Prince

The Prince
by Nicolo Machiavelli
Written c. 1505, published 1515 Translated by W. K. Marriott
The Original Version o this Te!t "as #endered into $TM% by &on #oland o the Constitution Society http://constitution.org Converted to PDF by Danny Stone as a Community Service to the Constitution Society
The Prince
Nicolo Machiavelli
CHAPTER I
How Many Kinds Of Principalities There Are And !y "hat Means They Are Ac#$ired
all powers that have held and hold r$le over 'en have (een and are either rep$(lics or principalities) Principalities are either hereditary in which the fa'ily has (een lon* esta(lished+ or they are new) The new are either entirely new as was Milan to ,rancesco &for-a or they are as it were 'e'(ers anne.ed to the hereditary state of the prince who has ac#$ired the' as was the /in*do' of Naples to that of the Kin* of &pain) &$ch do'inions th$s ac#$ired are either acc$sto'ed to live $nder a prince or to live in freedo'+ and are ac#$ired either (y the ar's of the prince hi'self or of others or else (y fort$ne or (y a(ility)
%% &TATE&
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CHAPTER II
Concernin* Hereditary Principalities
"I%% leave o$t all disc$ssion on rep$(lics inas'$ch as in another place I have written of the' at len*th 1 and will address 'yself only to principalities) In doin* so I will /eep to the order indicated a(ove and disc$ss how s$ch principalities are to (e r$led and preserved) I say at once there are fewer diffic$lties in holdin* hereditary states and those lon* acc$sto'ed to the fa'ily of their prince than new ones+ for it is s$fficient only not to trans*ress the c$sto's of his ancestors and to deal pr$dently with circ$'stances as they arise for a prince of avera*e powers to 'aintain hi'self in his state $nless he (e deprived of it (y so'e e.traordinary and e.cessive force+ and if he sho$ld (e so deprived of it whenever anythin* sinister happens to the $s$rper he will re*ain it) "e have in Italy for e.a'ple the 1$/e of ,errara who co$ld not have withstood the attac/s of the 2enetians in 345 nor those of Pope 6$li$s in 317 $nless he had (een lon* esta(lished in his do'inions) ,or the hereditary prince has less ca$se and less necessity to offend+ hence it happens that he will (e 'ore loved+ and $nless e.traordinary vices ca$se hi' to (e hated it is reasona(le to 1 1isco$rses)
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e.pect that his s$(9ects will (e nat$rally well disposed towards hi'+ and in the anti#$ity and d$ration of his r$le the 'e'ories and 'otives that 'a/e for chan*e are lost for one chan*e always leaves the toothin* for another)
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CHAPTER III
Concernin* Mi.ed Principalities
the diffic$lties occ$r in a new principality) And firstly if it (e not entirely new ($t is as it were a 'e'(er of a state which ta/en collectively 'ay (e called co'posite the chan*es arise chiefly fro' an inherent diffic$lty which there is in all new principalities+ for 'en chan*e their r$lers willin*ly hopin* to (etter the'selves and this hope ind$ces the' to ta/e $p ar's a*ainst hi' who r$les; wherein they are deceived (eca$se they afterwards find (y e.perience they have *one fro' (ad to worse) This follows also on another nat$ral and co''on necessity which always ca$ses a new prince to ($rden those who have s$('itted to hi' with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he '$st p$t $pon his new ac#$isition) In this way yo$ have ene'ies in all those who' yo$ have in9$red in sei-in* that principality and yo$ are not a(le to /eep those friends who p$t yo$ there (eca$se of yo$r not (ein* a(le to satisfy the' in the way they e.pected and yo$ cannot ta/e stron* 'eas$res a*ainst the' feelin* (o$nd to the') ,or altho$*h one 'ay (e very stron* in ar'ed forces yet in enterin* a province one has always need of the *oodwill of the natives) ,or these reasons %o$is <II Kin* of ,rance
:T
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#$ic/ly occ$pied Milan and as #$ic/ly lost it+ and to t$rn hi' o$t the first ti'e it only needed %odovico3s own forces+ (eca$se those who had opened the *ates to hi' findin* the'selves deceived in their hopes of f$t$re (enefit wo$ld not end$re the ill>treat'ent of the new prince) It is very tr$e that after ac#$irin* re(ellio$s provinces a second ti'e they are not so li*htly lost afterwards (eca$se the prince with little rel$ctance ta/es the opport$nity of the re(ellion to p$nish the delin#$ents to clear o$t the s$spects and to stren*then hi'self in the wea/est places) Th$s to ca$se ,rance to lose Milan the first ti'e it was eno$*h for the 1$/e %odovico to raise ins$rrections on the (orders+ ($t to ca$se hi' to lose it a second ti'e it was necessary to (rin* the whole world a*ainst hi' and that his ar'ies sho$ld (e defeated and driven o$t of Italy+ which followed fro' the ca$ses a(ove 'entioned) Nevertheless Milan was ta/en fro' ,rance (oth the first and the second ti'e) The *eneral reasons for the first have (een disc$ssed+ it re'ains to na'e those for the second and to see what reso$rces he had and what any one in his sit$ation wo$ld have had for 'aintainin* hi'self 'ore sec$rely in his ac#$isition than did the Kin* of ,rance) Now I say that those do'inions which when ac#$ired are added to an ancient state (y hi' who ac#$ires the' are either of the sa'e co$ntry and lan*$a*e or they are not) "hen they are it is
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easier to hold the' especially when they have not (een acc$sto'ed to self>*overn'ent+ and to hold the' sec$rely it is eno$*h to have destroyed the fa'ily of the prince who was r$lin* the'+ (eca$se the two peoples preservin* in other thin*s the old conditions and not (ein* $nli/e in c$sto's will live #$ietly to*ether as one has seen in !rittany !$r*$ndy @ascony and Nor'andy which have (een (o$nd to ,rance for so lon* a ti'e; and altho$*h there 'ay (e so'e difference in lan*$a*e nevertheless the c$sto's are ali/e and the people will easily (e a(le to *et on a'on*st the'selves) He who has anne.ed the' if he wishes to hold the' has only to (ear in 'ind two considerations; the one that the fa'ily of their for'er lord is e.tin*$ished+ the other that neither their laws nor their ta.es are altered so that in a very short ti'e they will (eco'e entirely one (ody with the old principality) !$t when states are ac#$ired in a co$ntry differin* in lan*$a*e c$sto's or laws there are diffic$lties and *ood fort$ne and *reat ener*y are needed to hold the' and one of the *reatest and 'ost real helps wo$ld (e that he who has ac#$ired the' sho$ld *o and reside there) This wo$ld 'a/e his position 'ore sec$re and d$ra(le as it has 'ade that of the T$r/ in @reece who notwithstandin* all the other 'eas$res ta/en (y hi' for holdin* that state if he had not settled there wo$ld not have (een a(le to /eep it) !eca$se if one is on the spot disorders are seen as
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they sprin* $p and one can #$ic/ly re'edy the'+ ($t if one is not at hand they heard of only when they are one can no lon*er re'edy the') !esides this the co$ntry is not pilla*ed (y yo$r officials+ the s$(9ects are satisfied (y pro'pt reco$rse to the prince+ th$s wishin* to (e *ood they have 'ore ca$se to love hi' and wishin* to (e otherwise to fear hi') He who wo$ld attac/ that state fro' the o$tside '$st have the $t'ost ca$tion+ as lon* as the prince resides there it can only (e wrested fro' hi' with the *reatest diffic$lty) The other and (etter co$rse is to send colonies to one or two places which 'ay (e as /eys to that state for it necessary either to do this or else to /eep there a *reat n$'(er of cavalry and infantry) A prince does not spend '$ch on colonies for with little or no e.pense he can send the' o$t and /eep the' there and he offends a 'inority only of the citi-ens fro' who' he ta/es lands and ho$ses to *ive the' to the new inha(itants+ and those who' he offends re'ainin* poor and scattered are never a(le to in9$re hi'+ whilst the rest (ein* $nin9$red are easily /ept #$iet and at the sa'e ti'e are an.io$s not to err for fear it sho$ld happen to the' as it has to those who have (een despoiled) In concl$sion I say that these colonies are not costly they are 'ore faithf$l they in9$re less and the in9$red as has (een said (ein* poor and scattered cannot h$rt) :pon this one has to re'ar/ that 'en o$*ht either to (e well treated or cr$shed (eca$se they can aven*e the'selves of
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li*hter in9$ries of 'ore serio$s ones they cannot+ therefore the in9$ry that is to (e done to a 'an o$*ht to (e of s$ch a /ind that one does not stand in fear of reven*e) !$t in 'aintainin* ar'ed 'en there in place of colonies one spends '$ch 'ore havin* to cons$'e on the *arrison all inco'e fro' the state so that the ac#$isition t$rns into a loss and 'any 'ore are e.asperated (eca$se the whole state is in9$red+ thro$*h the shiftin* of the *arrison $p and down all (eco'e ac#$ainted with hardship and all (eco'e hostile and they are ene'ies who whilst (eaten on their own *ro$nd are yet a(le to do h$rt) ,or every reason therefore s$ch *$ards are as $seless as a colony is $sef$l) A*ain the prince who holds a co$ntry differin* in the a(ove respects o$*ht to 'a/e hi'self the head and defender of his powerf$l nei*h(o$rs and to wea/en the 'ore powerf$l a'on*st the' ta/in* care that no forei*ner as powerf$l as hi'self shall (y any accident *et a footin* there+ for it will always happen that s$ch a one will (e introd$ced (y those who are discontented either thro$*h e.cess of a'(ition or thro$*h fear as one has seen already) The Ro'ans were (ro$*ht into @reece (y the Aetolians+ and in every other co$ntry where they o(tained a footin* they were (ro$*ht in (y the inha(itants) And the $s$al co$rse of affairs is that as soon as a powerf$l forei*ner enters a co$ntry all the s$(9ect states are drawn to hi' 'oved (y the hatred which they feel a*ainst
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the r$lin* power) &o that in respect to these s$(9ect states he has not to ta/e any tro$(le to *ain the' over to hi'self for the whole of the' #$ic/ly rally to the state which he has ac#$ired there) He has only to ta/e care that they do not *et hold of too '$ch power and too '$ch a$thority and then with his own forces and with their *oodwill he can easily /eep down the 'ore powerf$l of the' so as to re'ain entirely 'aster in the co$ntry) And he who does not properly 'ana*e this ($siness will soon lose what he has ac#$ired and whilst he does hold it he will have endless diffic$lties and tro$(les) The Ro'ans in the co$ntries which they anne.ed o(served closely these 'eas$res+ they sent colonies and 'aintained friendly relations with the 'inor powers witho$t increasin* their stren*th+ they /ept down the *reater and did not allow any stron* forei*n powers to *ain a$thority) @reece appears to 'e s$fficient for an e.a'ple) The Achaeans and Aetolians were /ept friendly (y the' the /in*do' of Macedonia was h$'(led Antioch$s was driven o$t+ yet the 'erits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never sec$red for the' per'ission to increase their power nor did the pers$asions of Philip ever ind$ce the Ro'ans to (e his friends witho$t first h$'(lin* hi' nor did the infl$ence of Antioch$s 'a/e the' a*ree that he sho$ld retain any lordship over the co$ntry) !eca$se the Ro'ans did in these instances what all pr$dent princes o$*ht to do who have to re*ard
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not only present tro$(les ($t also f$t$re ones for which they '$st prepare with every ener*y (eca$se when foreseen it is easy to re'edy the'+ ($t if yo$ wait $ntil they approach the 'edicine is no lon*er in ti'e (eca$se the 'alady has (eco'e inc$ra(le+ for it happens in this as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever that in the (e*innin* of the 'alady it is easy to c$re ($t diffic$lt to detect ($t in the co$rse of ti'e not havin* (een either detected or treated in the (e*innin* it (eco'es easy to detect ($t diffic$lt to c$re) Th$s it happens in affairs of state for when the evils that arise have (een foreseen Cwhich it is only *iven to a wise 'an to seeD they can (e #$ic/ly redressed ($t when thro$*h not havin* (een foreseen they have (een per'itted to *row in a way that every one can see the') there is no lon*er a re'edy) Therefore the Ro'ans foreseein* tro$(les dealt with the' at once and even to avoid a war wo$ld not let the' co'e to a head for they /new that war is not to (e avoided ($t is only p$t off to the advanta*e of others+ 'oreover they wished to fi*ht with Philip and Antioch$s in @reece so as not to have to do it in Italy+ they co$ld have avoided (oth ($t this they did not wish+ nor did that ever please the' which is for ever in the 'o$ths of the wise ones of o$r ti'e;E %et $s en9oy the (enefits of the ti'e E ($t rather the (enefits of their own valo$r and pr$dence for ti'e drives everythin* (efore it and is a(le to (rin* with it *ood as well as evil and evil as well as *ood)
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!$t let $s t$rn to ,rance and in#$ire whether she has done any of the thin*s 'entioned) I will spea/ of %o$is F<IIG Cand not of Charles F2IIIGD as the one whose cond$ct is the (etter to (e o(served he havin* held possession of Italy for the lon*est period+ and yo$ will see that he has done the opposite to those thin*s which o$*ht to (e done to retain a state co'posed of divers ele'ents) Kin* %o$is was (ro$*ht into Italy (y the a'(ition of the 2enetians who desired to o(tain half the state of %o'(ardy (y his intervention) I will not (la'e the co$rse ta/en (y the /in* (eca$se wishin* to *et a foothold in Italy and havin* no friends there E seein* rather that every door was sh$t to hi' owin* to the cond$ct of Charles E he was forced to accept those friendships which he co$ld *et and he wo$ld have s$cceeded very #$ic/ly in his desi*n if in other 'atters he had not 'ade so'e 'ista/es) The /in* however havin* ac#$ired %o'(ardy re*ained at once the a$thority which Charles had lost; @enoa yielded+ the ,lorentines (eca'e his friends+ the Mar#$ess of Mant$a the 1$/e of ,errara the !entivo*lio 'y lady of ,orli the %ords of ,aen-a of Pesaro of Ri'ini of Ca'erino of Pio'(ino the %$cchesi the Pisans the &ienese E every(ody 'ade advances to hi' to (eco'e his friend) Then co$ld the 2enetians reali-e the rashness of the co$rse ta/en (y the' which in order that they 'i*ht sec$re two towns in %o'(ardy had 'ade the /in* 'aster of two>thirds of Italy)
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%et any one now consider with what little diffic$lty the /in* co$ld have 'aintained his position in Italy had he o(served the r$les a(ove laid down and /ept all his friends sec$re and protected+ for altho$*h they were n$'ero$s they were (oth wea/ and ti'id so'e afraid of the Ch$rch so'e of the 2enetians and th$s they wo$ld always have (een forced to stand in with hi' and (y their 'eans he co$ld easily have 'ade hi'self sec$re a*ainst those who re'ained powerf$l) !$t he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary (y assistin* Pope Ale.ander to occ$py the Ro'a*na) It never occ$rred to hi' that (y this action he was wea/enin* hi'self deprivin* hi'self of friends and those who had thrown the'selves into his lap whilst he a**randi-ed the Ch$rch (y addin* '$ch te'poral power to the spirit$al th$s *ivin* it *reat a$thority) And havin* co''itted this pri'e error he was o(li*ed to follow it $p so '$ch so that to p$t an end to the a'(ition of Ale.ander and to prevent his (eco'in* the 'aster of T$scany he was hi'self forced to co'e into Italy) And as if it were not eno$*h to have a**randi-ed the Ch$rch and deprived hi'self friends he wishin* to have the /in*do' of Naples divides it with the Kin* of &pain and where he was the pri'e ar(iter of Italy he ta/es an associate so that the a'(itio$s of that co$ntry and the 'alcontents of his own sho$ld have where to shelter+ and whereas he co$ld have left in the
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/in*do' his own pensioner as /in* he drove hi' o$t to p$t one there who was a(le to drive hi' %o$is o$t in t$rn) The wish to ac#$ire is in tr$th very nat$ral and co''on and 'en always do so when they can and for this they will (e praised not (la'ed+ ($t when they cannot do so yet wish to do so (y any 'eans then there is folly and (la'e) Therefore if ,rance co$ld have attac/ed Naples with her own forces she o$*ht to have done so+ if she co$ld not then she o$*ht not to have divided it) And if the partition which she 'ade with the 2enetians in %o'(ardy was 9$stified (y the e.c$se that (y it she *ot a foothold in Italy this other partition 'erited (la'e for it had not the e.c$se of that necessity) Therefore %o$is 'ade these five errors; he destroyed the 'inor powers he increased the stren*th of one of the *reater powers in Italy he (ro$*ht in a forei*n power he did not settle in the co$ntry he did not send colonies) "hich errors if he had lived were not eno$*h to in9$re hi' had he not 'ade a si.th (y ta/in* away their do'inions fro' the 2enetians+ (eca$se had he not a**randi-ed the Ch$rch nor (ro$*ht &pain into Italy it wo$ld have (een very reasona(le and necessary to h$'(le the'+ ($t havin* first ta/en these steps he o$*ht never to have consented to their r$in for they (ein* powerf$l wo$ld always have /ept off others fro' desi*ns on %o'(ardy to which the 2enetians wo$ld never have consented e.cept to (eco'e 'asters the'selves there+ also
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(eca$se the others wo$ld not wish to ta/e %o'(ardy fro' ,rance in order to *ive it to the 2enetians and to r$n co$nter to (oth they wo$ld not have had the co$ra*e) And if any one sho$ld say; Kin* %o$is yielded the Ro'a*na to Ale.ander and the /in*do' to &pain to avoid war I answer for the reasons *iven a(ove that a (l$nder o$*ht never (e perpetrated to avoid war (eca$se it is not to (e avoided ($t is only deferred to yo$r disadvanta*e) And if another sho$ld alle*e the pled*e which the /in* had *iven to the Pope that he wo$ld assist hi' in the enterprise in e.chan*e for the dissol$tion of his 'arria*e and for the hat to Ro$en to that I reply what I shall write later on concernin* the faith of princes and how it o$*ht to (e /ept) Th$s Kin* %o$is lost %o'(ardy (y not havin* followed any of the conditions o(served (y those who have ta/en possession of co$ntries and wished to retain the') Nor is there any 'iracle in this ($t '$ch that is reasona(le and #$ite nat$ral) And on these 'atters I spo/e at Nantes with Ro$en when 2alentino 1 as Cesare !or*ia the son of Pope Ale.ander was $s$ally called occ$pied the Ro'a*na and on Cardinal Ro$en o(servin* to 'e that the Italians did not $nderstand war I replied to hi' that the ,rench did not $nderstand statecraft 'eanin* that otherwise they wo$ld not have allowed the Ch$rch to reach s$ch
1 &o called E in Italian E fro' the d$chy of 2alentinois conferred on hi' (y %o$is <II)
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*reatness) And in fact it has (een seen that the *reatness of the Ch$rch and of &pain in Italy has (een ca$sed (y ,rance and her r$in 'ay (e attri($ted to the') ,ro' this a *eneral r$le is drawn which never or rarely fails; that he who is the ca$se of another (eco'in* powerf$l is r$ined+ (eca$se that predo'inancy has (een (ro$*ht a(o$t either (y ast$teness or else (y force and (oth are distr$sted (y hi' who has (een raised to power)
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CHAPTER I2
"hy The Kin*do' Of 1ari$s Con#$ered !y Ale.ander 1id Not Re(el A*ainst The &$ccessors Of Ale.ander At His 1eath
the diffic$lties which 'en have had to hold a newly ac#$ired state so'e 'i*ht wonder how seein* that Ale.ander the @reat (eca'e the 'aster of Asia in a few years and died whilst it was yet scarcely settled Cwhence it 'i*ht appear reasona(le that the whole e'pire wo$ld have re(elledD nevertheless his s$ccessors 'aintained the'selves and had to 'eet no other diffic$lty than that which arose a'on* the'selves fro' their own a'(itions) I answer that the principalities of which one has record are fo$nd to (e *overned in two different ways; either (y a prince with a (ody of servants who assist hi' to *overn the /in*do' as 'inisters (y his favo$r and per'ission+ or (y a prince and (arons who hold that di*nity (y anti#$ity of (lood and not (y the *race of the prince) &$ch (arons have states and their own s$(9ects who reco*ni-e the' as lords and hold the' in nat$ral affection) Those states that are *overned (y a prince and his servants hold their prince in 'ore consideration (eca$se in all the co$ntry there is no one who is reco*ni-ed as s$perior to hi' and if they yield o(edience to another they do it as to a 'inister and
ON&I1ERIN@
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official and they do not (ear hi' any partic$lar affection) The e.a'ples of these two *overn'ents in o$r ti'e are the T$r/ and the Kin* of ,rance) The entire 'onarchy of the T$r/ is *overned (y one lord the others are his servants+ and dividin* his /in*do' into san9a/s he sends there different ad'inistrators and shifts and chan*es the' as he chooses) !$t the Kin* of ,rance is placed in the 'idst of an ancient (ody of lords ac/nowled*ed (y their own s$(9ects and (eloved (y the'+ they have their own prero*atives nor can the /in* ta/e these away e.cept at his peril) Therefore he who considers (oth of these states will reco*ni-e *reat diffic$lties in sei-in* the state of the T$r/ ($t once it is con#$ered *reat ease in holdin* it) The ca$ses of the diffic$lties in sei-in* the /in*do' of the T$r/ are that the $s$rper cannot (e called in (y the princes of the /in*do' nor can he hope to (e assisted in his desi*ns (y the revolt of those who' the lord has aro$nd hi') This arises fro' the reasons *iven a(ove+ for his 'inisters (ein* all slaves and (ond'en can only (e corr$pted with *reat diffic$lty and one can e.pect little advanta*e fro' the' when they have (een corr$pted as they cannot carry the people with the' for the reasons assi*ned) Hence he who attac/s the T$r/ '$st (ear in 'ind that he will find hi' $nited and he will have to rely 'ore on his own stren*th than on the revolt of others+ ($t if once the T$r/ has (een con#$ered and ro$ted in the field in s$ch a way
