POLICE POWER LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.

L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]

Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners forviolation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.

Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition againstimprisonment for debt.

The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but anoffense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

Del Rosario vs. Bengzon (December 21, 1989) Facts: Philippine Medical Association is the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines. They assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act 6675) and the implementation of Administrative Order No. 62.

The law specifically provides that All government health agencies shall use generic terminology or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and administering of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical, dental and veterinary, private practitioners shall write prescriptions using the generic name.

The petitioners main argument is the alleged unequal treatment of government practitioners and those on the private practice. It is because the former are required to use only generic terminology in the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the drug below the generic name. It is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation.

In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin Order No. 62 saying that the salesgirl and or druggist have the discretion to substitute the doctors pres cription. The court says that the salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their prices.

Issue: Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to theexercise of police power by the government.

Held: Petition Dismissed.

The court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements the constitutional mandate for the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and to make essential goods, health and other social services available toall the people at affordable cost.

The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists and veterinarians on one hand and those in the private practice in the other, is a misinterpretation of the law.

The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of all available products, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their corresponding process.

The penal sanction in violation of the law is indispensable because they are the teeth of the law. Without them, the law would be toothless.

The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health are constitutional.

The purpose of the Generics Act is to promote and require the use of generic drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing a requirement the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition and the NMAT was conducted and administered as scheduled.

The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges. Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila (20 SCRA 849) Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process: refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view; prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old; usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also); making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and cancellation of license for subsequent violation. The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

Dela Cruz v Paras G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983 Fernando, CJ: Facts: 1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Counc ils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. 3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. 4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs. 2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. 3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. 4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

Velasco vs. Villegas [G.R. No. L-24153 (120 SCRA), February 14, 1983] Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz BarbershopAssociation. This is an appeal from the lower court's(LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory relief. They are challenging the constitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They contend that it amounts to deprivation of properties and their means of livelihood without dueprocess of law.

The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massagingcustomers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."

Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional and such is just an exercise of the state's inherent power (police power).

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the petitioner's right to property and their means of livelihood.

Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC decision affirmed.

Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of Police Power.

The objectives of the Ordinance are:

(1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the business of massage clinics, and;

(2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from the construction of a separate room for massaging customers.

This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. And for that reas on, the petitioners rights were not violated and they are not deprived of the due process of law.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc. [234 SCRA 255]

(Municipal Corporation Tests of a Valid Ordinance)

Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino.

On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of a casino.

On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor.

The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.

Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.

Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, gambling and other prohibited games of chance.

Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

8 (Digests from the Access Ebook)Tano v. Socrates,G.R. No. 110249, Aug. 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 154Facts: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that certain ordinances, orders and resolutions passed by the province of Palawan and the city of Puerto Princesa relating to the banning of shipments of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa and the protection of marine coral dwelling, be declared as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprive them of their right todue process of law and of their only means of livelihood.The respondents defended the validity of the ordinances by arguing that their issuance was a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Issue: Whether the ordinances are unconstitutional. Ruling: No. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinances.The Supreme Court held that LGUs are directed by the LGC to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that [p]protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing another forms of destructive fishing x x x and such other activities which result inp o l l u t i o n , a c c e l e r a t i o n o f e u t r o p h i c a t i o n o f r i v e r s a n d l a k e s o r o f e c o l o g i c a l imbalance.Furthermore, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution. Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned.Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 100152 Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various speci al conditions which basically made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptions to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practice optometry within the city. Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply.

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO, JR., digested GR # 118127, April 12, 2005 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Regulation by Ordinance)

FACTS: Manila Ordinance No. 7738, prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, to include motels and inns, was enacted by herein petitioners contending that the said ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the State in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) assailed the ordinance as an invalid exercise of police power on the grounds that the Local Government Code grants the City Council only with the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, but not to prohibit them. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 of the City of Manila is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: Petition denied. The assailed ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond the regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is an exercise of police power that is violative of the private property rights of individuals.

