CHAPTER 1

CHINESE CHECKERS A SUMMARY OF RECENT EVENTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT REUTERS NEWS REPORT LOCATION: INDIA NEWS RELEASE: THURSDAY,

News reports are still coming in from Rangoon regarding the recent military coup that has toppled the existing military regime in Myanmar, but it is now confirmed that the coup was orchestrated by a group of senior military officers who, it is rumoured, were dissatisfied with the current state of the Myanmar armed forces and the lack of interest shown by the army leaders then in power. The coup was apparently launched on Monday by heavily armed rebel soldiers from the local garrison following weeks of rumours and tension in the highest echelons of the general staff of the Myanmar army. ideo images have emerged showing armoured vehicles and tanks on the streets of Rangoon and reports are coming in of rebel soldiers having taking over the strategic locations in the city. The generals of the military !unta who were in command of Myanmar for the last decade were reportedly evacuated from the government compounds in some highly dramatic evacuations by army helicopters. The helicopters, piloted by loyalist troops, landed on the lawns of the compound amidst heavy gunfire and the generals were rushed by a group of loyalist guards to the helicopters. "f the three helicopters that had landed, one managed to lift off the ground while the remaining two were damaged and then destroyed on the ground by R#$ fire. %muggled images out of Rangoon show one of the helicopters bursting into flames. The remaining loyalist troops were soon thereafter defeated and then executed within the compound walls. This and other incidents of high&level evacuations occurred around ''(( )rs. *y '+(( )rs on Tuesday, the rebels had reportedly secured all ma!or locations around the city, but fighting was still reported in some areas. ,round '++( )rs on Tuesday, strike aircraft of the Myanmar ,ir -orce appeared over the city and rocketed several loyalist positions around the government ministry buildings. The situation calmed down around dusk while the rebels consolidated their power in Rangoon. This changed around .+(( )rs when loyalist troops rallied by the $enerals evacuated earlier from the capital attempted to recapture the city. )eavy fighting was reported on the streets during the night as heavily armed rebels fought against the tanks and aircrafts of the loyalist troops around the city locations. The fighting then broke out in other cities of the country and is reportedly continuing. /e have a large number of reports of indiscriminate use of aircraft delivered cluster bombs and napalm bombs in the villages and civilian areas and panic is in the air among the civilian population throughout the country.
,t the present moment it is not clear who is in command of Rangoon or whether the fighting has subsided in the city or elsewhere. ,ll foreign media having been restricted in the country by the previous regime, the main sources of information at this time are from eyewitness reports by the hundreds of civilians fleeing across the border into 0ndia, Malaysia and Thailand. The international response to the military coup and the subse1uent fighting was mixed and uncertain earlier on Monday with the 2nited %tates denying to comment on its stand in the issue but asking both sides to cease fighting and prevent the loss of lives. -rance and $ermany preferred to wait and watch the unfolding events in Myanmar while other western countries including $reat *ritain commented to the effect that one military dictatorship would replace another in Myanmar with no significant change in the political arena within the country. ,%3,N countries including 0ndia, Malaysia, %ingapore and 0ndonesia expressed 4concern on issues related to region stability5 and expressed regret at the heavy loss of civilian lives in Rangoon and other cities of Myanmar. This response from N,T" and ,%3,N countries changed on Tuesday when it was revealed by reliable sources that 6ieutenant $eneral )oa, the army commander leading the rebel takeover in Myanmar was being supported militarily and politically by the 7hinese authorities. This caused an upheaval in the western community and led to statements being issued by all ma!or western nations including the 2nited %tates that were highly critical of 7hina5s involvement with the bloodshed. The 7hinese authorities however, denied their involvement in a press conference at ''(( )rs local time, Tuesday. The 7hinese #remier /ang said,

1uote8 4,ll allegations regarding 7hina5s involvement with the unfortunate incidents in Myanmar and the support for 6ieutenant&$eneral )oa5s rebels are totally false and are the product of western propaganda intending to damage the harmony and friendship between 7hina and its ,%3,N brothers. /e ask both sides to cease combat and instead negotiate peacefully. 7hina will fully support such a conference here in *ei!ing.5 2n1uote. )owever, most western countries have refused to accept this statement on the grounds that by calling both parties to a peace negotiation in *ei!ing, 7hina is attempting to gain international recognition for 6ieutenant $eneral )oa and thus strengthen his position both domestically and internationally. ,%3,N countries have voiced similar doubts regarding 7hina5s sincerity and asked the 2nited %tates to intervene. The 2nited %tates however, already heavily involved militarily in the middle&east and ,fghanistan, refused any and all military assistance to the loyalist troops in Myanmar with %tate 9epartment officials reporting in a press conference yesterday afternoon that although the Navy 7arrier *attle $roup or 7 *$, centred around the aircraft carrier 2%% :itty&hawk was being readied in the 0ndian ocean island base at 9iego $arcia for possible operations in the *ay of *engal, its mission was purely humanitarian relief operations and was being e1uipped as such. Reacting to this statement, and to make a substantial statement unconnected with ,%3,N, the 0ndian government issued a statement at ';+( )ours, /ednesday, that it has confirmed through its own sources, 1uote8 4The total and utter lack of sincerity on behalf of the 7hinese authorities5 and the presence of 4#6, ,dvisors5 within 6ieutenant $eneral )oa5s army. 0t went on to say that it was highly disappointed with the 2nited %tates and other /estern countries for showing an 4uninspiring5 response to a crisis that has been 4instigated and planned by the 7hinese5 and with 0ndia having a responsibility towards its ,%3,N neighbours, the government of 0ndia felt obliged to maintain the stability of the region 4through all available means5.

"ne hour later, 0ndia officially sided with the loyalist generals but refused to comment on what level of assistance it was willing to give to the loyalist troops. Three hours later, with news arriving regarding the movement of 0ndian army and *%- troops towards the border with Myanmar in the N3-, region, the 7hinese $overnment issued a statement saying that it regretted the 0ndian response to the crisis and reiterated its stand made earlier and denied any involvement with the crisis in Myanmar. 0t also called the 0ndian response, 1uote8 43xcessive, unnecessary and provocative5 and that 7hina 4reserved the right to conduct its international policy regardless of 0ndian concerns to the contrary5. ,t .+(( )rs, the 0ndian government called an international press conference where senior 0ndian army officers revealed satellite footage taken from 0ndian 7artosat satellites showing the massive airlift operations being conducted by the 7hinese air force, #6,,-, on its forward airfields near 7hina5s border with Myanmar and bringing in heavy military e1uipment and possibly reinforcement troops for the rebels in Rangoon. 0t was revealed for the first time by 0ndian ,ir -orce officers at the conference that attack aircraft had been detected by 0ndian radar after taking off from 7hinese airfields and heading towards Rangoon and returning after a period of time that was, <uote8 4enough to drop a load of 7luster bombs or napalm5 before returning back to the airfields. The 0ndian government authorities have called this as conclusive proof that china is not only supporting the rebels politically but is also giving active military support to these forces and that if unassisted, the loyalist troops could soon succumb to this assault and be defeated. The 0ndian #rime minister, ,tul %ingh, however, denied to comment as to whether any assistance package was being given to the loyalists in Myanmar, but did say that, 1uote8 40t is now clear to us that 7hina is intent on demolishing the relations between 0ndia and Myanmar built over the years, by militarily destroying the Myanmar government and installing a puppet government under 6ieutenant $eneral )oa. /hat we are seeing, therefore, is the first step taken by an aggressive and colonial minded 7hina. The 0ndian government will not stand idly and watch this happen. /e, as the largest democracy on this planet, have a responsibility towards our ,%3,N neighbours to ensure that such aggression is curbed when it is still on its knees.5 The #rime minister was referring in this comment to the close cooperation that had started to develop between 0ndia and Myanmar5s military regime on issues such as the tackling of 26-, in N3-, and the rearming of Myanmar5s armed forces by the 0ndian army as a trade&off to the above&mentioned cooperation. This has been perceived as a strategic threat in *ei!ing for several years now and as a result it

makes the possibility of 7hinese involvement in this crisis more likely than previously imagined.
/hile the tensions between 0ndia and 7hina remain at an all time high for the first time since the border violations of '=>., the fighting in the streets of Rangoon continues with reports of heavy casualties sustained by loyalist troops due to 47hinese5 air strikes. 7ivilians have been flooding across into refugee camps in neighbouring countries for the past three days of this crisis and there seems to be no end in sight. /ith the world standing and nervously watching the unfolding events in the 0ndian subcontinent, all western countries are conducting desperate last minute diplomacy and are asking both 0ndia and 7hina to pull back from the borders and take a deep breath. /hether these negotiations can prevent a war from occurring between the two largest populated countries on the planet remains to be seen.?

CRISIS RESPONSE CENTER, INDIAN ARMY HQ

NEW DELHI, INDIA PRESENT DAY 0600 HRS THURSDAY

The people at the crisis response centre, a part of the 9irectorate of Military "perations or 9$M", at the 0ndian army )< had been awake for the last forty&eight hours and it was visible on their faces. ,ll of a sudden everyone had wanted to know what in hell was happening in Myanmar or *urma, as it was still known in some military circles. This had been compounded on Tuesday when the first piece of information regarding 7hinese involvement had surfaced from R,/ sources. ,s usual nobody had bothered asking or informing the 0ndian army about anything substantial, with the notable exception of the 9efence Minister who made it his !ob to keep the army chiefs involved in the decision making processes. This was the 9efence Minister who, for the first time in decades, had come from defence background and was liked by the army generals for the simple reason that when they talked, he actually listened. )e also had a good sense of all things strategic, and had been instrumental in getting the approval of the government for the sale of the %%&.@( %%*M, known in 0ndia as the 4#rithvi5 to ietnam in exchange for greater access to their naval ports for the 0ndian navy. That had turned out to be a good deal, with the ietnamese extremely happy with a counterforce weapon with which to threaten the 7hinese. The threat wasn5t going to be much of a headache for the 7hinese, given the restricted range of the %%&.@(, and the relatively small numbers of these missiles deployed, but it was only an appetiAer. 0t had taken the 7hinese a very small time to find out about the deal and soon thereafter the first imagery from their satellites had shown the clearly visible deployments around )anoi. The 0ndians had released the details of the deal in public and the ietnamese had arranged the photo& op. ,ll in all, it had infuriated the 7hinese, in turn pleasing the 0ndian #M and the ietnamese head of state and increasing their popularity in their respective countries.
The defence minister had also endorsed the setting up of the maintenance facility for the Malaysian %u& +(M:Ms in 0ndia under ),6 in exchange for greater cooperation on all matters military and also to stabiliAe that region from similar 7hinese initiatives. The underlying consideration in all these agreements had been to control the expansion of the 7hinese sphere of influence in the %outheast ,sian region. The recent trade negotiations with the generals of the military !unta in Myanmar had been the cornerstone of this initiative. ,t the same time he realised the Myanmar government for what it was, a military dictatorship in cahoots with 7hina, and had cautioned the #rime Minister on publicly extending the hand of friendship. )e had suggested using Myanmar to stamp out the 26-, once and for all, and then trying to bring Myanmar under the 0ndian sphere of influence, but always adding that should things go wrong, 0ndia should not get actively involved as it had in %ri&6anka. The 0ndian army had agreed with this plan since it was already involved with the control of the infiltration in :ashmir and the border tensions with #akistan and 7hina and had wanted to end its operations against 26-, once and for all, thereby relieving the stress on it. The army had been willing to even arm the Myanmar armed forces with e1uipment that was in storage or about to be decommissioned. This e1uipment was obsolete as far as the 0ndian army was concerned, but was still a hell of a lot better than what the Myanmar army had. 0t was also something they could not have possibly afforded with their annual budget. The 9efence Minister had approved the army5s list of e1uipment that it had wanted to be handed over to the Myanmar army. That list included the now obsolete 7heetah 6ight )elicopters, 6ight, towed field artillery of the now worthless '(@mm 7alibre, the assorted ammunition and thousands of world war 00 era steel helmets along with some other infantry e1uipment. ,lso on the deal had been T&@@ tanks, Trucks and !eeps and contracts to upgrade the Myanmar army with 0ndian built e1uipment. The unwritten part of the contract, as far as the 9efence Minister had been concerned, was that, taking into consideration the

tensions between Thailand and Myanmar, who had already fought skirmishes before, the usage of ammunition and spares, attrition, and increasing dependency on 0ndian e1uipment, they were creating a maintenance and upgrades vacuum that could only be filled with 0ndian companies. This was going to include the ),6 7heetal )elicopter upgrade from the baseline 7heetah )elicopter, maintenance for the trucks and T&@@ tank spares, ammunition, replacements tools, components etcetera, the list went on. The bottom line was that the Myanmar government would have been forced into the 0ndian sphere of influence without significant active participation on 0ndia5s part, wrenching the strategic initiative from 7hina, who was also trying to do the same with B&C00 and B&; fighter aircrafts for the Myanmar air force. 0t was like a basketball match between two players, with Myanmar being the basketball, and 0ndia and 7hina the two players trying to steal the basketball from each other. ,mong one of the definite losers of this strategic game was Thailand, who would be at the wrong receiving end of all these armaments, but that was a matter of little concern to either 0ndia or 7hina, already involved as they were, in their own survival. *ut as with most strategic issues, this one had been a long game, extending over years, where patience is a very critical characteristic to possess. 0t was here that the 9efence Minister5s great 0ndian expansion plan had become undone. ,s with every human, the 9efence Minister had his flaws, the ma!or one being his lack of knowledge on most things political, which included political backstabbing, and this meant that the people at the National %ecurity 7ouncil or N%7, often had their own way by bypassing the 9efence Minister5s chain of command and authority, without his knowing, of course. %ome of these members had the ear of the #rime Minister, who had been known to be an impulsive operator. The N%7 had convinced the #M that the plan being executed for Myanmar was too hesitant and covert, and that the 7hinese were way ahead of the 0ndians simply because they were more active in their approach to Myanmar. ,s a result, 0ndia should reciprocate. 7all the $enerals of the military !unta over for trade negotiations, bilateral talks, call it anything you want, they had told the #M. /e can then create a stable border on our east and give 7hina serious headaches on its southern border, forcing them to move their troops from the border with us to that with Myanmar and relieve the stress on our own army, and oh, by the way, get rid of 26-, once and for all. /ith this plan we can achieve in as many months as what the 9efence minister is promising in years, they promised the 0ndian head of state. 0n theory the plan was somewhat sound, but vague in all ma!or areas, highly exaggerated in its timeline and overlooked several issues, the ma!or one being the 7hinese response to the 0ndian political probes. ,lready the 7hinese news agency Dinhua had begun to create an anti&0ndia atmosphere in china as a result of the missile sales to ietnam and the deals with Myanmar and Malaysia. Nobody at N%7 seemed to have considered the extent of the 7hinese response. 0t might anyway have been ridiculed if someone would have suggested even a month back that the 7hinese response would involve toppling the entire military !unta in Rangoon to set a precedent and display to the world as to what happens to politiciansE $enerals who start to go against the 7hinese interests by !oining 0ndia. ,nd yet, the incidents in the last four days had shown exactly that. 0t certainly looked as if the 0ndians weren5t the only ones short on patience. ,ll indications from R,/, 90#,7, 90, and ,R7 showed that the 7hinese had impatient and impulsive leaders too. The 9efence Minister removed his glasses and rubbed his eyes for a bit, silently cursing the career politicians on the planet as he summed up in his head as to what was wrong with the world today, and specifically the ,sia region. )e had not slept for some time now and had absolutely no idea of the time until he looked at the wall on which hung clocks showing the local times in all areas of importance at the moment, including *ei!ing, New&9elhi, Rangoon and :olkata among others. 2nlike the members of N%7, who had taken the first opportunity to return to their beds for at least a few hours, the 9efence Minster had stayed. ,s 9efence Minister, he could have ordered them to stay, but he had deliberately not opposed their departure. ,t least now they had some rational people in the room, most of who were in uniforms of one sort or another, and all of them wide awake. The room had a big oval conference table and the Minister sat at one end of the table while the army, air force and navy officers sat on either side. 0t was indeed a big table, the minister realised, cursing himself for delving into irrelevancy. 6ittered on the table was a bunch of papers piling on top of itself since Monday. %ome were satellite imagery from the 9efence 0mage #rocessing and ,nalysis or 90#,7F others detailed the "rder of battle or "R*,T of the 0ndian, Malaysian, 7hinese, #akistani and every other regional armed force in the region. , whole bunch of papers on his end of the table were concerned with intelligence analyses and situation reports, also piling up since Monday because of the 1uarter&daily updates made to them. The walls around the room were filled with computer screens showing the colour&coded digital maps of Northeast 0ndia, the Myanmar border with 0ndia, the 3astern 0ndia 7hina border region from %ikkim to ,runachal #radesh and the *ay of *engal region. These showed the military deployments and specifically the pro!ected areas of conflict and deployments of the rebel and loyalist forces on the map detailing Myanmar.

Technically the prime minister should have been present in the room, but he had a separate !ob at the moment, involving showing his face to the media and to calm public fears and to replace it with confidence. 0t was a big enough !ob as it was, and as a result he had deputed the 9efence minister and other members of the N%7 to work out the details at the crisis response centre in %outh *lock. 0nstead the 9efence Minister had shifted the meeting to the ,rmy )< for reasons known only to him. The army people weren5t ob!ecting, of course, since it only made their !ob of getting the information and passing the orders easier and more efficient. Many officers suspected that this might have been the reason for the sudden change in location of the meeting, with the added effect of bringing discomfort to the politicians. ,ll of this was enough to bring a tired smile on their faces for the first time in the last forty&eight hours. The smiles vanished as the meeting was brought to order by the 9ef&Min, as the Minister was now known in military circles, more as a sign of affection and respect than anything else. The room was heavily crowded even when only the chiefs of the various army and governmental organiAations were present. The people sitting on the conference table included the 9efence Minister, the 7hief "f ,rmy %taff or 7",%, the vice&chief or 7",%, $eneral "fficer 7ommanding, or $"7, of all the three army corps of eastern command that were involved in the area of operations, 7hiefs of R,/, 0* and N%7, the lieutenant generals in charge of 90,, 90#,7, B73/%, ,rmy %pecial "perations command, the ,ir& 7hief Marshal of the 0ndian air force, his eastern air command ,"7, the ,ir&Marshal commanding the formidable %trategic -orces 7ommand and the 7hief of Naval staff and his eastern fleet commander. ,mong those standing were the ,97 or aides to all the seated chiefs and some other staff officers from the 9$M" and 9$#%. 0n addition, on the wall at the opposite end of where the 9ef&Min sat, was a large screen on which any other re1uired commander could be summoned to attend the conference or answer the 1uestions via the video link. ,t the moment it was switched off. 0n all, it was a formidable presence of the commanding officers of the 0ndian armed forces and their dominating effect on the politicians in the room was recognised by both the politicians as well as the officers themselves. The only 4politician5 not affected by this show of force was the 9efence Minister. To him, it was what he had done throughout his life. "nly now, the stakes were higher, as his country stood poised to fight a ma!or war in the 0ndian subcontinent. $entlemen, as of exactly seven hours ago, we are directly involved in this crisis. The prime minister has told the world that 0ndia is on the side of the 46oyalists5, while 7hina has decided to bet its money on the 4rebels5. $entlemen, the political ramifications of this decision on our part are severe. "ur regional dominance in the entire %outheast ,sia region, which had started booming only from the last few years, is under threat. 0f we fail to support Myanmar, then ietnam will be lost and then so will the other smaller nations. -or those of you, who haven5t grasped the political model that we are seeing here, let me point it out to you. /hat we are fighting for the last decade is a scaled down model of the cold war. There also it was against the communists, so it is here. 0f there it was a bipolar world during the cold war, then there is a regional bipolarity in this region today. The ,mericans entered the ietnam /ar under 6yndon Bohnson under the exact conditions that we find ourselves today. *ut there are two ma!or differences between these two situationsF the first one is that at no point was ,merica directly threatened other than by its own citiAens. 0n our case, we are not so lucky. /e share a border with the enemy. 0f we lose Myanmar, we will face another enemy by the name of $eneral )oa. 0f Myanmar is lost, we are then geographically surrounded, and then the internal pressure on us will mount from all sides. The internal violence will flourish and the country will collapse. /e are fighting today, not for the sake of a world or even a regional dominance, but for our own survival. That being the first point, the second is this8 we will learn from the ,merican model. /e will not make the same mistakes. /hich is why you all are here now. 0 have been asked to brief the #M on what our response to the situation in Myanmar will be and what will be the political conse1uences of that action on us. *ut before 0 can make an analysis of the political conse1uences, 0 need to know what our military responses can or should be.? The defence minister concluded. The whole crowd was still silent, measuring up the conse1uences of what the minister had !ust said, after which, the 7",%, $eneral 9ivesh %inha, faced the defence minister and gave his first order in the crisis8 Minister, before 0 present to you what options our Military "perations team has come up with, lets get up to date on the latest military situation in Myanmar. %harma, you may begin.? The 7",% motioned to *rigadier %urendar %harma to begin the briefing. %harma was a staff officer in the 9$M" at ,rmy )<, and officially under the command of 6ieutenant $eneral )arbinder %ingh, the 7",%. Ges, sir.? %harma turned towards the digital map showing Myanmar only. The blue coded forces are the 6oyalists. The red are the rebels. This data is now three to four hours old. The next analysis is being compiled now, as the situation on the ground has been very fluid over the last twenty&four hours. ,s you can see, theH? the 9efence minister intervened with a raised hand in ob!ection.

*rigadier %harma, how have we compiled all this informationI? the 6ieutenant $eneral in command of the 9efence 0ntelligence ,gency or 90,, leaned forward on the table so that the minister could see who was answering and gave the reply instead of %harma. %ir, we have used a number of our intelligence sources and techni1ues that have been developed over the years. 0 will not go into the details, but 0 will say that seventy percent of this information has been collected from our side of the border. ,s you know, the basis of all these intelligence operations come from the modifications of the authorisation granted by #rime Minister .#. %ingh in '==(&'==' to my predecessor, myself and all other commanders to follow me as head of 90,. The modifications included the addition of the surrounding countries to the existing list of countries where the 90, could launch covert intelligence gathering operations within the limit of our military intelligence gathering technology. This included %0$0NT and 0M0NT.? 0 am aware of this modification to the authorisation, $eneral. $et to the point.? The point, sir, is that as of ''+( hrs yesterday, several Nishant 2, s deployed from a small airstrips at #alel near 0mphal, :ohima near 000 7orps )< at 9imapur, Mackeypur near Borhat and 6edo in the extreme North&east of 0ndia are taking real time imagery of the battles in Myanmar5s cities. These aircraft are small and not easily detectable on radar. More importantly, the Myanmar air force has nothing to detect it with. The 7hinese are more competent. /e still have to establish the effort they are expending in this campaign. 0f they have forward deployed some low&level radar units, which we doubt, they could detect these drones. )owever, 0 find this unlikely at best. The Nishant has a decent endurance capability of around four hours, measured at its maximum range. ,s such they are capable of providing effective continuous coverage near the border regions and intermittent coverage over distant battlefields. /e have the %earcher and )eron&00 2, platforms as well, which have better capabilities in terms of range and endurance, but they are needed on our other borders. -or example, 0 7orps at TeApur has a s1uadron each of %earcher and )erons, but they are both needed for keeping an eye on the 7hinese. ,lso, we had to factor in that authoriAation 0 mentioned earlier, regarding the range of operations that 0 can authoriAe. 0f you authoriAe it, 0 can probably find some army sector that can swap its %earchers for Nishant 2, s and then deploy them in Nagaland. This will improve our coverage of the battlefields and provide real&time information for longer and more comprehensive periods. This is an official re1uest from 90, to you. 0 can submit this and some other re1uests in written form later today, but if you can give the word during this meeting, 0 can have the units moving within the hour. ,part from optical imagery, we have deployed some 3lectronic /arfare or 3/ units of the army5s %ignal corps right at the 0ndia&Myanmar border in Nagaland, near the village of :amtong, listening to all communications from both warring sides in Myanmar5s western regions. The location is well suited to our operations. The road to :amtong loops around a ma!or peak known as No. ';J+ and links near 0mphal. :amtong is on the easternmost point on the loop, and is at a much higher location compared to Myanmar territory for around one hundred and fifty kilometres. ,nother unit is being deployed at :honsa, near 6edo, and is at a much higher location compared to :amtong, but the local mountains are higher still, limiting the effectiveness of the unit. ,s you can see on the map, these two locations are basically on the southern and northen tips respectively, of the high peaks east of :ohima, where we had planned to deploy another 3/ unit but were unable to due to the severe remoteness and the treat of 26-, attacks. The units we have deployed so far are a forward extension of the %amyukta Bammers system deployment in the Northeast to counter 26-, communications. /hile the remainder of the system continues to monitor the 26-,, these two detachments are monitoring the Myanmar army5s communications and radars. The key word here is 4monitoring5. /e are listening in to the communications from both sides for the moment. 0f the crisis goes any further and we have to provide active assistance to the rebels, we can easily !am the 4rebel5s5 communications within an hour of giving the order to do so. ,s you know, most of the radios and communication e1uipment for the Myanmar army comes from us. The older radios that is. )ence it is very easy for us to listen in on the loyalist communications. )owever, it also has a drawback, which includes the fact that the 7hinese and hence the rebels are also able to listen the loyalist communications very easily. -rom what we have so far, it seems clear that the rebels are indeed using this information, provided to them by the 7hinese, to launch offensives in sectors that are weak and provide reinforcements in sectors which are about to be attacked by the loyalists before the attack can begin. The 7hinese are also using this information to launch air strikes on the loyalist bases and convoys and from what we hearF the situation on the 6oyalist side is critical. They have sustained massive casualties due to these air strikes but are holding out, at least for the time being. ,nyway, this is our $round&0ntelligence&%urveillance&Reconnaissance or $0%R network for the western side of Myanmar. -or the eastern side of the country, 90#,7 has deployed the army5s T3%&00 as well as the 7artosat satellites on loan from 0%R", ensuring that we have full coverage of the ground battles taking place in the whole of Myanmar. /e presume the 7hinese are doing the same,

with some more units deployed within Myanmar itself. /e are ready to do the same, if it is re1uired to do so.? The 90, chief concluded, impressing the politicians and the N%7 members in the room including the 9efence Minister, who started smiling when he saw the shocked expression on the faces of the people in the room before saying his next thought. $eneral, you are pushing the limits of that authoriAation order that was given to you. 0 hope you realiAe that.? Ges sir, 0 do. *ut it was your order yesterday to establish what in hell was going on in that country. /ell, sir, your orders are completed. "ur $0%R network is deployed.?

CONTINUATION NOTE: <<THE DIA COMMANDER HAS UST CONCLUDED HIS BRIEF ON THE ISR NETWORK IN MYANMAR, THE DISCUSSION ON AERIAL ISR AND AIR SUPERIORITY IS ABOUT TO START!!
0ndeed, $eneral.? The 9ef&Min turned towards the 7",%. $eneral %inha, were you aware of this operation conducted by the 90,I? the 7",% leaned back in his chair. )e had not slept for some time as well. No sir. *ut then again, 0 didn5t need to know. This 4modified5 authoriAation allows the 90, commander to do !ust what 6ieutenant $eneral 9ixit has done. 0t is entirely within his purview, not mine. More importantly, the deployment of these 3/ units was done after we had told the world that we were siding the 6oyalist forces in Myanmar, thus it was not that big a ripple in the water as it might seem. ,lso, 0 must admit, the results of these operations speak for themselves.? The 7",% answered. 0ndeed general, but a few minor points. -irst of all, 6ieutenant $eneral 9ixit, in future, kindly inform me about such operations beforehand so that 0 don5t have to learn it from some reporter in the #ress, understandI ery well. %econd, 0 am giving you the authoriAation to deploy the %earchers as you have re1uested. %ee if they can be deployed properly and go ahead with it, but inform me before they start conducting their operations. Third, 0 want a detailed report on the 7hinese 0%R network in Myanmar. 0 also want you to be prepared to surge forward your 3/ units into Myanmar in the near future. -inally, 0 want to see your list of re1uests immediately after this meeting.K KNow, what about the ,erial&0%RI? The heads turned towards ,ir 7hief Marshal *hosale, the 7hief of air staff, or 7,%. )e took out some papers from one of his files marked 47onfidential5. 9efence Minister, as of yesterday afternoon, the ,erial&0%R over Myanmar is being maintained by a group of 3/ aircrafts launched from several airbases in our 3astern ,ir 7ommand or 3,7. These include one #halcon ,/,7% launched from :alaikunda ,-*, two 3/ *&;+; aircrafts also from the same base, and several modified M0$&.; aircrafts from )asimara. The #halcon ,/,7% is providing continuous coverage for most of the Myanmar battlefields, while flying on our side over ,ssam. 0ts airborne surveillance radar is able to detect 7hinese and Myanmar aircraft after they have taken off and after they have dispensed their munitions, but not during the time when they are flying at lower altitudes. This is due the mountains in the region. ,s 6ieutenant $eneral 9ixit mentioned earlier, the hills near :ohima are blocking our view. 0f we push over that region in Nagaland, we will be able to see the aerial situation much better, but the threat of long&range surface to air missiles increases. /e do not believe the Myanmar air force to have these missiles, but the 7hinese do, and as 9ixit mentioned, we do not know the extent of the 7hinese involvement in this crisis.K KTo counter this we are deploying small low altitude radars in the peaks to the east of :ohima, right at the border with Myanmar. These should be operational within the next three to four hours if the order to deploy is decided now in this meeting. The e1uipment is ready to be transported from )asimara airbase as we speak. 0n addition, one of two forward deployed 3lectronic /arfare specialised *&;+;s of the ,viation Research 7entre or ,R7 have lifted off from :alaikunda thirty minutes ago and will fly over ,ssam. These aircrafts will establish information on the enemy radars and communications and will be linked with the 90,5s %amyukta system to establish comprehensive electronic coverage of the conflict in Myanmar. 0n addition, five M0$&.; fighters have been fitted out with the electronic warfare gear, including 37M and 377M pods and seven others fitted out with ground attack munitions including dumb bombs, rockets and six other aircrafts are optimised for the precision strike role and fitted with laser guided bombs or 6$*s. These constitute our strike capability earmarked for the Myanmar theatre of operations.K K-or the air superiority role 0 have earmarked a detachment of %2&+(M:0s of No. .J s1uadron from *areily and another detachment of M0$&.' 4*ison5 aircrafts based at :alaikunda. 0n addition, one 06&;CM:0 of No.

;C s1uadron has been dispatched to :alaikunda to support the %ukhois and M0$&.;s with in&flight refuelling capability. "ur transport and helicopter s1uadrons have been put on high alert to airlift any and all army e1uipment and personnel to bases in ,ssam and Nagaland and are at a high state of readiness. 0f re1uired, and considering the presence of only Myanmar5s forces to deal with, we can ensure air superiority over the battlefields with relative ease. Then move in with our strike aircraft 0 had earmarked earlier to deliver severe blows to the rebel forces. This can begin within an hour of receiving the orders to do so.K K0f the 7hinese get involved, the situation changes, and any encounter with their aircraft will lead to greater confrontation between our air and land forces in this theatre. Then the e1uations change. 0 can no longer provide complete air superiority to the land forces. The sky will become one vast battlefield that will suck away my resources and ability to wage war on the ground. #lease keep in mind while making the decisions that if the army is ordered to provide support to the loyalist forces, they will for the most part not encounter the 7hinese on the ground, and the war remains limited. 0f the air force is told to gain air superiority over the battlefield, we can do it, but most likely we will encounter the 7hinese aircraft that have been bombing areas all over Myanmar in support of the rebels and that if we shoot them down, the war will not remain restricted. They will launch their own aircrafts and missiles and so will we, and the whole situation will get out of control. ,lso, 0 should tell you that the crisis has started only forty&eight hours ago as far as we are concerned, and that full deployment of all sides is not complete. 0t is in effect a rehearsal of the 47old %tart5 strategy doctrine that we had formulated years ago. 0f we treat it as such, we have a period of another thirty to forty&eight hours before complete deployment of both the 7hinese and 0ndian armies should be complete. 0t is within this time that 0 can launch air strikes against enemy targets in Myanmar and get away with it. ,fter that, the air !ust gets too congested with too many aircraft from too many nations. 0f the government of 0ndia decides to provide air support to the loyalists, it has to take that decision within the next couple of hours. 0 understand that what 0 am re1uesting is extreme in terms of timeline, but that5s the way it has to go. ,fter that, 0 will be too busy trying to control the 7hinese threat to even think about what in hell is going on in Myanmar. 0H? the briefing was disrupted by the 9ef&Min, with a raise of the hand. %orry to interrupt you but 0 wanted to ask this 1uestion at this time while we are still discussing the air option. 7an you make a difference within such a short timeI ,re the air strikes worth itI? the 9efence Minister asked. 9epends on the type of air campaign we run. Gou had mentioned earlier that we would learn from the ,merican mistakes in the ietnam /ar. 3ssentially then, my 1uestion is this8 do you want us to wage a limited air campaign with restricted R"3, or do you want to wage an unrestricted campaignI My gut feeling is that either way, its going to become unrestricted sooner or later, but 0 want to know as to what you want me to tell my operations people.? The 7,% answered. $ood 1uestion. 0 want to think this over. $ive me your opinion on both cases anyway.? The 9ef&Min ordered.

%ir, we can make a difference. 9efinitely. There are a lot of roads and bridges that we can block or destroy in Myanmar, which will stop both sides from moving and engaging each other, giving us more time to deploy ground forces to help the loyalists. The Myanmar air force was in a worthless situation before and it is gone to even lower levels since the coup began. ,s far as we can tell, many of their aircrafts were destroyed on the ground itself when fighting broke out within various groups of servicemen at the airbases themselves. 0t turned out that many of their air force officers were backing the coup while the others were opposing it. They both tried to recruit the N7"s and airmen to !oin their cause and the eventual gunfights damaged many aircrafts on the ground, some even started to burn and were damaged beyond repair, according to our aerial recon. %ome pilots appeared to have tried to take off when they were shot at by their own surface to air missiles. Many of the airbases have now fallen into rebel hands but the fighting at those locations is still continuing. /hat bases remained loyal are mostly in the western parts of that country, that is, near to our side while most other bases have completely seiAed operations. This allowed some fifty odd aircrafts of all types, including counter&insurgency types, to mount an all out air campaign against the rebels from their western airbases. The attacks showed some signs of success, with reports of heavy rebel casualties reported by our 0ntelligence.K
KThen the 7hinese moved in with their fighters from bases in the south of their country, mostly in the Gunnan province, but also in the DiAang province, known to us as the Tibet ,utonomous Region. The aircrafts on

both sides were same types for most of these air battles, mostly the -&; variants, but then the 7hinese moved in their %2&.;s during the last twelve hours and have started to completely decimate the remainder of the Myanmar5s loyalist air force or the Tatmadow 6ei or T6, as it was called until very recently.K K-or this reason 0 want to move in our %2&+(M:0s into this region. 0f we want to ensure air superiority, we can do it with our %2&+(M:0s. They will effectively destroy the 7hinese %2&.;s in air combat, but then the 7hinese will move larger numbers of these aircrafts into the region and then we will start to take losses, which 0 am not prepared to accept. %o, the other option 0 see is to send in the %2&+(M:0s to ensure local air superiority, call in the M0$&.;s for the ground strikes, then 1uickly pull the whole force back into 0ndia, preferably with no losses on our side. Then we repeat this process again and again, with variations in aircraft numbers, direction and altitude of airspace penetration and points of penetration of Myanmar5s airspace. 0f the 7hinese attempt to pursue our aircrafts into 0ndian Territory, 0 will have some %pyder %,Ms ready for them on the hills east of :ohima. These will knock the 7hinese aircrafts out of the sky before they come anywhere close to our bases.K K,s for the effects of the air strikes themselves, the best 0 can do with such restricted methods is provide more time for our land forces to move into the area of operations. ,lso, 0 can forward deploy another %pyder unit with these army units to provide a bubble of air defence over their heads when they move into Myanmar. ,lso, 0 want to add that before you consider any air campaign on our part, we should attempt to contact the Tatmadow 6ei high command, whatever is left of it, and ask them to back off from areas that we want to attack, or else we might not be able to differentiate between 7hinese and T6 -&;s and my pilots may accidentally shoot down their fighters.? ,nd what of an unrestricted air campaignI? the 9ef&Min asked. ,s for the unrestricted campaign, well, that5s more of a strategic 1uestion than tactical. /e have the resources to do it. *ut so do the 7hinese. Then it becomes a 1uestion of who is more interested in Myanmar, and who is more willing to sacrifice their pilots for that country. #ersonally, 0 would recommend against this type of response. 0t will only aggravate the situation more than what it already is. 3ventually the war is going to reach our borders anyway, and saving our assets for that campaign will bear more dividends than in this case.K K,lso, 0 would like to point out that although 0 am no expert in this, it seems to me that this coup in Myanmar was very properly thought out and executed. The very fact that the remainder of the loyalist forces have been pushed all the way north and west into the very foothills of Nagaland within a few days bears testimony to this, does it notI 0f this is indeed the case, we probably need to consider the fact that Myanmar will be lost to $eneral )oa5s troops and the 7hinese despite our last ditch efforts in the coming few days. Therefore, we need to start securing our defences in this region rather than wasting whatever assets we have in the region trying to save the loyalists. 0 would rather have my pilots die for my own country than for some two bit nation on our border.? The 7,% concluded. The response from the 9ef&Min was immediate, and harsh. , lot of heads turned and people standing in the background shared silent looks. ,7M *hosale, 0 fear that you do not understand the importance of this 4two bit nation5, or Myanmar, as 0 like to call it. 0 am not going to discuss this again, however. 0 will not ask you to like my views on this matter, but it is going to be carried out regardless.? The 9ef&min reduced his voice and rubbed his eyes again before speaking again in a much more polite manner. #lease forgive my temper. The last few days have been very exactingH you say that the air campaign is worth pursuing as a precursor to any land campaigns on our part. ,lso, if this is to go ahead, we must establish contact with the T6. 6ieutenant $eneral 9ixit, you had mentioned that the older radio communication e1uipment we had provided to the Myanmar army are compromised. %o, we will have to probably get them the new %,T7"M radios before we start anything. 9o you agreeI? the 9ef&Min asked. Ges sir. /e can probably insert special operation teams into the country and use them to try and reach the T6 command centre. /e already know the location of this centre from its own radio transmissions, and 0 fear if they don5t shut down those radios, the rebels and therefore the 7hinese will soon locate them as well. The #6,,- can then attack that site from the air and destroy the command and control capabilities of the T6. 6uckily for us they have been pushed into the westernmost part of Myanmar and right into the foothills of the )ills to the east of :ohima, near a place called %ingkaling )yamti. There is a small airfield there, and so is their temporary regional air command centre. The base is as austere as it can be and the location itself does not offer any protection from attacks, but they have deployed some radars and %,M batteries there in addition to flying their helicopters from the local airstrip.K

KGou can see the location on the map here. 0t is on the eastern riverbank of the 7hindwin River that flows parallel to the :ohima hills. /e have been watching the events taking place there through our Nishant 2, platforms for some time now, and 0 have to tell you, sir, that it is one very crowded place. 0f the 7hinese get one crumb of information regarding its existence, they are going to turn it into the lunar landscape. 0f it is lost, then so are their western region ,ir -orce 7+0 capabilities. 0n addition, if the reports coming from 3astern Myanmar are true, then this is most probably their last active centre. /e have to ensure that it survives if we want the loyalists and the T6 to survive this war.? The 90, commander replied. /e can already do that.? ,ir 7hief Marshal *hosale said. 6ook, the %pyder units 0 have ready to move are to be deployed on the hills in :ohima. They practically overlook this %ingkaling place you talked about. ,ny aircraft attempting to attack this place can be firstly tracked by the low level 0ndra Radars that will be deployed in these hills as 0 had mentioned earlier, and then targeted and destroyed by these missile units right from where they areL ,ccording to the map, their 7+0 centre is at a distance of around, what, fifty :ilometres from where my missiles are going to beI The attacking aircrafts will have to fly near the border, unless they launch standoff weaponry, which 0 don5t think the 7hinese will waste. They will therefore automatically present themselves as easy targets to the %pyder missiles.? %till, 0 feel that we should transfer some M,N#,9 systems to this centre. ,7M *hosale, bear in mind that although your missiles can shoot down the attackers, they will still be launched from across the border, will they notI 0f so, the 7hinese will definitely regard that as an act of war on our part. /hatever air defences we want to put up, we should put up in Myanmar territory. #referably in con!unction with T6 air defence systems. 0t will give as an element of deniability in case the 7hinese accuse us of something or the other. 0t will also help the T6 protect themselves better.? 6ieutenant general 9ixit continued. Ges, and it will also mean that when they start launching ,nti&Radiation Missiles at these units, our men are going to die and the 7hinese will claim that they couldn5t differentiate between our systems and T6 systems because they were so closely spaced together.? The 7,% thought out aloud. ,lready he knew that he was outnumbered in his opinions with the 9efence Minister and the 90, commander, 6ieutenant $eneral 9ixit. *ut he spoke his opinions anyway. ,7M *hosale, that5s war. /e are committed to this conflict because the #M says we are committed. 0f we provide only token resistance to the 7hinese aggression now, they are only going to get more aggressive. /ill we take casualtiesI Ges. 0s the cause worth itI /ell, 0ts better 0 think, to lose a hundred soldiers now, than to lose a hundred thousand one month from now, isn5t itI? 9ixit concluded coldly. The 7,% remained 1uiet at this point and the 9ef&Min finished the argument for him. 0 agree. $eneral %inha and ,7M *hosale, please see to it that these M,N#,9 missiles are ready to be deployed to %ingkaling )kamti. ,lso, prepare some special operations forces for deployment to this region and forward me the details as soon as you can. $eneral 9ixit, authoriAe your 3/ units at kamtong and 6edo to try and establish contact with this 7+0 centre at %ingkaling )kamti. ,7M *hosale, deploy all your assets as necessary, including all the radar and missile units, but they are not to open fire on any of the 7hinese fighters before my authoriAation to engage. This is a serious matter that 0 need to discuss with the #M first. ,part from that continue as planned. 2nderstoodI? the 9efence Minister concluded. The 7,% motioned to his 3astern ,ir 7ommand or 3,7 ,"7, ,ir Marshal %unil %hankar and he picked up the secure phones in front of him to give the orders. The first air strike would have to begin within the next few hours if they were going to be of any help to the loyalists, as everybody knew. "nce connected, the 3,7&,"7 spoke 1uickly into the speaker8 This is the 3,7&,"7. 3xecute "#&%2R$3 7"NTR"6. 0 repeat, authoriAation granted. 3xecute "#& %2R$3 7"NTR"6 with #"7&' active. ,ctivate 9efence alert level three.? #"7&' was the acronym for #lan "f ,ction&one. 0t was one of the list of six possible scenarios and the respective level of granted authoriAations. This one was for the designated strike aircrafts to take off with live weapons, but not to fire them without authoriAation from the 3,7&,"7. 9efence alert level three was for the entire 3,7. ,ll aircraft in the 3,7 were now on ground alert and ready to take off within minutes of expected threats to 0ndian airspace. The 90, commander was the next to get through and he spoke to the 3/ commander for the eastern army command. ,s a Ma!or $eneral, it was his units and 2, s that were operating in the !ungle hilltops of :ohima, Nagaland. 3xecute "#&#07:3T -3N73. 0 repeat, authoriAation for "#&#07:3T -3N73 granted. 3stablish

10

communications with local troops across the border. ,wait orders to forward deploy. Re1uest for %earchers authoriAed. #repare the reception. ,wait details on deployed units. 9eploy local 0%RN.?