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that he cannot replace his ar'ies there is nothin* to fear ($t the fa'ily of the prince and this (ein* e.ter'inated there re'ains no one to fear the others havin* no credit with the people+ and as the con#$eror did not rely on the' (efore his victory so he o$*ht not to fear the' after it) The contrary happens in /in*do's *overned li/e that of ,rance (eca$se one can easily enter there (y *ainin* over so'e (aron of the /in*do' for one always finds 'alcontents and s$ch as desire a chan*e) &$ch 'en for the reasons *iven can open the way into the state and render the victory easy+ ($t if yo$ wish to hold it afterwards yo$ 'eet with infinite diffic$lties (oth fro' those who have assisted yo$ and fro' those yo$ have cr$shed) Nor is it eno$*h for yo$ to have e.ter'inated the fa'ily of the prince (eca$se the lords that re'ain 'a/e the'selves the heads of fresh 'ove'ents a*ainst yo$ and as yo$ are $na(le either to satisfy or e.ter'inate the' that state is lost whenever ti'e (rin*s the opport$nity) Now if yo$ will consider what was the nat$re of the *overn'ent of 1ari$s yo$ will find it si'ilar to the /in*do' of the T$r/ and therefore it was only necessary for Ale.ander first to overthrow hi' in the field and then to ta/e the co$ntry fro' hi') After which victory 1ari$s (ein* /illed the state re'ained sec$re to Ale.ander for the a(ove reasons) And if his s$ccessors had (een $nited they wo$ld have en9oyed it sec$rely and at their ease for there were no t$'$lts raised in the /in*do'
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e.cept those they provo/ed the'selves) !$t it is i'possi(le to hold with s$ch tran#$illity states constit$ted li/e that of ,rance) Hence arose those fre#$ent re(ellions a*ainst the Ro'ans in &pain ,rance and @reece owin* to the 'any principalities there were in these states of which as lon* as the 'e'ory of the' end$red the Ro'ans always held an insec$re possession+ ($t with the power and lon* contin$ance of the e'pire the 'e'ory of the' passed away and the Ro'ans then (eca'e sec$re possessors) And when fi*htin* afterwards a'on*st the'selves each one was a(le to attach to hi'self his own parts of the co$ntry accordin* to the a$thority he had ass$'ed there+ and the fa'ily of the for'er lord (ein* e.ter'inated none other than the Ro'ans were ac/nowled*ed) "hen these thin*s are re'e'(ered no one will 'arvel at the ease with which Ale.ander held the E'pire of Asia or at the diffic$lties which others have had to /eep an ac#$isition s$ch as Pyrrh$s and 'any 'ore+ this is not occasioned (y the little or a($ndance of a(ility in the con#$eror ($t (y the want of $nifor'ity in the s$(9ect state)
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CHAPTER 2
Concernin* The "ay To @overn Cities Or Principalities "hich %ived :nder Their Own %aws !efore They "ere Anne.ed
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those states which have (een ac#$ired as stated have (een acc$sto'ed to live $nder their own laws and in freedo' there are three co$rses for those who wish to hold the'; the first is to r$in the' the ne.t is to reside there in person the third is to per'it the' to live $nder their own laws drawin* a tri($te and esta(lishin* within it an oli*archy which will /eep it friendly to yo$) !eca$se s$ch a *overn'ent (ein* created (y the prince /nows that it cannot stand witho$t his friendship and interest and does its $t'ost to s$pport hi'+ and therefore he who wo$ld /eep a city acc$sto'ed to freedo' will hold it 'ore easily (y the 'eans of its own citi-ens than in any other way) There are for e.a'ple the &partans and the Ro'ans) The &partans held Athens and The(es esta(lishin* there an oli*archy nevertheless they lost the') The Ro'ans in order to hold Cap$a Cartha*e and N$'antia dis'antled the' and did not lose the') They wished to hold @reece as the &partans held it 'a/in* it free and per'ittin* its laws and did not s$cceed) &o to hold it they were
HENE2ER
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co'pelled to dis'antle 'any cities in the co$ntry for in tr$th there is no safe way to retain the' otherwise than (y r$inin* the') And he who (eco'es 'aster of a city acc$sto'ed to freedo' and does not destroy it 'ay e.pect to (e destroyed (y it for in re(ellion it has always the watch>word of li(erty and its ancient privile*es as a rallyin* point which neither ti'e nor (enefits will ever ca$se it to for*et) And what ever yo$ 'ay do or provide a*ainst they never for*et that na'e or their privile*es $nless they are dis$nited or dispersed ($t at every chance they i''ediately rally to the' as Pisa after the h$ndred years she had (een held in (onda*e (y the ,lorentines) !$t when cities or co$ntries are acc$sto'ed to live $nder a prince and his fa'ily is e.ter'inated they (ein* on the one hand acc$sto'ed to o(ey and on the other hand not havin* the old prince cannot a*ree in 'a/in* one fro' a'on*st the'selves and they do not /now how to *overn the'selves) ,or this reason they are very slow to ta/e $p ar's and a prince can *ain the' to hi'self and sec$re the' '$ch 'ore easily) !$t in rep$(lics there is 'ore vitality *reater hatred and 'ore desire for ven*eance which will never per'it the' to allow the 'e'ory of their for'er li(erty to rest+ so that the safest way is to destroy the' or to reside there)
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CHAPTER 2I
Concernin* New Principalities "hich Are Ac#$ired !y One3s Own Ar's And A(ility
no one (e s$rprised if in spea/in* of entirely new principalities as I shall do I add$ce the hi*hest e.a'ples (oth of prince and of state+ (eca$se 'en wal/in* al'ost always in paths (eaten (y others and followin* (y i'itation their deeds are yet $na(le to /eep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they i'itate) A wise 'an o$*ht always to follow the paths (eaten (y *reat 'en and to i'itate those who have (een s$pre'e so that if his a(ility does not e#$al theirs at least it will savo$r of it) %et hi' act li/e the clever archers who desi*nin* to hit the 'ar/ which yet appears too far distant and /nowin* the li'its to which the stren*th of their (ow attains ta/e ai' '$ch hi*her than the 'ar/ not to reach (y their stren*th or arrow to so *reat a hei*ht ($t to (e a(le with the aid of so hi*h an ai' to hit the 'ar/ they wish to reach) I say therefore that in entirely new principalities where there is a new prince 'ore or less diffic$lty is fo$nd in /eepin* the' accordin*ly as there is 'ore or less a(ility in hi' who has ac#$ired the state) Now as the fact of (eco'in* a prince fro' a private station
ET
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pres$pposes either a(ility or fort$ne it is clear that one or other of these two thin*s will 'iti*ate in so'e de*ree 'any diffic$lties) Nevertheless he who has relied least on fort$ne is esta(lished the stron*est) ,$rther it facilitates 'atters when the prince havin* no other state is co'pelled to reside there in person) !$t to co'e to those who (y their own a(ility and not thro$*h fort$ne have risen to (e princes I say that Moses Cyr$s Ro'$l$s These$s and s$ch li/e are the 'ost e.cellent e.a'ples) And altho$*h one 'ay not disc$ss Moses he havin* (een a 'ere e.ec$tor of the will of @od yet he o$*ht to (e ad'ired if only for that favo$r which 'ade hi' worthy to spea/ with @od) !$t in considerin* Cyr$s and others who have ac#$ired or fo$nded /in*do's all will (e fo$nd ad'ira(le+ and if their partic$lar deeds and cond$ct shall (e considered they will not (e fo$nd inferior to those of Moses altho$*h he had so *reat a preceptor) And in e.a'inin* their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anythin* to fort$ne (eyond opport$nity which (ro$*ht the' the 'aterial to 'o$ld into the for' which see'ed (est to the') "itho$t that opport$nity their powers of 'ind wo$ld have (een e.tin*$ished and witho$t those powers the opport$nity wo$ld have co'e in vain) It was necessary therefore to Moses that he sho$ld find the people of Israel in E*ypt enslaved and oppressed (y the E*yptians in order that they
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sho$ld (e disposed to follow hi' so as to (e delivered o$t of (onda*e) It was necessary that Ro'$l$s sho$ld not re'ain in Al(a and that he sho$ld (e a(andoned at his (irth in order that he sho$ld (eco'e Kin* of Ro'e and fo$nder of the fatherland) It was necessary that Cyr$s sho$ld find the Persians discontented with the *overn'ent of the Medes and the Medes soft and effe'inate thro$*h their lon* peace) These$s co$ld not have shown his a(ility had he not fo$nd the Athenians dispersed) These opport$nities therefore 'ade those 'en fort$nate and their hi*h a(ility ena(led the' to reco*ni-e the opport$nity where(y their co$ntry was enno(led and 'ade fa'o$s) Those who (y valoro$s ways (eco'e princes li/e these 'en ac#$ire a principality with diffic$lty ($t they /eep it with ease) The diffic$lties they have in ac#$irin* it arise in part fro' the new r$les and 'ethods which they are forced to introd$ce to esta(lish their *overn'ent and its sec$rity) And it o$*ht to (e re'e'(ered that there is nothin* 'ore diffic$lt to ta/e in hand 'ore perilo$s to cond$ct or 'ore $ncertain in its s$ccess than to ta/e the lead in the introd$ction of a new order of thin*s) !eca$se the innovator has for ene'ies all those who have done well $nder the old conditions and l$/ewar' defenders in those who 'ay do well $nder the new) This coolness arises partly fro' fear of the opponents who have the laws on their side and partly fro' the incred$lity of 'en who do not readily (elieve in
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new thin*s $ntil they have had a lon* e.perience of the') Th$s it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the opport$nity to attac/ they do it li/e partisans whilst the others defend l$/ewar'ly in s$ch wise that the prince is endan*ered alon* with the') It is necessary therefore if we desire to disc$ss this 'atter thoro$*hly to in#$ire whether these innovators can rely on the'selves or have to depend on others; that is to say whether to cons$''ate their enterprise have they to $se prayers or can they $se forceH In the first instance they always s$cceed (adly and never co'pass anythin*+ ($t when they can rely on the'selves and $se force then they are rarely endan*ered) Hence it is that all ar'ed prophets have con#$ered and the $nar'ed ones have (een destroyed) !esides the reasons 'entioned the nat$re of the people is varia(le and whilst it is easy to pers$ade the' it is diffic$lt to fi. the' in that pers$asion) And th$s it is necessary to ta/e s$ch 'eas$res that when they (elieve no lon*er it 'ay (e possi(le to 'a/e the' (elieve (y force) If Moses Cyr$s These$s and Ro'$l$s had (een $nar'ed they co$ld not have enforced their constit$tions for lon* E as happened in o$r ti'e to ,ra @irola'o &avonarola who was r$ined with his new order of thin*s i''ediately the '$ltit$de (elieved in hi' no lon*er and he had no 'eans of /eepin* steadfast those who (elieved or of 'a/in* the $n(elievers to (elieve) Therefore s$ch as these
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have *reat diffic$lties in cons$''atin* their enterprise for all their dan*ers are in the ascent yet with a(ility they will overco'e the'+ ($t when these are overco'e and those who envied the' their s$ccess are e.ter'inated they will (e*in to (e respected and they will contin$e afterwards powerf$l sec$re hono$red and happy) To these *reat e.a'ples I wish to add a lesser one+ still it (ears so'e rese'(lance to the' and I wish it to s$ffice 'e for all of a li/e /ind; it is Hiero the &yrac$san) This 'an rose fro' a private station to (e Prince of &yrac$se nor did he either owe anythin* to fort$ne ($t opport$nity+ for the &yrac$sans (ein* oppressed chose hi' for their captain afterwards he was rewarded (y (ein* 'ade their prince) He was of so *reat a(ility even as a private citi-en that one who writes of hi' says he wanted nothin* ($t a /in*do' to (e a /in*) This 'an a(olished the old soldiery or*ani-ed the new *ave $p old alliances 'ade new ones+ and as he had his own soldiers and allies on s$ch fo$ndations he was a(le to ($ild any edifice; th$s whilst he had end$red '$ch tro$(le in ac#$irin* he had ($t little in /eepin*)
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CHAPTER 2II
Concernin* New Principalities "hich Are Ac#$ired Either !y The Ar's Of Others Or !y @ood ,ort$ne
who solely (y *ood fort$ne (eco'e princes fro' (ein* private citi-ens have little tro$(le in risin* ($t '$ch in /eepin* atop+ they have not any diffic$lties on the way $p (eca$se they fly ($t they have 'any when they reach the s$''it) &$ch are those to who' so'e state is *iven either for 'oney or (y the favo$r of hi' who (estows it+ as happened to 'any in @reece in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont where princes were 'ade (y 1ari$s in order that they 'i*ht hold the cities (oth for his sec$rity and his *lory+ as also were those e'perors who (y the corr$ption of the soldiers fro' (ein* citi-ens ca'e to e'pire) &$ch stand si'ply $pon the *oodwill and the fort$ne of hi' who has elevated the' E two 'ost inconstant and $nsta(le thin*s) Neither have they the /nowled*e re#$isite for the position+ (eca$se $nless they are 'en of *reat worth and a(ility it is not reasona(le to e.pect that they sho$ld /now how to co''and havin* always lived in a private condition+ (esides they cannot hold it (eca$se they have not forces which they can /eep friendly and faithf$l) &tates that rise $ne.pectedly then li/e all other
HO&E
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thin*s in nat$re which are (orn and *row rapidly cannot have their fo$ndations and relations with other states fi.ed in s$ch a way that the first stor' will not overthrow the'+ $nless as is said those who $ne.pectedly (eco'e princes are 'en of so '$ch a(ility that they /now they have to (e prepared at once to hold that which fort$ne has thrown into their laps and that those fo$ndations which others have laid (efore they (eca'e princes they '$st lay afterwards) Concernin* these two 'ethods of risin* to (e a prince (y a(ility or fort$ne I wish to add$ce two e.a'ples within o$r own recollection and these are ,rancesco &for-a and Cesare !or*ia) ,rancesco (y proper 'eans and with *reat a(ility fro' (ein* a private person rose to (e 1$/e of Milan and that which he had ac#$ired with a tho$sand an.ieties he /ept with little tro$(le) On the other hand Cesare !or*ia called (y the people 1$/e 2alentino ac#$ired his state d$rin* the ascendancy of his father and on its decline he lost it notwithstandin* that he had ta/en every 'eas$re and done all that o$*ht to (e done (y a wise and a(le 'an to fi. fir'ly his roots in the states which the ar's and fort$nes of others had (estowed on hi') !eca$se as is stated a(ove he who has not first laid his fo$ndations 'ay (e a(le with *reat a(ility to lay the' afterwards ($t they will (e laid with tro$(le to the architect and dan*er to the ($ildin*) If therefore all the steps ta/en (y the d$/e (e
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considered it will (e seen that he laid solid fo$ndations for his f$t$re power and I do not consider it s$perfl$o$s to disc$ss the' (eca$se I do not /now what (etter precepts to *ive a new prince than the e.a'ple of his actions+ and if his dispositions were of no avail that was not his fa$lt ($t the e.traordinary and e.tre'e 'ali*nity of fort$ne) Ale.ander 2I in wishin* to a**randi-e the d$/e his son had 'any i''ediate and prospective diffic$lties) ,irstly he did not see his way to 'a/e hi' 'aster of any state that was not a state of the Ch$rch+ and if he was willin* to ro( the Ch$rch he /new that the 1$/e of Milan and the 2enetians wo$ld not consent (eca$se ,aen-a and Ri'ini were already $nder the protection of the 2enetians) !esides this he saw the ar's of Italy especially those (y which he 'i*ht have (een assisted in hands that wo$ld fear the a**randi-e'ent of the Pope na'ely the Orsini and the Colonna and their followin*) It (ehoved hi' therefore to $pset this state of affairs and e'(roil the powers so as to 'a/e hi'self sec$rely 'aster of part of their states) This was easy for hi' to do (eca$se he fo$nd the 2enetians 'oved (y other reasons inclined to (rin* (ac/ the ,rench into Italy+ he wo$ld not only not oppose this ($t he wo$ld render it 'ore easy (y dissolvin* the for'er 'arria*e of Kin* %o$is) Therefore the /in* ca'e into Italy with the assistance of the 2enetians and the consent of Ale.ander) He was no sooner in
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Milan than the Pope had soldiers fro' hi' for the atte'pt on the Ro'a*na which yielded to hi' on the rep$tation of the /in*) The d$/e therefore havin* ac#$ired the Ro'a*na and (eaten the Colonna while wishin* to hold that and to advance f$rther was hindered (y two thin*s; the one his forces did not appear loyal to hi' the other the *oodwill of ,rance; that is to say he feared that the forces of the Orsini which was $sin* wo$ld not stand to hi' that not only 'i*ht they hinder hi' fro' winnin* 'ore ($t 'i*ht the'selves sei-e what he had won and that the Kin* 'i*ht also do the sa'e) Of the Orsini he had a warnin* when after ta/in* ,aen-a and attac/in* !olo*na he saw the' *o very $nwillin*ly to that attac/) And as to the /in* he learned his 'ind when he hi'self after ta/in* the d$chy of :r(ino attac/ed T$scany and the /in* 'ade hi' desist fro' that $nderta/in*+ hence the d$/e decided to depend no 'ore $pon the ar's and the l$c/ of others) ,or the first thin* he wea/ened the Orsini and Colonna parties in Ro'e (y *ainin* to hi'self all their adherents who were *entle'en 'a/in* the' his *entle'en *ivin* the' *ood pay and accordin* to their ran/ hono$rin* the' with office and co''and in s$ch a way that in a few 'onths all attach'ent to the factions was destroyed and t$rned entirely to the d$/e) After this he awaited an opport$nity to cr$sh the Orsini havin* scattered the adherents of the Colonna) This ca'e to hi'
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soon and he $sed it well+ for the Orsini perceivin* at len*th that the a**randi-e'ent of the d$/e and the Ch$rch was r$in to the' called a 'eetin* at Ma*ione in the territory of Per$*ia) ,ro' this spr$n* the re(ellion at :r(ino and the t$'$lts in the Ro'a*na with endless dan*ers to the d$/e all of which he overca'e with the help of the ,rench) Havin* restored his a$thority not to leave it at ris/ (y tr$stin* either to the ,rench or other o$tside forces he had reco$rse to his wiles and he /new so well how to conceal his 'ind that (y the 'ediation of &i*nor Paolo FOrsiniG E who' the d$/e did not fail to sec$re with all /inds of attention *ivin* hi' 'oney apparel and horses E the Orsini were reconciled so that their si'plicity (ro$*ht the' into his power at &ini*a*lia) Havin* e.ter'inated the leaders and t$rned their partisans into his friends the d$/e had laid s$fficiently *ood fo$ndations to his power havin* all the Ro'a*na and the d$chy of :r(ino+ and the people now (e*innin* to appreciate their prosperity he *ained the' all over to hi'self) And as this point is worthy of notice and to (e i'itated (y others I a' not willin* to leave it o$t) "hen the d$/e occ$pied the Ro'a*na he fo$nd it $nder the r$le of wea/ 'asters who rather pl$ndered their s$(9ects than r$led the' and *ave the' 'ore ca$se for dis$nion than for $nion so that the co$ntry was f$ll of ro((ery #$arrels and every /ind of violence+ and so wishin* to (rin* (ac/ peace and o(edience to a$thority he
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considered it necessary to *ive it a *ood *overnor) There$pon he pro'oted Messer Ra'iro d3Orco Fde %or#$aG a swift and cr$el 'an to who' he *ave the f$llest power) This 'an in a short ti'e restored peace and $nity with the *reatest s$ccess) Afterwards the d$/e considered that it was not advisa(le to confer s$ch e.cessive a$thority for he had no do$(t ($t that he wo$ld (eco'e odio$s so he set $p a co$rt of 9$d*'ent in the co$ntry $nder a 'ost e.cellent president wherein all cities had their advocates) And (eca$se he /new that the past severity had ca$sed so'e hatred a*ainst hi'self so to clear hi'self in the 'inds of the people and *ain the' entirely to hi'self he desired to show that if any cr$elty had (een practised it had not ori*inated with hi' ($t in the nat$ral sternness of the 'inister) :nder this pretence he too/ Ra'iro and one 'ornin* ca$sed hi' to (e e.ec$ted and left on the pia--a at Cesena with the (loc/ and a (loody /nife at his side) The (ar(arity of this spectacle ca$sed the people to (e at once satisfied and dis'ayed) !$t let $s ret$rn whence we started) I say that the d$/e findin* hi'self now s$fficiently powerf$l and partly sec$red fro' i''ediate dan*ers (y havin* ar'ed hi'self in his own way and havin* in a *reat 'eas$re cr$shed those forces in his vicinity that co$ld in9$re hi' if he wished to proceed with his con#$est had ne.t to consider ,rance for he /new that the /in* who too late was aware of his 'ista/e wo$ld not s$pport hi') And