White Light Corporation et. al vs City of Manila G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation Respondent: City of Manila

Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordin ance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions

warrant.Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO, digested GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional Law Police Power, LOI, No Violation of Equal Protection Clause) FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power. Respondents denied the above allegations. ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity. Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, digested GR # L-59234, September 30, 1982 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Equal Protection)

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry. Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places. MIRASOL VS. DPWH, digested GR # 158793, June 8, 2006 (Constitutional Law Police Power) FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations. ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional. HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety. Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983) Property Rights Are Subject to the Exercise of Police Power. F: The petitioners were among 23 stevedoring and arrastre operators at the Mla South Harbor. Their licenses had expired but they were allowed to continue to operate on the strength of temporary permits. On May 4, 1976, the resp Phil Ports Authority decided to allow only one org. to operate the arrastre and stevedoring services. On April 28, 1980, based on the report and recommendation of an evaluation committee, the PPA awarded the exclusive contract for stevedoring services to the Ocean Terminal Services Inc (OTSI). The petitioners brought suit in the CFI to annul the contract for exclusive service. On motion, Ct issued a TRO enjoining PPA and OTSI from implementing the exclusive contract. Later, the ct lifted the TRO prompting the petitioners to file an action for certiorari with the SC contending that: (1) ex parte lifting of TRO constituted grave abuse of discretion; (2) the award would impair the petitioners'' contracts with foreign customers. HELD: (1) Considering that the previous grant of TRO in favor of pets. was made ex parte and w/o bond, notice and hearing of the lifting were not necessary, much less mandatory. (2) Stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and in the interest of the general welfare. A single contractor furnishing the stevedoring requirements of a port has in its favor the economy of scale and the maximum utilization of equipment and manpower. In return, effective supervision and control as well as collection and accounting of the govt share of revenues are rendered easier than where there are 23 contractors to oversee. As resp ct found from the evidence, the multiple contractor system has bred cut-throat competitions in the port . Understandably, most contractors had been unable to acquire sufficient modern facilities , observe labor standards, maintain efficiency, and pay PPA dues. The contention of pets. that due process was violated resulting in a confiscation of private property is likewise without merit. In the first place, the pets were operating merely on "hold over"permits. In the second place, the award of OTSI was the result of a evaluation of performance of existing contractors made by a special committee created by the PPA

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORING AND ARRASTRE INC., digested GR # 145742 July 14, 2010 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Stevedoring) FACTS: PPA AO No. 03-90 is an administrative order decision to bid out the cargo holding services in the ports around the country, which is within the province and discretion of the petitioner. Respondent with hold-over permits for the continuance of its stevedoring business, contends that the administrative order above violated the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract. ISSUE: Whether or not PPA AO No. 03-90 violated the non-impairment clause. HELD: Petition Granted. Stevedoring services are imbued with public interest and subject to the states police power. In the legitimate exercise of the police power, all contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs and interest of the general public as may be determined by the State. Note: Contract Clause cannot override Police Power doctrine. Chavez vs. Romulo G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

A mere license is always revocable FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property. ISSUE:

Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD: Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision. In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic p ronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. xxx

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlat ive power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007 FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain: WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different transport modes; Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing Agency for the project. As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA had recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilitieswhich plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project). The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project. Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8 On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila. Chairman Fernando, was po ised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation. This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its b us terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.

The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manilas basic services including those of transport and traffic management. ISSUE: W/N EO is unconstitutional HELD: YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor. It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924. SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . . The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to prom ote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications which has the power to establish and a dminister a transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar Administrative regulation; void. Executive Order No. 566, which grants the CHED the power to regulate review center, is unconstitutional as it expands Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.

EMINENT DOMAIN CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for theexpropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the privatecemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal. Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise ofeminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities

Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July 20, 1998) G.R. No. 127820 292 SCRA 676 July 20, 1998 Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing pro ject. Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the co mplaint Issue: Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body. Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former. Saguitan v . City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137, GR 135087 (2000) Facts: On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceeding over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario Streets in Mandaluyong City for the expansion of Mandaluyong Medical Center. On January 20, 1995, Mayor Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the said motion and

subsequently, it allowed the expropriation of the subject property. Aggrieved by the said order, the heirs of Suguitan asserted that the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160, and not by means of a mere resolution.

Issue: WON the city of Mandaluyong has validly exercised its power of expropriation.

Held: NEGATIVE

Ratio: The Court ruled that the basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is Section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that: "A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong sought to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Therefore, while the Court remains conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, it cannot grant judicial sanction to a local government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.

REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY [395 SCRA 494; GR NO. 147511; 20 JAN 2003]

Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use." In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homelesscitizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

APO Fruits Corp. et al vs Court of Appeals, Land Bank of the Philippines Property Eminent Domain Determination of Just Compensation AFC and Hijo Plantation Inc. were owners of 5 parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9M for AFCs land and P164.40 for HPIs land. AFC, HPI and DAR cannot agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14 February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the government deposited P26M into AFCs account and P45M into HPIs account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP. Due to DARABs failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from assessors, that the purchase price should be higher than what was offered by DAR; that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38B. DAR appealed to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not there was just compensation. HELD: No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB, an agency of t he DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. The RTCs finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. DAR was g iven chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such evidence. To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive. The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of hi s land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken sha ll be real, substantial, full, and ample. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and in the abundant jurisprude nce that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation. Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides: SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows: Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFCs and HPIs lands have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them up. The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stones throw from the residential and/or in dustrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore. The market value of the property (plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size, shape and location.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested 26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation) FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them. ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs Heirs of Franco Pastor Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Expropriation BP 129 In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case. HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . . The present action involves t he exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation. What are the two phases of expropriation cases? The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the act ion and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of con demnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . . It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matte r that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI [58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]

Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just c ompensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract. City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino Police Power Not Validly Exercised Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]

Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating amongothers that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, Napocor''s lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmissin lines. RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of ts ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just equiivalent has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just cmpensation.

Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767235-case-digest-napocor-gutierrez-193/#ixzz2qqrUsppz

United States v. Causby Citation. 22 Ill.328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946) Brief Fact Summary. Respondents claim that their property was taken, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by the regular army and navy aircraft flights over their house and chicken farm. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The airspace is a public highway, but if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control over the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.

Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents property, and the gli de path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United States four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights. Respondents chic ken farm production had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the val ue of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted. Issue. Has the Respondents property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?

Held. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement and whether the easement was permanent or temporary. The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the sky above the land. However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the air space. The court noted that common sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable. However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the present case. The United States had conceded in oral argument that if flights over the Respondents property rendered it uninhabitable then there would be a taking compensable un der the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property taken is the owners loss, not the takers gain. The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences. The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court does not set the precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. The Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and whether it is a temporary or permanent easement. Dissent. The dissent would reverse the decision of the Court of Claims and hold that there has been no taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This is because of the modern nature of the airplane, and the desire to avoid confusion.

Philippine Press Institute vs. comelec Phil. Press Institute, Inc. vs. Comelec 244 scra 272 Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, nonprofit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it cameraready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid. Held: WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs. Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. 2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.

Filstream International Incorporated v. CA, 284 SCRA 716, Jan. 23, 1998 [Francisco]

The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.

That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them.

Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing.

Lagcao vs. Labra FACTS:In 1965 petitioners purchased a lot (1029) on installment basis from the province of Cebu. Consequently, the province through the City of Cebu tried to annul the sale which prompted the petitioner to file civil action in the court of first instance.On July 9, 1986, the court of first instance ruled that the province execute a deed of salein favor of the petitioner. On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decisionof the trial court wherein this ruling was affirmed by the CA.After the title was acquired, petitioners discovered that the property was occupied bysquatters which prompted them to institute ejectment proceedings. In this regard, TheMunicipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision onApril 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed theMTCC's decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolitionThe writ of execution and order of demolition was suspended for 120 days when CebuCity Alvin Garcia wrote a request for the deferment of the ejection order on the groundthat the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. During the effect of the suspension order, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City passed a resolution andan Ordinance on Feb 22, 1999 and June 30, 1999 respectively, which identified lot 1029as part of the socialized housing in pursuant of RA 7279. On July 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings on petitioners property.Issue:Whether or not Cebu City Ordinance No. 1843 contravenes the Constitution and other applicable lawsRuling:The enactment of Ordinance 1843 contravenes the Constitution and other applicablelaws.First, Ordinance 1843 contravenes the constitution because condemnationof private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the randomexpropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for theconvenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the publicSecond, the ordinance is violative of the petitioners right to due process since petitionershad already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality,with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trialcourt to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for arelocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site duringthe suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for theexpropriation of petitioners' lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple.Third, RA 7160 itself explicitly states that local appropriation of property must complywith the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