KALAIKUNDA AIR FORCE BASE

WEST BEN"AL, INDIA 06#0 HRS $IST%, THURSDAY The skies were covered with white clouds to the point that the sun was barely visible. There was also a wind blowing so that the sunshine came and went as the clouds passed overhead. 0t wasn5t exactly a perfect flying day, but neither was it something that wasn5t going to impede the day5s flying routine. ,nd there was plenty of that going around. $roup 7aptain . Naidu in charge of flight operations was standing near the tarmac and the main aircraft parking area staring not so much at the clouds, on which he had received the daily weather forecast, as looking at the line up of aircraft on the flight line. , beautiful sight, to be sure, it was also something that told the $roup captain about how busy he was going to be today, tomorrow and probably the whole of the coming month. -irst on the flight line in front of him was an 3/ *&;+; of the ,R7, standing with the front entry door open and connected to a ladder, not too different from those used in civilian airports for passengers, only more austere and painted grey. %o was the aircraft. The new low visibility paint scheme had now been applied to the modified *&;+;s of the ,R7 as well. 3ssentially the aircraft were the same ones that had flown with the communications s1uadron not too long ago, but with the delivery of the new *oeing ;+;&;(( series aircrafts to that s1uadron, the older aircraft had been resurrected by the ,R7 to carry all manner of 3lectronic warfare systems and communication systems including %,T7"M and )- systems to act as nodes in an airborne communications network in case the satellites went down. ,t the moment however, the aircraft was looking sleek in its overall grey paint and small and somewhat insignificant markings on the tail. ,lthough the engines were switched off, the aircraft collision lights were flashing to tell everyone interested in watching that the aircraft was about to depart in a while. Next to the *&;+; was parked a wonderful mixture of nearly all the variants of the 06&;> aircrafts in 0ndian service, which included a #halcon ,/,7% standing immediately next to the *&;+; and also awaiting departure while next to that was one 06&;CM:0 aircraft whose engines were already spooling up and it would be the first aircraft in this flight line to leave :alaikunda ,-* this morning. Next to that were a couple of 06& ;>s of the basic transport type whose rear loading ramps were open and loading operations were about to begin, except that the cargo itself had been somewhat delayed and obviously, the officer in charge of loading was one very unhappy man. )e was shouting into his intercom to someone over the sound of the engines of the 06&;C tanker nearby. ,s the $roup captain watched, the concerned officer finished talking into the intercom and then silently looked at the sky above, probably cursing the people who had screwed up his timing. -light operations 7entre was already aware of the delay in the arrival of the army cargo to be airlifted to Borhat in ,ssam, and had compensated accordingly, but it was gratifying to see younger officers eager to get the !ob done, even if it meant extreme use of profanities, enough to bring a smile on the $roup captain5s face on a very tense morning. The 06&;C tanker finally began to roll down the tarmac under the instructions of the ground handlers whose hand signals allowed the pilots of the aircraft to move from the main tarmac to the taxiway from where the ,T7 tower would take over to guide them to the end of the runway for takeoff. /hen the aircraft finally began to roll forward towards the taxiway, the main handler looking at the aircraft gave it a final thumbs up signal for the pilots benefit and then saluted and walked off as the aircraft continued to the end of the runway taking with it the massive noise from its engines. 3verybody was relieved when the engine noise receded and it was visible on their faces. *ut they were to be soon disappointed. The 06&;C may have been the first tanker to take off from :alaikunda this morning, but it wasn5t the first aircraft to leave. Moments later, the walls and windows and the very souls of the crew and pilots on the ground reverberated with the noise from two M0$&.' 4*ison5 aircrafts as they left the runway at :alaikunda with full engine reheat to commence their patrol duties further north of the ,-*. 9efence alert level three had been activated and the influx of fighters into the 3,7 meant that several detachments from various s1uadrons had to share the same airbases, and :alaikunda was the designated home for a lot of aircrafts in the region, including the M0$&.'s. That being said, it didn5t take long for the aircrafts to initially disappear into the clouds hovering over the base only to become visible again, by which time they were visible only as two black specks in a mostly white sky, and then thirty seconds later they

11

were no longer visible. The 06&;CM:0 was now turning at the end of the runway when the -light "ps commander noticed another $roup 7aptain walking towards him on the tarmac. )is arm patch showed him to be a pilot from the communications s1uadron, but his looks told him that he was a real professional. )e also wore pilot5s wings on top of his green overall that was now standard for ,ir -orce pilots. )e was the pilot for the *&;+; parked on the tarmac. ,s a senior $roup 7aptain himself, the captain had been flying *& ;+;s for a long time now, and had more than several thousand hours on the type. )e had noticed the -light operations centre commander watching the aircraft and had walked over after finishing the visual inspection of his own aircraft. -or today the crew for the ,R75s 3/ *&;+; was not an ,R7 deputed crew, most of who were retired ,ir -orce people anyway. The need of the hour re1uired every available military aircraft to be available to the ,ir -orce at a moment5s notice, and so the 3/ crew were active personnel as well. The co&pilot and the aircraft 3ngineer were busy inside the cockpit while they checked all aircraft systems and conducted pre& flight procedures. There was still some time before takeoff. /hat5s going on over thereI? the #ilot asked the -light "ps commander, referring to the two 06&;>s waiting with their ramps open. , delay in the loading of cargo to Borhat. %eems that someone in the ,rmy responsible for the cargo wasn5t told until the last minute about where and how he was supposed to send the cargo to us. They have cleared it up now. The loading should begin in another fifteen minutes or so. The specific army units are already on the way.? Tunnel vision.? 0t wasn5t a 1uestion. This merited a grunt from Naidu. Ges, that5s one way of looking at it. ,nother is that the army has really been pushing hard for the last three days. /hen you move so many men and machines, such things are bound to happen. 0n any case, we had the systems all ready to be loaded from our side, but somebody from ,rmy )< said that it would be better if the army5s units were deployed for the same purpose but with the added facet of better interoperability. /hat about youI? /e are on time. ,bout to leave in another fifteen minutes and have to travel the better part of a thousand kilometres to reach my area of patrol and relieve one of the *&;+;s already there now. 0t would have been much better if we had forward deployed to somewhere like $auhati or )asimara. 6esser distances to cover, and more time on station.? The pilot said. ,nd becoming more vulnerable to attacks while on the ground. 6ook, 0 know that it5s an inconvenience to deploy here and have to go on a round about route towards :ohima. /ith the *angladeshis not playing ball and letting over&flights through their airspace, the problem becomes more complicated, but the thinking at ,ir )ead1uarters is that this war is going to spill over into a general war with 7hina sooner or later. 0f so, :alaikunda is relatively safer from air and missile attacks than any other bases to the north or east. /e get more warning here than any other place and for aircrafts like yours, this gives you more time to take the hell off before the missiles hitH? *oth men then looked at the source of the noise to see the 06&;CM:0 take off from the runway and the turn north before it headed off. %oon the noise receded again. 0 agree. Most uncooperative of the *angladeshis. 0 bet they are thinking that we are going to lose the war and our Northeastern states and so it5s in their best interests to not antagonise the 7hinese unnecessarily by allowing us to over fly their airspace. This, after all we have done for them. 9amn it, if it hadn5t been for us there wouldn5t even have been a 9amned *angladesh at all. ,nyway, what are we planning to do about itI? 0f war breaks out, we over&fly their airspace anyway.? The answer was delivered with a smile, and it was returned. $ood. Bust what 0 wanted to hear to cheer me up before 0 begin a long and relatively boring flight. "kay, time for me to go. 0 will see you later.? The pilot walked off towards the *&;+; even as the ground crew began taking the ground e1uipment away from the aircraft. The pilot ran the last few meters and swiftly climbed up the ladder along with a ground crewman who closed the door after he had entered the aircraft and then signalled others to remove the ladder itself. Two minutes later all e1uipment was clear and the crew chief on the ground near the cockpit signalled the captain to start the left engine and then the right one with hand signals. The front compressor started turning and the engine began producing forward thrust but the aircraft was still not moving, the forward thrust not being enough and the brakes applied. %oon the aircraft engines were roaring and the aircraft was straining at the leash when the orders to take off came through. The aircraft started rolling and then turned towards the taxiway, even as the #halcon ,/,7% began to spool up its engines as well. The flight 6ine at :alaikunda was soon going to become empty. 3xcept for the two 06&;>s of course.

12

$roup 7aptain Naidu walked over to these aircrafts as soon as the *&;+; had passed towards the end of the runway. %everal army trucks had !ust some through to the aircrafts and three of these trucks and a military !eep went over to one aircraft while the remaining two Tatra vehicles went over to the other 06&;>. The first army officer to !ump off the !eep was a colonel of the 7orps of army air defence artillery, even as the two Tatra trucks with the rectangular box shaped systems attached to their backs were starting to move under the directions of the air force ground crew before they drove onto the ramps of the aircraft and then inside it. "ne of the other trucks at the first aircraft was actually a trailer while another carried the packed components of 0ndra 6ow level radar. "nly the third truck was a normal one from whom about two&doAen army soldiers started to !ump off. ,ll of them wore the badges of the army5s air defence artillery units. The 7olonel walked over to the flight operations commander. $ood morning $roup 7aptain. My men are ready. /e are good to go. %orry for the delay, but we !ust received the orders a few hours ago. 0 had to reorganiAe the men and e1uipment before we could come here. The Ma!or *alin here will assist you in handling all the e1uipment.? The colonel motioned for the Ma!or to move out and he saluted and ran off, motioning his men to form up and organiAe the details while he spoke with the air force5s loading officer. %ome of this e1uipment was very delicate, he was telling the ,ir -orce officer now, who !ust looked about as irritated as anyone being told about how to do his !ob. The $roup 7aptain looked back at the 7olonel. The arrangements have been made at Borhat airbase. 0t5s a roundabout route around *angladesh, so it will take some time. #lease make sure that your men are properly seated and organiAed. /here are you going after BorhatI? the colonel produced a folded map from his trouser pockets. /ell, from Borhat we move down with some other army units of the 000 7orps towards the %outheast, aboutHhere. Near :ohima. Then from there onto this road which loops around this hill range dominated by peak .+.> and #eak '@+. and then towards the border fromHhere.? The talk got disrupted as both men looked to their right to see a 7&'+(B of the newly formed %"7"M ,ir %upport %1uadron come in to land at :alaikunda. The aircraft touched the concrete runway and then rolled off to the end of the runway before beginning to turn and move towards the far right corner of the tarmac where no other aircraft was supposed to be parked to maintain separation from the %"7"M pilots and crew. ,lready there were some trucks waiting for the 7&'+(B bear its designated parking area. The %"7"M troopers were a very secretive lot. Gou think they are going my way as wellI? the 7olonel asked the -light "ps commander. 2pon not receiving an answer he looked back to face the $roup 7aptain directly and received a cryptic remark8 3verybody5s going your way 7olonel. *ut that5s all 0 can say for now. Now, you were sayingH? GesHwe move from here towards the border near %ingkaling )kamti.? 0 hear it5s a real busy place.? The $roup 7aptain was cleared for this information. /e are going to be busy too.? The 7olonel answered with a smile of his own. Ges, these %pyder systems are especially useful, aren5t theyI?

CRISIS RESPONSE CENTER, INDIAN ARMY HQ

NEW DELHI, INDIA PRESENT DAY 06&' HRS THURSDAY

6ieutenant $eneral 9ixit spoke into the phone. %oon thereafter he put down the receiver. Then he spoke to the audience before him.
"kay, sir, the %,T7"M systems are on their way. The %"7"M aircraft carrying them is at present refuelling and is about to depart from :alikunda ,-*, as are the %pyder missile systems on two 06&;>s of the ,ir -orce. These particular missiles are the ones belonging to the army and not to the air force as we had discussed earlier.? Now, 0 think we need to continue with the report of the ground situation in Myanmar. *rigadier %harma, we are sorry to keep you waiting for so long. #lease continue with your briefing.? The 9efence Minister ordered. )eads turned towards the digital map again, and the light intensity was reduced in the room for better viewing of the screen. Ges sir. ,s 0 was mentioning earlier, the blue coded forces are the loyalists, while the red ones are rebels and 7hinese assisted units. 0t is clear from the map before you that the rebels have essentially overrun all

13

ma!or military bases in Myanmar at this time. )owever, due to the threat of massive 7hinese air&strikes on their bases and that of a rebel coup within the base complexes, the loyalist soldiers safely removed the ma!ority of the their mobile e1uipment and weapons before their bases fell. This was conducted professionally in most cases although some reports have emerged where the evacuation was botched or ruined by ground attacks by #6,,- aircrafts assisting the rebels, especially in the northern part of the country. 0n addition, the officers of the various loyalist army divisions had probably shut down most of the communications available to their soldiers with the outside world in order to prevent any rebellions from within.K K,s far as we can tell, most of the loyalist soldiers were told only that their country was under invasion, and they continued to believe this for the first thirty to forty&eight hours, during which they were under attack from the #6,,- which further reinforced their beliefs. 0n this time therefore, their army was mobilised to meet an external threat that did not exist while the internal threat of the coup was hidden from the soldiers until it was too late. 0n any case they could hardly have hidden the coup for too long anyway. 0n any case, as soon as these army units made contact with rebel soldiers from their own army, the whole army started falling apart. /hole units rebelled. *attalions rebelled, platoons and so on. -orty hours after the coup, the loyalist forces in most of the regional military commands or RM7s were broken and disorganised.K K*ecause the rebellions had taken place to various degrees in various RM7s, it is difficult to paint a picture the situation as a whole. -or example, the 7entral and the Rangoon 7ommands had a rebel percentage of around ;( percent. 6esser so for the other, more remote commands, while their Northern 7ommand which faced and is still facing the brunt of the #6,,- strikes had a very small percentage of rebellions, as they were more focused on fighting and surviving against these strikes than any other command. %imilarly the western and Northwestern commands on our border were relatively unaffected by rebellions and are essentially still termed loyalists. The 7entral, %outhern and 3astern 7ommands have been totally wiped out as effective loyalist forces by a combination of rebel attacks, the desertions of their soldiers trying to !oin the rebels and the #6,,- strikes. 0f you recall, these are the commands that had fought against the Thailand army some time back and were fully supporting the rebels in their demands for moderniAation of the armed forces. ,s a result, the attrition within their ranks was high, and so was their support for the rebels. /hat is the situation in RangoonI ,nd who is in command of the loyalists, *rigadier %harmaI? the 9efence Minister asked. %ir, as of twelve hours ago, Rangoon is now completely in rebel hands. -ighting has seiAed in the city for the most part while the loyalist forces of the Rangoon 7ommand and the Rangoon #eace and 9evelopment 7ouncil have surrendered in the outskirts of the city. /e intercepted their communications in this regard. /e believe the generals of the military Bunta in Rangoon escaped from the city during the initial hours of the coup and it is a good probability that they are taking cover in the western part of the country where they still have some control. %ince they escaped in helicopters, it is safe to assume that they may even have made it as far the base at %ingkaling )kamti. Two of the generals who were captured by the rebels before they could escape have been executed. /e have yet to establish contact with the escaped generals, wherever they are. 7oming back to the military situation, we believe that soon after Rangoon fell, the troops of the %outhern and %outhwestern commands also surrendered in large numbers. Their treatment has not been proper. The rebels have shot most of the loyalist officers who surrendered while the soldiers have suffered brutality from their own countrymen. This is not limited to individual cases and is very widespread if media reports are to be believed. 0n any case, with the collapse of organiAed defence in the southern and central parts of Myanmar, the focus of the combat shifted north. Now, here, the loyalist troops are cut off from the north because of the border with china while on the south they face the rebels and the skies above them are ruled by the #6,,- who are mounting ever&increasing air strikes to finish the conflict before we can cause any interference. The situation faced by the Northern 6oyalist troops is indeed severe. 0t is our estimate that unless the pressure on them is relieved, they will be forced to surrender within the next forty&eight to seventy&two hours. 0n any case, organiAed resistance from these troops is reducing by the hour, and their combat effectiveness could be lost even sooner. The situation in the immediate area across our border is no less critical. )ere however, three things have happened. "ne, the river 7hindwin flowing parallel to our border and the Nagaland hills to the east of :ohima at around fifty kilometres separation has proven to be a barrier across which the loyalists are holding. There are several points where the rebels have only now broken through. 0n any case, they are contained for the moment. Two, we have deployed our 0%R network in this region that has not only given us the force strength and command structures of both sides, but if decision is taken to deploy and assist these loyalists, then these

14

3/ units of the %amyukta %ystem M3astN can disrupt all rebel communications from their present deployment locations, hence allowing the loyalists to get their act together and stop the rebels, or at least provide time for us to deploy and assist. /e can go one step further and provide information from our 0%R to these 6oyalists and help them defeat the rebels in this region altogether. Three, the #6,,- air strikes in this region are much more limited, probably due to the close proximity to our border where we can gather intelligence not only about their attack capabilities, but also gather 4proof5 for the outside world that the 7hinese are actually assisting the rebels. ,lthough the whole world already knows, and the fact that some media videos actually show the 7hinese aircraft dropping bombs and napalm on loyalist held villages and towns, the 7hinese still deny this and it is our belief that due to this their strikes in this region are restricted. ,s a result, the loyalist troops in this area are not under much pressure from the air and in fact the loyalist Tatmadaw lei had established some local air supremacy until twenty hours ago after which a series of losses to ground fire and lack of logistics forced them to abandon their air strikes. 0n addition, when the loyalists retreated across the 7hindwin River, they were forced to abandon their last fixed airbases. Now, we believe that they are operating helicopter gunships from their last local air command centre at %ingkaling )kamti with relative success. ,t present the situation on the ground was a stalemate following heavy losses on both sides, but this data is a few hours old and we should get the latest report shortly. 0n any case, the material losses in terms of tanks, trucks and ,#7s indicate that the battle is now reminiscent of the standard of infantry style warfare on both sides with little or no mechaniAed movement on the roads in the region. That5s the situation as far as the ground forces are concerned. -or the Naval forces, 0H ? *rigadier %harma looked at ,dmiral ,rora and got a nod in return.

...The ,dmiral then looked at the 9efence Minister and spoke without preamble8 %ir, the situation at sea in the *ay of *engal is relatively 1uiet. )owever, the 1uiet nature belies the fact that several ma!or strategic events have already taken place already. The biggest one was the virtual 7hinese takeover of the entire 7ocos island chain from the Myanmar naval or the Tatmadaw Gay forces within the first twelve hours of combat on the mainland. 0n addition, gunfights on several naval bases on the coast in the *ay of *engal left the ma!or surface vessels of the TG, tiny by our standards but ma!or for them anyway, burning or damaged and still tied to port while the various parties in the conflict fought each other for control.K KNow, if you look at the second map, you can see that the islands under 7hinese control lie between us at the ,ndaman and Nicobar 0slands and the main naval bases of the TG on the mainland. ,s a result of this, our surveillance of the situation from aerial platforms is limited. /e have deployed the long&range maritime reconnaissance T2&'J.s from ,rakonnam Naval air station to fly east and above the 7ocos 0slands to take a closer look at what is happening with the TG. 0n addition to electronic surveillance of their naval vessels, these aircraft are also tracking their communications due to the recent upgrade we carried out. 0n any case, these birds have extremely long legs, as you are probably aware. Therefore they can stay at patrol for much longer times. /ith in&flight refuelling from the ,ir -orce5s 06&;CM:0 platforms, this increases further, but the crew becomes tired during these ultra long duration missions and so does their working efficiency, not to mention the extra dependency on the ,ir -orce tankers that become mandatory.K KTherefore, we are not going by this method and are essentially rotating these aircrafts so that the crews can rest before each mission. 0deally 0 would have deployed some )eron 2, platforms from the ,ndaman 0slands, but the 7hinese occupation of the $reat 7ocos islands stops me from doing that. This, sir, is not a good development. Those islands that the 7hinese took over are not theirs to take. Nor, we believe, did they have permission from any Myanmar based authority, rebel or loyalist. They simply noticed the infighting within the TG and took the opportunity to take over these islands. /e should technically take them back, given that we now back the loyalists, but the reaction in *ei!ing may not be so understanding 0 think. ,nd that sir, is a decision 0 would like you to take today. /e can take them back, if we act now, that is. $ranted that they are not very big islands to make much difference on our dominance in the region, the 7hinese actions are none the less the kind of stuff that we should expect from now on in the region, and something we could have done withoutH?

15

,dmiral, hold it for a second. /hat you are advocating is a declaration of war on the 7hinese. /hat if they actually had permission from $eneral )oa beforehandI 0n any case, if the loyalists are defeated, our whole plan of action will collapse. /e first have to make sure that the loyalists are able to resist and that they can maintain an international presence as far as the world is concerned. Then we can ask them to legitimately hand over these islands to us in exchange for continuous support near the Nagaland border. "nce they do that, we can take these islands, if necessary, by force. /hat 0 want from you at this stage is an opinion on the following8 9o you think the islands will change the naval balance within say, ten daysI ? The 9ef&Min asked the 7N% across the conference desk. No %ir. Not for the moment at least. 0t will take them at least several months to turn those islands into naval bases and military strongholds. 0n ten days they cannot tilt the naval balance in their favour.? The 7N% answered. Then will you mind if we focus on the situation on our border in the Northeast instead of the *ay of *engal for the next two weeksI? 3ssentially, No. *ut 0 want the freedom of manoeuvre for my ships and the authoriAation to deploy my ships for a possible blockade of the straits of Malacca against the 7hinese. 0 can have the ships placed within ten days, after which a decision should preferably be reached on our stand in the *ay of *engal. 0n addition, 0 want the rules of engagement changed so that if any of my ships notice any strange or erratic manoeuvring by TG ships or the #6,N, the concerned ships can engage and destroy the threats.? The 7N% said. ,uthoriAation granted for the deployment of the ships for the possible blockade. ,uthoriAation given for change in the Rules of 3ngagement with respect to TG ships, but the 7hinese and us are not yet at war. 0 cannot allow any of our naval commanders to destroy any 7hinese shipsH not yet at any rate. 7ontinue as discussed.? The 9efence minister concluded and then looked back at *rigadier %harma who gestured that he had concluded his brief as well. The 7",%, $eneral %inha, then spoke after some serious contemplation on his part for the last half hour regarding the army5s response in Myanmar. 9efence Minister, at this point 0 want to discuss the army5s role in an future operations. /e have so far discussed the peripheries of the situation in Myanmar, including the air, sea, space and electronic intelligence aspects. Now 0 want to discuss the army5s role in any future combat in Myanmar. ,s you know, 000 7orps is based in Nagaland with the 7# at 9imapur, thirty kilometres west and north of :ohima. 0n any war with the rebels in Myanmar, units from our side that may be sent in will mostly be from this 7orps. 0 7orps is based in TeApur in Northern ,ssam. *ut this 7orps is essentially ordered to be ready to fight the 7hinese and only the 7hinese for the most part. 000 7orps also has to deal with the 26-, in that area. ,s a result, its units are dispersed and engaged in 7"0N "ps. ,s the threat from Myanmar was not perceived until recently, the units are only now starting to gather near 0mphal on my orders. This will allow the force to gather strength for conventional combat. 0t will however, also allow the 26-, to start creating trouble again since the pressure on them will be relieved. Then they will start to harass our rear echelons and the logistics trains that is the lifeline of any army. K /e cannot allow that to happen. Nor can we allow our 0 7orps to get engaged with these operations. Now to remedy the situation 0 could deploy the DDD000 7orps from /est *engal with its 7# at %iliguri into ,ssam and order them to control the 26-, while 000 7orps moves into Myanmar. *ut 0 am against this for the simple reason that the 000 7orps is optimised to fight the type of war that 26-, wages while the DDD000 7orps is not so optimised. %o, another choice would be to hold 000 7orps in place and move the DDD000 7orps units through them into Myanmar. The ma!ority of the DDD000 7orps that won5t go into Myanmar will be positioned in strategic areas of %ikkim, ,ssam and ,runachal #radesh to support 0 7orps and indeed double our strength in the region. The only drawback 0 see at this point is the time factor. 0t will take several days to move these units from %iliguri in /est *engal to the border near 0mphal, while the 000 7orps units can begin to pour through into %ingkaling )kamti by the end of this day itself. "bviously, doubling our strength in the region before the inevitable 7hinese attacks allows us to stand up to them

16

better as well, maybe even force them to back off and not attack, but that remains to be seen. , third option would be to go ahead with the DDD000 7orps deployment as 0 mentioned !ust now while we move a battalion of the parachute regiment into %ingkaling )kamti and deploy them and maybe some other battalions as 4,dvisors5 in the loyalist forces.K %ir, 0 need to go over these plans before we can make any decisions. 0 need a few more hours to get this done. There are a thousand minor details to take care of, hundreds of orders to issue. )owever on the issue of whether we can get the !ob done8 %ir, we can do it. No problem. /e will stabiliAe the issue for you within a few days after you give us the deployment order. 0f needed, we can defeat the rebels in Myanmar completely. $ive us the 4$o5 order and we will get the !ob done.?
$ranted, $eneral. 0 think its time anyway to call this meeting to a close. 0 need some time to think over all the information you have handed over to me in the last forty&five minutes. 0 also have to brief the #M after some time on this issue. $eneral, plan your moves. 0 will get you the deployment order before lunchtime.?

THE PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE $PMO%

NEW DELHI, INDIA PRESENT DAY 0(00 HRS THURSDAY The drive over from ,rmy )ead1uarters to the #rime Minister5s "ffice allowed one to see a lot of the old colonial era monuments that bear testament to the once powerful *ritish 3mpire. ,t eight in the morning the traffic was only now staring to pick up. %oon it would become heavy and impassable and had he left the meeting any later, he would have been probably taken by helicopter to the #M". ,t this time however, the traffic was less, the views unobstructed and the morning mist !ust beginning to clear as the sun made its presence felt. 0t was still cold however, and the !acket worn by the defence minister offered a mere token resistance to the cold. The cold, however, kept him awake. ,t any rate, not having slept for some time now was taking its toll on the defence minister. 0n addition, the burden placed on his shoulders by a country that depended on him for their national security was beginning to show around the tired eyes. )e rubbed them and again stared out the window as his motorcade went swiftly through New 9elhi5s roads, taking advantage of the emptiness on the streets. 0t must be colder still in the north, the 9ef&Min thought, maybe more in *ei!ingH)is thoughts came back to him. %uddenly the view outside became a blur for the defence minister as he recollected his thoughts. You b*******so, you thought you could surround usyou thought we will sit on our hands and wait, didnt you? You thought we would sit on our Asses and wait while you surround uswellguess what you thought wrong. We are going to kick your Asses back to Beijing and beyond. This isnt !"#. We dont ha$e %ools leading our country this ti&e. This is our chance and you just ga$e it to us on a sil$er 'late(re&ier Wang, ) ho'e you like it when ) sho$e a Agni &issile u' your %ir, we are here. /e have arrived.? The driver reported over his shoulder as he brought the car to a stop at the main entrance. , uniformed guard opened the door and the 9efence Minister brought himself back to reality as he stepped out of his car, papers in hand, and then swiftly entered the building. The office of the #rime Minister was well decorated and while it didn5t have the feeling of power attached to it to a degree as the "val "ffice did, it did represent the post of the leader representing a *illion people. #rime Minister ,tul %ingh was behind the table and he got up personally to greet the 9efence Minister with a handshake before gesturing him to sit down. The 9efence Minister noted at once that the only other person in the room was the -oreign Minister, 9r. %hivdev %ingh. The weary smile given by the seated -oreign Minister showed that the 9efence Ministry wasn5t the only ministry working throughout the night. *o ) a& not the only one working throughout the night. +ood %or you *hi$de$you are %inally starting to rise %or the countrys sake and not %or your own. Well, wars do that to a &an dont they? )% you had the co&'etence you would ha$e 're$ented us %ro& co&ing to this stage at all. ) cant e$en i&agine how you got your ,octorate. )t see&s to &e that ) a& &anaging your &inistry in addition to &ine. ,a&n it, i% you had su''orted &y 'lan %or -yan&ar we wouldnt ha$e been in this situation at all,a&n you and the 'olitical backstabbing in this country. The foreign ministry was one of the more efficient ministries, but the -oreign Minister5s attitude to the 9efence Minister5s plan for Myanmar and more importantly the large time re1uired before it could have borne results had led to the adoption of the plan suggested by the N%7, and the 9efence minister had not

17

forgotten. ,s it was, however, the #M had a small group whom he trusted more than anyone. %ome in this group like the 9efence Minister and the )ome Minister were excellent in their fields. *ut others were not. This included the -oreign Minister who had received the prestigious post purely on political groundsF and that hadn5t helped 0ndia at all. The results were plain to see. The #M had understood the -oreign Minister5s shortcomings only when the damage had been done. Now it didn5t matter who in the -oreign Ministry did what. 0t was purely a military matter now. /hich is why the 9efence Minister could not understand the presence of the -oreign Minister in the room. Ravi, have a seat. %hivdev was !ust explaining to me the international repercussions of our response in Myanmar. 0t seems that you were at the ,rmy )< for most of the nightH? The #M walked over to the table where his morning tea had arrived five minutes ago. H7are for some teaI? Ges, thank you.? the 9efence minister took the cup from the #M. )e wanted to ask the -oreign Minister as to how he was predicting 40nternational Repercussions5 without first knowing what the response was, but restrained his temper and instead sipped his tea. That first hot sip got him to forget his weariness. The #M took his own cup and walked behind the desk and sat down facing the 9efence Minister and the -oreign Minister across the desk. %o, what is view of our Military on the situation in Myanmar and 7hinaI? the #M asked as he sipped his tea from behind the desk. %hivdev %ingh turned to his left to face the 9ef&Min as he put down his own cup and took some of his papers out. The army thinks they can do it. 0 !ust had a meeting with them about an hour ago in the 7risis response centre at ,rmy )<. 3ssentially the plan is for us to deploy troops in the western part of Myanmar and make sure the loyalists there are not wiped out. That will keep them politically alive and sabotage the 7hinese plan of installing a government under $eneral )oa. That will buy us some time.K K0 also had another thought as well. 0f we go ahead with this action, the loyalists will be forced to give us anything we ask them for. The 7N%, ,dmiral ,rora, told me that the 7hinese have taken over some strategic locations near the ,ndaman 0slands. "nce the loyalists have been politically secured, we ask them to officially hand us those islands. /e then ask the 7hinese to withdraw peacefully or take these islands by force if they do not comply.? That5s called *lackmailing. That5s how the international community will see it, and it5s not the way things are done.? %hivdev intervened and the #M closed his eyes8 Not againH No, that5s politics. ,nd it5s your !ob to make sure the world sees it as mutually friendly cooperation between two friendly neighbours, or whatever. 7hina has convinced the world that it is respects human rights despite the R,/ video we saw last week showing those executions in 6hasa. 0f they could do it, then why can5t youI? The 9ef&Min responded. 0n any case, if you haven5t noticed, Myanmar is gone. ,t best there will be extended civil war in that country for the next decade with help from 0ndia and 7hina. 0ts what we call as a strategic casualty, and Myanmar is the first in a long list of countries that will eventually pay the cost for our survival. -rankly, 0 don5t care about any of these countries, but 0 do care about 0ndia, and if these countries have to pay the price for it, so be it. "ur !ob, at this time, is to make sure that the loyalists survive. The #M has spoken to the world and told them that.K K,nd 0 am telling you how we can even use to our strategic advantage. The Navy really wants those islands, and 0 have a plan here to give it to them. Gour !ob, as 0 see it, is to tell the world that we are the good guys, which we are. /e didn5t start this war. 7hina did. /e didn5t take over the 7ocos 0slands, they did. /e !ust want them back.? The 9ef&Min concluded testily.

TWO ALH HELICOPTERS $CODE: "RIFFON ONE AND TWO%

ARMY AVIATION ADVANCED OPERATIN" BASE AND C#I ORHAT, ASSAM 0(1' HRS THURSDAY Borhat is at the western foothills of the Nagaland hills and is similar in features to the ,rakan plains on the east side of these hills. To its north are the massive )imalayas, and it is based near the river *rahmaputra. $iven the time of the day therefore, the sun had not yet penetrated completely through the Nagaland hills. The sun was beginning to pour through of course, between the peaks, that is. 3ven so, it was relatively dark

18

at Borhat. The place was crawling with army aviation ground crews and pilots alike and in the early hours of the day, the few vehicles plying about on the apron still had their headlights on. The s1uadron of ,6)s parked on the apron were still in the shadows of the hills and the lack of sunlight on them made them look sleek and dark. "f the doAen or so parked ,6)s, however, the two at the extreme end of the apron were the ones where the current activity was focussed. The two flight crews and their ground crews were outside, and the senior pilot among them, a 7olonel, was holding a folded map while the others were around him, staring at the waypoints marked on the map. 0t was going to be a relatively short flight8 "nly a hundred and ten kilometres, one&way. The 7olonel5s 7o&pilot, a Ma!or, was holding a small red flashlight to illuminate the map details as the colonel went over them respectively. The 7olonel was using a small pen from his pocket to go over the route once again, although they had discussed this several times already. *ut this one was different. This one was going to be the last one. Ten meters to their side, the ten members of the 0ndian #ara 7ommando team were busy checking their gear. The loud click&clack sound of their gear disturbed the pilots and their thoughts but not overly so. This team was relatively young, as compared to the pilots, but then again, they had to be. The team was being led by a 7aptain, and the team was coded )otel *ravo by the %"7"M boys who would be running the show today. The weapons were young too. *eing the heavily modified 0N%,% rifles fitted with optical and 0nfra red lasers for day and night targeting, as well as "ptical %copes, the fitment being so radical that the gun had come to be known as the -ranken&0N%,% by the %"7"M officers who had overseen their development. ,s it was, the guns barely looked like the 0N%,% they were born as, and the few guards roaming around saw and then compared their rifles with the -ranken&0N%,% and absorbed the smiles given to them by the #aras. The communication gear was being checked as well, as was the personal intercom systems. The e1uipment now weighed as much as the soldiers themselves, but the #aras bore the burdens with no apparent effort, much to the surprise of the ground crew watching them. The soldiers then took the cue from the 7olonel who had put the pen in his shoulder pocket of his green overalls and had started walking to the cockpit with the Ma!or while the other crew, which was anyway closer to their chopper, started opening the doors to enter the cockpit, with the ground crews assisting. Two minutes later the #aras were on board the helicopters and the main blades were staring to rotate, the red anti collision lights flashing, for now. The 7olonel was already in touch with the local %"7"M 7+0 and was told in turn to standby. The blades were now rotating at full speed and the surrounding long, green grass next to the apron was blowing as if due to a hurricane, which it might well have been. The ground crews had cleared off and the helicopters were now waiting to lift off, with the sun looking as if it was !ust about to break through the mountains. ,lready the first long thin beams of sunlight were trickling through. 0t was going to be a clear day, wonderful for flying, but ironically this mission was better off done now then later in full daylight. 0n any case, it was light enough now that the pilots didn5t bother with their helmet mounted N goggles, which were locked upwards on the helmet, the extra weight of which they could feel on their necks. Borhat was the location of the new ,rmy ,viation ,dvanced operating base and 7+0 centre from where 7"0N "ps had been launched for the last two years. 0t had already been the site of army flights before, but now it was separate from the 0,- base, had its new concrete apron, and Aero dependency on the ,ir -orce ground crews. Now, it even had its own rough landing field for fixed wing aircrafts, and the %"7"M had wanted their 7&'+(B to come here, but that would have been too insulting and inconsiderate for the ,ir force, who had got their own base highly developed for strategic airlifts. ,nd in any case, the 0,- base was better e1upeed to take these large aircrafts for extended periods, while the army strip was suitable for cmall duration vists, mostly for landing, dropping off supplies or people, and then leaving immediately. ,nd for this mission, the duration and the timeline had so far been undefined. %o the 7&'+(B was waiting at the apron at ,-* Borhat, ready to take off in a moment with the 7ommunications e1uipment for %ingkaling )kamti, while $riffon -light was at the ,rmy ,irfield and the local %"7"M )< was at 9imapur, co&located since the last few days with 000 7orps )<. This diversification was somewhat unnecessary, and would not have happened in normal times, but these weren5t normal times. The 47old %tart5 9octrine should have helped avoid this kind of problem, but that doctrine hardly expected to have to provide assistance to another country, as was the case. %o the war was now defined along three fronts, re1uiring three different doctrines. "ne was the threat from 7hina, for which the 47old start5 9octrine was being used. The second was the 7"0N "ps going on simultaneously, which had no fixed 9octrine. The third was the assistance operations for the *urmese

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loyalists, for which the 9octrine was evolving as things went along. $riffon -ight, this is 7ontrol, you are clear for take off. %witch to ictor for airborne control. $ood luck. "ver.? The radio crackled. 7ontrol, this is $riffon "ne. Thanks for the )ospitality. $riffon -light is departing. "ver and out.? The colonel answered and immediately the ,6) lifted off the ground, swiftly tipped its nose, turned east&by&north towards Mackeypur for a seemingly routine flight and started gathering speed. %econds later $riffon Two lifted off the ground and headed in the same direction. %oon the two helicopters were a couple of black specks against the mountains of Nagaland. The rising sun blinded and so prevented the people from staring at the two dark %"7"M ,6)s from their rooftops, and that5s when the first change in direction towards the southeast was taken. ictor was the 0,- #halcon ,/,7% flying over ,ssam trying to keep an eye on things over the border with 7hina as well as Myanmar, but their limited availability was a severe hindrance. *ut for this mission, one had been re1uested specifically, and it hadn5t taken $riffon -light a long while to find out that it was there. $riffon -light, this is ictor "ne. /e detect you leaving the Borhat&Mackeypur air route on a southeasterly direction. 7ontinue on current heading for four&Aero :ilometres. "ver.? The Ma!or and the 7olonel shared a look, and the Ma!or was the first one to say his thoughts. )e beat you to it today, sir.? 0t was an in&house fact among the army aviation 7orps community about how the 0,- boys always wanted to show off their high technology gear, especially their eyes&in&the&sky ,/,7%, to the poor flyers from the army. That merited an amused laugh from the 7olonel before he witched fre1uencies to answer the call. )e was anyway going to report to ictor flight, but the 0,- controller aboard the #halcon beat him to it by seconds. ictor "ne, this is $riffon "ne. Thanks for the assistance. )eading to waypoint one. /hat5s the aerial situation at the final destinationI "ver.? %kies are clear, $riffon "ne. )owever, be advised, we are detecting strike aircrafts to the north of your destination. They are a long way off, but we will lose track of them once they go low in their attack profiles. My advice is to deploy your package and leave for home immediately, over.? ictor "ne responded. The aircrafts in 1uestion were #6,,- aircrafts attacking several loyalist targets near %ingkaling )kamti, but they still hadn5t located the 6oyalist 7+0 there. ictor "ne smiled at his thoughts8 *o &uch %or your conce'ts on ad$anced in%or&ation war%are, you /o&&ies. You talk as i% you are going to take the world by stor& and here you are, attacking e$ery target other than the ene&y /0). ) bet you wouldnt be able to see it e$en i% ) drew a big round bulls eye on it. -aybe its because those co&&ies are %lying with their eyes closed Thanks ictor "ne. This is $riffon -light signing off. "ver and out.? The green grass and trees that cover most of this region in addition to the hills have an awe&inspiring beauty. More so !ust after the winter, when the trees are greener than ever, and so is the grass. -lying at tree top height allows the entire region to look like a green blanket over the hills, and mix that with the darkened hillsides against an early morning sun and you get a sight and territory worth fighting for, as many had realiAed in all the preceding decades before this one. 0t is at times like this when the hours go by as seconds. There5s Mokokchung on the horiAon. /e are approaching waypoint one.? The ma!or told the 7olonel who was disturbed from his daytime reverie. Right. ictor "ne, this is $riffon "ne, we are approaching waypoint one, "ver.? The 7olonel spoke on his radio. The response was immediate. $riffon -light, this is ictor "ne. Gou are clear to proceed. 0 say again, proceed to remaining waypoints.? ictor, what is the status of the enemy fightersI? the 7olonel asked. $riffon, be advised, weHuhHhave lost track of the inbound #6,,- strike package when they went low approaching north&by&northwest towards the 6oyalist positions in the extreme North. %ingkaling )kamti should be clear, over.? Roger, ictor "ne. This is $riffon "ne. /e are proceeding to our destination, over.? The 7olonel looked at the Ma!or and shook his head 1uietly, before he spoke to $riffon Two. Two, this is "ne. Mission is a go, repeat, mission is a go. %witch to waypoint two and follow my lead. Maintain radio silence. "ver and out.? The two helicopters immediately turned towards the border near the village of Noklak. The closest penetration point in the Nagaland hills on the way to %ingkaling )kamti was to the north of )ill .===, where

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the peaks parted enough for the )elicopters to go through without gaining too much height and thus counter detection. The sudden increase in power now re1uired to help navigate through the hills was felt throughout the cabin, where the #ara 7ommandoes were sitting with their weapons packed and their faces painted with disruptive shades of green and brown. The sudden increase in height was very exhilarating for the passengers, but not so for the aircrew, who were busy keeping an eye on the instrumentation dials to see if everything was working fine. 0t was. The ,6) was designed for high altitude flight and it did so perfectly and effortlessly. There5s peak two&nine&nine&nine. There5s waypoint two. )ere we go.? The helicopter rose over the hill top and its success in doing so was reported by the now unrestricted bright glaring sun now staring at the pilots who had to lower their photosensitive helmet visors. They were over and beyond the peaks of :ohima. The sudden !ump over hill .=== was followed by a sudden dive, as the helicopter attempted to stick to Nap&of& the&earth flying, and for the passengers and the crew it was a roller&coaster ride, but no one was shouting with !oy !ust yet. They were over the border now, and that put an end to all the childish fun. Nothing changed. Nothing. The same hills, the same green grass and the same blue sky. Get they were now in a war Aone, and that changes everything. $riffon one and two along with the first team of #aras were now the first 0ndian military units to officially enter Myanmar.