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fro' this ti'e he (e*an to see/ new alliances and to te'pori-e with ,rance in the e.pedition which she was 'a/in* towards the /in*do' of Naples a*ainst the &paniards who were (esie*in* @aeta) It was his intention to sec$re hi'self a*ainst the' and this he wo$ld have #$ic/ly acco'plished had Ale.ander lived) &$ch was his line of action as to present affairs) !$t as to the f$t$re he had to fear in the first place that a new s$ccessor to the Ch$rch 'i*ht not (e friendly to hi' and 'i*ht see/ to ta/e fro' hi' that which Ale.ander had *iven hi' so he decided to act in fo$r ways) ,irstly (y e.ter'inatin* the fa'ilies of those lords who' he had despoiled so as to ta/e away that prete.t fro' the Pope) &econdly (y winnin* to hi'self all the *entle'en of Ro'e so as to (e a(le to c$r( the Pope with their aid as has (een o(served) Thirdly (y convertin* the colle*e 'ore to hi'self) ,o$rthly (y ac#$irin* so '$ch power (efore the Pope sho$ld die that he co$ld (y his own 'eas$res resist the first shoc/) Of these fo$r thin*s at the death of Ale.ander he had acco'plished three) ,or he had /illed as 'any of the dispossessed lords as he co$ld lay hands on and few had escaped+ he had won over the Ro'an *entle'en and he had the 'ost n$'ero$s party in the colle*e) And as to any fresh ac#$isition he intended to (eco'e 'aster of T$scany for he already possessed Per$*ia and Pio'(ino and Pisa was $nder his protection) And as he had no lon*er to st$dy
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,rance Cfor the ,rench were already driven o$t of the /in*do' of Naples (y the &paniards and in this way (oth were co'pelled to ($y his *oodwillD he po$nced down $pon Pisa) After this %$cca and &iena yielded at once partly thro$*h hatred and partly thro$*h fear of the ,lorentines+ and the ,lorentines wo$ld have had no re'edy had he contin$ed to prosper as he was prosperin* the year that Ale.ander died for he had ac#$ired so '$ch power and rep$tation that he wo$ld have stood (y hi'self and no lon*er have depended on the l$c/ and the forces of others ($t solely on his own power and a(ility) !$t Ale.ander died five years after he had first drawn the sword) He left the d$/e with the state of Ro'a*na alone consolidated with the rest in the air (etween two 'ost powerf$l hostile ar'ies and sic/ $nto death) Iet there were in the d$/e s$ch (oldness and a(ility and he /new so well how 'en are to (e won or lost and so fir' were the fo$ndations which in so short a ti'e he had laid that if he had not had those ar'ies on his (ac/ or if he had (een in *ood health he wo$ld have overco'e all diffic$lties) And it is seen that his fo$ndations were *ood for the Ro'a*na awaited hi' for 'ore than a 'onth) In Ro'e altho$*h ($t half alive he re'ained sec$re+ and whilst the !a*lioni the 2itelli and the Orsini 'i*ht co'e to Ro'e they co$ld not effect anythin* a*ainst hi') If he co$ld not have 'ade Pope hi' who' he wished at least the one who' he did not wish
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wo$ld not have (een elected) !$t if he had (een in so$nd health at the death of Ale.ander everythin* wo$ld have (een easy to hi') On the day that 6$li$s II was elected he told 'e that he had tho$*ht of everythin* that 'i*ht occ$r at the death of his father and had provided a re'edy for all e.cept that he had never anticipated that when the death did happen he hi'self wo$ld (e on the point to die) "hen all the actions of the d$/e are recalled I do not /now how to (la'e hi' ($t rather it appears to 'e as I have said that I o$*ht to offer hi' for i'itation to all those who (y the fort$ne or the ar's of others are raised to *overn'ent) !eca$se he havin* a lofty spirit and far>reachin* ai's co$ld not have re*$lated his cond$ct otherwise and only the shortness of the life of Ale.ander and his own sic/ness fr$strated his desi*ns) Therefore he who considers it necessary to sec$re hi'self in his new principality to win friends to overco'e either (y force or fra$d to 'a/e hi'self (eloved and feared (y the people to (e followed and revered (y the soldiers to e.ter'inate those who have power or reason to h$rt hi' to chan*e the old order of thin*s for new to (e severe and *racio$s 'a*nani'o$s and li(eral to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new to 'aintain friendship with /in*s and princes in s$ch a way that they '$st help hi' with -eal and offend with ca$tion cannot find a 'ore lively e.a'ple than the actions of this 'an)
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Only can he (e (la'ed for the election of 6$li$s II in who' he 'ade a (ad choice (eca$se as is said not (ein* a(le to elect a Pope to his own 'ind he co$ld have hindered any other fro' (ein* elected Pope+ and he o$*ht never to have consented to the election of any cardinal who' he had in9$red or who had ca$se to fear hi' if they (eca'e pontiffs) ,or 'en in9$re either fro' fear or hatred) Those who' he had in9$red a'on*st others were &an Pietro ad 2inc$la Colonna &an @ior*io and Ascanio) 1 Any one of the others on (eco'in* Pope wo$ld have had to fear hi' Ro$en and the &paniards e.cepted+ the latter fro' their relationship and o(li*ations the for'er fro' his infl$ence the /in*do' of ,rance havin* relations with hi') Therefore a(ove everythin* the d$/e o$*ht to have created a &paniard Pope and failin* hi' he o$*ht to have consented to Ro$en and not &an Pietro ad 2inc$la) He who (elieves that new (enefits will ca$se *reat persona*es to for*et old in9$ries is deceived) Therefore the d$/e erred in his choice and it was the ca$se of his $lti'ate r$in)
1 6$li$s II had (een Cardinal of &an Pietro ad 2inc$la+ &an @ior*io was Raffaells Ria.is and Ascanio was Cardinal Ascanio &for-a)
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CHAPTER 2III
Concernin* Those "ho Have O(tained A Principality !y "ic/edness
a prince 'ay rise fro' a private station in two ways neither of which can (e entirely attri($ted to fort$ne or *eni$s yet it is 'anifest to 'e that I '$st not (e silent on the' altho$*h one co$ld (e 'ore copio$sly treated when I disc$ss rep$(lics) These 'ethods are when either (y so'e wic/ed or nefario$s ways one ascends to the principality or when (y the favo$r of his fellow>citi-ens a private person (eco'es the prince of his co$ntry) And spea/in* of the first 'ethod it will (e ill$strated (y two e.a'ples E one ancient the other 'odern E and witho$t enterin* f$rther into the s$(9ect I consider these two e.a'ples will s$ffice those who 'ay (e co'pelled to follow the') A*athocles the &icilian (eca'e Kin* of &yrac$se not only fro' a private ($t fro' a low and a(9ect position) This 'an the son of a potter thro$*h all the chan*es in his fort$nes always led an infa'o$s life) Nevertheless he acco'panied his infa'ies with so '$ch a(ility of 'ind and (ody that havin* devoted hi'self to the 'ilitary profession he rose thro$*h its ran/s to (e Praetor of &yrac$se) !ein* esta(lished in that position and havin* deli(erately resolved to 'a/e hi'self
%THO:@H
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prince and to sei-e (y violence witho$t o(li*ation to others that which had (een conceded to hi' (y assent he ca'e to an $nderstandin* for this p$rpose with Ha'ilcar the Cartha*inian who with his ar'y was fi*htin* in &icily) One 'ornin* he asse'(led the people and senate of &yrac$se as if he had to disc$ss with the' thin*s relatin* to the Rep$(lic and at a *iven si*nal the soldiers /illed all the senators and the richest of the people+ these dead he sei-ed and held the princedo' of that city witho$t any civil co''otion) And altho$*h he was twice ro$ted (y the Cartha*inians and $lti'ately (esie*ed yet not only was he a(le to defend his city ($t leavin* part of his 'en for its defence with the others he attac/ed Africa and in a short ti'e raised the sie*e of &yrac$se) The Cartha*inians red$ced to e.tre'e necessity were co'pelled to co'e to ter's with A*athocles and leavin* &icily to hi' had to (e content with the possession of Africa) Therefore he who considers the actions and the *eni$s of this 'an will see nothin* or little which can (e attri($ted to fort$ne inas'$ch as he attained pre>e'inence as is shown a(ove not (y the favo$r of any one ($t step (y step in the 'ilitary profession which steps were *ained with a tho$sand tro$(les and perils and were afterwards (oldly held (y hi' with 'any ha-ards and dan*ers) Iet it cannot (e called talent to slay fellow>citi-ens to deceive friends to (e witho$t faith witho$t 'ercy witho$t reli*ion+ s$ch
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'ethods 'ay *ain e'pire ($t not *lory) &till if the co$ra*e of A*athocles in enterin* into and e.tricatin* hi'self fro' dan*ers (e considered to*ether with his *reatness of 'ind in end$rin* overco'in* hardships it cannot (e seen why he sho$ld (e estee'ed less than the 'ost nota(le captain) Nevertheless his (ar(aro$s cr$elty and inh$'anity with infinite wic/ednesses do not per'it hi' to (e cele(rated a'on* the 'ost e.cellent 'en) "hat he achieved cannot (e attri($ted either to fort$ne or to *eni$s) In o$r ti'es d$rin* the r$le of Ale.ander 2I Oliverotto da ,er'o havin* (een left an orphan 'any years (efore was (ro$*ht $p (y his 'aternal $ncle @iovanni ,o*liani and in the early days of his yo$th sent to fi*ht $nder Paolo 2itelli that (ein* trained $nder his discipline he 'i*ht attain so'e hi*h position in the 'ilitary profession) After Paolo died he fo$*ht $nder his (rother 2itello--o and in a very short ti'e (ein* endowed with wit and a vi*oro$s (ody and 'ind he (eca'e the first 'an in his profession) !$t it appearin* to hi' a paltry thin* to serve $nder others he resolved with the aid of so'e citi-ens of ,er'o to who' the slavery of their co$ntry was dearer than its li(erty and with the help of the 2itelli to sei-e ,er'o) &o he wrote to @iovanni ,o*liani that havin* (een away fro' ho'e for 'any years he wished to visit hi' and his city and in so'e 'eas$re to loo/ into his patri'ony+ and altho$*h he had not la(o$red to ac#$ire anythin* e.cept hono$r yet in order that
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the citi-ens sho$ld see he had not spent his ti'e in vain he desired to co'e hono$ra(ly so wo$ld (e acco'panied (y one h$ndred horse'en his friends and retainers+ and he entreated @iovanni to arran*e that he sho$ld (e received hono$ra(ly (y the citi-ens of ,er'o all of which wo$ld (e not only to his hono$r ($t also to that of @iovanni hi'self who had (ro$*ht hi' $p) @iovanni therefore did not fail in any attentions d$e to his nephew and he ca$sed hi' to (e hono$ra(ly received (y the ,er'ans and he lod*ed hi' in his own ho$se where havin* passed so'e days and havin* arran*ed what was necessary for his wic/ed desi*ns Oliverotto *ave a sole'n (an#$et to which he invited @iovanni ,o*liani and the chiefs of ,er'o) "hen the viands and all the other entertain'ents that are $s$al in s$ch (an#$ets were finished Oliverotto artf$lly (e*an certain *rave disco$rses spea/in* of the *reatness of Pope Ale.ander and his son Cesare and of their enterprises to which disco$rse @iovanni and others answered+ ($t he rose at once sayin* that s$ch 'atters o$*ht to (e disc$ssed in a 'ore private place and he (etoo/ hi'self to a cha'(er whither @iovanni and the rest of the citi-ens went in after hi') No sooner were they seated than soldiers iss$ed fro' secret places and sla$*htered @iovanni and the rest) After these '$rders Oliverotto 'o$nted on horse(ac/ rode $p and down the town and (esie*ed the chief 'a*istrate in the palace so that in fear the people
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were forced to o(ey hi' and to for' a *overn'ent of which he 'ade hi'self the prince) He /illed all the 'alcontents who were a(le to in9$re hi' and stren*thened hi'self with new civil and 'ilitary ordinances in s$ch a way that in the year d$rin* which he held the principality not only was he sec$re in the city of ,er'o ($t he had (eco'e for'ida(le to all his nei*h(o$rs) And his destr$ction wo$ld have (een as diffic$lt as that of A*athocles if he had not allowed hi'self to (e overreached (y Cesare !or*ia who too/ hi' with the Orsini and 2itelli at &ini*a*lia as was stated a(ove) Th$s one year after he had co''itted this parricide he was stran*led to*ether with 2itello--o who' he had 'ade his leader in valo$r and wic/edness) &o'e 'ay wonder how it can happen that A*athocles and his li/e after infinite treacheries and cr$elties sho$ld live for lon* sec$re in his co$ntry and defend hi'self fro' e.ternal ene'ies and never (e conspired a*ainst (y his own citi-ens+ seein* that 'any others (y 'eans of cr$elty have never (een a(le even in peacef$l ti'es to hold the state still less in the do$(tf$l ti'es of war) I (elieve that this follows fro' severities (ein* (adly or properly $sed) Those 'ay (e called properly $sed if of evil it is lawf$l to spea/ well that are applied at one (low and are necessary to one3s sec$rity and that are not persisted in afterwards $nless they can (e t$rned to the advanta*e of the s$(9ects) The (adly e'ployed
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are those which notwithstandin* they 'ay (e few in the co''ence'ent '$ltiply with ti'e rather than decrease) Those who practise the first syste' are a(le (y aid of @od or 'an to 'iti*ate in so'e de*ree their r$le as A*athocles did) It is i'possi(le for those who follow the other to 'aintain the'selves) Hence it is to (e re'ar/ed that in sei-in* a state the $s$rper o$*ht to e.a'ine closely into all those in9$ries which it is necessary for hi' to inflict and to do the' all at one stro/e so as not to have to repeat the' daily+ and th$s (y not $nsettlin* 'en he will (e a(le to reass$re the' and win the' to hi'self (y (enefits) He who does otherwise either fro' ti'idity or evil advice is always co'pelled to /eep the /nife in his hand+ neither can he rely on his s$(9ects nor can they attach the'selves to hi' owin* to their contin$ed and repeated wron*s) ,or in9$ries o$*ht to (e done all at one ti'e so that (ein* tasted less they offend less+ (enefits o$*ht to (e *iven little (y little so that the flavo$r of the' 'ay last lon*er) And a(ove all thin*s a prince o$*ht to live a'on*st his people in s$ch a way that no $ne.pected circ$'stances whether of *ood or evil shall 'a/e hi' chan*e+ (eca$se if the necessity for this co'es in tro$(led ti'es yo$ are too late for harsh 'eas$res+ and 'ild ones will not help yo$ for they will (e considered as forced fro' yo$ and no one will (e $nder any o(li*ation to yo$ for the')
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CHAPTER I<
Concernin* A Civil Principality
co'in* to the other point E where a leadin* citi-en (eco'es the prince of his co$ntry not (y wic/edness or any intolera(le violence ($t (y the favo$r of his fellow citi-ens E this 'ay (e called a civil principality; nor is *eni$s or fort$ne alto*ether necessary to attain to it ($t rather a happy shrewdness) I say then that s$ch a principality is o(tained either (y the favo$r of the people or (y the favo$r of the no(les) !eca$se in all cities these two distinct parties are fo$nd and fro' this it arises that the people do not wish to (e r$led nor oppressed (y the no(les and the no(les wish to r$le and oppress the people+ and fro' these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three res$lts either a principality self>*overn'ent or anarchy) A principality is created either (y the people or (y the no(les accordin*ly as one or other of the' has the opport$nity+ for the no(les seein* they cannot withstand the people (e*in to cry $p the rep$tation of one of the'selves and they 'a/e hi' a prince so that $nder his shadow they can *ive vent to their a'(itions) The people findin* they cannot resist the no(les also cry $p the rep$tation of one of the'selves and 'a/e hi' a prince so as to (e defended (y his a$thority) He
:T
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who o(tains soverei*nty (y the assistance of the no(les 'aintains hi'self with 'ore diffic$lty than he who co'es to it (y the aid of the people (eca$se the for'er finds hi'self with 'any aro$nd hi' who consider the'selves his e#$als and (eca$se of this he can neither r$le nor 'ana*e the' to his li/in*) !$t he who reaches soverei*nty (y pop$lar favo$r finds hi'self alone and has none aro$nd hi' or few who are not prepared to o(ey hi') !esides this one cannot (y fair dealin* and witho$t in9$ry to others satisfy the no(les ($t yo$ can satisfy the people for their o(9ect is 'ore ri*hteo$s than that of the no(les the latter wishin* to oppress whilst the for'er only desire not to (e oppressed) It is to (e added also that a prince can never sec$re hi'self a*ainst a hostile people (eca$se of their (ein* too 'any whilst fro' the no(les he can sec$re hi'self as they are few in n$'(er) The worst that a prince 'ay e.pect fro' a hostile people is to (e a(andoned (y the'+ ($t fro' hostile no(les he has not only to fear a(andon'ent ($t also that they will rise a*ainst hi'+ for they (ein* in these affairs 'ore far>seein* and ast$te always co'e forward in ti'e to save the'selves and to o(tain favo$rs fro' hi' who' they e.pect to prevail) ,$rther the prince is co'pelled to live always with the sa'e people ($t he can do well witho$t the sa'e no(les (ein* a(le to 'a/e and $n'a/e the' daily and to *ive or ta/e away a$thority when it pleases hi')
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Therefore to 'a/e this point clearer I say that the no(les o$*ht to (e loo/ed at 'ainly in two ways; that is to say they either shape their co$rse in s$ch a way as (inds the' entirely to yo$r fort$ne or they do not) Those who so (ind the'selves and are not rapacio$s o$*ht to (e hono$red and loved+ those who do not (ind the'selves 'ay (e dealt with in two ways+ they 'ay fail to do this thro$*h p$sillani'ity and a nat$ral want of co$ra*e in which case yo$ o$*ht to 'a/e $se of the' especially of those who are of *ood co$nsel+ and th$s whilst in prosperity yo$ hono$r yo$rself in adversity yo$ have not to fear the') !$t when for their own a'(itio$s ends they sh$n (indin* the'selves it is a to/en that they are *ivin* 'ore tho$*ht to the'selves than to yo$ and a prince o$*ht to *$ard a*ainst s$ch and to fear the' as if they were open ene'ies (eca$se in adversity they always help to r$in hi') Therefore one who (eco'es a prince thro$*h the favo$r of the people o$*ht to /eep the' friendly and this he can easily do seein* they only as/ not to (e oppressed (y hi') !$t one who in opposition to the people (eco'es a prince (y the favo$r of the no(les o$*ht a(ove everythin* to see/ to win the people over to hi'self and this he 'ay easily do if he ta/es the' $nder his protection) !eca$se 'en when they receive *ood fro' hi' of who' they were e.pectin* evil are (o$nd 'ore closely to their (enefactor+ th$s the people #$ic/ly (eco'e 'ore devoted to hi' than
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if he had (een raised to the principality (y their favo$rs+ and the prince can win their affections in 'any ways ($t as these vary accordin* to the circ$'stances one cannot *ive fi.ed r$les so I o'it the'+ ($t I repeat it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly otherwise he has no sec$rity in adversity) Na(is Prince of the &partans s$stained the attac/ of all @reece and of a victorio$s Ro'an ar'y and a*ainst the' he defended his co$ntry and his *overn'ent+ and for the overco'in* of this peril it was only necessary for hi' to 'a/e hi'self sec$re a*ainst a few ($t this wo$ld not have (een s$fficient if the people had (een hostile) And do not let any one i'p$*n this state'ent with the trite prover( that 3He who ($ilds on the people ($ilds on the '$d 3 for this is tr$e when a private citi-en 'a/es a fo$ndation there and pers$ades hi'self that the people will free hi' when he is oppressed (y his ene'ies or (y the 'a*istrates+ wherein he wo$ld find hi'self very often deceived as happened to the @racchi in Ro'e and to Messer @ior*io &cali in ,lorence) !$t *ranted a prince who has esta(lished hi'self as a(ove who can co''and and is a 'an of co$ra*e $ndis'ayed in adversity who does not fail in other #$alifications and who (y his resol$tion and ener*y /eeps the whole people enco$ra*ed E s$ch a one will never find hi'self deceived in the' and it will (e shown that he has laid his fo$ndations well) These principalities are lia(le to dan*er when
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they are passin* fro' the civil to the a(sol$te order of *overn'ent for s$ch princes either r$le personally or thro$*h 'a*istrates) In the latter case their *overn'ent is wea/er and 'ore insec$re (eca$se it rests entirely on the *oodwill of those citi-ens who are raised to the 'a*istracy and who especially in tro$(led ti'es can destroy the *overn'ent with *reat ease either (y intri*$e or open defiance+ and the prince has not the chance a'id t$'$lts to e.ercise a(sol$te a$thority (eca$se the citi-ens and s$(9ects acc$sto'ed to receive orders fro' 'a*istrates are not of a 'ind to o(ey hi' a'id these conf$sions and there will always (e in do$(tf$l ti'es a scarcity of 'en who' he can tr$st) ,or s$ch a prince cannot rely $pon what he o(serves in #$iet ti'es when citi-ens had need of the state (eca$se then every one a*rees with hi'+ they all pro'ise and when death is far distant they all wish to die for hi'+ ($t in tro$(led ti'es when the state has need of its citi-ens then he finds ($t few) And so '$ch the 'ore is this e.peri'ent dan*ero$s inas'$ch as it can only (e tried once) Therefore a wise prince o$*ht to adopt s$ch a co$rse that his citi-ens will always in every sort and /ind of circ$'stance have need of the state and of hi' and then he will always find the' faithf$l)
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CHAPTER <
Concernin* The "ay In "hich The &tren*th Of All Principalities O$*ht To !e Meas$red
necessary to consider another point in e.a'inin* the character of these principalities; that is whether a prince has s$ch power that in case of need he can s$pport hi'self with his own reso$rces or whether he has always need of the assistance of others) And to 'a/e this #$ite clear I say that I consider those are a(le to s$pport the'selves (y their own reso$rces who can either (y a($ndance of 'en or 'oney raise a s$fficient ar'y to 9oin (attle a*ainst any one who co'es to attac/ the'+ and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show the'selves a*ainst the ene'y in the field ($t are forced to defend the'selves (y shelterin* (ehind walls) The first case has (een disc$ssed ($t we will spea/ of it a*ain sho$ld it rec$r) In the second case one can say nothin* e.cept to enco$ra*e s$ch princes to provision and fortify their towns and not on any acco$nt to defend the co$ntry) And whoever shall fortify his town well and shall have 'ana*ed the other concerns of his s$(9ects in the way stated a(ove and to (e often repeated will never (e attac/ed witho$t *reat ca$tion for 'en are always adverse to enterprises where diffic$lties can (e