Relatively, RA 7279 mandatesthat local expropriation of property must comply on the order of the priorities on theexpropriation of property under section 10 for which private property ranks last in theorder of priorities provided under section 9.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, digested GR # 152230 August 9, 2005 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Valid and Definite Offer) FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision of declaring respondent municipality (now city) as having the rig ht to expropriate petitioners property for the construction of an access road. Petitioner argues that there was no valid and defin ite offer made before a complaint for eminent domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code). Respondent contends that a letter to purchase was offered to the previous owners and the same was not accepted. ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to expropriate. HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory requirement to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action. Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts. HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.

Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987) F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners'' lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224. HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose

objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. The provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on judicial prerogatives.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. CA and TITO B. DATO FACTS: In January 1, 1960 - private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov. of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.October 12, 1972 - Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr.Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanentappointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which was renewed annually. January 1, 1974 Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter'srepresentation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was notfavorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibilityfor the office he was appointed to. His appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was extended to him.March 16, 1976 Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard forallegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil ServiceCommission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary topermanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be maderetroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted privaterespondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla.Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Gov. for reinstatement and backwages.His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action before the RTC.RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent to five years. Province of Camarines Sur appealed the decisionto the CA.CA: Affirmed RTCs decision. Hence the present petition. ISSUE: W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16,1976.Petitioners contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the employment status of private respondent fromtemporary to permanent, which the CSC approved as only temporary pending validation of the results of private respondent'sexamination for supervising security guard, private respondent's appointment in effect remained temporary. Hence, his subsequentqualification for civil service eligibility did not ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent. SC Held: Agrees with Petitioners contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to his claim for backwagesfor the entire period of his suspension. Ratio: At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriateexamination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and

without afixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervisingsecurity guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. What is required is a newappointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment these are two distinct acts of theappointing authority The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to theappointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to makethe appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. CSC should have endedits participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of the latterwho lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toesof the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter. MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [252 SCRA 412; G.R. NO. 106440, 29 JAN. 1996]

Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose.

Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.

Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.

Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, 349 SCRA 240, Jan. 16, 2001, 2 Compensation)

nd

Div. [De Leon] (Public Use Requirement; Payment of Just

In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term "necessary", in this connection, does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better served if respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.

The Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.

In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 46 Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the delay to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO FACTS:

On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo for the purpose of the public use of Socialized housing.

On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to NHAs power to expropriate their properties. Thus an order of execution has been granted and the court already appointed commissioners to determine the amount for just compensation

On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners submitted their report wherein they recommended that the just compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter wherein a partial judgment has been rendered.

After the report on the just compensation has completed, both parties filed an MR on the amount for the just compensation stating that it has no adequate basis and support. Both MR was denied by the court.

While the judgment has been rendered in the RTC and an entry of judgment and the motion for execution has been issued, NHA filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition on the ground that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal the same.

ISSUE 1)

Wherefore, the Petitioner NHA filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED AND COERCED BY THE COURTS TO EXERCISE OR CONTINUE

WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN; 2) WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE IN AN

EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN WILL NOT SERVE PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE

3)

WHETHER OR NOT JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IF ESTOPPEL OR LACHES APPLIES TO

GOVERNMENT; HELD: The petition was denied and the judgment rendered by the lower court was affirmed.

RATIO: On the first issue, the court held that, yes the state can be compelled and coerced by the court to continue exercise its

inherent power of eminent domain, since the NHA does not exercise its right to appeal in the expropriation proceedings before the court has rendered the case final and executory. In the early case of City of Manila v. Ruymann and Metropolitan Water District v. De Los Angeles, an expropriation proceeding was explained. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition

will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the

propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objectio n to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the just compensation

for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal there from. On the second issue, the court held that a socialized housing is always for the public used and that the public purpose of the

socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just compensation that the court has fixed. On the third issue, the court ruled that in this case the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied to the NHA, although it is

public in character, it is only public in character since it is government -owned, having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment. De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980) F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against

the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner. HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrayr and should not receive judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people.

Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990) F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando ReinDel Pan streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case was remanded to the lower court. No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. The lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal. RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent legislative fiat

ESLABAN VS. ONORIO [360 SCRA 230; G.R. NO. 146062; 28 JUN 2001]

Facts: Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the National IrrigationAdministration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project managerof NIA. The parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area that has been taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused. Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been used for the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.

Held: The CA is correct in affirming the decision of the RTC but modifications shall be made regarding the value of the just compensation. The following are the points to be considered in arriving in this decision. First, Rule 7 par 5 of the Rule of Civil Procedure provides that thecertification against forum shopping should only be executed by the plaintiff or the principal. The petition for review was filed by Mr. Eslaban jr. while the verification or certification were signed by Mr. Cesar Gonzales, an administrator of the agency. Neither of the two has the authority to sign such certificate for they are not the plaintiff or principal. Such case is a sufficient ground for dismissing this petition. Second, PD NO. 1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in favor of the government the easement of a public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined. In the case at bar, the irrigation canal was constructed on Oct 1981 after the property had been registered in May of 1976. In this case, prior expropriation proceedings must be filed and just compensation shall be paid to the owner before the land could be taken for public use. Third, In this case, just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be paid but the reasonable time for the Government to pay the owner. The CA erred in this point by stating that the market value (just compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the complaint in 1991.The determination of such value should be from the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981. Lastly, the petitioner cannot argue that the Affidavit of waiver of rights and fees executed by the respondent pertains to the payment of the value of the land therefore exempting NIA to pay the value of the land taken. Such waiver pertains only to the crops and improvements that were damage due to the construction of the right-of-way not the value of the land. Wherefore, decision of CA affirmed with modification regarding the just compensation in the amount of P16, 047.61 per hectare. EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and current market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. YUNITA TUAZON, ROSAURO TUAZON AND MARIA TERESA TUAZON (G.R. NO. 193023, 22 JUNE 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECT: DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION. (BRIEF TITLE: NAPOCOR VS. TUAZON)

NAPOCORS TRANSMISSION LINE TRAVERSED ON RESPONDENTS PROPERTY. RESPONDENTS DEMANDS THAT THEY BE PAID FULL VALUE OF THEIR LAND AS JUST COMPENSATION. NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT IT SHALL ONLY PAY EASEMENT FEE PURSUANT TO SECTION 3-A(B) ITS CHARTER, R.A. 6395, WHICH PRESCRIBES A FORMULA FOR EASEMENT FEE. IS NAPOCOR CORRECT? NO. THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. THE FORMULA PROVIDED IN NAPOCORS CHARTER IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT. IT IS ONLY A GUIDE. NAPOCORs protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez, heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines, has no merit. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts. categorically held: Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.) The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.
[3][35] [1][33]

In National Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui, et al.,

[2][34]

we

This judicial function has constitutional raison dtre; Article III of

[4][36]

the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al., matter: The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this

SUBJECT: NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT RESPONDENTS MAY BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO SUCH VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BECAUSE THEY DID NOT OPPOSE THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSMISSION LINE ON THEIR PROPERTY. IS NAPOCORS CONTENTION CORRECT? NO. HIS PRESUMED WAIVER IS A BAR TO HIS ACTION TO DISPOSSESS THE COMPANY, HE IS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR THE VALUE OF THE LAND, OR FOR INJURIES DONE HIM. That the respondents predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition, NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim.
[5][38]

This insinuation has no legal basis. Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the
[6][39]

respondents right to just compensation. In Rafael C. de Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,

we ruled:

The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation. (Goodin v. Cin. And Whitewater Canal Co.,18 Ohio St., 169.)

One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the company s taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done hi m by the construction or operation of the road. (St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35La.Ann., 924.) CITY OF CEBU V. SPS. DEDAMO FACTS: The City of Cebu expropriated the parcel of land owned by the Sps. Dedamo. The parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case. Pursuant to the Agreement, the trial court appointed 3 Commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. The 3 Commissioners rendered an assessment for the lot in dispute and fixed it at P 12, 824.10 per sq. m. The assessment was approved as just compensation thereof by the trial court. As a result, the City of Cebu elevated the case to the SC and raised the issue that just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings and not at the time the property was actually taken.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to attack or question the report of the Commissioners on which the decision was based.