THE PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE $PMO%

NEW DELHI, INDIA PRESENT DAY 0(00 HRS THURSDAY

The defence minister came back from the ad!oining room where he had !ust received a call from the 7",%. The #M and the -oreign Minister were waiting for him.
0 !ust got word from $eneral %inha that the %pecial -orces team has been inserted into Myanmar to try and establish communications with the 6oyalist $enerals for us.? They are on the groundI? the -oreign Minister asked. They will beH? the 9efence minister looked at his watch, Hin another half hour or so, at the maximum.? The #M looked at his watch as well and reminded himself that he was due to meet the 7hinese ,mbassador in an hour5s time. The ambassador was supposedly going to speak on ways to diffuse this crisis. *ure. The #M thought. 1e is going to s'eak about 'eace while they continue to bo&b u' and down the whole o% -yan&ar. 1y'ocritical Bastards. Who do they think we are? Anyway, That &eeting is going to be a waste o% &y ti&e2 ) &ight as well &ake use o% this one. ":, %hivdev, Ravi is right. Gou will tell the international community what Ravi has mentioned earlier. /e have not started this war. /e have not disturbed the balance of power in %outheast ,sia or the subcontinent. The 7hinese #remier /ang is to blame for all this, and he will have to pay the price for it too. Gou will tell the world this fact. 2nderstoodI? the #M entered the discussion forcefully, and then received a nod from the -oreign Minister before he looked at the 9ef&Min again and gestured for him to continue. /here was 0H"h yes, we ask for the islands from the loyalists. ,lso, 0 want your authoriAation for the ,rmy to start moving their troops to the final !ump&off points in Nagaland. 0f we want the loyalists to survive, we must make that decision before the end of the day today, preferably within the next few hours. Now, 0 have the entire details of the ,rmy deployments with me here in these papers, but honestly, do you want to see these or should 0 handle themI? Gou know more about these issues than 0 do, Ravi. Gou handle it. ,s for the authoriAation for deployment, tell the army people to begin preparations but no crossing the international border before 0 give them that particular order. 0 want some time to think this over.? The #M said to the 9efence Minister. 0 thought you might like to think this over, that5s why 0 asked $eneral %inha to be totally prepared and wait. )e is awaiting your orders at this time.? Atul, &ake your &o$e Gou know, this whole crisis is more complicated than !ust this situation in the east. There is more to it than !ust Myanmar, isn5t itI? the #M asked the now smiling 9efence Minister. Ges, sir. There is. There is much more to it that !ust Myanmar. /e have !ust entered into another cold war type scenario. 9emocracy versus communism all over again. Now, some will argue that we have been in this for the last decade, so what5s new about itI /ell, the new fact of the matter is that for most of the last decade both countries had been trying to stand up on their feet. They didn5t have time or the resources for

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too many expensive strategic games. That has changed in the last decade or so. The immense economic growth has allowed massive development of the two countries, militarily and as mature nations, but the fundamental problems are still there. The border problems have not yet been solved and impatience on that issue is growing. *ut there5s more to it. "ur development of nuclear weapons was worrisome to them even though these weapons were primarily meant to turn the #akistani countryside into radioactive wasteland. 3ven so, the threat to them was low because of our inability to deliver these weapons deep into china if we so wished. /e !ust didn5t have the delivery systems, that is, missiles. This has now changed. /ith the activation of the ,gni&000 missiles, we can reach into *ei!ing we if wanted. This has alarmed them immensely. "ur ability of reaching and destroying *ei!ing and other ma!or cities coupled with their threat perception of internal dissent when the seats of power will be gone means that they are probably now feeling that they need to change things. -or example, we know for certain that they were and still are pouring tons of money into ,nti&*allistic Missile systems. *ut guess whatHwe beat them to it. /hile they are still experimenting, we have already deployed several systems of the #rithvi ,*M batteries in addition to the %&+(( systems deployed fifteen years ago. The %&+((, which incidentally, china also has are a last ditch effort types at best and both sides know it. %o now the situation is changed wherein if we attack today, chances are that we will be able to hold off their attacks while they won5t be able to do so themselves. 0 have dreamt of such a situation for decades, but we are finally there and that5s what matters. 0n addition, we were now more active strategically in the region than ever before. "ur missile deals with ietnam and those with Myanmar did not sit well in *ei!ing for obvious reasons. 0t had caused them to lose face in the international community in addition to creating a threat to their ma!or Naval bases in the south which are !ust in range of the ietnamese #rithvi Missiles that we provided. /e have also started to place Naval ships in ietnam and that5s perceived as a threat as well. They have been doing the same to us for a long time since they deployed radars on the 7ocos 0slands, but that isn5t considered similar to what we are doing by those hypocritical *astards. ,nyway, it would seem that our political probes with Myanmar was the last straw for them. *ut it is here that they have made a mistake. , big one, potentially, one that could make them lose strategically vital assets in the region. ,nd 0 am not talking about hardware. 0 am talking about their standing in the global and regional arena. They have moved into our backyard and we hold every advantage possible. 0f we act accordingly, we can convince all of the minor countries in the region that 0ndia can hold its own against 7hina. That will get them into our sphere of influence. ,nd it won5t be hard for the simple reason that it5s common sense to choose a democratic country as an ally over a wary, repressive, 7ommunist one if both are considered e1uals. ,nd the ,%3,N countries have a lot of common sense lying around.? ,s opposed to our -oreign Minister, The 9efence Minister did not add. ,nd what about #akistanI? %hivdev wanted to know. /hat about itI? )ow do you think they are going to react when they see you hurting 7hina or when they see our military deployments in Myanmar and not on their *orderI? The -oreign Minister continued. +ood 3uestion. 4or once you ha$e asked so&ething worthwhile, *hi$de$too bad ) ha$e to sho$e your shoe in your &outh again. 5h well That5s the best part. "ur plan is to send in no more than a 9ivision in the worst&case scenario. "ur deployments on the western front remain unaffected. The #aki&bastards won5t be able to do a thing. They might help increase the insurgency in :ashmir but all of this is going to take place in the next few weeks while they will re1uire at least a month to make the increase in insurgency even visible to us. 7hina is another matter however. 0ts possible that they will get more active in their reactions to our interventions.? The 9efence Minister concluded somewhat dubiously. More activeI 7are to elaborate on that one RaviI? the #M ordered. 6ook, its obvious that our intervention in Myanmar is not going to please the 7hinese #olitburo very much. 0t5s likely that their reaction to our intervention will be a gradual escalation. *ut it5s also likely that they might launch an attack on us directly. /e can hold them at the border itself. This isn5t '=>.. /e are prepared. 0 even got the feeling that the people in ,rmy )< want a fight. They want to kick the 7hinese ,sses to return the favour for what the 7hinese did to us back then. 0n any case, 0 am telling you that we are prepared, but if we are to win this decisively, we have to stand tough on this issue. They cannot and should not push us into concessions. That5s the one thing 0 have learnt from dealing with the 7hinese8 9o not ever, under any circumstances, back down in front of them, or else they will cut you into little pieces. %tand fast and chances are that the battle will be a draw.?

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*ut we cannot win as suchI? the #M asked. 0f by winning you mean a complete defeat of the 7hinese armed forces, then No. 0t5s physically impossible for more reasons than one. -or one thing, the siAe of the 7hinese military is too large for our purposes. 0t has less to do with our military funding so much as the fact that 7hina is twice the siAe of 0ndia and so is the ratio in terms of the armies. %econdly, you would never get to such a stage in the conflict, because before you do, the war will change its colours from conventional to non&conventional without pause. That5s the beauty of fighting wars in the subcontinent. 3verybody has those damned Nuclear weapons, so that if one side starts losing, their leaders start thinking about nuking the other side. This eventually brings the war to a halt, leaves the two countries still standing and ready to fight and shed blood a decade later. %ooner or later however, one side will screw up and actually launch the missiles and then both sides go :a&boom. #athetic, isn5t itI? the 9efence Minister said. Geah. Makes you wonder why it has to be like this, isn5t itI *ut those bastards in the 46and of The #ure5 and the 4land of %ocialism5 probably don5t think in the same way. Maybe its part of their upbringing, or maybe they are so damned scared of us all the time that nothing logical makes its way from their brains to their mouths.? The #M commented. Then went into silence before the 9efence Minister spoke again. 0f you want, 0 can have $eneral %inha, ,ir 7hief Marshal *hosale and ,dmiral ,rora and the commander of the %trategic -orces 7ommand, ,ir Marshal Gadav come here and give you a full briefing on what they plan to do, later in the day.? The 9ef&Min offered. Ges, lets do that. *ut for now, tell them to go ahead with their plans and deploy their forces in the area. *ut under no circumstances are they to open fire on the enemy yet.? RightHso 0 tell them that the mission is a goI? the 9efence Minister asked. /hat else can 0 doI 0f 0 don5t act, the loyalists are defeated, Myanmar becomes a radical pro&7hina country and we are surrounded. 0f 0 do act, we end up fighting a war with 7hina and suffer heavy losses. 3ven if 0 don5t act, we will probably be under attack from multiple directions by an alliance of 7hina, #akistan and Myanmar a few years or even a few months from today.? The #M thought out loudly. ,nd suffer even greater losses than what we would do if we went in now. Remember, right now we have the loyalists on our side, Myanmar is broken into pieces fighting each other and the alliance between these three countries does not yet exist, so we are up against only 7hina and if we move 1uickly, the #akis wont have the time to enter the e1uation.? The 9efence Minister reminded the #M. The #M instead walked over to the window and looked at the green lawn where the morning dew had not yet shaken itself from the grass and leaves. My countrymen outside this building expect me to stop this war from happening. )ow do 0 tell them that the war has already begunI That 0 was the one to give the order to start itI? %ir, you did not start it. 0t had !ust never stopped in the last fifty years. The people will understand. They always have. /hat we need now, therefore, is a 1uick solution to this skirmish today. /e have been standing up on our feet to 4face the 7hinese 9ragon5 since '=>.. 0t5s time now to flex our muscles. Gou, sir, are the brain of this body, and it5s eventually your decision. No conscientious leader ever wants to start a war, but sometimes its forced upon him. /e have always been surprised in all the wars we have fought, and in most cases we won the wars only on our Military5s ability to improvise. This time it is the other side that has made a strategic mistake, and it5s our time for retribution.? The 9ef&Min replied. Gou are that confidentI? Ges, sir. 0 am confident. *ut 0 will be honest with you. 0f we do win, you will be a national hero. 0f we do not, it is still you who will take the blame. *ut 0 really don5t see a choice in the matter and neither, 0 think, do you.? No. 0 don5t.? the #M responded, in a voice nearly inaudible to the two others in the room. %o, your answer isI? The 9ef&min looked at the #M who was still staring at the green grass and the morning sun outside and did not respond. 0t must have been one of the most crucial minutes in any country5s history and yet they seemed so ordinary to the #M. The decision he made was made for him by the situation and not by his conscience. 0t had to be done, his brain told him, but his heart was telling him something else. A& ) instigating a nuclear war hereor is it being i&'osed u'on &e? Will the decision ) take now sa$e )ndia or kill &illions o% its citi6ens? What to do? , voice inside him spoke up. ,nother voice had something different to say, with a bit of anger involved, of course.

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)t has always been like this isnt it? We ha$e always ended u' %ighting wars that others ha$e started. ,a&n it, does di'lo&acy count %or so&ething or not? 5r do the di'lo&ats and 'oliticians who %ail to sto' a war %ro& starting in the %irst 'lace use it only to broker cease%ires when thousands o% their citi6ens ha$e already died? Why do we ne$er see it co&ing? Are we that blind in strategic a%%airs? 5r is it just &e whos blind? 5nly once did we actually take the initiati$e, and that was back in !7 , %our long decades ago. 8ook what we did to the (akistanis then. 5nly once we took the initiati$e and we literally tore that country a'art. What i% this ti&e ) can do that to /hina as well? What i% we can actually win this? ,o ) dare take this o''ortunity? ,o ) dare not to? Because i% ) dont, sure as hell ) will be the one leading this country to war against a $ery 'ower%ul alliance %ew &onths %ro& now. What will 'eo'le say then? Atul *ingh, 9The idiot who didnt start the war when we could ha$e actually won it, is what the 'eo'le would say then. Best 'art is, ) would be agreeing with the&. And then it would be too little too late. -aybe then it would turn nuclear, and our country will be brought to its knees. *i:ty years o% de$elo'&ent down the drain. )n return %or what? Turning the (akistani countryside into a radioacti$e lunar landsca'e? And where would /hina be? -aybe it would be 'ushed back by twenty years, i% &y intelligence and strategic analysts are to be belie$ed. Twenty. While we would lose si:ty. )s it worth it? *o thats what it ca&e down to, isnt it? ) nuke your city and you nuke &ine, and guess what, they are twice as big as we are. We are the weaker nation today2 &ore by sheer si6e that by any other consideration. ) %eel it &ore today than at any other ti&e in &y li%e. All those years o% blustering about being e;ual, ) %inally understood that we are not e;ual. ) a& just not willing to bet by country&ens li%e and &y cities in e:change %or so&e unknown godda&ned 'lace in /hina, although (re&ier Wang is 'er%ectly ca'able o% betting his, at least according to the <AW director. ) just cannot do it. )ts not a ga&e. 5r is it? )% it is, then it has to be a ga&e that ) ha$e to win at all costs. Then its decided, isnt it? ) ha$e to act today i% only to %urther the 'ossibility o% this night&are. -yan&ar &ust re&ain broken. +eneral 1oa &ust =5T co&e to 'ower and the loyalists &ust =5T be de%eated, no &atter what it takes. -yan&ar si&'ly cannot be allowed to uni%y under +eneral 1oa and his rebels. *o what choice do ) ha$e? =one.

IAF PHALCON AWACS $CALL SI"N: VICTOR%

FLYIN" OVER EASTERN ASSAM 0(&' HRS THURSDAY The 0,- #halcon crew had been having a busy week so far, and there was no sign of let up. 9ay in and day out they were flying over ,ssam, keeping an eye on the 7hinese aerial movements in the Tibet ,utonomous region where it was now building up to enormous proportions, as well as keeping an eye on the Myanmar theatre of operations. ,nother #halcon had been deputed to this region, but as it was, rotation of the aircraft for around six hours each was necessary to give the crews barely ade1uate time for rest, mandatory for efficient working. *ut it still meant that the crews were flying two whole missions every day, and the strain on them was getting visible. 0t had taken a full&blown scenario for the main operators in ,ir )ead1uarters to realiAe that despite the surge in the ,/,7% fleet caused by the induction of the home grown ,3/O7 aircraftsF they simply did not have the numbers to maintain .JE; coverage of the entire 7hinese border. ,nd ground based picket fence radars were only an interim measure. 0t was highly probable that as soon as hostilities would begin, these fixed and highly vulnerable radars could be expected to be knocked out by cruise missiles on both sides. 0t !ust was simple logic in the age of electronic and information warfare. %o when the chips were down, it came down to how many ,/,7% you have. ,nd the 0,- !ust didn5t have enough, and neither did the #6,,-, but that was hardly a consolation to the 0,- planners. ,nd any changes now were impossible, only improvisations were feasible. %o the first step had been to deploy a mobile radar station to the hills of :ohima, whose location was excellent due to the fact that they had excessive height and the ,rakan plains to the east were devoid of any such hills for long ranges, mostly in the hundreds of kilometres, and that allowed good long range of vision. 0t was almost as good as an ,/,7%. ,lmost. *ut it was still fixed, but that couldn5t be helped now. 0t was another case of $eography helping one side and denying that advantage to the other side, and no one at ,ir )ead1uarters had complained when this idea had been mentioned in one of the briefings. 0t !ust made sense. *ut the downside was that it was still a day away from resuming operations, and so the #halcon aircraft was again flying, this time coordinating the first influx of 0ndian troops into Myanmar.

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/here5s $riffon -light nowI? the head controller asked ictor "ne, the controller coordinating the %pecial operations crews. The head controller instead reported via voice what was already being transmitted via data&links to the %"7"M centre at 000 7orps )<, and also to the regional )< at :alaikunda. %ir, they !ust cleared the )ills east of :ohima. They are now into Myanmar. 0 am having difficulty keeping track of them on radar, due to the terrain, and they are sticking to it at the moment. Though 0 do have them on the $#% systems. 0n any case they have reached /aypoint three and are heading to the 9P. 0H/hat theH? Geah, 0 see it tooH &Three, what5s the status of Targets %ierra one through fourI? the commander asked another controller whose !ob it was to track that particular set of #6,,- aircrafts operating in Northern Myanmar. %ir, 0 had lost track of them some time back but they have !ust increased altitude. 0 have them now. They have also changed their heading and are now heading southwest.? /hich would lead them towards %ingkaling )kamti, he didn5t add, but which everybody knew. %hit. &"ne, how far is $riffon -light from their 9PI? the commander asked ictor "ne. ,nother ten kilometres to go, sir. Those fighters will beat them to it.? The commander ordered the communications officer over the intercom to get %"7"M )< for him. %econds later the voice came on the air. $riffon 7ontrol, be advised, we are detecting inbound 7hinese -ighters towards $riffon -light. %uggest you abort mission immediately.? The delay in the reply was a whole ten seconds, and to the commander that had seemed like an hour. This is $riffon 7ontrol, what the hell is going onI? another voice demanded. The voice was of the %"7"M 6ieutenant&$eneral who was supervising the entire operation. 0t should have been the !unior officer at the communications centre at %"7"M )<, who should have replied, but the content of the message was profound indeed, and that had prompted the 7ommanding officer to take things in his own hands. %ir, we are detecting inbound fighters on a direct bearing to %ingkaling )kamti. They have changed their original profile. /e have reason to believe that they have located the 7+0 centre there. $riffon "ne and Two are still inbound. %uggest we pull them back, over.? Negative. They must make the drop. 0f necessary, order them to make the drop immediately, wherever they are now. My #aras can slog an extra ten kilometres, but they should not abort the mission. %on, you make sure my )elicopters make it through. 0f you have to shoot those communist bastards down, do it. Gou have some of our own fighters with youI? Ges sir, we do. *ut we haven5t received authoriAation to engage any targets yet.? /hat the hell is going on hereI The mission commander wanted to know. Gou get the !ob done, 0 will get you your authoriAation from your direct chain of command within two minutes. 2nderstoodI? the %"7"M commander ordered like an angry god. Ges %ir.? The commander said. $ood. 0 will get back to you.? The line clicked off. The commander looked at the people next to him who for the first time were staring at him and not at their screens. $et $riffon -light on the radio nowL? shouted the now worried commander.

TWO INDIAN ALH HELICOPTERS $CALL SI"N: "RIFFON ONE AND TWO% TWENTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SIN"KALIN" HKAMTI MYANMAR 0('0 HRS THURSDAY The two ,6) helos were now descending. )aving cleared #eak .===, the rest of the flight to the 9rop off point was all down hill, with the occasional small peak in the way. They had now entered a valley west of )tangsan, and it flowed eastwards directly into the ,rakan #lains. ,t the centre of the valley was the small river called Nam %alein, which eventually flowed along with the valley westwards until it !oined the 7hindwin River, North of %ingkaling )kamti. ,s a result, all the pilots had to do was follow this river to reach close to the 9P. ,nd the flying was easy too, with the valley having very gentle slopes on each side. The forests here were denser than on the 0ndian side, probably due to a lack of human settlement in the region, which was also another reason why this path had been chosen for the ingress. There was no need as of yet for the local population to know about 0ndian armed forces helping the loyalists, as many of them might have their sympathies lying with the rebels instead. $riffon "ne was in the lead, with Two half a kilometre behind. The Ma!or was flying while the 7olonel kept

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his eyes peeled for anything out of the ordinary in the 0nstrumentation display. 0t was they way they did it, rotating these duties on a flight in order to give each other time for rest. %o when the radio started to make noise, the 7olonel was the one who took the call. The voice was familiar, but more tense than before. $riffon "ne this is ictor "ne, do you acknowledgeI? The radio s1uawked. ictor "ne, this is $riffon "ne, reading you loud and clear, over.? $riffon "ne, you are ordered to conduct your drop immediately. 0 say again, make your drop now. 9o not, 0 repeat, do not proceed towards your #rimary 9P. /e have inbound enemy fighters towards your bearing. 7onduct your drop and head back nowL? 5h *hit. $riffon Two, this is "ne. -ollow my leadF we are conducting our drop right away. /e have inbound fighters. )it the dirt nowL? the 7olonel shouted on the )- radio speaker as the Ma!or next to him brought the ,6) into a screeching turn that ate away the forward velocity immediately and brought the helicopter near to hovering. $riffon two did the same behind them. The 7olonel then called up the #ara commander forward and told him about the change in plans. The 7aptain smiled back and looked at the nearest flat area in the valley where he could get off and pointed towards it. The 7olonel nodded and brought the ,6) to hover two feet above the grassF next to the riverbank while $riffon two followed a hundred meters behind him. There was no way the 7olonel was going to risk touching the helicopter on the ground so close to the border. The main threat to him at this point was mines, and landing on one didn5t make his !ob any easier. The #ara commandoes !umped out of the two hovering helicopters with all their gear and hit the ground as they pointed their weapons outwards at any emerging threats. The good thing about the place they had selected was the dampness and the grass on the ground, which made sure that the hovering helicopters did not raise a whole lot of dust to alert anybody nearby. The two helicopters conducted their drops within seconds and then turned, raised their altitudes slightly, and tipped their nose to again start building up their forward velocity as they headed west, with the 7olonel in $riffon "ne talking on the radio informing ictor -light that the drop had been concluded, hastily, but without incident. ictor -light, on the other hand, now had other things having higher priority. The authoriAation had come through from ,ir head1uarters, and ictor -light had been authoriAed to shoot down the intruders, who were now definitely heading towards %ingkaling )kamti. ,lthough the threat to the 0ndian helicopters had decreased due to this action, the 6oyalist 7+0 centre simply had to be protected. The first aircrafts to be scrambled towards the border had been the flight of three %2&+(M:0s on 7ombat ,ir #atrol duty in northern ,ssam, but as luck would have it, they were on the western leg of their flight pattern, ad would take some time to catch up, so others had been called in. "ne of the first ones to get the scramble order were four Mig&.' 4*ison5 ,ir 9efence fighters that were on the "R# at Borhat.

FOUR MI")*1 BISON AIRCRAFTS $CALL SI"N: ALPHA ) ONE THROU"H FOUR%
ORHAT AFB ASSAM, INDIA 0('* HRS THURSDAY The sun had come up by now and the day was bright and sunny at Borhat ,-*. Not the kind of day you would expect with the !ob at hand, the pilots reflected. 0t would have more normal for a dark overcast of sorts. The pilots had been next to their aircrafts when the :laxons had started, and it had taken them barely two minutes to climb into the aircraft. Next on the ladder had been the crew chief, leaning on the ladder as he helped the pilot strap himself. /ithin seconds the powerful turbo!et engines were rotating and the noise was excruciating enough that all ground crewmen nearby had their earphones on, the new model ones, which allowed them to communicate to each other as well as to shield their hearing abilities for later use. The ladders were removed 1uickly and the M0$&.'s were ready to roll, the pilots simultaneously talking to the *ase 7ontrol centre, as the ,T7 was about to be shut down as part of the alerts now activated. The base control itself was taking the tactical data from the #halcon ,/,7% and making sense of it, and giving the relevant data to the pilots waiting in the cockpits. There was no need to give them any more data at the moment other than the initial vectors, altitude and command links. 0n this case, *ase control would hand over airborne control to ictor, and ictor would then conduct the aerial engagement, keeping the *ase control in the loop, because, after all, the fighters and the pilots belonged to this airbase. The aircrafts themselves were armed with R&;;R &,3 and R&;+ missiles, but drop&tanks were not being used, seeing the short range in which they would be operating. 0n addition, each aircraft was carrying

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external 3/ pods, to be used in an 3/ intensive environment, which again was somewhat unexpected as far the current engagement was concerned. The situation at hand was however more complicated, and was one that re1uired careful planning. The #6,,- aircrafts were !ust beyond the hills of :ohima, and while the #halcon ,/,7% had been tracking them while they made their ingress to the target, it had lost track of them when they had gone low, probably trying to evade detection as well, although their final destination was well fixed. The hills of :ohima prevented the #halcon from looking beyond. ,s a result, ,lpha flight could be directed on a vector towards %ingkaling )kamti, and they in turn would remain blind all the way to the hills, but after which they would have immediate ac1uisition. The problem lay there. )aving crossed, the hills, the distance to %ingkaling )kamti was barely fifty :ilometres, and that meant that whatever advantage of the long&range * R engagement lay with the use of the R&;; air&to&air missiles was gone. ,lso gone was the inherent advantage of the #halcon ,/,7%, that is, the positional advantage that would have been possible if the enemy had been visible to the ,/,7% radar. ,lpha -light would have to ac1uire and engage the enemy on their own. The only thing going for the pilots right now was that they had the advantage of surprise with them. That was because the #6,,- aircrafts had so far operated with impunity, and were only now gearing up to face the 0,- over Myanmar. , nice advantage to have on your side, but one that would not last for very long. The pilots !ust had to make the most of it before it vanished. )aving said that, it was also true that once the 0,- fully entered the conflict, the #halcons could then be directed further eastwards and above the hills of :ohima, thereby negating the corresponding blind areas. ,t the moment, however, the first engagement between 0,- and #6,,- aircrafts would be outside the radar coverage areas of the 0ndian and 7hinese ,erial 0%R networks. The first M0$&.' to roll down the runway belonged to the -light leader, having call sign ,lpha "ne. The massive power of the engine in the M0$&.' became apparent as the aircraft took off on full afterburner whose orange&yellow conical exhaust was clearly seen despite the bright sun. Then more sounds were heard, and in 1uick succession the remaining three aircrafts were airborne and hurrying to catch up with the -light leader who had already concluded his talks with *ase 7ontrol and had begun his next conversation with ictor -light as he shifted airborne control to the ,/,7%. The first vector given the four aircrafts flying in a finger&four pattern made them turn southeast. Ten minutes later the pilots had been informed about the possible type of the #6,,- aircrafts8 B&C00. The line of hills east of kohima representing the international border was now visible on the horiAon against the clear blue sky. Thirty seconds later the four aircraft thundered over )ill .=== at murderously low altitude. The M0$&.'s were trying to keep as low as possible. Why let the /hinese know unnecessarily about the wrath o% god that is about to strike the&, not they acknowledge what god is, o% course, but what the hell ,lpha "ne thought, and then to his colleagues8 ,lpha "ne to all ,lpha units, prepare to engage.?

AIRSPACE OVER SIN"KALIN" HKAMTI

0+0# HRS THURSDAY ,lpha flight was now taking the same route that the ,6)s had taken earlier. They were flying fast and low through the valley next to )tangsan and doing so eastwards. -ollowing the Nam %oleh River for the next twenty kilometres would bring them to the !unction where another river, the Nampak, would !oin the former and both would head east to eventually !oin the 7hindwin River. *ut waypoint two was the !unction, not the 7hindwin River, and from the !unction ,lpha -light would go southeast for ten kilometres in order to reach %ingkaling )kamti. 3ngaging the B&Cs was another matter, however. )aving reached the !unction, the M0$&.'s could turn south for a kilometre or so, and then pop up to medium altitude and then destroy the #6,,- aircrafts with R&;+ missiles, given that they would be engaging them at twenty :ilometres or so. 0n addition, the pop&up manoeuvre would allow the 0ndian pilots to gain positional advantage in terms of height as the #halcon had clearly informed them that the B&Cs were attacking the 7+0 locations at low altitude. They would be laden with air to ground ordinance while the 0ndian M0$&.'s were e1uipped with air&to&air missiles. 0t was hardly fair, but the 0ndian flight commander didn5t give a damn about that particular fact. /ithin a minute the four aircrafts thundered over the !unction and then began the turn to the south. 0n doing so, the aircrafts also changed relative positions so that the finger&four formation was now line abreast, more suitable for volley fire of air&to&air missiles. The aircrafts were thundering over Myanmar at an altitude of a

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few hundred feet. The onboard radars were off. This made sure that the 7hinese aircrafts would not receive a warning from their radar warning receivers or R/R, that they were being watched, or that a threat was looming to the north. -lying without radar was dangerous, of course, because it made the host aircraft blind as well, but there was little to fear at the moment. The 7hinese weren5t prepared and weren5t expecting a fight, which was the ma!or factor for the mow threat perception. ,nd the #halcon ,/,7% would pick up any inbound fighters coming at medium to high altitude from the Gunnan province long before they could pose a threat, and it was unlikely at best that those fighters would come at low altitude for such long ranges. %o that meant that the M0$&.'s could continue to keep their onboard radars off and take the data from the #halcon which was informing the pilots that there were no inbound #6,,- aircrafts at the moment. 0t was also highly unlikely that the 7hinese could launch any fighters in air&defence configuration in the short while that the 0ndian fighters would be over Myanmar ,irspace. -urther, the M0$&.'5*ison5 variant was e1uipped with the Tarang R/R on the tail section of the fuselage which was recording no threats, although it was encountering what could only be some rebel ground based tracking radar at extreme range to the northeast, probably beyond the river 0rrawaddy, near the 7hinese Gunnan province. ,s is the problem with such radars, the range at which they return a signal is different, and lesser, than the range at which their electronic signature is picked up by any passive airborne 3/ device. 7ouple that with the chaos in the Myanmar airspace for the last few days wherein aircrafts had been moving to and fro from all sides, and it became highly improbable that this radar could represent any threat. %till, it gave the 0ndian pilots another reason to stay low until it suited them to gain altitude. ,ll factors taken, however, the external threat was low, and the ball was in the 0ndian court. The #6,,- B&Cs, on the other hand, did not have any such extensive coverage and real&time data to support their operations at the moment. They were operating near the 0ndian border, where every advantage lay with the 0ndians both geographically, politically, militarily and psychologically. ,t the same time they were operating away from their home bases, and outside the coverage of their home grown ,3/ aircrafts mounted on the modified ,N&'. platforms that had !ust begun their operations. Most importantly, however, they were without dedicated fighter escorts, which was unforgivable as far as the 7hinese -ight commander was concerned. 0t was true that they had secured air supremacy over the loyalists within the first twenty&four hours, and the succeeding days had built up a level of complacency with regard to air operations within the #6,,-, but considering that the 0ndians had pledged their support for the loyalists should have stirred the #6,,- high staff a little, but it had not. ,nd the only reaction from them had been laughter and !okes about the 0ndian air combat capability as compared to massive #6,,- strike force built up over the years and now assembling in the Gunnan and DiAang provinces. That it would take another two days to get them all in theatre had not been discussed. There had been further talk of correcting their mistakes from '=>., about how the #6,,- should have acted then to disrupt the 0ndian transport flights, again ignoring the fact that their inability to pro!ect power in that war had been due to different reasons, and that the current situation was somewhat different. 0n '=>., not using air power for the entire duration of the month long war had been the result of political bungling at south block, not the result of incompetence on behalf of the 0,-. Now, in this 4war5, the use of air power had been authoriAed from day one. The 0ndian ,/,7% fleet was up, so were their fighters and their deployments were ahead of similar deployments on the 7hinese side of the border. The 7hinese knew a lot about the 0,- capabilities, with information coming from their #akistani allies who had set up spy networks in 0ndia, from their own 3/ aircrafts now flying over Tibet and northeast Myanmar and some other information from the rebels in Myanmar, who had happily handed over the 0ndian donated military e1uipment for evaluation to the 7hinese 4,dvisors5. *ut while this technical information had been sent up the #6,,- chain of command, the local #6,,commanders knew more. They knew for example, the #sychological data coming from across the border that was difficult to put into words or in some report in organiAation such as the 7hinese military. They were the ones who saw and recogniAed the subtle but still aggressive behaviour and the burgeoning confidence of their enemies. ,nd small things could alert them to such things, right from closeness of the 0ndian ,/,7% flight path to the border to the movement of their fighters trying to mirror the #6,,- strike missions from across the border since the last day or so. -urther, while the younger generation of #6,,commanders could and did accept that the technological edge, understanding and competence was on the 0ndian side thus far, the older, senior generations would not. There were !ust too many racial factors involved in their case. ,nd as a result any young officer who would have said that the 0,- was competent and deserved our attention during any meeting of the #6,,- *rass might find himself on some remote airbase on the Mongolian border, and that wasn5t desirable, was itI %o when the #6,,- commander commanding the B&C00 regiment in the Gunnan province had demanded %2&.; escorts for his four aircrafts heading near the 0ndian border, he had been overruled and as a result

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the four B&C00 aircrafts found themselves laden with cluster bombs and rockets, without fighter escorts, and facing the threat from all sides and from both the air and ground dimensions. 9iving low to evade the #halcon5s radar had been among the only things he could do at this stage, after calling for support yet again, that is. *ut that was a while back, while they had made their ingress to the target Aone. Right now, the 7hinese -light commander had other things on his mind, one of which included evading the wall of flak that the loyalists were putting up in front of him and his fellow pilots. They had discovered a real hornet5s nest here, and he had already delivered a message to his superiors about the location of what he now knew to be the main loyalist 7+0 facility in the region. )is first high speed pass over the rebel base had caught them by surprise, but that hadn5t lasted for too long. )is second pass had been slower, and the flak had been heavier, but still inaccurate, and that had allowed him to take out a single Tunguska anti&aircraft vehicle with unguided rockets before its crew could react. That had been the first order of business for the 7hinese pilots8 take out as many triple&, systems that you could within the first two passes. The other B&Cs had some success as well, having destroyed several ,,, systems while flak continued to go off around them. %ome damage was inevitable, of course, and one of the B&Cs was trailing a thin trail of smoke by the time the flight leader had decided to break off the attack. ,mong the screeching of his R/R systems trying to tell him that there were literally doAens of ,,, ground radars tracking him, there was a new distinctive tone, this one warning the flight commander what he feared most8 they were being ac1uired by airborne radars. ,c1uisitionL ,lpha "ne has ac1uired bandit head&on at Two&"ne :ilo&Mike. ,lpha "ne to all ,lpha units, weapons freeHweapons free. Tally ho. :ill them allL? the 0ndian flight commander said to his colleagues. The M0$&.'s had popped up ten kilometres north of %ingkaling )kamti, and had caught the 7hinese off balance, and in between on of their attack runs, which they were now aborting as they banked and switched on afterburners to confront the 0ndian aircrafts. *ut it was too late. The four 0ndian aircrafts fired one R&;+ each, the white trails behind the rocket motors giving the path taken by the missiles to the anxious pilots. The missiles traced out a thin white trial across the blue sky and the green forest background, and the twenty seconds later the eagle eyes of ,lpha "ne picked up a small orange yellow flash on the horiAon, and his radar showed that the target was no more. Then one more flash to the left of the first one announced the second aircraft5s destruction, but there were no more explosions. Two had escaped the missiles. ,lpha "ne, this is ,lpha three. 0 got oneL? the commander was somewhat annoyed with ,lpha three for breaking radio silence and his concentration, but this wasn5t the time for anger, more for a cool head. Roger. ,ll ,lpha units, we have two leakers. ,c1uire and destroy.? , sudden warning tone from his R/R informed him that the remaining two 7hinese pilots, or at least one of them, had not taken the opportunity to bug out. ,t the same time he had another ac1uisition. *rave but stupid, my young 7hinese comrades. Gou will pay for thatHthe commander thought. The second R&;+ streaked off the pylon and the slight shudder was felt inside the cockpit. The trial leading away from the aircraft until seconds later there was another flash, and this time the targeted aircraft was visible, or at least the black smoke trail following the burning wreckage, as it headed down into the hills was visible. There was another huge orange yellow explosion as the burning aircraft hit the vegetated slopes of some hill below, sending a huge trail of smoke from it. There was no sign of a parachute. Bad news co&rade ,lpha "ne, this is ,lpha -our, 0 have a bandit at -our&Pero :ilo&Mike east of my position and increasing. 6ooks like our remaining bandit. )e5s beyond R&;+ range but not out of my R&;; range. Re1uesting permission to break and engage with a * R shot, over.? $o for it, ,lpha -our, you are closer to him than me. %hoot him down.? Roger, ,lpha four engagingH? the radio crackled. The radar plot showed the R&;; leaving the M0$&.' and heading at high speed towards the target, the pilot of whom seemed to have broken off the moment his R/R must have s1uawked. 0n any case, the R&;; has sufficient range even in the tail chase scenario to reach the target. The missile went active and slammed into the B&C00 beyond a trail of chaff and flares launched by the 7hinese pilot in his last desperate moves. )e had known what was coming, and that fact alone made his chance of surviving higher, though there was no way it could be verified at the moment. Target is splashed. *andit number four is down. Returning to formation.? ,lpha -our remarked excitedly for all to hear. That5s when the sky lit up with puffs of smoke all around. The B&C00 looks somewhat like the M0$& .' in shape when seen from the ground, and seeing them, the 6oyalists forces had mistaken them for #6,,- aircraft and begun to shoot. There5s nothing like a morning strike to make someone !ittery and

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nervous for the rest of the day. %o while the loyalist officers were shouting at their men to cease fire, the response from their gunners was not immediate, with the unfortunate effect of damaging one of the egressing 0,- aircraft. The mistake was understandable because of the fact that the loyalists on the ground had encountered only the B&Cs and not the Mig&.'s in the air for the last few days and the fact that from the ground it is difficult to see whether the wings have an orange, white and green ring or a big red star on them. 0n addition, the #ara commandoes had yet to make contact wit the loyalists. ,ll in all, it was the conclusion of some very hectic events. "h shitH,lpha "ne, this is Two. 0 have been hit. 0 have been hit. 0t5s that loyalist ,,,. They are shooting at us, those idiots.? )ow bad is it, TwoI? the commander asked his comrade as he brought his own aircraft in the general direction of the border. The other aircrafts were visible to him now, amidst the numerous black puffs that began to reduce, and the ,,, fire receded. Not too bad 0 think. 0 still have control. 0 ought to make it back to base easily.? Roger. ,lpha "ne to all ,lpha units, form up and let5s go home.? The -light commander replied, and the earlier finger four formations were reinstated as the four 0ndian aircraft flew over the peaks of Nagaland, back into 0ndia. The first contact between the 0,- and the #6,,- had been resounding success, but that was soon to change. 3ven before the last B&C00 had been shot down, the orders from #6,,- )< had gone out. The first of several fighter and heavy bomber 9ivisions had !ust received the orders to deploy from their home bases in the *ei!ing and %henyang Military 9istricts to bases in the 7hengdu Military district. 0t was no longer about Myanmar now.