T I&
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Nicolo Machiavelli
seen and it will (e seen not to (e an easy thin* to attac/ one who has his town well fortified and is not hated (y his people) The cities of @er'any are a(sol$tely free they own ($t little co$ntry aro$nd the' and they yield o(edience to the e'peror when it s$its the' nor do they fear this or any other power they 'ay have near the' (eca$se they are fortified in s$ch a way that every one thin/s the ta/in* of the' (y assa$lt wo$ld (e tedio$s and diffic$lt seein* they have proper ditches and walls they have s$fficient artillery and they always /eep in p$(lic depots eno$*h for one year3s eatin* drin/in* and firin*) And (eyond this to /eep the people #$iet and witho$t loss to the state they always have the 'eans of *ivin* wor/ to the co''$nity in those la(o$rs that are the life and stren*th of the city and on the p$rs$it of which the people are s$pported+ they also hold 'ilitary e.ercises in rep$te and 'oreover have 'any ordinances to $phold the') Therefore a prince who has a stron* city and had not 'ade hi'self odio$s will not (e attac/ed or if any one sho$ld attac/ he will only (e driven off with dis*race+ a*ain (eca$se that affairs of this world are so chan*ea(le it is al'ost i'possi(le to /eep an ar'y a whole year in the field witho$t (ein* interfered with) And whoever sho$ld reply; If the people have property o$tside the city and see it ($rnt they will not re'ain patient and the lon* sie*e and self>interest will 'a/e the' for*et their
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prince+ to this I answer that a powerf$l and co$ra*eo$s prince will overco'e all s$ch diffic$lties (y *ivin* at one ti'e hope to his s$(9ects that the evil will not (e for lon* at another ti'e fear of the cr$elty of the ene'y then preservin* hi'self adroitly fro' those s$(9ects who see' to hi' to (e too (old) ,$rther the ene'y wo$ld nat$rally on his arrival at once ($rn and r$in the co$ntry at the ti'e when the spirits of the people are still hot and ready for the defence+ and therefore so '$ch the less o$*ht the prince to hesitate+ (eca$se after a ti'e when spirits have cooled the da'a*e is already done the ills are inc$rred and there is no lon*er any re'edy+ and therefore they are so '$ch the 'ore ready to $nite with their prince he appearin* to (e $nder o(li*ations to the' now that their ho$ses have (een ($rnt and their possessions r$ined in his defence) ,or it is the nat$re of 'en to (e (o$nd (y the (enefits they confer as '$ch as (y those they receive) Therefore if everythin* is well considered it wilt not (e diffic$lt for a wise prince to /eep the 'inds of his citi-ens steadfast fro' first to last when he does not fail to s$pport and defend the')
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Nicolo Machiavelli
CHAPTER <I
Concernin* Ecclesiastical Principalities
re'ains now to spea/ of ecclesiastical principalities to$chin* which all diffic$lties are prior to *ettin* possession (eca$se they are ac#$ired either (y capacity or *ood fort$ne and they can (e held witho$t either+ for they are s$stained (y the ordinances of reli*ion which are so all>powerf$l and of s$ch a character that the principalities 'ay (e held no 'atter how their princes (ehave and live) These princes alone have states and do not defend the' they have s$(9ects and do not r$le the'+ and the states altho$*h $n*$arded are not ta/en fro' the' and the s$(9ects altho$*h not r$led do not care and they have neither the desire nor the a(ility to alienate the'selves) &$ch principalities only are sec$re and happy) !$t (ein* $pheld (y powers to which the h$'an 'ind cannot reach I shall spea/ no 'ore of the' (eca$se (ein* e.alted and 'aintained (y @od it wo$ld (e the act of a pres$'pt$o$s and rash 'an to disc$ss the') Nevertheless if any one sho$ld as/ of 'e how co'es it that the Ch$rch has attained s$ch *reatness in te'poral power seein* that fro' Ale.ander (ac/wards the Italian potentates Cnot only those who have (een called potentates ($t every (aron and lord tho$*h the s'allestD have
T ON%I
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Nicolo Machiavelli
val$ed the te'poral power very sli*htly E yet now a /in* of ,rance tre'(les (efore it and it has (een a(le to drive hi' fro' Italy and to r$in the 2enetians E altho$*h this 'ay (e very 'anifest it does not appear to 'e s$perfl$o$s to recall it in so'e 'eas$re to 'e'ory) !efore Charles Kin* of ,rance passed into Italy this co$ntry was $nder the do'inion of the Pope the 2enetians the Kin* of Naples the 1$/e of Milan and the ,lorentines) These potentates had two principal an.ieties; the one that no forei*ner sho$ld enter Italy $nder ar's+ the other that none of the'selves sho$ld sei-e 'ore territory) Those a(o$t who' there was the 'ost an.iety were the Pope and the 2enetians) To restrain the 2enetians the $nion of all the others was necessary as it was for the defence of ,errara+ and to /eep down the Pope they 'ade $se of the (arons of Ro'e who (ein* divided into two factions Orsini and Colonna had always a prete.t for disorder and standin* with ar's in their hands $nder the eyes of the Pontiff /ept the pontificate wea/ and powerless) And altho$*h there 'i*ht arise so'eti'es a co$ra*eo$s pope s$ch as &i.t$s FI2G yet neither fort$ne nor wisdo' co$ld rid hi' of these annoyances) And the short life of a pope is also a ca$se of wea/ness+ for in the ten years which is the avera*e life of a pope he can with diffic$lty lower one of the factions+ and if so to spea/ one pope sho$ld al'ost destroy the Colonna another wo$ld arise hostile to the Orsini
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Nicolo Machiavelli
who wo$ld s$pport their opponents and yet wo$ld not have ti'e to r$in the Orsini) This was the reason why the te'poral powers of the pope were little estee'ed in Italy) Ale.ander 2I arose afterwards who of all the pontiffs that have ever (een showed how a pope with (oth 'oney and ar's was a(le to prevail+ and thro$*h the instr$'entality of the 1$/e 2alentino and (y reason of the entry of the ,rench he (ro$*ht a(o$t all those thin*s which I have disc$ssed a(ove in the actions of the d$/e) And altho$*h his intention was not to a**randi-e the Ch$rch ($t the d$/e nevertheless what he did contri($ted to the *reatness of the Ch$rch which after his death and the r$in of the d$/e (eca'e the heir to all his la(o$rs) Pope 6$li$s ca'e afterwards and fo$nd the Ch$rch stron* possessin* all the Ro'a*na the (arons of Ro'e red$ced to i'potence and thro$*h the chastise'ents Ale.ander the factions wiped o$t+ he also fo$nd the way open to acc$'$late 'oney in a 'anner s$ch as had never (een practised (efore Ale.ander3s ti'e) &$ch thin*s 6$li$s not only followed ($t i'proved $pon and he intended to *ain !olo*na to r$in the 2enetians and to drive the ,rench o$t of Italy) All of these enterprises prospered with hi' and so '$ch the 'ore to his credit inas'$ch as he did everythin* to stren*then the Ch$rch and not any private person) He /ept also the Orsini and Colonna factions within the (o$nds in which he
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fo$nd the'+ and altho$*h there was a'on* the' so'e 'ind to 'a/e dist$r(ance nevertheless he held two thin*s fir'; the one the *reatness of the ch$rch with which he terrified the'+ and the other not allowin* the' to have their own cardinals who ca$sed the disorders a'on* the') ,or whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not re'ain #$iet for lon* (eca$se cardinals foster the factions in Ro'e and o$t of it and the (arons are co'pelled to s$pport the' and th$s fro' the a'(itions of prelates arise disorders and t$'$lts a'on* the (arons) ,or these reasons his Holiness Pope %eo fo$nd the pontificate 'ost powerf$l and it is to (e hoped that if others 'ade it *reat in ar's he will 'a/e it still *reater and 'ore venerated (y his *oodness and infinite other virt$es)
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CHAPTER <II
How Many Kinds Of &oldiery There Are And Concernin* Mercenaries
disco$rsed partic$larly on the characteristics of s$ch principalities as in the (e*innin* I proposed to disc$ss and havin* considered in so'e de*ree the ca$ses of their (ein* *ood or (ad and havin* shown the 'ethods (y which 'any have so$*ht to ac#$ire the' and to hold the' it now re'ains for 'e to disc$ss *enerally the 'eans of offence and defence which (elon* to each of the') "e have seen a(ove how necessary it is for a prince to have his fo$ndations well laid otherwise it follows of necessity he will *o to r$in) The chief fo$ndations of all states new as well as old or co'posite are *ood laws and *ood ar's+ and as there cannot (e *ood laws where the state is not well ar'ed it follows that where they are well ar'ed they have *ood laws) I shall leave the laws o$t of the disc$ssion and shall spea/ of the ar's) I say therefore that the ar's with which a prince defends his state are either his own or they are 'ercenaries a$.iliaries or 'i.ed) Mercenaries and a$.iliaries are $seless and dan*ero$s+ and if one holds his state (ased on these ar's he will stand neither fir' nor safe+ for they are dis$nited a'(itio$s and witho$t discipline $nfaithf$l
A2IN@
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valiant (efore friends cowardly (efore ene'ies+ they have neither the fear of @od nor fidelity to 'en and destr$ction is deferred only so lon* as the attac/ is+ for in peace one is ro((ed (y the' and in war (y the ene'y) The fact is they have no other attraction or reason for /eepin* the field than a trifle of stipend which is not s$fficient to 'a/e the' willin* to die for yo$) They are ready eno$*h to (e yo$r soldiers whilst yo$ do not 'a/e war ($t if war co'es they ta/e the'selves off or r$n fro' the foe+ which I sho$ld have little tro$(le to prove for the r$in of Italy has (een ca$sed (y nothin* else than (y restin* all her hopes for 'any years on 'ercenaries and altho$*h they for'erly 'ade so'e display and appeared valiant a'on*st the'selves yet when the forei*ners ca'e they showed what they were) Th$s it was that Charles Kin* of ,rance was allowed to sei-e Italy with chal/ in hand+ 1 and he who told $s that o$r sins were the ca$se of it told the tr$th ($t they were not the sins he i'a*ined ($t those which I have related) And as they were the sins of princes it is the princes who have also s$ffered the penalty) I wish to de'onstrate f$rther the infelicity of these ar's) The 'ercenary captains are either capa(le 'en or they are not+ if they are yo$ cannot tr$st the' (eca$se they always aspire to their own *reatness either (y oppressin* yo$ who are their 'aster or others contrary to yo$r intentions+ ($t if the captain is not s/ilf$l yo$ are r$ined in the
1 "ith which to chal/ $p the (illets for his soldiers)
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Nicolo Machiavelli
$s$al way) And if it (e $r*ed that whoever is ar'ed will act in the sa'e way whether 'ercenary or not I reply that when ar's have to (e resorted to either (y a prince or a rep$(lic then the prince o$*ht to *o in person and perfor' the d$ty of captain+ the rep$(lic has to send its citi-ens and when one is sent who does not t$rn o$t satisfactorily it o$*ht to recall hi' and when one is worthy to hold hi' (y the laws so that he does not leave the co''and) And e.perience has shown princes and rep$(lics sin*le>handed 'a/in* the *reatest pro*ress and 'ercenaries doin* nothin* e.cept da'a*e+ and it is 'ore diffic$lt to (rin* a rep$(lic ar'ed with its own ar's $nder the sway of one of its citi-ens than it is to (rin* one ar'ed with forei*n ar's) Ro'e and &parta stood for 'any a*es ar'ed and free) The &wit-ers are co'pletely ar'ed and #$ite free) Of ancient 'ercenaries for e.a'ple there are the Cartha*inians who were oppressed (y their 'ercenary soldiers after the first war with the Ro'ans altho$*h the Cartha*inians had their own citi-ens for captains) After the death of Epa'inondas Philip of Macedon was 'ade captain of their soldiers (y the The(ans and after victory he too/ away their li(erty) 1$/e ,ilippo (ein* dead the Milanese enlisted ,rancesco &for-a a*ainst the 2enetians and he havin* overco'e the ene'y at Carava**io allied hi'self with the' to cr$sh the Milanese his
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Nicolo Machiavelli
'asters) His father &for-a havin* (een en*a*ed (y J$een 6ohanna of Naples left her $nprotected so that she was forced to throw herself into the ar's of the Kin* of Ara*on in order to save her /in*do') And if the 2enetians and ,lorentines for'erly e.tended their do'inions (y these ar's and yet their captains did not 'a/e the'selves princes ($t have defended the' I reply that the ,lorentines in this case have (een favo$red (y chance for of the a(le captains of who' they 'i*ht have stood in fear so'e have not con#$ered so'e have (een opposed and others have t$rned their a'(itions elsewhere) One who did not con#$er was @iovanni Ac$to ' and since he did not con#$er his fidelity cannot (e proved+ ($t every one will ac/nowled*e that had he con#$ered the ,lorentines wo$ld have stood at his discretion) &for-a had the !racceschi always a*ainst hi' so they watched each other) ,rancesco t$rned his a'(ition to %o'(ardy+ !raccio a*ainst the Ch$rch and the /in*do' of Naples) !$t let $s co'e to that which happened a short while a*o) The ,lorentines appointed as their captain Paolo 2itelli a 'ost pr$dent 'an who fro' a private position had risen to the *reatest renown) If this 'an had ta/en Pisa no(ody can deny that it wo$ld have (een proper for the ,lorentines to /eep in with hi' for if he (eca'e the soldier of their ene'ies they had no 'eans of resistin* and if they
0 As &ir 6ohn Haw/wood the En*lish leader of 'ercenaries was called (y the Italians)
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held to hi' they '$st o(ey hi') The 2enetians if their achieve'ents are considered will (e seen to have acted safely and *lorio$sly so lon* as they sent to war their own 'en when with ar'ed *entle'en and ple(eians they did valiantly) This was (efore they t$rned to enterprises on land ($t when they (e*an to fi*ht on land they forsoo/ this virt$e and followed the c$sto' of Italy) And in the (e*innin* of their e.pansion on land thro$*h not havin* '$ch territory and (eca$se of their *reat rep$tation they had not '$ch to fear fro' their captains+ ($t when they e.panded as $nder Car'i*nola they had a taste of this 'ista/e+ for havin* fo$nd hi' a 'ost valiant 'an Cthey (eat the 1$/e of Milan $nder his leadershipD and on the other hand /nowin* how l$/ewar' he was in the war they feared they wo$ld no lon*er con#$er $nder hi' and for this reason they were not willin* nor were they a(le to let hi' *o+ and so not to lose a*ain that which they had ac#$ired they were co'pelled in order to sec$re the'selves to '$rder hi') They had afterwards for their captains !artolo'eo da !er*a'o Ro(erto da &an &everino the Co$nt of Piti*liano and the li/e $nder who' they had to dread loss and not *ain as happened afterwards at 2aila where in one (attle they lost that which in ei*ht h$ndred years they had ac#$ired with so '$ch tro$(le) !eca$se fro' s$ch ar's con#$ests co'e ($t slowly lon* delayed and inconsidera(le ($t the losses s$dden and portento$s)
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And as with these e.a'ples I have reached Italy which has (een r$led for 'any years (y 'ercenaries I wish to disc$ss the' 'ore serio$sly in order that havin* seen their rise and pro*ress one 'ay (e (etter prepared to co$nteract the') Io$ '$st $nderstand that the e'pire has recently co'e to (e rep$diated in Italy that the Pope has ac#$ired 'ore te'poral power and that Italy has (een divided $p into 'ore states for the reason that 'any of the *reat cities too/ $p ar's a*ainst their no(les who for'erly favo$red (y the e'peror were oppressin* the' whilst the Ch$rch was favo$rin* the' so as to *ain a$thority in te'poral power; in 'any others their citi-ens (eca'e princes) ,ro' this it ca'e to pass that Italy fell partly into the hands of the Ch$rch and of rep$(lics and the Ch$rch consistin* of priests and the rep$(lic of citi-ens $nacc$sto'ed to ar's (oth co''enced to enlist forei*ners) The first who *ave renown to this soldiery was Al(eri*o da Conio a native of the Ro'a*na) ,ro' the school of this 'an spran* a'on* others !raccio and &for-a who in their ti'e were the ar(iters of Italy) After these ca'e all the other captains who till now have directed the ar's of Italy+ and the end of all their valo$r has (een that she has (een overr$n (y Charles ro((ed (y %o$is rava*ed (y ,erdinand and ins$lted (y the &wit-ers) The principle that has *$ided the' has (een first to lower the credit of infantry so that they 'i*ht increase their own) They did this
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(eca$se s$(sistin* on their pay and witho$t territory they were $na(le to s$pport 'any soldiers and a few infantry did not *ive the' any a$thority+ so they were led to e'ploy cavalry with a 'oderate force of which they were 'aintained and hono$red+ and affairs were (ro$*ht to s$ch a pass that in an ar'y of twenty tho$sand soldiers there were not to (e fo$nd two tho$sand foot soldiers) They had (esides this $sed every art to lessen fati*$e and dan*er to the'selves and their soldiers not /illin* in the fray ($t ta/in* prisoners and li(eratin* witho$t ranso') They did not attac/ towns at ni*ht nor did the *arrisons of the towns attac/ enca'p'ents at ni*ht+ they did not s$rro$nd the ca'p either with stoc/ade or ditch nor did they ca'pai*n in the winter) All these thin*s were per'itted (y their 'ilitary r$les and devised (y the' to avoid as I have said (oth fati*$e and dan*ers+ th$s they have (ro$*ht Italy to slavery and conte'pt)
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Nicolo Machiavelli
CHAPTER <III
Concernin* A$.iliaries Mi.ed &oldiery And One3s Own
which are the other $seless ar' are e'ployed when a prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend as was done (y Pope 6$li$s in the 'ost recent ti'es+ for he havin* in the enterprise a*ainst ,errara had poor proof of his 'ercenaries t$rned to a$.iliaries and stip$lated with ,erdinand Kin* of &pain for his assistance with 'en and ar's) These ar's 'ay (e $sef$l and *ood in the'selves ($t for hi' who calls the' in they are always disadvanta*eo$s+ for losin* one is $ndone and winnin* one is their captive) And altho$*h ancient histories 'ay (e f$ll of e.a'ples I do not wish to leave this recent one of Pope 6$li$s II the peril of which cannot fall to (e perceived+ for he wishin* to *et ,errara threw hi'self entirely into the hands of the forei*ner) !$t his *ood fort$ne (ro$*ht a(o$t a third event so that he did not reap the fr$it of his rash choice+ (eca$se havin* a$.iliaries ro$ted at Ravenna and the &wit-ers havin* risen and driven o$t the con#$erors Ca*ainst all e.pectation (oth his and othersD it so ca'e to pass that he did not (eco'e prisoner to his ene'ies they havin* fled nor to his a$.iliaries he havin* con#$ered (y other ar's
:<I%IARIE&
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than theirs) The ,lorentines (ein* entirely witho$t ar's sent ten tho$sand ,rench'en to ta/e Pisa where(y they ran 'ore dan*er than at any other ti'e of their tro$(les) The E'peror of Constantinople to oppose his nei*h(o$rs sent ten tho$sand T$r/s into @reece who on the war (ein* finished were not willin* to #$it+ this was the (e*innin* of the servit$de of @reece to the infidels) Therefore let hi' who has no desire to con#$er 'a/e $se of these ar's for they are '$ch 'ore ha-ardo$s than 'ercenaries (eca$se with the' the r$in is ready 'ade+ they are all $nited all yield o(edience to others+ ($t with 'ercenaries when they have con#$ered 'ore ti'e and (etter opport$nities are needed to in9$re yo$+ they are not all of one co''$nity they are fo$nd and paid (y yo$ and a third party which yo$ have 'ade their head is not a(le all at once to ass$'e eno$*h a$thority to in9$re yo$) In concl$sion in 'ercenaries dastardy is 'ost dan*ero$s+ in a$.iliaries valo$r) The wise prince therefore has always avoided these ar's and t$rned to his own+ and has (een willin* rather to lose with the' than to con#$er with others not dee'in* that a real victory which is *ained with the ar's of others) I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare !or*ia and his actions) This d$/e entered the Ro'a*na with a$.iliaries ta/in* there only ,rench soldiers and with the' he capt$red I'ola and ,orli+ ($t
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afterwards s$ch forces not appearin* to hi' relia(le he t$rned to 'ercenaries discernin* less dan*er in the' and enlisted the Orsini and 2itelli+ who' presently on handlin* and findin* the' do$(tf$l $nfaithf$l and dan*ero$s he destroyed and t$rned to his own 'en) And the difference (etween one and the other of these forces can easily (e seen when one considers the difference there was in the rep$tation of the d$/e when he had the ,rench when he had the Orsini and 2itelli and when he relied on his own soldiers on whose fidelity he co$ld always co$nt and fo$nd it ever increasin*+ he was never estee'ed 'ore hi*hly than when every one saw that he was co'plete 'aster of his own forces) I was not intendin* to *o (eyond Italian and recent e.a'ples ($t I a' $nwillin* to leave o$t Hiero the &yrac$san he (ein* one of those I have na'ed a(ove) This 'an as I have said 'ade head of the ar'y (y the &yrac$sans soon fo$nd o$t that a 'ercenary soldiery constit$ted li/e o$r Italian condottieri was of no $se+ and it appearin* to hi' that he co$ld neither /eep the' nor let the' *o he had the' all c$t to pieces and afterwards 'ade war with his own forces and not with aliens) I wish also to recall to 'e'ory an instance fro' the Old Testa'ent applica(le to this s$(9ect) 1avid offered hi'self to &a$l to fi*ht with @oliath the Philistine cha'pion and to *ive hi' co$ra*e &a$l ar'ed hi' with his own weapons+ which 1avid re9ected as soon as he had the' on his (ac/
