on causality& >The .in+ died and then the =ueen died> is a story& >The .in+ died and then the =ueen died of +rief> is a plot& The time se=uence is preserved, (ut the sense of causality overshado?s it (!000, ";)& Forster relates the issue of causality very clearly to the presentation of characters> minds& The cause of the second event, the =ueen>s death, is a state of mind the =ueen>s +rief& The ar+ument of this (oo. is that the paradi+ms for the causal lin.s that create a narrative are events and states in characters> minds& Ho?ever, it is possi(le that Forster overestimates the importance of the e9plicit reference to the Wueen>s state of consciousness& The difference (et?een the e9plicit of +rief version and the implicit non3specific version is perhaps not as +reat as Forster appears to su++est& 8 am sure that most readers, if +iven the story version, ?ould provide the appropriate fictional3mind construction for themselves and turn it into a plot& They ?ould assume that the Wueen had died of +rief (ecause the Din+ had died& This is precisely the sort of +ap that readers are adept at fillin+& *uth *onen, Catherine Bmmott, Mena.em Perry, and, of course, Marie2aure *yan are amon+ the narrative theorists ?ho have added su(stantially to our .no?led+e of ho? readers create story?orlds +enerally and also the characters that inha(it them& @ith re+ard to the physical aspects of story?orlds, *onen mentions as e9amples of the uses made (y readers of (asic real3?orld .no?led+e the fact that ?e .no? ?ithout havin+ to (e told e9plicitly (y the te9t that the la?n on ?hich Mrs& *amsay sits in .o the "i#hthouse is outside the house and not inside it and

also that the 0istine Chapel referred to in that novel is in *ome and not in Florence (15"", $55)& @ith re+ard to characters in story?orlds, *onen defines her concept of definitization as that sta+e or process in ?hich it is te9tually indicated that a name or a description denotes a sin+le, concrete, and ?ell3individuated (i&e& distinct from others) o(Kect (15"", 60%)& 0he points out that this can (e done ?ith a very small num(er of attri(utes, possi(ly even a sin+le one& /s 8 have said, readers are very resourceful& From the point of vie? of the reader accessin+ a story?orld, the e9istence of ?ell3individuated characters 31"03 is as much a part of the elementary reality of the story?orld as the fact that la?ns are found outside houses and the 0istine Chapel is in *ome& The elementary reality of the story?orld is not simply a matter of physical facts, it comprises in addition the virtual mental su(?orlds of the characters in the story?orld& Catherine Bmmott in Narrative Comprehension (155;) descri(es the process of the construction of fictional minds in the follo?in+ terms For every reference that is made in the te9t to a particular character, ?hether (y a noun or a pronoun, the reader needs to access the mental representation&&&& The proper noun >2ady Chatterley> therefore refers technically to a mental representation made up from all previous mentions of 2ady Chatterley plus information in the accompanyin+ te9t plus inferences& This ma.es sense (ecause it means that reference is to a representation of a character ?ith ?hom ?e can empathiAe rather than Kust a ?ord or ?ords in the te9t (155;, !01#!)& Blse?here she states that >entity representations,> co+nitive stores ?hich hold information a(out characters (and locations and o(Kects), can e9plain the si+nificance of events and ena(le readers to empathiAe ?ith the participants& Conversely, readers must respond to events (y updatin+ their .no?led+e and opinions of the characters& Lften, the te9t does not ma.e these lin.s e9plicit, (ut readers cannot really understand and appreciate a narrative ?ithout supplementin+ the te9t in this ?ay (155;, 10%)& Bmmott refers e9plicitly here to a num(er of the points that 8 am ma.in+ the scattered =uality of fictional characters and the need to lin. the various mentions of them in the te9t into a sin+le entityC the importance of empathyC the use of real3?orld .no?led+e to fill +apsC the past3present3future lin.s that form minds and so on& @hat 8 ?ish to do here is to supplement her line of reasonin+ and to ma.e more e9plicit and specific precisely ?hat information and ?hich lin.s are used (y the reader to construct fictional people& Bmmott is very informative indeed on the precise strate+ies (y ?hich readers place characters in a physical conte9t& Her conte9tual frame theory contains a num(er of conceptual tools such as (indin+, primin+, and so on that can (e used to +reat effect ?ithin the continuin+3consciousness paradi+m& The fact that a character is currently in or out of a particular physical conte9t crucially affects their perceptual vie?point and state of mind at that time& @hat 8 ?ish to stress is that the reader processes this .no?led+e from the su(Kective point of vie? of that character and, (y a process of empathy, vicariously e9periences the particular physical conte9t of the story?orld as the character does& 8t is only (y these means that

the reader can plausi(ly interpret the character>s su(se=uent (ehavior& This process is understood (etter ?hen ?e ma.e e9plicit the centrality of fictional minds& 31"13 8n tryin+ to follo? characters> mental functionin+, readers must ma.e a series of inferences& /s Mena.em Perry points out, most of the information that a reader derives from the te9t is not e9plicitly ?ritten in itC rather it is the reader himself ?ho supplies it (y the mere fact of choosin+ frames& This is not limited merely to su(tle information such as comple9 causal connections or the secret motives of characters, (ut involves even elementary components of the >reality> to ?hich the te9t refers&&&& Most of ?hat the reader infers from the te9t, it ?ill (e discovered, is the reader>s o?n +ap3fillin+ (15;5, $6)& He also stresses that this is a continuous and evolvin+ process The reader of a te9t does not ?ait until the end (efore (e+innin+ to understand it, (efore em(ar.in+ upon its semantic inte+ration&&&& Lf course, inferences in the initial sta+es are necessarily tentative (15;5, $%)& @hat *onen, Bmmott, and Perry have in common is a desire to stress that the impressive story?orld3creatin+ a(ilities of readers are not limited to sophisticated and su(tle understandin+s of the deep meanin+s of te9ts (ut are concerned ?ith apparently (asic and simple3soundin+ issues such as .no?in+ that la?ns occur outside houses& This is ?hat Perry refers to as elementary components of the actual ?orld& This understandin+ of the importance of readers> co+nitive s.ills in (ein+ a(le to understand te9ts on even the most elementary level mar.s a hu+e advance in our .no?led+e of narrative comprehension& Ho?ever, there is the dan+er that theorists, in order to stress the ma+nitude of the tas. facin+ the reader in comprehendin+ a te9t, may tend to emphasiAe the more o(viously elementary components of reality at the e9pense of issues such as comple9 causal connections and secret motivations& Jet, comple9 causal motivations and secret motivations are also elementary components of story?orlds& For e9ample, Perry is concerned ?ith the hypotheses and frames ?ith ?hich the reader constructs the story?orld of @illiam Faul.ner>s short story / *ose for Bmily& )ut ?hat Perry does not ma.e e9plicit is that the hypotheses and frames that he descri(es nearly all relate to fictional mental functionin+ in +eneral and to the construction of Bmily>s mind in particular (15;5, :61#6$)& 8n her article, The Modal 0tructure of -arrative ,niverses (15"6), Marie2aure *yan descri(es an >al+orithm> for the co+nitive processin+ of narrative discourse (15"6, ;60#61) in this ?ay / pro+ram ?ith this a(ility to form hypotheses, chain events (ac.?ards, reconstrue +ame3 plans, and revise its representation of past states or events ?ould fulfill one of the most am(itious proKects of te9tual semiotics it ?ould capture #as 0tanley Fish & & & puts it# >the temporal flo? of the readin+ process> and the >successive responses of the reader> as he +oes throu+h the te9t (15"6, ;6:#6$)& @hat is of particular interest 31"!3

here is her use of the term #ame$plans& This is an e9plicit reco+nition that co+nitive frames are crucially related to the mental functionin+ of characters their +oals, desires, plans for achievin+ them, and so on& The psycholo+ist /lan Par.in points out that the reader has a +oal ?hen addressin+ a te9t to achieve a representation of the te9t that is coherent at (oth the local and +lo(al level, at the level of (oth microstructure and macrostructure (!000, !$0)& 8t is the representations (y readers of the mental functionin+ of characters that ties to+ether the microstructural level of specific mental events and particular actions ?ith the macrostructural level of lon+3term plans and +oals& The ne9t section ?ill address the relationship (et?een microstructural and macrostructural issues in more detail& 3. 0m'edded !arrati)es The em(edded narrative approach has underpinned many of the ar+uments advanced so far throu+hout this (oo., so this section ?ill summariAe some of the points made to date, lin. the concept to the continuin+3consciousness frame, pic. out a fe? of the issues raised (y Marie32aure *yan>s ori+inal ?or. on it, and develop some of its teleolo+ical implications& The relationship (et?een the continuin+3consciousness frame and the notion of em(edded narratives is this the former is the means (y ?hich ?e are a(le to construct fictional mindsC the latter is the result of that construction& Bm(edded narratives are the product of the application of the continuin+3consciousness frame to the discourse& The term embedded narratives is intended to convey the point that the reader has a ?ide ran+e of information availa(le ?ith ?hich to ma.e and then revise Kud+ments a(out characters> minds& The three su(frames of the continuin+3consciousness frame that are descri(ed in chapter ; are Kust some of the ?ays in ?hich this ?ide ran+e of information is o(tained& First thou+h, 8 ?ish to continue the discussion started in section 1 of this chapter on the )lifil and Bmma passa+es& Jou ?ill remem(er that 8 made four comments on the t?o passa+es& Here is one more& 6& .hese pictures of the minds of 6lifil and (mma that are contained in the t,o passa#es form part of their embedded narratives & / .ey mediational tool for the study of fictional minds can (e found ?ithin the story3analysis side of narratolo+y& 8t is Marie32aure *yan>s notion of em(edded narratives, ?hich 8 am e9tendin+ (y applyin+ it to discourse analysis and usin+ it to mean the ?hole of a character>s mind in action the total perceptual and co+nitive vie?pointC ideolo+ical ?orldvie?C memories of the pastC and the set of (eliefs, desires, intentions, motives, and plans for the future of each character in 31":3 the story as presented in the discourse& 8t is a narrative (ecause it is the story of the novel as seen from the limited, aspectual point of vie? of a sin+le character& )oth passa+es may (e called narratives (ecause ?e see the story?orlds of Bmma and .om 7ones from the limited co+nitive and

ethical vie?points of Bmma and )lifil& The results of this analysis can in turn (e enmeshed into analyses of the other minds in the story?orld ?ith their o?n em(edded narratives, their o?n motives, intentions, and plans& The em(edded narrative approach can relate states of mind to the other presentations of )lifil>s consciousness in the discourse as ?ell as to his (ehavior and actions& The (mma passa+e is related to the su(se=uent development of Bmma>s em(edded narrative (ecause the final sentence e9presses an intention re+ardin+ future action& 8n this ?ay, a complete picture of an aspectual, su(Kectively e9perienced story?orld results& The story?orld is aspectual in the sense that its characters can only ever e9perience it from a particular perceptual and co+nitive aspect at any one time& /s 0earle e9plains, P?Qhenever ?e perceive anythin+ or thin. a(out anythin+, ?e al?ays do it under some aspects and not others (155!, 16%#6;)& There is a lin. (et?een the activity of reconstructin+ Bmma>s fictional mind in particular and the activity of understandin+ the lar+er narrative ?ithin ?hich it is located& This lin. is the relationship (et?een different minds& There is an important sense in ?hich the Bmma passa+e is a(out t?o minds rather than one it is a(out Churchill>s mind as ?ell as Bmma>s& The t?o minds are in some sort of relationship, (ut ?hat sort of relationship is thisI Ho? can it (e successfully theoriAedI 8n addition to the actual em(edded narratives of characters> minds, the overlappin+ and intert?inin+ of narratives referred to earlier results in the creation of ?hat mi+ht (e called dou(ly em(edded narratives& That is, em(edded ?ithin Bmma>s narrative is a virtual version of Churchill>s& 8n ma.in+ assumptions a(out the reasons for his (ehavior, she is reconstructin+, incorrectly, an aspect of his mind ?ithin her o?n& The ?hole passa+e is (ased on a complete misunderstandin+ of his actual em(edded narrative& This dou(ly em(edded =uality of em(edded narratives is a restatement in different terms of the dialo+ic nature of consciousness& 8n aspectual terms, Bmma sees a particular aspect of Churchill that causes her to misread his ?hole narrative& @hen she hears of his true position, she is forced to reconstruct it from the (e+innin+ and there(y see him under a different aspect& 8 ?ill discuss dou(ly em(edded narratives in more detail in chapter ;, section $& To summariAe the conclusions up to this point, the em(edded narrative approach dra?s attention to the fact that narrative is, in essence, the presentation 31"$3 of fictional mental functionin+& 8t hi+hli+hts the follo?in+ aspects of fictional minds, many of ?hich have (een discussed in earlier chapters U the future (+oals) and the past (memory) relate to the present (immediate consciousness, emotions, and dispositions)C U the mind is an information3processin+ device that adapts to its environment (y dealin+ ?ith surprisesC U much of our mental functionin+ is pu(lic and social in natureC U ?e ma.e stories of our livesC

U U U U U U

a +ood deal of our mental functionin+ is counterfactual in natureC there is a net?or. of causal mental events (ehind our actions, and many of the action descriptions in narrative discourse ma.e the e9istence of this net?or. clearC ascription has an important role to play in assessin+ the nature of this net?or., and it ta.es the form of first3person as ?ell as third3person ascriptionC the use of the ?ord embedded stresses the situatedness of our mental functionin+C the story?orld is aspectual it is seen from the points of vie? of the characters in it and it is, in a sense, the amal+amation of the various su(?orlds of the characters> mindsC and it is an open concept that stresses the ?ide variety of information, (oth pu(lic and private, that is availa(le for the process of constructin+ fictional minds&

8 thin. that the em(edded narrative approach is valua(le for a num(er of reasons it is a detailed precise approach to the ?hole of a particular fictional mind that avoids the fra+mentation of previous approachesC it vie?s characters> minds not Kust in terms of the presentation of passive, private inner speech in the modes of direct or free indirect thou+ht, (ut in terms of the narrator>s positive role in presentin+ characters> social mental functionin+, particularly in the mode of thou+ht reportC and it hi+hli+hts the role of the reader, the process (y ?hich the reader constructs the plot (y means of a series of provisional conKectures and hypotheses a(out the em(edded narratives of characters& The term embedded narrative is in a sense simply a la(el for an approach that has al?ays (een used (y literary critics in practice (ut that has not yet (een sufficiently theoriAed& /s 8 said in chapter !, the material that is covered (y the term has (een cate+oriAed separately ?ithin narrative theory under a num(er of different headin+s consciousness representation, focaliAation, characteriAation, 31"63 and so on& The usefulness of the em(edded narrative la(el is that it encoura+es a detailed, precise, functional, and inclusive approach to?ard the ?hole of a fictional mind& 8t clarifies the process (y ?hich the reader constructs a series of encounters ?ith a particular fictional mind into somethin+ that is coherent and continuous& Currently, there is a hole in literary theory (et?een the analysis of consciousness, characteriAation, and focaliAation& Lddly, as 8 hope to have sho?n, a +ood deal of fictional discourse is situated precisely ?ithin this analytical +ap& 8t may appear that 8 am stretchin+ the term narrative too far and overe9tendin+ its scope to the point ?here it ceases to (e useful& Ho?ever, 8 ?ould ar+ue that the use of the phrase has +reat value (ecause it focuses attention on the teleolo+ical value of the information that te9ts provide

on fictional minds& Characters are o(viously different from real people in that they e9ist only ?ithin a narrative structure& The detail on fictional minds provided in te9ts +ains si+nificance ?ithin that structure, and the use of the ?ord narrative is intended to dra? attention to this point& 8t is noticea(le that there is no? a +ro?in+ interest ?ithin a num(er of real3mind disciplines in the role of narrative in thou+ht& This trend stren+thens an identification of the t?o concepts& Manfred Eahn dra?s attention to the spreadin+ insi+ht that a person>s perceptions are already informed (y internal narrative >scripts> (1555(, 1")& 4aniel 4ennett refers to the self as a center of narrative +ravity (for e9ample, 1551, $10, $1")& ,sin+ a variety of metaphors, theorists from various disciplines have su++ested that life plans are scripted on fairy3tale patterns and that in a sense ?e are all novelists& For e9ample Story is a (asic principle of Mind& Most of our e9perience, our .no?led+e, and our thin.in+ is or+aniAed as stories (Turner 155%, v)& Reoffrey @hite considers the issue from an anthropolo+ical point of vie? The relevance of prototype schemas for emotional understandin+ follo?s from the ?ider salience of narrative as an or+aniAin+ principle in ethnopsycholo+ical thou+ht +enerally&&&& /mon+ the many types of narrative used to represent and communicate social e9perience, >life stories> appear to (e an especially salient +enre across cultures& He notes, ho?ever, that there is some evidence that Buro3/merican cultures tend to >pac.a+e> e9perience in the form of individualiAed life stories more than many non3 @estern cultures that do not value or ela(orate individual self3narrative (1555, !";)& 2i.e so many of the comparisons made ?ithin anthropolo+y re+ardin+ the differences (et?een @estern culture and other cultures, this line of in=uiry ma.es it easy to understand ?hy the novel has developed into an important art form that is identified ?ith the @est& 31"%3 /s 8 have said, the term embedded narratives e9presses )a.htin>s vision of the novel as a polyphony of independent voices and his vie? that readers should re+ard characters not as o(Kects (ut as su(Kects& @ertsch comments that )a.htin follo?ed the collectivist orientation of *ussian culture and assumed that meanin+ ?as al?ays (ased in +roup life (1551, %")& *eaders e9perience the su(Kectivity of characters> em(edded narratives and realiAe that the events in the story?orld are aspectual& The same o(Kect or event ?ill (e e9perienced under a different aspect (y another character or (y the same character at a different time& Much of the sense of the situated and conte9tual nature of consciousness is conveyed (y Golosinov>s notion of the utterance and, in particular, )a.htin>s concept of voice& 8n fact, the notion of voice has a +ood deal in common ?ith the concept of em(edded narratives& )oth are the concrete e9pression of the ideolo+ical vie?point and total ?orld3vie? of fictional characters& Ho?ever, 8 prefer the term embedded narrative to the term voice for t?o reasons First, it is more complete as it conveys, at least to me, more of a sense of the action and (ehavior of characters in addition to their co+nitive, ideolo+ical, and perceptual vie?point& 0econdly, it is more accurate as it conveys, a+ain at least to me, a clearer sense of a discursive construct, an element in narrative discourse& )ecause of this, it

invites analysis of the means (y ?hich the narrator constructs and the reader reads a particular fictional character& )y contrast, the notion of voice invites the analyst to see the fictional mind as more of a +iven& 0ome approaches to the role of narrative in thou+ht adopt a functionalist perspective on the issue& This is a particularly interestin+ e9ample em(odied a+ents can inventively e9ploit facts a(out their physical circumstances to avoid e9plicit representation and reasonin+&&&& PMQost human activity, rather than implementin+ preconceptualiAed plans, consists of incessant, creative improvisational mo(iliAation and appropriation of the vast array of resources that environments re+ularly ma.e availa(le& -ot only do people rarely >fi+ure it all out in advance> &&& their stories should (e understood not as veridical reports of ho? activity comes to (e, (ut as after3the3fact reconstructions ?hose role is to retrospectively render activity intelli+i(le (and perhaps accounta(le) (0mith 1555, ;;0)& These insi+hts relate closely to the discussion on first3person ascription in chapter $, section "& The reports that people +ive of their thou+ht processes are not necessarily relia(le& @e tend to create narratives for ourselves in order to ma.e intelli+i(le ?hat has happened to us& /ntonio 4amasio reminds us that the narrative mind has a use not Kust for the past, (ut also for the future The chan+es ?hich occur in the auto(io+raphical self over an individual lifetime are not due only to the remodelin+ of the lived past that ta.es place 31";3 consciously and unconsciously, (ut also to the layin+ do?n and remodelin+ of the anticipated future (!000, !!$)& 4amasio>s last point there interestin+ly echoes 4ennett>s ar+ument that the purpose of the mind is to produce future& )rian McHale has dra?n attention to the need for a functional approach ?ithin literary theory in a ?ay that reinforces the remar.s (y real3mind theorists that 8 =uoted in the section on functionalism in chapter $ / functionalism ?ould not or+aniAe ta9onomies, (ut ?ould e9plain teleolo+iesC it ?ould not define ?hat, a(stractly, sentences are, (ut rather ?ould +ive an account of ?hat sentences do, ?hat, in particular conte9ts, they are there for (15":, $$)& 8 hope that this study ?ill +o a little ?ay to?ard fulfillin+ McHale>s pro+ram ?ithin the specific field of fictional minds& Marie32aure *yan defines her concept of embedded narratives as any storyli.e representation produced in the mind of a character and reproduced in the mind of the reader (15"%, :!0)& 8 have considera(ly e9tended the meanin+ of the term (y placin+ it in the conte9t of the parallel discourses descri(ed in this study and, therefore, (y usin+ it to refer to all aspects of the fictional mind& *yan e9plains that for a discourse to evo.e a story?orld, it must (rin+ a universe to life and convey to the reader the sense that at the center of this universe there resides an actual or real ?orld, a realm of factual states or events& This ?orld is understood (y the reader to (e inha(ited (y intelli+ent (ein+s ?ho produce a variety of mental representations such as (eliefs, ?ishes, proKections, intents, o(li+ations, dreams, and fantasies& Ta.en to+ether, these mental constructs constitute the private domain of characters (*yan 15"%, :!0)& 8t is *yan>s vie? that the study of em(edded narratives is most

re?ardin+ in +enres ?ith the most canonical plot structures, such as fol. tales, spy stories, soap operas, tra+edies, and comedies of errors& )ut, she ventures, the concept can also find useful applications in the modern novel, possi(ly the least canonical of all narrative +enres (15"%, :!%)& This seems to me to (e an unnecessarily tentative vie? of the value of the approach& 8 have tried in this study to demonstrate that a more fluid and fle9i(le use of the notion can (e of +reat value in analyAin+ all novels, includin+ su(tle and difficult modern novels such as .he Cryin# of "ot %B& *yan presents an astonishin+ly comple9 analysis of a sin+le3para+raph /esop fa(le usin+ the em(edded narrative techni=ue, and Fluderni. comments very +enerously on this aspect of *yan>s ?or. as follo?s /n interestin+ proposal that si+nificantly develops the analysis of plottin+ is Marie32aure *yan>s essay &&& PthatQ stresses characters> intentions and plans as ?ell as their ?ishes and hopes, and the effect of these on possi(le plot development& 8ncorporatin+ these several 31""3 layers of fictional virtualities, the model provides for a more comple9 account of narrative in process than traditional plot analysis allo?s& Jet even *yan>s account uses a simple te9t, a fairy tale, as its o(Kect of analysis#a move that &&& puts in dou(t a possi(le application to the novel (155%, 6%)& 8n an endnote to her comment, Fluderni. =ualifies it some?hat to concede that in fact applica(ility to the novel is hindered for reasons of te9tual len+th#it is not (in principle) reKected& Marie32aure *yan>s approach ?ould (e hi+hly useful in the analysis of individual scenes of chapters of a novel (155%, :"$)& /s 8 have su++ested, it is inappropriate to tal. simply in terms of simple te9ts, +enre novels, and analyses of sin+le scenes in novels& / necessarily simplified version of the notion of em(edded narratives can (e applied to the teleolo+ical structures of the ?hole ran+e of complete novels& @hen *yan>s =uasi3scientific and technical method is applied in this ?ay, it +ains in (readth, insi+ht, fle9i(ility, and heuristic po?er ?hat it may lose in scientific ri+or and completeness& 8t may (e ?orth stressin+ a+ain here the point that 8 made in chapter 1, section 6 re+ardin+ the ran+e of novels that 8 have in mind& )ecause my interest is in consciousness, you may have (een tempted to thin. that 8 re+ard as my paradi+m the consciousness novel or the stream of consciousness novel& This is not the case& 8 am concerned ?ith the role of consciousness in all novels& Here is an illustration& 8n Te9t @orlds (1555), Paul @erth discusses a ?ell3.no?n interior monolo+ue novel, @illiam Faul.ner>s .he Sound and the !ury& /s @erth points out, ?e can re+ard the character frames of )enKi, Wuentin and Eason as (oth (uildin+ up representations of their inner ?orlds, and also as providin+ vanta+e points from ?hich commonly e9perienced events are vie?ed&&&& @e can re+ard them, then, as three separate te9t ?orlds, representin+ a set of overlappin+ circumstances&&&& Lur privile+e as readers is to (e a(le to e9perience separate >realities> vicariously (1555, :::)& 8t seems to me that his term te2t ,orlds can, in this conte9t at least, (e re+arded as a synonym for the term embedded narratives& )oth emphasiAe the centrality of fictional minds to the readin+ process& Ho?ever, there is a dan+er that the force of this insi+ht ?ill (e reduced if it is thou+ht that it should (e

applied only to stream of consciousness novels& @erth ma.es the point a(out the te9ts ?orlds of )enKi>s, Wuentin>s, and Eason>s minds that Faul.ner presents the three ?orlds >ra?,> as it ?ere there is no narrative envelope ?ithin ?hich the three stories unfoldC they are simply presented one after the other (1555, :::)& This is true& )ut it should (e emphasiAed that the constructions of fictional minds as te9t ?orlds occurs in all narratives and not Kust those (stream of consciousness) narratives 31"53 in ?hich the ?orlds happen to (e presented ra? and apparently unmediated& The minds of Bmma, 2yd+ate, and )lifil, ?hich are all processed and hi+hly mediated, are Kust as much te9t ?orlds as the minds of )enKi, Wuentin, and Eason& This is my final comment on the )lifil and Bmma passa+es ?ith ?hich 8 (e+an this chapter %& 6oth passa#es have a teleolo#ical si#nificance& The /usten passa+e has a si+nificant teleolo+ical purpose ?ithin the functionin+ of Bmma>s em(edded narrative& The superficiality and self3 deception that it conveys ?ill cause the collision (et?een Bmma>s and Dni+htley>s em(edded narratives and those of others such as Churchill that ?ill ultimately determine the teleolo+ical shape of the narrative& The concepts of motive and intention have a pivotal role in this line of in=uiry (ecause they lin. the mass of consciousness that is contained in em(edded narratives ?ith its visi(le and overt e9pression in (ehavior and action& This is the point at ?hich characters pu(licly en+a+e ?ith, and conflict ?ith, each other throu+hout the events that ma.e up the story& 8 refer to teleolo+y here (ecause readers read the plot of a novel as the com(ination of the concrete e9pressions of the em(edded narratives of all of its various characters the thou+hts they thin. and the actions they ta.e& The teleolo+ical approach to the presentation of mind in narrative fiction forms a conceptual frame?or. ?ithin ?hich te9ts can (e analyAed to sho? ho? particular e9amples of access to characters> minds contri(ute to the presentation of the plot3formin+ process& @ithin the discourse, the contents of characters> minds in the story are presented directly ?hen the narrator needs to provide e9plicit e9planations for their em(edded narrative that are re=uired in addition to descriptions of their (ehavior& L(viously, the narrator cannot +ive the reader continued and total direct access to the minds of all the characters& *eaders infer their continued mental processes from all of the availa(le evidence& From this steady flo? of information, the reader constructs the initial hypotheses and underta.es the comple9 sets of modifications that readin+ involves& The reader then a++re+ates each character>s em(edded narrative from the discourse to form that reader>s story& *eaders read plots as the interaction of characters> em(edded narratives&