T)3 90R37T"R,T3 "- M060T,RG "#3R,T0"N% M9$M"N ,RMG )< N3/ 936)0, 0N90, '((( )R% T)2R%9,G "kay people, listen up. The preliminary orders have !ust come through. /e are deploying troops to Myanmar to assist the loyalists. The time hasn5t been decided yet, but it will be done. "ur air force has already had a little skirmish with the 7hinese, and both sides are preparing for a big one as we speak. *ut that5s the air force5s problem, and we have our own...? The 7",% was telling the assembled officers in the 9irectorate of Military "perations. Now the room was filled with a lot less people than before. "nly the relevant people from the 9$M" %taff and the commanders of the eastern command were present. This time $eneral %inha took the dominating chair in the conference room. The others who were seated included the 3,7 7ommander, 6ieutenant $eneral :. Reddy, the 7",%8 6ieutenant $eneral )arbindar %ingh, the %"7"M commander, the 90, 7ommander, the 000, 0 and DDD000 7orps 7ommanders and the 9ivisional 7ommanders of the two 9ivisions under the 000 7orps. These were the .+R9 0nfantry and the @;T) Mountain 9ivisions. ,t the moment however, several other officers were on call through the Teleconference system, many of whom were commanders of 0ndependent ,rmoured *rigades and MechaniAed 0nfantry units, as well as the 9ivisional 7ommanders of the various 9ivisions under DDD000 and 0 7orps. This had been necessary because it had been decided that the @;T) Mountain 9ivision, which was the point command in this case, simply did not have the mechaniAed e1uipment at its disposal to fight a fast paced war once it had proceeded from the )ills of :ohima into the foothills and then eventually the plains near the river 7hindwin where the landscape was planar, even if extensively vegetated. )ere the road network was relatively developed to allow fast paced movement for mechaniAed infantry units to go in for tactical envelopments and encirclements, especially if the enemy was foot&bound, as intelligence suggested that it had now become. The @;T) Mountain 9ivision had never been expected to fight in the plains, as its name literally suggests, and it had been one of the ten or so 0nfantry 9ivisions optimised for combat in the )imalayas. ,s a result, all Mountain 9ivisions had their e1uipment, personnel and 7ombat 9octrine optimised for high altitude combat. 0n addition, this 9ivision, along with the .+R9 0nfantry 9ivision, were engaged in 7ounter 0nsurgency "perations or 7"0N "ps for some years now, with

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assistance from 0 7orps units as well. The result was that the soldiers of these two 9ivisions had become the elite in terms of %pecialiAed 7ombat training and also in terms of experience. 0t had reached a level now wherein they were rightfully feared primarily due to their daring, initiative and unorthodox methods. Their use of %)*" or %pecial )eli&*orne "perations, using a mix of ,6) and 6ancer helicopters, flying at tree top levels and at night using the most advanced of "ptical, navigation and communication systems to strike an 0nsurgent camp detected earlier by a Nishant 2, also deployed by the @;T) M9, had become a familiar pattern, and one truly feared for its unpredictability. The @;T) M9 had received a lot of awards off late, for the bravery and valour displayed by its troops when in contact with the enemy as also for its commanders for their development of new tactics for 7"0N "ps. The 26-, had by now been nearly crushed, with most of its cadres returning to their natural sanctuaries, among the civilian population, waiting for the storm to pass. ,nd the storm had had no intention of passing, until very recently that is. The situation in Myanmar had changed the e1uations once again. The threat axis for 000 7orps had shifted by 'C( degrees. ,nd the order to assemble its units for the situation in Myanmar had been a hard one, coming at a crucial time when a final push would have sorted out the 26-, and the Naga insurgency problems once and for all. This had happened before, but those had been due to political reasons, wherein the ,rmy had been told to cease operations at a time when they could have closed the insurgency once and for all in order to give diplomacy a chance. "nly to find that 9iplomacy didn5t have a chance, and that the insurgents had used the reduction of pressure on them to build up forces once again. This time however, the reason for the release of pressure had not been due to the political bungling of %outh *lock. *ut that didn5t make the 7",% very happy at the moment. )e now had a very difficult choice at hand. "ne was to wait for the DDD000 7orps, which had !ust been mobiliAed, to move into the region and continue the pressure on the insurgents while 000 7orps moved the @;T) M9 into Myanmar. 0t had its advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of this plan was that it was very time efficient. The @;T) M9 could theoretically start moving its units into Myanmar within the next few hours itself, thereby improving chances for the 6oyalists. The disadvantage was that the @;T) Mountain 9ivision had no mechaniAed or ,rmoured units organically attached that could sustain any fast MechaniAed offensives beyond the foothills. 0t was essentially and primarily an 0nfantry 9ivision, and one that was designed to fight in the hills and the Mountains, not in the plains. 0t !ust wasn5t optimised for that !ob. 0t wasn5t so much a lack of foresight as much as the fact that the 0ndian ,rmy had never really thought of the possibility that it could one day be asked to go from the hills of Nagaland into Myanmar itself. The DDD000 7orps was not optimised for this !ob either. 0tself consisting of the .(T), .+R9 and the ';T) Mountain 9ivisions, its original area of responsibility was the defence of %ikkim, and if necessary, *hutan. 0n the extreme conditions, it could move units to assist 0 7orps and if necessary, assist 000 7orps in its fight against the 0nsurgents. ,t the moment, it had been asked to do all three !obs at the same time, allowing the .(T) M9 to move into %ikkim along with elements of the .+R9 M9, the ma!ority of whose units were in the process of deployment in *hutan at the re1uest of the :ing of *hutan who had so far not asked for assistance but was expected to do so in a few hours. The ';T) Mountain 9ivision was the one tasked with the !ob of fighting the 26-, while the @;T) M9 prepared for its assault into Myanmar. The DDD000 7orps commander was one very unhappy man. )e had made his displeasure at seeing the spreading out of his 9ivisions very clear to the 7",%, who didn5t entirely disagree, but had seen no choice either. ,nother choice would have been to deploy some specific units like the #arachute Regiment into Myanmar, thereby leaving all other divisions with their primary responsibility. 0t was indeed a very tempting choice. "ne that the 7",% had nearly ordered, but had pulled back when faced with the very real fact that this Regiment, specially trained as it was in these kind of expeditionary deployments, had one great disadvantage8 6ogistics. 0n particular, the 6ogistics for extensive and prolonged engagements, for which the unit was not e1uipped.

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0deally, according to the standard 7ombat 9octrine, the #arachute Regiments were the kind of units that could deploy fast, hit hard, hit deep, strike fear into the hearts and minds of the enemy and then expect to be relieved by the follow on ,rmoured, MechaniAed or even 0nfantry 2nits, upon whom they could then depend for their e1uipment and material needs. 9eployed alone, they could not sustain in combat, no matter how good they were. 0n this case, if they were deployed into Myanmar, on the western banks of the river 7hindwin, they would become dependant on the 6ogistics provided by 000 7orps from across the border, which would become more of a problem than if the @;T) M9 deployed one of its Regiments directly. The people would then be familiar with each otherF work would be more efficient, the logistical trains would already be set up, and the units would know the area like their own backyard, as a result of the extensive deployments in that sector. *ut then the fact still remained that the @;T) M9, e1uipped as it was, would need a shot in the arm in terms of e1uipment and technology. That was something that could be arranged easily by transferring high technology weapons from other dormant sectors in 0ndia. This 9ivision would have the very latest in whatever it needed. No effort was to be spared. The nature of the expected combat dictated that a lot ,rmy ,viation assets like "bservation, Troop Transport andEor logistical and ,ttack )elicopters be organically attached. These included the ,6) 49hruv5 helicopters, the 6ancer )elicopters and now the @;T) M9 had the honour of becoming the first ,rmy 9ivision to receive assistance from the new 67) or 6ight 7ombat )elicopters, straight from the factory based 4,5 -light of the '.@ %1uadron 0,-, that had recently completed their conversion from the old M0&+@s which they had handed over to another )elicopter %1uadron of the 0,-. 0n addition, the 9ivision was also to receive heavy assistance from ,ir -orce )eavy lift helicopters like the Mi&';s and also had a priority in ,ir -orce lists for tactical ,irlifts using ,N&+.s and 9ornier 9"&..Cs. 0n addition, MechaniAed units were to be deployed to exploit the large number of roads and paths in the plains near the river 7hindwin. These particular units were e1uipped with the *M#&. 07 and some of the s1uadrons had received the experimental 4,bhay5 07 , developed in&house by the 9R9". These were the units that would add punch to the 0nfantry units of the @;T) M9. -urther, an armoured force had to be deployed. *ut that was a problem. %everal issues had to be taken into consideration, one of which was the large numbers of waterborne obstacles like rivers and streams that had to be crossed, which meant that the heavy ,r!un M*T was out of consideration. %omething lighter and faster was re1uired. T&=(s were considered, but they could not be moved from the #akistani *order, another reason why the ,r!un M*T could not be moved from there as well. That left the T&;.M' as the only real option. The specific units however, were yet to be decided. "kay, it5s decided now that the @;T) M9 is going to deploy into Myanmar. /hat5s the situation of its e1uipment and personnelI? the 7",% asked the 9ivisional 7ommander. %ir, 0 am at full T"O3. )owever, my force has been augmented by the arrival of several *attalions of the MechaniAed 0nfantry Regiment. 0n addition, my )elipads are buAAing with )elicopters of all kinds and my men are ready. ,ll of my Regiments and *attalion 7#s have begun the planning and my intelligence officers are busy collecting information from across the border. -urther, some of my Recon teams have already started to feed my staff officers with information about what is !ust beyond the hills of :ohima and the ground and ,erial 0%R networks have ensured that we know everything there is to know for the hundred kilometres beyond these foothills.K K%ir, the @;T) Mountain 9ivision is ready to deploy. 0t is my estimate that we would have reached the western bank of the 7hindwin River, both on the northern and southern sides of %ingkaling )kamti within two to three hours of crossing the 0nternational *order, if there is no resistance. 0f there is indeed resistance, which 0 doubt, we will reach our ob!ectives within six hours of crossing.

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,t this point, however, 0 am assuming that the 6oyalist force 7ommanders at %ingkaling )kamti would have been notified of our ob!ectives and intent.? Ges. /e need to do that before we start the deployment. /e need the Tatmadaw 7ommander5s consent and cooperation beforehand, otherwise we will end up fighting both the 6oyalists and the rebels and that is undesirable. /hat5s the status of those %"7"M teams at the momentI? the 1uestion was directed at the %"7"M 7ommander. %ir, the original ob!ective as 0 understood it was to establish contact with these loyalists. -or this my men were ready to move from Borhat in ,ssam. Then this ob!ective was changed somewhat by the 90, commander when he re1uested that my teams also take with them the %,T7"M communication systems to %ingkaling )kamti and ask the Tatmadaw kyee or the Myanmar army, by which 0 mean the loyalists, to shut down their radio communications using older radios from their command centre which were susceptible to !amming and interception. Now, my teams cannot possibly take the radios, other than their own, with them when they do infiltrate the border, so it was suggested by me that they go in without them, establish communications with the loyalists by reaching their 7# and then have one of our 7&'+(B aircrafts land at %ingkaling )kamti and bring in the necessary communication e1uipment for their uses. ,s of one hour ago, the aircraft had already left :alaikunda ,-* with all the re1uired e1uipment and hasH? the %"7"M 7ommander checked his watch8 GesHlanded at Borhat. 0t will stay there and await the confirmation order from my infiltration team after they have made contact. The team themselves are ready. They have already been dropped twenty :ilometres across the border as of one hour ago and forty :ilometres from their final destination. They are now awaiting the order to go ahead and actually establish contact. That particular order hasn5t been given yet.? The %"7"M 7ommander concluded. GesH? $eneral %inha looked at his watch as well. %hould get it anytime nowH? 3DT3RN,6 ,--,0R% M0N0%TRG *20690N$ N3/ 936)0, 0N90, '('@ )R% T)2R%9,G 9r. %hivdev %ingh was reviewing the files before him that had piled up since his morning visit to the #M". ,nother sheet made by his secretary listed the countries whose foreign Ministries had called when he was not in his office. ,ll of them had wanted to talk to him and ask about the state of affairs, but none were going to come forward and offer any constructive help, the -oreign Minister was sure. )e could have called them back now, but that was an unproductive way of spending the early hours of the day. ,t any rate he had other things that needed doing. -irst on the list had been to call the *hutanese ,mbassador over to the -oreign Ministry. This he did through his secretary. )e had discussed the details of this meting with the #M before the 9efence Minister had arrived. The #M in turn, had said that he would discuss this with the 9efence Minister and the )ome Minister before giving his final call. This had come !ust minutes ago, and there was no time to waste after that. *hutan was in an interesting situation to say the least. 0t was caught up between the two warring parties and had no political influence or military power to back up its position in the frantic diplomacy going on. /hat military it did have was deployed right at the border, or fighting the insurgents in the south. The Royal *hutanese ,rmy was what it was only because of the 0ndian support it had received for the last few decades. ,lmost all the e1uipment was 0ndian in origin. *ut their courage was their own. The 0ndian ,dvisors with them had seen it first hand, the 26-, had the honour of tasting it in combat and 7hina knew about it. ,s far as the world was concerned, the Royal *hutanese army was independent only in its thoughts and character. ,nd its courage in the face of fire was one of the last vestiges of its independence in this crisis, its only independent identity. 0n all other actions, especially external affairs, the disadvantage of being land&locked meant that the 0ndian -oreign Minister had more evocative powers with respect to the

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*hutanese ,mbassador than what the *hutanese authorities would have liked. )owever, it was still a lot better than being gobbled up by 7hina and being treated as its outlying provinces, and that meant that the meeting between these two people was more cordial and friendly than would otherwise have been the case. There was also a debt to be paid, but the 0ndian foreign Minister had no intention of bringing that up today. , relatively short walk down the hall to receive him followed a short message from his secretary stating the arrival of the *hutanese ,mbassador. The usual pleasantries were exchanged while both men walked back to the main room. 3ach man had been awake for a long time, and his eyes showed. Tea was served formally, as was the seating arrangement, which belied the fact that these two men were close and informal friends. *y normal standards the timing was very early for such a meeting, but desperate times called for desperate measures. 0t was time to get down to business. The *hutanese ambassador was the one to speak first, much to the relief of the foreign minister who didn5t want the meeting to look like he was giving an order, which in effect it was. %o, 9r. %ingh, how may 0 be of service to youI? here we goHthe -oreign Minster thought. /ell, ,mbassador, it5s the other way around, actually. The #M has decided it fit to brief you and hence your government on the gravity of the situation in Myanmar, and its possible repercussions on your country. ,s you know, Myanmar has fragmented, and 7hina has brought it about. Gou also know our pledge of allegiance with the former military leaders of Myanmar, now known in our media as the 6oyalists, although that5s a loose political definition by any standard. 3ven so, the #ledge stands, and we are at the moment poised to launch military strikes against rebel positions in Myanmar. ,s a result, our relations with 7hina have deteriorated tremendously, and our political and military positions are now similar to as they were in the '=C(s. K K/e earlier believed that 7hina could be kept out of Myanmar. /e were wrong. 7hinese aircraft are bombing all over Myanmar and if we are to strike ourselves, our ,ir -orce 7ommander thinks that it is inevitable that 7hinese planes would be shot down. 0f so, the situation could deteriorate further, and we can5t rule out the possibility of all out war between 0ndia and 7hina. 0f this were to happen, Myanmar will become irrelevant, and the outcome there will become immaterial to both sides. 0t is under these conditions that the :ingdom of *hutan will gain strategic significance.K /e believe that the 7hinese #olitburo is not irrational, and neither is the #6,. /e believe for example, that any strikes directed against 0ndia will be retaliatory in nature and will be cloaked under a veil of 4assisting the rebel5s war in Myanmar5, or some other nonsense like that. /e also believe that their army realiAes or may realiAe in the near future when they see our massive military deployments in the N3, that this is not '=>.. That we are prepared. That the war is unwinnable for them unlike in >.. 3ven so, the 7hinese #remier /ang or the politburo in general may order an attack regardless, and under this scenario we believe that a threat to the sovereignty of *hutan exists.K ,s you know, your country has a lot of strategic value. 0t has many of the mountain passes of the )imalayas, and flanks ,runachal #radesh, %ikkim and some regions of ,ssam. %eeing that our deployments are mostly in that sector, the 7hinese may intrude on your territory to try and outflank our forces in the N3 and %ikkim in a strategic manoeuvre. /e could hold them off, maybe even push them back all the way, but if some sort of peace treaty is arranged while they still hold ground in *hutan, things could get difficult within your country. ,ll our sources indicate that the 7hinese are looking very deeply at exploiting these passes and the :ingdom of *hutan during an attack on 0ndia. )owever, it was only early this morning that our satellites located 7hinese military movements in accordance with this threat. The #M then decided that it was time that you came to know about the threat to your country and has suggested some measures to help you deal with it.? the -oreign Minister concluded and waited to let the thought sink in before he went into the details. 0t took twenty seconds of before the ,mbassador replied. This is a very serious matter that 0 will need to discuss with my sovereign and the government. *ut 0 will venture to ask you the details of how you wish to help us.? The ,mbassador said, and

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the -oreign Minister put his cup of tea down before he replied back while the ,mbassador picked up his, and he his hands were shaking somewhat as he thought over the implications of the situation, the -oreign Minister noticed. )e wondered how much the ambassador was going to be listening at the moment. Time to grab his attention again... Mr. ,mbassador, the #M feels that its time to let the :ingdom of *hutan know that the $overnment of 0ndia and indeed 0ndia as a whole will not let such aggression foster, and that we stand ready to defend this )imalayan kingdom. Now, 0 may not be an expert in military affairs, but 0 do know that we must never bow down in front of the 7hinese while dealing with them. /e therefore have to stop their aggressive thinking before it gets out of hand.K "ur ,rmy people have suggested that we deploy some troops to your country. 0t will help to deter the 7hinese from thinking about attacking as well as help us repel them if indeed they do attack. The army5s units are waiting to deploy as we speak. Now, 0 am aware that this is a serious and a burdensome re1uest, and that it will take some time for you to evaluate your options, but 0 would like to urge you that you do so in the shortest time possible. Time is a parameter we don5t have a luxury of. 0 would like you to give your answer later today, preferably in the next few hours. 0f you like, our military ,ttachQ can deliver a detailed military briefing to your government and army officers within the hour. #lease make sure that they don5t drag their feet on this.? The ,mbassador looked at the 0ndian minister now.K This is most gracious, even if it is a part of the agreement between us that has stood for more than half a century. 0 will convey this message to my government. )owever, we would like to see this issue resolved by peaceful methods. ,re all such approaches exhaustedI? Not at all. 0 will be speaking to the 7hinese ,mbassador later today on this very issue. *ut 0 fear he may not understand. Mr ,mbassador, what 0 am telling you now is not in the public so far. 0t will remain that way for the nextH? the -oreign Minister checked his watch. H-orty minutes. ,fter that it will be made public by the media. 0t seems that the dogs of war have been released. "ur ,ir -orce !ets have shot down four 7hinese warplanes in Myanmar about an hour or so ago. This is most serious, and 0 fear that once it comes out in public, the 7hinese will withdraw all offers for peace. *ut as it is, our media people have already come to know of it and going to release this information even after our pleas to the contrary. /e are trying to get a presidential authoriAation to try and get the media people from using this information but 0 doubt we will get that far before the news gets loose. 0n any case, peace is always possible, but to rely on it completely is also foolish. ,s they say8 4To be prepared for war is one of the most effective ways of preserving peace.5? 9r. %hivdev %ingh concluded. 0t is indeed true for this case, isn5t itI 3ven so, we must always pray for peace, and hope that diplomacy prevents war from happening. 0t has achieved it before, after all.? The *hutanese ,mbassador said. 0ndeed. *ut rarely, Mr. ,mbassador. ery rarely has diplomacy prevented war from beginning. 3specially in our case. There is !ust too much emotion involved. 0ts what defines us in the subcontinent. 0n any case, my gut feeling is that the dogs of war are loose and can5t be put back in.? the -oreign Minister said as both men got up to leave. %o it beginsH? the *hutanese ,mbassador had accepted this fact long ago, but a final thought remained to be asked8 /hen do your air strikes in Myanmar beginI? They have already begun, Mr. ,mbassador.? 7),#T3R . %2R$3 7"NTR"6 0,- 3,%T3RN ,0R 7"MM,N9 )3,9<2,RT3R% M,0N "#3R,T0"N% 73NTR3 ''(( )R% T)2R%9,G

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%ir, this doesn5t look good at all.? The -light 6ieutenant commented to his superior, who was leaning over his shoulders and looking at the screen in front of him. 0t was the data being downloaded from the #halcon ,/,7% flying over eastern ,ssam. 0t showed that that the #6,,had pulled back all of its aircrafts operating over Myanmar towards its Gunnan province and aborted all air strikes against loyalist positions. 0ronically, that wasn5t the good news. 0t was more like the tran1uil before the storm. 0t was now clear by the flight patterns of the patrolling #6,,- aircraft that they were perhaps expecting the 0,- to strike at their bases in Gunnan and DiAang. -ollowing the sudden shoot down of four of their B&C00 aircrafts by the 0,- M0$&.' 4*ison5 aircrafts, the response was understandable. They had apparently pulled back to lick their wounds at a time when they didn5t have any serious wounds, and that was the bad news. 0t suggested that they were marshalling their resources for some other purpose. ,ll of a sudden, they had abandoned their massive air support to the loyalists except for a few strikes in some northern sectors where their rebel comrades were in trouble. 0n addition, 90#,7 had reported massive influx of 7hinese bombers to bases in the 7hengdu military district. 6iterally doAens of )&> bombers had recently deployed to bases in the northern parts of 7hengdu district. These bases were far from the target area to be free of counterattacks by the 0,- but in range for the massive )&>9E: bombers. ,n even doAen number of )&>2 tanker aircrafts had also relocated to remote bases in the 6anAhou district to provide in&flight refuelling support. ,nd it was clear that the 7hinese high command was pulling every available %2&.;E+( series aircraft from all other districts and deploying them in the region. This was not counting the hundreds of other fighters flooding into the region, crowding all known airbases to extreme capacity, making them highly vulnerable to air attacks. 0t was for this reason that most of the #6,,- fighters flying at the moment were doing so near their borders, in the event that the 0,should strike and take out their precious bombers on the tarmac. "n the other side of Myanmar was the opposing force. The 0,- didn5t nearly have enough fighters to match the numbers being geared up to be thrown against them. )owever, they had other advantages that would in all likelihood offset the 7hinese offensive capability. -or one thing, the geography was on the 0ndian side. The 0,- had no intention, at the moment, to strike the 7hinese at their bases since more pressing ob!ectives were at hand, the most important one being the halting of the rebel offensive in Myanmar. ,s a result, the 0,- could rely on the ground based %,M belt laid out all through N3-,, mostly with the %pyder and ,kash systems, but also the ,*M systems to attempt and shoot down any ballistic missile threats to its airfields. This ground system advantage the 7hinese aircraft could not hope to get, simply because they were on the offensive. Their aircrafts would be far from their airbases and %,M systems, as also from their ,3/ and ,/,7% systems, and that was going to prove costly for them. %econdly, geography again played a hand on the 0ndian side. The mountains in the N3-, region, followed by the foothills beyond in Myanmar, ensured that while the 0ndian ,/,7% could see hundreds of kilometres into the plains of Myanmar, the same hills created a sort of wall beyond which the 7hinese aircraft could not see. ,ny 0ndian fighter flying low on its own side of the border would be effectively secure from detection by the 7hinese ,3/ aircrafts who could therefore not inform their inbound fighter aircrafts about what lay !ust inside of the border while the 0ndian ,/,7% aircraft would be able to see the 7hinese aircraft coming from the Gunnan province long before they get close to the 0ndian border and position friendly fighters accordingly. This was a critical advantage, seeing that both sides had decent ,3/ capability and the 7hinese had more numbers. 0t was hoped in the 0,- )< that these two advantages would help to negate the massive 7hinese numerical superiority and reduce the numbers of aircraft before the final advantage came into play8 1uality. 0n the aftermath of the recent destruction of the four 7hinese attack aircrafts, it was 1uite clear to the people at 0,- )< that 0,- aircraft were in possession of 1ualitative technical superiority with respect to the individual aircrafts. ,nd as also with respect to the individual pilots themselves. The

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0ndian pilots had a much more flexible doctrine as well, as against the rigid #6,,- doctrine for air warfare, and the 0ndian commanders had every intention of using this against the 7hinese. They had chosen to draw the 7hinese into the trap they were laying. The 7hinese alpha strike was expected soon, and when it would come, the 0,- would let them walk into the aerial ambush of the century. The 7,% had flown down to see the preparations himself. /ith him in the main "ps centre was the 3,7 commander, and his main staff officers, working feverishly to set the pieces in place before the 7hinese fell upon them. 0n retrospect, the shooting down of the 7hinese B&Cs was a mistake. 0t had forced the 0,- to show its hand at a time when it wasn5t ready, the result being that they were now forced to fight without the kind of preparations to make the 3,7&,"7 happy. "f course, at the time there really wasn5t a choice. The 7+0 centre at %ingkaling )kamti needed securing, and that was that. 0n any case, most of the pieces were in place and the remaining would get in place by the time the #6,,- decided where and how to strike. The large room had digital maps all around, although they were the maps that helped pilots more than an infantryman in terms of detail. Marked on the screen in various shapes were the assets of the 0,- deployed in the region. The blue marking were impressive in absolute terms, but looked spare as compared to the red marks all over and around them showing the 7hinese presence. 0t wasn5t exactly making anybody happy at the moment, and anybody feeling sleepy simply needed to look at these electronic maps to remind him of the gigantic threat forming around his country to keep him awake for all eternity. -rantic phone calls were coming and being made and people were running about. The 7,% and the 3,7 commander were standing and watching their people work, while the 3,7&,"7 was also looking at some papers and signing them as the 7,% looked at the screen and was deep in his thoughts. )ow can we stop these buggers from breaking throughI )owI /hy is it appearing impossibleI 0t5s notL 0t5s not impossibleL There must be something we could doHsomethingL /hat if we strike firstI NoHthat will only waste what resources 0 have and then leave the doors open for those bastards. 7an5t do thatHso what elseI %ure as hell we can5t hold them off indefinitely in a defensive posture, even with this trap we are setting. There are bound to be leakersHpossibly in the doAens, and then 0 am going to start losing my fighters. That will be the time when we start losing the initiative. *ut 0 can5t let them secure air superiority either, can 0I 0f 0 let that happen, they are going to chew up the 000 7orps units planning to move into Myanmar even before they start to do so. /e simply have to maintain pressure on the #6,,- continuously, while maintaining my force levels. *ut that5s impossibleL ,nd 0 can5t move /estern ,ir 7ommand fighters here because then the #akistanis will get cocky, and 0 can5t leave my fighters there because then the #6,,- will kill my 3astern ,ir 7ommand. /hat the hell am 0 supposed to doI /e have got to prioritise 7hina as our main threat and apply all our assets here. ,nd as for the #akistanisHwellH screw themL $et me the 9efence Minister on the phone. NowL? the 7,% shouted to the communications officer in a voice that made the young officer tremble. 0t took ten minutes of talking with the 9efence Minister before the emergency redeployment orders were sent to the commander of the /estern ,ir 7ommand, 0ndian air force. Thirty minutes later, the first %2&+(M:0s and 67,s took off from bases in /,7 and headed on an easterly heading. #),67"N ,/,7% M7,66 %0$N8 07T"RN -6G0N$ " 3R 3,%T3RN ,%%,M ''J@ )R% T)2R%9,G The picture was complete now. The mobile 0ndra radar had been installed in the hills near :ohima and was giving a complete picture east of the hills into Myanmar. This included the loyalist 7+0 centre at a range of about fifty kilometres directly east, which was now under the

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protective umbrella of the %,M systems being set up near this radar site. )aving a seat e1uivalent to an eagle5s nest was helpful to the missile crews, who were now sharing the data from the radar systems. %o was the #halcon crew as well. The message was the same to one and all8 the skies were clear. The 7hinese had pulled back all the way so that there was nothing on the radar screens other than the odd rebel piloted aircrafts that were attacking one target or the other. Two of the rebel ,& @s had actually attacked the village of %hirang, twenty kilometres southeast of %ingkaling )kamti, where a probable location existed for an ammunition dump according to 90,, but the place was far enough from the %pyder systems so that the flight remained untouched, by 0ndian weapons, that is. That flight had been engaged by the 6oyalist %,M systems with enough competence so as to bring down one of the ,&@s on the return leg. The 0ndian radars had seen it all on their screens as it happened, and the 0ndian missile crews were discussing what they had seen and how they could use the evasive tactics of the enemy against them. The fact remained, however, that the 0ndian armed forces in general did not have any missile systems at %ingkaling )kamti or even near it, so that in most of these engagements the 0ndian air force was merely watching. The #ara commandoes that had been inserted earlier were yet to establish preliminary contact, and the %"7"M 7&'+(B carrying the necessary communications gear for establishing higher&level contact was still sitting at Borhat, awaiting instructions from the %"7"M )< to go to %ingkaling )kamti. The %pyder systems were also awaiting deployment, with two 06&;>s having deployed the systems to Borhat from where they could be sent by road to %ingaling )kamti. *ut the events that had taken place belied the fact it had still been only half a day since the orders had come through, and despite the thinking of many that things should happen instantly, they didn5t take place that way. 3verybody would have to wait, and so while ,ir head1uarters eagerly placed all pieces in place, the aerial 0%R had gone up, and all fighters were armed and ready for combat. The #halcon crew had been up for a long time now, and it was beginning to show both in the way they looked and the way they performed. 3ven so, spirits were high, and the anxiety now was about when it would begin, and not whether it would begin at all. The controllers were looking at the data being sent from all the ground radars in the hills around them. The North&eastern region has a interesting geography, with the massive )imalayan peaks to the north and the ,rakan hills in the east, as well as several peaks to the south of ,ssam, making it like a bowl, surrounded by mountains from all sides. ,ssam itself holds the valley between these peaks and the river *rahmaputra flows through this valley in its downward !ourney to the sea. 0t meant that there were walls on nearly all sides of the region, and the military advantage it held was a double&edged sword. -rom an air war standpoint, these hills meant that the side holding them could indeed use to shield his movements from the other side, but it also meant that the other side could sneak up on you because of the restricted line of sight, unless you had peepholes in the walls, that is. These were the radars that had been deployed on the western slopes of the hills in Myanmar, and similar positions in the north. 0t was however, easier in the north than the east, primarily because in the east, these hills were followed by plains and that improved the view. 0n the north, the hills lead to more hills and so on, so it was a losing scenario any way you looked at it. There were massive electronic holes in the north that needed to be plugged by airborne radar only, because ground radars simply could not do the !ob, unless deployed in large numbers, and numbers was a luxury the 0,- did not have at this time. 0t was planned therefore, that the 0,-5s homegrown ,3/ aircrafts would be deployed closer to the border in the north and none deployed in the east, where the ground radars would work wonderfully. They would transfer their data to the #halcon ,/,7% who would fly over ,ssam only, being much more valuable in relative terms than the ,3/ aircrafts. /hile this included risk to the concerned ,3/ aircraft and its crew, it had to be done. There was no choice in the matter. ,t the moment, that ,3/ aircraft had !ust taken off from :alaikunda and was flying into the region via west *engal and %ikkim. The #halcon was flying in a loop extending 3ast&/est over ,ssam. 0t was escorted by three %2&

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+(M:0s instead being supported by an 06&;C tanker further to the south and west. The 0%RN commander was inside the cockpit to talk to the flight crew. "utside the blue sky was visible and there were no clouds worth speaking of. #erfect day for flying, and the #halcon pilot, a /ing 7ommander, realiAed that he probably wasn5t the only one to have commented on that aspect. 3xcept for the high speed of his heartbeat, he had no indication whatsoever that the same blue skies he saw outside his aircraft were going to host the most intensive and deadly air combat battles in more than a century of flight. The thoughts of the 0%RN commander were not spoken but they still kept coming back to him. 0 might not make it out of this alive...what if the 7hinese have anti&radiation missiles that could reach usI /hat thenI /e are !ust a big !uicy target for them with no defensive capability. *ut at least we have the sukhois with us now, to protect us. /hat about that ,3/ aircraft flying right next to the 7hinese borderI /hat is that crew thinking about the threat to themI 0f the 7hinese launch an ,lpha&strike on that flight and its escorts, what will be the reaction time before our own heavy fighters can engage the threatI /ill the 7hinese be able to engage that flight and its three escorts before we can reach to helpI 0t5s my responsibility to take care nothing happens to them, but the enemy5s not a fool either, is heI NoH0 have to improve their security somehow. 0 can probablyH the thoughts were interrupted by a shout from the controllers in the back. 0nbound, inboundL 0 have a lot of fast moving inbounds heading towards radar station echo and the 7+0 centre in Myanmar. These can5t be aircrafts damn itHshitL /e got inbound cruise missilesL %eem to be heading towards our radar sites in eastern :ohima hills. 0 don5t know how they might have located theH? the controller was interrupted by a heavy voice, who realised that the young controller was probably scared. )ell, who isn5tI the commander thought. 9oesn5t matter how they found it damn itL Not now anyway. $et a warning out to everybody. /arn that radar crew to bug the hell out of there, nowL %cramble all fighters now. Tell them to get in the air and stay there, for god5s sake. /e don5t know how many strikes we can expect on our bases. /hat5s the range from point to impact for the inboundsI? the 0%RN commander shouted over the intercom to all controllers who immediately started shouting scramble orders for their respective flights. ictor "ne was again the controller in charge of the area about to be hit. Two hundred and seventy five kilometres and closing fast, sir.? ,nd the number of inbound missilesI? the commander asked next. Thirty six total. They expect many to be shot down by our spyder missiles, 0 think. They have computed for that in their calculations.? 9ear godL Thirty&six missiles to take out one bloody radar siteI *ut that5s the way it the 7hinese have always fought, isn5t itI Numbers, always bloody numbers.? The commander switched fre1uencies and spoke again, this time his voice cold and professional. Tell the 3,7 commander that his radar net for the Myanmar theatre of operations is about to go permanently offlineH? )066% T" T)3 3,%T "- :")0M, N,$,6,N9, 0N90, ''@@ )R% T)2R%9,G The missiles were several minutes out now. The mobile radar system located in the hills of kohima had three main locations where the radars themselves were based and a central command and control centre at a fourth location. There were several other nodes for communication located throughout and this count did not include the locations for the %pyder missile systems deployed nearby in the same hills. 0n all, there were over a doAen targets that the 7hinese had marked out to be eliminated in order to crush the 0ndian anti&air system in the Nagaland hills. 0n doing so, they would also clear the path for their main strike composed of literally several doAen fighters and another two doAen bombers that was tasked with the destruction of all concentration points for 000 7orps units assembling to enter Myanmar.