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sayin* he co$ld 'a/e no $se of the' and that he wished to 'eet the ene'y with his slin* and his /nife) In concl$sion the ar's of others either fall fro' yo$r (ac/ or they wei*h yo$ down or they (ind yo$ fast) Charles 2II the father of Kin* %o$is <I havin* (y *ood fort$ne and valo$r li(erated ,rance fro' the En*lish reco*ni-ed the necessity of (ein* ar'ed with forces of his own and he esta(lished in his /in*do' ordinances concernin* 'en>at>ar's and infantry) Afterwards his son Kin* %o$is a(olished the infantry and (e*an to enlist the &wit-ers which 'ista/e followed (y others is as is now seen a so$rce of peril to that /in*do'+ (eca$se havin* raised the rep$tation of the &wit-ers he has entirely di'inished the val$e of his own ar's for he has destroyed the infantry alto*ether+ and his 'en>at>ar's he has s$(ordinated to others for (ein* as they are so acc$sto'ed to fi*ht alon* with &wit-ers it does not appear that they can now con#$er witho$t the') Hence it arises that the ,rench cannot stand a*ainst the &wit-ers and witho$t the &wit-ers they do not co'e off well a*ainst others) The ar'ies of the ,rench have th$s (eco'e 'i.ed partly 'ercenary and partly national (oth of which ar's to*ether are '$ch (etter than 'ercenaries alone or a$.iliaries alone yet '$ch inferior to one3s own forces) And this e.a'ple proves it the /in*do' of ,rance wo$ld (e $ncon#$era(le if the ordinance of Charles had (een enlar*ed or 'aintained)
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!$t the scanty wisdo' of 'an on enterin* into an affair which loo/s well at first cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it as I have said a(ove of hectic fevers) Therefore if he who r$les a principality cannot reco*ni-e evils $ntil they are $pon hi' he is not tr$ly wise+ and this insi*ht is *iven to few) And if the first disaster to the Ro'an E'pire sho$ld (e e.a'ined it will (e fo$nd to have co''enced only with the enlistin* of the @oths+ (eca$se fro' that ti'e the vi*o$r of the Ro'an E'pire (e*an to decline and all that valo$r which had raised it passed away to others) I concl$de therefore that no principality is sec$re witho$t havin* its own forces+ on the contrary it is entirely dependent on *ood fort$ne not havin* the valo$r which in adversity wo$ld defend it) And it has always (een the opinion and 9$d*'ent of wise 'en that nothin* can (e so $ncertain or $nsta(le as fa'e or power not fo$nded on its own stren*th) And one3s own forces are those which are co'posed either of s$(9ects citi-ens or dependants+ all others are 'ercenaries or a$.iliaries) And the way to ta/e ready one3s own forces will (e easily fo$nd if the r$les s$**ested (y 'e shall (e reflected $pon and if one will consider how Philip the father of Ale.ander the @reat and 'any rep$(lics and princes have ar'ed and or*ani-ed the'selves to which r$les I entirely co''it 'yself)
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CHAPTER <I2
That "hich Concerns A Prince On The &$(9ect Of The Art Of "ar
o$*ht to have no other ai' or tho$*ht nor select anythin* else for his st$dy than war and its r$les and discipline+ for this is the sole art that (elon*s to hi' who r$les and it is of s$ch force that it not only $pholds those who are (orn princes ($t it often ena(les 'en to rise fro' a private station to that ran/) And on the contrary it is seen that when princes have tho$*ht 'ore of ease than of ar's they have lost their states) And the first ca$se of yo$r losin* it is to ne*lect this art+ and what ena(les yo$ to ac#$ire a state is to (e 'aster of the art) ,rancesco &for-a thro$*h (ein* 'artial fro' a private person (eca'e 1$/e of Milan+ and the sons thro$*h avoidin* the hardships and tro$(les of ar's fro' d$/es (eca'e private persons) ,or a'on* other evils which (ein* $nar'ed (rin*s yo$ it ca$ses yo$ to (e despised and this is one of those i*no'inies a*ainst which a prince o$*ht to *$ard hi'self as is shown later on) !eca$se there is nothin* proportionate (etween the ar'ed and the $nar'ed+ and it is not reasona(le that he who is ar'ed sho$ld yield o(edience willin*ly to hi' who is $nar'ed or that the $nar'ed 'an sho$ld (e sec$re a'on* ar'ed servants) !eca$se there
PRINCE
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(ein* in the one disdain and in the other s$spicion it is not possi(le for the' to wor/ well to*ether) And therefore a prince who does not $nderstand the art of war over and a(ove the other 'isfort$nes already 'entioned cannot (e respected (y his soldiers nor can he rely on the') He o$*ht never therefore to have o$t of his tho$*hts this s$(9ect of war and in peace he sho$ld addict hi'self 'ore to its e.ercise than in war+ this he can do in two ways the one (y action the other (y st$dy) As re*ards action he o$*ht a(ove all thin*s to /eep his 'en well or*ani-ed and drilled to follow incessantly the chase (y which he acc$sto's his (ody to hardships and learns so'ethin* of the nat$re of localities and *ets to find o$t how the 'o$ntains rise how the valleys open o$t how the plains lie and to $nderstand the nat$re of rivers and 'arshes and in all this to ta/e the *reatest care) "hich /nowled*e is $sef$l in two ways) ,irstly he learns to /now his co$ntry and is (etter a(le to $nderta/e its defence+ afterwards (y 'eans of the /nowled*e and o(servation of that locality he $nderstands with ease any other which it 'ay (e necessary for hi' to st$dy hereafter+ (eca$se the hills valleys and plains and rivers and 'arshes that are for instance in T$scany have a certain rese'(lance to those of other co$ntries so that with a /nowled*e of the aspect of one co$ntry one can easily arrive at a /nowled*e of others) And the prince that lac/s this s/ill lac/s the essential which
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it is desira(le that a captain sho$ld possess for it teaches hi' to s$rprise his ene'y to select #$arters to lead ar'ies to array the (attle to (esie*e towns to advanta*e) Philopoe'en Prince of the Achaeans a'on* other praises which writers have (estowed on hi' is co''ended (eca$se in ti'e of peace he never had anythin* in his 'ind ($t the r$les of war+ and when he was in the co$ntry with friends he often stopped and reasoned with the'; KIf the ene'y sho$ld (e $pon that hill and we sho$ld find o$rselves here with o$r ar'y with who' wo$ld (e the advanta*eH How sho$ld one (est advance to 'eet hi' /eepin* the ran/sH If we sho$ld wish to retreat how o$*ht we to set a(o$t itH If they sho$ld retreat how o$*ht we to p$rs$eHK And he wo$ld set forth to the' as he went all the chances that co$ld (efall an ar'y+ he wo$ld listen to their opinion and state his confir'in* it with reasons so that (y these contin$al disc$ssions there co$ld never arise in ti'e of war any $ne.pected circ$'stances that he co$ld deal with) !$t to e.ercise the intellect the prince sho$ld read histories and st$dy there the actions of ill$strio$s 'en to see how they have (orne the'selves in war to e.a'ine the ca$ses of their victories and defeat so as to avoid the latter and i'itate the for'er+ and a(ove all do as an ill$strio$s 'an did who too/ as an e.e'plar one who had (een praised and fa'o$s (efore hi' and whose achieve'ents and deeds he always /ept in
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his 'ind as it is said Ale.ander the @reat i'itated Achilles Caesar Ale.ander &cipio Cyr$s) And whoever reads the life of Cyr$s written (y <enophon will reco*ni-e afterwards in the life of &cipio how that i'itation was his *lory and how in chastity affa(ility h$'anity and li(erality &cipio confor'ed to those thin*s which have (een written of Cyr$s (y <enophon) A wise prince o$*ht to o(serve so'e s$ch r$les and never in peacef$l ti'es stand idle ($t increase his reso$rces with ind$stry in s$ch a way that they 'ay (e availa(le to hi' in adversity so that if fort$ne chan*es it 'ay find hi' prepared to resist her (lows)
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CHAPTER <2
Concernin* Thin*s ,or "hich Men And Especially Princes Are Praised Or !la'ed
now to see what o$*ht to (e the r$les of cond$ct for a prince towards s$(9ect and friends) And as I /now that 'any have written on this point I e.pect I shall (e considered pres$'pt$o$s in 'entionin* it a*ain especially as in disc$ssin* it I shall depart fro' the 'ethods of other people) !$t it (ein* 'y intention to write a thin* which shall (e $sef$l to hi' who apprehends it it appears to 'e 'ore appropriate to follow $p the real tr$th of a 'atter than the i'a*ination of it+ for 'any have pict$red rep$(lics and principalities which in fact have never (een /nown or seen (eca$se how one lives is so far distant fro' how one o$*ht to live that he who ne*lects what is done for what o$*ht to (e done sooner effects his r$in than his preservation+ for a 'an who wishes to act entirely $p to his professions of virt$e soon 'eets with what destroys hi' a'on* so '$ch that is evil) Hence it is necessary for a prince wishin* to hold his own to /now how to do wron* and to 'a/e $se of it or not accordin* to necessity) Therefore p$ttin* on one side i'a*inary thin*s concernin* a prince and disc$ssin* those which are real I say that all 'en when they are spo/en of
T REMAIN&
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and chiefly princes for (ein* 'ore hi*hly placed are re'ar/a(le for so'e of those #$alities which (rin* the' either (la'e or praise+ and th$s it is that one is rep$ted li(eral another 'iserly $sin* a T$scan ter' C(eca$se an avaricio$s person in o$r lan*$a*e is still he who desires to possess (y ro((ery whilst we call one 'iserly who deprives hi'self too '$ch of the $se of his ownD+ one is rep$ted *enero$s one rapacio$s+ one cr$el one co'passionate+ one faithless another faithf$l+ one effe'inate and cowardly another (old and (rave+ one affa(le another ha$*hty+ one lascivio$s another chaste+ one sincere another c$nnin*+ one hard another easy+ one *rave another frivolo$s+ one reli*io$s another $n(elievin* and the li/e) And I /now that every one will confess that it wo$ld (e 'ost praiseworthy in a prince to e.hi(it all the a(ove #$alities that are considered *ood+ ($t (eca$se they can neither (e entirely possessed nor o(served for h$'an conditions do not per'it it it is necessary for hi' to (e s$fficiently pr$dent that he 'ay /now how to avoid the reproach of those vices which wo$ld lose hi' his state+ and also to /eep hi'self if it (e possi(le fro' those which wo$ld not lose hi' it+ ($t this not (ein* possi(le he 'ay with less hesitation a(andon hi'self to the') And a*ain he need not 'a/e hi'self $neasy at inc$rrin* a reproach for those vices witho$t which the state can only (e saved with diffic$lty for if everythin* is considered caref$lly it will (e fo$nd that so'ethin* which
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loo/s li/e virt$e if followed wo$ld (e his r$in+ whilst so'ethin* else which loo/s li/e vice yet followed (rin*s hi' sec$rity and prosperity)
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CHAPTER <2I
Concernin* %i(erality And Meanness
then with the first of the a(ove>na'ed characteristics I say that it wo$ld (e well to (e rep$ted li(eral) Nevertheless li(erality e.ercised in a way that does not (rin* yo$ the rep$tation for it in9$res yo$+ for if one e.ercises it honestly and as it sho$ld (e e.ercised it 'ay not (eco'e /nown and yo$ will not avoid the reproach of its opposite) Therefore any one wishin* to 'aintain a'on* 'en the na'e of li(eral is o(li*ed to avoid no attri($te of 'a*nificence+ so that a prince th$s inclined will cons$'e in s$ch acts all his property and will (e co'pelled in the end if he wish to 'aintain the na'e of li(eral to $nd$ly wei*h down his people and ta. the' and do everythin* he can to *et 'oney) This will soon 'a/e hi' odio$s to his s$(9ects and (eco'in* poor he will (e little val$ed (y any one+ th$s with his li(erality havin* offended 'any and rewarded few he is affected (y the very first tro$(le and i'perilled (y whatever 'ay (e the first dan*er+ reco*ni-in* this hi'self and wishin* to draw (ac/ fro' it he r$ns at once into the reproach of (ein* 'iserly) Therefore a prince not (ein* a(le to e.ercise this virt$e of li(erality in s$ch a way that it is reco*ni-ed e.cept to his cost if he is wise he
OMMENCIN@
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o$*ht not to fear the rep$tation of (ein* 'ean for in ti'e he will co'e to (e 'ore considered than if li(eral seein* that with his econo'y his reven$es are eno$*h that he can defend hi'self a*ainst all attac/s and is a(le to en*a*e in enterprises witho$t ($rdenin* his people+ th$s it co'es to pass that he e.ercises li(erality towards all fro' who' he does not ta/e who are n$'(erless and 'eanness towards those to who' he does not *ive who are few) "e have not seen *reat thin*s done in o$r ti'e e.cept (y those who have (een considered 'ean+ the rest have failed) Pope 6$li$s the &econd was assisted in reachin* the papacy (y a rep$tation for li(erality yet he did not strive afterwards to /eep it $p when he 'ade war on the Kin* of ,rance+ and he 'ade 'any wars witho$t i'posin* any e.traordinary ta. on his s$(9ects for he s$pplied his additional e.penses o$t of his lon* thriftiness) The present Kin* of &pain wo$ld not have $nderta/en or con#$ered in so 'any enterprises if he had (een rep$ted li(eral) A prince therefore provided that he has not to ro( his s$(9ects that he can defend hi'self that he does not (eco'e poor and a(9ect that he is not forced to (eco'e rapacio$s o$*ht to hold of little acco$nt a rep$tation for (ein* 'ean for it is one of those vices which will ena(le hi' to *overn) And if any one sho$ld say; Caesar o(tained e'pire (y li(erality and 'any others have reached the hi*hest positions (y havin* (een li(eral and (y
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(ein* considered so I answer; Either yo$ are a prince in fact or in a way to (eco'e one) In the first case this li(erality is dan*ero$s in the second it is very necessary to (e considered li(eral+ and Caesar was one of those who wished to (eco'e pre>e'inent in Ro'e+ ($t if he had s$rvived after (eco'in* so and had not 'oderated his e.penses he wo$ld have destroyed his *overn'ent) And if any one sho$ld reply; Many have (een princes and have done *reat thin*s with ar'ies who have (een considered very li(eral I reply; Either a prince spends that which is his own or his s$(9ects3 or else that of others) In the first case he o$*ht to (e sparin* in the second he o$*ht not to ne*lect any opport$nity for li(erality) And to the price who *oes forth with his ar'y s$pportin* it (y pilla*e sac/ and e.tortion handlin* that which (elon*s to others this li(erality is necessary otherwise he wo$ld not (e followed (y soldiers) And of that which is neither yo$rs nor yo$r s$(9ects3 yo$ can (e a ready *iver as were Cyr$s Caesar and Ale.ander+ (eca$se it does not ta/e away yo$r rep$tation if yo$ s#$ander that of others ($t adds to it+ it is only s#$anderin* yo$r own that in9$res yo$) And there is nothin* wastes so rapidly as li(erality for even whilst yo$ e.ercise it yo$ lose the power to do so and so (eco'e either poor or despised or else in avoidin* poverty rapacio$s and hated) And a prince sho$ld *$ard hi'self a(ove all thin*s a*ainst (ein* despised and hated+
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and li(erality leads yo$ to (oth) Therefore it is wiser to have a rep$tation for 'eanness which (rin*s reproach witho$t hatred than to (e co'pelled thro$*h see/in* a rep$tation for li(erality to inc$r a na'e for rapacity which (e*ets reproach with hatred)
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Nicolo Machiavelli
CHAPTER <2II
Concernin* Cr$elty And Cle'ency And "hether It Is !etter To !e %oved Than ,eared
now to the other #$alities 'entioned a(ove I say that every prince o$*ht to desire to (e considered cle'ent and not cr$el) Nevertheless he o$*ht to ta/e care not to 'is$se this cle'ency) Cesare !or*ia was considered cr$el+ notwithstandin* his cr$elty reconciled the Ro'a*na $nified it and restored it to peace and loyalty) And if this (e ri*htly considered he will (e seen to have (een '$ch 'ore 'ercif$l than the ,lorentine people who to avoid a rep$tation for cr$elty per'itted Pistoia to (e destroyed) Therefore a prince so lon* as he /eeps his s$(9ects $nited and loyal o$*ht not to 'ind the reproach of cr$elty+ (eca$se with a few e.a'ples he will (e 'ore 'ercif$l than those who thro$*h too '$ch 'ercy allow disorders to arise fro' which follow '$rders or ro((eries+ for these are wont to in9$re the whole people whilst those e.ec$tions which ori*inate with a prince offend the individ$al only) And of all princes it is i'possi(le for the new prince to avoid the i'p$tation of cr$elty owin* to new states (ein* f$ll of dan*ers) Hence 2ir*il thro$*h the 'o$th of 1ido e.c$ses the
OMIN@
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inh$'anity of her rei*n owin* to its (ein* new sayin*; Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt Moliri, et late fines custode tueri. 1 Nevertheless he o$*ht to (e slow to (elieve and to act nor sho$ld he hi'self show fear ($t proceed in a te'perate 'anner with pr$dence and h$'anity so that too '$ch confidence 'ay not 'a/e hi' inca$tio$s and too '$ch distr$st render hi' intolera(le) :pon this a #$estion arises; whether it (e (etter to (e loved than feared or feared than lovedH It 'ay (e answered that one sho$ld wish to (e (oth ($t (eca$se it is diffic$lt to $nite the' in one person is '$ch safer to (e feared than loved when of the two either '$st (e dispensed with) !eca$se this is to (e asserted in *eneral of 'en that they are $n*ratef$l fic/le false cowardly coveto$s and as lon* as yo$ s$cceed they are yo$rs entirely+ they will offer yo$ their (lood property life and children as is said a(ove when the need is far distant+ ($t when it approaches they t$rn a*ainst yo$) And that prince who relyin* entirely on their pro'ises has ne*lected other preca$tions is r$ined+ (eca$se friendships that are
1 )))a*ainst 'y will 'y fate A throne $nsettled and an infant state !id 'e defend 'y real's with all 'y pow3rs And *$ard with these severities 'y shores)
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o(tained (y pay'ents and not (y *reatness or no(ility of 'ind 'ay indeed (e earned ($t they are not sec$red and in ti'e of need cannot (e relied $pon+ and 'en have less scr$ple in offendin* one who is (eloved than one who is feared for love is preserved (y the lin/ of o(li*ation which owin* to the (aseness of 'en is (ro/en at every opport$nity for their advanta*e+ ($t fear preserves yo$ (y a dread of p$nish'ent which never fails) Nevertheless a prince o$*ht to inspire fear in s$ch a way that if he does not win love he avoids hatred+ (eca$se he can end$re very well (ein* feared whilst he is not hated which will always (e as lon* as he a(stains fro' the property of his citi-ens and s$(9ects and fro' their wo'en) !$t when it is necessary for hi' to proceed a*ainst the life of so'eone he '$st do it on proper 9$stification and for 'anifest ca$se ($t a(ove all thin*s he '$st /eep his hands off the property of others (eca$se 'en 'ore #$ic/ly for*et the death of their father than the loss of their patri'ony) !esides prete.ts for ta/in* away the property are never wantin*+ for he who has once (e*$n to live (y ro((ery will always find prete.ts for sei-in* what (elon*s to others+ ($t reasons for ta/in* life on the contrary are 'ore diffic$lt to find and sooner lapse) !$t when a prince is with his ar'y and has $nder control a '$ltit$de of soldiers then it is #$ite necessary for hi' to disre*ard the rep$tation of cr$elty for witho$t it he wo$ld never
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hold his ar'y $nited or disposed to its d$ties) A'on* the wonderf$l deeds of Hanni(al this one is en$'erated; that havin* led an enor'o$s ar'y co'posed of 'any vario$s races of 'en to fi*ht in forei*n lands no dissensions arose either a'on* the' or a*ainst the prince whether in his (ad or in his *ood fort$ne) This arose fro' nothin* else than his inh$'an cr$elty which with his (o$ndless valo$r 'ade hi' revered and terri(le in the si*ht of his soldiers ($t witho$t that cr$elty his other virt$es were not s$fficient to prod$ce this effect) And shortsi*hted writers ad'ire his deeds fro' one point of view and fro' another conde'n the principal ca$se of the') That it is tr$e his other virt$es wo$ld not have (een s$fficient for hi' 'ay (e proved (y the case of &cipio that 'ost e.cellent 'an not of his own ti'es ($t within the 'e'ory of 'an a*ainst who' nevertheless his ar'y re(elled in &pain+ this arose fro' nothin* ($t his too *reat for(earance which *ave his soldiers 'ore licence than is consistent with 'ilitary discipline) ,or this he was $p(raided in the &enate (y ,a(i$s Ma.i'$s and called the corr$pter of the Ro'an soldiery) The %ocrians were laid waste (y a le*ate of &cipio yet they were not aven*ed (y hi' nor was the insolence of the le*ate p$nished owin* entirely to his easy nat$re) Inso'$ch that so'eone in the &enate wishin* to e.c$se hi' said there were 'any 'en who /new '$ch (etter how not to err than to correct the errors of others) This disposition if he had (een contin$ed in the