8 referred earlier to Bmma>s need to reconstruct Churchill>s em(edded narrative once she hears of his secret en+a+ement& From the point of vie? of the reader, there is a parallel process of construction and reconstruction& The reader is presented ?ith a narrative for Churchill (as the availa(le flirt) that is refracted, in the main, throu+h the prism of Bmma>s perception of him& 31503 Ho?ever, the reader is forced in the li+ht of the revelation at the end of the (oo. to reconstruct Churchill>s actual em(edded narrative (as the secretly en+a+ed, resourceful manipulator) and to a(andon the earlier narrative that he had successfully presented to Bmma and also to the reader& This readin+ process re=uires the reader in effect to recreate the ?hole story?orld of the novel& Fictional minds are semiotic constructs that form part of an overall narrative pattern& They are elements in a plot as ?ell as centers of consciousness& / sli+htly different approach is ta.en (y Fluderni. /ctants in my model are not defined, primarily, (y their involvement in a plot (ut, simply, (y their fictional e9istence&&&& PTQheir actin+ necessarily revolves around their consciousness, their mental center of self3a?areness, intellection, perception and emotionality (155%, !%)& )ut surely fictional characters e9ist to (e in a plot& )oth aspects are essential& The notion of em(edded narratives appears to me to (e an e9citin+ and re?ardin+ ?ay out of this narratolo+ical dualism& The study of a character>s em(edded narrative is a study of their consciousness and, simultaneously, a study of the conte9t of that consciousness& 8t is the study of fictional thin.in+ and actin+ to+ether ?ith, and in conflict ?ith, other consciousnesses and is, therefore, the study of the plot& @hen a fictional consciousness is vie?ed as the story?orld as e9perienced from a particular vie?point, it (ecomes difficult to drive the .ind of ?ed+e that Fluderni. envisa+es (et?een the different aspects of that consciousness& 4irect presentations of a character>s consciousness in any of the three modes are used (y the narrator to +ive access to that em(edded narrative ?hen the narrator needs to do so in order to provide any e9planation that is necessary in addition to descriptions of that character>s actions& The narrator ?ill +ive inside vie?s of an em(edded narrative ?hen it appears that other evidence relatin+ to that fictional mind is insufficient for the reader to follo? its ?or.in+s& *yan o(serves that a study of fairy tales sho?s that unrealiAed em(edded narratives tend to (e fully e9pressed (y the narrator in order to rescue them from o(livion& Ln the other hand, actualiAed em(edded narratives are li.ely to remain implicit (ecause there ?ould then (e duplication ?hen the events of the story?orld ?ere retold (*yan 15"%, :!")& / detailed e9amination of a num(er of novels ?ould esta(lish ?hether *yan>s su++estion is +enerally true of comple9 fiction& 8n a famous paralipsis (?ithholdin+ of information) in (mma, the narrator decides not to +ive access to a character>s successfully realiAed em(edded narrative, thou+h for reasons different from those su++ested (y *yan& 4urin+ Fran. Churchill>s (rief conversation ?ith Eane Fairfa9 in chapter $:, the reader is deli(erately and pointedly not +iven any access to his thou+hts,

31513 (ecause the narrator does not ?ish to reveal their secret en+a+ement& @hen Eane Fairfa9 spea.s, Fran. Churchill made no ans?er, merely loo.ed, and (o?ed in su(mission (155%, :0")& The narrator can conceal the true situation only (y not +ivin+ the reader access to their thou+hts& 8nstead, the narrator uses surface description and misleadin+ indicative (ehavior such as the description of his speech to her as +rave& )y the end of the narrative, the reader .no?s that this ?as misleadin+ (ecause the +rave (ehavior ?as not indicative of a +rave state of mind at all (ut ?as intended to conceal his playful and conspiratorial thou+hts& L(viously, the teleolo+ical shape of the narrative ?ould have (een very different if the narrator had informed the reader at that point of the true nature of his em(edded narrative& /lthou+h direct access is fre=uently +iven to Bmma>s mind in chapter $:, there are only t?o occasions on ?hich other minds (Miss )ates>s and Mr& Dni+htley>s) are directly vie?ed& Ho?ever, these t?o occasions are si+nificant (ecause they come at crucial points in the development of Bmma>s education, or in other terms, in the modifications to her em(edded narrative that ?ill (e necessary for the conclusion of the plot to (e reached& The first is Miss )ates>s reaction to Bmma>s insult her meanin+ & & & (urst on her (155%, :0%)C and the second is Dni+htley>s mista.en vie? of Bmma>s feelin+s durin+ the =uarrel that they have a(out the insult He had misinterpreted her feelin+s (155%, :10)& The first sho?s the diver+ence of another character>s em(edded narrative from Bmma>s o?n, and the conflict that arises from her (lind and selfish pursuit of her +oals& The second is the lo+ical conse=uence of this diver+ence& @ithin Dni+htley>s em(edded narrative, Bmma is spoiled and self3centered and is not at that moment capa(le of remorse for hurtin+ Miss )ates& /s their narratives conflict, Dni+htley fails to read the si+ns of her chan+e of heart& )ecause of this, the reconciliation of their narratives is postponed for convenient and teleolo+ical reasons until the end of the narrative& Considered in functional terms, other minds are dipped into in order to illuminate Bmma>s dilemmas& 8t is possi(le to construct a +reatly simplified teleolo+ical model for the information that is used (y the reader durin+ this process, ?hich summariAes the material e9plained in the previous chapters as follo?s desires and (eliefs [ intentions and motives [ inner speech and selfre+ulation [ decisions [ action and (ehavior [ lon+ term plans and +oals [ em(edded narratives [ character [ plot This is simply an initial attempt at a model that ?ill necessarily (e modified as more ?or. is done alon+ the lines su++ested (y this (oo.& 0everal e9amples of ?hat mi+ht (e called teleolo#ical consciousness can (e

315!3 found in .he Cryin# of "ot %B& 8 mean (y this phrase the use of thou+ht report (y the narrator to lin. the character>s consciousness to the teleolo+ical shape of the narrative, often (y presentin+ it in a heavily schematic fashion& B9amples include 0o (e+an, for Ledipa, the lan+uid, sinister (loomin+ of The Tristero (155%, :%)C Trystero& The ?ord hun+ in the air as an act ended and all li+hts ?ere for a moment cutC hun+ in the dar. to puAAle Ledipa Maas, (ut not yet to e9ert the po?er over her it ?as to (155%, 61)C 0he could, at this sta+e of thin+s, reco+niAe si+nals li.e that, as an epileptic is said to (155%, %%)C and 0he +lanced do?n the corridor of Cohen>s rooms in the rain and sa?, for the very first time, ho? far it mi+ht (e possi(le to +et lost in this (155%, %%)& These e9amples can (e read alon+ a scale of character consciousness& They start ?ith the narrator addressin+ the reader re+ardin+ the plot over the head of the character as it ?ere and end ?ith the character herself (ecomin+ a?are of the shape of the narrative in ?hich she is actin+& This is sho?n most clearly in the follo?in+ e9ample ?hen in the clima9 to the novel Ledipa addresses herself alone& 0he methodically lists the four possi(le e9planations for the situation in ?hich she finds herself and there(y summariAes the plot of the narrative Bither you have stum(led indeed, ?ithout the aid of 204 or other indole al.aloids, on to a secret richness and concealed density of dream&&&& Lr you are hallucinatin+ it& Lr a plot has (een mounted a+ainst you&&&& Lr you are fantasyin+ some such plot&&&& Those, no? that she ?as loo.in+ at them, she sa? to (e the alternatives& Those symmetrical four (155%, 11;#1")& Finally, in commentin+ on the interpretive activity of readers ?hile constructin+ em(edded narratives, *yan introduces an interestin+ perspective (y relatin+ it to our roles in real life& 0he comments that in a dramatic performance the spectator reads the plot into the +estures and utterances that are o(served on the sta+e in an attempt to rationaliAe the (ehavior of the characters& 0he then su++ests that the same interpretive activity is performed on data in real life Eust as ?e read a plot into a play, ?e may form a story out of private e9periences or out of personally recorded o(servations (*yan 1551, !%6)& /s the various theorists =uoted earlier told us, ?e construct a story out of our o?n life& @e have to form stories in order to ma.e our lives coherent& 8t is (y these stories that ?e live& Lur lives are narratives that are em(edded in the social conte9t ?ithin ?hich ?e function& 0pecifically, there is the conte9t of other narratives& Lur lives do not Kust consist of the sin+le em(edded narrative that ?e construct for ourselves& 8n addition, ?e are (urdened, or (lessed, ?ith the .no?led+e that alternative em(edded narratives e9ist for all of us ?ithin the em(edded narratives of all of those ?ho .no? us& 315:3

4. #he Storyworld 8n chapter !, section ! 8 (riefly considered the application of possi(le3?orlds theory to narratolo+y& The purpose of this section is to apply the notion of fictional story?orlds more specifically to the issue of fictional minds& #he aspectual nature of the storyworld 4oleTel contends that it is ?orlds ?ith persons or, (etter, persons ?ithin ?orlds that +enerate stories (155", ::)& Chapter 6 tried to sho? that our minds are social and that the norm for mental functionin+ is multiperson ?orlds& This means that it is the relationships (et?een persons that +enerate stories& 0tories are +enerated (y the conflicts (et?een persons, and the conflicts are caused (y the fact that the story?orld is aspectual& Bach character sees the story?orld under a different aspect or from a different point of vie?& 8f they did not, there ?ould (e no conflicts and no stories& Crucially, fictional minds, once created and then re3created ?ith each ne? hypothesis, are themselves aspectual& They e9ist, or are seen from a certain aspect, ?ithin the minds of the other characters in the novel& The same +oes for physical events, apart from mar+inal e9amples such as narrator3supplied information on (ac.+round events in historical novels& 8t is for this reason that it ?ould perhaps (e (etter in +eneral to refer to story?orld events as e9periences& /lthou+h the point developed earlier is a simple one, 8 thin. that a +ood deal of narrative theory is structured in such a ?ay that one can easily lose si+ht of it& 4oleTel asserts that the factual domain of the fictional ?orld is split into these t?o su(domains fully authenticated, (y authoritative narrative, and collectively authenticated, (y consensual fictional persons> accounts& /s to the virtual domain, the domain of possi(les that remain nonauthentic, it divides into private domains, the (eliefs, visions, illusions, and errors of individual fictional persons (155", 161)& This is completely true, (ut is there not also a sense in ?hich all fictional mental life is virtualI From the point of vie? of an individual mind, the distinction (et?een (eliefs that are shared (y others and those that are not shared (y others may not (e apparent to the individual, or at least not to (e+in ?ith& )oth sorts ?ill simply (e (eliefs& /s for (eliefs that have (een certified as true (y the narrator, and those that have not, the earlier point is even more apt& The character can never .no? ?hich is ?hich& )oth sorts, narrator3certified and non3narrator3 certified, ?ill al?ays (e simply (eliefs for that character& This is not a trivial point& The aesthetic appeal of a plot is a function of the richness and variety of the various aspects under ?hich the story?orld is perceived (y the characters in that ?orld& 8n Marie32aure 315$3

*yan>s terms, this is the domain of the virtual& /ll of those aspects are virtual and su(Kective in the sense that they form a part of a character>s (elief system, includin+ those that are made real and o(Kective (y the statements of the narrator and those that are shared ?ith other characters& 8 said at the (e+innin+ of the discussion of fictional3?orlds theory in chapter !, section ! that the theory arose out of the philosophical concept of possi(le ?orlds and that this notion had developed as a tool to consider various technical issues in philosophy& Lne of those technical issues is relevant to the discussion here& 8t is the distinction dra?n (y the philosopher Rottlo( Fre+e (et?een sense and reference& Put very crudely, the reference of an o(Kect or entity is the o(Kective meanin+ of it that holds true under all circumstances and in all possi(le ?orlds& -ames are ri+id desi+nators (to use 0aul Drip.e>s phrase) that e9press the reference of a sentence& Sense relates to the various su(Kective descriptions of an o(Kect or entity that can affect the truth or falsity of a sentence in various ?ays ?hen they are su(stituted for its name& For e9ample, the name Eocasta is a ri+id desi+nator that e9presses the reference to that person& Garious descriptions of or senses for the entity Eocasta include The Wueen of The(es and the mother of Ledipus& 0o, it is true to say that Ledipus ?ished to marry EocastaC it may or may not (e true to say that Ledipus ?ished to marry the Wueen of The(es (he ?ould have to .no? that she ?as the Wueen of The(es, and he may not care ?hether she is or not)C it is o(viously false to say that Ledipus ?ished to marry the mother of Ledipus& /+ain, very crudely, the same distinction can (e e9pressed (y usin+ the technical philosophical terms, e2tension (correspondin+ to reference) and intension (correspondin+ to sense)& My purpose in mentionin+ this a(struse ar+ument here is to point out that 4oleTel ma.es use of the sense7reference and intension7e9tension distinctions in ;eterocosmica to refer to the aspectuality of the fictional ?orld& He e9plains that a fictional ?orld can (e structured intensionally in many different ?ays (y different intensional functions& 8n this thesis, a feature of Fre+e>s >sense> is reflected a variety of senses can (e associated ?ith one and the same referent, the various senses >illuminatin+> the referent>s different aspects (155", 1$1)& Put very simply, the su(Kective side of (oth pairs (sense and intensionality) account for the aspectual nature of the story?orld reality& 4ifferent characters e9perience the o(Kective reference or e9tension of the story?orld under a variety of different su(Kective intensional senses or aspects& The tra+edy of the narrative of Cedipus /e2 derives from the fact that Ledipus ?ished to marry Eocasta (ut ?as horrorstruc. ?hen he found that he had married his mother& 31563

0ncyclopedias 4oleTel refers to the cognitive element in the role of the reader as an encyclopedia Bncyclopedia as shared communal .no?led+e varies ?ith cultures, social +roups, historical epochs, and for these reasons relativiAes the recovery of implicit meanin+ (155", 1;;)& This is the real3?orld encyclopedia or store of .no?led+e that readers possess and that they (rin+ to te9ts in order to comprehend them& Dno?in+ that la?ns occur outside houses and that the 0istine Chapel is in *ome are e9amples of elements in a reader>s actual3?orld encyclopedia& Ho?ever, 4oleTel then +oes on to e9plain that, in order to reconstruct and interpret a fictional ?orld, the reader has to reorient his co+nitive stance to a+ree ?ith the ?orld>s encyclopedia& 8n other ?ords, .no?led+e of the fictional encyclopedia is a(solutely necessary for the reader to comprehend a fictional ?orld (155", 1"1)& The reader>s real3?orld encyclopedia has to (e modified in order to create the story?orld& My actual3?orld encyclopedia contains the fact that )a.er 0treet is in the center of 2ondon& My story?orld encyclopedia contains the fact that 0herloc. Homes lives in )a.er 0treet& 4oleTel calls this the fictional encyclopedia Dno?led+e a(out a possi(le ?orld constructed (y a fictional te9t constitutes a fictional encyclopedia (155", 1;;)& Ho?ever, this is only part of the story& The fictional encyclopedia is the totality of possi(le .no?led+e a(out a story?orld& 8n addition, characters each have their o?n fictional encyclopedias that are much smaller than the total one& -ot all of the characters in the Conan 4oyle stories ?ill .no? that 0herloc. Holmes lives in )a.er 0treet& @e can refer to these as internal encyclopedias the encyclopedias that all fictional characters possess a(out their story?orld and that are different from the reader>s story?orld encyclopedia& /s 4oleTel points out, PcQ o+nitive relations# the .no?led+e and (eliefs of each person a(out the other mem(ers of the a+ential constellation#play a maKor role in the a+ents> decision ma.in+, plans and strate+ies (155", 101)& The co+nitive relationship (et?een a character and the story?orld (that is, ho? much the character .no?s a(out the story?orld) and the co+nitive relationship (et?een the reader and the story?orld are (oth .ey elements in the narrative process& 4oleTel e9plores several of the implications arisin+ from characters> co+nitive relations& The modal system of .no?led+e, i+norance and (elief imposes epistemic order on the fictional ?orld&&&& The person of the fictional ?orld is an epistemic monad, perceivin+ himself or herself, other persons and the entire ?orld from a definite and distinct vanta+e point& The person>s practical reasonin+ and, conse=uently, his or her actin+ and interactin+ 315%3

are to a hi+h de+ree determined (y this epistemic perspective, (y ?hat the a+ent .no?s, is i+norant of, and (elieves to (e the case in the ?orld&&&& Bpistemic modalities release their story3+eneratin+ ener+y (ecause of uneven distri(ution of .no?led+e amon+ the fictional persons& The epistemic im(alance produces the (asic epistemic narrative, the story ?ith a secret (mystery story)&(155", 1!%) There are several si+nificant insi+hts in this passa+e& The list in 4oleTel>s second sentence is particularly useful himself, so first3person .no?led+e of inner states is not necessarily more relia(le than third3person .no?led+e (see chapter 6)C other persons, hence the importance of the concept of dou(ly em(edded narratives (see chapter ;)C the entire ?orld, hence the importance of internal encyclopediasC 4oleTel>s reference to practical reasonin+ and interaction sho?s the importance of aspectuality to the social and purposive nature of fictional mental functionin+C and finally, he usefully relates epistemic aspectuality to the teleolo+y of plot (see the previous section)& Ho?ever, it seems to me to (e a mista.e to limit these insi+hts to particular .inds of narrative& 8n the remar. =uoted earlier, 4oleTel refers to the mystery story& He later comments that PeQpistemic =uest can also (e perceived at the core of the )ildun+sroman (155", 1!;)& )ut it is important to reco+niAe that it is not Kust in mystery stories and the )ildun+sroman that epistemic im(alance is a si+nificant +enerator of plot& 8t is true of all narratives& 8s there a novel that you .no? of in ?hich every character .no?s ?hat every other character .no?sI Riven the aspectuality of fictional ?orlds, that state of affairs must (e impossi(le& This necessary im(alance is as true, and as teleolo+ically si+nificant, of Henry Eames as it is of, say, the thriller ?riter Patricia Hi+hsmith& Marie32aure *yan also ma.es the same point a(out the aspectual nature of the story?orld and, in particular, the epistemic im(alance (et?een characters and readers& 0he o(serves that the reader>s representation of the actual ?orld of a fictional universe is much more accurate (thou+h usually more limited) than the representation of the characters ?ho must (ase their .no?led+e on their o?n empirical e9perience (15"6, ;!1)& / part of this process is the need to reorient one>s co+nitive stance in order to a+ree ?ith all the characters> encyclopedias& 8t is not possi(le to follo? the plot other?ise& Jou can try an e9periment yourself in order to test the validity of this ar+ument& Choose a novel#any novelM#and (riefly summariAe the plot in your mind& Then see ?hether any elements of your summary are not dependent on the sort of co+nitive and emotional empathy that 8 am discussin+& My +uess is that there ?ill (e very fe?& 315;3

3aps 8 referred in chapter ! to the various +aps that arise (et?een (oth the story and the discourse on the one hand and on the other hand the story?orld& Bven the most detailed story and the most e9haustive discourse can only ever (e a very partial and limited description of the ?hole story?orld& There are +aps in the information provided in the story (ecause (ehind that story there e9ists the theoretical postulate of a story?orld that contains the missin+ information& The story is necessarily incomplete (ecause it can never list every possi(le fact a(out the story?orld& 8t is the function of the discourse to assist the reader to fill in those +aps in the story that appear to the reader to (e si+nificant& To do this readers need strate+ies for dealin+ ?ith the necessary incompleteness of fictional (ein+s& These strate+ies are contained in the frames, scripts, and so on that are necessary for comprehension of a te9t& /s *uth *onen indicates, the reliance on a frame of reference can e9plain ho? a te9t, characteriAed (y a paucity of information a(out its ?orld, rhetorically overcomes the incompleteness of its constituent o(Kects (15"", 61!)& The aspectual nature of perception that 8 discussed earlier can (e related to the role of the reader as much as to the activities of characters& Fictional people are perceived (y the reader under a particular aspect, ?hich is the e9plicit description in the discourseC and ?hat is not made e9plicit under that particular aspect is indeterminate& 8t is then part of the competence of the reader to fill in the +aps (y creatin+ more aspects under ?hich the character may (e implicitly or hypothetically perceived& Ho?ever, ?e have to (e careful to ensure that the lan+ua+e that ?e use a(out the incompleteness of possi(le ?orlds accurately fits the specific case of fictional minds& For e9ample, the first sentence of *uth *onen>s Completin+ the 8ncompleteness of Fictional Bntities (the title itself is revealin+) is this Fictional entities are inherently incomplete (ecause it is impossi(le to construct a fictional o(Kect (y specifyin+ its characteristics and relations in every detail (15"", $5;)& )ut is it possi(le to specify in every detail the characteristics and relations of real mindsI *onan>s ans?er is that in reality, as opposed to fiction, +aps are filled (y reference to a complete, fully detailed and, at least in principle, availa(le o(Kect (15"", $5;)& 0o, *onen appears to (e ar+uin+, it is possi(le to arrive at a complete and fully detailed description of a real mind& Bven ?ith the in principle caveat, this seems a stran+e ?ay to tal. a(out real minds& 8t is possi(le that *onen and the other possi(le3?orlds theorists are thin.in+ a(out such features of fictional ?orlds and real ?orlds as eye color and the num(er of children that 2ady Mac(eth had& These are issues that are easy to decide& Ta.e other e9amples The to?n ?here Bmma lives may or may not (e (ased on the 315"3 real to?n of Bpsom in 0urrey& Bmma may or may not (e five feet si9 inches& Her eyes may or may not (e (lue& These thin+s are indeterminate in the (mma story?orld& Ln the other hand, they are easily determined in the actual ?orld& @e tend to .no?, or can easily find out, ?here ?e are& @e can see the hei+ht and the eye color of ourselves and of others& Ho?ever, minds (oth real and fictional seem to me to (e some?hat different&