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The 7hinese had ensured that each of the doAen or so targets located by their satellites !ust an hour earlier were to ht by three missiles each. This would ensure that at least one missile would get through to all the targets in the event that the 0ndian %pyder systems proved as deadly as their intelligence suggested it was. The idea was that if a target is saturated with enough missiles, even the most potent of anti&missile systems having a hundred percent chance of hit would not have barely enough time to track, engage and destroy all targets. They would either run out of missiles or destroy maybe several missiles before the remaining missiles fell upon them. "ne thing that the 0ndians had at the moment was a very clear idea of what was happening. The radars were functioning properly, and they showed that the missile&inbound&vectors were changing slightly, as each missile headed for its own target. The missile themselves were unknown to the 0ndian armed forces in terms of performance and range. 0t was possible that these were the new )N&'E.E+ series missiles having minimum range of around six hundred kilometres. 0f so, it confirmed the thoughts of all people taking the data from these radars that the missiles had been launched from within china itself, possibly in the Gunnan province, as against an earlier theory that they had been fired from within Myanmar on the basis of range of al previously known 7hinese cruise missiles. ,nd if this was indeed the case, this was unfortunately, the first public demonstration of this missile. Therefore, the one thing that the 90, was looking for was all available intelligence on these missiles. ,s a result, the radars continued to track the inbound missiles as they headed towards them. 0n any case, mobile though they were, it was physically impossible to move any of these systems within a span of a few minutes. %o the obvious other alternative was to keep them operating and hand over as much tracking data that could be transmitted to the missile crews waiting to engage the missiles. That being said, it was physically impossible to replicate the mental strength of the crews concerned who volunteered to stay and try and eliminate the massive missile threat descending upon them rather than run away as fast as possible even when told to do so. Their country needed all available information from them right then, and also needed them to fight it out and try to survive along with their e1uipment and systems, and this they did in the highest traditions. /hen the missiles passed over %ingkaling )kamti and headed west towards the border which was now an even doAen kilometres away, the ground control station for Radar site 3cho shut down voice communications with ictor "ne and established contact with their local %pyder systems crews via )- systems. The radar plots however, continued to be transmitted via secure data links to ictor "ne and then on to 3,7 )< where all people were staring at the screens silently as they prayed for the radar and missile crews sitting in the hills in Nagaland. The first 0ndian %,M leapt out of the Tatra truck launcher in front of a massive cloud of dust and smoke and streaked across the blue sky at its target beyond visual range. %everal officers were standing outside with their binoculars to try and spot the flash from the impact of the two missiles. %everal other thin grey streaks leapt off the other hills and also headed east on their tra!ectories as all the %pyder missile systems began engaging their targets. The first volley was of six missiles. The radar plots showed the outbound %,Ms and the inbound cruise missiles as they headed for each other. The closure rate between them was massive and within seconds the first blips on the screen merged, broke into several smaller blips and disappeared from the screens. "utside, the first flashes were spotted visually on the binoculars against the bright blue background. 0n all there were five flashes. %econds later, another volley of six missiles reached out into the sky and travelled east before they too arced down and hit most of their targets that were now going into terminal mode. -our more flashes were spotted, this time without binoculars. Now the things became chaotic. ,nother volley of six missiles destroyed another four cruise missiles before the missiles reached their targets. 0n all, thirteen cruise missiles had been eliminated when the first leakers went overhead and started diving into the targets. The final

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volley claimed another two missiles that were the rearmost in the group of inbound missiles and that was that. 0n all, it had been impossible to stop all the missiles at any rate. The range of the %pyder systems was too small to begin any engagements early on and as far away as possible, and as a result, the tie of engagement had been too small for any useful engagement to take place. The 7hinese had launched too many missiles in any case, and it was debatable as to whether any system could have done the !ob one hundred percent, but even so, the %pyder systems had performed their use as best they could, and indeed, half of the inbound missiles were no more. The rest hit their targets as programmed to do so. 3ven though the 7hinese had taken care to allocate three missiles to each target, the %pyder system had messed up their plans by shooting down all three missiles designated for a particular target and leaving another set untouched. This meant that while the 7hinese wanted a kill on all targets, they now had overkill on some and no kill on another. "ne of the overkill targets was a radar site located on a hilltop near a place called %aramati, and that hilltop took the full brunt of three missiles targeted. The ground shook as one by one the three missiles hit the hilltop with thousand pound warhead and the initial orange yellow explosion was centred right where the radar was located before a cloud of dust and smoke covered it up. The cloud had barely gone up when the second and he third missiles hit the same location again and again, and the missive hilltop cloud of dust and smoke against a blue background now resembled an exploding volcano. Then the ground shook once again as other targets were hit. The shockwaves were travelling through the hills and by the time command centre of the radar network took a hit from one of the two missiles targeted on it, the hill tops of Nagaland were nothing more than several large pillars of smoke and huge clouds of dust visible to at all nearby villages. #eople rushed out when the ground shook with the explosions, and were now staring at the hills covered with black smoke and dust as they wondered what had happened to their once beautiful green hilltops. The system worked until the last. ,ll radars were transmitting their data to the #halcon ,/,7% via data links until they were knocked out and went offline. /hen the final missile hit the base holding the mobile command centre, the last data transfer from base 3cho ceased transmissions and the entire radar network for the Myanmar theatre was shut down. /ith that all screens taking the data from radar network 3cho went blank throughout the eastern air command. The ,ir defence for the northeast against the expected massive #6,,- alpha&strike was now severely compromised. 90R37T"R,T3 "- M060T,RG "#3R,T0"N% ,RMG )< N3/ 936)0 '.J@ )R% T)2R%9,G The first attack by the 7hinese had been mostly successful, and had resulted in the first 0ndian casualties of the war. *ut the war wasn5t over yet. Not by a long shot. 0t was clear that the 7hinese missile strike against the 0ndian radars was not the precursor before the main attack as many had expected it would be. ,s more and more time passed it had become clear that the attack was a retaliatory one and an escalation no doubt, but it was still only retribution for shooting down the 7hinese warplanes earlier in the day. ,nd there the 7hinese had stopped. There were no more attacks on any other 0ndian installation. 0t was now clear that they were looking to see how and when the 0ndians would respond, if at all they would, as the 7hinese intelligence was now apparently telling their comrades in arms in *ei!ing. 0t also made perfect sense from the 7hinese point of view. *y restricting their initial strike to this first one, they could theoretically get away with it in front of the world by saying things like8 4it was a strike to prevent the 0,- from bombing civilians in Myanmar and causing bloodshed5 to 4the 0ndians provoked us, but hey, we are the good guys. /e !ust attacked enough to stop them from

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attacking our socialist comrades again5. 0n addition, waiting for a response from the 0ndians meant that if the 0ndians did respond, it would be seen as an all out escalation and then the 7hinese would have all possible excuses to leap at the 0ndians. 0f they didn5t respond, that is if the politicians in New 9elhi could not summon the courage to strike back and escalate the conflict all out, well, then both sides revert to stalemate conditions with the additional losses that the 0ndian air force loses incurred when their radars were struck and destroyed along with doAens of its officers and men. ,nd the reverse of the same e1uation wasn5t true. The 0ndians were the ones who had been struck, but if they responded, the world would hold them responsible for escalating the war further and not taking the 7hinese offer to stop the 4provocations5. ,nd if New 9elhi didn5t respond, they would bear the wrath of a billion of their countrymen for not acting to avenge their soldiers who had been killed in the hills of :ohima. ,s a result, the military responses were really something that had by now taken a life and process of its own. ,nd the death of those 0ndian servicemen was now the catalyst that would accelerate these military operations on the 0ndian side in terms of aggressiveness and determination. The bottom line was that the war was now unstoppable, and the thought that this process was now unstoppable was a result of the simplest of logic to a politician when to a simple man it could be the most baffling of processes. 2nfortunately for the 9efense Minister, it all made sense to him as well and the inherent analogy with a politician didn5t make his day any better. Not that the 7hinese wanted my day to get any better in the first placeHthe 9efense minister thought as he went through the report in front of him detailing the first cruise missile strike to take place in active operations in the subcontinent. The room he was sitting in was again the same room that he had sat in the morning. The people were familiar too, with the 7,% and the 7",% sitting in front of him along with their usual ad!utants who were standing. The only person not sitting was the 7N%, but he would be called soon to present his report on the 0ndian naval deployments in the *ay of *engal. The defense minister put down his glasses and the report on the table in front of him before speaking to his audience. There were no preliminaries this time. /hat 0 want to know is how did these bastards come to know about our radar deployments in the hills of :ohimaI? the 7,% answered his 1uestion with another. 0n normal conditions, it couldn5t have bee too hard, sir. 0f the radars were operating for sufficient time, their electronic signature could easily be detected by their 3/ aircrafts that our #halcon ,/,7% detected some time back, flying over northeastern Myanmar. "nce detected, they could have directed their satellites to look at the specific area and locate the individual targets there, and then given their coordinates to the missile launch centers. *ut that5s not the point here. ,ccording to all our intelligence, the #6,,- chain of command is not so streamlined so as to permit very rapid responses in fluid situations. They prefer to steamroller their way forward. KTherefore, normally, it would take them hours after the radars would start operating before their attacks could materialiAe, and by then my men would have changed the locations of the radars. :eep in mind they are mobile radars. *ut it didn5t happen. Thirty minutes after my first radar switched in, 0 had this whole shitload of cruise missiles falling on them. They didn5t have a chance. ,ll evidence suggests that the 7hinese missile were armed, ready and deployed. %o, we have to consider two things here. "ne, either we have greatly underestimated the 7hinese 7+0 capabilities and should then adapt, or two, the 7hinese had prior information of the deployment of the radars in the hills and their rough locations. %ir, 0 hate to say this, but 0 think we have a mole in our chain of command. 3ither that or the 7hinese are getting information from the Nagaland insurgents or some other communist rebel group that has a bone to pick with us. 0H? the 7,% was cut off by the 7",%. This may be true. /e have indeed got reason to believe that the insurgents are helping the 7hinese. 0t is possible that the 7hinese may have offered them some reward in return for helping

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them beat us in the N3. 0f that is indeed the case, we may have some insurgents sitting in the hills with binoculars trying to keep an eye on our movements. /e are facing an attack from all sides in that region. 0 may have to recall other units from the other regional commands to help me fight all of these enemies.? The 7",% concluded. 9amn it. 9amn those treacherous bastards. They would rather assist the 7hinese than !ust lay 1uiet and neutral. That does it. They are not getting away with this treachery. $eneral, you may proceed with your deployments. $et everything you need into the region from wherever you want, but 0 want those damned insurgents neutraliAed by all means necessary. ,nd what is the air force planningI? the defense minister asked the 7,%. "n the ground, nothing. 0f the enemy indeed has such intelligence gathering capabilities, 0 am not putting anything on the ground again for some time. 0 am still waiting for the first definitive report on the situation at my radar stations in :ohima. ,fter that comes through, 0 am pulling all my men back from those exposed locations. 0 have an ,3/ aircraft moving into the region to fill the gaps in the radar net. That cannot be touched by missiles, so its safe. ,ll my fighters have pulled into the air and are going to stay there for some time. ,s far as my bases are concerned, they are going to be hollow targets for the enemy to waste their missiles on. 0 have also rushed every available tanker aircraft to the region to help those aircraft in the air to stay aloft. Then we wait for the situation to develop further before taking any other action. The orders for those, sir, must come from you.? 0ndeed, ,7M *hosale. GesH$eneral %inha, 0 had spoken to the #M on your earlier re1uest for "peration N"RT)&%/0#3 and "peration 3,%T&%/0#3. 0 have the go ahead for those operations now.? The 9efense Minister said, smiling. That caused the 7,% to raise his eyebrows in surprise before he posed the obvious next 1uestion seconds later. "ne or bothI? "ne. N"RT)&%/0#3 only. $ive the follow on orders. )ow long before you are ready to executeI? the 9ef&min asked, en!oying himself. The response was immediate. /ithin fifteen minutes. 0 can give the orders now.? The 7,% answered and got a nod in return before he picked up the phone on the table in front of him. -ifteen minutes later, the first 6auncher truck moving through the roads in ,runachal #radesh pulled off the road into a clearing near it and came to a stop. 3ven before the dust had settled, the triple launcher tubes started moving from the horiAontal position upwards. 0n the region nearby, three other trucks did the same. %oon, the huge vertical tubes were locked in position and the dust settled around the trucks as all activity ceased. The four trucks were now sitting 1uietly with their launchers ready. "#3R,T0"N N"RT)&%/0#3 %7"#3 ,N9 "*B37T0 3% "peration N"RT)&%/0#3 was an ad!unct to the set of operations under the code name of 3,%T&%/0#3 designed with the simple and primary ob!ective of dismantling the complete 7ommand, 7ontrol, 7ommunications and 0ntelligence capabilities of the 7hinese assistance program to the rebels in Myanmar. *ut it was more than !ust an ad!unct. 0t was a complete set in itself. 3ssentially, the only commonality shared by this plan with the others was in the method of its execution. "peration 3,%T&%/0#3 was ambitious in its aims by all standards. -urther, the target themselves were numerous. ,nd it had only increased since the last few days. The 7hinese assistance program in Myanmar was gathering momentum in addition to building up to massive proportions. There were several aspects to the program. The first was that of logistics. The 7hinese were bringing in massive amounts of war supplies into Myanmar via the Gunnan

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province. 6arge number of the 7hinese version of the ,N&'.s and a doAen 06&;>s were bringing in arms, ammunition, food and medical supplies for the rebels in Myanmar. , hub and spoke system was in place and smaller transports were going from the main logistical nodes to the smaller dispersal airstrips throughout Myanmar. This needed to be shut down. The main targets for this case were the central 7hinese airbases in the Gunnan province. %ince an aircraft strike was not possible, missiles were the solution. )ere also, the *rahmos could not be used because of range limitations. The last choice therefore was a strike by ballistic missiles, but which instead was a very sensitive decision that New 9elhi had not made as yet. ,s a result the planners at the 9$M" were scrambling to find alternate methods of destroying these targets with no luck so far. %econd, the 7hinese were supplying a lot of electronic intelligence to the rebels, and that needed shutting down too. This involved the destruction of several mobile radar stations in Myanmar as also the destruction of any 360NTE%0$0NT aircraft that was within range of the %2&+(M:0s. This was ob!ective number two. Third, the 7hinese 7+0 centres in the Gunnan as well as in Myanmar were to be levelled to the ground. This would render the 7hinese chain of command broken and disoriented and &allow the 0ndian army to pile across the indo&myanmar border without serious opposition. These target were within range of the *rahmos missiles and the respective targets had been located and marked, with the missiles deployed in the !ungles of Nagaland and awaiting launch orders a few hours before the 0ndian army5s @;T) Mountain 9ivision crossed over into Myanmar. That5s where the scope 3,%T&%/0#3 ended and that of N"RT)&%/0#3 began. The one aspect worrying the 0ndian planners at the moment was that once the main #6,,- alpha strike began, the 0,- would 1uite literally fighting for its survival in the air for the first several hours. 9uring this time, it would be unable to provide any 7,% sorties against the rebels in Myanmar or anywhere for that matter. There was a dimension of warfare that could upset the 0ndian army5s plans during that time8 airborne assault. The ideal 7hinese or indeed any military airborne assault would follow close on the heels of the main aerial strike by fighter&bombers and air&superiority aircrafts. 3specially if the enemy air force could be overwhelmed by the scope and magnitude of the attack. 9uring this time, the enemy air force would be struggling to hold control of the skies and that would allow the lumbering transports to #ara drop a larger number of airborne troops and their e1uipment behind the enemy lines before their transports could come under any threat. 0ndeed, if the friendly aircrafts had secured air supremacy over the concerned airspace, the airdrop could continue without any interference. 0f they had not secured air supremacy, they would instead buy time for the airborne troops to deploy themselves. The plan was idealiAed and didn5t take into consideration a lot of parameters, but it could still work, provided luck was on the side executing the attack, and the 7hinese had every intention of following up their alpha strike with an attack of this kind. 90#,7 had recently submitted a set of satellite imagery to the 0,- and the 0ndian army showing the two&doAen odd 06&;> aircraft parked on a massive flight line on a military airfield about two hundred and eighty kilometres inside 7hinese territory. ,lso visible in the photographs were the hundreds of men in full combat gear milling bout while several doAen #6, vehicles were being laagered near the aircrafts. They had given the game away for the 7hinese. The vehicles were the new model airborne infantry support vehicles intended to be dropped along with airborne troops to give them some modicum of armoured firepower. , few of the photographs even showed the vehicles being loaded individually onto the rear ramps of the 06&;>s. it was obvious that an airborne invasion was being planned. The only mistake made by the 7hinese was the close proximity of their staging airfield from the border. 0ndeed, their choice might have been made keeping logistics in mind, as also the flight time re1uired to support those airborne infantry

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deployed in enemy territory. )owever, the location also made the 7hinese airbase vulnerable to attacks. 0t seemed obvious therefore, that they considered that the 0ndian armed forces would to strike back in china itself, not likely restricting itself to attacks against 7hinese targets in Myanmar where already preparations to survive such an attack were being made. The 0ndian army had a rude surprise in store for the proud 7hinese airborne troops.

T)3 )0M,6,G,N -""T)066% ,R2N,7),6 #R,93%), 0N90, '+.( )R% T)2R%9,G The first *rahmos missile leaped out of its transportation and 6aunch 7anister MT67N on top of a massive ball of orange&yellow cloud of gases and then continued to move upwards as the ball of gases turned into a pillar behind the rapidly accelerating missile. %oon the missile itself was not visible, and the officer of the missile regiment followed the tra!ectory only by the trail of gases streaking behind it and visible in a bright blue afternoon sky. Three more trails of smoke were visible from the mountaintops. *efore the first trail had even dispersed, another set of missiles leaped upwards and went towards its target. 0t had only been seconds before the first missile had been launched, and yet it seemed like an hour. The missiles were being fired in a %alvo -iring mode, and the necessary gap between the missile launches was to avoid friendly missile fratricide by a minimum of time possible. The third missile fired from its T67 along with three others in the hills and the even before the cloud of dust and smoke had cleared, the three empty launcher tubes were being lowered into the horiAontal position onto the bed of the Tatra 6and mobile launcher truck. N"RT)&%/0#3 phase&0 was now in motion as the twelve *rahmos missiles screeched towards their targets at continuously increasing speed until they broke the sonic barrier inside china for the first time. The location of the missile launches was now sure to be compromised, as the tra!ectory of the cruise missile told that tale. The 7hinese were sure to have radars tracking the missiles in their initial phase as they went vertically up before turning north. 0t was one of the drawbacks of cruise missiles in the mountains. They had to go vertical enough for them to clear the hills before going into the mid&course and then the terminal phases. 0t was during the latter two stages when the 7hinese would lose track of the inbound missiles as they went to altitudes of '(&'@m using terrain following navigation systems. The 7hinese therefore would have no idea as to what target was being attacked, thus precluding any chance of missile interception, detection or even target dispersal. The targets would therefore be hit hard and hit fast. The only thing then remaining for the 7hinese to do would be to attack the 0ndian launching vehicles and units, and they had the information for that already in their hands. *ut the 0ndians were not foolish either. ,s soon as the T67s had retracted to their horiAontal positions and locked there, the trucks pulled out of their locations in the )imalayan foothills. Their routes had already been decided and the drivers drove as fast as they could because they were intelligent enough to know that the enemy was coming. The trucks pulled back onto the roads they had left only minutes earlier and the drove southwards. Twenty kilometres down they again pulled off the main road and drove towards another set of Tatra trucks parked under protective camouflage. These were the loading vehicles having several loaded T67s and the cranes needed to load them onto the launcher trucks. The next set of *rahmos missiles were loaded and the launchers again packed up to move out, after of course,

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the *attle&9amage&,ssessment or *9,, pending the end of phase&0. *ut that didn5t stop the procedures for phase&00. ,fter the loading was complete, the loader trucks went further south to their next location as the current clearing then turned into the phase&00 launch site for the launcher vehicles. The 7hinese airborne troops had no idea what was descending upon them as there was no sound because the missile was supersonic, no radar warning of attack and Aero visual sighting for something flying in such a speed profile at tree top altitude. ,s a result, the #6,,- 06&;>s and most of the 7hinese airborne troops were parked in the open on the main tarmac when the missiles began their final dive into the targets. There was no warning. PLAAF ADVANCED STA"IN" AREA
(1ST AIRBORNE DIVISION, 1'TH ARMY NORTH EAST OF LHASA, NORTH OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH 1#*( HRS THURSDAY The airfield was extremely busy as #6, troops milled about in preparation fro the main attack about to take place in a few hours. Their pilot comrades were at the airfield too. The #6,,- heavy transport fleet was showing its massive presence at the airfield in support of the 7hinese airborne divisions. -ully a doAen 06& ;>s were present at the airfield, along with five G&= medium transports. ,lso present were a doAen of the %2&.; aircrafts designated as the close escorts for the lumbering transports as they made their way towards 0ndia. 0n addition, one G&C ,/,7% had landed half an hour ago to refuel and was present at the far end of the runway where it was being supported by several fuel trucks and security personnel. The ,T7 was one very busy building, more so after receiving a warning from one of the mobile observation posts near the border about several intermittent contacts close to the border. *ut that was several minutes ago, and they hadn5t received anything further after the initial warning. %till, the base commander was no fool. ,s soon as he had heard the details of the warning, he had ordered the G&C ,/,7% to take to the air immediately, and that aircraft had started to turn its propellers at the end of the runway. The #6,,commander had then thought about sounding the alarm when one of the lookouts inside the ,T7 shouted a warning. )eads turned to face the direction into which the lookout was pointing. %everal binoculars were pointed from the ,T7 towards the hills. -or several crucial seconds nobody saw anythingHand then twelve black spots emerged against the bright blue sky. That was when the panicked shouts and warnings began. The 7hinese ,T7 officers detected the *rahmos missiles from their posts at the very last minute as the missiles came over the hills and into the plains surrounding the airfield against the blue sky. *ut by then it was far too late. *efore the first officer could signal any sort of warning the first *rahmos dived into the ,T7 building and hit it with such tremendous kinetic energy that the building was literally blown to smithereens, throwing the massive amounts of dust, smoke and debris all around the airfield even as everybody present nearby were thrown off their feet by the explosions. %econds later the second missile bore down on the airfield, this time aiming towards one of the hangers being used as a barracks for the 7hinese airborne troops. The speed of the missile was such that by the time the warhead explosion began to have any effect, the missile had already penetrated through the weak roof of the hanger and entered the interiors where the massive explosion of the missile warhead destroyed the hanger inside out, amidst another massive ball of fire that mushroomed into the sky. Then things started moving very 1uickly. The third and the fourth missiles dove into the parked 06&;>s that had already skidded while stationary due to the massive force of the explosions nearby. "ne 0l&;> took a direct hit from the missile that destroyed that aircraft and severely damaged two others on each side, and threw several 7hinese P*9(+ ,- s that were parked nearby, flying into the air and falling upside down. ,nother missile exploded above the other end of the tarmac using a fuel air explosive warhead that released enough pressure to literally flatten several 0l&;>s in a crushing blast as well as leaving several hangers on fire. Two of the remaining missiles were programmed to hit some specific coordinates that were incidentally, the centre of the main runway and the accompanying taxiway with direct hit warheads, and the explosion there was not so much fire and smoke as much as dust and huge chunks of concrete being thrown into the air.

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The final two missiles flew through the massive cloud of dust and thick black smoke covering the entire space of the airfield and hit the radar station on top of a hill nearby and the #6,,- base&ops centre building that was also left shattered. 0t was all over in one extremely long minute. "verall, as the massive dust cloud over the airfield cleared, the damage became clear. The ,T7 building was burning furiously with massive flames reaching for the sky with a deafening roar. The two main hangers that were being used by the 7hinese airborne troops as a barracks was totally destroyed, with the burning pieces of wreckage strewn around the airfield. The main runway intersection was cratered with a massive hole in the center, and the cracks in the runway concrete around the crater meant that those tiles would have to be replaced as well, making the !ob of repairing the airfield more than !ust a fill&up operation. "ne 06& ;> front section was thirty meters away from where the rest of the aircraft was, and five other aircrafts were burning on the tarmac. Three others had whole wings missing and the undercarriage collapsed. %everal ,- s were upside down on their turrets while a doAen others were burning furiously. The G&C ,/,7% had one engine hit by shrapnel and was burning even as the crew was !umping out of the cockpit as fire&fighting vehicles moved in to douse the flame with foam. The 06% e1uipment was doAens of meters away from where it should have been, covered in debris and the main hilltop that housed the mobile radar vehicles was covered in a massive black pillar of smoke. The only aircrafts totally untouched by the attack were the %2&.;s parked at the extreme end of the tarmac and in their ),%s, and the G&=s, who miraculously escaped severe damage despite being parked next to the doomed 06&;>s. The pilots of the %2&.;s watched in horror as the aircrafts they were supposed to escort and protect lay broken and burning on the airfield in front of them. There was no way of knowing the casualties of the attack, but it was soon obvious to the survivors that there were a lot fewer people running around with their shiny new rifles and e1uipment than there were only minutes ago. The two main hangers that were hit housed several whole companies of infantry, none of whom were anywhere to be seen anymore, and that didn5t count the massive number of casualties taken by the 7hinese when the fuel air explosion had hit the tarmac. "verall the damage was significantly extensive. ,nd it only got worse. The %2&.;s were unharmed but could no longer take off. No more aircrafts could come in, and most of the e1uipment for repair was destroyed. The #6,,- had lost a large number of their 06&;>s and could not afford to stage them close to the area of operations anymore. /ithout the transport capability, the 7hinese airborne assault threat disappeared in the span of under two minutes. Ten minutes later an 0ndian %atellite moved over the area and its cameras took high&resolution photographs of the airfield that was easy to make out thanks to the smoke and dust clouds nearby. The photographs showed the orange&yellow flames in great detail and colour and also showed the two big holes on the runway. *efore long the imagery was sent to 90#,7 where it was processed and analysed. The 90, officers were very pleased with what they saw. N"RT)&%/0#3 #hase&0 was over within half an hour. #hase&00 missile launchers were moving into their final positions in the )imalayan foothills and the first 0ron&hand defence suppression designated Baguars were being loaded with their tools of the trade. The 7hinese would not be allowed to gain a foothold or even a modicum of air&superiority in the region as far as the 0ndian armed forces were concerned. the ob!ective was to disable all #6,,- facilities in the region to prevent them from using them for any air operations. This included hitting radarsF %,Ms, airfields and 7+0 facilities before the full might of the #6,,- could be brought to bear on the 0,-. The mission was simple8 hit hard, hit fast. -ind, attack and eliminate the enemy.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE BUILDIN"

NEW DELHI, INDIA 1&10 HRS THURSDAY The 9efence minister was staring outside his office windows deep in his thoughts. The two other people in the room were the 7,% and 7",% who had the good sense to keep silence. 0t anyway wasn5t the time fro talking. ,ll the talking had !ust finished and the 7",% took the time to put the imagery shots and the analysis report back into his case while the 7,% shared the defence minister5s passion for 1uiet thought. 0t was time for a 1uiet reflection and a mental clarification of what needed to be done further. N"RT)&%/0#3 phase&0 had !ust been completed and the first *9, had already been done by 90#,7. The 7hinese had been dealt a massive blow, and their plans for an airborne assault into Myanmar or 0ndia had been postponed indefinitely. *ut that had been !ust a secondary ob!ective for the 9efence Minister. The

47

political ob!ective of retribution had been achieved. The lives of the hundred odd 0ndian airmen killed in the missile attack on the hills of :ohima had been avenged. ,t a rate of nine to one, according to the first reports by the intelligence sources who had been intercepting the 7hinese communications from the ,R7 aircrafts flying near the border, and even over the border in some of the more clandestine operations since early in the morning. 0t should have been a time to celebrate, but there was hardly a time for that now. The country was officially at war now, and the 7hinese had been dealt their first blow. The initiative had been stolen from the #6,,- and the 0,- had no intention of giving it back. N"RT)&%/0#3 #hase&00 was ready to go, and several strike packages of the 0,- 0ron&hand missions were waiting. There was a slight change in plans for those missions, as the 7,% had discussed earlier in the meeting and got the approval for. ,s both the 7,% and the 7",% mulled over the !obs they had to do, they looked over to the 9efence minister in the first sign of impatience for the two men. Where has this day gone to? The defence minister thought. We started the day with the intention o% hel'ing the loyalists in -yan&ar, and here we are looking o$er how &any /hinese we killed within china by our &issile strikes. +od, it was this $ery &orning when ) had gi$en those orders, and its just lunchti&e now. )t has ha''ened in hal% a day, or hal% a century, de'ending on your $iew. 1istory is re'eating itsel%. We were here be%ore. Both )ndia and china. That was hal% a century be%ore in "#. What had started then is &aking its &ark today. 4i%ty years. And we are again %ighting on the sa&e battle%ields but %or $ery di%%erent 'ur'oses. <egional ,o&inance &y ass. As i% we cant all li$e together. But now that this is ha''ening today it is &y res'onsibility just as it was >rishna -enons to ensure that our %uture generations do not ha$e to deal with the sa&e 'roble&s in their li%eti&e. 1e &ust ha$e sat in this sa&e o%%ice back then. )nter%ering with all a%%airs &ilitarybungling decisions and leading )? /or's to lose thousands o% its &en along with its honour and 'restigean entire nation and its &ilitary hu&iliated because o% one &ans ego and his bosss inco&'etence in all things &ilitary. 5% course he wasnt alone in &aking the decisions during that %iasco, but the res'onsibility sto''ed cold at -enon and =ehrus %ootste's. ) wonder what he was thinking a%ter it was all o$er, and when he &ust ha$e le%t this o%%ice %or the last ti&e. *orrow? +rie%? 5r a con$iction that it wasnt his %ault? )n any case, what had started in that cold winter in !"# was an ani&osity towards /hina that would last generations, and that was the root cause behind todays e$ents. 4i%ty years o% ani&osity had led to this day, at the end o% which both countries were threatening the $ery e:istence o% their citi6ens. >rishna -enon %ailed his res'onsibility, and so here we are today. ) &ust not %ail &ine. The defence minister came out of his reverie and turned to look at the two men staring at him and awaiting his instructions. $entlemen, 0 have to tell you that this war is now officially on, and that after a final meeting with the 7hinese ambassador and our #M, if no solution is reached between the two countries, we are to begin full combat operations against the #eople5s republic of 7hina. That meeting began ten minutes ago. #lan your moves, gentlemen, because 0 am drawing from all my experience with the 7hinese when 0 tell you that there will be no solution reached. %o within a call from the #M that the meeting is closed, 0 want to unleash our might against the 7hinese. $eneral, N"RT)&%/0#3 #hase&00 through will commence immediately after my call to you within the hour. ,7M *hosale, put your aircrafts in the air. 0 want them across the border five minutes after the final handshake between the 7hinese ambassador and the #M.? The defence minister concluded with a determination so far unseen in his character. )e added one final statement that brought the meeting to a close. This thing gets sorted out today.?

DEFENCE IMA"ERY PROCESSIN" AND ANALYSIS CENTRE $DIPAC%

AD UNCT TO THE DEFENCE INTELLI"ENCE A"ENCY $DIA% INDIA 1&1' HRS THURSDAY The military people at 90#,7 had been working around the clock since this crisis had begun several days back, and more imagery of the surrounding region had been taken in the last few days than had been taken in the last year. There were several task forces organiAed around the various specialities and the regions

48

involved. -or example, there was an air force team of officers tasked with the analysis of the imagery of #6,,- airfields and bases. ,nother team from the army artillery 7orps was doing a similar !ob on the #6, artillery positions and so on for other tasking. "ne of the main tasks at the moment was the monitoring of the #6,,- assets in the DiAang province in accordance with the threat of an alpha strike expected at any time now. -urther north and east the <inghai and the Gunnan provinces respectively were also under the scanner. The main priorities at this time were the massive numbers of )&> bombers parked on the tarmac of at least two doAen airfields around the 7hinese mainland. The secondary tasking was the monitoring of the %2&.;s and the %2&+(M:: aircrafts that were now flowing into the region in ever&greater numbers. 90#,7 was simply being overwhelmed with the amount of data coming in and there was simply not enough time to analyse everything. Therefore while the air force team was involved with the sorting of the technical details of the critical bases and e1uipment, another secondary team was involved with !ust the numbers. They checked for example the number of bombers seen on the tarmac and compared those numbers with existing and previous known numbers to evaluate the influx or dispersal of the main bomber threat aligned against 0ndia. "nly when they saw something out of the ordinary or something special did they forward that to the primary team. -or example, the 7hinese G&C ,/,7% that had been damaged and left afire during the attacks of N"RT)& %/0#3 #hase&0 could be seen being repaired on the ground and that imagery was sent to the primary team to evaluate the time before that aircraft was repaired. ,nother aspect was the movement of the 7hinese %& +(( systems into the region that was also being followed closely in anticipation of the 0,- 0ron&)and missions about to be launched. 0n addition, the targets for N"RT)&%/0#3 #hase&00 were being finaliAed. #hase&00 would hit the #6, and #6,,- 7+0 centres and radar facilities throughout DiAang province. 3,%T& %/0#3 had been cancelled and the missiles allocated for those operations had been redirected to the newly added phase&000, 0 and for N"RT)&%/0#3. The targets for those had been located on the maps via this imagery as well. 9uring the final of the photographs during this pass of the satellite would be of the #6,,- bomber fleet based at the $olmud airbase in the <inghai province. The satellite5s cameras Aoomed in to the base and the real&time imagery being downloaded to 90#,7 was of high resolution and colour. 7loud cover was moderate and it was the most frustrating thing to force yourself to look through the holes in those clouds to try and find your ob!ective even when you knew it was there. The massive '>((( feet runway could be easily spotted as a reference mark when trying to locate the runway, along with it5s main tarmac. The main tarmac was a huge one in comparison to the other bases in the region and along with the infrastructure at the base was the reason why the base had been selected for housing a third of the #6,,- )&> bomber fleet. -or the last two days the )&>s had been neatly lined up on the main tarmac as they were prepared for war. %everal smaller delta wing aircrafts had also been located here since yesterday. That was of course when the clouds had been non&existent and the imagery had been clear and revealing. That was not the case today, but the experience gained for this base from the last two days meant that the analysts knew exactly what to look for. ,t the moment several officers were sitting in the main operations centre for 90#,7 where all the action was. 0t was here that the real&time imagery was being downloaded on a giant screen in front of the consoles. 0n effect it was similar to a movie theatre, except the video on the screen was live and in colour. The Ma!or $eneral in charge of 90#,7 was standing alongside a $roup 7aptain of the 0,- as the !unior officers sat at the controls in front of them. "kay sir, the clouds are giving way. /e are starting to see the base nowH? one of the console operators said to no&one in particular, and was commenting for everyone who didn5t have the liberty of looking up from their !obs at the moment. That5s the main tarmac, andHoh shitL? the officer commented and then checked something before speaking again8 %ir, 0H? the officer was interrupted by the $roup 7aptain who started to pick up the phone receiver. GesH0 see it. 0ssue the alert to everybody.? The air force officer was as cool and professional as had ever been. The army general was not so sure. ,fter the air force officer put down the phone, issuing a priority&, warning to everybody in the 3astern ,ir command, both him and the army Ma!or $eneral left the room in a brisk space. They both had work to do.

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They left behind a screen showing the live imagery of a completely empty tarmac at $olmud airbase. The )& >s were not on the ground anymore.

B),0, COMINT AIRCRAFT OF THE ARC

CHARBATIA, ORISSA, INDIA 1&1' HRS THURSDAY The grey painted *&;(; took off from the main runway at 7harbatia and gently turned northwards as it gained altitude and retracted its undercarriage. , doAen different radars were tracking the aircraft, and none knew who it was other its identification call sign on the radar, and the friendly 0--, of course. They weren5t supposed to know either, but had been informed of a flight from 7harbatia lest they call in fighters to shoot it down. ,s the *&;(; started gaining altitude, several long&range radars in the north started tracking the aircraft as it came over the horiAon for the radar beams. "nly one other aircraft crew knew of this aircraft5s flight and mission, and they would be the ones coordinating its move through the airspace. They were also the ones who would come to its rescue if it got into trouble. This aircraft was a 7"M0NT version of the standard *oeing airliner, ac1uired by the ,R7 decades ago. The airframe was nearing the end of its life but the electronics packed inside was not. ,ll of the e1uipment was 0ndian, and that meant that upgrading those was never a problem. The same could not be said for the airframe. The aircraft being ,merican in origin, the logistics for the aircraft had always been dependent on the status of diplomatic relations with the 2nited %tates and that had caused a lot of headaches for the ,R7 maintenance crews over the years. That had led to a search for different spare part source. The search had ended with a clandestine deal with 0ran over a decade ago. 0ran had been in a similar situation for enough time after the %hah was removed from power to be able to overcome the maintenance problems of its ,merican purchased aerial refuelling tanker fleet based on the same aircraft body as the ,R7 aircrafts, and the deal had seen the first production of components for the 0ndian *&;(;s within 0ndia itself, and that had led to the *&;(; fleet coming back to flying status long before the 0ndo&,merican diplomatic relationships had taken a turn for the better in the new century, so that the aircraft had avoided obsolescence far longer than most had predicted, and all the money and effort spent on the aircrafts had proven their worth time and again during the last decade, with countless clandestine intelligence gathering missions being flown inside 7hinese airspace. This time was a first, however, as none of the previous missions had taken place during wartime. Now the risks were higher, but so were the rewards. The aircraft was full of passive and active electronic e1uipment and there were a doAen crewmen sitting in the rear of the aircraft in front of their consoles trying to garner the entire 3/ picture in the region even as the pilots were making a transit to the north. 0n order to conduct a practice run of sorts, the aircraft took a small change in bearing to the east and turned towards the *angladeshi border. %oon enough the computer screens in front of the operators lighted up to reveal large amounts of information about the *angladeshi picket fence radars at the border with 0ndia. 0t wasn5t much of a drill for the crew but it did wake the sleepy ones among them and set the mood for the mission. -urther north, the pilot diverted towards the west when over northern parts of /est&*engal. That took the aircraft towards *areilly. The snow capped brown mountain peaks of the )imalayas were visible to the pilots from the cockpit even from this distance. That first line of the mountains north of the plains of northern 0ndia was the rough border for Nepal and east of it the 0ndian Territory continued northwards into %ikkim. More radars were detected now, all of them 0ndian, but showing different 0-- re1uirements. These were the 0ndian donated radars given to the Nepalese to monitor their borders, and they were doing the !ob properly. The *&;(; was still a couple hundred kilometres short of the border, and the Nepalese radars were still a good deal inside their borders so that the coverage on their radars was at best intermittent and in worst cases, blind. %oon the aircraft was flying over *areilly where the local *ase 9efence Pone began tracking the unmarked aircraft and started locking on it for practice. 0t was especially unnerving fro the crew on board since at the level of secrecy they were operating, that *9P commander might not know their allegiance. 0t was time to take another diversion. This one took the aircraft north again, this time towards Tibet. They were now entering the aerial battlefield. They were also entering the aerial coverage of the #halcon ,/,7% 4 ictor Three5, who was flying over New 9elhi and whose responsibility was the air defence of the northern 0ndian plains. ictor three didn5t bother hailing the aircraft until it was fifty kilometres south of the Tibet. Then the predetermined call was made to the aircraft. The call was the final transmission given to the aircraft before it started its mission and was essentially a final 4$o5 order for which the *&;(; pilot didn5t have to respond. ,fter that the *&;(; was on its own, and although it would receive all available intelligence on the aerial situation from ictor three, it would

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be flying alone and without cover. 0t was no surprise that the entire crew was composed of volunteers from the ,R7. That did not preclude the fact most of this crew was highly experienced in these operations and had been doing it for years. Most had retired from active duty simply to !oin the ,R7 and make a difference. -or all the insults directed at the ,R7 over the years for not delivering, it was still doing one of the most dangerous operations in the country. The only good news was that it was wartime now, and so they were now active parts of the air force, and therefore legit?, as the crews called it. ,s a result, at the very least they could expect that the government would acknowledge their efforts, which was more than what they could expect during peacetime, when their missions? simply did not exist on paper, and for which there were no congratulations. North of *areilly, the aircraft moved parallel to the western border of Nepal. The massive snow capped )imalayas were now fully visible, and the massive peak known as Nanda 9evi was visible, being the highest peak around, at .@>(( feet. 0t was snow&capped throughout the year and was high enough that even when the aircraft passed near it, and by near it meant twenty :ilometres, with the peak falling on its right hand side, it seemed as if it was closer than a kilometre. The beauty of the peaks was ma!estic, and the crew took the time relishing its beauty, as it was also the last thing truly 0ndian before they crossed the border into Tibet. 0t was also the last region where they would continue to be tracked by 0ndian radars. ,fter that the )imalayan peaks would ensure that radar contact with friendly forces was at a minimum. The pilot looked at the mission commander who had come to the cockpit to see the beautiful peaks and then turned the aircraft on a northeasterly bearing. There was no hesitation. They had been here too many times for that to occur. ictor Three finally lost radar contact with the aircraft when the ,R7 aircraft flew northwards beyond Nanda 9evi and then crossed the 0ndo&7hina *order into Tibet.