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co''and wo$ld have destroyed in ti'e the fa'e and *lory of &cipio+ ($t he (ein* $nder the control of the &enate this in9$rio$s characteristic not only concealed itself ($t contri($ted to his *lory) Ret$rnin* to the #$estion of (ein* feared or loved I co'e to the concl$sion that 'en lovin* accordin* to their own will and fearin* accordin* to that of the prince a wise prince sho$ld esta(lish hi'self on that which is in his own control and not in that of others+ he '$st endeavo$r only to avoid hatred as is noted)
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CHAPTER <2III
Concernin* The "ay In "hich Princes &ho$ld Keep ,aith
one ad'its how praiseworthy it is in a prince to /eep faith and to live with inte*rity and not with craft) Nevertheless o$r e.perience has (een that those princes who have done *reat thin*s have held *ood faith of little acco$nt and have /nown how to circ$'vent the intellect of 'en (y craft and in the end have overco'e those who have relied on their word) Io$ '$st /now there are two ways of contestin* the one (y the law the other (y force+ the first 'ethod is proper to 'en the second to (easts+ ($t (eca$se the first is fre#$ently not s$fficient it is necessary to have reco$rse to the second) Therefore it is necessary for a prince to $nderstand how to avail hi'self of the (east and the 'an) This has (een fi*$ratively ta$*ht to princes (y ancient writers who descri(e how Achilles and 'any other princes of old were *iven to the Centa$r Chiron to n$rse who (ro$*ht the' $p in his discipline+ which 'eans solely that as they had for a teacher one who was half (east and half 'an so it is necessary for a prince to /now how to 'a/e $se of (oth nat$res and that one witho$t the other is not d$ra(le) A prince therefore (ein* co'pelled /nowin*ly to adopt the (east o$*ht to choose the
2ERI
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fo. and the lion+ (eca$se the lion cannot defend hi'self a*ainst snares and the fo. cannot defend hi'self a*ainst wolves) Therefore it is necessary to (e a fo. to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves) Those who rely si'ply on the lion do not $nderstand what they are a(o$t) Therefore a wise lord cannot nor o$*ht he to /eep faith when s$ch o(servance 'ay (e t$rned a*ainst hi' and when the reasons that ca$sed hi' to pled*e it e.ist no lon*er) If 'en were entirely *ood this precept wo$ld not hold ($t (eca$se they are (ad and will not /eep faith with yo$ yo$ too are not (o$nd to o(serve it with the') Nor will there ever (e wantin* to a prince le*iti'ate reasons to e.c$se this nono(servance) Of this endless 'odern e.a'ples co$ld (e *iven showin* how 'any treaties and en*a*e'ents have (een 'ade void and of no effect thro$*h the faithlessness of princes+ and he who has /nown (est how to e'ploy the fo. has s$cceeded (est) !$t it is necessary to /now well how to dis*$ise this characteristic and to (e a *reat pretender and disse'(ler+ and 'en are so si'ple and so s$(9ect to present necessities that he who see/s to deceive will always find so'eone who will allow hi'self to (e deceived) One recent e.a'ple I cannot pass over in silence) Ale.ander 2I did nothin* else ($t deceive 'en nor ever tho$*ht of doin* otherwise and he always fo$nd victi's+ for there never was a 'an who had *reater power in assertin* or who with *reater oaths wo$ld affir' a thin* yet wo$ld
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o(serve it less+ nevertheless his deceits always s$cceeded accordin* to his wishes (eca$se he well $nderstood this side of 'an/ind) Therefore it is $nnecessary for a prince to have all the *ood #$alities I have en$'erated ($t it is very necessary to appear to have the') And I shall dare to say this also that to have the' and always to o(serve the' is in9$rio$s and that to appear to have the' is $sef$l+ to appear 'ercif$l faithf$l h$'ane reli*io$s $pri*ht and to (e so ($t with a 'ind so fra'ed that sho$ld yo$ re#$ire not to (e so yo$ 'ay (e a(le and /now how to chan*e to the opposite) And yo$ have to $nderstand this that a prince especially a new one cannot o(serve all those thin*s for which 'en are estee'ed (ein* often forced in order to 'aintain the state to act contrary to faith friendship h$'anity and reli*ion) Therefore it is necessary for hi' to have a 'ind ready to t$rn itself accordin*ly as the winds and variations of fort$ne force it yet as I have said a(ove not to diver*e fro' the *ood if he can avoid doin* so ($t if co'pelled then to /now how to set a(o$t it) ,or this reason a prince o$*ht to ta/e care that he never lets anythin* slip fro' his lips that is not replete with the a(ove>na'ed five #$alities that he 'ay appear to hi' who sees and hears hi' alto*ether 'ercif$l faithf$l h$'ane $pri*ht and reli*io$s) There is nothin* 'ore necessary to appear to have than this last #$ality inas'$ch as
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'en 9$d*e *enerally 'ore (y the eye than (y the hand (eca$se it (elon*s to every(ody to see yo$ to few to co'e in to$ch with yo$) Every one sees what yo$ appear to (e few really /now what yo$ are and those few dare not oppose the'selves to the opinion of the 'any who have the 'a9esty of the state to defend the'+ and in the actions of all 'en and especially of princes which it is not pr$dent to challen*e one 9$d*es (y the res$lt) ,or that reason let a prince have the credit of con#$erin* and holdin* his state the 'eans will always (e considered honest and he will (e praised (y every(ody (eca$se the v$l*ar are always ta/en (y what a thin* see's to (e and (y what co'es of it+ and in the world there are only the v$l*ar for the few find a place there only when the 'any have no *ro$nd to rest on) One prince 1 of the present ti'e who' it is not well to na'e never preaches anythin* else ($t peace and *ood faith and to (oth he is 'ost hostile and either if he had /ept it wo$ld have deprived hi' of rep$tation and /in*do' 'any a ti'e)
1 Ma.i'ilian I Holy Ro'an E'peror)
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Nicolo Machiavelli
CHAPTER <I<
That One &ho$ld Avoid !ein* 1espised And Hated
concernin* the characteristics of which 'ention is 'ade a(ove I have spo/en of the 'ore i'portant ones the others I wish to disc$ss (riefly $nder this *enerality that the prince '$st consider as has (een in part said (efore how to avoid those thin*s which will 'a/e hi' hated or conte'pti(le+ and as often as he shall have s$cceeded he will have f$lfilled his part and he need not fear any dan*er in other reproaches) It 'a/es hi' hated a(ove all thin*s as I have said to (e rapacio$s and to (e a violator of the property and wo'en of his s$(9ects fro' (oth of which he '$st a(stain) And when neither their property nor hono$r is to$ched the 'a9ority of 'en live content and he has only to contend with the a'(ition of a few who' he can c$r( with ease in 'any ways) It 'a/es hi' conte'pti(le to (e considered fic/le frivolo$s effe'inate 'ean>spirited irresol$te fro' all of which a prince sho$ld *$ard hi'self as fro' a roc/+ and he sho$ld endeavo$r to show in his actions *reatness co$ra*e *ravity and fortit$de+ and in his private dealin*s with his s$(9ects let hi' show that his 9$d*'ents are
O"
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irrevoca(le and 'aintain hi'self in s$ch rep$tation that no one can hope either to deceive hi' or to *et ro$nd hi') That prince is hi*hly estee'ed who conveys this i'pression of hi'self and he who is hi*hly estee'ed is not easily conspired a*ainst+ for provided it is well /nown that he is an e.cellent 'an and revered (y his people he can only (e attac/ed with diffic$lty) ,or this reason a prince o$*ht to have two fears one fro' within on acco$nt of his s$(9ects the other fro' witho$t on acco$nt of e.ternal powers) ,ro' the latter he is defended (y (ein* well ar'ed and havin* *ood allies and if he is well ar'ed he will have *ood friends and affairs will always re'ain #$iet within when they are #$iet witho$t $nless they sho$ld have (een already dist$r(ed (y conspiracy+ and even sho$ld affairs o$tside (e dist$r(ed if he has carried o$t his preparations and has lived as I have said as lon* as he does not despair he will resist every attac/ as I said Na(is the &partan did) !$t concernin* his s$(9ects when affairs o$tside are dist$r(ed he has only to fear that they will conspire secretly fro' which a prince can easily sec$re hi'self (y avoidin* (ein* hated and despised and (y /eepin* the people satisfied with hi' which it is 'ost necessary for hi' to acco'plish as I said a(ove at len*th) And one of the 'ost efficacio$s re'edies that a prince can have a*ainst conspiracies is not to (e hated and despised (y the people for he who conspires
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a*ainst a prince always e.pects to please the' (y his re'oval+ ($t when the conspirator can only loo/ forward to offendin* the' he will not have the co$ra*e to ta/e s$ch a co$rse for the diffic$lties that confront a conspirator are infinite) And as e.perience shows 'any have (een the conspiracies ($t few have (een s$ccessf$l+ (eca$se he who conspires cannot act alone nor can he ta/e a co'panion e.cept fro' those who' he (elieves to (e 'alcontents and as soon as yo$ have opened yo$r 'ind to a 'alcontent yo$ have *iven hi' the 'aterial with which to content hi'self for (y deno$ncin* yo$ he can loo/ for every advanta*e+ so that seein* the *ain fro' this co$rse to (e ass$red and seein* the other to (e do$(tf$l and f$ll of dan*ers he '$st (e a very rare friend or a thoro$*hly o(stinate ene'y of the prince to /eep faith with yo$) And to red$ce the 'atter into a s'all co'pass I say that on the side of the conspirator there is nothin* ($t fear 9ealo$sy prospect of p$nish'ent to terrify hi'+ ($t on the side of the prince there is the 'a9esty of the principality the laws the protection of friends and the state to defend hi'+ so that addin* to all these thin*s the pop$lar *oodwill it is i'possi(le that any one sho$ld (e so rash as to conspire) ,or whereas in *eneral the conspirator has to fear (efore the e.ec$tion of his plot in this case he has also to fear the se#$el to the cri'e+ (eca$se on acco$nt of it he has the people for an ene'y and th$s cannot hope for any
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escape) Endless e.a'ples co$ld (e *iven on this s$(9ect ($t I will (e content with one (ro$*ht to pass within the 'e'ory of o$r fathers) Messer Anni(ale !entivo*lio who was prince in !olo*na C*randfather of the present Anni(aleD havin* (een '$rdered (y the Canneschi who had conspired a*ainst hi' not one of his fa'ily s$rvived ($t Messer @iovanni who was in childhood; i''ediately after his assassination the people rose and '$rdered all the Canneschi) This spr$n* fro' the pop$lar *oodwill which the ho$se of !entivo*lio en9oyed in those days in !olo*na+ which was so *reat that altho$*h none re'ained there after the death of Anni(ale who were a(le to r$le the state the !olo*nese havin* infor'ation that there was one of the !entivo*lio fa'ily in ,lorence who $p to that ti'e had (een considered the son of a (lac/s'ith sent to ,lorence for hi' and *ave hi' the *overn'ent of their city and it was r$led (y hi' $ntil Messer @iovanni ca'e in d$e co$rse to the *overn'ent) ,or this reason I consider that a prince o$*ht to rec/on conspiracies of little acco$nt when his people hold hi' in estee'+ ($t when it is hostile to hi' and (ears hatred towards hi' he o$*ht to fear everythin* and every(ody) And well>ordered states and wise princes have ta/en every care not to drive the no(les to desperation and to /eep the people satisfied and contented for this is one of the 'ost i'portant o(9ects a prince can have)
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A'on* the (est ordered and *overned /in*do's of o$r ti'es is ,rance and in it are fo$nd 'any *ood instit$tions on which depend the li(erty and sec$rity of the /in*+ of these the first is the parlia'ent and its a$thority (eca$se he who fo$nded the /in*do' /nowin* the a'(ition of the no(ility and their (oldness considered that a (it in their 'o$ths wo$ld (e necessary to hold the' in+ and on the other side /nowin* the hatred of the people fo$nded in fear a*ainst the no(les he wished to protect the' yet he was not an.io$s for this to (e the partic$lar care of the /in*+ therefore to ta/e away the reproach which he wo$ld (e lia(le to fro' the no(les for favo$rin* the people and fro' the people for favo$rin* the no(les he set $p an ar(iter who sho$ld (e one who co$ld (eat down the *reat and favo$r the lesser witho$t reproach to the /in*) Neither co$ld yo$ have a (etter or a 'ore pr$dent arran*e'ent or a *reater so$rce of sec$rity to the /in* and /in*do') ,ro' this one can draw another i'portant concl$sion that princes o$*ht to leave affairs of reproach to the 'ana*e'ent of others and /eep those of *race in their own hands) And f$rther I consider that a prince o$*ht to cherish the no(les ($t not so as to 'a/e hi'self hated (y the people) It 'ay appear perhaps to so'e who have e.a'ined the lives and deaths of the Ro'an e'perors that 'any of the' wo$ld (e an e.a'ple contrary to 'y opinion seein* that so'e of the' lived no(ly and showed *reat #$alities of so$l
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nevertheless they have lost their e'pire or have (een /illed (y s$(9ects who have conspired a*ainst the') "ishin* therefore to answer these o(9ections I will recall the characters of so'e of the e'perors and will show that the ca$ses of their r$in were not different to those alle*ed (y 'e+ at the sa'e ti'e I will only s$('it for consideration those thin*s that are noteworthy to hi' who st$dies the affairs of those ti'es) It see's to 'e s$fficient to ta/e all those e'perors who s$cceeded to the e'pire fro' Marc$s the philosopher down to Ma.i'in$s+ they were Marc$s and his son Co''od$s Pertina. 6$lian &ever$s and his son Antonin$s Caracalla Macrin$s Helio*a(al$s Ale.ander and Ma.i'in$s) There is first to note that whereas in other principalities the a'(ition of the no(les and the insolence of the people only have to (e contended with the Ro'an e'perors had a third diffic$lty in havin* to p$t $p with the cr$elty and avarice of their soldiers a 'atter so (eset with diffic$lties that it was the r$in of 'any+ for it was a hard thin* to *ive satisfaction (oth to soldiers and people+ (eca$se the people loved peace and for this reason they loved the $naspirin* prince whilst the soldiers loved the warli/e prince who was (old cr$el and rapacio$s which #$alities they were #$ite willin* he sho$ld e.ercise $pon the people so that they co$ld *et do$(le pay and *ive vent to their *reed and cr$elty) Hence it arose that those
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e'perors were always overthrown who either (y (irth or trainin* had no *reat a$thority and 'ost of the' especially those who ca'e new to the principality reco*ni-in* the diffic$lty of these two opposin* h$'o$rs were inclined to *ive satisfaction to the soldiers carin* little a(o$t in9$rin* the people) "hich co$rse was necessary (eca$se as princes cannot help (ein* hated (y so'eone they o$*ht in the first place to avoid (ein* hated (y every one and when they cannot co'pass this they o$*ht to endeavo$r with the $t'ost dili*ence to avoid the hatred of the 'ost powerf$l) Therefore those e'perors who thro$*h ine.perience had need of special favo$r adhered 'ore readily to the soldiers than to the people+ a co$rse which t$rned o$t advanta*eo$s to the' or not accordin*ly as the prince /new how to 'aintain a$thority over the') ,ro' these ca$ses it arose that Marc$s FA$reli$sG Pertina. and Ale.ander (ein* all 'en of 'odest life lovers of 9$stice ene'ies to cr$elty h$'ane and (eni*nant ca'e to a sad end e.cept Marc$s+ he alone lived and died hono$red (eca$se he had s$cceeded to the throne (y hereditary title and owed nothin* either to the soldiers or the people+ and afterwards (ein* possessed of 'any virt$es which 'ade hi' respected he always /ept (oth orders in their places whilst he lived and was neither hated nor despised) !$t Pertina. was created e'peror a*ainst the wishes of the soldiers who (ein* acc$sto'ed to
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live licentio$sly $nder Co''od$s co$ld not end$re the honest life to which Pertina. wished to red$ce the'+ th$s havin* *iven ca$se for hatred to which hatred there was added conte'pt for his old a*e he was overthrown at the very (e*innin* of his ad'inistration) And here it sho$ld (e noted that hatred is ac#$ired as '$ch (y *ood wor/s as (y (ad ones therefore as I said (efore a prince wishin* to /eep his state is very often forced to do evil+ for when that (ody is corr$pt who' yo$ thin/ yo$ have need of to 'aintain yo$rself E it 'ay (e either the people or the soldiers or the no(les E yo$ have to s$('it to its h$'o$rs and to *ratify the' and then *ood wor/s will do yo$ har') !$t let $s co'e to Ale.ander who was a 'an of s$ch *reat *oodness that a'on* the other praises which are accorded hi' is this that in the fo$rteen years he held the e'pire no one was ever p$t to death (y hi' $n9$d*ed+ nevertheless (ein* considered effe'inate and a 'an who allowed hi'self to (e *overned (y his 'other he (eca'e despised the ar'y conspired a*ainst hi' and '$rdered hi') T$rnin* now to the opposite characters of Co''od$s &ever$s Antonin$s Caracalla and Ma.i'in$s yo$ will find the' all cr$el and rapacio$s E 'en who to satisfy their soldiers did not hesitate to co''it every /ind of ini#$ity a*ainst the people+ and all e.cept &ever$s ca'e to a (ad end+ ($t in &ever$s there was so '$ch valo$r that /eepin* the soldiers friendly altho$*h
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the people were oppressed (y hi' he rei*ned s$ccessf$lly+ for his valo$r 'ade hi' so '$ch ad'ired in the si*ht of the soldiers and people that the latter were /ept in a way astonished and awed and the for'er respectf$l and satisfied) And (eca$se the actions of this 'an as a new prince were *reat I wish to show (riefly that he /new well how to co$nterfeit the fo. and the lion which nat$res as I said a(ove it is necessary for a prince to i'itate) Knowin* the sloth of the E'peror 6$lian he pers$aded the ar'y in &clavonia of which he was captain that it wo$ld (e ri*ht to *o to Ro'e and aven*e the death of Pertina. who had (een /illed (y the praetorian soldiers+ and $nder this prete.t witho$t appearin* to aspire to the throne he 'oved the ar'y on Ro'e and reached Italy (efore it was /nown that he had started) On his arrival at Ro'e the &enate thro$*h fear elected hi' e'peror and /illed 6$lian) After this there re'ained for &ever$s who wished to 'a/e hi'self 'aster of the whole e'pire two diffic$lties+ one in Asia where Ni*er head of the Asiatic ar'y had ca$sed hi'self to (e proclai'ed e'peror+ the other in the west where Al(in$s was who also aspired to the throne) And as he considered it dan*ero$s to declare hi'self hostile to (oth he decided to attac/ Ni*er and to deceive Al(in$s) To the latter he wrote that (ein* elected e'peror (y the &enate he was willin* to share that di*nity with hi' and sent hi' the title of Caesar+ and 'oreover that the
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&enate had 'ade Al(in$s his collea*$e+ which thin*s were accepted (y Al(in$s as tr$e) !$t after &ever$s had con#$ered and /illed Ni*er and settled oriental affairs he ret$rned to Ro'e and co'plained to the &enate that Al(in$s little reco*ni-in* the (enefits that he had received fro' hi' had (y treachery so$*ht to '$rder hi' and for this in*ratit$de he was co'pelled to p$nish hi') Afterwards he so$*ht hi' o$t in ,rance and too/ fro' hi' his *overn'ent and life) He who will therefore caref$lly e.a'ine the actions of this 'an will find hi' a 'ost valiant lion and a 'ost c$nnin* fo.+ he will find hi' feared and respected (y every one and not hated (y the ar'y+ and it need not (e wondered at that he the new 'an well (eca$se his s$pre'e renown always protected hi' fro' that hatred which the people 'i*ht have conceived a*ainst hi' for his violence) !$t his son Antonin$s was a 'ost e'inent 'an and had very e.cellent #$alities which 'ade hi' ad'ira(le in the si*ht of the people and accepta(le to the soldiers for he was a warli/e 'an 'ost end$rin* of fati*$e a despiser of all delicate food and other l$.$ries which ca$sed hi' to (e (eloved (y the ar'ies) Nevertheless his ferocity and cr$elties were so *reat and so $nheard of that after endless sin*le '$rders he /illed a lar*e n$'(er of the people of Ro'e and all those of Ale.andria) He (eca'e hated (y the whole world and also feared (y those he had aro$nd hi' to s$ch an e.tent that he was '$rdered in the 'idst
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of his ar'y (y a cent$rion) And here it '$st (e noted that s$ch>li/e deaths which are deli(erately inflicted with a resolved and desperate co$ra*e cannot (e avoided (y princes (eca$se any one who does not fear to die can inflict the'+ ($t a prince 'ay fear the' the less (eca$se they are very rare+ he has only to (e caref$l not to do any *rave in9$ry to those who' he e'ploys or has aro$nd hi' in the service of the state) Antonin$s had not ta/en this care ($t had cont$'elio$sly /illed a (rother of that cent$rion who' also he daily threatened yet retained in his (ody*$ard+ which as it t$rned o$t was a rash thin* to do and proved the e'peror3s r$in) !$t let $s co'e to Co''od$s to who' it sho$ld have (een very easy to hold the e'pire for (ein* the son of Marc$s he had inherited it and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and soldiers+ ($t (ein* (y nat$re cr$el and (r$tal he *ave hi'self $p to a'$sin* the soldiers and corr$ptin* the' so that he 'i*ht ind$l*e his rapacity $pon the people+ on the other hand not 'aintainin* his di*nity often descendin* to the theatre to co'pete with *ladiators and doin* other vile thin*s little worthy of the i'perial 'a9esty he fell into conte'pt with the soldiers and (ein* hated (y one party and despised (y the other he was conspired a*ainst and /illed) It re'ains to disc$ss the character of Ma.i'in$s) He was a very warli/e 'an and the ar'ies (ein* dis*$sted with the effe'inacy of