8 have tried to sho? that ?e should feel a little uncomforta(le ?ith the assertion that ?e can easily determine facts a(out our o?n minds and other minds& 8 mi+ht thin. that 8 am +enerous and he is selfish& 8t ?ould not (e any surprise thou+h to hear that the other person feels the e9act opposite& @ho is to say ?ho is ri+htI 8n this respect, it seems to me that the relative determinacies and indeterminacies of real minds and of fictional minds are in many si+nificant respects =uite similar& 8 said Kust then that ?e can determine simple facts in the actual ?orld& )ut is this necessarily trueI @hile it is true that ?e do not .no? Bmma>s nec. measurements, ?e do not .no? Eane /usten>s either (let us assume for the sa.e of ar+ument)& The difference, possi(le3?orlds theorists ?ill say, is that the latter is in principle .no?a(le, ?hile the former is not& The difference is a theoretical one the Bmma +ap in our .no?led+e is ontolo+ical (ecause the nec. siAe does not e9istC the Eane /usten +ap is epistemolo+ical (ecause it did e9ist once, (ut ?e do not no? .no? ?hat it ?as& @hile this is true, the fact remains that they are (oth still +aps, and in practice (if not in theory), they amount to the same thin+& Lur attention is also often dra?n to the =uestion of the finiteness of fictional (ein+s& They are different from real people (ecause they end ?hen the novel ends& They do not continue to e9ist as ?e do& @ell, that may (e true of people ?ho are alive, (ut ?hat a(out people ?ho are no? deadI /lso, less dramatically, surely ?e re+ularly e9perience others as finite (ein+s in the sense that ?e lose touch ?ith people and do not see them a+ain& L(viously they are still alive some?here, so a+ain it is a =uestion of practice as opposed to theory, (ut 8 am tal.in+ a(out our e2perience of others& The reader can cope ?ith the +aps in the continuin+ consciousnesses of fictional minds (ecause in the real ?orld ?e e9perience +aps in other, real minds too& From an aspectual point of vie?, another mind is sometimes present to us (?hen ?e are ?ith that person) and sometimes a(sent& Lur real3?orld co+nitive frame ena(les us to construct a continuin+ consciousness for the a(sent person unless ?e suffer from an a(normal condition such as autism that causes mind(lindness& 0o, is too much made of the incompleteness of fictional ?orldsI 8 do not mean that they are not incomplete& They are& @hat 8 mean is that in practice real individuals also find the actual ?orld incomplete& @e only ever 31553 .no? a fraction of ?hat is +oin+ on around us& L(viously, the difference is that it is theoretically possi(le for us to find out simple facts, and so it is an epistemolo+ical not an ontolo+ical issue& )ut, in practice, ?hat is the differenceI *eaders ?ho access fictional ?orlds and people ?ho live in the actual ?orld (oth have to ma.e inferences and construct hypotheses on the (asis of limited information& This is especially true in the case of other minds, ?here tal. of facts seems inappropriate& The reader thin.s, 8s a certain character ?ell intentionedI /n individual thin.s, 8s this ac=uaintance of mine ?ell intentionedI Theoretical completeness is not +oin+ to help very much in the latter case& Raps are a part of fictional individuals, and so the reader has to construct continuin+ consciousnesses, (ut is the same not true to a certain e9tent of the real people that ?e

.no?I /s 8 Kust said, ?e are ?ith them some of the time (ut they are a(sent at other times& 4o not real a(sences e=uate to fictional +apsI @hen ?e see them a+ain ?e +enerally attempt to reconstruct ?hat they have (een doin+ since ?e last sa? them in order to ?or. out rou+hly ho? they are feelin+ no?& @e reconstruct their narrative& Jou ?ill remem(er that the point of the false(elief tests for children that are used in the theory7simulation de(ate (chapter 6, section !) is to test ho? children can construct continuin+ consciousnesses follo?in+ the a(sence or +ap of the person in the test& This process is surely very similar to the activities of readers& @e (rin+ to the readin+ process our real3?orld .no?led+e of ho? to fill +aps and construct narratives for actual people& Finally, the emphasis in the thou+ht of the social theorists that ?as discussed in chapter 6 is on environment and conte9t& This is another ?ay in ?hich parallels can (e dra?n (et?een our construction of real people and readers> constructions of fictional people& The point is often made, =uite ri+htly, that characters are only elements in a story or plot they have no e9istence outside of that conte9t& *eal people are o(viously different, (ut are they that differentI @e too e9ist only in a social conte9t& 8t is rare for individuals to find themselves in the sin+le3person ?orlds that 4oleTel descri(es& Lur minds are reconstructed (ri+htly or, ?e may often feel, completely ?ron+ly and unfairlyM) ?ithin the minds of others, and this process forms the social conte9t ?ithin ?hich ?e function& 8 must emphasiAe that 8 am not denyin+ that fictional people are different from real people& 8 am simply sayin+ that, in descri(in+ the undenia(le differences, ?e must not +ive an unrealistic picture of ho? real minds ?or., and ?e must also ac.no?led+e the e=ually undenia(le similarities (et?een real minds and fictional minds& 3!003 #he limits of storyworlds /s descri(ed in section ! of this chapter, the continuin+3consciousness co+nitive frame has a default value or slot the reader assumes that the character>s consciousness ?ill continue (et?een mentions of them in the te9t unless informed other?ise, say, (ecause of e9ceptional circumstances such as amnesia, a coma, or a death and return to life or some such ma+ical event& 8 am not concerned in this (oo. ?ith the ran+e of values that arise from confounded e9pectations (for e9ample, as in science fiction, fantasy, or postmodernist narratives)& My study relates to the sorts of fictional minds that are contained in all .inds of narratives& B9ceptional consciousnesses could perhaps (e the su(Kect of a further study& This (rin+s me to a concern that 8 have re+ardin+ the limits of story?orlds& Possi(le3?orlds theorists emphasiAe the independence and autonomy of possi(le ?orlds from the actual ?orld& 8t can sometimes seem as thou+h there is no limit to the e9tent of story?orlds& 4oleTel maintains that PtQ e9tual poeisis &&& constructs fictional realms ?hose properties, structures, and modes of e9istence are, in principle, independent of the properties, structures, and e9istential mode of actuality (155", !:)& )ein+

independent from the real ?orld means that they are not constrained (y the actual structure of the real ?orld& Hence, hi+hly ima+inative literatures such as science fiction, fantasy, utopias, postmodernist te9ts, and so on are possi(le& Ho?ever, from my perspective, a very important limit to the e9tent of story?orlds su++ests itself& This is the need to descri(e fictional minds en+a+in+ in mental functionin+& To read narrative coherently, the reader must posit the e9istence of continuin+ consciousnesses that can em(ody the various causal net?or.s (ehind the actions of the characters in the narrative& This ?ill surely (e as necessary of the inha(itants of Pluto in a science fiction story as it is of the people (ein+ descri(ed in a +rittily realistic faction narrative& There are certain sorts of ma+ical minds that are conceiva(le those capa(le of B0P, mind readin+, tele.inesis, and so on& )ut if one loo.s at the fundamentals of cause and effect, mental events causin+ actions, and so on, these differences (e+in to loo. rather superficial& Lf course, the causal connections ?ill often (e very different, and these differences ?ill form the interest of the narrative& )ut the differences are small in the conte9t of the po?erful operation of the (asic frame& 8t is never a +ood idea to underestimate the in+enuity of narrative theorists ?here challen+es re+ardin+ the nature of narrative are concerned& -evertheless, 8 ?ill su++est this test 8s it possi(le to thin. of a narrative for ?hich the continuin+3consciousness 3!013 frame is inapplica(leI My ?easelly caveat here is to concede that it mi+ht (e possi(le to construct some sort of tortured e9ample of a science fiction or postmodern narrative, (ut a pretty poor specimen of narrative it mi+ht ?ell (e& 8n practice, even fictional realms are very much tied to the properties of the actual ?orld& Fictional minds, even on Pluto, have to operate very much li.e actual minds& (8n fact, 4avid Herman has su++ested as a possi(le e9ception to my su++ested rule a very compellin+ narrative& 8t is Christopher -olan>s film -emento, in ?hich the events are focaliAed throu+h the main character ?ho suffers from short3term memory loss& To ma.e matters more confusin+, his story is told (ac.?ard& Ho?ever, it seems to me that it is precisely the vie?er>s a(ility to use the continuin+3consciousness frame in order to construct, eventually and ?ith difficulty, an em(edded narrative for this character that imposes coherence on ?hat ?ould other?ise (e an incomprehensi(le e9perience&) / helpful perspective on the issue of the limits of story?orlds comes from an une9pected source& 8n M8TBC0, 0per(er and Hirschfeld su++est that reli+ious representations ?or. ?ell ?hen a (alance (et?een counterintuitive and intuitive =ualities is reached& / supernatural (ein+ ?ith too fe? une9pected =ualities is not attention demandin+ and thus not memora(le& Lne ?ith too many une9pected =ualities is too information rich to (e memora(le (1555, c99i)& This point applies e=ually ?ell to science and fantasy fiction& 8n (oth cases there has to (e in place a sufficient num(er of appropriate consciousness frames and su(frames for the narrative to (e comprehensi(le& /s F& B& 0parshott noticed, either the place

and the participants are conceived on the model of familiar types, in ?hich case the element of fantasy (ecomes scarcely more than decoration, or the story (ecomes thin and schematic, (ecause ?e cannot tell ?hat sort of (ac.+round to provide for ?hat ?e are e9plicitly told (15%;, 6, =uoted in Pavel 15"%, %0)& Thomas Pavel lists a num(er of the elements that he su++ests are indispensa(le to the sort of (ac.+round that he has in mind& He ?rites that every period, no matter ho? diverse and sophisticated its functional arran+ements, seems to have at its command a certain num(er of indispensa(le elements&&&& )irth, love, death, success and failure, authority and its loss, revolution and ?ar, production and distri(ution of +oods, social status and morality, the sacred and the profane, comic themes of inade=uacy and isolation, compensatory fantasies, and so much more, are al?ays present, from early myths and fol.tales to contemporary literature& Chan+es of taste or shifts of interest seem to affect the inventory only 3!0!3 mar+inally& 0ince ?e need an alien space in ?hich to deploy the ener+y of the ima+ination, there have al?ays (een and al?ays ?ill (e distant fictional ?orlds#(ut ?e may also use close fictional ?orlds for mimetic purposes, in order to +ather relevant information or Kust for the pleasure of reco+nition& (15"%, 1$;#$") Pavel>s list of indispensa(le elements seems to me to (e completely convincin+& Ho?ever, 8 thin. it ?ould (e a +ood idea to e9tend the point& 8 do not thin. that it is Kust the inventory of themes that stays pretty much the sameC it is also the (asic co+nitive frames relatin+ to fundamental fictional ?orld construction& 8t seems to me that these frames impose a (asic uniformity on fictional ?orlds that is necessary in order for us to (e a(le to access them& 4espite the daAAlin+ variety and ima+inativeness of fictional ?orlds, they all, even science fiction ?orlds, have to (e conceived on the model of familiar types for us to enter them& 8f ?e cannot use real ?orld frames to reconstruct them, they ?ill remain unintelli+i(le& *yan>s principle of minimal departure, ?hich 8 referred to in chapter !, section !, comes into play here& The departures re=uired for fictional minds are not as radical as their surface variety ?ould su++est& 4istant fictional ?orlds are, 8 thin., closer to us than they may at first appear& Ln a more +eneral point, Pavel>s final sentence seems to me to (e indicative of a rather ?orryin+ +ulf (et?een possi(le3?orlds theorists and other readers& 2iterary critics and +eneral readers read novels to +ather relevant information (the social history side of literary criticism) and also for the pleasure of reco+nition (the feelin+ that the fictional minds (ehave Kust li.e real minds)& )ut the ?ord Kust is revealin+& 8t seems to trivialiAe a lar+e amount of people>s reactions to novels& @hat is the interest in readin+, say, (mmaI 8s it not for the many, detailed, and comple9

correspondences and other relationships (et?een the (mma ?orld and the real ?orldI The +atherin+ of information and the pleasure of reco+nition, if these t?o phrases are interpreted ?idely enou+h, are at the heart of the readin+ process& 8 am sure that possi(le3?orlds theorists ?ould not deny this, (ut it does not appear that it is often said e9plicitly& To say this is certainly not to su(scri(e to a naNvely mimetic or realist vie? of fiction& *eaders +ather information a(out and +ain the pleasure of reco+nition from fictional minds in distant fictional ?orlds, Kust as much as they do from close ones& Conclusion /s 8 ?rite this, ne?s has Kust (een announced that a lar+e +roup of novelists has (een as.ed to vote on the +reatest novel of all time and that the ?inner 3!0:3 is Cervantes>s Don Dui2ote& 8t is often said that all novels derive from this, the first +reat novel& /s the poll sho?s, many thin. even no? that it is still the +reatest novel& 8t is, therefore, very satisfyin+ to see that it is particularly ?ell suited to an em(edded narrative analysis& The point of the novel is that the narrative that 4on Wui9ote constructs for himself is re+ularly in conflict ?ith the narratives of the other characters in the story?orld in a variety of different ?ays& He sees +iants ?here they see ?indmills& /t every point in the novel, he constructs the reality of the story?orld differently from others (ecause he aspectually interprets every event in a ?ay that ensures that it coheres ?ith his em(edded narrative& 3!0$3 1 #he *ictional ,ind in Action %. Background This chapter ?ill e9pand on the (asic conceptual frame?or. for the analysis of fictional minds that ?as descri(ed in the previous chapter and develop it in some of the ?ays that ?ere su++ested (y the e9plorations of the ?hole mind in chapter $ and, in particular, the social mind in chapter 6& 8 ?ill e9plore three maKor su(frames of the main consciousness frame the relationship (et?een thou+ht and action (section !), intermental or +roup or shared thin.in+ (section :), and ?hat 8 am callin+ dou(ly em(edded narratives, the representations of characters> minds that are contained ?ithin the minds of other characters (section $)& /ll three utiliAe fundamental aspects of our real3?orld .no?led+e of the

mental functionin+ (oth of ourselves and of others& These su(frames are certainly not the only ones, (ut 8 have chosen them (ecause they sho? the mind (eyond the s.in in action& They contain a num(er of areas of interest that, althou+h the terminolo+y is no? (ecomin+ rather cum(ersome, one mi+ht la(el sub$subframes& @ithin the thou+ht and action su(frame, 8 discuss the decodin+ of action statements, the thou+ht3 action continuum, indicative description, causation, and local and teleolo+ical motivationC and ?ithin the +roup3thin.in+ su(frame 8 discuss norm esta(lishment and maintenance, +roup conflict, and intramental assent and dissent& The unfamiliar terms are e9plained later& These discussions ?ill (e illustrated mainly (y e9amples from Bvelyn @au+h>s +ile 6odies& The novel, ?ritten in 15:0, is a(out a +roup of )ri+ht Joun+ People ?ho attend an endless round of parties in 2ondon& The main character is /dam, ?hose fiancOe, -ina, calls off their en+a+ement (ecause she meets someone else ?ith more money& The novel ends ?ith a shoc.in+ chan+e of tone& Rlo(al ?ar is announced, and ?e last see /dam ?anderin+ around a desolate (attlefield& The rest of this section is ta.en up ?ith a fe? introductory remar.s that may (e of assistance to you ?hen readin+ the rest of the chapter& Beha)iorist narrati)e 8n chapters $ and 6 8 referred occasionally to the concept of behaviorism in psycholo+y and philosophy, particularly ?hen discussin+ third3person ascription& )ehaviorism is a psycholo+ical method that uses the o(Kective o(servation of other people as the (asis for theories and conclusions, and so is hi+hly reliant on the relia(ility of ascriptions of mental states to others& The concept of behaviorist narrative is derived from this (asic sense of the term, and in this chapter 8 ?ill (e usin+ e9amples from a particular (ehaviorist narrative, +ile 6odies& 8 chose it (ecause of the apparently unpromisin+ nature of its presentations of consciousness& The reader strate+y of Koinin+ up the dots is particularly important in the case of this sort of narrative ?here the readin+ process has to (e very creative in constructin+ fictional minds from less information than is availa(le in other types of narrative& The Dictionary of Narratolo#y defines behaviorist narrative as an o(Kective narrativeC a narrative characteriAed (y e9ternal focaliAation and thus limited to the conveyance of the characters> (ehavior (?ords and actions (ut not thou+hts and feelin+s), their appearance, and the settin+ a+ainst ?hich they come to the fore (>The Dillers>)& 8n this type of narrative, the narrator tells less than one or several characters .no? and a(stains from direct commentary and interpretation (Prince 15";, 10)& 8t is ?ell .no?n that pure (ehaviorist narrative is difficult if not impossi(le to find& There are even different vie?s on the e9tent to ?hich Hemin+?ay>s self3conscious e9periments in this mode, such as the short stories The Dillers and Hills 2i.e @hite Blephants, are purely (ehaviorist& This is an ar+ument that 8 ?ould prefer to avoid& 8 ?ill simply su++est that (ehaviorism in narrative is a tendency to?ard the features descri(ed (y Prince and that +ile 6odies is an illustration of that tendency& (/ll the pa+e references in the e9amples are to the 155% Pen+uin edition&)

My +uess is that most readers of the novel ?ould say that they ?ere struc. (y ho? little direct access is +iven to characters> minds& @hat little there is tends to consist of a fe? ?ords of thou+ht report discreetly inserted into accounts of the happenin+s in the story?orld (1) he told her that she loo.ed li.e a fashion dra?in+ ?ithout the clothes& -ina ?as rather pleased a(out that& (%") 8n fact, this is the only direct access that is +iven to -ina>s mind, ?hich is si+nificant as she is an important character in the novel& @e see a little of /dam>s inner life (ut very little of the other characters>, and this lac. of access creates a faintly distur(in+ impression& 8n fact, the novel has (ecome associated ?ith its famous chapter 11, that, apart from /dam ran+ up -ina and 2ater 3!0%3 -ina ran+ up /dam, consists in its entirety of forty3three very short episodes of unta++ed speech& 8 am not =uestionin+ the +eneral validity of the behaviorist la(el& -either, in vie? of the narrative>s distinctive features of pure dialo+ue, attenuated characteriAation, and minimal motivation, am 8 =uestionin+ the application of the la(el to +ile 6odies& My point is merely that (ehaviorist narratives contain a +ood deal more information a(out fictional minds than has +enerally (een appreciated& 0pecifically, 8 hope to sho? that this particular discourse is saturated ?ith meanin+s that are closely related to the inner lives of characters& / character>s name is a space or a vacuum into ?hich readers feel compelled to pour meanin+ characteristics, dispositions, states of mind, causations& *eaders ta.e even the most apparently uninformative references to characters as cues to construct attri(utes& Ho?ever, much of this process can only (e theoriAed (y defamiliariAin+, la(elin+, and so ma.in+ visi(le some of the hitherto ne+lected devices that ena(le readers to understand ho? fictional minds function ?ithin the conte9t of their story?orlds& nner speech4 direct thought4 and free indirect thought 8 ?ill say a little a(out inner speech and the speech cate+ories at this point (efore discussin+ the three su(frames& There is very little evidence in the novel of the presence in characters> minds of inner speech& Lne reason for this is that the use of direct thou+ht necessarily entails inner speech, and there is very little direct thou+ht in the novel& @hat little there is consists of Kust a fe? rather inconse=uential and uninformative ?ords such as these >More trou(le for 0imon> thou+ht /dam (;%)C >Has he +iven all to his dau+htersI> thou+ht /dam (11")C and (>@hat indeedI> thou+ht /dam) (1%6)& Lf course, the t?o other modes of thou+ht report and free indirect thou+ht can also (e used to represent inner speech& 8n the case of the relatively small num(er of episodes of free indirect thou+ht, some appear to represent inner speech and some do not& 8

=uote a lar+e num(er of episodes of thou+ht report, and almost all of them appear to me to descri(e states of mind such as desires, emotions, dispositions, (eliefs, and attitudes rather than inner speech& The follo?in+ discussion of free indirect thou+ht anticipates some of my main ar+ument, (ut it is placed here (ecause of the intense interest in this particular speech cate+ory& There are t?o aspects to the use of free indirect thou+ht in +ile 6odies that are concerned ?ith the mind (eyond the s.in& First, the follo?in+ +rammatical form occurs on no less than nine occasions 3!0;3 (!) (a) 8t ?as a?ful ?hen Mrs /pe ?as li.e this& (") (& 8t ?as so difficult& ($0) c& 8t had (een an a?.?ard moment& ("6) d& 8t ?ould (e a?.?ard& (11:) e& 8t seemed odd& (115) f& 8t ?as all li.e one of those ca(inet meetin+s& (";) +& 8t ?as clearly +oin+ to (e a (ad crossin+& (;) h& 8t seemed odd that a man so (ul.y could (e so elusive& (5") i& 8t ?as clearly suita(le that he should marry (efore he ?as thirty& (10") /lthou+h it is not apparent from this heavily truncated presentation, these sentences, ?ith the e9ception of e9amples !+ and !h, occur in the conte9t of some form of social a?.?ardness& The character has internaliAed the social norms that he or she perceives to (e appropriate to the occasion and is em(arrassed (y the dan+er that they mi+ht (e trans+ressed& The intimate lin. (et?een social norm and individual consciousness is particularly ?ell illustrated (y e9ample !i, a sentence of free indirect thou+ht that occurs in a passa+e of thou+ht report of Bd?ard Thro((in+>s mind& 8t ta.es place t?o para+raphs after this description of the social conte9t in ?hich the character is thin.in+ (:) 8t ?as +enerally understood that no? Bd?ard Thro((in+ ?as (ac. these t?o ?ould (ecome en+a+ed to (e married& (10") This episode of consensus thou+ht report is a statement of reinforcement of the social norm of marria+e that is unmista.a(ly echoed in the free indirect thou+ht in e9ample !i& 8t is clear that the norms of the social consensus have (een very efficiently internaliAed and that Thro((in+>s mental functionin+ has (een severely constrained (y the pu(lic conte9t ?ithin ?hich it occurs&

0econd, the te9t contains some e9amples of intermental free indirect thou+ht& 8 ?ill start ?ith some mar+inal cases, and +o onto some more definite e9amples& The second sentence in the follo?in+ e9ample could (e a comment (y the narrator ($) / profusion of men in plus3fours ?ere havin+ =uic. ones (efore the start& There ?as no nonsense a(out not smo.in+& (1$1) 8t could, ho?ever, also (e a free indirect renderin+ of the collective consciousnesses of the users of the (ar& 8n the ne9t e9ample, a lon+ list of various features of the physical conte9t, clearly focaliAed throu+h a +roup of people, is follo?ed (y this statement (6) There ?as nothin+ for it (ut to +o (ac. to the (ar& (1$") /+ain, it is possi(le to interpret this statement as a narratorial Kud+ment on the 3!0"3 situation (ut e=ually possi(le to re+ard it as the collective decision of the +roup e9pressed in free indirect thou+ht& The follo?in+ three e9amples are made less am(i+uous (y the use of e9pressive devices %& (-o one had ?arned them that there ?as a motor race onC their hotel (ill ,as a shoc.&) (1::) ;& and at last they all ?ent to (ed, very tired, (ut fairly contented, and oh, ho? they ?ere (itten (y (u+s all that ni+ht& (1:!) "& The an+els cro?ded to+ether disconsolately& 8t ?as a?ful ?hen Mrs /pe ?as li.e this& My, ho? they ?ould pinch Chastity& (") The e9pressive emphasis on the italiciAed ,as allo?s e9ample % to (e plausi(ly interpreted as free indirect thou+ht rather than thou+ht report& The same +oes for oh ho? in e9ample ;, ?hich is perhaps indeterminate (et?een thou+ht and speech& 8n e9ample " the collective action (cro?din+) and the collective feelin+ or sensation ((ein+ disconsolate) is follo?ed first (y a free indirect presentation of their a?areness of the reason (Mrs /pe>s (ehavior) for the action and the accompanyin+ state of mind (see e9ample !a), and second (y a free indirect presentation of their intention to act in response (y pinchin+ Chastity& Free indirect perception (or internal focaliAation) also has a +roup form )ut there ?as no si+n of Miss *unci(le (16!)&The final e9ample is particularly interestin+ for the s.illful ?ay in ?hich the narrator alternates (et?een collective thou+ht report in e9amples 5a and 5c, collective free indirect speech in 5(, and collective free indirect thou+ht in e9ample 5d 5& (a) Their flashes and (an+s had rather a dis=uietin+ effect on the party, causin+ a feelin+ of tension, (ecause every(ody loo.ed ne+li+ent (() and said ?hat a (ore the papers ?ere, and ho? too li.e /rchie to let the photo+raphers come, (c) (ut most of them, as a matter of fact, ?anted dreadfully to (e photo+raphed and the others ?ere froAen ?ith unaffected terror that they mi+ht (e ta.en una?ares (d) and then their mamas ?ould .no? ?here they had (een ?hen they said they ?ere at the )icesters> dance, and then there ?ould (e a ro? a+ain,