HELD: NO. By a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by the petitioner and the respondents, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The AGREEMENT is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with (Art. 1159 , CC). Furthermore, Art. 1315 of the same Code provides that contracts are perfected by mere consent. In the case at bar, the petitioner was estopped from attacking the report on which the decision was based due to consenting the commissioners report during the hearing. Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform Equal Protection These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a

comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON, digested

GR # 166429, December 19, 2005 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation) FACTS: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified. Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court). However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution). ISSUE: WON expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property. HELD: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law (RA No. 8974). being in a law school. "Dura Lex Sed Lex" - The law may be harsh but it is the law; the prolific group of students from CPC College of Law :-)

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of Zamboanga 22 SCRA 1334

Facts

Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga was the provincial capital of Zamboanga Province. By virtue of Commonwealth Act 39, section 50 providing that the buildings and other properties that the Province will abandon in view of its conversion as Zamboanga City shall be paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General, the said properties consisting of 50 lots were identified and the price were fixed thereof. An allotment for its payment was authorized by the BIR Commissioner. In June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved and it amended section 50 of the Commonwealth Act 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the Province of Zamboanga and located in the City of Zamboanga are transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction contending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional as it deprives the Province of its properties without just compensation and due process. Issue Whether or not RA 3039 is unconstitutional? Held

The court held that to resolve the issue it is important to identify the nature of the properties in dispute. The properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by the province in its governmental capacity. Those that are not devoted for public use remain as patrimonial property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as the properties that are devoted for public use or owned by the province in its governmental capacity and thus must retain its public purpose. Hence these governmental properties need not be paid by the City of Zamboanga.

With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039 cannot be applied in order to deprive the province of its own patrimonial properties that are not devoted for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall pay just compensation to the Province of Zamboanga for these patrimonial properties.

TAXATION Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte [GR 27588, 31 December 1927] Post under case digests, Taxation at Tuesday, March 20, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is the owner of a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On the south side is a part of the Church yard, the convent and an adjacent lost used for a vegetable garden in which there is a stable and a well for the use of the convent. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the Church. On the north side is an old cemetery with its two walls still standing, and a portion where formerly stood a tower. The provincial board assessed land tax on lots comprising the north and south side, which the church paid under protest. It filed suit to recover the amount.

Issue: Whether the lots are covered by the Churchs tax exemption.

Held: The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of land tax refers to the home of the priest who presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. The exemption includes not only the land actually occupied by the Church but also the adjacent ground destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. A vegetable garden, thus, which belongs to a convent, where its use is limited to the necessity of the priest, comes under the exemption. Further, land used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities, which constitutes an incidental use in religious functions, likewise comes within the exemption. It cannot be taxed according to its former use, i.e. a cemetery. LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965]

Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.

Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos. The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.

PROVINCE OF ABRA vs. HONORABLE HAROLD M. HERNANDO G.R. No. L-49336. August 31, 1981. FACTS: The Provincial Assessor of Abra levied a tax assessment on the properties of respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. An action for declaratory relief by private respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being exempted from a real estate tax followed by a summary judgment granting such exemption, without even hearing the side of petitioner. In the rather vigorous language of the Acting Provincial Fiscal, as counsel for petitioner, respondent Judge "virtually ignored the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; . . . wantonly violated the rights of petitioner to due process, by giving due course to the petition of private respondent for declaratory relief, and thereafter without allowing petitioner to answer and without any hearing, adjudged the case; all in total disregard of basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due process in the constitution, thereby indicating a failure to grasp and understand the law, which goes into the competence of the Honorable Presiding Judge." The latter filed a petition for declaratory relief on the ground that it is exempted from payment of real estate taxes, its properties being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes as sources of support for the bishop, the parish priest and his helpers. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. After conducting a summary hearing, respondent Judge granted the exemption without hearing the side of petitioner. Hence, this present petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging denial of procedural due process. ISSUE: Whether the present requirement of actual exclusive and direct use of property for charitable and religious purposes is material. HELD: Under Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, building, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The present Constitution (Article VIII, Section 17, paragraph 3) added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly" used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Petitioner Province of Abra is therefore fully