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Ale.ander of who' I have already spo/en /illed hi' and elected Ma.i'in$s to the throne) This he did not possess for lon* for two thin*s 'ade hi' hated and despised+ the one his havin* /ept sheep in Thrace which (ro$*ht hi' into conte'pt Cit (ein* well /nown to all and considered a *reat indi*nity (y every oneD and the other his havin* at the accession to his do'inions deferred *oin* to Ro'e and ta/in* possession of the i'perial seat+ he had also *ained a rep$tation for the $t'ost ferocity (y havin* thro$*h his prefects in Ro'e and elsewhere in the e'pire practised 'any cr$elties so that the whole world was 'oved to an*er at the 'eanness of his (irth and to fear at his (ar(arity) ,irst Africa re(elled then the &enate with all the people of Ro'e and all Italy conspired a*ainst hi' to which 'ay (e added his own ar'y; this latter (esie*in* A#$ileia and 'eetin* with diffic$lties in ta/in* it were dis*$sted with his cr$elties and fearin* hi' less when they fo$nd so 'any a*ainst hi' '$rdered hi') I do not wish to disc$ss Helio*a(al$s Macrin$s or 6$lian who (ein* thoro$*hly conte'pti(le were #$ic/ly wiped o$t+ ($t I will (rin* this disco$rse to a concl$sion (y sayin* that princes in o$r ti'es have this diffic$lty of *ivin* inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far less de*ree (eca$se notwithstandin* one has to *ive the' so'e ind$l*ence that is soon done+ none of these princes have ar'ies that are veterans in the *overnance and ad'inistration of provinces as
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were the ar'ies of the Ro'an E'pire+ and whereas it was then 'ore necessary to *ive satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people it is now 'ore necessary to all princes e.cept the T$r/ and the &oldan to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers (eca$se the people are the 'ore powerf$l) ,ro' the a(ove I have e.cepted the T$r/ who always /eeps ro$nd hi' twelve infantry and fifteen tho$sand cavalry on which depend the sec$rity and stren*th of the /in*do' and it is necessary that p$ttin* aside every consideration for the people he sho$ld /eep the' his friends) The /in*do' of the &oldan is si'ilar+ (ein* entirely in the hands of soldiers follows a*ain that witho$t re*ard to the people he '$st /eep the' his friends) !$t yo$ '$st note that the state of the &oldan is $nli/e all other principalities for the reason that it is li/e the Christian pontificate which cannot (e called either an hereditary or a newly for'ed principality+ (eca$se the sons of the old prince not the heirs ($t he who is elected to that position (y those who have a$thority and the sons re'ain only no(le'en) And this (ein* an ancient c$sto' it cannot (e called a new principality (eca$se there are none of those diffic$lties in it that are 'et with in new ones+ for altho$*h the prince is new the constit$tion of the state is old and it is fra'ed so as to receive hi' as if he were its hereditary lord) !$t ret$rnin* to the s$(9ect of o$r disco$rse I say that whoever will consider it will ac/nowled*e that either hatred or conte'pt has (een fatal to the
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a(ove>na'ed e'perors and it will (e reco*ni-ed also how it happened that a n$'(er of the' actin* in one way and a n$'(er in another only one in each way ca'e to a happy end and the rest to $nhappy ones) !eca$se it wo$ld have (een $seless and dan*ero$s for Pertina. and Ale.ander (ein* new princes to i'itate Marc$s who was heir to the principality+ and li/ewise it wo$ld have (een $tterly destr$ctive to Caracalla Co''od$s and Ma.i'in$s to have i'itated &ever$s they not havin* s$fficient valo$r to ena(le the' to tread in his footsteps) Therefore a prince new to the principality cannot i'itate the actions of Marc$s nor a*ain is it necessary to follow those of &ever$s ($t he o$*ht to ta/e fro' &ever$s those parts which are necessary to fo$nd his state and fro' Marc$s those which are proper and *lorio$s to /eep a state that 'ay already (e sta(le and fir')
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CHAPTER <<
Are ,ortresses And Many Other Thin*s To "hich Princes Often Resort Advanta*eo$s Or H$rtf$lH
1) &OME princes so as to hold sec$rely the state have disar'ed their s$(9ects+ others have /ept their s$(9ect towns (y factions+ others have fostered en'ities a*ainst the'selves+ others have laid the'selves o$t to *ain over those who' they distr$sted in the (e*innin* of their *overn'ents+ so'e have ($ilt fortresses+ so'e have overthrown and destroyed the') And altho$*h one cannot *ive a final 9$d*'ent on all one of these thin*s $nless one possesses the partic$lars of those states in which a decision has to (e 'ade nevertheless I will spea/ as co'prehensively as the 'atter of itself will ad'it) 0) There never was a new prince who has disar'ed his s$(9ects+ rather when he has fo$nd the' disar'ed he has always ar'ed the' (eca$se (y ar'in* the' those ar's (eco'e yo$rs those 'en who were distr$sted (eco'e faithf$l and those who were faithf$l are /ept so and yo$r s$(9ects (eco'e yo$r adherents) And whereas all s$(9ects cannot (e ar'ed yet when those who' yo$ do ar' are (enefited the others can (e handled 'ore freely and this difference in their treat'ent which they #$ite $nderstand
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'a/es the for'er yo$r dependants and the latter considerin* it to (e necessary that those who have the 'ost dan*er and service sho$ld have the 'ost reward e.c$se yo$) !$t when yo$ disar' the' yo$ at once offend the' (y showin* that yo$ distr$st the' either for cowardice or for want of loyalty and either of these opinions (reeds hatred a*ainst yo$) And (eca$se yo$ cannot re'ain $nar'ed it follows that yo$ t$rn to 'ercenaries which are of the character already shown+ even if they sho$ld (e *ood they wo$ld not (e s$fficient to defend yo$ a*ainst powerf$l ene'ies and distr$sted s$(9ects) Therefore as I have said a new prince in a new principality has always distri($ted ar's) Histories are f$ll of e.a'ples) !$t when a prince ac#$ires a new state which he adds as a province to his old one then it is necessary to disar' the 'en of that state e.cept those who have (een his adherents in ac#$irin* it+ and these a*ain with ti'e and opport$nity sho$ld (e rendered soft and effe'inate+ and 'atters sho$ld (e 'ana*ed in s$ch a way that all the ar'ed 'en in the state shall (e yo$r own soldiers who in yo$r old state were livin* near yo$) 8) O$r forefathers and those who were rec/oned wise were acc$sto'ed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia (y factions and Pisa (y fortresses+ and with this idea they fostered #$arrels in so'e of their tri($tary towns so as to /eep possession of the' the 'ore easily) This 'ay have (een well eno$*h in those ti'es when Italy was in a way
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(alanced ($t I do not (elieve that it can (e accepted as a precept for to>day (eca$se I do not (elieve that factions can ever (e of $se+ rather it is certain that when the ene'y co'es $pon yo$ in divided cities yo$ are #$ic/ly lost (eca$se the wea/est party will always assist the o$tside forces and the other will not (e a(le to resist) The 2enetians 'oved as I (elieve (y the a(ove reasons fostered the @$elph and @hi(elline factions in their tri($tary cities+ and altho$*h they never allowed the' to co'e to (loodshed yet they n$rsed these disp$tes a'on*st the' so that the citi-ens distracted (y their differences sho$ld not $nite a*ainst the') "hich as we saw did not afterwards t$rn o$t as e.pected (eca$se after the ro$t at 2aila one party at once too/ co$ra*e and sei-ed the state) &$ch 'ethods ar*$e therefore wea/ness in the prince (eca$se these factions will never (e per'itted in a vi*oro$s principality+ s$ch 'ethods for ena(lin* one the 'ore easily to 'ana*e s$(9ects are only $sef$l in ti'es of peace ($t if war co'es this policy proves fallacio$s) 5) "itho$t do$(t princes (eco'e *reat when they overco'e the diffic$lties and o(stacles (y which they are confronted and therefore fort$ne especially when she desires to 'a/e a new prince *reat who has a *reater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one ca$ses ene'ies to arise and for' desi*ns a*ainst hi' in order that he 'ay have the opport$nity of overco'in* the' and (y the' to 'o$nt hi*her as (y a ladder which his
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ene'ies have raised) ,or this reason 'any consider that a wise prince when he has the opport$nity o$*ht with craft to foster so'e ani'osity a*ainst hi'self so that havin* cr$shed it his renown 'ay rise hi*her) =) Princes especially new ones have fo$nd 'ore fidelity and assistance in those 'en who in the (e*innin* of their r$le were distr$sted than a'on* those who in the (e*innin* were tr$sted) Pandolfo Petr$cci Prince of &iena r$led his state 'ore (y those who had (een distr$sted than (y others) !$t on this #$estion one cannot spea/ *enerally for it varies so '$ch with the individ$al+ I will only say this that those 'en who at the co''ence'ent of a princedo' have (een hostile if they are of a description to need assistance to s$pport the'selves can always (e *ained over with the *reatest ease and they will (e ti*htly held to serve the prince with fidelity inas'$ch as they /now it to (e very necessary for the' to cancel (y deeds the (ad i'pression which he had for'ed of the'+ and th$s the prince always e.tracts 'ore profit fro' the' than fro' those who servin* hi' in too '$ch sec$rity 'ay ne*lect his affairs) And since the 'atter de'ands it I '$st not fail to warn a prince who (y 'eans of secret favo$rs has ac#$ired a new state that he '$st well consider the reasons which ind$ced those to favo$r hi' who did so+ and if it (e not a nat$ral affection towards hi' ($t only discontent with their *overn'ent then he will only /eep the' friendly
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with *reat tro$(le and diffic$lty for it will (e i'possi(le to satisfy the') And wei*hin* well the reasons for this in those e.a'ples which can (e ta/en fro' ancient and 'odern affairs we shall find that it is easier for the prince to 'a/e friends of those 'en who were contented $nder the for'er *overn'ent and are therefore his ene'ies than of those who (ein* discontented with it were favo$ra(le to hi' and enco$ra*ed hi' to sei-e it) ?) It has (een a c$sto' with princes in order to hold their states 'ore sec$rely to ($ild fortresses that 'ay serve as a (ridle and (it to those who 'i*ht desi*n to wor/ a*ainst the' and as a place of ref$*e fro' a first attac/) I praise this syste' (eca$se it has (een 'ade $se of for'erly) Notwithstandin* that Messer Nicolo 2itelli in o$r ti'es has (een seen to de'olish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he 'i*ht /eep that state+ @$id$(aldo 1$/e of :r(ino on ret$rnin* to his do'inion whence he had (een driven (y Cesare !or*ia ra-ed to the fo$ndations all the fortresses in that province and considered that witho$t the' it wo$ld (e 'ore diffic$lt to lose it+ the !entivo*lio ret$rnin* to !olo*na ca'e to a si'ilar decision) ,ortresses therefore are $sef$l or not accordin* to circ$'stances+ if they do yo$ *ood in one way they in9$re yo$ in another) And this #$estion can (e reasoned th$s; the prince who has 'ore to fear fro' the people than fro' forei*ners o$*ht to ($ild fortresses ($t he who has 'ore to fear fro' forei*ners than fro' the people o$*ht to
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leave the' alone) The castle of Milan ($ilt (y ,rancesco &for-a has 'ade and will 'a/e 'ore tro$(le for the ho$se of &for-a than any other disorder in the state) ,or this reason the (est possi(le fortress is E not to (e hated (y the people (eca$se altho$*h yo$ 'ay hold the fortresses yet they will not save yo$ if the people hate yo$ for there will never (e wantin* forei*ners to assist a people who have ta/en ar's a*ainst yo$) It has not (een seen in o$r ti'es that s$ch fortresses have (een of $se to any prince $nless to the Co$ntess of ,orli when the Co$nt @irola'o her consort was /illed+ for (y that 'eans she was a(le to withstand the pop$lar attac/ and wait for assistance fro' Milan and th$s recover her state+ and the post$re of affairs was s$ch at that ti'e that the forei*ners co$ld not assist the people) !$t fortresses were of little val$e to her afterwards when Cesare !or*ia attac/ed her and when the people her ene'y were allied with forei*ners) Therefore it wo$ld have (een safer for her (oth then and (efore not to have (een hated (y the people than to have had the fortresses) All these thin*s considered then I shall praise hi' who ($ilds fortresses as well as hi' who does not and I shall (la'e whoever tr$stin* in the' cares little a(o$t (ein* hated (y the people)
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CHAPTER <<I
How A Prince &ho$ld Cond$ct Hi'self As To @ain Renown
'a/es a prince so '$ch estee'ed as *reat enterprises and settin* a fine e.a'ple) "e have in o$r ti'e ,erdinand of Ara*on the present Kin* of &pain) He can al'ost (e called a new prince (eca$se he has risen (y fa'e and *lory fro' (ein* an insi*nificant /in* to (e the fore'ost /in* in Christendo'+ and if yo$ will consider his deeds yo$ will find the' all *reat and so'e of the' e.traordinary) In the (e*innin* of his rei*n he attac/ed @ranada and this enterprise was the fo$ndation of his do'inions) He did this #$ietly at first and witho$t any fear of hindrance for he held the 'inds of the (arons of Castile occ$pied in thin/in* of the war and not anticipatin* any innovations+ th$s they did not perceive that (y these 'eans he was ac#$irin* power and a$thority over the') He was a(le with the 'oney of the Ch$rch and of the people to s$stain his ar'ies and (y that lon* war to lay the fo$ndation for the 'ilitary s/ill which has since distin*$ished hi') ,$rther always $sin* reli*ion as a plea so as to $nderta/e *reater sche'es he devoted hi'self with a pio$s cr$elty to drivin* o$t and clearin* his /in*do' of the Moors+ nor co$ld there (e a 'ore
OTHIN@
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ad'ira(le e.a'ple nor one 'ore rare) :nder this sa'e cloa/ he assailed Africa he ca'e down on Italy he has finally attac/ed ,rance+ and th$s his achieve'ents and desi*ns have always (een *reat and have /ept the 'inds of his people in s$spense and ad'iration and occ$pied with the iss$e of the') And his actions have arisen in s$ch a way one o$t of the other that 'en have never (een *iven ti'e to wor/ steadily a*ainst hi') A*ain it '$ch assists a prince to set $n$s$al e.a'ples in internal affairs si'ilar to those which are related of Messer !erna(o da Milano who when he had the opport$nity (y any one in civil life doin* so'e e.traordinary thin* either *ood or (ad wo$ld ta/e so'e 'ethod of rewardin* or p$nishin* hi' which wo$ld (e '$ch spo/en a(o$t) And a prince o$*ht a(ove all thin*s always to endeavo$r in every action to *ain for hi'self the rep$tation of (ein* a *reat and re'ar/a(le 'an) A prince is also respected when he is either a tr$e friend or a downri*ht ene'y that to say when witho$t any reservation he declares hi'self in favo$r of one party a*ainst the other+ which co$rse will always (e 'ore advanta*eo$s than standin* ne$tral+ (eca$se if two of yo$r powerf$l nei*h(o$rs co'e to (lows they are of s$ch a character that if one of the' con#$ers yo$ have either to fear hi' or not) In either case it will always (e 'ore advanta*eo$s for yo$ to declare yo$rself and to 'a/e war stren$o$sly+ (eca$se in the first case if yo$ do not declare yo$rself yo$
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will invaria(ly fall a prey to the con#$eror to the pleas$re and satisfaction of hi' who has (een con#$ered and yo$ will have no reasons to offer nor anythin* to protect or to shelter yo$) !eca$se he who con#$ers does not want do$(tf$l friends who will not aid hi' in the ti'e of trial+ and he who loses will not har(o$r yo$ (eca$se yo$ did not willin*ly sword in hand co$rt his fate) Antioch$s went into @reece (ein* sent for (y the Aetolians to drive o$t the Ro'ans) He sent envoys to the Achaeans who were friends of the Ro'ans e.hortin* the' to re'ain ne$tral+ and on the other hand the Ro'ans $r*ed the' to ta/e $p ar's) This #$estion ca'e to (e disc$ssed in the co$ncil of the Achaeans where the le*ate of Antioch$s $r*ed the' to stand ne$tral) To this the Ro'an le*ate answered; KAs for that which has (een said that it is (etter and 'ore advanta*eo$s for yo$r state not to interfere in o$r war nothin* can (e 'ore erroneo$s+ (eca$se (y not interferin* yo$ will (e left witho$t favo$r or consideration the *$erdon of the con#$eror)K Th$s it will always happen that he who is not yo$r friend will de'and yo$r ne$trality whilst he who is yo$r friend will entreat yo$ to declare yo$rself with ar's) And irresol$te princes to avoid present dan*ers *enerally follow the ne$tral path and are *enerally r$ined) !$t when a prince declares hi'self *allantly in favo$r of one side if the party with who' he allies hi'self con#$ers altho$*h the victor 'ay (e powerf$l and 'ay have hi' at his
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'ercy yet he is inde(ted to hi' and there is esta(lished a (ond of a'ity+ and 'en are never so sha'eless as to (eco'e a 'on$'ent of in*ratit$de (y oppressin* yo$) 2ictories after all are never so co'plete that the victor '$st not show so'e re*ard especially to 9$stice) !$t if he with who' yo$ ally yo$rself loses yo$ 'ay (e sheltered (y hi' and whilst he is a(le he 'ay aid yo$ and yo$ (eco'e co'panions in a fort$ne that 'ay rise a*ain) In the second case when those who fi*ht are of s$ch a character that yo$ have no an.iety as to who 'ay con#$er so '$ch the 'ore is it *reater pr$dence to (e allied (eca$se yo$ assist at the destr$ction of one (y the aid of another who if he had (een wise wo$ld have saved hi'+ and con#$erin* as it is i'possi(le that he sho$ld not with yo$r assistance he re'ains at yo$r discretion) And here it is to (e noted that a prince o$*ht to ta/e care never to 'a/e an alliance with one 'ore powerf$l than hi'self for the p$rpose of attac/in* others $nless necessity co'pels hi' as is said a(ove+ (eca$se if he con#$ers yo$ are at his discretion and princes o$*ht to avoid as '$ch as possi(le (ein* at the discretion of any one) The 2enetians 9oined with ,rance a*ainst the 1$/e of Milan and this alliance which ca$sed their r$in co$ld have (een avoided) !$t when it cannot (e avoided as happened to the ,lorentines when the Pope and &pain sent ar'ies to attac/ %o'(ardy then in s$ch a case for the a(ove reasons the
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prince o$*ht to favo$r one of the parties) Never let any @overn'ent i'a*ine that it can choose perfectly safe co$rses+ rather let it e.pect to have to ta/e very do$(tf$l ones (eca$se it is fo$nd in ordinary affairs that one never see/s to avoid one tro$(le witho$t r$nnin* into another+ ($t pr$dence consists in /nowin* how to distin*$ish the character of tro$(les and for choice to ta/e the lesser evil) A prince o$*ht also to show hi'self a patron of a(ility and to hono$r the proficient in every art) At the sa'e ti'e he sho$ld enco$ra*e his citi-ens to practise their callin*s peacea(ly (oth in co''erce and a*ric$lt$re and in every other followin* so that the one sho$ld not (e deterred fro' i'provin* his possessions for fear lest they (e ta/en away fro' hi' or another fro' openin* $p trade for fear of ta.es+ ($t the prince o$*ht to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these thin*s and desi*ns in any way to hono$r his city or state) ,$rther he o$*ht to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year+ and as every city is divided into *$ilds or into societies he o$*ht to hold s$ch (odies in estee' and associate with the' so'eti'es and show hi'self an e.a'ple of co$rtesy and li(erality+ nevertheless always 'aintainin* the 'a9esty of his ran/ for this he '$st never consent to a(ate in anythin*)
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CHAPTER <<II
Concernin* The &ecretaries Of Princes
choice of servants is of no little i'portance to a prince and they are *ood or not accordin* to the discri'ination of the prince) And the first opinion which one for's of a prince and of his $nderstandin* is (y o(servin* the 'en he has aro$nd hi'+ and when they are capa(le and faithf$l he 'ay always (e considered wise (eca$se he has /nown how to reco*ni-e the capa(le and to /eep the' faithf$l) !$t when they are otherwise one cannot for' a *ood opinion of hi' for the pri'e error which he 'ade was in choosin* the') There were none who /new Messer Antonio da 2enafro as the servant of Pandolfo Petr$cci Prince of &iena who wo$ld not consider Pandolfo to (e a very clever 'an in havin* 2enafro for his servant) !eca$se there are three classes of intellects; one which co'prehends (y itself+ another which appreciates what others co'prehend+ and a third which neither co'prehends (y itself nor (y the showin* of others+ the first is the 'ost e.cellent the second is *ood the third is $seless) Therefore it follows necessarily that if Pandolfo was not in the first ran/ he was in the second for whenever one has 9$d*'ent to /now *ood or (ad when it is said and done altho$*h he hi'self 'ay not have
HE
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the initiative yet he can reco*ni-e the *ood and the (ad in his servant and the one he can praise and the other correct+ th$s the servant cannot hope to deceive hi' and is /ept honest) !$t to ena(le a prince to for' an opinion of his servant there is one test which never falls+ when yo$ see the servant thin/in* 'ore of his own interests than of yo$rs and see/in* inwardly his own profit in everythin* s$ch a 'an will never 'a/e a *ood servant nor will yo$ ever (e a(le to tr$st hi'+ (eca$se he who has the state of another in his hands o$*ht never to thin/ of hi'self ($t always of his prince and never pay any attention to 'atters in which the prince is not concerned) On the other to /eep his servant honest the prince o$*ht to st$dy hi' hono$rin* hi' enrichin* hi' doin* hi' /indnesses sharin* with hi' the hono$rs and cares+ and at the sa'e ti'e let hi' see that he cannot stand alone so that 'any hono$rs not 'a/e hi' desire 'ore 'any riches 'a/e hi' wish for 'ore and that 'any cares 'ay 'a/e hi' dread chan*es) "hen therefore servants and princes towards servants are th$s disposed they can tr$st each other ($t when it is otherwise the end will always (e disastro$s for either one or the other)