?hich ?as so e2haustin#, if nothin+ else& ($6) Conte$tual thought report /lmost all of the direct access ?ith ?hich 8 am concerned for the rest of this chapter consists of conte2tual thou#ht report& 8 am usin+ this term for the short, uno(trusive sentences, phrases, or even sin+le ?ords that descri(e an aspect of a character>s mind and that are often com(ined ?ith descriptions of action or 3!053 conte9t& This device often refers to intentions to act or motives for action and is, therefore, purposive and e9planatory in nature& 8n discussin+ a story from .he Decameron, @ayne C& )ooth refers to its use as fre=uent#thou+h (y modern standards certainly shallo?#inside vie?s of characters> thou+hts (15";, 1!)& Most of the follo?in+ e9amples illustrate the comple9ity of the relationships (et?een conte9tual thou+ht report, action, and conte9t& The three are often ine9trica(ly lin.ed, and so it can (e a very artificial operation to lift conte9tual thou+ht report out of the sentence that contains it& This insepara(ility is an illustration of the centrality of consciousness to narrative that Moni.a Fluderni. has stressed so persuasively& 0pecifically, many of the follo?in+ e9amples contain a reference to the social and physical conte9t ?ithin ?hich the mental functionin+ ta.es place, althou+h a num(er have (een cut for reasons of space& The follo?in+ sentence uses t?enty3t?o ?ords to descri(e not Kust mental states, (ut also several facts a(out the physical environment ho? the +roup are positioned, the fact that they have a (oo. in front of them, and the movement of Mrs /pe (10) Their heads ?ere close to+ether and they ?ere so deeply en+rossed in the story that they did not hear Mrs /pe>s entry& ("0) 0ometimes the reference to the conte9t accompanies the action or consciousness description (11) /dam sat in the (ac. of the car ?ith Miles, ?ho ?as clearly put out a(out his friend>s lac. of cordiality& (1:") /t other times, the conte9t is contained ?ithin the description (1!) They ?ent do?n the hill feelin+ (uoyant and detached& (1$6)

Conte9tual thou+ht report plays an important role in the process of characteriAation& The term characterization can imply the presence of lon+ and ponderous passa+es in Gictorian novels that appear to tell the reader everythin+ there is to .no? a(out a character& )ut one should not lose si+ht of the characteriAation illustrated in e9ample 1:, ?hich occurs ?hen /dam tells 2ottie, his landlady, that he no? has money (1:) Have you no? said 2ottie indifferently& 0he lived on the assumption that everyone she .ne? al?ays had several thousand pounds& (%$) 8n only fourteen ?ords, the reader has learned a +ood deal a(out 2ottie&

2. #hought and Action #he decoding of action The first su(frame of the continuin+3consciousness frame that 8 ?ish to discuss is the relationship (et?een thou+ht and action& Constructions of fictional minds 3!103 are ine9trica(ly (ound up ?ith presentations of action& 4irect access to inner speech and states of mind is only a small part of the process of (uildin+ up the sense of a mind in action& This centrality of consciousness to narrative can (e demonstrated (y as.in+ readers to retell the plot of a novel& My +uess is that most ?ould not (e content to respond (y sayin+ < did /, J did ), F did C& They ?ould (e much more li.ely to descri(e characters> actions in terms of mental functionin+ such as < decided to do /, J ?anted to do ), F re+retted doin+ C& 4ecidin+, ?antin+, and re+rettin+ are the mental events and states that provide the causal net?or. (ehind the physical events, and they are Kust as much a part of the story?orld as the physical environment, events, and happenin+s& +ile 6odies contains very fe? action descriptions that simply descri(e only the surface of physical (ehavior& The mental event that necessarily accompanies the action is often made part of the action description or is added in an adver(, rather than left implicit& Ta.e this simple statement (1$) The three statesmen hid themselves& ("%)

This is a description of an action, (ut it +oes further in identifyin+ the accompanyin+ mental processes than a statement such as They stood (ehind the curtain, that leaves more ?or. for the reader to do in decidin+ ?hy they are standin+ there& 8t can (e decoded in consciousness terms as follo?s the three a+reed that it ?as in their interest to conceal themselves from someone, realiAed that it ?as possi(le for them to do so, and decided to+ether to ta.e the action of hidin+& 8n this ?ay, the reader as part of the process of understandin+ narratives has to translate passa+es of action description into mind description in the manner of a psycholo+ical novel& /s 8 said in chapter $, it is si+nificant that philosophers often discuss action in terms of ho? onloo.ers to an action ?ould reasona(ly interpret it& This perspective is very similar to the role of the reader in considerin+ the motives (ehind and the reasons for a character>s actions& @hen ?e e9plain an action (y +ivin+ the reason for it, ?e often redescri(e the action (y placin+ it in its conte9t& The descriptions of the physical conte9t and the causal net?or. (ehind the fictional (ehavior are sometimes identical (16) People had cro?ded into the ,nder+round station for shelter from the rain& (!5) 8n Kust t?elve ?ords, the narrator descri(es the action, the physical conte9t in detail (the rain, the station, and the cro?d), and the fact that this conte9t is the reason for the action of shelterin+& Ho?ever, many narrative statements re=uire a +ood deal more decodin+ than e9amples 1$ and 16& For e9ample, some convey information a(out more than one consciousness (1%) Here an atmosphere of +reater +eniality prevailed& (1$1) 3!113 4ecoded, this mi+ht mean that the consciousnesses of the individuals in the +roup are open and ?elcomin+ and are enKoyin+ the atmosphere& 8t mi+ht also mean that the consciousness of anyone comin+ in ?ould feel ?elcome and at home& -arratorial statements such as e9amples 1% and 1; mi+ht seem a lon+ ?ay from a study of the presentation of consciousness (1;) Jou see, that ?as the .ind of party /rchie 0ch?ert>s party ?as& ($:) )ut as ?ith e9ample 1%, ?hen e9ample 1; is decoded, ?e find that that it is precisely a(out consciousness& 8t is sayin+ that ?ithin the story?orld of the narrative this is ?hat the fictional minds of the +roup of characters that comprised the party thou+ht, felt, perceived, e9perienced ?hen

they ?ere present in the social and physical conte9t of the party& Mental functionin+ is al?ays present ho?ever o(li=ue the e9plicit reference to it& The distinction (et?een action and non3action is fre=uently not clear, illustratin+ the point that it is the mental process, not the physical movement, that is the si+nificant issue (1") This time no3one trou(led to pic. them up& (16) The a(sence of action, such as not pic.in+ somethin+ up, can (e as much of an action as a physical movement, particularly ?hen the nature of the intention is specified, as in this case& @hen non3action is deli(erate, it is an action& (15) They ?ere very late for the film -ina ?anted to see, and that set them (ac. a+ain& They didn>t spea. for a lon+ time& (;%) -ot spea.in+ is a non3action that amounts in a conte9t such as this to a very si+nificant action& #he thought.action continuum Tal. of decodin+ action statements into consciousness statements can, ho?ever, (e misleadin+ if it +ives the impression that, not?ithstandin+ the intimate and comple9 connections (et?een the t?o, thou+ht and action are easily separa(le& They are not, and many of the statements in fictional narratives inha(it the lar+e +ray area (et?een the t?o& 8 shall refer to this phenomenon as the thou#ht$action continuum, and it is one of the .ey senses in ?hich the mind e9tends (eyond the s.in& @itt+enstein>s =uestion (8s this a report a(out his (ehavior or his state of mindI P156", 1;5Q) is particularly relevant here& (!0) /dam undressed very =uic.ly and +ot into (edC -ina more slo?ly arran+in+ her clothes on the chair and fin+erin+ the ornaments on the chimney piece ?ith less than her usual self3possession& /t last she put out the li+ht& (%") This passa+e, ?ith the e9ception of the phrase ?ith less than her usual self 3!1!3

possession, consists of ?hat mi+ht (e called si#nificant action the reader is provided ?ith enou+h conte9tual information to appreciate the si+nificance of /dam actin+ very =uic.ly and -ina actin+ more slo?ly& The reader can speculate ?ith assurance a(out ?hat mental events accompany these t?o actions (ecause he or she .no?s that they are a(out to +o to (ed to+ether for the first time /dam is ea+er and -ina is nervous& Ho?ever, the phrase ?ith less than her usual self3possession is in the +ray area (et?een thou+ht and action& @itt+enstein>s =uestion is appropriate (ecause the ?ords appear to (e a description (oth of -ina>s (ehavior and of her state of mind& 8 ?ill illustrate the thou+ht3action continuum ?ith a study of the speech ta+ adver(s in +ile 6odies& Prince defines ?ords such as these as attributive discourse The discourse accompanyin+ a character>s (direct) discourse and specifyin+ the act of the spea.er or thin.er & & & and (sometimes) indicatin+ various dimensions or features of the act, the character, the settin+ in ?hich they appear etc (15";, ;)& The purpose of this discussion is to apply a co+nitive perspective to the =uestion, @hat precisely is (ein+ attri(utedI The adver(s listed are descriptions of actions in the sense that they descri(e the manner in ?hich speech acts are performed, (ut they can also (e re+arded as conte9tual thou+ht report as they provide important information a(out the functionin+ of characters> minds& The descriptions can (e placed at various points alon+ the thou+ht3action continuum (and readers mi+ht ?ell disa+ree ?ith the su++ested placin+s)& 8n some cases, at the thou+ht end of the spectrum, a state of mind is directly and o(viously indicated& 0u(Kect to the conte9t sho?in+ that the indication is ironic and therefore misleadin+, these cases seem strai+htfor?ard Triumph said 2ottie triumphantly (:$) 4esperation said Eane>s father desperately ($5), he shouted desperately (1:5) /n+er or annoyance said the stran+er crossly ("%), said the Colonel crossly (1;5), said the Colonel crossly (1!%), said the Prime Minister sharply (11!) )itterness said Father *othschild (itterly (";) /n9iety as.ed the (armaid an9iously (1$!) Thou+htfulness repeated Mr )enfleet thou+htfully (!;) Rentleness said Father *othschild +ently (111), said /dam +ently (1%$)

8n other cases, perhaps in the middle of the spectrum, one mi+ht say that a state of mind is indirectly indicated 3!1:3 @ish to +ive encoura+ement said /dam encoura+in+ly (;!) /(sentmindedness said the Colonel dreamily (1"$), said Mr Henderson mechanically (1%) Garious ne+ative feelin+s said Miss *unci(le severely (1$%), said the drun. MaKor distantly (161), he said rather stiffly (1%:), repeated Miss *unci(le firmly (1$%) 2ac. of concern said Mr 8saacs airily (1!:) Ho?ever, at the action end of the spectrum, there are some very interestin+ e9amples in ?hich the adver( appears to relate primarily to the manner of spea.in+ said the Reneral hospita(ly (1"") said Miss *unci(le rather faintly (1:1) said the Matron archly (16%) he hinted dar.ly (!0) she as.ed plaintively (;5) said /dam in no particular manner (!;) These e9amples appear to contain a lar+er element of narratorial Kud+ment and seem to re=uire more ?or. from the reader, than the others& 8n particular, althou+h the real3?orld .no?led+e that ?e (rin+ to te9ts tells us +enerally ?hat they mean as action descriptions (?e 9ind$of .no? ?hat an arch tone of voice sounds li.e), their si+nificance in terms of the character>s consciousness can (e unclear ?hen ta.en out of conte9t& /s a conse=uence, the accompanyin+ state of mind is not o(vious and has to (e inferred from the surroundin+ narrative& These cases also raise issues related to focaliAation and free indirect perception& Lther characters ?ill (e listenin+ to the Reneral and Miss *unci(le and ?ill (e understood (y the reader as perceivin+ the various tones of voices as arch, dar., and so on& These adver(s need not simply (e reports of the spea.in+ characters> minds, they can also (e read as reports of the listenin+ characters> minds&

ndicati)e description *eaders use the preference rule system in readin+ actions& That is, they prefer to use the default of the indicated mental state unless other evidence that is contained in the conte9t indicates other?ise& 8 am +ivin+ the name indicative description to a description of an action that appears to indicate an accompanyin+ state of mind& /s 8 have said, it is not easy to distin+uish (et?een such 3!1$3 descriptions and thou+ht report, as in chapter !5 of (mma, every(ody had a (urst of admiration on first arrivin+ (155%, :0:)& To apply @itt+enstein>s =uestion a+ain, 8s this a report of their (ehavior or their state of mindI The ?ord admiration could refer to their thou+ht processes or to their (ehavior& 8n a sense, it is descri(in+ a pu(lic event, (ut there is a private side& The phrase a (urst of admiration could mean that they felt +enuinely admirin+ or that they ?ere only (ehavin+ in an admirin+ ?ay, possi(ly insincerely out of politeness& 2ater, Mr @eston is referred to as cheerful& This is another indicative description that may conceal a different state of mind from that indicated& /lthou+h ?e are not told e9plicitly, ?e can +uess from the conte9t of the )o9 Hill picnic that the cheerful (ehavior may (e accompanied (y a rather stressed state of mind& 8t is possi(le to apply ?hat mi+ht (e called the opposite thou#ht test to an action description of this sort& This means as.in+ ?hether the state of mind that appears to (e implied (y the action is in fact present in the story?orld& The character mi+ht (e thin.in+ the opposite of ?hat is implied (y the description of the action& 8n the case of polite (ehavior, it is clearly possi(le for the character to (e havin+ anythin+ other than polite thou+hts& 8n Bmma the politeness of the actions of all the characters (ut Bmma to?ard Miss )ates does not necessarily entail less impatient feelin+s to?ard her +arrulousness& 8t is often for the reader to decide& 8ndicative descriptions only indicate and do not conclusively esta(lish the state of mind that ?ould normally (e associated ?ith the (ehavior& The use of misleadin+ indicative description is characteristic of heavily ironic novelists such as Eane /usten and Bvelyn @au+h& 8ndicative descriptions tend to occur in the middle of the thou+ht3action continuum& They can (e identified ?hen the ans?er to @itt+enstein>s =uestion is unclear& Ta.e this e9ample (!1) ,nsteadily, (ut ?ith rene?ed hope, the passen+ers had disem(ar.ed& (15) 8n the case of ?ith rene?ed hope and had disem(ar.ed, the ans?er to @itt+enstein>s =uestion is strai+htfor?ard the former is conte9tual thou+ht report that refers to a state of mind and the latter is (ehavior& )ut ?hat a(out unsteadilyI 8 ?ould su++est that the ans?er to the

=uestion is not o(vious& Ln the one hand, it is a description of the manner in ?hich the action of disem(ar.in+ is performedC on the other hand, it appears to indicate that the action is accompanied (y a sensation or feelin+ of unsteadiness& (!!) then rose & & & the despairin+ voices of Mrs /pe>s an+els, in fre=uently (ro.en unison, sin+in+, sin+in+, ?ildly, desperately, as thou+h their hearts ?ould (rea. in the effort and their minds lose their reason& (1!#1:) 3!163 Here, the description of the action of unison sin+in+ is follo?ed (y indicative description the t?o adver(s ?ildly and desperately descri(e a =uality in the sound (ut also appear to indicate the accompanyin+ state of mind of ?ild desperation& Ho?ever, it is (y no means certain that this state of mind does e9ist ?ithin the reality of the fictional story?orld& The uncertainty is reinforced (y the e9plicitly modal nature (as thou+h) of the ne9t indicative description& 8t seems too far3fetched to suppose that the an+els really are sufferin+ (ro.en hearts and lost reason& 8t is perhaps (est understood as a comment (y the narrator on the +eneral states of mind or dispositions of the an+els, ?hich has a validity (eyond their mental state at that particular time& The ironic possi(ilities of misleadin+ indicative description are e9tensive (!:) the CafO *oyal ?as cro?ded and overflo?in+& Bveryone ?as (ein+ thorou+hly cross, (ut only the most sarcastic and over(earin+ ?ere +iven ta(les, and only the +ross and outra+eous ?ere +iven food& (160) 0tartin+ ?ith the physical conte9t, four +roups are descri(ed everyone, the sarcastic and over(earin+, the +ross and outra+eous, and the staff ?ho are puttin+ up ?ith this (ehavior& This last +roup is understood, li.e the car driver in the 0chan. and /(elson e9ample (chapter %, section !)& Cross is usually used to refer to a state of mind, (ut everyone (ein+ cross sounds more li.e a description of (ehavior ?ith an element of calculation a(out it& This suspicion is confirmed (y the rest of the sentence, ?here the mental states present in those +ettin+ ta(les and then food are not necessarily the ones indicated& Their states of mind are pro(a(ly related more to a cold3(looded decision to use this sort of (ehavior in order to +et ?hat they ?ant& This difference results in misleadin+ indicative description& / +ood deal of t?entieth3century narration is characteriAed (y a reluctance to ma.e the decodin+ of action too e9plicit and a disinclination to use too much indicative description or conte9tual thou+ht report& @ayne )ooth mentions that in the manuscript of Stephen ;ero, Eames Eoyce>s early version of A Portrait of the Artist as a Eoun# -an , Eoyce ori+inally ?rote that 0tephen put his spoon throu+h the (ottom of his e++shell an+rily and then deleted the ?ord an+rily (15";, 5;)&

Causation Lne of the most important functions of conte9tual thou+ht report is to present e9planations for (ehavior, reasons for action, the causal net?or.s that are present (ehind apparently simple action descriptions& B9plicit motivations are also provided (y ?hat 8 shall call cue$reason ?ords such as for, caused, so, 3!1%3 and to& 8n e9ample 16, the ?ord for cues the reader to read the clause follo?in+ it as an e9plicit and sufficient reason for the action& 8n e9ample !$, the physical conte9t is a+ain +iven as the reason for the (ehavior (!$) 8t ?as this last movement that caused the most havoc amon+ the passen+ers& (11) (!6) 0o they all had another drin.& (:%) (!%) Then they ?ent a?ay to intervie? some more drivers& (1::) 8mplied or indirect motivation is even more interestin+& 8n this case, everyone is relieved that a punishin+ly (orin+ film has finished (!;) @hen the reel came to an end everyone stirred lu9uriously& (1;") The use of ?hen instead of the cue3reason ?ord (ecause leaves the motivation for the action teasin+ly implicit& (!") There ?as a hush all over the course, and the refreshment tent (e+an to empty =uic.ly& (1$1) The first part of the sentence can (e decoded as a deli(erate non3action that is caused (y the race (ein+ a(out to start& The ne9t action is also caused (y the same reason, (ut it is very different (ecause here there is a clear intention& The cue3reason phrase to see the race is understood& (!5) Lutside this rin+ clustered a +roup of predatory little (oys ?ith auto+raph al(ums and lea.in+ fountain pens& (1:6)

The use of the ?ord clustered and the narratorial comment of predatory, to+ether ?ith the circumstantial evidence of the auto+raph al(ums and the pens all imply that this is not a random +roup and that they are +athered to+ether for a common purpose& Ho?ever, the information re+ardin+ the purpose is +iven (y implication& 8t is not spelled out that they are ?aitin+ to collect auto+raphs& )ut, (ecause the purpose is so clear to the reader, it is easy to overloo. the fact that it is merely implied and never e9plicitly stated& The causal net?or.s surroundin+ actions can (e su(Kect to re+ressive =uestionin+& For e9ample in the case of e9ample 16 one can as., Jes, (ut ?hy did they shelterI )ecause they did not ?ant to +et ?et& @hy notI )ecause it is uncomforta(le& /nd so on& These motivations tend to +et lar+er and lar+er, (ut the chain is not infinite (ecause it tends to end in a fairly unans?era(le motive such as 8 ?ant to (e happy& Bven ?hen the motivation for an action appears to (e e9plicitly provided, the reader often still has to fill in the implicit chains in the reasonin+& The characters in +ile 6odies are va+ue, s.etchy, and attenuated (ecause the cues for the reader tend to (e short3term, specific, and localiAed& @hen, for e9ample, a character is descri(ed as sayin+ somethin+ thou+htfully, this does not necessarily imply that the reader should read that 3!1;3 person as a thou+htful character the ?ord may (e si+nificant only for the effects to (e o(tained in that particular scene& There is a +ood deal of ?hat mi+ht (e called local motivation of this sort, e9planations and reasons for actions that are specific to the particular conte9t& There is almost none of the e2tended or teleolo#ical motivation that readers re=uire in order to (uild up a full, detailed, and coherent sense of character& This a(sence means that there is more for the reader to do& 8t is not possi(le to (e too do+matic a(out this issue as one reader may find conte9tual clues to (e localiAed ?hile another may (e more resourceful in usin+ them to (uild up a coherent account of a character& Havin+ said that, the follo?in+ sentence is clearly an unusual e9ample of teleolo+ical motivation as opposed to local motivation (:0) 8t hurt /dam deeply to thin. much a(out -ina& (16%) This simple statement derives much of its po?er and impact from the fact that there is no other description of such deep feelin+ in the novel& 0tron+ vivid characteriAation and clear teleolo+ical shape rely on (i+ and important motivations such as love or money that can propel a ?hole narrative& @ea., haAy characteriAation tends to (e associated, it seems, ?ith local and specific motivation& 8t is a nota(le characteristic of Gile )odies that these lar+er motivations are almost never made e9plicit& This +ives the narrative its hi+hly distinctive =uality of aimless and restless desperation&

3. ntermental #hought This section ?ill consider the second su(frame of the continuin+3consciousness frame intermental or Koint, shared, or communal thou+ht as opposed to intramental, or individual thin.in+& Jou may remem(er that Eames @ertsch>s e9planation in chapter 6, section 6 that the notion of mental function can properly (e applied to social as ?ell as individual forms of activity (1551, !;), and that the terms mind and mental action can appropriately (e predicated of dyads Pthat is, pairsQ and lar+er +roups as ?ell as of individuals (1551, 1$)& ,nsurprisin+ly, +iven his ?or. on the formation of the social mind, 2ev Gy+ots.y noticed a vivid e9ample of fictional intermental thin.in+ in Tolstoy>s Anna Farenina& He commented that +ood e9amples of the condensation and reduction of e9ternal speech are found in the novels of Tolstoy, ?ho demonstrated that for people livin+ in close psycholo+ical contact communication (y a((reviated speech is common (15"%, !:%#:")& He ?as referrin+ in particular to the famous scene in ?hich Ditty and 2evin ?rite out only the initial letters of the ?ords that they ?ish to say, and the other understands perfectly& 3!1"3 8 ?ill refer (riefly to the ?or. of t?o theorists on fictional +roups (efore e9plainin+ ho? intermental thin.in+ ?or.s in practice in +ile 6odies& Pioneerin+ research has (een done (y 2u(omir 4oleTel and ,ri Mar+olin on the notion of +roups ?ithin the possi(le3?orlds paradi+m& 8n ;eterocosmica, 4oleTel is very informative a(out the dynamics of ?hat he calls multiperson ,orlds The vast maKority of stories &&& are +enerated in multiperson ?orlds (155", 5%)C The semantics of narrative is, at its core, the semantics of interaction (155", 5;)C and The a+ential constellation is not only a precondition of interactin+ (ut also its scope (space) (155", 5")& He e9plains that the e9istence of +roups and social or+aniAation +ives rise to collective consciousness& 8ts co+nitive form is socially (ased .no?led+e (155", 101)& This .no?led+e includes lan+ua+e, cultural archetypes, racial and ethnic (eliefs, reli+ious creeds, ideolo+ies, and scientific .no?led+e (155", 101)& 4oleTel also ma.es this important distinction (et?een informally coordinated +roups and formal or+aniAations 8nformal coordination prevails in communities, +roups ?hose collective actin+ is >a function of individual actions> & & & its structure and modes correspond to those defined for interaction (et?een persons&&&& 8n contrast, formal or+aniAation motivates social actin+ in institutions, ?hich impose a num(er of supraindividual constraints e9plicitly formulated re+ulations, ?ell3defined po?er hierarchy, charted division of la(our, specific role distri(ution, and, last (ut not least, reinforcin+ social representations (le+itimiAin+ ideolo+ies, identifyin+ em(lems, and so on) (155", 111)& ,ri Mar+olin sets out in t?o articles (Tellin+ Lur 0tory on >@e> 2iterary -arratives, and Tellin+ in the Plural from Rrammar to 8deolo+y) a typically ri+orous and comprehensive account of the portrayal of lar+e or+aniAations or cultures in a ?ide ran+e of fictions& He calls these fictions 3,e4 narratives in order to stress that they are first3person rather than third3person narratives& This is the sort of or+aniAation that 4oleTel and Mar+olin have in mind / mammoth or+aniAation li.e this#it em(odies too much e9perience& 8t possesses in fact a sort of +roup mind (4ic. 1555, $6)&