justified in invoking the protection of procedural due process. If there is any case where proof is necessary to demonstrate that there is compliance with the constitutional provision that allows an exemption, this is it. Instead, respondent Judge accepted at its face the allegation of private respondent. All that was alleged in the petition for declaratory relief filed by private respondents, after mentioning certain parcels of land owned by it, are that they are used "actually, directly and exclusively" as sources of support of the parish priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop. In the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of petitioner Province of Abra, the objection was based primarily on the lack of jurisdiction, as the validity of a tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause of action, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not proper, as there had been breach or violation of the right of government to assess and collect taxes on such property. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by the constitutional command of procedural due process. ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS AQUINO JUNE 15 1988 PARAS, J. FACTS:Abra Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higherlearning duly incorporated with the SEC filed a complaint to annul and declarevoid the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building locatedat Bangued , Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties. PaternoMillare filed through counsel a motion to dismiss the complaint. The provincialfiscal filed a memorandum for the government wherein they opined hat based onthe evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the schoolbuilding and the school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra ValleyCollege are exempted from payment of taxes. Nonetheless, the trial courtdisagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of the said schoolfor residential purpose. He thus ruled for the government and rendered theassailed decision. ISSUE:Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively foreducational purposes? HELD:NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and nonrestrictive interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for educationalpurposes as provided for in the Article VI, Section 22, Paragraph 3 of the 1935Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made thatexemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessaryfor the accomplishment of the main purpose. Otherwise stated, the use of theschool building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, norby jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building inthe case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to themain or primary purpose educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to theNorthern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination beconsidered incidental to the purposes of education.Under the 1935 Constitution, the rial court correctly arrived at theconclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, should betaxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the director andhis family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being usedfor commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be return to the schoolinvolved. American Bible Society v. City of Manila [GR L-9637, 30 April 1957] Facts: In the course of its ministry, American Bible SocietysPhilippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/orgospel portions thereof (since 1898, but except during the Japaneseoccupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same intoseveral Philippine dialects. On 29 May 1953, the acting CityTreasurer of the City of Manila informed the Society that it wasconducting the business of general merchandise since November1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayors permit andmunicipal license, in violation of Ordinance 3000, as amended, andOrdinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the Society tosecure, within 3 days, the corresponding permit and license fees,together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarterof 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45.On 24 October 1953, the Society paid to the City Treasurer underprotest the said permit and license fees, giving at the same timenotice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court toquestion the legality of the ordinances under which the said feeswere being collected, which was done on the same date

by filing thecomplaint that gave rise to this action. After hearing, the lower courtdismissed the complaint for lack of merit. the Society appealed tothe Court of Appeals, which in turn certified the case to the SupremeCourt for the reason that the errors assigned involved only questionsof law. Issue: Whether the Society is required to secure municipal permit toallow it to sell and distribute bibles and religious literature, and topay taxes from the sales thereof. Held: No. Section 27 (e) of Commonwealth Act 466 (NIRC) exemptscorporations or associations organized and operated exclusively forreligious, charitable, or educational purposes, Provided however,That the income of whatever kind and character from any of itsproperties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable tothe tax imposed under the Code. Herein, the act of distributing andselling bibles, etc. is purely religious and cannot be made liable fortaxes or fees therein. Further, Ordinance 2529, as amended, cannotbe applied to the Society, for in doing so it would impair its freeexercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship aswell as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. The fact thatthe price of the bibles and other religious pamphlets are little higherthan the actual cost of the same does not necessarily mean that it isalready engaged in the business or occupation of selling said merchandise for profit. Furthermore, Ordinance 3000 of the City of Manila is of general application and it does not contain anyprovisions whatsoever prescribing religious censorship norrestraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religiousprofession. The ordinance is not applicable to the Society, as itsbusiness, trade or occupation is not particularly mentioned in Section3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permit isrequired therefor under existing laws and ordinances for the propersupervision and enforcement of their provisions governing thesanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health of theemployees engaged in the business of the Society. PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]

Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes amunicipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose amunicipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize what amounts to double taxation. Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion may tax all, or select classes ofoccupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the sameoccupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.