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CHAPTER <<III
How ,latterers &ho$ld !e Avoided
wish to leave o$t an i'portant (ranch of this s$(9ect for it is a dan*er fro' which princes are with diffic$lty preserved $nless they are very caref$l and discri'inatin*) It is that of flatterers of who' co$rts arc f$ll (eca$se 'en are so self>co'placent in their own affairs and in a way so deceived in the' that they are preserved with diffic$lty fro' this pest and if they wish to defend the'selves they r$n the dan*er of fallin* into conte'pt) !eca$se there is no other way of *$ardin* oneself fro' flatterers e.cept lettin* 'en $nderstand that to tell yo$ the tr$th does not offend yo$+ ($t when every one 'ay tell yo$ the tr$th respect for yo$ a(ates) Therefore a wise prince o$*ht to hold a third co$rse (y choosin* the wise 'en in his state and *ivin* to the' only the li(erty of spea/in* the tr$th to hi' and then only of those thin*s of which he in#$ires and of none others+ ($t he o$*ht to #$estion the' $pon everythin* and listen to their opinions and afterwards for' his own concl$sions) "ith these co$ncillors separately and collectively he o$*ht to carry hi'self in s$ch a way that each of the' sho$ld /now that the 'ore freely he shall spea/ the 'ore he shall (e preferred+ o$tside of these he sho$ld listen to no
1O NOT
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one p$rs$e the thin* resolved on and (e steadfast in his resol$tions) He who does otherwise is either overthrown (y flatterers or is so often chan*ed (y varyin* opinions that he falls into conte'pt) I wish on this s$(9ect to add$ce a 'odern e.a'ple) ,ra %$ca the 'an of affairs to Ma.i'ilian the present e'peror spea/in* of his 'a9esty said; He cons$lted with no one yet never *ot his own way in anythin*) This arose (eca$se of his followin* a practice the opposite to the a(ove+ for the e'peror is a secretive 'an E he does not co''$nicate his desi*ns to any one nor does he receive opinions on the') !$t as in carryin* the' into effect they (eco'e revealed and /nown they are at once o(str$cted (y those 'en who' he has aro$nd hi' and he (ein* pliant is diverted fro' the') Hence it follows that those thin*s he does one day he $ndoes the ne.t and no one ever $nderstands what he wishes or intends to do and no one can rely on his resol$tions) A prince therefore o$*ht always to ta/e co$nsel ($t only when he wishes and not when others wish+ he o$*ht rather to disco$ra*e every one fro' offerin* advice $nless he as/s it+ ($t however he o$*ht to (e a constant in#$irer and afterwards a patient listener concernin* the thin*s of which he in#$ired+ also on learnin* that any one on any consideration has not told hi' the tr$th he sho$ld let his an*er (e felt) And if there are so'e who thin/ that a prince who conveys an i'pression of his wisdo' is not
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so thro$*h his own a(ility ($t thro$*h the *ood advisers that he has aro$nd hi' (eyond do$(t they are deceived (eca$se this is an a.io' which never fails; that a prince who is not wise hi'self will never ta/e *ood advice $nless (y chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to (e a very pr$dent 'an) In this case indeed he 'ay (e well *overned ($t it wo$ld not (e for lon* (eca$se s$ch a *overnor wo$ld in a short ti'e ta/e away his state fro' hi') !$t if a prince who is not e.perienced sho$ld ta/e co$nsel fro' 'ore than one he will never *et $nited co$nsels nor will he /now how to $nite the') Each of the co$nsellors will thin/ of his own interests and the prince will not /now how to control the' or to see thro$*h the') And they are not to (e fo$nd otherwise (eca$se 'en will always prove $ntr$e to yo$ $nless they are /ept honest (y constraint) Therefore it '$st (e inferred that *ood co$nsels whencesoever they co'e are (orn of the wisdo' of the prince and not the wisdo' of the prince fro' *ood co$nsels)
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CHAPTER <<I2
The Princes Of Italy Have %ost Their &tates
previo$s s$**estions caref$lly o(served will ena(le a new prince to appear well esta(lished and render hi' at once 'ore sec$re and fi.ed in the state than if he had (een lon* seated there) ,or the actions of a new prince are 'ore narrowly o(served than those of an hereditary one and when they are seen to (e a(le they *ain 'ore 'en and (ind far ti*hter than ancient (lood+ (eca$se 'en are attracted 'ore (y the present than (y the past and when they find the present *ood they en9oy it and see/ no f$rther+ they will also 'a/e the $t'ost defence for a prince if he fails the' not in other thin*s) Th$s it will (e a do$(le *lory to hi' to have esta(lished a new principality and adorned and stren*thened it with *ood laws *ood ar's *ood allies and with a *ood e.a'ple+ so will it (e a do$(le dis*race to hi' who (orn a prince shall lose his state (y want of wisdo') And if those sei*niors are considered who have lost their states in Italy in o$r ti'es s$ch as the Kin* of Naples the 1$/e of Milan and others there will (e fo$nd in the' firstly one co''on defect in re*ard to ar's fro' the ca$ses which have (een disc$ssed at len*th+ in the ne.t place
HE
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so'e one of the' will (e seen either to have had the people hostile or if he has had the people friendly he has not /nown how to sec$re the no(les) In the a(sence of these defects states that have power eno$*h to /eep an ar'y in the field cannot (e lost) Philip of Macedon not the father of Ale.ander the @reat ($t he who was con#$ered (y Tit$s J$inti$s had not '$ch territory co'pared to the *reatness of the Ro'ans and of @reece who attac/ed hi' yet (ein* a warli/e 'an who /new how to attract the people and sec$re the no(les he s$stained the war a*ainst his ene'ies for 'any years and if in the end he lost the do'inion of so'e cities nevertheless he retained the /in*do') Therefore do not let o$r princes acc$se fort$ne for the loss of their principalities after so 'any years3 possession ($t rather their own sloth (eca$se in #$iet ti'es they never tho$*ht there co$ld (e a chan*e Cit is a co''on defect in 'an not to 'a/e any provision in the cal' a*ainst the te'pestD and when afterwards the (ad ti'es ca'e they tho$*ht of fli*ht and not of defendin* the'selves and they hoped that the people dis*$sted with the insolence of the con#$erors wo$ld recall the') This co$rse when others fail 'ay (e *ood ($t it is very (ad to have ne*lected all other e.pedients for that since yo$ wo$ld never wish to fall (eca$se yo$ tr$sted to (e a(le to find so'eone later on to restore yo$) This a*ain either does not happen or if it does it will not (e for
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yo$r sec$rity (eca$se that deliverance is of no avail which does not depend $pon yo$rself+ those only are relia(le certain and d$ra(le that depend on yo$rself and yo$r valo$r)
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CHAPTER <<2
"hat ,ort$ne Can Effect In H$'an Affairs And How To "ithstand Her
is not $n/nown to 'e how 'any 'en have had and still have the opinion that the affairs of the world are in s$ch wise *overned (y fort$ne and (y @od that 'en with their wisdo' cannot direct the' and that no one can even help the'+ and (eca$se of this they wo$ld have $s (elieve that it is not necessary to la(o$r '$ch in affairs ($t to let chance *overn the') This opinion has (een 'ore credited in o$r ti'es (eca$se of the *reat chan*es in affairs which have (een seen and 'ay still (e seen every day (eyond all h$'an con9ect$re) &o'eti'es ponderin* over this I a' in so'e de*ree inclined to their opinion) Nevertheless not to e.tin*$ish o$r free will I hold it to (e tr$e that ,ort$ne is the ar(iter of one>half of o$r actions ($t that she still leaves $s to direct the other half or perhaps a little less) I co'pare her to one of those ra*in* rivers which when in flood overflows the plains sweepin* away trees and ($ildin*s (earin* away the soil fro' place to place+ everythin* flies (efore it all yield to its violence witho$t (ein* a(le in any way to withstand it+ and yet tho$*h its nat$re (e s$ch it does not follow therefore that 'en when the weather (eco'es fair shall not 'a/e
T
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provision (oth with defences and (arriers in s$ch a 'anner that risin* a*ain the waters 'ay pass away (y canal and their force (e neither so $nrestrained nor so dan*ero$s) &o it happens with fort$ne who shows her power where valo$r has not prepared to resist her and thither she t$rns her forces where she /nows that (arriers and defences have not (een raised to constrain her) And if yo$ will consider Italy which is the seat of these chan*es and which has *iven to the' their i'p$lse yo$ will see it to (e an open co$ntry witho$t (arriers and witho$t any defence) ,or if it had (een defended (y proper valo$r as are @er'any &pain and ,rance either this invasion wo$ld not have 'ade the *reat chan*es it has 'ade or it wo$ld not have co'e at all) And this I consider eno$*h to say concernin* resistance to fort$ne in *eneral) !$t confinin* 'yself 'ore to the partic$lar I say that a prince 'ay (e seen happy to>day and r$ined to>'orrow witho$t havin* shown any chan*e of disposition or character) This I (elieve arises firstly fro' ca$ses that have already (een disc$ssed at len*th na'ely that the prince who relies entirely $pon fort$ne is lost when it chan*es) I (elieve also that he will (e s$ccessf$l who directs his actions accordin* to the spirit of the ti'es and that he whose actions do not accord with the ti'es will not (e s$ccessf$l) !eca$se 'en are seen in affairs that lead to the end which every 'an has (efore hi' na'ely *lory and riches to *et there
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(y vario$s 'ethods+ one with ca$tion another with haste+ one (y force another (y s/ill+ one (y patience another (y its opposite+ and each one s$cceeds in reachin* the *oal (y a different 'ethod) One can also see of two ca$tio$s 'en the one attain his end the other fail+ and si'ilarly two 'en (y different o(servances are e#$ally s$ccessf$l the one (ein* ca$tio$s the other i'pet$o$s+ all this arises fro' nothin* else than whether or not they confor' in their 'ethods to the spirit of the ti'es) This follows fro' what I have said that two 'en wor/in* differently (rin* a(o$t the sa'e effect and of two wor/in* si'ilarly one attains his o(9ect and the other does not) Chan*es in estate also iss$e fro' this for if to one who *overns hi'self with ca$tion and patience ti'es and affairs conver*e in s$ch a way that his ad'inistration is s$ccessf$l his fort$ne is 'ade+ ($t if ti'es and affairs chan*e he is r$ined if he does not chan*e his co$rse of action) !$t a 'an is not often fo$nd s$fficiently circ$'spect to /now how to acco''odate hi'self to the chan*e (oth (eca$se he cannot deviate fro' what nat$re inclines hi' to and also (eca$se havin* always prospered (y actin* in one way he cannot (e pers$aded that it is well to leave it+ and therefore the ca$tio$s 'an when it is ti'e to t$rn advent$ro$s does not /now how to do it hence he is r$ined+ ($t had he chan*ed his cond$ct with the ti'es fort$ne wo$ld not have chan*ed)
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Pope 6$li$s II went to wor/ i'pet$o$sly in all his affairs and fo$nd the ti'es and circ$'stances confor' so well to that line of action that he always 'et with s$ccess) Consider his first enterprise a*ainst !olo*na Messer @iovanni !entivo*li (ein* still alive) The 2enetians were not a*reea(le to it nor was the Kin* of &pain and he had the enterprise still $nder disc$ssion with the Kin* of ,rance+ nevertheless he personally entered $pon the e.pedition with his acc$sto'ed (oldness and ener*y a 'ove which 'ade &pain and the 2enetians stand irresol$te and passive the latter fro' fear the for'er fro' desire to recover all the /in*do' of Naples+ on the other hand he drew after hi' the Kin* of ,rance (eca$se that /in* havin* o(served the 'ove'ent and desirin* to 'a/e the Pope his friend so as to h$'(le the 2enetians fo$nd it i'possi(le to ref$se hi' soldiers witho$t 'anifestly offendin* hi') Therefore 6$li$s with his i'pet$o$s action acco'plished what no other pontiff with si'ple h$'an wisdo' co$ld have done+ for if he had waited in Ro'e $ntil he co$ld *et away with his plans arran*ed and everythin* fi.ed as any other pontiff wo$ld have done he wo$ld never have s$cceeded) !eca$se the Kin* of ,rance wo$ld have 'ade a tho$sand e.c$ses and the others wo$ld have raised a tho$sand fears) I will leave his other actions alone as they were all ali/e and they all s$cceeded for the shortness of his life did not let hi' e.perience the contrary+
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($t if circ$'stances had arisen which re#$ired hi' to *o ca$tio$sly his r$in wo$ld have followed (eca$se he wo$ld never have deviated fro' those ways to which nat$re inclined hi') I concl$de therefore that fort$ne (ein* chan*ef$l and 'an/ind steadfast in their ways so lon* as the two are in a*ree'ent 'en are s$ccessf$l ($t $ns$ccessf$l when they fall o$t) ,or 'y part I consider that it is (etter to (e advent$ro$s than ca$tio$s (eca$se fort$ne is a wo'an and if yo$ wish to /eep her $nder it is necessary to (eat and ill>$se her+ and it is seen that she allows herself to (e 'astered (y the advent$ro$s rather than (y those who *o to wor/ 'ore coldly) &he is therefore always wo'an>li/e a lover of yo$n* 'en (eca$se they are less ca$tio$s 'ore violent and with 'ore a$dacity co''and her)
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CHAPTER <<2I
An E.hortation To %i(erate Italy ,ro' The !ar(arians
caref$lly considered the s$(9ect of the a(ove disco$rses and wonderin* within 'yself whether the present ti'es were propitio$s to a new prince and whether there were the ele'ents that wo$ld *ive an opport$nity to a wise and virt$o$s one to introd$ce a new order of thin*s which wo$ld do hono$r to hi' and *ood to the people of this co$ntry it appears to 'e that so 'any thin*s conc$r to favo$r a new prince that I never /new a ti'e 'ore fit than the present) And if as I said it was necessary that the people of Israel sho$ld (e captive so as to 'a/e 'anifest the a(ility of Moses+ that the Persians sho$ld (e oppressed (y the Medes so as to discover the *reatness of the so$l of Cyr$s+ and that the Athenians sho$ld (e dispersed to ill$strate the capa(ilities of These$s; then at the present ti'e in order to discover the virt$e of an Italian spirit it was necessary that Italy sho$ld (e red$ced to the e.tre'ity she is now in that she sho$ld (e 'ore enslaved than the He(rews 'ore oppressed than the Persians 'ore scattered than the Athenians+ witho$t head witho$t order (eaten despoiled torn overr$n+ and to have end$red every /ind of desolation)
A2IN@
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Altho$*h lately so'e spar/ 'ay have (een shown (y one which 'ade $s thin/ he was ordained (y @od for o$r rede'ption nevertheless it was afterwards seen in the hei*ht of his career that fort$ne re9ected hi'+ so that Italy left as witho$t life waits for hi' who shall yet heal her wo$nds and p$t an end to the rava*in* and pl$nderin* of %o'(ardy to the swindlin* and ta.in* of the /in*do' and of T$scany and cleanse those sores that for lon* have festered) It is seen how she entreats @od to send so'eone who shall deliver her fro' these wron*s and (ar(aro$s insolencies) It is seen also that she is ready and willin* to follow a (anner if only so'eone will raise it) Nor is there to (e seen at present one in who' she can place 'ore hope than in yo$r ill$strio$s ho$se with its valo$r and fort$ne favo$red (y @od and (y the Ch$rch of which it is now the chief and which co$ld (e 'ade the head of this rede'ption) This will not (e diffic$lt if yo$ will recall to yo$rself the actions and lives of the 'en I have na'ed) And altho$*h they were *reat and wonderf$l 'en yet they were 'en and each one of the' had no 'ore opport$nity than the present offers for their enterprises were neither 'ore 9$st nor easier than this nor was @od 'ore their friend than He is yo$rs) "ith $s there is *reat 9$stice (eca$se that war is 9$st which is necessary and ar's are hallowed when there is no other hope ($t in the') Here there
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Nicolo Machiavelli
is the *reatest willin*ness and where the willin*ness is *reat the diffic$lties cannot (e *reat if yo$ will only follow those 'en to who' I have directed yo$r attention) ,$rther than this how e.traordinarily the ways of @od have (een 'anifested (eyond e.a'ple; the sea is divided a clo$d has led the way the roc/ has po$red forth water it has rained 'anna everythin* has contri($ted to yo$r *reatness+ yo$ o$*ht to do the rest) @od is not willin* to do everythin* and th$s ta/e away o$r free will and that share of *lory which (elon*s to $s) And it is not to (e wondered at if none of the a(ove>na'ed Italians have (een a(le to acco'plish all that is e.pected fro' yo$r ill$strio$s ho$se+ and if in so 'any revol$tions in Italy and in so 'any ca'pai*ns it has always appeared as if 'ilitary virt$e were e.ha$sted this has happened (eca$se the old order of thin*s was not *ood and none of $s have /nown how to find a new one) And nothin* hono$rs a 'an 'ore than to esta(lish new laws and new ordinances when he hi'self was newly risen) &$ch thin*s when they are well fo$nded and di*nified will 'a/e hi' revered and ad'ired and in Italy there are not wantin* opport$nities to (rin* s$ch into $se in every for') Here there is *reat valo$r in the li'(s whilst it fails in the head) %oo/ attentively at the d$els and the hand>to>hand co'(ats how s$perior the Italians are in stren*th de.terity and s$(tlety) !$t when it co'es to ar'ies they do not (ear
The Prince
104
Nicolo Machiavelli
co'parison and this sprin*s entirely fro' the ins$fficiency of the leaders since those who are capa(le are not o(edient and each one see's to hi'self to /now there havin* never (een any one so distin*$ished a(ove the rest either (y valo$r or fort$ne that others wo$ld yield to hi') Hence it is that for so lon* a ti'e and d$rin* so '$ch fi*htin* in the past twenty years whenever there has (een an ar'y wholly Italian it has always *iven a poor acco$nt of itself+ as witness Taro Alessandria Cap$a @enoa 2aila !olo*na Mestre) If therefore yo$r ill$strio$s ho$se wishes to follow those re'ar/a(le 'en who have redee'ed their co$ntry it is necessary (efore all thin*s as a tr$e fo$ndation for every enterprise to (e provided with yo$r own forces (eca$se there can (e no 'ore faithf$l tr$er or (etter soldiers) And altho$*h sin*ly they are *ood alto*ether they will (e '$ch (etter when they find the'selves co''anded (y their prince hono$red (y hi' and 'aintained at his e.pense) Therefore it is necessary to (e prepared with s$ch ar's so that yo$ can (e defended a*ainst forei*ners (y Italian valo$r) And altho$*h &wiss and &panish infantry 'ay (e considered very for'ida(le nevertheless there is a defect in (oth (y reason of which a third order wo$ld not only (e a(le to oppose the' ($t 'i*ht (e relied $pon to overthrow the') ,or the &paniards cannot resist cavalry and the &wit-ers are afraid of infantry whenever they enco$nter
The Prince
10B
Nicolo Machiavelli
the' in close co'(at) Owin* to this as has (een and 'ay a*ain (e seen the &paniards are $na(le to resist ,rench cavalry and the &wit-ers are overthrown (y infantry) And altho$*h a co'plete proof of this latter cannot (e shown nevertheless there was so'e evidence of it at the (attle of Ravenna when the &panish infantry were confronted (y @er'an (attalions who follow the sa'e tactics as the &wiss+ when the &paniards (y a*ility of (ody and with the aid of their shields *ot in $nder the pi/es of the @er'ans and stood o$t of dan*er a(le to attac/ while the @er'ans stood helpless and if the cavalry had not dashed $p all wo$ld have (een over with the') It is possi(le therefore /nowin* the defects of (oth these infantries to invent a new one which will resist cavalry and not (e afraid of infantry+ this need not create a new order of ar's ($t a variation $pon the old) And these are the /ind of i'prove'ents which confer rep$tation and power $pon a new prince) This opport$nity therefore o$*ht not to (e allowed to pass for lettin* Italy at last see her li(erator appear) Nor can one e.press the love with which he wo$ld (e received in all those provinces which have s$ffered so '$ch fro' these forei*n sco$rin*s with what thirst for reven*e with what st$((orn faith with what devotion with what tears) "hat door wo$ld (e closed to hi'H "ho wo$ld ref$se o(edience to hi'H "hat envy wo$ld hinder hi'H "hat Italian wo$ld ref$se hi'
The Prince
187
Nicolo Machiavelli
ho'a*eH To all of $s this (ar(aro$s do'inion stin/s) %et therefore yo$r ill$strio$s ho$se ta/e $p this char*e with that co$ra*e and hope with which all 9$st enterprises are $nderta/en so that $nder its standard o$r native co$ntry 'ay (e enno(led and $nder its a$spices 'ay (e verified that sayin* of Petrarch; 2irt$ contro al ,$rore Prendera l3ar'e e fia il co'(atter corto; Che l3antico valore Ne*li italici c$or non e ancor 'orto) 1
THE EN1
1 2irt$e a*ainst f$ry shall advance the fi*ht And it i3 th3 co'(at soon shall p$t to fli*ht+ ,or the old Ro'an valo$r is not dead Nor in th3 Italians3 (reasts e.tin*$ished)

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1 Ma.i'ilian I Holy Ro'an E'peror)

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