/s my interest in +roups in narrative is very different from 4oleTel>s and Mar+olin>s, 8 should start (y ma.in+ the differences e9plicit 8 am more interested in they (third3person plural) narratives than in ?e (first3person plural) narrativesC 8 am also more interested in informal small +roups than in formal lar+e or+aniAationsC 8 ?ill (e e9plorin+ a very fluid and fle9i(le notion of a +roup as any a++re+ate of characters, includin+ a pair and even includin+ people ?ho may not (e particularly close, (ut ?ho are, for ho?ever short a period, thin.in+ intermentallyC and 8 am as interested in the ne+ative +roup 3!153 dynamics of conflict and fra+mentation as in the positive dynamics of +roup solidarity and Koint identification& The e9tent of the difference in approach can (e +au+ed from the fact that Mar+olin feels that the case of a character spea.in+ a(out some +roup of ?hich she or he is a mem(er is u(i=uitous, trivial and of no si+nificance for our purposes (155%(, 1!:)& He is here descri(in+ e9actly the sort of area that 8 thin. is ?orth investi+atin+& @ithin my perspective, the role of +roups in narrative is not mar+inal& 8n fact, it is central, +iven that most novels are a(out the conflicts (et?een individuals and the social +roups to ?hich they (elon+& )oth 4oleTel and Mar+olin have prioritiAed lar+e or+aniAations, (ut some very interestin+ ?or. can (e done in the middle of the individual7collective continuum ?here individuals relate to each other in pairs or other small +roups& Mar+olin states in the openin+ para+raph of Tellin+ in the Plural that +roups or collective a+ents are optional elements in literary narratives, and ?hen they do occur, they usually occupy a (ac.+round or secondary role (!000, 65!)& This is not the case ?ithin the informal, small +roup perspective that 8 am adoptin+& 8n Mar+olin>s vie?, the tension (et?een individual and collective levels of description reaches its clima9 in the representation of mental activity or e9perientiality &&& since mental activity is essentially and inaliena(ly individual (!000, %0$)& 8 hope that it is clear (y no? that this remar. comes from an intellectual tradition that is very different from the intersu(Kective, e9ternalist perspective that informed chapters $, 6, and %& /n inevita(le conse=uence of this internalist, su(Kective first approach is that the difficulties involved in the concept of Koint thin.in+ are heavily overestimated& The e9amples of intermental thou+ht in +ile 6odies that are contained in this chapter do not seem to me to (e at all pro(lematical& @hat could (e simpler than They decided to +oI /lso, 8 am not sure that 8 accept the firm distinction that is implied here (et?een Koint action and Koint thou+ht (that is, the former is easier to represent in discourse than the latter)& 8n practice, descriptions of the t?o in fictional narratives are li.ely to amount to the same thin+& Eoint action re=uires at least a measure of Koint thin.in+, and Koint thin.in+ ?ill often result in Koint action& Mar+olin states that the +eneral feelin+ of >?e3ness> or >us>&&& can in principle (e descri(ed from the outside in the third person plural, especially in literature&&&& )ut a more effective, immediate and convincin+ manner of e9pressin+ this refle9ive dimension is to let its possessors spea. for

themselves (155%(, 1!")& The very different tradition that 8 referred to earlier is a+ain evident here& @ithin the social mind paradi+m, it is not at all clear ?hy it is only in principle that +roups can (e descri(ed in the third person& @hy cannot a +roup 3!!03 (e descri(ed perfectly ade=uately (y the usual .ind of omniscient narrator usin+ the third3person ascription that ?as e9plained in chapter 6, section !I 8t is li.e sayin+ that any individual character can in principle (e descri(ed (y a thirdperson narrator, (ut it is more effective, immediate, and convincin+ to let the character spea. for him or herself in the first person& Mar+olin emphasiAes the importance of the individual mem(er>s sense of a +roup (for e9ample, 155%(, 1!"), ?hereas my focus of interest is e=ually related to the sense of a +roup that can (e possessed (y outsiders or even another +roup& Lutsiders loo.in+ at a (ureaucracy tend to see it in monolithic terms and re+ard the people ?ho ?or. in it as ro(otic adherents to a sin+le and infle9i(le (ureaucratic line& Ho?ever, ?or.in+ ?ithin a (ureaucracy as 8 do, 8 see that life inside one is really fra+mented, diffuse, and incoherent& 8 am sure that this is true of many other lar+e or+aniAations& 8 am also particularly interested in the conflicts (et?een individuals in +roups that Mar+olin illuminatin+ly discusses in a passa+e on intra+roup conflict (!000, %05)& Bvelyn @au+h>s -en at Arms is in part a(out the conflictin+ feelin+s of the prota+onist to?ard his re+iment& They include affection, a feelin+ of (elon+in+, and so on, (ut also e9asperation, dis+ust, and eventually a feelin+ of fallin+ out of love ?ith it& L(viously, the other soldiers in the story have e=ually am(ivalent feelin+s to?ard the re+iment and to?ard each other& Mar+olin refers to the fact that a num(er of individual actions carried out simultaneously do not necessarily constitute +roup action (ecause the participants may (e actin+ independently of each other (!000, 65$)& This is true& Ho?ever, 8 ?ould li.e to e9plore the cases that are mar+inal from this perspective (ecause 8 ?ould li.e to see ho? far the concept of intermental action can (e pushed& This ?ould mean, for e9ample, as.in+ ?hat it is a(out a particular social or physical conte9t that mi+ht cause individuals to underta.e simultaneous individual actions, and ?hether the ans?er to that =uestion sho?s that there is a +ray area (et?een +roup actions and connected individual actions& @ith this conte9t in mind, 8 no? ?ish to consider more systematically the second su(frame of shared or +roup thin.in+& 8 say more systematically (ecause 8 have already (een implicitly discussin+ this device in some detail in the previous sections& 8 am sure that you ?ill have noticed that a lar+e num(er of the e9amples of thou+ht and action +iven earlier#e9amples : to 10, 1!, 1$ to 15, and !1 to !5#?ere e9amples of intermental thin.in+& / )a.htinian emphasis on the shared, social, and dialo+ic nature of mental functionin+ is after all clearly suita(le to a novel that is e9plicitly concerned ?ith (:1) all that succession and repetition of massed humanity&&&& Those vile (odies& (10$)

3!!13 Communicati)e action Lne of the terms in Eames @ertsch>s fivefold typolo+y of situated action that 8 discussed in chapter 6, section 6 ?as communicative action& This notion is closely lin.ed to the concept of intermental thin.in+& 8 ar+ued in the previous section that fictional thou+ht and action descriptions form a continuum and this ar+ument ?or.s particularly ?ell in the case of intermental action and thou+ht& /s Clar. and Chalmers su++est, if their ar+ument is ta.en seriously, certain forms of social activity mi+ht (e reconceived as less a.in to communication and action, and as more a.in to thou+ht (155", 1")& 8n other ?ords, action descriptions can ?ithin the situated thou+ht paradi+m (e easily and informatively reconceived as consciousness descriptions& For these reasons, 8 am not +oin+ to ma.e a hard and fast distinction (et?een intermental thin.in+ and communicative action& Ho?ever, althou+h communicative action clearly re=uires intermental functionin+, and core or paradi+matic intermental thin.in+ is Koint or cooperative decision ma.in+, 8 have ?idened my use of the term to include Koint states of mind and other interestin+ mar+inal cases such as ?hat mi+ht (e called conflicted or competitive actions (such as =uarrellin+)& 8ntermental thin.in+ and communicative action can (oth (e lin.ed to the em(edded narrative approach (y (ein+ re+arded as Koint or mer+ed em(edded narratives& This is a core e9ample of +roup decision ma.in+ (:!) @hen they reached the pits they decided they ?ere hun+ry& 8t seemed too far to clim( up to the dinin+ tent, so they ate as much of the mechanic>s lunch as Miss *unci(le>s ci+arette had spared& (1$;) This is paradi+matic functional intermental thin.in+ (ecause it involves an initial shared decision, a Koint perception (of distance), a shared Kud+ment (re+ardin+ the distance), and, finally, a +roup decision to act& The cue3reason ?ord so ma.es e9plicit the communal motivation for the communicative action& (::) Lutside his door, t?o very limp detective ser+eants had deserted their posts& (1!) Contained ?ithin this description of a Koint action of desertion is the Koint decision to ta.e that action& 4eserted ma.es the mental processes much clearer than a simple description of mere physical movement& The shared feelin+s or emotions (for e9ample, sensations of tiredness and feelin+s of resentment) that presuma(ly caused the decision to leave are not made e9plicit (ut can (e inferred from the conte9t& 8n the ne9t case,

the adver(s used in the description emphasiAe that this is very conscious communicative action and that the individuals are clearly a?are that it is a Koint enterprise 3!!!3 (:$) Then they all pinched her all over, (ut precisely and Kudiciously, so as not to distur( her ?in+s or halo& (;5) The follo?in+ passa+es move a?ay from core functional intermental decision ma.in+ in various ?ays& For e9ample, some intermental thin.in+ is counterfactual (:6) The +atecrashers ?ondered ?hether it ?ould not have (een (etter to have stayed at home& ("6) (:%) The race ?as not due to start until noon, (ut any indecision ?hich they may have felt a(out the employment of the ne9t fe? hours ?as settled for them (y the local police& (1:%) B9ample :% descri(es a counterfactual intermental state of mind& The +roup mi+ht have e9perienced, (ut did not in fact e9perience, the state of mind of indecision& The reason ?hy the indecision did not occur is then +iven& Here are illustrations of conflicted communicative action (:;) He and -ina ?ere lunchin+ at BspinoAa>s and =uarrellin+ halfheartedly& (51) and competitive communicative action (:") (a) The others ?ere Kostlin+ one another ?ith their lu++a+e, (() tryin+ to attract the Customs officers (c) and lon+in+ for a cup of tea& (15) These actions clearly differ from the cooperative actions descri(ed in e9amples :! to :$& 8n e9ample :", the Koint mental event of the attempt to attract attention ma.es it clear that the passen+ers have all ta.en the decision deli(erately to Kostle one another in order to +ain an advanta+e& Competitive action is intermental in the sense that the individuals are united in reco+niAin+ the need to en+a+e in this action& 8t is also ?orth notin+ that the same considerations re+ardin+ @itt+enstein>s =uestion, the thou+ht3action continuum, and the nature of action apply Kust as much to Koint action as to sin+le a+ent action& B9ample :"a is a description of (odily movement, (ut can it (e called an action as it is presuma(ly unintentionalI B9ample :"c is thou+ht report of a state of mind& )ut ?hat is e9ample :"(I 8t is @itt+enstein>s =uestion a+ain 8s it a report of

(ehavior or of a state of mindI 8t is important to note also that e9ample :"( has a causal function it is the reason for the Kostlin+, and it is the intention to +et off the (oat =uic.ly& The potential comple9ity of competitive intermental thou+ht is clearly demonstrated in a +ame of chess& For a +ood chess player, the attempt to construct the pro(a(le thou+ht processes of the opponent can stretch to a very lar+e num(er of moves ahead& 4escriptions of the shared perceptions and states of mind that cause and 3!!:3 emer+e from Koint actions such as emotions, feelin+s, and sensations are very common (:5) 8t ?as not a really +ood evenin+& The lon+ drive & & & chilled and depressed them, dissipatin+ the +aiety ?hich had flic.ered rather spasmodically over Rin+er>s dinner& (10:) This is a description of the thou+hts and feelin+s of a +roup in very a(stract terms& The ?ord evenin+ in the first sentence functions as a metonymy for the +roup of people spendin+ the evenin+ to+ether& The passa+e descri(es shared emotions and feelin+s such as the sensation of (ein+ chilled, the state of mind of (ein+ depressed, and the previous state of mind of +aiety& /lthou+h this sort of thin.in+ is different from functional decision ma.in+, it is the product of a shared +roup dynamic& The individuals are e9periencin+ the same states of mind (ecause of the common situation in ?hich they find themselves& 0ee also e9amples 1!, 1%, 1;, and $%& Rroup ver(al action is common /ll teams ?ere confident of victory, they said (1::)& -ot all +roups are intermental& 8t may (e that individuals simply happen to share (eliefs or feelin+s that have not (een ?or.ed out to+ether or caused (y the same +roup dynamic& 8n e9ample $0 it is not clear ?hether there is intermental a+reement (et?een Chastity and 4ivine 4iscontent or ?hether they intramentally happen to thin. the same thin+ ($0) /t intervals letters arrived from )uenos /ires in ?hich Chastity and 4ivine 4iscontent spo.e rather critically of 2atin /merican entertainment& (5!) ($1) (Many doctors, thus diverted, spent an enKoya(le day ?ithout apparent preKudice to their patients&) (1:;) B9ample $1 refers to t?o +roups, (ut as discrete individuals and not as intermental +roups& /lthou+h the reason for the doctors> and patients> states of mind happens to (e the same, they are not cooperatively shared&

+elationship with intramental thinking 8n a sense, intermental thin.in+ is simply the a++re+ate of the individual, intramental consciousnesses that ma.e up the +roup& Ln the other hand, intermental thin.in+ is often more than the sum of its parts, and this difference can sometimes (e =uantified& My partner and 8 actively cooperate on the ans?ers to a ?ee.ly =uiA (every 0aturday in the 8uardian ne?spaper) and re+ularly +et scores of si9 to ei+ht out of ten, compared to a pro(a(le a++re+ate of individual scores of a(out t?o or three& The intermental dividend is clearly su(stantial& The po?er of intermental thou+ht is clearly related to the concept of syner+y, 3!!$3 ?hich specifies that a com(ined effect is +reater than the sum of the parts and that increased effectiveness and achievements are produced (y com(ined action and cooperation& 8n e9ample $!, an intramental state of mind, (ein+ moved, is put in an intermental conte9t (ecause all the other listeners are moved as ?ell ($!) The /merican ?ho, li.e all the listeners, had (een profoundly moved (y the e93Din+>s recitation& (::) 0ometimes, an individual description (ecomes intermental ?ith the introduction of others such as, in this case, co3conspirators ($:) Father *othschild ?as conspirin+ ?ith Mr Lutra+e and 2ord Metroland& ("!) The narrator chooses a form of ?ords that +ives the ?ei+ht to Father *othschild rather than sayin+, The three ?ere conspirin+, there(y cuein+ the reader to surmise that he is the most enthusiastic conspirator& 8ntermental thou+ht report is sometimes necessarily appro9imate& 8n an e9ample such as They all fell (ac. in amaAement, it seems li.ely that some individuals ?ould (e more amaAed than others& 8t may (e necessary in some cases of intermental thou+ht to develop a division (et?een the core and the periphery, ?hich ?ould indicate that some individuals had the specified mental states to a +reater de+ree than others& Ln a related point, +roups are sometimes specified ?ith a leader ($$) The old (ri+ade, led (y Mrs )lac.?ater, thre? themselves ?ith relish into an or+y of liti+ation& (5!) / stran+e .ind of leadership occurs ?hen /dam ?or.s as a +ossip columnist

($6) ar+uin+ that people did not really mind ,hom they read a(out provided that a .ind of vicarious in=uisitiveness into the lives of others ?as satisfied, /dam (e+an to invent people& (5$) The activities of /dam>s creations then (e+in to respond to the pu(lic>s reception of them as real people& 0ym(iotically, the fictional creations then influence readers> actual (ehavior, ?hich in turn modifies their actions and so on& /dam>s mind is in a )a.htinian dialo+ue ?ith ?hat he anticipates, correctly, the pu(lic mind to (e& His ?holly fictitious narratives ta.e on a life of their o?n and achieve a .ind of reality ?ithin the story?orld that is (ased on the dialo+ic relationship (et?een /dam>s intramental thou+ht processes and the pu(lic>s intermental mind& 8n one scene, three characters are descri(ed as ($%) maintainin+ a moody silence& (160) This phrase implies three separate conscious decisions to remain silent, and the resultin+ non3action maintains the +roup dynamic& Moody indicates the 3!!63 shared reason for the silence& The ne9t three passa+es contain very comple9 interrelationships (et?een intermental and intramental thin.in+& B9ample $; occurs (efore and e9ample $" after /dam and -ina ma.e love for the first time ($;) (a) )ut this raised a =uestion in (oth their minds (() that had (een uno(trusively a+itatin+ them throu+hout the Kourney& (c) -either said anymore on the su(Kect, (d) (ut there ?as a distinct air of constraint (e) in the 4aimler from Pul(orou+h on?ards& (%;) /n intermental event is descri(ed in e9ample $;a, (ut e9ample $;( ma.es it clear that it is (ased on previously e9istin+ or latent states of mind (of uncertainty and apprehension re+ardin+ the possi(ility that they mi+ht (e ma.in+ love that ni+ht)& ,no(trusive refers to the fact that their state of mind had not made itself o(vious in their (ehavior& B9ample $;c is non3action that arises from a conscious intermental decision not to do anythin+& B9ample $;d can (e decoded as /dam is e9periencin+ a feelin+ of constraintC -ina is e9periencin+ the same feelin+C and an o(server could tell from their e9ternal (ehavior that they ?ere e9periencin+ that feelin+& B9ample $;e is the physical conte9t& ($") (a) They treated each other =uite differently (() after their ni+ht>s e9periences& (c) /dam ?as inclined to (e e+otistical and despondentC (d) -ina ?as rather +ro?n up and disillusioned and distinctly cross& (;%)

The action in e9ample $"a is intermental in the sense that their thou+hts and actions have chan+ed as a unit& The reason for the chan+es +iven in e9ample $"( consists of a Koint e9perience& Ho?ever, in e9amples $"c and $"d, their reactions are intramentally different& 4espondent is clearly a state of mind& B+otistical is sli+htly different (ecause it has more of the =uality of a (ehavior description and also a Kud+ment (y the narrator& 8nclined to (e puts these mental states in the conte9t of /dam>s ?hole personality& /s re+ards -ina>s reactions, @itt+enstein>s =uestion is unans?era(le& ($5) (a) /dam and Miles and /rchie 0ch?ert (() did not tal. much& (c) The effects of their drin.s had no? entered on that secondary sta+e, vividly descri(ed in temperance hand(oo.s, ?hen the momentary illusion of ?ell3(ein+ and e9hilaration +ives place to melancholy, indi+estion and moral decay& (d) /dam tried to concentrate his thou+hts upon his sudden ?ealth, (ut they seemed una(le to adhere to this hi+h pinnacle, and as often as he impelled them up, slithered (ac. helplessly to his present physical discomfort& (1$5) The listin+ of the individuals in e9ample $5a seems si+nificant, pavin+ the ?ay for the pro+ression in this passa+e from intermental to intramental thou+ht 3!!%3 and the eventual disinte+ration of the +roup later in the narrative& B9ample $5( is si+nificant action it soon (ecomes clear ?hy they did not feel li.e tal.in+& B9ample $5c is +roup thou+ht report that descri(es a typical process of consciousness as it applies in this case to these three individuals& B9ample $5d is intramental thou+ht report that is standard in most novels (ut comparatively rare in this one& /dam>s thou+ht processes are preoccupied, as this discussion has (een, ?ith the importance of physical conte9t& The thriller ?riter 4onna 2eon is very +ood at conveyin+ the intimate e(( and flo? of the intermental unit of a marria+e that is not e9plored in +ile 6odies& For e9ample, 0he lau+hed at the Ko.e contempt for Freud and all his ?or.s and pomps ?as part of the intellectual +lue that held them to+ether (155;, !:6)C He stood at the door and ?atched her turn a pa+e& The radar of lon+ marria+e caused her to turn to him (155%, 1!")C and /s if she had read his thou+hts, she ans?ered (155%, 5")& 3roup norms The foundation for a +ood deal of the ?or. done in this chapter has (een laid (y possi(le3?orlds theorists and social thou+ht analysts, and this is particularly true of +roup norms& /s 4oleTel remar.s, PsQocial representations and collective emotions are essential for +roup cohesion, splittin+

the ?orld into >us> and >them> and, conse=uently, motivatin+ interactin+ (et?een +roups (155", 101)& 4oleTel also discusses the role of po?er in interpersonal relationships in ;eterocosmica (155", 10:#$)& Thomas Pavel>s e9cellent (oo. !ictional Worlds (15"%) has a chapter on social conventions and their role in re+ulatin+ the (ehavior of +roups& Gy+ots.y, )a.htin, and the other thin.ers that 8 e9amined in chapter 6 sho? that ?e are constituted (y our social relationships and, in particular, (y the ac=uisition and use of the shared cultural resource of lan+ua+e& 8ntersu(Kectivity is a part of us& / particularly important function of intermental thin.in+ and communicative action is the formation and maintenance of +roup norms and conventions, such as in this case (60) the sort of people ?ho li.ed that sort of thin+ ?ent there continually and said ho? a?ful it ?as& (;1) Here is one of the fe? e9amples in the novel of (eneficial intermental action in ?hich the norms are shared (61) 0oon they ?ere all at it, sin+in+ li.e (laAes, and it is undou(tedly true that they felt the (etter for it& (1%) The lan+ua+e used (y the narrator in e9ample 60 to descri(e this consensus 3!!;3 creates a noticea(le distance (et?een the values of the )ri+ht Joun+ People and the values of the implied author and therefore, implicitly, the implied reader& This effect is even more apparent in this passa+e ?hen 2ady Circumference sees (6!) a +reat concourse of pious and honoura(le people & & & people of decent and temperate life, uncultured, unaffected, unem(arrassed, unassumin+, unam(itious people, that fine phalan9 of the passin+ order& (10%#;) 8t appears for most of the narrative that the novel does not contain an implied moral norm (that is, one esta(lished (y the implied author) a+ainst ?hich the implied reader is invited to Kud+e the norms of the various sets such as the )ri+ht Joun+ People and other, older sets& Ho?ever, the stren+th of the lan+ua+e used in this important passa+e, al(eit focaliAed (y free indirect perception throu+h 2ady Circumference, appears to su++est that it should (e read as more than Kust the perception of one character& 8t reveals a (edroc. of norm3alness or norm3ality a+ainst ?hich the artificiality, cruelty, and futility of the lives of the )ri+ht Joun+ People are clearly revealed& The implied author appears to intend these Kud+ments to form the moral center of the novel&

(6:) (a) There ?ere a(out a doAen people left at the partyC (() that hard .ernel of +aiety that never (rea.s&&&& (c) Lf course there>s al?ays the *itA said /rchie&&&& )ut he said it in the tone of voice that made all the others say, (d) no, the *itA ?as too, too (orin+ at that time of ni+ht&&&& (e) 0oon someone ?ould say those fatal ?ords, @ell, 8 thin. it>s time for me to +o to (ed &&& (f) and the party ?ould (e over& ($%) This passa+e (e+ins ?ith narrative description in e9ample 6:a& B9ample 6:( is a su(tly ?orded comment or Kud+ment (y the narrator on the minds of the ?hole +roup& 0uperficially, they are +ay (ut all the other ?ords apart from +aiety convey a sense of their aimlessness and desperation& This is the consensus in action& The action in e9ample 6:c can (e decoded as follo?s he intended that his action ?ould have an effect on their minds that ?ould (e the opposite to the surface meanin+ of the ?ords and cause them to come to the same decision re+ardin+ an intention to act as he has (that is, to +o else?here)& B9ample 6:d is intermental free indirect speech, similar to the +roup free indirect thou+ht that 8 referred to in an earlier section& B9ample 6:e is a statement (y the narrator that one of the +roup ?ill come to an intramental decision to leave and so destroy the intermental consensus& B9ample 6:f descri(es the conse=uences of e9ample 6:e& 0ocial norms are al?ays lia(le to (e trans+ressed (y individuals, and the fatal ?ords are a potentially norm3(rea.in+ intramental action& 0uch dissent 3!!"3 is characteristic of many aspects of the relationship (et?een intermental and intramental thin.in+& 4issentin+ action can (e comically inadvertent (6$) Then Mrs Melrose /pe stood up to spea.& / hush fell in the +ilt (allroom (e+innin+ at the (ac. and spreadin+ amon+ the chairs until only Mrs )lac.?ater>s voice ?as heard e9=uisitely articulatin+ some details of 2ady Metroland>s past& ("$) )ut, in e9ample 66, the same act, (rea.in+ a socially a+reed silence, =uite deli(erately defies the consensus (66) )ut suddenly on that silence vi(rant ?ith self3accusation, (ro.e the or+an voice of Bn+land, the huntin+ cry of the ancien re#ime& & & ?hat a damned impudent ?oman she said& ("6) 0ometimes, inter3+roup conflict ?ill re=uire adroit social mana+ement (y others (6%) it is only a very confident hostess ?ho ?ill invite (oth these sets to+ether at the same time& ("1)

L(viously, intramental dissent can also ta.e place amon+ the norm3reinforcement of core, colla(orative intermental decision ma.in+ (6;) /fter further discussion the conclusion ?as reached that an+els ?ere nurses, and that (ecame the official rulin+ of the household& )ut the second footman ?as of the opinion that they ?ere Kust >youn+ persons&> (;5) The final aspect of intermental thin.in+ to ?hich 8 ?ish to dra? attention is the +roup conflict that can arise ?hen the social norms esta(lished (y t?o or more +roups are incompati(le (6") They stopped for dinner at another hotel, ?here everyone +i++led at Miss *unci(le>s trousers& (1!5) (65) T?o little /merican cars had failed to startC their team ?or.ed desperately at them amid derisive comments from the cro?d (1$!) These e9amples may seem rather trivial, (ut the ne9t is representative of the social fissures that are such a mar.ed feature of the novel (%0) The real aristocracy &&& had done nothin+ a(out Pcomin+ in fancy dressQ& They had come on from a dance and stood in a little +roup (y themselves, aloof, amused (ut not amusin+ ($$) 8n descri(in+ the self3conscious conflict and hostility (et?een the small +roup (the aristocrats) and the lar+er +roup (the rest of the party), the passa+e is an interestin+ e9ample of ho? focaliAation can chan+e in Kust four ?ords amused (ut not amusin+& /mused descri(es the consciousness of the aristocrats 3!!53 ?e are amused in a superior sort of ?ay at the rest of the party& /musin+ descri(es the state of mind of the rest of the party they are very superior (ut ?e do not find them amusin+& Ln occasions the reader can e9perience a (e?ilderin+ly comple9 mOlan+e of different intermental +roups, ?hich also contains very mar.ed +roup conflict and hostility (%1) (a) From the ?indo? Pthe an+elsQ could see the +uests arrivin+ for the party& (() 8n spite of the rain =uite a lar+e cro?d had collected &&& (c) to criticiAe the cloa.s ?ith appreciative oohs and ahs or contemptuous sniffs&&&& (d) The )ri+ht Joun+ People came poppin+ all to+ether&&&& (e)