NO- 16 BULLS A"UAR DPSA SQUADRON AMBALA AFB, INDIA 1&*' HRS THURSDAY Minutes later the first of four two&seater upgraded Baguar&0% aircraft loaded with an assortment of cluster& bombs and 40ron5 bombs lifted off the tarmac from ,mbala ,-* and turned eastwards. These would be the first 9,R0N&00 !aguars to see action in the role they were designed to do. The ob!ective was different and the region was different as well, but the execution was similar, and lethal. They would not be alone in seeing action of course, but they would certainly be the ones opening the gates on a different theatre of "perations in this war. No. '> %1n had been deputed on an ad&hoc basis to the 7entral ,ir command for this crisis while the No. .; %1n 4-laming archers5 also flying the Baguar&0% had been deputed to the 3astern ,ir command for the war. /hile the 4*ulls5 remained at their present location at ,mbala, the 4-laming archer had been transferred to )ashimara and would launch all their operations from there. *oth these s1uadrons had similar tasking and mainly dealt with 40ron )and5 9efence suppression sorties against the 7hinese ,ir 9efence structure. /ithin minutes the aircraft had reached their cruising altitude and they headed towards *arielly where they were met by an 06&;C tanker along with four Mirage&.(((s of the 4/olfpacks5 %1uadron, and these would be the escorts for the Baguars as they conducted their mission. The Mirage&.(((s would trail the Baguars at high altitude and would remain inside 0ndian airspace until the !aguars had disabled their targets. "nce that was done, the Mirages would close in and provide a clear corridor for the Baguars to move through as they went back into 0ndian airspace. ,s each aircraft slid underneath the 06&;C to take on fuel, the pilots waited for orders from their ,/,7% aircraft, ictor Three, who would provide the ingress route to the target once the ,R7 aircraft had located it. The Baguar pilots weren5t aware of the *&;(; that had !ust penetrated 7hinese airspace and only knew that some special intelligence was expected. "nce all eight aircraft had topped off their tanks they took leave from the 06&;C that turned southwards for safety reasons. ,ll eight aircraft in two groups of four headed north towards a civilian airfield known to the 0,- as 4Bolly $rant5 which was two hundred :ilometres from the Tibetan border and was the emergency recovery point for all aircraft during this mission. 0t was also their !ump off point. "nce they reached this point, all aircrafts orbited over 4Bolly $rant5 while they awaited their target data. The 7entral ,ir command was now poised to begin the war in the North. The broad ob!ective for these missions about to be flown under "peration #0 "T&)336 was to force the #6,,- to disperse the massive threat against the N3 by forcing them to allocate assets for the safety of this region as well to make them

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believe that the 0ndians were adopting news threat axes and therefore delay their main strikes as they re& evaluated their positions. 0t also made sense, as it allowed the /,7 aircraft to launch attacks without having to leave their primary !ob of keeping the #akistanis in check. 0t was all&in&all a strategic feint. The 0,- didn5t have barely enough fighters to hold off the 7hinese against in the N3, let alone the Tibet region. *ut by launching air strike against targets in this region would give the 7hinese pause, as they would be forced to stop and check out what was happening. 0t was all an effort to gain time, and the only way the 0,- was going to survive this war was by being smart, not brave. The aircrafts who would strike against targets here would then be used to strike targets in the N3 as soon as they completed their missions here. That would again confuse the enemy about the intentions, and provide more time for the 0,- to fly as many attack missions as they could. They had the initiative here, and they were forcing the 7hinese to react, not act. That was as priceless in war as it in peacetime, and the 0,- had no intention of giving it up, no matter what the cost, especially because it couldn5t last forever, and the enemy would smarten up sooner or later. The ob!ective was to keep the #6,,- high command knocked and daAed even as they attempted to get back up after the drubbing handed out to them after "p N"RT)&%/0#3 #hase&0. *ut that operation was launched in coordination with the army. This one was the first fully 0,- mission. ,nd the 7entral air command staff officers prided themselves at having this opportunity, and they intended to make it into an example that would enter the annals of military aviation history. ,s "peration #0 "T&)336 swung into action, the 7entral air command began the air war in Tibet, and the first true fight for the air dominance of the )imalayas was poised about to commence.

THE TIBETAN MOUNTAINS

.I/AN" PROVINCE, CHINA 1&&' HRS THURSDAY The *&;(; passed over the massive )imalayan peaks and entered the Tibetan mountains near the location of 6ama 7horten. The cloud cover that had been in the north some hours before had now shifted south, much to the relief of the pilots flying the aircraft. They were over china now, what was once called Tibet and now referred to as the DiAang province. -orty kilometres east of the aircraft was the huge Manasarowar 6ake stretching twenty kilometres in rough diameter. 0t wasn5t visible now but the Rakas 6ake, to its west, was visible, and it was nearly as big as the former. *eauty was all over the place, and so was the enemy, and it was time to get #0 "T&)336 in motion. 9irectly north of the two lakes was a ma!or highway that roughly went east to west parallel to the 0ndian border and roughly at a separation of eighty kilometres from the border. 0t was the main highway that connected all 7hinese border locations from 6hasa in the east all the way to the 7hinese border posts near 6addakh. -or the past few days5 traffic had been moving north from 6hasa to this region as the 7hinese were establishing their bases in the region. 0t had to be done this way because 6hasa had the biggest cluster of airfields around for accepting large number of military transport flights, and had become the de& facto hub of 7hinese air operations. The situation was further complicated for the 7hinese by the absence of ma!or airfields in the region west of 6hasa. %o the spoke in the hub&and&spoke system was made up of #6, trucks and armoured vehicles plying this highway in huge convoys. Most of them being soft skinned vehicles, and ideal targets for cluster munitions. The situation wasn5t totally against the 7hinese of course. "ne ma!or advantage was that there was a total absence of steep gradients in the mountain peaks around the region, and while the )imalayan peaks to the south was like a towering wall through which the 7hinese anti&air systems could not see, once any aircraft passed over that wall and reached about ten kilometres south of the highway, it would present itself to the 7hinese triple&, systems and have no cover in sight. ,s a result of this, the #6, had deployed large numbers of ,,, systems around the highway all the way from 6hasa. ,ll in all, it was a powerful wall of defences for any aircraft trying to penetrate it. *ut with all defences, it had weaknesses. The biggest one being the vulnerability of the choke points on the highway, one of the biggest one being the near the Tibetan town of :haleb, north of the Rakas lake. The town being mostly Tibetan, the 7hinese had no problems clearing the local population out of their homes and streets to clear the way for the massive convoys to pass through the streets of the town before they began moving northwest. 0n fact, :haleb was the pivoting point for the highway from where it pivoted from an easterly heading to a northwesterly heading. The destruction of this pivot to shut down the flow of enemy forces to the north was the ob!ective of this

52

operation. ,t least it had to appear that way for the 7hinese to transfer any fighters to this region at all. They had to take the bait. The *&;(; was by now fully fifty kilometres inside Tibet and was near enough to the highway that the first communications intercepts made in the very high fre1uency range started off. These would be the 6"% based communications used by the 7hinese to communicate locally. That was the ob!ective of #0 "T& 7,663R, the call sign of the ,R7 *&;(;. They had to confirm the presence of the 7hinese %,M systems near :haleb using their passive 360NT gear as well as to listen in on not only the local units communicating with each other, but also on the longer ranged ,rmy&level communications that were being made using low fre1uency communications in the Tibetan mountains. Their !ob was complex, and the threats large. /hile the interception of communications was relatively easy, the type of communications made the !ob difficult. -or example, communications via 6"% radios was easy to listen in on, if you were within the 6"%. That was the reason #0 "T&7,663R was beyond the )imalayan peaks into Tibet. There was no way you could listen in on 6"% based communications south of the )imalayas. ,s a result of which the 0,- had asked the ,R7 to do this !ob because of their proficiency with the !ob at hand as well as the region where they were flying. 0f the enemy was using %,T7"M systems with burst transmission of encrypted data, or simply using phones or fibre&optic cables, things got difficult for the 0ndian 7"M0NT crew. Things got further complex if there were no voice communications, the classic 7"M0NT intelligence source for the last century. -or example, if the enemy used direct data transmission and Aero voice transmission, garnering of data could take several hours, assuming you knew what to look for in the first placeL Then there was the airborne threat to the aircraft itself. *eing a lumbering airliner based aircraft, any radar sweeping the region with electronic signals would be able to detect the aircraft in a heartbeat, and then it was all over. -ortunately, the region being mountainous, didn5t allow for efficient use of ground based radars, and the few that the #6,,- had deployed in this sector were old and mapped by the ,R7 for decades. )ence they knew the loopholes in their deployments and the flight path for the *&;(; had been decided to allow it to go through these regions, with minimum threat. 0nstead, the 7hinese had deployed a G&C ,/,7% aircraft to the region. ,nother piece of luck for the ,R7 crew was the confirmed destruction of one of the G&C ,/,7% on the ground during "peration N"RT)&%/0#3. That aircraft had been left burning at the tarmac earlier in the day and the 7hinese had shifted the ,/,7% meant for this region to the east to cover the N3 against possible threats from there. "bviously they expected the threat axis aligned along that region. 0t was one of the lesser&realiAed successes of N"RT)&%/0#3 strikes8 the 7hinese didn5t know where the threat now lay and where from it would strike. ,s a result, the skies were clear for the *&;(; when it penetrated Tibet, although the radar signature of the #6,,- G&C ,/,7% was detected at extremely long range from the east, and far beyond what would register a return. ,nother problem was the possibility of visual ac1uisition from the ground. The 7hinese were sure to have observers at the border hills with powerful binoculars scanning the sky. )ad this been the southern plain, the observers could not have seen the aircraft from the altitude it was flying. *ut that was not the case here, and hills were nearly as high as the aircraft altitude. Moreover, the sound of the engines echoed here, and the four powerful turbines of the aircraft would alert even a deaf man to the proximity of the aircraft. ,nd visual ac1uisition wasn5t re1uired either. , simple phone call to the local #6,,- )< informing of unrecognised engine noises would send a s1uadron of %2& .;s to look for the aircraft and ac1uire it visually, and then it would all be over for the 0ndian aircrew. 3ven if they could !am the radars of the 7hinese fighters using the electronic warfare e1uipment and !amming systems on board, it only took two small bursts of gunfire to bring the lumbering aircraft down in flames and there could be no manoeuvring. -aybe they will gi$e us a &edal or so&ething, like that /anberra reconnaissance 'ilot during the !"# warbelonging to that unit based in agra, ) think. At least he was %lying a &ore warlike aircra%t instead o% this busand in a less lethal en$iron&ent. 5n the other hand we do ha$e the &ost so'histicated electronics known to &anall he had was a <W< to tell hi& when he was about to die. ) guess that e$ens it out the pilot thought as he scanned the blue sky in front of him for enemy aircraft while his co&pilot aimed the aircraft from one cloud to another.

53

0n the back of the aircraft the enemy situation near the town of :haleb was now becoming clear, and the first %,M system locations had been plotted already. ,nother twenty minutes and #0 "T&7,663R would change !obs from being a snooper to a -"7 and a stand off !ammer for the Baguars who had now been told to move northwards and cross the border to !oin up with #0 "T&7,663R and then commence their attacks around the town of :haleb. 9uring the ietnam /ar, the 7hinese assistance program for the North ietnamese had allowed them to see the effects and hear the details about the ,merican 4/ild weasel5 strike packages. They had never felt it themselves. That was about to change. The four !aguars soon thundered over the border into Tibet under the guidance of #0 "T&7,663R and headed towards the town of :haleb. Time&on&Target was now seventeen minutesH

INDIA)MYANMAR BORDER CROSSIN"

10 KM NORTHWEST OF KAMTON" NA"ALAND, INDIA 1&'' HRS THURSDAY The 0ndian army 0 7orps was now feeling much more secure after the 7hinese airborne infantry assault threat had been neutraliAed. The 7hinese '@th army had been stranded at the #6,,- bases along with their 06&;> Transports after "peration N"RT)&%/0#3 had destroyed the main runways at their airfields. 0n addition, the loss of several heavy transport aircrafts, e1uipment and hundreds of men had at the very least put a dent and a delay in the timetable for the attack. The 7hinese *ombers were assembling over Tibet now, but their attacks would be directed against the 0,- for the moment, and the missile threat to 0 7orps units was not nearly as bad as having 7hinese paratroopers falling out of the sky all over the region. The elimination of that threat had secured 0 and 000 7orps logistical routes and the way was now clear for the 0ndian army5s advance into Myanmar. The @;T) Mountain 9ivision was now ready to move. The %"7"M troopers had established contact with the Myanmar loyalists at %ingkaling )kamti and had secured the routes for the @;T) to move through all the way to the 7hindwin River west bank via many crossing points on the 0ndian&Myanmar border. The terrain necessitated the use of infantry assisted by armour and they had to move 1uickly to reach their destinations. Therefore, long mechaniAed convoys would be needed, led by tanks and ,#7s followed by infantry in trucks and other vehicles and the whole convoy being supported by an organic helicopter detachments consisting of attack, observation and logistical helicopters at the *attalion level. ,t the front of the convoys would be the -,7 helicopters conducting Reconnaissance and surveys. The artillery would stay at the border areas on the 0ndian side and not cross in the initial stages. 0n any case, the first drive to the 7hindwin was about forty to about fifty kilometres at the maximum and barely twenty kilometres at a minimum, and therefore was within range of 0ndian artillery systems stationed !ust at the border. The airborne component would hop along with the convoys as the convoys themselves established -,R# or -orward ,rea Rearming #oints as they went along. The 0,- had attached several Mi&'; flights with the @;T) M9 and these would help transport the logistics and e1uipment for setting up the -,R# as they shadowed the convoy. The nature of the mechaniAed convoys and their e1uipment was decided on the basis of the routes and the region they were to take. 0n all there were to be a total of seven MechaniAed 7onvoys crossing the border at seven different points, followed by holding formations. 0n addition, there were three other smaller convoys and two %)*" lined up for places that could not be accessed by roads. Moving from north to south, the first convoys would cross the border near )ill .=== where the 0ndian aircrafts had intruded into Myanmar earlier in the day. The road was mostly theoretical, and was basically a dirt track, and was also at high altitude. ,s a result, the troops crossing here would be mostly truck bound with a smaller contingent of *M#&00 07 s and no tanks. They would be crossing the hills east of :ohima and their !ob would be to secure the way from the top of these hills all the way to the bottom of the foothills and then mate up with the loyalist troops and the 0ndian #ara commandoes waiting at %ingkaling )kamti, then cross the 7hindwin to the eastern side ad secure the road checkpoint on that side of the river and then wait for the tanks. This point was crucial for the 0ndian army5s advance east of the 7hindwin. That road !unction had to be held. 0t was the only one in the north that had relatively decent road coming to it and moving away from it. *ut the troops allocated fro convoy one were not sufficiently e1uipped with mechaniAed firepower. ,s a result, another convoy that was heavy in tanks would be moving north on a road parallel to the 7hindwin on the eastern side of the river once they had secured their crossing point south, and while they would then move

54

north to assist the troops at this road !unction by providing armoured support and then await further orders. The 7onvoy two and three would cross the border near hills +C.> and +(CC respectively and move towards the small town of 6ayshi, occupy it, and then convoy three, which was the southern element, would move further east along the road parallel to a small river by the name of Namtaleik and reach the town of Tamanthi, which was right on the western bank of the 7hindwin. ,ll contact with that town had been lost ten hours ago so nobody was sure as to who was occupying the town, but Nishant 2, s of 000 7orps had located a large number of T&@@ tanks on the streets and 90, was not sure who they belonged to, and neither, surprisingly, were the loyalists. 0n any case, the town was to be taken and then convoy three would force a crossing to the east side and then move north towards %ingkaling )kamti via the dirt road on the eastern bank of the 7hindwin, secure the villages along the way and then mate up with 7onvoy one at the road !unction. This was by far the most dangerous mission among all the convoys of the 0ndian army crossing later today, and was e1uipped accordingly. The convoy had one whole regiment of tanks attached to it, attached to the @;T) M9 by the '%T ,rmoured 9ivision on an ad&hoc basis for the duration of this war. 7onsidering that the tanks would have to fight their way along narrow roads and dirt paths flanked by heavy vegetation, the '%T ,rmoured had seen it fit to e1uip the @;T) with heavy ,r!un tanks as against the initial thoughts of putting T&=(s in the region. )it survivability was the issue here, and not speed and agility, for which there was no space in any case. Moving along narrow roads, the tanks were expected to be targeted by anti&tank weaponry. The ,r!un with its composite armour was better suited for the !ob of taking hits and still moving than the Russian built tanks. 0t was also a fine opportunity of testing the ,r!un tanks in a real live war, albeit of low intensity and learn the shortcomings and the advantages under live fire conditions. The $"7 of '%T ,rmoured had visited the region on Monday and it had taken him less than two hours to see the region before deciding to use the ,r!un M*T here. Two whole *attalions of ,r!un M*Ts was attached to 7onvoy three while 7onvoy two was mainly e1uipped with *M#&00 07 s as they would not even reach the 7hindwin and were mostly tasked with occupying the foothills all the way from the border to the western bank of the 7hindwin as a holding force between 7onvoy one in the north and three to the south. 6ater on, of course, they would be used as reserves should the need arise. -urther south, convoys four, five and six would cross the border near hills '(.> and '(=; and would move to the 7hindwin which was barely at twenty :ilometres. "nce there, they would follow the well developed roads in the region on the eastern side of the 7hindwin and probe eastwards towards the next set of hills at around fifty kilometres east of the 7hindwin known as the Pibyutaungdan in Myanmar. ,s such, these hills restricted the scopes of these mechaniAed convoys because of their impassibility, and any movement across them would have to loop around it to the north, covering far more ground than what the @;T) M9 could hold on to and take up too much time by which time the war may have shifted its centre of gravity towards the north if the #6, piled into Myanmar. There was no point in stretching the @;T) M9 out into the !ungles when they might serve a better purpose up north if the need arose. "ne *attalion of ,r!un tanks was attached in smaller 7ompany level or %1uadron level segments along with each of the convoys because of the low threat perception in the region. Mostly they were heavy in infantry and 07 s, including some experimental ,bhay 07 s that were also to be tested in combat in this region. 0n any case, the !ob was not to capture as much of Myanmar territory as possible. 0t was simply to make sure that the rebels survived as a political entity during the crisis and had hold over some portion of Myanmar. That would be accomplished and then the 0ndian army would stop, lest the 7hinese start calling them as invaders in front of the world stage. The two smaller convoys and the %)*" were lined up for moving southwards from 6edo to 7hanglang, then to :honsa which was still inside 0ndia and then cross the border near hill ..;' and then secure the North& south road running parallel to the %angpang *um hill range inside Myanmar. This would be the northern element and was uni1ue because of the fact that it was the only 0ndian army unit moving across the border that wasn5t attached to 000 7orps, but rather to 0 7orps. ,s a result, to avoid command overlap situations, they had been given the !ob of securing that road which was essentially unconnected to @;T) M9 movements to the south, but still important enough that 0 7orps units had to be diverted from facing 7hina to this !ob. This road was important because if the rebels got on this road, they could theoretically move south and then behind %ingkaling )kamti and the 0ndian logistical trains and cut off 7onvoy "ne positions in Myanmar. ,lthough it was unlikely that the rebels did indeed pose a threat to this road, it was making 000 7orps staff officers very uneasy and thus the decision to include 0 7orps into the

55

e1uation had been taken despite protests from the $"7, 0 7orps. This -ar 3ast, the sun was already starting to set. The units that would make up the convoys were in their final !ump off positions and their vehicles were laagered in large grounds ad!acent to the road that they would be taking when moving to the border crossings. ,ll soldiers of the 0ndian army were wearing the new 9isruptive type camouflage uniforms and the tanks crews of the '%T ,9 who had been sent here had also been issued green overalls as against their normal black uniforms on the advice of the $"7, @;T) M9. They were near their tanks now, and were walking nearby, watching other vehicles move east past them towards the border. %ome of these were the *M# based ,3R s or engineer reconnaissance vehicles that were moving out before the tanks to survey the first stretch of the road after the border. The crews were sitting with the hatches open and en!oying the cool wind in these hills before they buttoned up near the border. The border crossings itself were somewhat crowded with Myanmar citiAens trying to gain permission to come into 0ndia to escape the air attacks being done on them by the #6,,- and the rebels. The 0ndian army soldiers had been asked to close the border when reports had started coming in the morning of infiltrators and spies coming in with the refugees to spy on 0ndian army deployments near the border. ,fter the missile attacks had taken place on the 0ndian radars that was witnessed by everybody nearby, most refugees had turned back, deciding that 0ndia wasn5t safe anymore either, and by the afternoon the crossings were deserted on the Myanmar side. The 0ndian army had seiAed this opportunity to move several recon teams across the border and secure the first leg of the roads to be taken by the convoys from any threats. ,lthough the steel gate at the border were still closed, there were 0ndian soldiers on both sides now, and when the first ,3R s started to reach the gate, it was smashed open by the engineer vehicles as they moved across to conduct their survey full one hour before the main units piled across. *ack at 000 7orps )< at 9imapur, some had debated the decision to move so late in the afternoon as against early next day morning, but the fact was that the 0ndian army had far better war fighting capabilities than the rebels for night&time operations, and the situation being fluid across the border, it was also safer to move during the night. 0f all things worked, as they should, the convoys would reach the 7hindwin before the night was over, and preferably before either the 7hinese or the rebels realiAed what was happening. ,s the ,3R s started moving cautiously across the border, the tanks crews started to gather around their officers and commanders for the final briefing before it all began. They were told that the movement to the final !ump&off points was at 'C(( )ours. The Bump&off itself was set for '=(( )ours. That was when the unreal war would turn real.

C0123412 R1567 The 7hindwin River is a river in Myanmar and the ma!or tributary of the ,yeyarwaddy River. The river flows CJ( kilometres to !oin the ,yeyarwaddy. The 7hindwin river is ;@( miles from north to south. )owever, she is the biggest tributary of the mighty ,yeyarwaddy and spills her strength into the longer river at a place not far from Mandalay, an old city that is the heart of Myanmar. 0t runs through misty&blue mountains and charming towns and villages, proudly running through a region of abundant natural resources and fertile meadows. The 7hindwin alley is a place of deep !ungles and lofty mountains. The cultures of the inhabitants are more unspoilt, and the towns and villages lining the river bank. The marvellous Thanboddhay #agoda of Monywa and the cave pagodas of )powintaung and %hwebataung, are in the 7hindwin valley. ,nother natural wonder is an extinct volcano crater producing natural %pirulina. 0t is grown in many parts of the world but this is a rare natural find, the blue&green algae growing organically in a nature&made lake. %pirulina is rich in protein, minerals, amino acids, iron, beta&carotene,

56

vitamins * and 3. 0nternational researchers have found that it probably stimulates the immune system, and may have antiviral and anticancer effects. 0t is widely consumed in Myanmar. No organisms can survive to pollute the waters in which this algae grows, so %pirulina is one of the cleanest, most naturally sterile foods found in nature. ,long the 7hindwin river bank are :yaukkar village, producing lac1uer ware products, :ani town which has been known as the birthplace of learned nobles and wealthy merchants of the ancient times, :alewa town, the point where the Myit Thar River !oins the 7hindwin River. There are also ,llaungdaw :atthapa /ild 6ife %anctuary, and #yingago and #adauk wood, and Thanakha wood, forest products. ,lso to go to Naga New Gear festival, one has to travel up the 7hindwin river reaching the )omemalin Town.
%ettlements along the 7hindwin River include %hwebo, which was the royal capital from ';>(&';>J.

FLASH BACK TO HISTORY "fficially established March +, '=J., the 7hina&*urma&0ndia Theater of "perations M7*0N is often referred to as the -orgotten Theater of /orld /ar 00. "f the '.,+((,((( ,mericans under arms at the height of /orld /ar 00 mobiliAation, only about .@(,((( Mtwo percentN were assigned to the 7*0 Theater. Relatively few ,mericans were in combat in the theater. 3xcept for a few stories, 7*0 did not often make headlines in the newspapers back home. The '.,((( mile supply line, longest of the war, was often last in line for supplies from the 2nited %tates. Not forgotten to ,llied war planners, 7*0 was important to the overall war strategy. "ccupation of *urma in '=J. by Bapanese forces cut the last supply line of communication between 7hina and the outside world. , military airlift was begun as it was important to keep 7hina supplied and in the war. 0t was generally agreed that this would not be enough and a land supply route would be needed. , road from 6edo, ,ssam, 0ndia was begun in late '=J.. 6edo was chosen because it was close to the northern terminus of a rail line from the ports of 7alcutta and :arachi. 7onstruction of the 6edo Road was completed in early '=J@.
,llied forces in 7*0, mostly *ritish, 7hinese, and 0ndian, engaged large numbers of Bapanese troops that might have otherwise been used elsewhere. ,mericaRs role in 7*0 was to support 7hina by providing war materials and the manpower to get it to where it was needed. The -lying Tigers fought the Bapanese in the air over 7hina and *urma. ,rmy ,ir -orces flew supplies "ver The )ump from 0ndia to 7hina. MerrillRs Marauders and the Mars Task -orce fought through the !ungles of *urma. ,rmy 3ngineers built the 6edo Road to open up the land supply route.

THE TIBETAN MOUNTAINS

.I/AN" PROVINCE, CHINA 1'00 HRS THURSDAY The four Baguars passed the to the north of #eak @.CC and reached the southern edge of Rakas 6ake. -rom there they turned north, above the surface of the lake and moved all the way to the northern tip of the lake, about twenty five kilometres away. They were now less than fifteen kilometres away from the town of :haleb, and their mission ob!ective. ,lthough two of the Baguars carried 49umb5 bombs, all carried cluster munitions. The nature of the mission would define the need for the weapons at hand, which were being carried for attacking targets of opportunity rather than any specific target. The vector in which they were moving now would take them over the town whereon after minor course corrections based on visual ac1uisition of the target they would drop their bombs and then continue on a high speed dash to the north, thus in effect cutting across the main )ighway and thus also the main line of Triple&, defences. 0n doing so, they would enter the next set of large peaks to the north of the )ighway that would shield their backs from the anti&aircraft fire and allow them to maneuver freely while deiding the safest way south. *ecause the enemy would be aware of the direction from where they had ingressed, they would egress from another vector, this time easterly and attack a mobile radar deployment near Men&shih on the

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way. Then they would continue eastwards, fooling the enemy into thinking that that was the exit route towards )imachal #radesh and then loop south towards #eak @>'J, towards 6ama 7horten and then across the )imalayan peaks via the Nanda 9evi range and back into 0ndia. Two minutes out, #0 "T&7,663R activated the 3/ e1uipment started sending !amming signals towards all the radars they had been plotting for half an hour. ,ll locations and fre1uency ranges were known and so were the power output ranges. The massive active !amming signals sent out of the *&;(; were far higher in terms of power than the sensitive return signals of the aerial environment around the 7hinese radars. This caused the radar screens in front of the 7hinese operators to wipe themselves out. ,ll they could see was the massive returns coming from the direction in which the *&;(; was flying in addition to the massive radar reflections off the mountain peaks. ,s a result, the 7hinese radar operators could not distinguish the difference between the reflections and the main source of the signals at their current power settings. They had to decrease sensitivity in order to differentiate between a source and a reflection, and even at their minimum sensitivity settingsF the inbound signal spikes were large enough so that no differentiating was possible. The power of the *&;(; %tand&off Bammer was !ust too high. "nly a single radar unit at :haleb itself had the operating ranges to select minimum sensitivity and differentiate between the signals and they did this effectively, finally locating the 0ndian *&;(; aircraft flying over their country. They had made several mistakes. *y keeping their settings on high sensitivity to try and locate inbound fighters, they had also had to reduce their power outputF else the reflections from the environment nearby would clutter their screens. Reducing the power meant reduced range, and that meant that they had failed to locate the 0ndian *&;(; flying over Tibet. 0n any case, in the mountain battlefield, high power is somewhat useless in terms of ranges, as relatively few locations offer the 6"% for the ranges that the system is capable of, and the main issue is sensitivity in reduced ranges. )igh sensitivity is obviously better, but that can be made to work against it in case of electronic warfare. The 7hinese had now decreased sensitivity to burn through the 0ndian !amming, and had increased power to locate the source of the !amming. This they had successfully done, and the 0ndian aircraft was now in their sights. *ut at reduced sensitivity, they had no hope of picking up the 0ndian Baguars flying low and inbound towards them. Moreover, they now tried calling for %2&.;s to shoot down the !ammer aircraft and that5s when they discovered another art of modern warfare. The main speakers and data links were being scrambled. :nowing the various parameters of wave propagation type communications had limited the effectiveness of such communications in a high 3/ intensity environment long ago, and here, all )- communications between local units were being scrambled by inbound signals on the same fre1uency and power but having phase differences. The 7hinese weren5t fools either. They had fre1uency hopping systems, but even these systems had a certain range in which they 4hopped5 and if you were present within the 6"% and could send opposing signals in the entire fre1uency range, then anywhere the radio 4hopped5, the carrier signal was destroyed by destructive interference of the two propagating waves and the data signal had no carrier to move it and so the communications gets 4!ammed5. *eing on the same 6"% offers the enactment of 7"M0NT gathering and the same location offers 4%ignal %cramble5 opportunities to deny the enemy the use of his communications. "nly the use of old&fashioned telephone cables and the newer fibre&optics networks allows one to evade these !amming procedures, and these are sub!ected to environmental limitations during layout as well as being vulnerable to attacks at the main nodes by %pecial forces or aerial attacks. 0t5s always a losing game when you try to adapt yourself in a passive way rather than in an active one. , single surface&to&air missile could knock the 0ndian aircraft out of the sky an end all these nightmares for the 7hinese, if they could only contact their own %,M operators and transfer missile guidance data to them. The same target aircraft was now restricting this data transfer. 0n effect, the 0ndian *&;(; crew was fighting for its life in the electronic battle space, and doing so well enough that the main threat went unnoticed by the 7hinese operators who were busy trying to fight off the !ammer aircraft. 0t was too late when the #6, troops around the town of :haleb heard and saw the four 0ndian Baguars tear through the airspace around the town. That5s when the cluster munitions were e!ected from their racks.

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THE TOWN OF KHALEB

IN THE TIBETAN MOUNTAINS .I/AN" PROVINCE, CHINA 1'0* HRS THURSDAY The first man made thunderclaps reverberated around the valley as the cluster munitions hit the ground. The target was the main crossroads along the main highway where all the other smaller branches headed off into the region to the north and south of the highway. ,t the foothills of the :ailas peaks, the town was in all senses beautiful, and it was a sad aspect of current circumstances that it should fall at the centre of the conflict between 0ndia and china. The ob!ective was to neutraliAe flow of traffic along the highway by bombing the main !unction with cluster munitions that would destroy all soft skinned vehicles like trucks and other assorted lightly armoured vehicles. -urther north, !ust at the foot of the :ailas peaks, the secondary ob!ective was the destruction of the radar site that was coordinating the %,M systems in this region. 0t was also the most capable radar along this stretch of the highway and its destruction would create a big hole in the local air defences until the #6,,- ,/,7% reached the area and took over control. -inally, there was a medium siAed bridge inside the town over which the highway crossed. The Baguars armed with 49umb5 bombs were tasked with the destruction of this bridge. The city was heavily defended by M,N#,9s, and the only security for the Baguars was the surprise element that #0 "T&7,663R had arranged for them. The communications scramble had meant that the M,N#,9 troopers on the roofs of high rise buildings in the town were not alerted but were still 1uick to see the Baguars flying over the city and so they started their launch procedures, all of which took time as the Baguars separated into two pairs and one pair headed for the crossroads and the other headed for the bridge. The flight time had been seconds only. The first cluster munitions devastated the highway crossroad, and left several doAen vehicles on fire, with huge flames leaping across the sky. The two !aguars for that strike headed north and cleared the city limits even as two trails of white smoke followed them all the way. The massive number of flares launched by the two aircraft coupled with the chaff and their evasive manoeuvres at high speed negated the missile threat against them and they disappeared within the hills north of :haleb. The second pair of Baguars had a more difficult task at hand. They had to come from a certain angle in order to launch their weapons against the bridge if they wanted to completely destroy it. That made their flight path predictable and gave the M,N#,9 operators that little bit of time to get ready for launch. ,s the two aircraft spotted the bridge and ad!usted their vectors to get in line for the attack, several white trails leaped across the sky from near the bridge towards them. There was no turning back now. The aircraft were dropping flares in 1uick succession and the pilots had the satisfaction of seeing two of the seven trails turn slightly towards the flares and go off course, but the remaining missiles did not veer off course and headed towards the lead aircraft who now broke formation and went into a step climb to gain altitude and some space to manoeuvre. The missiles followed the aircraft up. 0t was a mistake. The aircraft was now up against the totally clear and cold blue sky, and it was the only one heat source in the sky. The aircraft started heading towards the general bearing of the sun so that he could draw the missiles in that direction and then break away, leaving the missiles trailing after the sun. The problem was that even if the Baguar managed to break off the missile lock against him, he was now flying high in the sky over :helab, and several doAen more M,N#,9 teams were busy trying to lock him in their sights. They were now waiting for the aircraft to clear the general direction of the sun before they fired their missiles. ,t this altitude the aircraft cannot perform beyond a certain height, and the thin air degrades engine performance, forcing the aircraft to lose energy and then fall back towards the earth. The Baguar could not fly at high angles for too long, and sure enough, when he broke away, fully two doAen missiles rose up to meet the lone Baguar. The Tarang R/R was screeching and warning of radar directed missiles among the doAen or so missiles heading towards the Baguar, and there was no escape. The aircraft was blotted out of the sky with multiple missiles slamming from all directions, and the massive explosion had the aircraft smithereens falling from the sky all over the town. The only ma!or section of the fuselage that came down in one piece was the port wing section that fell near the highway crossroad where the trucks were still burning furiously. The second Baguar had meanwhile reached the bridge and had used the distraction of the M,N#,9 operators to lie up his approach properly and drop his two 49umb5 bombs smack in the centre of the bridge which blew up in a massive explosion behind the Baguar and which caused the steel and concrete flying in

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all directions and showering the town with a massive spray of water all around the impact point. This caused the 7hinese soldiers to stop their cheering at the destruction of one aircraft and try and lock on to the other aircraft, but it was too late and the Baguar sped away on full afterburner. Then heads turned again in another direction as another set of thunderclaps far from the town echoed the destruction of the radar station based at the foothills of the :ailas peaks by the first pair of Baguars who had now emerged from the hills to the north to strike the final target. Then they too again entered the peaks before anybody could react and the skies became clear with all abruptness, except for the noise echoing across the region. The three Baguars assembled and headed back towards 0ndia following their predetermined paths over Men&shih and beyond. There were no celebrations. The 0,- had !ust lost one of its aircraft and crew in combat operations against the 7hinese. The mission had been a difficult one, and it had been accomplished, but that didn5t make that Baguar crew any less dead. #0 "T&)336 had !ust ended. The success was almost total, but that wasn5t totally unexpected either. The city was !ust too well guarded, the 0,- commanders realiAed belatedly, and despite the fact that all known threats had been !ammed beforehand, there were !ust to many M,N#,9 teams around using 0R seekers to make the concept of 6o& 6o&6o strike patterns obsolete, and deadly to the crews executing them. The commanders realiAed that they had made their first mistake in the war, and it had cost them the lives of two officers and an aircraft. The town horiAon had a number of smoke and dust clouds. The thick black clouds of smoke bellowing from the trucks filled with ammunition that had cooked off at the main crossroad was filling the sky, and as bulldoAers were called to clear the roads, several of them were disabled by the unexploded sub&munitions creating further nuisance, causing the #6, officers to swear at a non&existent god. The first set of troops also managed to reach the destroyed and burning radar site that had been fighting the ,R7 *&;(; not long ago. Not any more. /ith the only competition gone, the ,R7 crew had no intention of going back. ,ll military communications and radars were now !ammed with impunity. ,t the bridge another set of officers was swearing at the mass of tangled steel and concrete that now lay before them. ,ll communications were still being !ammed, and so there was a massive delay before any news went out by other means. ,s a result, the traffic continued to move towards the town from 6hasa and was held up as the #6, officers organiAed a diversion via the southern route, only to find that the massive traffic !am had started. The diversion was not nearly good enough for mass convoys. The number of supply vehicles piling up at the town was now massive, and the town of :haleb now becoming a highly vulnerable, target rich environmentH

T)3 T0*3T,N M"2NT,0N% D0P,N$ #R" 0N73, 7)0N, '@+( )R% T)2R%9,G The ,R7 *&;(; was still at station, and !amming all known communications and radars with impunity, now that the 7hinese electronic opposition in this sector had ceased. There were a whole lot of radios trying to reach each other, and all of them could not and none knew why. 0t was a source of immense satisfaction to the ,R7 crew flying above the most beautiful peaks in the world and through air that had a temperature below freeAing. 7ommunications system !amming was one aspect of the current !ob. ,nother was listening in to the same data for intelligence purposes. This was achieved by what is essentially localiAed !amming. The signal from a radio leaves the set and spreads radially outwards. )ere it is allowed to go most of the way and then !ammed. 3ssentially it means that the radio operator thinks he is sending the data out, and indeed the data is leaving his system, but it does not reach its destination. 0t was during this motion from the set to the point where it was !ammed that the signal was normal and it was therefore here that it could be hacked into. Total !amming prevents this kind of eavesdropping and destroys the carrier waves before they can leave the set, thus giving away to the operators the knowledge that they are being !ammed. This is what had been intentionally done during the Baguar strike to confuse the enemy. ,s soon as the Baguars had exited the range of the 7hinese radars, this kind of !amming had been ceased, fooling the enemy

60

into thinking that the ,R7 aircraft had left along with the Baguars. *ut that was not the case. The *&;(; was still there, and was now using localiAed !amming to achieve covert gathering of intelligence and continue to block 7hinese communications without their knowing. "f course this couldn5t last, and the gradual decrease in radio communications was suggesting that the 7hinese had smartened up. 0t was probable that they were using fibre&optic communications now, and the problem was that the 0ndians had no idea where the main nodes for that network were. ,nd unless they had %"7"M guys running around the Tibetan mountains destroying all such nodes, there would be little success in forcing the 7hinese to resort back to radio communications. ,s a result, the amount of signals intelligence was now rapidly decreasing, and the successes of the intercepts were decreasing in magnitude. 0t was something that everybody aboard the aircraft now realiAed. /hat they had learned from the frantic #6, communications was that the town of :haleb had been hit hard. The highway was !ammed, and the 7hinese were yelling out to higher command to dispatch them more engineers and e1uipment to restore the transportation system, but their pleas were not going anywhere, much to the entertainment of the 0ndian crew, listening in on the 7hinese fre1uencies, hopping or not. That was another difficult !ob, trying to listen on the 7hinese communication fre1uencies. 9oing this on a single carrier fre1uency is one thing, trying to do so on a carrier that is hopping within a range of fre1uencies is 1uite another. 0ronically, !amming it is easier, as the entire range of fre1uencies can be flooded with garbage signals to scramble any data transfer. 6istening in on it re1uires the listening e1uipment to follow the 7hinese fre1uency as it 4hopped5 along, and that was never easy. 0f you couldn5t do that, then all you would hear would be fragmented segments of data, and that was frustrating. "ne way was for the listening computer to first see the so called 4Random5 nature of hopping and try to figure out the logic behind it, and then try and 4hop5 in a similar way, thus producing the re1uired data. 0t only needed to be done once, as it was expected that only one kind of logic would be present for all the 7hinese radios. This method had its roots in /orld /ar 00, with the famous 43nigma5 coding logic broken by the *ritish that cost the $ermans, the war. %eventy years on, computer power had increased immeasurably, so that what had taken months to do now re1uired only hours, and was something that the ,R7 had achieved some time back. 0ndeed, it was one of the most closely guarded secrets of that organiAation and something that was, at the moment, winning the war for the 0ndian ,ir -orce. 2nfortunately, this great coup would never be made public, now or after the war, and the medals awarded would never be publicly given. The congratulations would itself be secret, much to the amusement of any layman. *ut the ,R7 people understood. 0t was something that they accepted without second thought and it reflected favourably on their character as patriots. ,nother radio message was intercepted and told the listeners that another convoy had made it to :haleb to find itself !ammed. The 7hinese were re&routing their convoys now, moving them around :haleb via the southern looping roads. That was causing problems as well, but the 7hinese were adapting, and the traffic was starting to move again. That could not be allowed, and another mission was being lined up. This was for the town of %ung&sha, seventy kilometres west of :haleb, and which was also another node in the traffic movement westwards from 6hasa. There was an even more lucrative target at %ung&sha8 the bridge over a medium power river called 6ongpoche. The bridge that was destroyed at :haleb was smaller, and could be repaired 1uickly. The one at this place could not. That was all part of the follow on missions after the not totally successful "peration #0 "T&)336, and would take into consideration the lessons learnt after the strike at :haleb. 0t was being organiAed right now, and this operation was called #0 "T& ),MM3R. 0t would involve several flights of Baguars, all of whom would be using #$Ms, supported by eight Mirages. No more lo&lo&lo strike&patterns after the debacle over the skies of :haleb. This one was all lo&hi&lo patterns that would take the attacking aircraft over the range of the M,N#,9 systems