0ome +atecrashers ?ho had made the mista.e of comin+ in Gictorian fancy dress (f) ?ere detected and repulsed& (+) They hurried home to chan+e for a second assault& (h) -o one ?anted to miss Mrs /pe>s de(ut& (i) )ut the an+els ?ere rather uneasy& (;") B9ample %1a consists of intermental free indirect perception the an+els are ?atchin+ the other +roups& 8n e9ample %1(, the cro?d is a second +roup of ?hom ?e are told the circumstances under ?hich they too. the decision to come& B9ample %1c is communicative action, and the adKectives used to descri(e it are indicative of the accompanyin+ states of mind& The contempt of one +roup for another is an o(vious manifestation of +roup conflict& B9ample %1d descri(es the action of a third +roup& B9ample %1e consists of a fourth +roup and their action of comin+ in Gictorian dress& Ho?ever, the fact that they come ?ron+ly dressed ma.es it clear that there is a fifth +roup, understood (ut norm3 re+ulatin+, ?ho had decided that it ?as the ?ron+ dress& The norm3re+ulatin+ +roup, still unnamed, ta.es the action in e9ample %1f of detectin+ and repulsin+ the +atecrashers& 8n e9ample %1+, the +atecrashers then ta.e the decision to follo? another course of action ?ith the intention of evadin+ the norm re+ulators& 8n e9ample %1h, the reason +iven for the course of action in e9ample %1+ +ives information a(out the state of mind (anticipation, e9citement, and so on) of all the +roups so far referred to& Finally, in e9ample %1i, the focus is narro?ed a+ain, and ?e are (ac. ?ith a very specific piece of intermental thou+ht report related to the first +roup mentioned& 4. Dou'ly 0m'edded !arrati)es 8n this section 8 am e9tendin+ the concept of em(edded narratives (y lin.in+ it to the notion of situated identity that 8 discussed in chapter 6, section 6 in order to develop the third su(frame& This is the dou(ly em(edded narrative a 3!:03 character>s mind as contained ?ithin another character>s mind& The claim that 8 ma.e (y usin+ the term situated identity is that a fictional character>s identity consists, not Kust of his or her o?n em(edded narrative, (ut of all the dou(ly em(edded narratives of ?hich he or she is the su(Kect& Here is an e9ample of a dou(ly em(edded narrative The mind of the youn+ 2ord of Rlenvarloch ?as filled ?ith anticipation, not the most pleasant, concernin+ the manner in ?hich he ?as li.ely to (e received (y the Monarch & & & and he ?as, ?ith the usual mental an9iety of those in such a situation, framin+ ima+inary =uestions from the Din+, and over3toilin+ his spirit in devisin+ ans?ers to them (0cott 15;:, 1:$)& 8n this passa+e, -i+el (2ord of Rlenvarloch) is ima+inin+ ?hat sort of reception he ?ill +et from Din+ Eames 8 ?hen he arrives at the Court& His em(edded narrative is in a future3oriented, counterfactual mode and is tryin+ to anticipate future events (y containin+ ?ithin it another em(edded narrative# that of the Din+& This vie? of the Din+>s mind can therefore (e called a doubly embedded narrative& *yan>s term for this phenomenon is recursive embeddin# (15"6, ;!:)&

He tried to put his mind inside *our.e>s caper (Connelly 155:, :::)& This sentence occurs in a thriller in ?hich the detective finally realiAes that *our.e, an F)8 a+ent, is in fact the villain& The detective attempts to vie? the story?orld from a different aspect not any more from an aspect that assumes that *our.e has (een helpin+ the murder investi+ationC (ut from an aspect that accepts that he is the murderer& /ll the previous events have to (e reinterpreted (y the detective and also, if possi(le, (y the reader& The detective and the reader do this (y puttin+ their mind inside *our.e>s caper, (y tryin+ to create a narrative of the story?orld from his aspectual vie?point @hy did he commit the first murderI Ho? did he conceal his involvementI @hy did he .ill a+ainI /nd so on& 8t is a pivotal moment in the plot ?hen the detective a(andons his previous attempt to construct the old 83that3is3*our.e inside his o?n mind, and tries to reconstruct a ne? one& 0o, ?e have an em(edded narrative, the detective>s, that contains ?ithin it a vie? or an interpretation of another em(edded narrative, *our.e>s& Ho?ever, as ?ith previous insi+hts relatin+ to the ?or.in+s of +enre fiction, this point need not (e limited to a particular +enre& All fiction is read (y means of dou(ly em(edded narratives& (mma has the po?er that it has (ecause it is propelled (y Bmma>s dou(ly em(edded narrative of Dni+htley& 0he ?onders a(out ?hat ima+e Dni+htley has of her in his mind, and she cares desperately a(out ?hat it is& /ll this is also true of real minds& @e have narratives of others that are more 3!:13 or less detailed, more or less accurate, more or less prone to chan+e& B=ually, people vary in the e9tent to ?hich they attempt to control the narratives that others have of them, and, of course, they vary in the e9tent to ?hich these attempts are successful& /s 8 said in chapter !, section $, 0chan. and /(elson maintain that in a role theme, a particular actor>s +oals are determined (y his role&&&& Lnce a role theme is invo.ed, it sets up e9pectations a(out +oals and actions (15;;, 1:!#::)& The social role that ?e ac=uire as it is formed ?ithin the em(edded narratives of others (ecomes part of our situated identity& Lur o?n +oals and actions are necessarily influenced (y the e9pectations of others& Those people ?ho, for e9ample, dress flam(oyantly and say they do not care ?hat others thin. of them are the ones ?ho, in reality, care most& 8ncredi(ly, dou(ly em(edded narratives even occur in the animal .in+dom& 8n Finds of -inds, 4aniel 4ennett e9plains the thin.in+ (ehind a (ird>s decision to distract a predator from its chic.s 8>m a lo? nestin+ (ird, ?hose chic.s are not protecta(le a+ainst a predator ?ho discovers them& This approachin+ predator can (e e2pected soon to discover them & & & unless 8 distract itC it could (e distracted (y its desire to catch and eat me, (ut only if it thou+ht there ?as a reasona(le chance of its actually catchin+ me (it>s no dummy)C it ?ould contract Kust that (elief if 8 +ave it evidence that 8 couldn>t fly anymoreC 8 could do that (y fei+nin+ a (ro.en ?in+, etc (155%, 1!!)& /s 4ennett remar.s, it defies credence to suppose that any (ird +oes throu+h anythin+ li.e the solilo=uy here& Jet that solilo=uy undou(tedly e9presses the rationale that has shaped the (ehavior, ?hether or not the (ird can appreciate the rationale (155%, 1!!)& The rationale that 4ennett descri(es is (ased on the (ird>s

assumptions a(out and predictions of another creature>s (ehavior& 8n ?hatever form that it ta.es, the (ird>s co+nitive functionin+ is (ased on some .ind of dou(ly em(edded narrative& @ith re+ard to fictional minds, ,ri Mar+olin dra?s a clear and useful distinction (et?een the ori+inal or real characters ?ho e9ist in the story?orlds of third3person narratives and the versions of these characters ?ho e9ist in the (elief ?orlds of other characters& He descri(es this difference as (et?een ontolo+ical and epistemic versions (155%a, 11$#16)& That is, the ori+inal is real ?ithin the ontolo+y of the story?orld, ?hile the versions e9ist only ?ithin the epistemic (elief ?orlds of the other characters& 8t is perhaps ?orth d?ellin+ on this distinction for a ?hile from a situated identity perspective& 8ma+ine that you are tryin+ to esta(lish the personality or mind of a character& 8f the narrator says that he is, say, mean, then that is ontolo+ically clear& )ut ?hat a(out the cases ?here the real character says that he is +enerous, (ut his versions are mean in the sense that all the other characters thin. that he is meanI 8f it is clear 3!:!3 that the reader ?ill find him mean also, then there is an interestin+ sense in ?hich the ontolo+ically real character is less real than the epistemolo+ical versions& @hat 8 ?ish to do is to =uery ?here the mind occurs (ecause recursive em(eddin+ can often (e more accurate than the ori+inal em(edded narrative& 0o it can (e true to say of character />s mind that he has an an+ry disposition if this characteristic is contained ?ithin the dou(ly em(edded narratives of ), C, and 4 (ut an+rily denied (y / himself& /s in real life, characters are continually attemptin+ to reconstruct aspects of the minds of others (y the process of third3person ascription, even in the a(sence of specific cues such as e9ternal action& This is amusin+ly illustrated ?hen underreaction leads to the & & & ?hatI & & & @H/TI &&& syndrome& (This is the situation that you often see in sitcoms ?hen an uneasy character reacts more and more frenAiedly to another character simply starin+ at them&) /n informative ?ay to loo. at narratives is to e9amine the distance (et?een a character>s vie? of their o?n em(edded narrative and the dou(ly em(edded narratives of others relatin+ to that character& Bm(edded narratives and the dou(ly em(edded variety relate in interestin+ ?ays& For e9ample, they may coincide or they may (e diver+entC if diver+ent, the dou(ly em(edded narrative can (e more accurate (Dni+htley>s of Bmma in Bmma) or less accurate (Pip>s of Miss Havisham as his (enefactress in Rreat B9pectations)C the vie?s of the reader mi+ht chan+e on the relationship (as in the latter case almost certainly and the former case possi(ly)& 0ometimes dou(ly em(edded narratives are rich and detailed (4orothea>s of Casau(on in -iddlemarch) and sometimes (arely e9istin+ (as in all the characters in +ile 6odies)& The interest of many novels is to see ho? the various em(edded and dou(ly em(edded narratives inter?eave, mer+e, conflict, (ecome reconciled, and so on& *ich and comple9 patterns result&

Lne ?ay to divide intramental and intermental dou(ly em(edded narratives is as follo?s an individual thin.in+ a(out another individualC an individual thin.in+ a(out a +roupC a +roup thin.in+ a(out an individualC and a +roup thin.in+ a(out another +roup& 0everal of the e9amples of the four cate+ories from +ile 6odies that are considered in the follo?in+ discussion could Kust have easily (een used in the conte9t of the discussion of the intermental thin.in+ in the previous section& The .ey to the fictional minds in +ile 6odies is that there is a +ood deal of intermental thin.in+ (ut very little evidence of dou(ly em(edded narratives& There is very little indication of the e9istence of one character in the mind of another& The follo?in+ e9amples tend to (e rather mar+inal and fleetin+ cases that are very ne+ative in content& There is no evidence of a dou(ly em(edded narrative that is sustained in any richness or depth over the ?hole 3!::3 of the novel& The lac. of dou(ly em(edded narratives demonstrates some very solipsistic states of mind the com(ination of this and the amount of intermental thin.in+ vividly conveys the sensation of (ein+ alone in a cro?d& The lac. of e9plicit and continued dou(ly em(edded narratives contri(utes su(stantially to the callous and unfeelin+ =uality of the novel& Follo?in+ the discussion of a fe? e9amples from +ile 6odies, 8 ?ill conclude this section ?ith some much richer e9amples of dou(ly em(edded narratives ta.en from three other novels& 0ndividual$individual& This is a +ood e9ample of prototypical dou(ly em(edded narrative (%!) /dam ?as =uite pleased to lunch ?ith 0imon )alcairn, thou+h he .ne? there must (e some sli+htly sinister motive (ehind this sudden hospitality& (;1) 8t is one character speculatin+ a(out the motives of another character>s action in the conte9t of that second character>s ?hole mind& /dam sat in the (ac. of the car ?ith Miles, ?ho ?as clearly put out a(out his friend>s lac. of cordiality (1:")& is another rare e9ample& /dam>s mental event is the a?areness of Miles>s mental event discomfiture at a third party>s unfriendly (ehavior and so, possi(ly, unfriendly state of mind& 0o, three individual em(edded narratives enmesh& (%:) 8t ?as a(out no? that /dam remem(ered that he ?as en+a+ed to (e married& (!") This is a dou(ly em(edded narrative that, +iven that it is a man thin.in+ a(out his fiancOe, is of a distur(in+ly casual and attenuated variety&

Lne e9ample turns out to (e amusin+ly counterfactual& (%$) 8t ?as fortunate, PMr )enfleetQ reflected, that none of the authors ever came across the senior partner, that (eni+n old +entleman&&&& He often ?ondered in his uneasy moments ?hat he ?ould find to say ?hen *ampole died& (!;# !") Mr& )enfleet is ?orryin+ (ecause he has created a fictitious dou(ly em(edded narrative of the (eni+n Mr *ampole as a avaricious old tyrant in order to scare the authors into acceptin+ unreasona(le contractual terms& His concern is related to the conflict (et?een this fictitious dou(ly em(edded narrative and the real dou(ly em(edded narrative that he has of the authors ?ho, he anticipates, ?ill (e difficult to control ?hen the fictitious one ends& Mr )enfleet>s state of mind is reminiscent of )a.htin>s notion of the ,ord ,ith a side,ays #lance the uneasy anticipation of the conflictin+ vie?point of another& 8n a scene (et?een 2ady ,rsula and her mother (11$), the t?o discuss her marria+e prospects ?ithout any meetin+ of minds at all& The mother is simply 3!:$3 not listenin+ to her dau+hter>s dou(ts and mis+ivin+s& There is, therefore, a conspicuous and si+nificant a(sence of the .ind of +enuine and accurate dou(ly em(edded narrative that the reader ?ould e9pect in this sort of situation& The mother is completely solipsistic and is ma.in+ no attempt to reconstruct ?ithin her o?n mind ?hat her dau+hter>s thou+hts mi+ht (e& That is the charita(le e9planation& The other is that she has done this and is i+norin+ the result& 8t is not clear ?hich& 0ndividual$#roup& This character is thin.in+ in typically ne+ative terms a(out the +roup or set to ?hich she (elon+s (%6) Lne day she ?ould surprise them all, thou+ht Miss Mouse& ($$) 8n e9ample %%, an individual is thin.in+ a(out himself as part of a pair and ma.in+ decisions a(out actions in the future& They are ironic (ecause they are mista.en (%%) @hen -ina and he ?ere married, he thou+ht, they ?ould often come do?n there for the day after a really serious party& (%1) 8roup$individual& The e9amples of this sort of dou(ly em(edded narrative tend to (e rather ne+ative& This one is o(viously rather callous

(%;) the Joun+er 0et & & & cheered up ?onderfully ?hen they heard a(out Miss *unci(le>s outra+eous treatment at the hands of the Customs officers& (!:) The conte9t to the ne9t e9ample, ?hich is no (etter, is that Miss *unci(le has (een (arred from the hotel (ecause she is ?earin+ trousers and is ?aitin+ outside in the cold (%") They spent a lon+ time over luncheon (ecause it ?as ?arm there, and they dran. Dummel over the fire until Miss *unci(le came in very an+rily to fetch them out& (1!5) This sentence involves intermental action (ut any dou(ly em(edded narrative is conspicuously and typically a(sent& Put simply, and stripped of my ne?ly minted narrative3theory Kar+on, they did not thin. a(out ?hat it mi+ht (e li.e for Miss *unci(le to (e hun+ry, lonely, and cold& 8 ?ould li.e to introduce here yet another ne? term#the fully doubly embedded narrative& This occurs ?hen the reader never meets a character directly, and he or she e9ists for the reader only throu+h the dou(ly em(edded narratives of other characters& 8 have already mentioned *e(ecca in 4aphne du Maurier>s novel /ebecca& /nother is the painter character in /+atha Christie>s ?hodunit !ive "ittle Pi#s& Bmily in @illiam Faul.ner>s / *ose for Bmily is a famous e9ample of a fully dou(ly em(edded narrative& 8n fact, it is an intermental fully dou(ly em(edded narrative (ecause she is .no?n only throu+h the +roup 3!:63 em(edded narrative of the to?nspeople& 8t is shared in that (y and lar+e the to?nspeople a+ree on the sort of mind that Bmily hadC the fully dou(ly em(edded narratives in the other t?o cases are conflicted, in that the narrative action arises from the e9istence of very different vie?s of the a(sent character& 8roup$8roup& Plenty of e9amples of this sort as they relate to su(3+roups and +roup conflict ?ere +iven earlier in section : on intermental thou+ht& -o? let us consider some very different e9amples from other novels& First, the reader (e+ins the initial, tentative, and hypothetical construction of 2yd+ate>s em(edded narrative in -iddlemarch (y ma.in+ use of the dou(ly em(edded narratives of other characters& The reader first hears of 2yd+ate indirectly ?hen 2ady Chettam and Mrs Cad?allader are discussin+ him& These are the main points Tell me a(out this ne? youn+

sur+eon, Mr 2yd+ate& 8 am told he is ?onderfully clever he certainly loo.s it#a fine (ro? indeed (15;;, %1)& Mrs Cad?allader replies that He is a +entleman&&&& He tal.s ?ell (15;;, %1)& 2ady Chettam a+rees that he is really ?ell connected&&&& Lne does not e9pect it in a practitioner of that .ind (15;;, %!)& Mrs Cad?allader then notices that 4orothea )roo.e is tal.in+ cotta+es and hospitals ?ith him&&&& 8 (elieve he is a sort of philanthropist (15;;, %!)& 0o, ?hat do ?e find out a(out him in the t?enty3one lines of te9t (efore ?e meet himI @e learn that he is apparently youn+, clever, +ood3loo.in+, a ?ell3connected +entleman, someone ?ho tal.s ?ell, a sort of philanthropist, and innovative and successful& These ?ords on the pa+e ?ill no? (e transformed (y the reader into an already pre3e9istin+ ima+inary individual ?ith a past that is part of the -iddlemarch story?orld& His em(edded narrative started t?enty3five odd years a+o, and the reader is no? en+a+ed in reconstructin+ it& This conversation is lar+ely a consideration of 2yd+ate>s mind& 0ome features are o(viously related to his mental life (ein+ clever, philanthropic, and successfully innovative& Lthers are sli+htly more indirect tal.in+ ?ell is a description of (ehavior that implies a series of mental attri(utes such as cleverness, confidence, a?areness of others, and so on& )ein+ a +entleman is yet more indirect (ut presuma(ly has implications for the ?ay the mind ?or.s& 8n addition to these e9plicit =ualities, it is also part of the competence of the reader to construct, this time (y indirect means, some aspects of 2yd+ate>s mental life that are implicit in ?hat ?e have (een told& 2et us say, for e9ample, havin+ these =ualities ma.es it li.ely that he is not only self3confident and am(itious (ut also altruistic, ima+inative, and idealistic& The reader is usin+ material on 2yd+ate>s social and pu(licly availa(le mind that has (een refracted throu+h the conflictin+ ?orld 3!:%3 vie?s of the t?o different em(edded narratives of Mrs Cad?allader and 2ady Chettam& His mind e9ists in their minds& Their minds are interactin+ ?ith, conflictin+ ?ith, and interro+atin+ the constructions that they have formed of his mind& They disapprove of his (ein+ (oth a +entleman and a doctor and also of the fact that he is a doctor ?ith ideas a(out the advancement of medicine& /lthou+h the characters do not e9plicitly speculate a(out the causal net?or. (ehind 2yd+ate>s (ehavior, there is an implicit puAAlement over the motives that a +entleman ?ould have for ?antin+ to (ecome a doctor& 2yd+ate>s o?n motivation (ecomes more e9plicit in the direct access to his mind later in the passa+e& 2ater events appear to sho? that the vie?s of the t?o characters ?ere fairly accurate in their discussions of 2yd+ate>s mind& /nd, to use a familiar (ut si+nificant phrase, there are some respects in ?hich he may not .no? his o?n mind& 8n the ne9t chapter 2yd+ate is scornful a(out the possi(ility of losin+ his (alance and fallin+ in love, and ?e find out later that this is precisely ?hat 2yd+ate does do& / +roup3+roup dou(ly em(edded narrative occurs in an apparently trivial incident in another of Bvelyn @au+h>s novels, Men at /rms& The prota+onist, Ruy Crouch(ac., has arrived in a ne? /rmy camp as part of a +roup of officers from the )arrac. camp& /t the dinin+ ta(le they see another +roup of officers from the 4epot camp that they do not .no?& The t?o +roups do not spea.&

PCrouch(ac.Q ?as the first to +o& 0oon after him the 4epot )atch rose from the ta(le& Lne or t?o of them hesitated, ?onderin+ ?hether they ou+ht not to spea. to the ne?comers, (ut (y no? all heads at the )arrac. (atch ta(le ?ere (ent over their plates& The moment passed (efore it ?as reco+niAed& Matey (astards, aren>t theyI said 0arum30mith& (15%$, "5) 2ater, the narrator reports that There ?as no enmity (et?een the t?o +roups (ut there ?as little friendship& They continued as they had (e+un, eatin+ at separate ta(les and inha(itin+ separate (edrooms (15%$, 5:)& 8t seems to me that the discourse conveys in a sensitive and careful manner a typical pro(lem in social relations& / trivial incident, li.e t?o people not ac.no?led+in+ each other in the corridor the first time they pass, achieves an importance completely out of proportion to its true si+nificance (ecause it can (e so difficult to put it ri+ht on su(se=uent occasions& / coldness can soon arise for no other reason than the initial a?.?ardness& 8n these situations, em(edded narratives are not Kust dou(led, they are tripled, =uadrupled, and so on, and so on& 8n fact, ?hen it comes to social em(arrassment, em(edded narrative +ro?th is 3!:;3 pro(a(ly e9ponential& He>ll thin. that 8 thin. that he thin.s that 8 thin. &&& /s a child 8 read a /eader>s Di#est story in ?hich a man +oes to (orro? a ?i+ from a nei+h(or for some amateur theatricals& @hile he ?al.s he thin.s of all the reasons ?hy his nei+h(or ?ill not ?ant to lend it, a fe? reasons ?hy he ?ill, yet more and even stron+er reasons ?hy he ?ill not, and so on& @hen the man +ets there and his nei+h(or opens the door, the man shouts, Deep the damn ?i+, thenM 8 never ?anted it any?ayM The difference in the -en at Arms case is that the difficulty is (ein+ e9perienced (y t?o +roups& /lthou+h the passa+e is (eautifully understated, anyone ?ho is prone to this sort of pro(lem ?ill e9perience an instant and uncomforta(le thrill of reco+nition on readin+ the ?ords, the moment passed& /nd this thrill ?ill in no ?ay (e diminished (y the fact that ?hat is (ein+ descri(ed here is intermental and not intramental dou(ly em(edded narratives& 8 ?ill conclude this chapter ?ith an individual3individual dou(ly em(edded narrative& 8 said in chapter 1 that the follo?in+ passa+e ?as the .ind of fictional mental functionin+ that 8 ?as interested in and that 8 very much hoped that ?hen you read it a+ain here more of its full si+nificance ?ould (e revealed )runetti ?atched as Murino a(sor(ed this information, then ?aited as the other man (e+an to consider ?hat his visi(le response should (e& /ll of this too. only seconds, (ut )runetti had (een o(servin+ the process for decades and ?as familiar ?ith it& The people to ?hom he presented himself had a dra?er of responses ?hich they thou+ht appropriate, and part of his Ko( ?as to ?atch them as they sifted throu+h them one at a

time, see.in+ the ri+ht fit& 0urpriseI FearI 8nnocenceI CuriosityI He ?atched Murino flip throu+h them, studied his face as he considered, then discarded various possi(ilities& He decided, apparently, on the last& JesI /nd ?hat ?ould you li.e to .no?, CommissarioI (2eon 155%, 155) )ecause 8 hope that ?hat 8 am no? +oin+ to say is completely predicta(le, 8 ?ill .eep it (rief& The passa+e presents the ?hole of )runetti>s mind in action, includin+ states of mind such as dispositions and (eliefs and also emotions& )oth characters are employin+ purposive mental functionin+& Murino>s mind is pu(lic and social (ecause )runetti>s third3person ascriptions of mental states to Murino are successful and accurate& The presentation of )runetti>s ?hole mind contains elements of characteriAation (for e9ample, )runetti>s familiarity ?ith the process)& /ll the information on the t?o minds that is made availa(le in this passa+e forms part of )runetti>s em(edded narrative and also of Murino>s& The story?orld is aspectual (ecause ?e e9perience Murino from 3!:"3 )runetti>s aspectual point of vie?& The passa+e has an important teleolo+ical value in that it affects the end of the story& The t?o characters are en+a+ed in competitive intermental thin.in+ each is tryin+ to out3thin. the other& 8t is clear that )runetti>s em(edded narrative contains ?ithin it an accurate dou(ly em(edded narrative for Murino& Finally, Murino>s identity is situated some?hat closer to )runetti>s vie? of him than to his o?n vie? of himself& 3!:53 2 *urther Applications 8 see this (oo. as (ein+ the first of a pair& This one constructs the theoretical frame?or. ?ithin ?hich the ne9t one ?ill illustrate more fully the ?hole of the social mind in action& The purpose of this chapter is to descri(e in outline the proposed content of the second (oo.& Chapter 1, section $ referred to a num(er of issues that could not (e considered ?ithin the limits of this study (ut that ?ould (enefit from further e9amination ?ithin the perspective that 8 have advocated& 8 ?ill (riefly discuss t?o particularly fruitful applications the historical approach and the implications of some of the counterintuitive aspects of co+nitive science& The ?hole of the social mind in action ?ithin fictional te9ts can (e

e9plored further in a num(er of different directions for e9ample, ho? fictional minds are constructed in the first3person novelC ho? fictional minds are constructed ?ithin fictional te9ts of different historical periodsC ho? fictional minds are constructed ?ithin various +enres of fictionC ho? real minds are constructed in historical narrativeC ho? real7fictional minds are constructed in the roman a clefC and ho? fictional minds are constructed in plays and films& This pro+ram of study is clearly more than a lifetime>s ?or.& Bach of these issues deserves separate full3len+th treatment& The priority that 8 ?ill no? consider in a little detail is the historiciAed approach to?ard the constructions of fictional minds ?ithin different historical periods& / possi(le frame?or. for the diachronic study of fictional minds mi+ht consist of the close te9tual analysis of passa+es from some e9amples of the follo?in+ the )i(le ((oo.s from (oth the Lld and -e? Testament)C classical narrativesC early modern narrativesC ei+hteenth3century novelsC nineteenth3century classic realist novelsC late3nineteenth3century reflector novelsC t?entiethcentury modernist novelsC t?entieth3century formally conservative novelsC and t?entieth3century postmodernist novels& The purpose of the study ?ould (e to (e+in to su++est some ans?ers to the follo?in+ t?o =uestions @hat are the features of the fictional3mind constructions of a particular historical period that are characteristic of that period and different from other periodsI @hat are the similarities in fictional3mind constructions that o(tain across some, most, or all periodsI The t?o =uestions are e=ually important& 8 stress this (ecause it has (een the fashion for some time in literary theory to loo. primarily for the differences (et?een various phenomena& Ho?ever, co+nitive science has sho?n that it can (e e=ually informative to loo. also for (asic underlyin+ similarities&This historiciAed course of study mi+ht proceed alon+ the follo?in+ lines a& 8t ?ould (e+in ?ith the study of a ?ide ran+e of pre3novel and early novel te9ts in order to see ?hat remained constant and ?hat chan+ed in the presentation of characters> ?hole minds over a lon+ period of time& The analysis ?ould attempt to sho? ho? readers of these narratives (uild up a sense of characters> minds throu+hout their full len+th& 8t ?ould set out in detail all the evidence that is made availa(le to the reader on characters> em(edded narratives& The analysis ?ould then attempt to demonstrate ho? the plots of these narratives comprise the a++re+ate of their em(edded narratives& (& The study ?ould then e9amine the de(ate on the formation of the early Bn+lish novel that is referred to later& This is the point at ?hich the e9tended use of the direct3access device +ave rise to the self3conscious e9amination of its epistemolo+ical and ethical implications& c& 8t ?ould then analyAe a small num(er of classic te9ts such as (mma, -iddlemarch, and The /m(assadors in order to put into practice the methodolo+y descri(ed in sta+e a& The importance of this part of the study is that it ?ould sho? ho? narratives ?or. once the full ran+e of naturaliAed devices is in place and (efore they (ecome self3consciously pro(lematiAed& d& Finally, the study ?ould (e e9tended to the modernist and postmodernist novel, in order to analyAe their hi+hly self3conscious reactions a+ainst the norms for mind presentations that ?ere esta(lished in the nineteenth century& For e9ample, it may (e ?orth pursuin+ the

notion that postmodernist te9ts playfully disrupt the causal flo? of consciousness, motives, and action that ?as esta(lished as part of the nineteenth3century normC ho?ever, this study ?ould attempt to find out not only ?hat chan+es ?ere (rou+ht a(out (y the modernist and postmodernist pro+rams (ut also ?hat remained constant in ?hole mind presentations& /s an e9ample of the sort of historical research that 8 envisa+e, 8 ?ill tal. (riefly a(out sta+e (& The follo?in+ =uotes seem to form the possi(le (asis for a historiciAed vie? of the study of the minds presented in the early Bn+lish novel @e (e men and nat aun+els, ?herfore ?e .no?e nothin+e (ut (y out?arde si+nifications& (0ir Thomas Blyot, =uoted in McDeon 15";, 1:!) 36!$13 P/ series of letters offersQ the only natural Lpportunity &&& of representin+ ?ith any Rrace those lively and delicate 8mpressions ?hich .hin#s present are .no?n to ma.e upon the Minds of those affected (y them& (0amuel *ichardson, =uoted in McDeon 15";, $1$) 8t ?ould (e an ill office in us to pay a visit to the inmost recesses of his mind, as some scandalous people search into the most secret affairs of their friends, and often pry into their closets and cup(oards, only to discover their poverty and meanness to the ?orld& (Henry Fieldin+, =uoted in @att 156;, !;:) /s to the present situation of her mind 8 shall adhere to the rule of Horace, (y not attemptin+ to descri(e it, from despair of success& (Henry Fieldin+, =uoted in @att 156;, !;:) 8t is our province to relate facts, and ?e shall leave causes to persons of much hi+her +enius& (Henry Fieldin+, =uoted in @att 156;, !;:) 8t is not enou+h that your 4esi+ns, nay that your /ctions are intrinsically +ood, you must ta.e Care they shall appear so& 8f your 8nside (e never so (eautiful, you must preserve a fair Lutside too& (Fieldin+ 1556, 5:) @hether the insatia(le Curiosity of this +ood @oman had carried her on to that (usiness, or ?hether she did it to confirm herself in the +ood Rraces of Mrs 6lifil& & & 8 ?ill not determine& (Henry Fieldin+, =uoted in 4oody 155%, 1$;)

0he follo?s the Ma9im of Clarissa, of declarin+ all she thin.s to all the people she sees, ?ithout refflectin+ P sicQ that in this Mortal state of 8mperfection Fi+ leaves are as necessary for our Minds as our )odies, as tis as indecent to she? all ?e thin. as all ?e have& (2ady Mary @ortley Monta+ue of Harriet )yron, =uoted in McDeon 15";, $1$) His ?as (ut a .no?led+e of the outside of a cloc.?or. machine, ?hile yours ?as that of all the finer sprin+s and movements of the inside& (0amuel Eohnson to 0arah Fieldin+ of her (rother Henry Fieldin+, =uoted in 0pender 15"%, 1"6) / man must dive into the recesses of the human heart& (0amuel Eohnson, =uoted in McDeon 15";, $1%) 8t is a mercy our thou+hts are conceald from each other& L if at our social ta(le ?e could see ?hat passes in each (osom around ?e ?ould see. dens and caverns to shun human society& (0ir @alter 0cott, =uoted in *o(ertson 155$, 1%6) 3!$!3 8 do not mean that -i+el literally said aloud ?ith his (odily or+ans the ?ords ?hich follo? in inverted commas &&& (ut that 8 myself choose to present to my dearest reader the picture of my hero>s mind, his reflections and resolutions, in the form of a speech, rather than that of a narrative& 8n other ?ords, 8 have put his thou+hts into lan+ua+e& P8t isQ the most natural and perhaps the only ?ay of communicatin+ to the spectator ?hat is supposed to (e passin+ in the (osom of Pthe characterQ& There are no such solilo=uies in nature it is true&&&& 8n narrative, no dou(t, the ?riter has the alternative of tellin+ that his persona+es thou+ht so and so, inferred thus and thus, and arrived at such and such a conclusionC (ut the solilo=uy is a more concise and spirited mode of communicatin+ the same information& (0cott 15;:, !5$#56) These remar.s sho? that a de(ate on the presentation of fictional minds e9isted durin+ and after the formation of the Bn+lish novel& 8n the terms used (y Michael McDeon in his erudite and deeply impressive study, .he Cri#ins of the (n#lish Novel 'GGH )%G (15";), the vie?s sho? a close interest in =uestions of truth (15";, !0)& They raise epistemolo+ical concerns a(out ho? ?e can .no? the contents of other minds and, once they are .no?n, ho? they can (e presented in narrative& They also reveal ethical dou(ts a(out ?hether such information should (e presented in this ?ay& The =uotes sho? clear evidence of stron+ feelin+& The inside vie? of the mind (y the narrator is re+arded as a potentially po?erful and threatenin+ force& 8t is considered to (e stran+e, unfamiliar, and re=uirin+ Kustification& 2ater, in the nineteenth century, the device (ecame easier to accept, more familiar, and not re=uirin+ Kustification& 8t (ecame a convention& The *ichardson =uote is particularly interestin+ in its use of the ?ord natural& Ln this account, direct access to fictional minds is unnatural& Ho? did it (ecome naturaliAedI

The de(ate a(out ho? fictional minds can (e presented, and also ?hether or not their contents should (e revealed at all, illustrates very clearly McDeon>s notion of the fusion of ideolo+y and epistemolo+y in the construction of narrative (15";, !0)& Ho?ever, it is important to esta(lish precisely ?here Henry Fieldin+>s evident moral outra+e is directed 8s he sayin+ that the direct presentation of minds should not (e attempted (ecause it is trivial or (ecause it is not possi(le, or (othI Lne result of Fieldin+>s epistemolo+ical and ethical dou(ts is the lar+e num(er of e9plicit paralipses (omissions of information (y the narrator) relatin+ to the presentation of the mind in .om 7ones& Here are some more e9amples to add to the ones +iven earlier @hether she really felt any 8nKury & & & 8 ?ill not say (1556, :5%)C @hether she had for+iven him or 3!$:3 no, 8 ?ill not determine (1556, %%)C and more +enerally, 8 am not possessed of any Touchstone, ?hich can distin+uish the true from the false (1556, $:)C and usin+ the narratorial ?e, ?e never chuse to assi+n Motives to the /ctions of Men, ?hen there is any Possi(ility of our (ein+ mista.en (1556, 1%5)& The epistemolo+ical s.epticism and the ethical dou(ts are com(ined in the last remar. the former in the possi(ility of (ein+ mista.en, the latter in the resultin+ moral o(li+ation not to assi+n motives& These =uotes are not isolated e9amples& 8 have identified nearly one hundred paralipses related specifically to fictional minds in .om 7ones& Ho?ever, more analysis is re=uired (efore it can (e said ?ith confidence that they relate to an ac.no?led+ement (y the narrator of the uncertain nature of his .no?led+e a(out characters> minds as opposed, say, to the author>s ela(orate sense of irony& /ny study of ho? the naturaliAation of the device of direct access to characters> minds developed (et?een the (e+innin+ of the early Bn+lish novel and the assured and mature use of the device (y Eane /usten, BliAa(eth Ras.ell, and Reor+e Bliot mi+ht focus on the Rothic novel& For e9ample, in Horace @alpole>s The Castle of Ltranto durin+ 8sa(ella>s fli+ht from Manfred, the reader is +iven e9tended direct access to her mental state and the current of her immediate thou+hts, even includin+ some free indirect discourse (15"!, !!#!")& 8n vie? of the date of pu(lication (1;%$), the =uestion arises as to ?hether this presentation of her mind ?as a ne? development in the narrative fiction of the period& /fter all, the novel ?as pu(lished only fifteen years after .om 7ones (1;$5)& 8t is necessary to esta(lish ?hether, +iven Rothic>s o(vious interest in states of mind such as fear, an9iety, uncertainty, and curiosity, the Rothic novel played an important part in developin+ the presentation of the mind in narrative fiction& This mi+ht (e a ri+idly /n+lo centric perspective, and so account ?ould need to (e ta.en of parallel, and perhaps earlier, developments in the French novel& 8 ?ill conclude this section ?ith a (rief note on a specific theoretical issue& Fiction em(odies ?hat#in the fields of co+nitive psycholo+y, the philosophy of mind, and other co+nitive sciences#is .no?n as fol9 psycholo#y& This la(el is intended to cover our standard, everyday, unthin.in+, commonsense assumptions a(out ho? our minds and the minds of others ?or.& Fictional narrators employ fol. psycholo+y, and it

?ould (e unreasona(le to e9pect novelists to do other?ise& Ho?ever, some of the real3mind discourses that 8 have used =uestion some of the (asic components of fol. psycholo+y& This is a recurrin+ tension and one that is not easy to resolve& 8t is possi(le at this sta+e only to refer to it and to ma.e it e9plicit& The consciousness de(ate is concerned not only 3!$$3 ?ith fol.3psycholo+y notions of ho? ?e thin. (ut also ?ith more counterintuitive versions of the process& /n e9treme e9ample of this sort of theoriAin+ is 4ennett>s ar+ument in Consciousness (2plained that there is no Cartesian theatre in ?hich a unified and sin+le flo? of consciousness ta.es place#?hat ?e e9perience as consciousness is merely an amal+am of the various multiple drafts that are produced across all of the different re+ions of the ?hole (rain& /s soon as ?e (ecome accustomed to this sensation, ?e e9perience it as a continuity of consciousness& Further thou+ht needs to (e +iven to ?hether or not there is a place for such o(viously non3fol.3psycholo+ical ideas in an analysis of fictional minds& For e9ample, it mi+ht (e that fictional3mind constructions in (oth the modernist and postmodernist novel are, as 4ennett himself su++ests, interestin+ly consistent ?ith his ideas& /nother counterintuitive co+nitive science theory that has implications for a study of fictional minds concerns ?hat is termed the fundamental attribution error (F/B)& 8 said in chapter ! that the rich and comple9 relationship (et?een dispositions and specific conte9ts, events, and so on is at the heart of the value of novel readin+& @e as. ourselves continually, Riven the sort of disposition that this particular character has, ho? ?ill he or she react in this specific situationI Ho?ever, the F/B theory casts dou(t on our accuracy in ?ei+hin+ up the relative importance of disposition and conte9t ?hen attemptin+ to predict characters> reactions& The F/B is the tendency of o(servers to overestimate ho? much another>s (ehavior is determined (y the person>s sta(le traits (Morris, /mes, and Dno?les 1555, $%)& That is, ?e tend to overestimate the importance of a person>s character in findin+ an e9planation for the ?ay in ?hich they (ehave in a particular situation and underestimate the importance of the situation that they are in& Put crudely, the implication of the F/B is that different sorts of people in the same situation tend to (ehave in the same ?ayC and the same sorts of people in different situations tend to (ehave in different ?ays& 8t is interestin+ to note, +iven that the novel is characteristic of @estern culture, that findin+s that the F/B is stron+er in @estern, individualistic societies than in collectivist societies such as China seem to reflect different lay theories a(out the autonomy of individuals relative to social +roups (Morris, /mes, and Dno?les 1555, $;)& The F/B is an unsettlin+ findin+ for literary criticism and narrative theory, (oth of ?hich tend to (e (ased on the assumption that characters (ehave in the ?ay that they do (ecause of the personalities that they have& 8t is not often ?hile readin+ a novel that ?e say, @ell, anyone ?ould have done ?hat she didM @e are more li.ely to say, @ell, that>s typical of her to do thatM 8n any event, ?hat are the implications of the F/BI 4oes the ?hole practice of novel readin+ reinforce

3!$63 the errorI 8s that a (ad thin+I L(viously 8 do not have ans?ers to these =uestions, (ut perhaps they are ?orth mentionin+ at this point in order to ac.no?led+e that the relationship (et?een the co+nitive sciences and narrative theory mi+ht not all (e plain sailin+& Conclusion 8n one sense, as *& 4& 2ain+ says, ?e are invisi(le to each other& 8n another sense, the activities of our minds are perfectly visi(le to others in our actions& The reader>s e9perience of the minds of characters in novels does not depend solely on the stran+e device of the narrator +ivin+ direct access to the inner ?or.in+s of fictional consciousnesses& Eust as in real life the individual constructs the minds of others from their (ehavior, so the reader infers the ?or.in+s of fictional minds and sees these minds in action from o(servation of characters> (ehavior and actions& -ovels contain a ?ide variety of material or evidence on ?hich readers (ase their conKectures, hypotheses, and predictions a(out fictional minds& The importance of the ne? perspectives su++ested in this (oo. is that in various ?ays fictional minds are seen not as private, passive flo?s of consciousness, (ut as en+a+ed, social processes of mental action& The concept of em(edded narratives is a .ey mediational tool ?ith ?hich to analyAe this aspect of fictional minds& 8n particular, 8 have ar+ued that one of the most important of the frames used (y readers to understand te9ts is the continuin+3consciousness frame& 8 have focused on three ne+lected su(frames thou+ht and action, intermental thou+ht, and dou(ly em(edded narratives& 8 have also attempted to sho? that analysis of a num(er of su(3su(frames can reveal ho? much information on fictional minds is availa(le to the reader even ?ithin a (ehaviorist narrative such as +ile 6odies& 8 conclude (y su++estin+ that ?hat is no? re=uired is the application of this approach to a ?ide ran+e of other te9ts& 8t is possi(le that these devices are si+nificant constituents of all narrative discourses, (ut further ?or. on this point is re=uired& @hen the social mind e9ists for those ?ho ?ould e9plain it, narrative theory ?ill understand (etter ho? characters do and under+o thin+s in the story?orld and ho? mental processes ta.e place in their natural ha(itat of the houseyard, the mar.etplace, and the to?n s=uare (ecause these are the places in ?hich the fictional mind e9tends (eyond the fictional s.in& 0ometimes you read a (oo. that contains ar+uments that are in+enious& Jou thin. 8 am not sure that 8 follo?ed it all, (ut 8 am sure that it must (e ri+ht& 8n any event, 8 certainly cannot thin. of any o(Kections to it& The person ?ho ?rote it must (e (rilliant (ecause it ?as =uite difficult to follo? in several places& 3!$%3

8 ?ould never have thou+ht of it myself& My one concern is that it seemed a little contin+ent, a little ar(itrary& @hat 8 mean is that 8 cannot rid myself of the feelin+ that a completely different line of ar+ument could have (een presented that ?ould have seemed Kust as plausi(le& )ut at other times you read a (oo. that is very different& 8ts ar+ument is so over?helmin+ly convincin+ that you thin. 8 .ind3of .ne? that alreadyM Lr at least, it feels no? as thou+h on some level or other 8 al?ays .ne? it, even thou+h 8 had never articulated it to myself& 8n any event, havin+ read it, it seems so o(vious no?& 8t is very odd that, as it no? seems so o(vious, no one as far as 8 .no? has ever said it (efore& The person ?ho ?rote it ?as very luc.y to (e in the ri+ht place at the ri+ht time& The second type of (oo. tends to have a more profound impact than the first& These (oo.s often (ecome part of the ?ay that the people ?ho read them thin. a(out the su(Kect of the study& People ?ho read them see thin+s a little (it differently& 8 ?ould li.e this to (e one of those (oo.s& 3!$;3 Bi'liography *iction /m(ler, Bric& 15"$& (pitaph for a Spy& 2ondon 4ent& (Lri+& pu(& 15:"&) /usten, Eane& 155%& Bmma& Bdited (y *onald )lythe& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 1"1%&) )ehn, /phra& 155$& The History of a -un& 8n Croono9o and Cther Writin#s, edited (y Paul 0alAman& L9ford L9ford ,niversity Press& (Lri+& pu(& 1%"5&) Conan 4oyle, /rthur& 15"1& The Pen+uin Complete 0herloc. Holmes& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& Connelly, Michael& 155:& )lac. Bcho& )oston 0t Martin>s& 4ic., Philip D& 1555& 4o /ndroids 4ream of Blectric 0heepI 2ondon Millennium& (Lri+& pu(& 15%5&) 4ic.ens, Charles& 15%6& 8reat (2pectations& Bdited (y /n+us Calder& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 1"%1&)

###& 15;1& 6lea9 ;ouse& Bdited (y -orman Pa+e& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 1"6:&) ###& 1556& ;ard .imes& Bdited (y Date Flint& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 1"6$&) Bliot, Reor+e& 15;;& -iddlemarch& Bdited (y )ert R& Horn(ac.& -e? Jor. -orton& (Lri+& pu(& 1";!&) ###& 155%& Adam 6ede& Bdited (y Galentine Cunnin+ham& L9ford L9ford ,niversity Press& (Lri+& pu(& 1"65&) Fieldin+, Henry& 1556& .om 7ones& !d ed& Bdited (y 0heridan )a.er& -e? Jor. -orton& (Lri+& pu(& 1;$5&) Flau(ert, Rustave& 1560& -adame 6ovary& Translated (y /lan *ussell& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 1"6;&) Hi+hsmith, Patricia& 15%"& Stran#ers on a .rain& 2ondon Pan& (Lri+& pu(& 15$5&) Eoyce, Eames& 15"%& 5lysses& Corrected edition& Bdited (y Hans @alter Ra(ler& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 15!!&) 2eon, 4onna& 155%& Ac*ua Alta& 2ondon Macmillan& ###& 155;& .he Death of !aith& 2ondon Macmillan& ###& !001& A Sea of .roubles& 2ondon Heinemann& 2e?is, Matthe?& 155"& .he -on9& Bdited (y Christopher Maclachlan& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 1;5%&) 2od+e, 4avid& !001& .hin9s . . . & 2ondon 0ec.er and @ar(ur+& Pears, 8ain& !000& 8iotto>s ;and& 2ondon HarperCollins& Proust, Marcel& 155%& S,ann>s Way& Translated (y C& D& 0cott Moncreiff and Terence Dilmartin& *evised (y 4& E& Bnri+ht& 2ondon Ginta+e& (Lri+& pu(& 15!!&)

Pynchon, Thomas& 155%& .he Cryin# of "ot %B& 2ondon Ginta+e& (Lri+& pu(& 15%%&) 0cott, 0ir @alter& 15;:& The Fortunes of -i+el& 0t& /l(ans, Bn+land Panther& (Lri+& pu(& 1"!!&) ###& 15;6& Lld Mortality& Bdited (y /n+us Calder& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 1"1%&) ###& 1556& *o( *oy& Bdited (y Eohn 0utherland& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 1"1;&) Thac.eray, @illiam Ma.epeace& 155$& Ganity Fair& Bdited (y Peter 2& 0hillin+s(ur+& -e? Jor. -orton& (Lri+& pu(& 1"$"&) Thompson, Eim& !00!& The Reta?ay& 2ondon Lrion& (Lri+& pu(& 156"&) @alpole, Horace& 15"!& .he Castle of Ctranto& Bdited (y @& 0& 2e?is& L9ford L9ford ,niversity Press& (Lri+& pu(& 1;%$&) @au+h, Bvelyn& 15%$& -en at Arms& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 156!&) ###& 155%& +ile 6odies& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 15:0)& @harton, Bdith& 15;5& .he ;ouse of -irth& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu(& 150:&) @hite, Bdmund& !001& .he -arried -an& 2ondon Ginta+e& #heoretical Sources /cAel, *ichard& 155"& Hearin+ Goices in -arrative Te9ts& Ne, "iterary ;istory !5 $%;#600& /u, Terry& 1555& 2an+ua+e and Thou+ht& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press&

/uer(ach, Brich& 156:& -imesisA .he /epresentation of /eality in Western "iterature & Translated (y @illard *& Tras.& Princeton Princeton ,niversity Press& 3!603 )a.htin, Mi.hail& 15"1& .he Dialo#ic 0ma#ination& Translated (y Caryl Bmerson and Michael Hol=uist& /ustin ,niversity of Te9as Press& ###& 15"$& Problems of Dostoevs9y>s Poetics& Translated (y Caryl Bmerson& Manchester Manchester ,niversity Press& )al, Mie.e& 155;& Narratolo#yA 0ntroduction to the .heory of Narrative& !d ed& Toronto ,niversity of Toronto Press& )aldic., Chris& 155%& Criticism and "iterary .heory IBG to the Present& 2ondon 2on+man& )anfield, /nn& 15"!& 5nspea9able SentencesA Narration and /epresentation in the "an#ua#e of !iction. )oston *outled+e& )arnden, Eohn /& 1556& 0imulative *easonin+, Common30ense Psycholo+y, and /rtificial 8ntelli+ence& 8n Mental 0imulation Bvaluations and /pplications, edited (y Martin 4avies and Tony 0tone& L9ford )lac.?ell& )arthes, *oland& 1550& S<=& Translated (y *ichard Miller& L9ford )lac.?ell& )ateson, Rre+ory& 15;!& 0teps to an Bcolo+y of Mind / *evolutionary /pproach to Man>s ,nderstandin+ of Himself& -e? Jor. )allantine& )ic.erton, 4ere.& 15%;& Modes of 8nterior Monolo+ue / Formal 4efinition& Modern 2an+ua+e Wuarterly !" !!5#:5& )lac.(urn, 0imon& 155$& The L9ford 4ictionary of Philosophy& L9ford L9ford ,niversity Press& )olton, 4ere.& 1556& 0elf3Dno?led+e, Brror and 4isorder& 8n -ental SimulationA (valuations and Applications, edited (y Martin 4avies and Tony 0tone& L9ford )lac.?ell& )onheim, Helmut& 15"!& The -arrative Modes Techni=ues of the 0hort 0tory& Cam(rid+e, Bn+land )re?er&