61

and would be heavily dependent on #0 "T&7,663R to provide !amming support. That was not a problem, the ,R7 crew reflected. They could handle it. The problem was that the #6,,- was now fully warned, and passive 3/ systems were now beginning to detect several flights of 7hinese fighters heading towards the region. ,lso, the #6,,- had taken its first active measure of the war. The ,/,7% flying over the N3 was not recalled to this region, as the 0,- had expected them to do, and instead the #6,,- had left the #6, to take care of itself against the 0ndian Baguars !umping all over them, until further ,/,7% could fly down from the south, as 90, was now suggesting they were. That was not a good development from the 7,7 commander5s point of view, although the Baguar s1uadron commanders were not complaining. 0t allowed the 0,- to conduct another set of strikes under a new "peration called #0 "T&),MM3R, but that was never the point. The 7,7 had to fool the #6,,- into diverting resources into the region so that the army in the N3 could execute N"RT)&%/0#3 #hase&00 and 000. Now that plan was in !eopardy, and suggested that something nasty was heading for the 3,7. 0t was clear to everybody at 0,- head1uarters that the 7hinese )&> bombers were not on the ground anymore. They were all in the air as of forty minutes ago, and nobody had a clear idea as to their targets. 0t was highly probable that it would be in the 3,7 Aone of operations, and they were preparing accordingly. *ut as long as the )&>s were not detected on somebody5s radar, every 0,- commander was uneasy. The problem for the 7,7 was that the #halcon ,/,7% attached to it, call sign 4 ictor&Three5, was still flying south of the )imalayan peaks and south of )imachal #radesh, and could not go over them because that area was 7hinese territory. 0ts view was restricted and as a result, so was the 3arly /arning capability for the Northern states. The only 3/ asset north of the peaks was #0 "T&7,663R, and it didn5t have airborne search radar with it. 0nstead it depended on #assive detection of inbound threats coming down from the North and therefore had its limitations. *ased on this method, the ,R7 crew had plotted a set of bearings representing inbound fighters, and the four Mirage&.(((s of the previous Baguar strike had been ordered to move North from 4Bolly $rant5 and escort and protect #0 "T&7,663R. There was another bearing for a highly powerful radar haeding into the region from the North&east thatcould only be an airborne radar aircraft of some type, and although the ,R7 aircraft and its escorts were below the horiAon for that aircraft, it was only a matter of time before the ,R7 *&;(; would have to shut down operations and head south for safety. ,t the moment, however, operations continued as usual. Then another communication was picked up, and one of the operators who detected it called out to the Mission 7ontroller to come over and hear it for himself. /hat is thatI 9id he !ust talk to another bunch of crewsI? the commander asked. That5s what it looked like sir. 6ot of #lurals in his sentences. There5s more coming in nowH? the operator responded as he pressed his headphones for more clarity. )e and the mission commander were both familiar with the 7hinese 6anguage and spoke it fluently. %hitHhe5s ordering his aircrafts to form upH0H9amn it, he5s referring to cruise missile launchesL /here the hell is this coming fromI? the commander asked as his voice became tense for the first time in the day. %ir, its coming from bearing Aero&seven&five. 2)- bandwidth.? The operator responded 2)-I *ut that meansH? Ges, sir, they are within our 6"%.? The operator inter!ected. $ood lord, we are sixty kilometres from our border, and they must be whatHanother sixty kilometres at this altitudeI That means they are within a hundred and twenty :ilometres from the border. %hitHthey are already within rangeL? The commander switched fre1uencies and started talking to the ictor&Three mission commander to the south. This was the first time the *&;(; had

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used this fre1uency for communicating with anyone, and it had been reserved for emergencies only. There was one now. ictor&Three, this is #0 "T&7,663R, we are detecting inbound bombers within "ne )undred and twenty kilometres of the border, possible references made during communications to cruise missile launches. ,lert everybodyL /e have found the bombersL? Roger, #0 "T&7,663R, we confirm that you detect inbound bombers. /hat5s the bearing, overI? *earing Pero&seven&five. Relative. "ver.? The mission commander answered. 0t was all clear to him now. 0t took ten seconds for the #halcon commander to do the same. Then he came online, and the voice was not as professional as before. The bearing of the inbound bombers was now clear. They were not heading for the N3 as thought before. The 7hinese had a somewhat different thought in mind. ,t the current heading the two doAen )&> bombers would be within striking range New 9elhi within the next few minutesH T)3 )0M,6,G,N M"2NT,0N% 0N90, '@+' )R% T)2R%9,G The situation was desperate. There were enemy bombers bearing down on the National 7apital and there was little defence against it. The ma!or problem with cruise missiles is that once launched, they take a path that makes interception difficult till the last moment, as they can literally re&route their paths to go through the loopholes in any air defence system environment. "nly during the last phases can they be intercepted by point defence systems because of their inability to manoeuvre during that time. )aving said that, the only time they can be stopped effectively is before they are actually launched, and that5s another problem. ,s a result, most militaries around the world have redundant 7+0 capabilities so that such attacks can be absorbed without loss of capability. ,nd the 0ndian armed forces had exactly that re1uired redundancy based 7+0 capabilities. *ut that was not the problem right now. The problem was a possible attack on civilian areas using large numbers of missiles, and that was different. The final targets were not sure, and they wouldn5t be until the missiles crossed the )imalayan peaks. "nce that happened, they would still be at high attitude and would conduct a slight dive to go back to terrain following levels. 9uring this 4#op&down5 manoeuvre, the missiles would be detected and tracked by the #halcon ,/,7%, 4 ictor Three5 and would calculate and then relay the list of possible targets to the relevant ,ir 9efence $round 3nvironment %ystem or ,9$3%. Then it was up to that ,9 Pone to try and destroy the missiles before they hit their targets. *ut this plan was full of loopholes and even if it worked, and the concerned ,9 Pone could detect and engage the missiles, already the 1uestions were being raised at ,ir )< as to whether any ,9 Pone could attack and destroy such a large number of missiles. ,n alternative plan was needed. ,nd there were none. The 7hinese were using their )&> bombers as standoff cruise missile launchers in the 4:5 variant of the aircraft, and they could theoretically launch within a few minutes, depending on what they were carrying. The thing was that the missiles had not been launched, and were still slung under the wings of the 7hinese aircrafts. #roblem was that the first %2&+(M:0s to scramble from *areilly would not reach the area in time. That5s when the planners realised that #0 "T&7,663R had a total of four Mirage&.(((s trying to catch up with it to provide escort, in the aftermath of "p #0 "T&)336, and a 1uick look at the digital map showed that they near the 6ama 7horten and heading North&east to take positions around the ,R7 *&;(;. ,nother look at their weapons configuration showed that they were carrying four of the Radar guided ,stra * R&,,Ms each, and that made a total of sixteen missiles against twenty&four 7hinese bombers. ,nd that didn5t include the inbuilt guns on the four

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aircraft. That changed the odds admirably, but there were other considerations. The 7hinese had taken the initiative with such a bold strike, and were in full knowledge that 0ndia lacked the capability to do a similar strike on *ei!ing or even one of their ma!or cities simply because there were no such cities within practical limits of 0ndian aircraft. *ut they had lacked the full situational awareness picture before they had dispatched their bombers to this region to conduct their attack. The complete !amming and scrambling of the outgoing communications by #0 "T&7,663R had ensured for example, that by the time the #6,,- had received word from the #6, about 0ndian Baguars attacking their convoys in Tibet, the bombers had already taken off. 3ven then, they could have withdrawn their bombers or provided massive escort aircrafts if they knew that more threat existed. ,ll their intelligence suggested that only the four Baguars had hit the town of :haleb, and that they had been supported by an electronics !amming aircraft, all of whom must be withdrawing south after attacking. They had no idea that although the four Baguars had indeed withdrawn, #0 "T&7,663R had not, and it was still there and doing its !ob. The 7hinese radars, the ones that had not been destroyed by the Baguars were still !ammed, and that alone should have warned the #6,,- that something was not right and that the threat was still there, but the effective !amming of communications had delayed their decisions to the point that by the time escort fighters had been launched along with ,/,7% support, the bombers were way to the south of them and very close to the border, and the 0,- threat. The ,R7 aircraft was detecting the inbound %2&.;s and the 7hinese ,/,7% aircrafts coming south, but were also detecting the 7hinese bombers already within their line of sight. The -our Mirage&.((( escorts now had a window of opportunity to exploit the distance gap between the 7hinese bombers and their escort fighters. The 7hinese )&> aircraft crew themselves had no idea of the threat that now lay within their electronic 6"% as a result of the austere airborne threat detection e1uipment mounted on their aircrafts. The )&>: was a missile carrying variant and not a high&technology penetration variant, and the e1uipment reflected that capability perception. )urried calls were made to the #halcon ,/,7% and from there to the flight leader of the Mirage fighters and also to the mission commander of the ,R7 *&;(;. The fighters were instructed to abandon their current !obs of fighter escort and conduct a high&speed run towards the 7hinese bombers and get within range of their * R missiles. "nce that was done, they were instructed to launch and destroy as many of the bombers as they could. Then they were to close in and use their front guns to engage the remaining aircraft even of they had already launched their cruise missiles. 3ven if a few missiles hit New 9elhi, the main ob!ective as far as the Mirage pilots were concerned was the elimination of the 7hinese )&>: threat. No bombers were to return home to speak of their success. No mercy was to be shown. The overall mission control was in the hands of the ,R7 crew because the #halcon had no time to cross the border and assist. The *&;(; was also to provide stand off electronic support to the Mirag&.(((s. "nce the 7hinese %2&.;s got close, the Mirages were to break off and return south using the massive electronic !amming support from the *&;(; to blank out the 7hinese radar directed missile systems. /ithin seconds of receiving the orders from the #halcon, the four Mirage&.(((s were in line abreast formation and then towards the bearing data provided by the ,R7 crew who were using their 360NT e1uipment to obtain reasonably good data for the -ighters. "nce they got close, the fighters would light off their own radars to find and destroy their targets. ,gainst the blue sky above and the brown and white peaks below, the four Mirage&.(((s punched off their drop tanks and engaged engine reheat to dash towards an unsuspecting enemy that was a few kilometres out of their ranges. The missiles were selected, the radar was on standby, and the pilot5s finger were resting on the missile launch buttonH T)3 N"RT)3RN #6,0N%

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%"2T) "- )0M,7),6 #R,93%), 0N90, '@+@ )R% T)2R%9,G -urther south, inside 0ndia, preparations for the inbound strike was going forward at impossible speed. /hile people in New 9elhi were scrambling to evacuate the National 6eaders and advisors along with all high ranking military leaders and getting them aboard their command post aircrafts lined up by the 0,- at #alam airport, the 0,- was busy organising the ,ir 9efence of the National 7apital. North of 9elhi, in a large open plain ground, the 1uad launchers of several %&+(( systems elevated from the horiAontal positions on top of their T36s reached their vertical locations and it was an awe inspiring sight to one and all. "nce that had been done, however, there was little activity to be done outside, and except for the security detachment protecting the extremely secret location from curious strangers, everybody was inside the man control trailer, watching the data coming in from the #halcon ,/,7% flying north of their current location. 0t would be the first to spot the missiles, and then it would begin. ,t the moment, however, things were erringly 1uiet as all eyes turned towards the northern )imalayan foothills. T)3 )0M,6,G,N M"2NT,0N% 0N90, '@J( )R% T)2R%9,G The two&doAen 7hinese )&> bombers were flying in six groups of four, with a separation of a few kilometres between each group. They were flying over the :ailas Mountain range at the moment, and would be passing to the west of Manasarowar 6ake in several minutes. The aircrafts themselves were the 4)5 variant of the venerable bomber, and were at the moment carrying only two :9&>+ 6,7Ms, one under each wing pylon on either side. This configuration allowed them to go for extended range from their staging areas in central 7hina right up to the indo&china border, loiter and assemble without worrying about fuel and then launch their payloads and then return to base without need of in&flight refuelling. 3arlier, the #6,,- high command in *ei!ing had wanted to use the 4:5 variant of the )&>, which was capable of not only capable of carrying six missiles instead of four, but also carry the 9)&'( 6,7M with far greater range. The 9)&'( had a range of around fifteen hundred kilometres, but the current lack of these new missiles due to recent development meant that they were being configured only for launching strategic Nuclear weapons at this time. ,lso, the 4:5 version aircraft were only now coming off the production lines at full capacity, and their shortage had reduced them to carrying the 9)&'( as a strategic nuclear deterrent and thus not available for tactical missile strike use. ,s a result, although the 9)&'( was capable of ranges around fifteen )undred :ilometres, and thus capable of launch from long distances, the :9&>+ had a range of only Two )undred :ilometres, for which purpose, the 7hinese bomber fleet would have to cross the indo&china border near the )imalayan peaks of Nanda 9evi in order to reach within firing range of New 9elhi. The plan had therefore been somewhat convoluted. The basic idea was similar to that taken by the 0ndian 7,7 during operation #0 "T&%TR0:3 and #0 "T&),MM3R, and had involved diverting attention from the north&east into the north and central regions of 0ndia by a massive missile strike. The targets initially chosen by the #6,,- had been the 7,7 and some /,7 airbases in the region, but had been overruled by the 7hinese #remier /ang when the idea had been presented to him. )e had forced the #6,,- to target New 9elhi and thus political targets instead of military ones. That itself was a mistake, but one which the #6,,- chief could not refuse when standing in front of the leader of /orld %ocialism. The tactical plan involved the assembling of the six groups over the Manasarovar and Rakas lakes using the lakes as it as reference points. Then each group of four aircraft would head south

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one by one and pop up and over the )imalayas and launch their missiles, then dive back across the peaks into china and make their escape north. They were within a few minutes flying time of these lakes. The problem was that the pilots had been informed of the 0ndian Baguar aircraft strikes at :haleb only a few minutes earlier, and that the 7hinese radars had been !ammed in the region by escort standoff !ammers. The main radar at :haleb had also been destroyed, and unfortunately for the 7hinese bombers crews, that was to be their local controlling station for this mission. 3ven so, they really didn5t need the radars to guide them. They had their locations on $#%, they knew where New 9elhi was, and that was really all that was re1uired. /hat the 7hinese mission commander was worried about, sitting in the lead aircraft, was the total lack of communications with the local #6,,- units on the ground near :haleb. )e was trying to hail them, but there was no reply and there was no contact from their side either. )e was able to communicate with the six groups using their 2)- systems, and with 7hengdu 9istrict )igh command using %,T7"M systems, but that was all. )e had conveyed his misgivings to his superiors, and had been assured that by the time he would begin his attack runs, there would be %2&.;s and ,/,7% support to guard his aircrafts from the 0,- and that they were already on the way, but for the moment the big lumbering aircrafts around him didn5t seem like a very safe place to him. The first plains were visible from the cockpit of the lead )&> as the bombers reached the foothills of the :ailas mountain range, and there the town of :haleb was visible, not by its infrastructure but by the pillars of smoke within it that were visible all around. 0t had only been minutes before when the Baguars had arrived, and the bright yellow&orange flames f vehicles burning were visible even from this height. To the left side of the cockpit was another awe&inspiring sight of nature, the two huge lakes. They were new visible. 0t was also their main !ump off point. 0t was time to get to work. ,nother few minutes and the first four 7hinese *ombers would pop up from the )imalayas and wreak death and destruction on their enemy5s national capital. %eeing the smoke and fires coming out of :haleb, the 7hinese crews were only too eager to return the favour. /3%T "- $2R6, M,N9),T, #3,:, %"2T) "- R,:,% 6,:3 '@J+ )R% T)2R%9,G -urther south, the ,R7 *&;(; crew had taken evasive action to avoid visual detection and moved from their position south of Rakas lake to near the north&west of #eak ;;.C, referred locally as $urla Mnadhata, !ust near the Nepal&7hina *order. 0ndra radars were now tracking the ,R7 aircraft, and it belonged to the Nepalese. They had been 4donated5 some radars to help them keep an eye on their airspace and to prevent 7hinese airspace intrusion. 0ronically, they were now tracking 0ndian aircraft to their north, and not something they ever expected to see. *ut they didn5t know that it was 0ndian, and the secret nature of the ,R7 mission precluded any conversation with the Nepalese even when they re1uested clarification from the aircraft pilots regarding the nature of their flight near their border. -or all the Nepalese knew, it was !ust another 7hinese spy plane, but mostly the fact remained that they really couldn5t do much about it, having no air defence e1uipment worth speaking of. ,nd the ,R7 aircraft was not really over the border in any case. %o all that the Nepalese ,ir -orce could do was send the information higher up and re1uest clarification. ,nd this they did, and eventually the re1uest for some data reached in the hands of the 0,- air attachQ in the embassy, who refused to comment anything other than that he knew nothing about it and would get back with some more information later. The problem was that now the 0ndian 3/ mission being run by the ,R7 was coming under !eopardy, and there were several ways in which that could happen. The first was that news would

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leak out from some mole in the Nepalese air force that they were tracking an unidentified aircraft near their border, and that would blow the game when the #6,,- found out that it wasn5t their aircraft. 0f the *&;(; moved north to avoid detection from Nepalese radar, the 7hinese bombers would ac1uire them visually. -urthermore, as they were being forced southwards, they were also increasing the range between the ,R7 aircraft and the communications and radar systems it was attempting to !am and disrupt, and once the 7hinese overcame that disruption, the cat was out of the bag. The whole #6,,- fighter fleet would then sweep down into the region to establish air superiority and eliminate the ,R7 aircraft flying within their airspace, and that would spell the end of "peration #0 "T&),MM3R and the current engagement about to take place between the 7hinese bombers and the 0ndian Mirages that were seconds away from launching their missiles. 9espite the risk to themselves, the ,R7 crew had to coordinate with the fighters to help them eliminate the threat to 9elhi, or else hundreds might lose their lives. #0 "T&),MM3R could always be postponed, but the lives could not be recovered later. The 7hinese had not yet launched their cruise missiles, and the four 0ndian fighters cutting through the thin air in this region were trying to make sure that they never would. These four lone 0ndian pilots had no %ituational awareness other than #0 "T& 7,663R, and the ,R7 crew had no intention of leaving them without it. The four Mirage&.(((s constituted #3$,%2% -light, and were without doubt the first line of defence against the 7hinese threat. They were now within range of the 7hinese bombers, but with their radars on standby, they were unaware of this fact and were depending on #0 "T& 7,663R to make tell them when they were within range. That was when they would switch on their radars, ac1uire, illuminate and eliminate their targets. The problem was that there were only four of the 0ndian fighters and twenty&four of the bombers. There was no time to evaluate the danger of some bombers being able to launch their missiles before they were destroyed, but it still weighed on everybody5s minds aboard the ,R7 aircraft. Then it was timeH #3$,%2% "N3, this is #0 "T&7,663R. Gou are within range. 0lluminate the sky. -irst four bombers at your twelve positions. -ollow on bombers behind them. 0nbound threat from %2&.;s east of your position, at very long range. 6ow threat perception at this time. /ill advise. 7ommence firing. $ood luck. #0 "T&7,663R out.? The ,R7 mission commander spoke to the #3$,%2% flight commander. )e had little experience coordinating air force fighters during his career, but desperate times call for desperate measures, and even though he was sure that the #3$,%2% commander didn5t like it either, he had little choice but to listen to the ,R7 3/ mission commander as his was the only shop in town. /hen the R/Rs on the leading four 7hinese bombers suddenly started screeching, it was already too late. The first volley of four ,stra missiles were punched off their pylons by under the wings and they dropped several feet downwards when their propulsion motors ignited and the missile cut through the air in front of the four Mirage&.(((s behind a thin grey white trail of smoke that reached out like fingers of death towards the 7hinese aircraft. There was little reaction time, and for all that, the 7hinese pilots reacted swiftly, flipping their massive aircrafts to one side and deploying massive numbers of flares and chaff behind them, but the missiles were radar directed and not heat seeking, and inwardly all the four crews knew that, but in such cases, you deal every card you have, and they didn5t have enoughH The 7hinese mission commander looking out from one of the side windows cursed his still inbound escorts and the ineptness of the ground radars below him when he saw a very fast moving thin white trial of smoke behind a black speck against the blue sky heading towards his aircraft. )e was unable to complete his curses before there was a !arring explosion and a big white flash consumed himH ,board the *&;(; the crew had been listening on the 7hinese fre1uencies and had heard frantic calls and shouts of the 7hinese pilots as they had attempted to evade the missiles. 0t was a sobering experience, listening to men screaming that they were about to die. "thers had been

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professional to the end, and had probably no given up hope even when they had been hit, but within seconds the voices had died out in 1uick succession, and the numbers of com&systems being tracked, reduced by four, but there were still twenty more. -or the four Mirage #ilots it was a clinically detached experience. There was no audio and no visual. "nly their radars. ,nd these had showed that four huge blips had now disappeared off their screens, and that was that. The next four were being lined up for the slaughter. The #halcon ,/,7% 07T"R&T)R33 to the south of the )imalayan -oothills was not able to see hear or detect anything, and they waited for #0 "T&7,663R to report something. They missed a heartbeat when #0 "T&7,663R came on line. 07T"R T)R33, this is #0 "T&7,663R. #3$,%2% flight has engaged inbound bombers. %plash four bombers. More engaging nowHstand by.? Then the $roup 7aptain aboard the #halcon switched fre1uencies and called ,ir )< to let them know of the situation. They were then informed in turn that reinforcements were on the way. , deal had been reached with Nepal. They had allowed over flights over their airspace when they had been told of the impending strike on New 9elhi and the conse1uences of that strike. The first four %2&+(M:0s were now taking off from *areilly and heading north towards Nepal. They would not be in time to !oin the fracas surrounding the 7hinese bombers and the 0ndian Mirages, but the inbound 7hinese %2&.;s were in for a rude surpriseH T)3 T0*3T,N M"2NT,0N% B2%T /3%T "- R,:,% 6,:3 '@J; )R% T)2R%9,G The first four bombers were going down in flames, and pieces of debris still hadn5t hit the ground when the second ,stra dropped off its pylon under the wing and ignited its motors and again the same story was repeated, but with some differences. The 7hinese pilots coming up behind the first group had seen their comrades go down in front of them at the edge of visual range and they knew that they had been ambushed. ,s soon as they had got over the shock of seeing their comrades perish, they had initiated as steep a dive as their aircrafts could safely accomplish. They were now also more alert, and seconds after the four inbound missiles came within extreme visual range, the eagle&eyed pilots ac1uired them against the blue&sky background, and began to evade. *ut the fundamental difference between a heavy bomber and a small nimble fighter in terms of manoeuvring was now clear to them. Their aircrafts would not follow as their minds wished them to follow, and there were only a fixed number of seconds before the missiles sent them to the ether world. Those seconds were the longest of their lives, and as the missiles reached into their detonation proximity range, each pilot knew that those seconds were over. The second group of four bombers and another group behind them had taken a turn to the north, and were heading towards the town of :haleb in the hope of coming under the protective umbrella of its air defences. They didn5t know that those air defences were blind and deaf since long ago, thanks to the 0ndian 3/ *&;(; flying to the south. The #6, troops fighting the fires left by the 0ndian Baguars in :haleb were only now getting them under control, and barely had their morale started to come up when they first heard the engine noise and then saw the four large bombers coming over their town, each flying erratically, as if trying to evade something. ,nd then they saw why. The trailing bomber in the second group was the first to be hit with the ,stra targeted on it. The missile hit the rear fuselage and detonated in a massive explosion that destroyed the tail, sending the fragmented pieces flying in all directions ahead of a massive cloud of fire and smoke. The front fuselage and wings were remarkably intact, but were no longer flying, and instead spinning in all axes as they headed towards the hills below trailing a thick black column of smoke. Then the other missiles hit their targets.

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The second and third bomber hit were hit in a similar fashion, and had relatively intact fuselages that were nonetheless heading towards the earth before smashing into the gradual slopes around :haleb, in full view of the #6, troops below, who rushed towards the crash site of the third bomber to be hit because it had not exploded on hitting. 0t had actually not hit at all. Rather, it had slid up one of the slopes before it came rolling down the hill in a massive cloud of dust and smoke and then lay on the ground, with the front fuselage still relatively intact. The #6, soldiers on the ground site found that the co&pilot was miraculously alive, though in very bad shape. )e and the pilot had done a remarkable !ob in flying the aircraft after it had been hit, and as a result the co& pilot was still alive, but the pilot was not. The fourth and final bomber of the second group was the last to be hit and was not so lucky. The ,stra targeted on it slammed into it at an angle and hit the fuselage&wing connection and then caused the fuel tanks to explode. This bomber did not come down intact and the massive explosion of the bomber with nearly full fuel tanks and two heavy warheads shattered the buildings around :haleb and sent even more fires raging inside the town as the shabby and weak infrastructure of the town collapsed. The )&> was barely five hundred feet of the ground when it had been destroyed in mid air, and the shock wave had been e1uivalent to a fuel air explosion over the town and the results were horrendous. 9oAens more were killed when the burning pieces of wreckage came crashing down over the town. The aircrafts should never have been over the town in any case, and the pilots should have taken their doomed aircrafts elsewhere were there were no friendly forces around, but having been chased by four lethal missiles had not allowed them to think that way and they had only cared about getting into the air defence Aone around :haleb. %eeing the massive destruction that had been wrought about in :haleb because of the destruction of the four bombers of the second group, along with the ineffectiveness of the local ,ir 9efence systems to protect them, the commander of the third group ordered his bombers to move away from the town and head north& east, into the safety of the :ailas peaks from where they had arrived only fifteen minutes ago. They would not make it that far. )ere things started going wrong for the 0,-. The third group of bombers were moving Northeast, but the forth, fifth and sixth group of bombers were breaking up into pairs and heading to the south, towards the extreme northwest tip of Nepal and incidentally, towards #0 "T&7,663R. 0t would also allow them to reach within missile launch range of *areilly ,-*. 0t was clear that the main strike on 9elhi had been aborted, and that was good news. The bad news was that as these )&> bombers separated into singles and pairs, they were also diffusing and would re1uire the four Mirage&.(((s to split up into 4individuals5, as the pilots referred to such tactics, and then seek out the bombers one by one and engage them. This meant that not all of the bombers could be intercepted, and that some cruise missiles would be launched. ,nd the four %2&+(M:0s heading north towards Tibet via Nepal could not be diverted to this bomber hunt, as they were being vectored towards the inbound flight of %2&.;s by #0 "T&7,663R before they made mincemeat of the Mirages who were now starting to run low on fuel and missiles. The sky was starting to look like it was full of bombers now as the southbound twelve bombers diverged all over the sky into pairs at first and then into singles. 0t was every bomber for itself from now on. The northbound group of four that was heading towards the :ailas peaks now actually had a much better chance of escape, as the 0,- commanders discussed and argued via voice and data links as to whether the Mirage flight should be disengaged from this group and diverted to engage the bomber threat to *areilly or to let the Mirages choose their own targets and let it all play out as bets as it can before the 7hinese %2&.;s entered the chaos in the skies above Manasarovar 6ake. The #3$,%2% commander had no intentions of waiting, and even though he saw on radar the bomber groups splitting up to his southeast, he already had the northbound group lined up and he didn5t want this group to turn towards 9elhi again if he diverted south. Time was of the essence

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and his R/R was already warning him that he was beginning to enter the extreme detection range of the 7hinese G&C ,/,7% that was rushing to the south behind the %2&.;s. ,lthough he could not detect the %2&.;s, he knew they were there, and that he was running out of missiles and fuel. 0t was time to take his shots and then dash south and let the %2&+(M:0s deal with the 7hinese fighters. )e ordered his pilots to engage this group of four bombers with their third missile. The third volley performed every bit as well as the first two and the four bombers fell out of the sky. Twelve down, twelve to go. The four Mirage&.(((s flipped to their side and turned in a tight arc and then headed south and the twelve bombers flying towards *areilly were now in front of them. Things were about to get complicated. They now !ust had one missile each, after which they would have to engage the remaining bombers with their front guns, and that meant eating up a lot of fuel trying to chase down these evading bombers and lining them up in their gun sights. The #3$,%2% commander was actually somewhat relieved that they were heading towards the south now, and his uneasiness earlier as they had headed north into mainland 7hina was reducing. 3ven so, he was now constantly monitoring the fuel level indicators and doing calculations in his head as the four aircraft dashed south to catch up with the bombers. The Mirage has exceptionally good range, but that was assuming they had their main under wing drop tanks. 0n this case, they had had to drop these tanks when they had first engaged the bombers in order to prevent them from launching their cruise missiles. *ut there was little time to think of that now as the first bombers started coming into range, heading south. The white& capped )imalayan peaks were now again visible and showed where Tibet ended and Nepal and 0ndia began. The tight group of four Mirage&.(((s now loosened up as each of them began their individual search for targets. The commander with his fourth and last ,stra missile engaged the first bomber that he had detected. ,nd this time there was visual detection of impact as the Mirages closed in on the lumbering bombers. There was a small orange&yellow flash on the horiAon, against the white snow background of the )imalayan peaks. The commander was now out of missiles, and while he attempted to get close to another bomber he had detected some distance away, all he could do was watch on radar as another Mirage pilot engaged another bomber detected to the east. That target was blotted out within seconds. There were ten more bombers to go. That5s when the worst fears of #0 "T&7,663R came true. The ,R7 *&;(; was now taking the tracking data from the Nepalese radars as the bombers came close to the Nepalese border. The Nepalese government had no air defence systems capable of shooting down this massive 7hinese airspace intrusion threat, and so they were happily giving all their radar data to the 0ndians who were now handing it over to #0 "T&7,663R to help them coordinate with #3$,%2% flight. That radar screen was showing the ten bombers spread out line abreast and within a kilometre of the Nepal&china border. Then one of the blips vanished and a Mirage pilot claimed another kill, but it wasn5t enough. The screen got cluttered as each big radar contact signifying a bomber let loose two fast moving radar contacts heading south. These were the :9&>+ 6,7Ms. There was no stopping them now, and even though all nine remaining bombers might be claimed by the Mirages, the missiles were on their way. Nine )&>s had managed to launch a total eighteen missiles towards *areilly, and these missiles were now skimming over the hills of the %hivalik range, eighty kilometres west of Nainital as they headed towards their target. The 7hinese bombers had thus been forced to abandon their strike on 9elhi only to have them launch their missiles at *areilly ,-*. )ere the missile defences were not nearly as good as those around 9elhi, and it was likely that most of the missiles would get through. -ortunately the base itself was empty, with the remaining few remaining %2&+(M:0s ordered to take to the air immediately. *areilly would be hit, and hit hard, as most 0,- commanders now knew. *ut the damage to the 0,-5s %u&+( fleet should be at a minimum, as only one aircraft on maintenance was to remain on the ground, but that too inside its hardened aircraft shelter.

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The air war about to break out over Tibet between the same %2&+(M:0s from *areilly and the 7hinese %2&.;s was something that was grabbing more attention at 0,- )< at the moment. The missiles were heading south past the beautiful peaks of northern 0ndia ignorant to everything else happening around them. The time to target for these cruise missiles was now barely a few minutesH BAREILLY AIRBASE
NORTHERN INDIA 1''0 HRS THURSDAY The pilots and the /%"s were running towards their aircrafts parked on the operational readiness platform as soon as the scramble order had been given seconds ago. The base was under attack, and these four %2&+(M:0s were the only ones on the ground at the moment, having !ust returned from a 7,# mission over %ikkim. They had not yet been refuelled and the pilots had !ust come out of the cockpit after several hours of flight. They had not even walked back to their readiness room for some rest when the klaxons had started blaring all around the airfield. $round crewmen were running around, trying to get everything of value under cover and then to get back to safety. The pilots and /%"s reached the aircrafts and started strapping themselves in even as the refuelling and rearming trucks drove away from the aircrafts without getting a chance for refuelling them. There simply was no time. The aircrafts had fuel to get into the air, where an 06& ;C tanker aircraft would be diverted on emergency footing to fill up the fuel tanks of these aircrafts. The only priority right now was getting into the air. The engines started rolling when the ,T7 informed that airborne control was being shifted to 07T"R& T)R33 and that they were shutting down operations. The ,T7 crew then evacuated the towers and moved to the air raid shelters even as the first %2&+(M:0 started rolling towards the runway 1uickly followed by the remaining three aircrafts. The four aircrafts were soon in a line heading along the Taxi track towards the main runway. The stipulated time between takeoffs were dispensed with as the lead aircraft lighted the afterburners and was !oined by the second aircraft and these two rolled down the runway and lifted into the air. They were !oined by the remaining two aircrafts within seconds and the formation of four headed southwest towards the nearest tanker aircraft flying and away from the inbound missiles to give the *9P weapons a clear Aone of fire. The 06&;C that had been supporting #0 "T&%TR0:3 and #0 "T&),MM3R Baguar formations was diverted to refuel these four %2&+(M:0s, and halfway to it the low fuel level started worrying the pilots. They would make it, but only !ust. 0t was more than what they could say for the ground crews sitting in their shelters at *areilly, waiting for the missiles to strike. The missiles came over the horiAon of the %hivalik range a minute later and were detected by the *9P close range radars. There were distinct disadvantages for the 0ndian defenders this time around as compared to the morning 7hinese strike on the 0ndian radars in the hills of Nagaland. There the %pyder systems and the radars they were protecting were at an altitude, and looking down into a plain area, and so had sufficient warning of the inbound missile tra!ectories. )ere it was the reverse. The base was in the foothills of the %hivalik mountain range, and thus blinded by this wall. The missiles had simply popped over the hills towards the base. -ortunately for the defenders, the Nepalese radars had detected their launch on radars and this had allowed #0 "T&7,663R to flash a warning to the base via the 7,7 that missiles were inbound, so at least they were looking for them and waiting. *ut it wasn5t enough. -urthermore, the morning strike was from a single thin arc of the overall bearing. That had allowed the missile systems to engage in 1uick succession. )ere, the 7hinese bombers had been dispersed while launching, so the inbound missiles were coming from a larger arc of the bearing, thus forcing the %pyder missile systems to change launch bearings after each launch. ,ll that took time, and combined with the geographic disadvantage, they didn5t have much of it. 7ertainly not enough for engaging all of the eighteen missiles. 3ven now it was clear to everybody that some missiles would get through. 0t was now a race to see how many. The first %pyder system engaged within half a minute of radar ac1uisition as the missile came in range. , massive dust cloud was raised around the launcher and from that cloud came out the missile rapidly gaining speed and trailing a finger of smoke behind it as it headed skywards. 0t then turned down to engage the :9& >+ that was moving lower than it was and reached close enough for a detonation. The explosion of the intercepting missile sent a massive fireball all around and it consumed the cruise missile. The :9&>+ came

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out of the ball of fire still relatively intact, much to the shock of the ground crews watching the event on the radar screens. Then the missile veered off course and smashed into the ground causing a massive explosion whose noise was enough to cause the people at the base to look up, even though the fireball was too far away to be seen. That was the first missile to go down. Then things started moving 1uickly. Two more launchers now released a couple of missiles from the base when the cruise missiles were roughly fifteen kilometres out. The first launcher had to now realign their bearings for the second intercept, something that they wished they could have done without. The second missile secured a hit, and this time the fireball and the shockwave that uprooted trees all around was visible on the horiAon, but the third missile missed and detonated behind the inbound cruise missile. *y the time three more launches were attempted, the interception failure rate had increased to almost a third. "ut of the third volley, only one hit, and the others lost the interception. *y the time the fourth set of launches were attempted the missiles were now in extreme range of visual ac1uisition. This was a problem now. ,s the missiles came closer, they were rapidly closing to the minimum engagement range of the %pyder system for its engagement profile of cruise missiles. %oon the missiles would reach a stage where even if the missiles were launched, they could pop out of their canisters, leap into the air, but by the time they began their 4pop down5 manoeuvre, they would have bypassed the inbound cruise missiles. 0t was in this range that the radar directed ,nti&,ircraft ,rtillery around the base opened fire, and small black explosions now surrounded the incoming dark specks against the blue sky. 0t would not matter. The missiles hit the base before any result could be achieved by this gunfire. The 7hinese had armed their cruise missiles with a variety of warheads, mostly reflecting the nature of their original mission. The first :9&>+ exploded above the main tarmac from where the four %u&+(s had scrambled minutes ago. The warhead was a fuel&air explosive type, and the massive shockwave of that explosion was enough to destroy the entire weak infrastructure on the base and left most of the above ground buildings on fire. The second missile hit the already burning ,T7 and the massive explosion obliterated the structure from the plinth level upwards in a massive fireball. ,nother missile hit the base 06% facility near the runway and consumed it in the dust and smoke cloud. The main trailer was sent flying into the air, falling hundreds of meters away by the sheer force of the explosion. Then the remaining missiles hit in 1uick succession, and the huge thunderclaps echoed around the airbase. *y the time the final missile hit the runway and sending concrete flying in all directions, dust clouds and black pillars of smoke had consumed the base. ,nd the only thing that could be made out amidst all that was the huge flames reaching for the sky. The base was surprisingly 1uiet, with the only noise being that of the raging fires or of some collapsing hanger structure. The people who should have been trying to contain the fires were nowhere to be seen. The fire fighting vehicles were nowhere to be seen, except for a single vehicle that was lying upside down with some dead firemen nearby. The base fire station had been hit. The radar directed gun battery site was now one massive pillar of smoke, and the one %2&+(M:0 that had been on the ground was now lying on the ground, its undercarriage collapsed, and cockpit and mid fuselage shattered with concrete of the roof of the ),% that had also taken a direct hit. The radars were gone and so were the base communications. ,ll contact between the base and 7,7 head1uarters was lost and was not restored. 0t was then that helicopters from nearby airbases were dispatched to head for *areilly ,-*. )owever, the first helicopter to arrive at the base was a 9hruv ,6) from the nearby army aviation unit, and it landed on a small grass clearing near the tarmac, sending the dust flying in all directions as the army officers scrambled from it. They were met by some of the 0,- officers from the *ase "perations facility, which was underground and had survived, although their topside communications had been destroyed. These officers told the army personnel what would be re1uired to begin recovery operations. The helicopter then lifted off and went around the base to look around, but the massive dust and smoke made this haAardous and instead it returned back to its base to fetch more personnel. The ,rmy team was being led by a Ma!or who would coordinate operations until a $roup 7aptain from the 0,-, who was at the moment on board a Mi&'; helicopter, could take over control. %everal local civilian and army units had been contacted and were dispatching fire fighting e1uipment, ambulances, vehicles and soldiers to the base. The initial army team had brought with them the radio and communications e1uipment which they began setting up. These would allow them to coordinate the massive recovery missions that would be needed to return the base to operational status. *ut at the moment, as far as 7,7 operations were concerned, 0,- *areilly had ceased to exist.

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THE TIBETAN MOUNTAINS SOUTH OF RAKAS LAKE 1''* HRS THURSDAY /hile the people at *areilly were facing severe conditions, the Mirages flying over Tibet were facing their own problems. #3$,%2% flight had dispersed to try and find the bombers but their luck was out. The bombers were visible to them but they were out of missiles, and had little fuel to go tail chasing with them. There was one barely within limits that the flight commander chose to engage whilst simultaneously calling for the Mirages to reassemble for the flight south. The Mirage came up behind the now northbound bomber and let loose several bursts of gunfire. The lighted tracer among those bursts illuminating the bullets tra!ectory for him to try and realign as the bomber turned erratically to try and evade. The first two bursts of gunfire barely clipped the bomber and it started trailing smoke from the port wing, but as the commander started aligning himself for another shot, the fuel started reaching dangerously low levels. )e had now about enough fuel to cross the border and mate up with one of the tankers. There was no choice. )e abandoned the final bomber and pulled his aircraft towards the south. The four mirages were now west of $urla Mandhata peak and heading southwest towards the 0ndian border, marked by the white peaked hills around Nanda 9evi that were now visible. ,ll four aircraft were scattered, out of missiles, low on fuel, and the pilots were exhausted after forty minutes of continuous combatHbut they had done the !ob. 3ight 7hinese bombers were on their way home, with one trailing smoke, but they had aborted their attack on 9elhi, and that was all that mattered. The strike on *areilly was on a military facility, and it could be repaired. The one on 9elhi had not been. The four Mirage&.(((s now had little fuel to waste on forming up and so they crossed the peaks around Nanda 9evi, scattered and individually, with little cockpit chatter. Now the fuel was getting dangerously low for all of them, and their original tanker had been diverted to fuel the scrambled %ukhois from *areilly. ,s a result, a second 4*attle 7ry5 06&;C that had been scrambled from ,gra some time back was now meeting up with them over 4Bolly $rant5 airfield in the foothills of the )imalayas and would remain on station after refuelling the four aircraft to support the four %2&+(M:0s that were now heading north to take over the escort mission for #0 "T&7,663R. #0 "T&7,663R itself would remain on station, having fuel for some more time, and this time it would be protected by these %ukhois. ,nother eight %2&+(M:0s were being scrambled to head north. 3ither side would not make the same mistake again. The first 7hinese %2&.;s were now !ust about to reach the region and were currently over the :ailas mountain range, and about to bypass the northbound force of eight of their )&>s. , 7hinese G&C ,/,7% aircraft was behind the %2&.;s and would need a little more time to catch up. ,s the ,R7 *&;(; detected more aircraft, the pilots decided to move further south for safety. /ith that the disruption period of 7hinese communications and radars was over, and the electronic threat warning picture lit up all across the board immediately. The 7hinese were now looking for the 0ndian standoff 3/ aircraft, and after repeated discussions with 7,7 commanders, it was decided that the threat to #0 "T&7,663R was simply too high. The *&;(; was told to cross back into 0ndia immediately, and soon after receiving the orders, the aircraft turned ever so gently and moved south, thus bringing to a close operation #0 "T& %TR0:3 and the 7hinese bomber hunt. The four %2&+(M:0s on the ambush mission over Nepal were told to head south to the foothills and wait there. Their !ob was not yet over, and would follow close on the heels of another 7,7 operation, now named8 #0 "T&),MM3R.