)ooth, @ayne C& 15";& .he /hetoric of !iction& !d ed& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& )remond, Claude& 15;:& "o#i*ue du /Jcit& Paris 0euil& )re?er, @illiam F& 1555& 0chemata& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& )rinton, 2aurel& 15"0& *epresented Perception / 0tudy in -arrative 0tyle& Poetics 5 :%:#"1& )rothers, 2eslie& 1555& Bmotion and the Human )rain& 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Chatman, 0eymour& 15;"& Story and DiscourseA Narrative Structure in !iction and !ilm& 8thaca -J Cornell ,niversity Press& 3!613 Choms.y, -oam& 15%6& Aspects of the .heory of Synta2& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Clar., /ndy, and 4avid E& Chalmers& 155"& The B9tended Mind& Analysis 6" ;#15& Cohn, 4orrit& 15;"& .ransparent -indsA Narrative -odes for Presentin# Consciousness in !iction& Princeton Princeton ,niversity Press& ###& 1555& .he Distinction of !iction& )altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins ,niversity Press& Co?ard, *osalind, and Eohn Bllis& 15;;& "an#ua#e and -aterialismA Developments in Semiolo#y and the .heory of the Sub1ect & 2ondon *outled+e& Culler, Eonathan& 15;6& Structuralist PoeticsA Structuralism: "in#uistics: and the Study of "iterature& 2ondon *outled+e& ###& 15"0& Fa(ula and 0KuAhet in the /nalysis of -arrative 0ome /merican 4iscussions& Poetics Today 1 (:) !;#:;&

4amasio, /ntonio& !000& .he !eelin# of What ;appensA 6ody: (motion and the Ma.in+ of Consciousness& 2ondon Heinemann& 4avies, Martin& 1555& Consciousness& 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co+nitive 0ciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& 4avies, Martin, and Tony 0tone& 1556& 8ntroduction& 8n Mental 0imulation Bvaluations and /pplications, edited (y Martin 4avies and Tony 0tone& L9ford )lac.?ell& 4ennett, 4aniel C& 1551& Consciousness (2plained& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& ###& 155%& Dinds of Minds To?ards an ,nderstandin+ of Consciousness& 2ondon @eidenfeld and -icholson& 4escartes, *enO& 155"& -editations and Cther -etaphysical Writin#s& Translated (y 4esmond M& Clar.e& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& 4illon, Reor+e 2&, and Frederic. Dirchhoff& 15;%& Ln the Form and Function of Free 8ndirect 0tyle& PT2 1 (:) $:1#$0& 4ole\el, 2u(omSr& 15""& Mimesis and Possi(le @orlds& Poetics .oday 5 (:) $;6#5%& ###& 1556& Fictional @orlds 4ensity, Raps, and 8nference& Style !5 (!) !01#1$& ###& 155"& ;eterocosmicaH!iction and Possible Worlds& )altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins ,niversity Press& 4oody, Mar+aret /nne& 155%& .he .rue Story of the Novel. 2ondon HarperCollins& 3!6!3 4ry, Helen& 15;;& 0ynta9 and Point of Gie? in Eane /usten>s (mma& Studies in /omanticism 1% (1) ";#55& 4uncan, 0usan& 1555& 2an+ua+e and Communication& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press&

Ba+leton, Terry& 15":& "iterary .heoryA An 0ntroduction& L9ford )lac.?ell& Bco, ,m(erto& 15"1& .he /ole of the /eaderA (2plorations in the Semiotics of .e2ts& 2ondon Hutchinson& Bhrlich, 0usan& 1550& Point of +ie,A A "in#uistic Analysis of "iterary Style& 2ondon *outled+e& Bllis, /ndre?, and Reoffrey )eattie& 15"%& .he Psycholo#y of "an#ua#e and Communication& Hove and 2ondon Brl(aum& Blster, Eon& 1555& Alchemies of the -indA /ationality and the (motions& Cam(rid+e Cam(rid+e ,niversity Press& Bmmott, Catherine& 155;& -arrative Comprehension / 4iscourse Perspective& L9ford Clarendon& Fauconnier, Rilles& 155;& Mappin+s in Thou+ht and 2an+ua+e& Cam(rid+e Cam(rid+e ,niversity Press& Flavin, 2ouise& 15";& Mansfield Par. Free 8ndirect 4iscourse and the Psycholo+ical -ovel& 0tudies in the -ovel 15 1:;#65& Fluderni., Moni.a& 155:& .he !ictions of "an#ua#e and the "an#ua#es of !ictionA .he "in#uistic /epresentation of Speech and Consciousness & 2ondon *outled+e& ###& 155%& To?ards a -atural -arratolo+y& 2ondon *outled+e& Forster, B& M& !000& Aspects of the Novel& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& Freeman, -orman H& 1556& Theories of the Mind in Collision Plausi(ility and /uthority& 8n -ental SimulationA (valuations and Applications , edited (y Martin 4avies and Tony 0tone& L9ford )lac.?ell& Fre+e, Rottlo(& 15;0& Ln 0ense and *eference& 8n .ranslations from the Philosophical Writin#s of 8ottlob !re#e, edited (y P& Reach and M& )lac.& L9ford )lac.?ell& Friedman, Melvin& 1566& Stream of ConsciousnessA A Study in "iterary -ethod& -e? Haven CT Jale ,niversity Press&

ReertA, Clifford& 155:& .he 0nterpretation of CulturesA Selected (ssays& 2ondon Fontana& Renette, Rerard& 15"0& Narrative DiscourseA An (ssay in -ethod& Translated (y Eane B& 2e?in& 8thaca -J Cornell ,niversity Press& 3!6:3 ###& 15""& Narrative Discourse /evisited& Translated (y Eane B& 2e?in& 8thaca -J Cornell ,niversity Press& Rerri+, *ichard E& 155:& (2periencin# Narrative WorldsA Cn the Psycholo#ical Activities of /eadin#& -e? Haven CT Jale ,niversity Press& Rins(ur+, *uth, and 0hlomith *immon3Denan& 1555& 8s There a 2ife after 4eathI TheoriAin+ /uthors and *eadin+ 7azz& 8n Narratolo#iesA Ne, Perspectives on Narrative Analysis, edited (y 4avid Herman& Colum(us Lhio 0tate ,niversity Press& Roldman, /lvin E& 1556& Bmpathy, Mind, and Morals& 8n -ental SimulationA (valuations and Applications , edited (y Martin 4avies and Tony 0tone& L9ford )lac.?ell& Ropni., /lison& 1555& T heory of Mind& 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co+nitive Sciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Rordon, *o(ert M& 1555& 0imulation vs& Theory3Theory& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Rreimas, /& E& 15":& 0tructural 0emantics /n /ttempt at a Method& 2incoln ,niversity of -e(ras.a Press& Ha(ermas, EZr+en& 15"$& The Theory of Communicative /ction& Gol& 1& Translated (y Thomas McCarthy& )oston )eacon& Heal, Eane& 1556& Ho? to Thin. /(out Thin.in+& 8n Mental 0imulation Bvaluations and /pplications, edited (y Martin 4avies and Tony 0tone& L9ford )lac.?ell& He+el, Reor+ @ilhelm Friedrich& 15:1& .he Phenomenolo#y of -ind& !d ed& Translated (y E& )& )aillie& 2ondon /llen and ,n?in&

Herman, 4avid& 155;& 0cripts, 0e=uences, and 0tories Blements of a Postclassical -arratolo+y& PM2/ 11! (6) 10$%#65& ###& 1555a& 8ntroduction -arratolo+ies& 8n Narratolo#iesA Ne, Perspectives on Narrative Analysis , edited (y 4avid Herman& Colum(us Lhio 0tate ,niversity Press& ###& 1555(& To?ards a 0ocionarratolo+y -e? @ays of /nalyAin+ -atural2an+ua+e -arratives& 8n Narratolo#iesA Ne, Perspectives on Narrative Analysis, edited (y 4avid Herman& Colum(us Lhio 0tate ,niversity Press& ###& !00!& Story "o#icA Problems and Possibilities of Narrative& 2incoln ,niversity of -e(ras.a Press& ###, ed& !00:a& Narrative .heory and the Co#nitive Sciences& 0tanford C/ C028 Pu(lications& 3!6$3 ###& !00:(& 0tories as a Tool for Thin.in+& 8n Narrative .heory and the Co#nitive Sciences, edited (y 4avid Herman& 0tanford C/ C028 Pu(lications& Hernadi, Paul& 15;!& 4ual Perspective Free 8ndirect 4iscourse and *elated Techni=ues& Comparative "iterature !$ :!#$:& Hirschfeld, 2a?rence /& 1555& -aNve 0ociolo+y& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Holyoa., Deith E& 1555& Psycholo+y& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Hutchins, Bd?in& 1556& Co#nition in the Wild& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& ###& 1555& Co+nitive /rtifacts& 1555& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press&

8n+arden, *oman& 15;:& .he "iterary Wor9 of ArtA An 0nvesti#ation on the 6or$ derlines of Lntolo+y, 2o+ic, and Theory of 2iterature& Translated (y Reor+e C& Rra(o?icA& Bvanston 82 -orth?estern ,niversity Press& 8ser, @olf+an+& 15;"& The /ct of *eadin+& 2ondon *outled+e& Eac.endoff, *ay& 15":& 0emantics and Co+nition& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Eahn, Manfred& 15":& -arration as -on3communication Ln /nn )anfield>s ,nspea.a(le 0entences& /vaila(le from http 77???&uni3.oeln&de7 ame0! <1ahnI3.htm& ###& 155!& Conte9tualiAin+ *epresented 0peech and Thou+ht& 7ournal of Pra#matics 1; :$;#%;& ###& 155;& Frames, Preferences, and the *eadin+ of Third Person -arratives To?ards a Co+nitive -arratolo+y& Poetics .oday 1" ($) $$1 #%"& ###& 1555a& >0pea., friend, and enter> Rarden Paths, /rtificial 8ntelli+ence, and Co+nitive -arratolo+y& 8n Narratolo#iesA Ne, Perspectives on Narrative Analysis, edited (y 4avid Herman& Colum(us Lhio 0tate ,niversity Press& ###& 1555(& 0tanley Fish and the .oeln&de7]ame0!7Kahn559a&htm& Constructivist )asis of Postclassical -arratolo+y& /vaila(le from http 77???&uni3
]

###& 1555c& More /spects of FocaliAation *efinements and /pplications& /vaila(le from http 77???&uni3.oeln&de7 ] ame0!7Kahn55(&htm& Eames, @illiam& 15"1& .he Principles of Psycholo#y& Gol& 1& Cam(rid+e Harvard ,niversity Press& Eohnson32aird, Philip -& 1555& Mental Models& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& 3!663

Dosslyn, 0tephen M&, and Carolyn 0& *a(in& 1555& 8ma+ery& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Drip.e, 0aul& 15"0& Namin# and Necessity& L9ford )lac.?ell& 2ain+, *& 4& 15%;& .he Politics of (2perience and the 6ird of Paradise& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& 2eech, Reoffrey, and Michael 0hort& 15"1& Style in !ictionA A "in#uistic 0ntroduction to (n#lish !ictional Prose& 2ondon 2on+man& 2e?is, 4avid& 15;:& Counterfactuals& Cam(rid+e Harvard ,niversity Press& 2od+e, 4avid& 1550& After 6a9htinA (ssays on !iction and Criticism& 2ondon *outled+e& ###& !00!& Consciousness and the -ovel Connected Bssays& 2ondon 0ec.er and @ar(ur+& 2u((oc., Percy& 15!1& .he Craft of !iction& 2ondon Eonathan Cape& 2uria, /le9ander& 15"!& 2an+ua+e and Co+nition& -e? Jor. @iley& Maloney, E& Christopher& 1555& Functionalism& 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co+nitive 0ciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Mar+olin, ,ri& 15"%& The 4oer and the 4eed /ction as a )asis for CharacteriAation in -arrative& Poetics Today ;(!) !06#!6& ###& 15";& 8ntroducin+ and 0ustainin+ Characters in 2iterary -arrative / 0et of Conditions& Style !1 (1) 10;#!$& ###& 15"5& 0tructuralist /pproaches to Character in -arrative The 0tate of the /rt& Semiotica ;6(1#!) 1#!$& ###& 1550& 8ndividuals in -arrative @orlds /n Lntolo+ical Perspective& Poetics .oday 11 ($) "$:#;1&

###& 1556a& Chan+in+ 8ndividuals in -arrative 0cience, Philosophy, 2iterature& Semiotica 10; (1#!) 6#:1& ###& 1556(& Characters in 2iterary -arrative *epresentation and 0i+nification& Semiotica 10% (:#$) :;:#5!& ###& 155%a& Characters and their Gersions& 8n !iction 5pdatedA .heories of !ictionality: Narratolo#y: and Poetics , edited (y Calin3/ndrei Mihailescu and @alid Hamarneh& Toronto Toronto ,niversity Press& ###& 155%(& Tellin+ Lur 0tory Ln >@e> 2iterary -arratives& "an#ua#e and "iterature 6 (!) 116#::& ###& !000& Tellin+ in the Plural From Rrammar to 8deolo+y& Poetics Today !1 (:) 651#%1"& ###& !00:& Co+nitive 0cience, the Thin.in+ Mind, and 2iterary -arrative& 3!6%3 8n Narrative .heory and the Co#nitive Sciences, edited (y 4avid Herman& 0tanford C/ C028 Pu(lications& McCrone, Eohn& 1555& 8oin# 0nsideA A .our /ound a Sin#le -oment of Consciousness. 2ondon Fa(er& McHale, )rian& 15;"& Free 8ndirect 4iscourse / 0urvey of *ecent /ccounts& PT2 : !$5#";& ###& 15"1& 8slands in the 0tream of Consciousness 4orrit Cohn>s .ransparent -inds& Poetics .oday ! (!) 1":#51& ###& 15":& ,nspea.a(le 0entences, ,nnatural /cts 2in+uistics and Poetics *evisited& Poetics .oday $ (1) 1;#$6& McDeon, Michael& 15";& .he Cri#ins of the (n#lish Novel: 'GG to )%G& )altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins ,niversity Press& ###, ed& !000& .heory of the NovelA A ;istorical Approach& )altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins ,niversity Press&

Morris, Michael @&, 4aniel /mes, and Bric Dno?les& 1555& /ttri(ution Theory& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& -a+el, Thomas& 15;$& @hat 8s 8t 2i.e to )e a )atI The Philosophical *evie? ": ($) $:6#60& -e(el, )ernhard& 1555& Frame3)ased 0ystems& 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& -eumann, /nne @aldron& 15"%& CharacteriAation and Comment in Pride and Pre1udice Free 8ndirect 4iscourse and >4ou(le Goiced> Ger(s of 0pea.in+, Thin.in+, and Feelin+& Style !0 (:) :%$#5$& Latley, Deith& 1555& Bmotions& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Lne+a, 0usana, and EosO /n+el Rarcia 2anda, eds& 155%& Narratolo#yA An 0ntroduction& 2ondon 2on+man& L>-eill, Patric.& 155$& .he !ictions of DiscourseA /eadin# Narrative .heory& Toronto ,niversity of Toronto Press& L>0hau+hnessy, )rian& 155;& Tryin+ (as the Mental >Pineal Rland>)& 8n .he Philosophy of Action, edited (y /lfred *& Mele& L9ford L9ford ,niversity Press& Par.in, /lan& !000& (ssential Co#nitive Psycholo#y& Hove Psycholo+y Press& Pascal, *oy& 15;;& .he Dual +oiceA !ree 0ndirect Speech and 0ts !unctionin# in the Nineteenth Century (uropean Novel & Manchester Manchester ,niversity Press& 3!6;3 Pavel, Thomas R& 15"%& !ictional Worlds& Cam(rid+e Harvard ,niversity Press&

Perry, Mena.hem& 15;5& 2iterary 4ynamics Ho? the Lrder of a Te9t Creates its Meanin+s& Poetics .oday 1 (1#!) :6#%$, :11#%1& Pin.er, 0teven& 155$& .he "an#ua#e 0nstinctA .he Ne, Science of "an#ua#e and -ind& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& ###& 155;& ;o, the -ind Wor9s& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& Poulet, Reor+es& 1566& The Circle and the Centre *eality and -adame 6ovary& Western /evie, 15 !$6#%0& ###& 15%5& Phenomenolo+y of *eadin+& Ne, "iterary ;istory 1 (1) 6:#%"& Priest, 0tephen& 1551& .heories of the -ind& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& Prince, Rerald& 15"!& Narratolo#yA .he !orm and !unctionin# of Narrative& )erlin Mouton& ###& 15";& A Dictionary of Narratolo#y& 2ondon 0colar& ###& 155%& -arratolo+y, -arratolo+ical Criticism, and Render& 8n !iction ,pdated Theories of Fictionality, -arratolo+y, and Poetics, edited (y Calin/ndrei Mihailescu and @alid Hamarneh& Toronto Toronto ,niversity Press& Propp, Gladimir& 15%"& Morpholo+y of the Fol.tale& Translated (y 2aurence 0cott& /ustin ,niversity of Te9as Press& *amireA, Euan 4& 155!& The Functional 4ifferentiation of 0ocial and Private 0peech / 4ialo+ic /pproach& 8n Private 0peech From 0ocial 8nteraction to Self$/e#ulation, edited (y *afael 4iaA and 2aura )er.& Hove and 2ondon Brl(aum& *eed, Bd?ard 0& 155%& Bncounterin+ the @orld To?ards an Bcolo+ical Psycholo+y& L9ford L9ford ,niversity Press& *icoeur, Paul& 15"$& .ime and Narrative& Gol& 1& Translated (y Dathleen Mc2au+hlin and 4avid Pellauer& Chica+o ,niversity of Chica+o Press& *immon3Denan, 0hlomith& 15":& Narrative !ictionA Contemporary Poetics& 2ondon *outled+e&

*o(ertson, Fiona& 155$& "e#itimate ;istoriesA Scott: 8othic: and the Authorities of !iction& L9ford Clarendon& *on, Moshe& 15"1& Free 8ndirect 4iscourse, Mimetic 2an+ua+e Rames and the 0u(Kect of Fiction& Poetics .oday ! (!) 1;#:5& *onen, *uth& 15""& Completin+ the 8ncompleteness of Fictional Bntities& Poetics .oday 5 (:) $5;#61$& ###& 155$& Possible Worlds in "iterary .heory& Cam(rid+e Cam(rid+e ,niversity Press& *osenthal, 4avid M& 1555& 8ntrospection& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#$ 3!6"3 nitive Sciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& *ussell, )ertrand& 15$0& An (n*uiry into -eanin# and .ruth& 2ondon /llen and ,n?in& *yan, Marie32aure& 15"6& The Modal 0tructure of -arrative ,niverses& Poetics .oday % ($) ;1;#66& ###& 15"%& Bm(edded -arratives and Tella(ility& Style !0 :15#$0& ###& 1551. Possible Worlds: Artificial 0ntelli#ence: and Narrative .heory& )loomin+ton 8ndiana ,niversity Press& ###& 155;& Postmodernism and the 4octrine of Panfictionality& Narrative 6 (!) 1%6#";& *yle, Ril(ert& 15%:& .he Concept of -ind& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pere+rine& 0chan., *o+er C&, and *o(ert P& /(elson& 15;;& Scripts: Plans: 8oals: and 5nderstandin#A An 0n*uiry into ;uman Fno,led#e Structures & Hillsdale -E Brl(aum& 0earle, Eohn *& 155!& The *ediscovery of the Mind& Cam(rid+e M8T Press&

0eifert, Colleen M& 1555& 0ituated Co+nition and 2earnin+& 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co+nitive 0ciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& 0hort, Michael, Blena 0emino, and Eonathan Culpeper& 155%& ,sin+ a Corpus for 0tylistics *esearch 0peech and Thou+ht Presentation& 8n 5sin# Corpora in "an#ua#e /esearch, edited (y Eenny Thomas and Michael 0hort& 2ondon 2on+man& 0.inner, )& F& 15%$& )ehaviorism at Fifty& 8n 6ehaviorism and Phenomenolo#yA Contrastin# 6ases for -odern Psycholo#y , edited (y T& @& @ann& Chica+o ,niversity of Chica+o Press& 0mith, )rian Cant?ell& 1555& 0ituatedness7Bm(eddedness& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& 0parshott, F& B& 15%;& Truth in Fiction& 7ournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism !% :#;& 0pender, 4ale& 15"%& -others of the NovelA GG 8ood Women Writers 6efore 7ane Austen& 2ondon Pandora& 0per(er, 4an, and 2a?rence Hirschfeld& 1555& Culture, Co+nition, and Bvolution& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& 3!653 0tanAel, FranA& 15"$& A .heory of Narrative& Translated (y Charlotte Roedsche& Cam(rid+e Cam(rid+e ,niversity Press& 0terelny, Dim& 1555& 2an+ua+e of Thou+ht& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& 0tern(er+, Meir& 15"!& Proteus in Wuotation32and Mimesis and the Forms of *eported 4iscourse& Poetics .oday : (!) 10;#6%& ###& !001& Ho? -arrativity Ma.es a 4ifference& Narrative 5 (!) 116#!!&

0tra?son, Ralen& 155;& The 0elf& 7ournal of Consciousness Studies& $ (6#%) $06#!"& 0tra?son, P& F& 1565& 0ndividualsA An (ssay in Descriptive -etaphysics& 2ondon Methuen& Todorov, TAvetan& 15;;& Poetics of Prose& 8thaca -J Cornell ,niversity Press& Trevarthen, Col?yn& 1555& 8ntersu(Kectivity& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co+nitive 0ciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Turner, Mar.& 1551& *eadin+ Minds The 0tudy of Bn+lish in the /+e of Co+nitive 0cience& Princeton Princeton ,niversity Press& ###& 155%& The 2iterary Mind& L9ford L9ford ,niversity Press& van 4iK., Teun /& 15;%& Philosophy of /ction and Theory of -arrative& Poetics 6 !";#::"& van Rulic., *o(ert& 1555& 0elf3Dno?led+e& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& Golosinov, Galentin& 15;:& -ar2ism and the Philosophy of "an#ua#e& Translated (y 2adislav MateK.a and 8& *& Tituni.& 2ondon 0eminar& Gy+ots.y, 2ev& 15"%& .hou#ht and "an#ua#e& Translated (y /le9 DoAulin& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& @att, 8an& 156;& .he /ise of the Novel& 2ondon Ho+arth& @ein(er+, Henry H& 15"$& Centers of Consciousness *econsidered& Poetics .oday 6 ($) ;%;#;:& @erth, Paul& 1555& .e2t WorldsA /epresentin# Conceptual Space in Discourse& 2ondon 2on+man& @ertsch, Eames G& 1551& +oices of the -indA A Sociocultural Approach to -ediated Action& Cam(rid+e Harvard ,niversity Press&

###& 1555& Gy+ots.y, 2ev 0emenovich& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& 3!%03 @hite, Reoffrey& 1555& Bthnopsycholo+y& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& @hite, Hayden& 15;"& .ropics of DiscourseA (ssays in Cultural Criticism& )altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins ,niversity Press& ###& 15";& .he Content of the !ormA Narrative Discourse and ;istorical /epresentation& )altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins ,niversity Press& @hite, 0tephen 2& 1555& 0elf& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& @ilson, *o(ert /& 1555a& 8ndividualism& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil, Cam(rid+e M8T Press& ###& 1555(& Philosophy& 8n .he -0. (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited (y *o(ert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil, Cam(rid+e M8T Press& @ilson, *o(ert /&, and Fran. C& Deil& eds& 1555& The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co+nitive 0ciences& Cam(rid+e M8T Press& @itt+enstein, 2ud?i+& 156"& Philosophical 8nvesti+ations& L9ford )lac.?ell& ###& 15;$& Tractatus 2o+ico3Philosophicus& Translated (y 4& F& Pears and )& F& McRuinness& 2ondon *outled+e& 3!%13