ARUNACHAL PRADESH
FOOTHILLS OF THE HIMALAYAS 16#0 HRS THURSDAY The border with Tibet was now to be guarded properly, and further aircraft from the /,7 were being earmarked for transfer to the 7,7. There was to be no let up in operations, but no one at ,ir head1uarters could now deny that the war could be contained to the 3,7. 0t had now spilled over into total war. /hile the air force 7,7 and 3,7 were waging an all&out air campaign over Tibet and the N3, the army was about to begin its own air operations over the Tibetan mountains and the )imalayas. /hile the 6eh based D0 7orps staff was waiting for its orders, 0 7orps was already launching operations. 0n the hilly terrain north of

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*omdila, a flat strip of land had been carved out months earlier. The strip was rectangular and barely sufficient for the !ob at hand. 3ven so, under the now setting sun, which was creating long shadows in the valleys, two %earcher&00 2, s was being given a final inspection by the army aviation ground crew. They wanted to be sure that their mounts for the air surveillance missions over the border were functioning properly. Takeoff was scheduled in another ten minutesH The army had been watching the brutal air war over Tibet since morning, and had concluded by the afternoon that it could not be controlled. The 7hinese had responded to the 0,- operations with a heavy hand, and 9elhi had barely been saved. There were now more 7hinese fighters over Tibet than the 0,could handle, and despite the denials of the 7,7 commanders, the 0,- had shifted to the defensive for the moment. The situation now developing was what the army commanders had feared. The 0ndian air force was very heavily involved in its fight for survival and the country5s airspace defence that there were little assets for supporting the army. There were !ust too many 7hinese aircrafts for the 0,- to handle and still make a difference for the army5s operations. 0t was time to take matters into their own hands, and that5s what the ,rmy ,viation units were raised for. The army5s re1uirement from the air force had always been surveillance of enemy positions. )owever, since this morning5s incidents, there were little assets other than satellites that could be diverted to the army5s use, and satellites only made one pass over an area before disappearing over the horiAon and by the time they returned, the enemy was gone. 0t had always been like this. Gou could track the status of fixed targets like airfields, command centres and even general corps level movements, but tactical movements were difficult to track and easy to conceal by the enemy. That5s where 2, s came in. They could loiter over an area for hours at a time, tracking the smallest of enemy movements and provide real time tactical battlefield information on the enemy. That was more useful to 0 7orps at the moment, because it was clear that some sort of ground action was about to happen here. %ince this morning 0 7orps staff officers had been receiving information from the 90, that enemy forces were moving into positions near the border north of Tawang, but that they didn5t know the exact composition of the units. The army instead had attempted several missions using )erons from TeApur but 7hinese units were always well concealed or froAe their operations as soon as the )erons started looking down. The army was sure that these 2, s were not being detected, since they were being flown in the shady detection Aones of the 7hinese radars at the border, but the 7hinese still knew about their presence. "ne theory was that the 7hinese were using satellites to monitor the operations at the TeApur 2, base, and to prove or disprove that theory four %earcher&00 aircraft had been dispatched under all secrecy to a highly secret landing field north of *omdila. Now, the first set of two operations were about to begin as darkness fell so that the 7hinese observation posts at the border could be relatively blinded by the darkness to avoid visual ac1uisition of the aircraft. "ne aircraft was earmarked for each mission. The first mission would take the first searcher, call sign T,70T&*623, towards the west, into *hutan, and then north from there to check the )imalayan passes for enemy presence and hence any threat to *hutan itself. That mission had been re1uested by the *hutanese $overnment and been granted by the 0ndian $overnment. The mission results were to be handed over via army high command to the commander of the 0ndian Military Training Team or 0MTR,T, in *hutan, to be shown to the *hutanese %overeign and his army commanders. 0f a threat did exist, then some action would be re1uired and would have to be executed by the units of DDD000 7orps whose units were now waiting south of the *hutanese border at their !ump&off points. This was a very critical mission, but less sensitive because the %earcher wouldn5t exactly have to cross the border to get the proper viewing angle. This wasn5t the case for T,70T&R39, the second searcher&00, who would have no proper obli1ue viewing angles while looking into 7hina from north of Tawang, thanks to the truly massive peaks of the region, part of what is known as the $reat )imalayas. The peaks of this region rose to altitudes above .+((( feet, and the rocks had never ever been without snow. The region was permanently below snow, and beyond it were the 7hinese armed forces. "f course, the 7hinese would have to move via some known and predictable passes to get the border with 0ndia, but that would be the 4too late5 time, when little preventive action could be taken. 0f the 0ndian army was to stop the 7hinese land assault in these hills, they had to know what was behind the $reat )imalayas right now. That meant that T,70T&R39 would have to cross the border and loop behind these mountains from the west, near to the *hutan&0ndia&7hina border !unction, into the heavily defended 7hinese airspace. ,nd that meant that the T,70T&R39 mission commander was going to be having an exciting night. #roper groundwork had been done, of course. The 7hinese radars had been located via satellite and 0,-

74

37M aircrafts as well as ,R7 clandestine missions over the years. The maximum ranges, altitudes, power and line of sight of these radars had been found. , flight&path between the so&called 4%hady5 detection Aones had been programmed into the flight control system and maps. "ne great relief for the 0ndian planners was that if things did indeed go wrong and the aircraft was detected and destroyed, there was no one sitting inside them, and that got rid of one big conscience problem. There was another aspect to this mission that was as secretive as the flight itself. The planners knew all along that the mission would involve hiccups. The ma!or one being a 7hinese long&range radar system mounted on the western slope of peak @.C., and was situated at a high position on the massive ';((( feet peak. 0t could not be avoided and it would pick up the %earcher&00 as soon as it moved northwards from Tawang. That radar was at so high an altitude that it was inside the permanent snow region of that slope. 0t had been taken up there piece by piece over the years and had since become the bane of 0ndian helicopter pilots flying sorties to Tawang, and who had nicknamed this powerful radar 4Red&eye5, in accordance with the allegiance and !ob of the radar station. The radar itself was built along western lines, and housed inside a big white dome on top of a concrete base to protect it from the high, winds and the cold air at that altitude. This was a permanent 7hinese facility since the last few months and had the power and range to look deep inside 0ndia, most of whose territory was below the @((( feet altitude of the radar site. 0t was for this reason that the 0ndian ,/7,% aircraft had been forced to fly south, over ,ssam, and not further north, since the last few days. 0t had caused a problem to the 0,- before, and it was causing a problem now. 0t had to be taken out. The solution to this problem was a thing of beauty. 4Red&eye5 was within fifteen kilometres of the 0ndian border, but afforded no direct line of sight for attack. *ut it was also within forty kilometres of another peak inside *hutan that was at an altitude of '>((( feet, called peak JC=+. There a direct electronic line of sight existed to the 7hinese radar, because no other peaks were in the way, and *hutan was allied with 0ndia since this morning. ,s a result, in the afternoon, at a *hutanese army )elipad near 9Aong had landed an 0ndian Mi&'; helicopter carrying two highly palletised cargo containers and some other attachment gear. Two *hutanese army trucks had been re1uisitioned by the 0MTR,T, and the palletised cargo had been loaded inside the two trucks and sent north&east towards Tarphe and from there to a location on some flat ground on the northern slope of hill&JC=+. The #alletised containers had been opened and then fixed onto their mechanical mount which in turn was fixed on the flatbed rear of one of the trucks. ,fter some testing it was again covered with camouflage netting and tarpaulin and the disposable material had been cleared off. The 0MTR,T officers and soldiers, along with their *hutanese comrades had then moved to set up their comm.&gear and the overall commander, a 6ieutenant 7olonel, had contacted the 0MTR,T head1uarters to let them know that the T,70T&#,T)-0N93R team was ready. -rom this altitude the doAen 0ndian soldiers and the two *hutanese 6iason officers could actually see the 4Red&eye&mountain5 and were trying to use heir high power optical scopes to see what their eyes could not, but their two 4)unter&birds5, as they referred to their weapons, could. *ack in ,runachal #radesh, the 2, base north of *omdila was under hectic activity. The T,70T&*623 %earcher&00 had its engine running at the end of the runway and was making a slight buAAing noise in the high cold winds blowing around the field. The airbase itself was one big rectangular patch of land. ,t one end of this field were the 2, s, hidden under 7amouflage nettings. ,t the other corner were the several mission control trailers of aircraft and several trucks for logistics and supplies were parked all around. The first %earcher lifted off the ground gently into the wind and headed west, and the commander watched the aircraft lift off before walking back into the trailer and closing the door behind him. The other mission commander was still waiting as the second %earcher came from under the netting hanger and turned smartly towards the end of the runway before facing the wind and then stopped. The engine was brought up to full power and soon it also lifted off the ground and this time the aircraft went north by northwest, before disappearing over the hills surrounding the base. ,s soon as the noise drowned out, the mission commander for T,70T&R39 moved into his command trailer, closed the door behind him and picked up the phone to inform 0 7orps )< that the mission was on. That5s when another call went out via encrypted %,T7"M data links directly to the 0MTR,T head1uarters as well as the T,70T&#,T)-0N93R team in northeastern *hutan.

75

THE TACIT)PATHFINDER TEAM

PEAK &(+#, THE "REAT HIMALAYAS NORTHEASTERN BHUTAN 16&' HRS THURSDAY -our 0MTR,T soldiers were busy removing the white camouflage netting over the *hutanese army trucks while another three, led by a young 6ieutenant, were busy setting up the remote launching unit, a doAen or so meters away from the flatbed truck launcher. The distance should have been more, but at this slope this was all they had. *eyond this was a big precipice, and on the other side was a massive vertical rock face. ,t this small physical separation, if there were to be some malfunction, and an associated sympathetic explosion, they would all be killed. *ut the built&in testing circuits inside the 4)unter *irds5 were confirming that the system was working fine. 3ven under such harsh environmental conditions. %oon the flat bed truck was in the open, and the driver aligned the vehicle in a direction perpendicular to what the proposed direction of launch would be. Then the launcher itself was rotated about its mounting on the launcher via the remote launch control, and the direction set roughly towards 4Red&eye mountain5. The proper aAimuth was set via the remote control and then the Aenith as the launcher moved to the proper vertical angle about its launcher pivot. The whole process took about ten minutes. The two hunter drones were now ready for launch. , young lieutenant of the 0ndian army kept a small tripod on the ground and mounted a small rod like structure on it that opened up into a small circular&netted&dish receiver array the moment his hand was lifted from it and pointed upwards. )e connected a few cables to the receiver from his communications set and picked up the phone like talker&receiver set and tuned in the proper settings before giving it to his 7", the 0MTR,T 6ieutenant 7olonel. The colonel took it from him and ordered the lieutenant to contact the 0MTR,T 7ommand 7entre in *hutan, which was his the next higher step in his chain of command that was eventually to end at the $"7, 0 7orps. The set&up of contact took a couple of seconds after which the 7olonel spoke into the receiver. This is T,70T&#,T)-0N93R "ne. /e are in location and ready to execute. /aiting for launch command. "ver.? #,T)-0N93R&"ne, this is T,70T&,%%0%T. /e copy your operational readiness status. %tandby for launch commandH? the 0MTR,T communications officer at the main command centre looked over to his boss, a Ma!or&$eneral of the 0ndian army, and the overall commander of 0MTR,T in *hutan, and he was speaking looking over a communi1uQ from 0 7orps )< that had come in minutes ago. )e finished the reading and notified his officers that the mission was a go. That5s when the 6ieutenant colonel standing in the hills next to his launcher with the receiver to his one ear and a hand to drown out the wind noise on the other ear heard the reply he was waiting for. #,T)-0N93R&"ne, this is T,70T&,%%0%T. 6aunch authority has been given. 0 say again. 6aunch authority has been given. 7onduct operations immediately. /e are time critical on this. T,70T&R39 and S*623 are on their way. 9estroy 4Red&eye5. 0f possible, confirm visual. 3xit after impact via egress route alpha. $ood luck. "ver and out? that was the point where the activity picked up as the colonel ordered immediate launching of the two 4)unter&birds5. ,fter checking all the details, all the 0MTR,T and *hutanese soldiers moved behind cover of the rocks where the remote launching control was located. /hen the last soldier was under cover the 6t& 7olonel ordered the lieutenant to launch the first drone. That5s when his finger depressed the launch button and the ground shook slightly. The first 4)arpy5 drone leaped out of its container on the back of the *hutanese army truck and 1uickly built up speed as it gained altitude and headed north&east. , second drone was launched seconds later and it too headed in the same direction. There were negligible dust clouds thrown up during both launches, and that was due to the rocky nature of the terrain coupled to the falling snow. ,s the second drone left the truck, the two launch containers were now empty. ,ll that was visible now were the two rapidly shrinking yellow dots against the dark blue sky that were heading in the general direction of the massive white covered peaks over the border into china.

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CHINESE LON" RAN"E RADAR FACILITY, RED)EYE PEAK '*(*, THE "REAT HIMALAYAS CHINA 16'0 HRS THURSDAY The snow had begun to fall in this region of the )imalayas because of the high altitude. The 7hinese radar dome was all but cloaked due to the snow around it that made visual ac1uisition difficult. 0nside the dome, however, the big radar was rotating normally as the 7hinese operators at the station continued to monitor 0ndian air activity in the Northeast. The new build +&9 radar was relatively powerful, and built for long&range detection of airborne threats deep inside enemy airspace. This high power output continues to dissipate from the source as it heads radially outwards, making it impossible t track small drone type airborne vehicles at longer ranges. ,t close ranges, this same high power output is especially useful in detecting the smaller threats. 0n this case, the launch site for the )arpy drones was a mere forty kilometres, and as a result it was picked up immediately after its launch. The problem was that the time taken by the drone to fly directly towards this radar facility before it switched to its terminal diving flight profile was very less. The close launch of the drones had negated the necessary reaction time needed by the 7hinese radar operators to shut down their radar and so cause the drones to break off and abort their attacks. ,nd for such high capability radars the time for winding down operations is somewhat more that for the older systems. ,nother problem was the rigid discipline enforced throughout the 7hinese military. No !unior level officer could shut down operations inside such a facility before 4consulting5 his base commander, and this led to time consuming processes even as the drones raced towards the source of the radar emissions. *y the time the radar was shut down, the drones had begun their diving manoeuvres. ,fter that they were impossible to stop. The first drone smashed into the dome structure and exploded on its outer walls upon impact. The warhead was relatively small and the 7hinese construction was robust, which prevented the dome from collapse, although it launched hundreds of red hot shrapnel and debris ricocheting around the inside of the dome and impacting the radar itself and peppering its receiver array with enough holes that it would need permanent replacement. Then the second drone smashed into another part of the dome and this impact, coupled with the weakening of the dome due to the first impact finally caused the dome to come crashing down upon itself and the radar inside it. That5s when the screens in front of the 7hinese operators sitting inside an underground bunker nearby went blank. The 0MTR,T team to the southwest had set up a couple of high power optical scopes at their base camp, and from there they saw the two small orange balls of fire and the resulting small column of smoke coming out of 4Red&eye5. The siAe of the small explosion disappointed the officers somewhat and sent some doubts into their head regarding the success of their mission. They had no way of visually confirming the shut down of 4Red&eye5 operations from where they were and would have to wait to receive the results from 0MTR,T command. They packed up their e1uipment and the two *hutanese army trucks pulled out of the small clearing and headed south towards Tarphe and then to 9Aong where the 0ndian ,ir -orce Mi&'; was waiting at the *hutanese army helipad to airlift them back to their base near the *hutanese 7apital. ,t the T,70T&R39 Mission 7ommand Trailer at the 2, base north of *omdila, as well as inside the #halcon ,/,7% 4 07T"R&"N35, flying over ,ssam, the 3/ operators noted that a ma!or source of 7hinese emissions had shut down and vanished from their screens. , closer look showed that it was the 4Red&eye5 facility, and that provided confirmation of the effectiveness of T,70T&#,T)-0N93R operations. , path had been carved out in the 7hinese picket fence radar network for the T,70T&R39 %earcher&00 to use to sneak into 7hina. /ith that, the 0ndian ,rmy5s 0 7orps had commenced its first active operations in the war against 7hinese forces. 0t was now only a matter of time before the #6, did the same. The %earcher&00 2, now headed towards Tawang and from there it turned north towards 7hina.

THE SEARCHER)II UAV, TACIT)RED

NORTHWEST OF THE CHINESE RED)EYE FACILITY

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CHINA 1,00 HRS THURSDAY The 0ndian searcher&00 2, was now over the border and heading north from the west slope of peak @.C. that, incidentally, was also where the now disabled 7hinese radar facility had been. 0n fact, as the searcher had passed near the facility, the operators had been treated to some close&ups of the damaged radar dome at the 7hinese facility. 7ounter detection by the 7hinese soldiers at the station was minimal since the 2, had passed at the edge of the human visual range and had used its powerful optical scopes to look at the base. The visual data had been passed on to some specialists via data links for the *attle 9amage ,ssessment or *9,, where it would be decided if a second strike would be re1uired to finish off what the first strike missed. The damage to the dome and the radar inside it looked extensive even to the untrained eye, and the collapsed dome structure on top of the radar receiver array could be made out from a first look itself. "n top of that what was left of the array was peppered with holes and exposed to the harsh winds and snow now that the dome over it was gone. /orst of all, the 7hinese would have to bring in the repair e1uipment via airlift or trucks coming on steep gradient roads, which would re1uire them to wait until morning when the sun would come up and the winds would die down. That meant that the 4Red&3ye5 facility was out of operations for the next twelve hours at a bare minimum. The electronic corridor into china was now open. "f course, the 7hinese could do the same to 0ndian radars as well, as a result of which the only radars working close to the 7hinese border were the mobile ones that were kept moving every few hours, and ones that had protection from air&to&air configured Mig&.'s from Borhat. Now that the %earcher was inside china, the aerial surveillance work began. -irst up was the surveillance of the roads leading up to the border crossing at *um&6a. This was the location from where Tawang was a mere doAen kilometres away. 0t was also one of the few passes that were at a somewhat lower altitude than others through the $reat )imalayan peaks to the east. 0n '=>. the 7hinese had attacked in force here, and had captured Tawang and further areas to the south all the way to the region around *omdila and even further south in other sectors as the 0ndian 0 7orps units reeled and disintegrated under the immense pressure of the 7hinese infantry assaults. This time, 0 7orps was determined to prepare itself for all possibilities. Tawang was also strategically important. 2nlike the month long war in '=>., driven by the infantry and artillery of both sides, this war was going to get over in week, with both sides utiliAing everything from missiles, armoured vehicles, artillery, helicopters and aircraft to ensure swift strikes into the enemy rear areas. 0nfantry would play a role, but mostly as a holding force or as manoeuvring forces on flanking missions via passes that were impassable for vehicles. 0f one accepted this it was pretty obvious that both sides would look to utiliAe low altitude passes through the )imalayan ranges to ensure the movement of their armoured forces. 0n this sector of the Northeast, the only ma!or low altitude pass was the one through *um&6a, east of peak @.'J, and that led to Tawang. -urthermore, Tawang was the terminal !unction for the main railway line and road that led to the south via the Nuranang ,rmy camp, then to *omdila and further south all the way to TeApur. 0f a massive vehicle bound force broke through the defences around Tawang, assisted by heavy air strikes and helicopter forces, the #6, could push all the way to the foothills of the )imalayas, continuously pushing the 0ndian forces into the plains and causing a repeat of the '=>. campaign, albeit in a shortened timeframe. This could not be allowed even if it was merely theoretical. 0 7orps had deputed the @T) Mountain 9ivision MM9N, assisted by units of the .'%T 0nfantry 9ivision and armoured units of '%T ,rmoured 9ivision to hold the inevitable 7hinese assaults in and around Tawang. The ma!ority of the .'%T was based further to the east, where the assaults would be mostly the classic infantry types as a result of the lack of suitable roads for vehicular movement. ,t the moment, a single s1uadron of T&=(s of the '%T ,9 was based at Tawang and another three were being transported on flatcars by trains via the main rail&line from TeApur. This was another possible chokepoint for the 0ndian forces. 2nlike the 7hinese who had taken up massive infrastructure moderniAation over the years and had improved their roads, bridges and deployed railway tracks, the successive 0ndian governments had taken a lacklustre view on this issue. ,t some level the 0ndian army was to blame as well. Their strategy of not deploying infrastructure in the region to slow an enemy advance reflected the defensive thinking persistent in generals who had seen the debacle of >. when they were !unior level officers. 0t had taken a new generation of officers and the resurgence in the confidence of the army so that they had started thinking aggressively and started

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reciprocating the 7hinese moves. 2nfortunately by this time the 7hinese were far ahead, and now the 0ndian army was going to pay a price for that lack of foresight. ,t the moment there was only a single rail&line to Tawang and if this got cut off, the @T) M9 and others would be fighting with Aero logistics that is the blood of today5s modern high&tech armies. ,ll of this thinking had seen the planning and execution of the T,70T&R39 and T,70T&*623 missions to determine whether the 7hinese were indeed looking at this area of operations with more than a causal interest. The data from the 2, s was being sent directly to the main command centre of the @T) M9 as well as to 0 7orps )<. 0n both locations the data was expected with wariness and anticipation by the army generals. That would become clear in another minute as the searcher5s optical cameras looked down towards the main 7hinese line of advance towards *um&6a. The view could not have been better, and although the lighting was low, thanks to the time of the day, the meandering road heading south was clearly visible on the screen. ,nd it was empty at the moment. The cameras Aoomed to follow the road from the border !unction all the way north till the range of its cameras and there was nothing to be seen, except for the abandoned 7hinese guard buildings at the border crossing itself. This meant that there were no 7hinese forces within thirty kilometres of the border. *ut that was inconclusive and the mission wasn5t over yet. The %earcher&00 now moved further north. The first activity noted by the operators that wasn5t normal was the presence of 7hinese artillery systems at thirty&five kilometres from the border. That should not have been problematic, as each side had stationed these systems close to the border for decades. The problem was that this wasn5t towed type gun artillery. These were several doAen parked self&propelled artillery systems and they were hunkered down for rapid movement, not for deployment, and that wasn5t funny. They were covered with camouflage netting and doAens of tents erected nearby, with the soldiers milling about. ,t least they showed that they weren5t planning to move anytime soon, although 4soon5 could mean anything from fifteen minutes to half an hour only. That was the level of time compression that now existed in the modern battlefield. Now the real #6, deployments came into view, and showed what could only be a 9ivisional or even an ,rmy level vanguard forming up. )eavy in infantry and soft skinned vehicles. ,nd these were parked a mere kilometre from the road heading to *um&6a. There were several helipads where the P&'( attack helicopters were parked and a single one was flying northwards. These looked like the Mangusta model of attack helicopters, and that evolution bloodline could not be discounted, seeing the 7hinese talent for reverse engineering. The air activity was now reaching heavy levels and showed large number of heavy helicopters flying around. This was the point where the %earcher was to hold its northward advance and turn to the west to get proper obli1ue viewing angles. /hen that manoeuvre was completed, the cameras were again brought into view and that revealed what the 0ndian army did not want to see. There were doAens of 7hinese Type&== M*Ts lined up one behind the other along the main road to *um&6a with hundreds of additional vehicles behind them. There was literally a ten&kilometre line of armoured vehicles lined up one behind the other. The 90, satellites that had covered this area in the morning showed that the 7hinese were moving the armoured units to this region and flying more units from central china via 6hasa. %o it wasn5t as if the news was surprising to the 0ndians. /hat was new to them was the location where the 7hinese had chosen to deploy their vehicles. ,nd it was now clear where the main 7hinese line of advance would be. ,nd that called for action. The T,70T&R39 Mission 7ommander was now ordered to stop the searching and to start fixing the locations of the 7hinese deployments in anticipation of air strikes on them. 0f the 0ndian army had chokepoints, so did the 7hinese. They had filled their roads with vehicles in anticipation for a possible nighttime assault on 0ndian positions north of Tawang, and the 0ndian defences were not yet totally ready to handle such an assault. That meant that the 0ndian army needed to buy some time for it to deploy fully in the field. They had now looked at the cards that the #6, had to play, and were interested in taking full advantage of it. Minutes after the first set of target listings were downloaded by 0 7rops, several +((mm %merch M6R% vehicles of a battery moved out from their camouflage netting and into the small plain ground that lay before them near Tawang. They came to a halt and then the twelve launch tubes were raised from their lock&down positions and then turned in the horiAontal plane until their aAimuth was aligned.

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The first targets were the 7hinese artillery systems laagered to the north of the great )imalayan peaks.

T)3 ,R3, N"RT) "- T,/,N$ ,R2N,7),6 #R,93%) 0N90, ';+@ )R% T)2R%9,G The first +((mm Rocket pro!ectile left the launch tube on top of a vast cone of fire and smoke as it accelerated off the ground. 0t was followed by doAens of others as all the %merch launchers got into the action and soon the hills around the region were filled by a cacophony of 4swishing5 noises as all the launchers attempted to empty their barrels in the minimum of time. /ithin seconds this !ob was done, and all that was left of the launch site was a massive cloud of dust. *efore the dust came down, the dust covered launcher trucks moved out from within and headed south towards their next ammo drop Aone in anticipation of a second launch that was already being drafted for them. The *attery commander was witnessing the first launch. )e was standing on top of his command trailer, half a kilometre away from the launch site itself. ,s soon as the first batch of rockets were on their way to the targets, he put down his binoculars and clambered down from the roof and walked inside the trailer and shut the door behind him. There he picked up a phone and informed 7orps 7+0 that the first 4fire mission5 had been executed by his forces. This allowed the T,70T& R39 searcher operators sitting at the 2, base north of *omdila to get into a proper viewing angle and allow visual ac1uisition of battle damage and second strike re1uirements. ,t the target itself, the first detection of the inbound rockets was done by several 7hinese observation posts at the south slopes of the $reat )imalayas. They were 1uick to contact their commanders about the impending attack, but human reaction can never match the speed of artillery rockets, and by the time the warning ran out, the first rockets were overhead and diving. The rockets were not loaded with conventional impact type warheads, but carrying the cluster munitions and fragmentation warheads. This allowed them to achieve in a single salvo what would generally take two or three salvoes to achieve, especially against soft skinned targets and infantry in the open. The attack was devastating. The large fields being used by the #6, to laager their self propelled artillery systems numbered five. ,nd each was targeted by a single salvo of twelve +((mm rockets. The grounds were of pretty large siAe, and despite the highest of accuracy, it was tacitly accepted that another salvo would be need to finish the !ob. The 1uestion then was, where exactlyI The answer to that 1uestion belonged with the T,70T&R39 team, who would have to decide on the parameters of the second strike after the first one had hit. ,t the moment their cameras showed that the vehicles were under camouflage netting and the crews were in the open or inside their tents. None had the faintest idea of what was happening. That didn5t last for long, and the high& resolution cameras showed the faces of the 7hinese soldiers as the looked up at the source of the noise. That5s when the camera showed people running around and half a second later the flat grounds were saturated with hundreds of small explosions that peppered the entire area with red& hot shrapnel. The entire area was covered in a small dust cloud and within it several fireballs raced skywards, while more appeared as the first ones turned into black smoke. ,ll five fields were now covered with smoke when the dust finally settled down after a few minutes. There were very few things moving. %ome of which were the %elf&propelled vehicles whose armour had not been penetrated and whose crew had been lucky enough to be inside the vehicle when the attack had begun. These were now trying to move out the grounds but were being obstructed by disabled vehicles or burning ones.

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0t was only a matter of time before they were free to move and after that would follow the #6, artillery counterstroke. ,lready the 7hinese artillery tracking radars had fixed the 0ndian launch site. The 0ndian second strike against these targets would have to follow within seconds now. 0t was now race to see whether the 0ndians reloaded first or the 7hinese were able to orient themselves. 0t also meant that the second salvos could not be used against the parked 7hinese tanks and ,#7s or against the helipads north of there. That was to prove costly. There was assistance available for the %merch launchers. The other 0ndian artillery batteries based around Tawang were the tube based ones and their range was roughly same as that of the 7hinese self propelled artillery. The first rocket strike had achieved its motive of instilling shock, confusion, immobility and mayhem. Now the good old fashioned work began as five '@@mm Tube artillery batteries deployed in a star fashion around Tawang opened fire with the old fashioned impact warheads, although one gun of each battery was firing sub&munitions based warheads for that special added effect. These rounds began hitting the disabled 7hinese artillery bases and attempted to finish off what the rockets had not. -or all that was falling on top of them, the 7hinese weren5t cowards. They knew that it would take a lucky shot to impact the top of the turret of their self&propelled vehicles and the law of probability was with them. 3ven if their tracks were disabled, they could still fire. %everal of the self&propelled vehicles began returning fire into the 0ndian artillery sites and with that the artillery duel began. The 7hinese were heaving outnumbered as a result of the initial attack, something that was new for the 0ndian army, and which couldn5t last long. The 7hinese rounds were being concentrated at the northernmost 0ndian '@@mm gun battery, and it was being battered to death as each successive gun was knocked out. The 7hinese gunfire was reducing as well, as the T,70T&R39 %earcher team coordinated with the 0ndian battery commanders and fixed fire on one 7hinese %elf #ropelled gun till it was destroyed before shifting fire to another gun. 0t was like aiming a machine gun firing alternate tracer rounds. The searcher team coordinated fire on a 7hinese gun until they saw the turret of that vehicle flying into the air on top of a fireball or when they saw the crew abandoning the vehicle and running away. 0t was starting to have effect but in return the northernmost gun battery had taken murderous losses and now only had a few guns operational that were continuing to fire at as fast a speed as they could, despite their casualties. The entire scenario was being played as a slugging match and sooner or later something had to give. 0t did. Bust as soon as the 0ndian ,rtillery commander for the Tawang area thought he was seeing a slackening in the enemy artillery attacks, suggesting that the sector north of Tawang had been sanitiAed of 7hinese ,rtillery, and that he could soon divert fire to the tanks that were his primary targets, all hell broke loose. ,rtillery shells began falling along the entire ,runachal #radesh border with 7hina. The power of the 7hinese artillery armies became powerfully clear to the 0ndian army. %hells were now falling at all ma!or bases within range of 7hinese artillery in addition to the forward areas. -ortunately for the @T) Mountain 9ivision soldiers deployed around Tawang, their supporting artillery had wiped out their 7hinese counterparts before the 7hinese began their assaults. ,s a result they didn5t have to bear the assault themselves, but as unit after unit of the .N9 Mountain 9ivision and some units of the .'%T started screaming on the radios that they were under artillery assault, a grim picture began to come into view. 0t was clear that the 7hinese had not been ready to launch a ground attack when the 0ndian rockets had been launched, and they sure as hell couldn5t be ready now. 0t was therefore clear that the 7hinese artillery assaults along the entire border were retaliatory in nature and an attempt to avenge the devastating artillery assaults north of Tawang. /hether these attacks were successful or not remained to be seen, but except for the sector north of Tawang, it seemed highly unlikely that any ground invasions would be launched before morning. The bulk of the 7hinese artillery attacks were being faced by the .N9 M9 in the extreme northeast of ,runachal #radesh as well as several regiments of the .'%T 0nfantry, who were supporting the .N9 M9. -or the soldiers of these units it was going to be long night.

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The second %merch rocket salvoes impacted the same ground that they had hit during the first, and this time the results were achieved. -aced with heavy '@@mm warheads being targeted one by one on their vehicles like rifle fire and now faced with hundreds of falling cluster munitions that laid waste their tracks and disabled several gun barrels was the last straw for the 7hinese crews. The handful of vehicles who were not yet disabled were ordered to pull out, leaving behind doAens of burning or immobiliAed %elf #ropelled $uns, burning tents, many dead crews and a cratered landscape of what had once been a flat ground. "f another few vehicles that were disabled and immobile, the crews !umped out. They faced a grim prospect as they were now entering into the open with no protection against the falling shells. Many were cut to pieces as they ran but many others made it and !umped on the remaining vehicles as they sped northwards, ending the artillery battle for the Tawang sector of operations. 0n return, the 0ndian army had lost an entire battery of towed artillery guns. /ith the massive casualties suffered within that battery, it was as good as decimated. *ut four batteries remained, and so did the rocket artillery battery, and despite the loss, they needed to get back to work, and were demanding targets over the radios. That was the !ob of T,70T&R39. 0t shifted its cameras to the left and brought the 7hinese tank column into view. That5s where the shock lay. The tanks were moving. They weren5t moving north either. The #6, 9ivisional commander had decided that with the loss of his artillery, he couldn5t afford to wait till morning for the intended assault. That would leave the 0ndian artillery with target practice during the night. )e had contacted his army commander and got the authoriAation to move south. )e was to raise the 7hinese flag in Tawang by midnight. ,s for the 0ndian artillery, they would be dealt with the help of #6,,- fighter&bombers. , flash warning was sent to all commanders of the 0ndian army near the Tawang area by the 7orps head1uarters. /ith 7hinese tanks assisted by heavy infantry heading south on the road to *um&6a and then to Tawang, the time before they would be engaged by 0ndian ground forces was now slightly more than an hour. #erhaps more, depending on the speed with which the 7hinese tank drivers moved on the weaving mountainous roads. 0n actuality, there shouldn5t have been any tanks involved in this theatre of operations by either side, but with the large number of surprises thrown by both sides at each other in the last ten hours, this was !ust one more and what would have surprised army commanders from both sides only a day ago, didn5t. ,s the 7hinese Type == Tanks headed south, supported by the now scrambling P&'( attack helicopters, the 0ndian T&=(s moved out from their hiding spaces around Tawang and started to move north to meet, engage and stop the 7hinese advance on Tawang. The darkness had now fallen on this region of the world, and had brought with it the end of an extraordinary day of military operations by the two most populous countries in the world. )owever, modern war does not stop for the night. 0t only makes the war more visible for everybody to see. The black silhouetted hills and mountains of the )imalayas were now visible with the orange glow of falling 7hinese artillery shells on 0ndian soil, even as 0ndian and 7hinese tanks were in for a night time fight. The fate of Tawang hung in the balance. 7)"N$<0N$ ,0R*,%3 7)3N$92 M060T,RG #R" 0N73 7)0N, 'C+( )R% T)2R%9,G %everal 7hinese B&'(s pulled out from their )ardened aircraft shelters carved out of a big mountain and moved via the camouflaged taxiway to the main runway. Their main undercarriage lights were off and the 7hinese pilots were looking left and right of the aircraft with their helmet mounted night vision e1uipment to ensure that they didn5t run off the runway concrete. ,t the main runway5s end, they turned around and came to a momentary stop. Then the slight humming

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noise of the aircrafts was replaced by a loud roar and a big cone of blue flame became visible at the engine exhaust. The brakes were released and the first B&'( moved down the runway at high speed and pulled into the air, the loud noise resonating around the airbase. Then more !oined him, and pretty soon the entire force of sixteen aircraft was flying into the air and swiftly turning south after assembling into four&ship formations. -ifty kilometres south, they were met by the first wave of a massive %2&.; force, a full regiment level strong, which would be escorting them while they made their foray into 0ndia. The pylons under the wings of the fighter&bombers were groaning with the weight of cluster bombs and the two main drop tanks carried under each wing. There was little ordinance for air&to& air engagements. That would be unnecessary in any case. They did not hope to be troubled by the 0,- during their short time into 0ndia, as the massive force of %2&.;s escorting them had plans to light up the night for the 0,-. The ordinance carried by the B&'(s was a special little gift to the 0ndian artillery batteries deployed around Tawang from the #eople5s Republic of 7hina.

T)3 R",9 T" *2M&6, -R"M T,/,N$ T)3 $R3,T )0M,6,G,% 0N90, 'C+@ )R% T)2R%9,G The units of the @T) Mountain 9ivision were now moving into positions on the hills overlooking Tawang. These hills, dominated by #eak J>';, lay to the north of Tawang. Tawang itself was in the foothills of this range, and a few kilometres north of a river by the same name. /hoever took control of these hills, took over Tawang. The single road from Tawang to *um&6a cut between this range of hills and was about twenty kilometres away. The idea behind defending Tawang was to keep control of these hills using infantry armed to the teeth with anti&tank Milan missiles, and a handful of T&=( tanks allocated to each critical area. 9espite the severe reduction in armoured concentration that this entailed, there was in any case no hope for armoured warfare per se, and their main role was infantry support. 2nfortunately, there was as such only a s1uadron5s worth T&=(s in Tawang, and the other two %1uadrons coming into the town via trains were to bring this s1uadron level unit to nearly *attalion level strength. *ut 4on the way5 was a whole other thing from 4already here5, and the two trains going close behind each other carrying these armoured vehicles had !ust crossed 9irang north of *omdila. That meant that they were still a good deal away, and despite the priority given by the railway officials at all levels in the region to get these trains to their destinations, they would still take more than an hour !ust to get to the station at Tawang. Then they would have to detrain, assemble and move out to the hills around the city in #latoon level units to beef up the scattered T&=(s of the 4,5 %1uadron of the *attalion. The roughly doAen tanks of 4,5 %1uadron would thus be alone for the initial stages of the 7hinese invasion, and that wasn5t funny to the crews of these tanks now facing ten to one odds against the 7hinese Type&== tanks heading for *um&6a. 9espite this, the tanks spread out into the hills one after another, each given a sector of fire to the north and each having the responsibility of supporting the infantry units to the left and right of the tanks with armoured gunfire. 0n return, the infantry would support the tank with its Milan missiles. ,s each tank moved into its position in the hills, they could look down at the road coming south from *um&6a at an angle from a distance of one kilometre. 0n effect, the $"7 of the @T) M9 and the overall regional commander had decided to place their limited resources to attacking the 7hinese tanks coming on the road from *um&6a from the hills north of Tawang. The 7hinese infantry coming with the tanks were more versatile, and could not be pinned down so easily. They would be able to lodge themselves in the hills around *um&6a without much

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resistance from the 0ndian army, seeing that the 0ndian army would be further to the south. 0t meant that the 0ndian army was gifting the 7hinese these hills, but not the town, which was more important. 0n any case, the local infantry commander was certain that his forces could dislodge the 7hinese infantry once their tanks had been destroyed. 0t was a risky operation, but one that could not be avoided. The air threat to the 0ndian units was even more serious. The 7hinese P&'( attack helicopters had last been seen heading towards the 0ndian *order from the north, but T,70T&R39 had lost visual on them as they started to weave through the hills. They would reach the area soon, and it was a certainty that the #6, would attempt to use them to destroy the small 0ndian tank force in the hills before the main 7hinese ground force came anywhere near the border. To prevent that from happening, a platoon of Tunguska self propelled ,, systems were now deployed around the hill tops with a clear line of view for several kilometres in all directions. 0n addition, a radar& directed gun battery was placed as a network around the hills. To improve the situation further, the 0,- had intervened. /ith the destruction of the 4Red&eye5 radar facility by the T,70T&#,T)-0N93R team form *hutan, the 0,- #halcon ,/,7% 07T"R&"N3 was now able to move north and improve its coverage deeper into china. %everal Mig&.'s were at high alert at Borhat at five&minute status. ,nother flight of four was armed with napalm and cluster bombs and was on fifteen&minute status. 0n the air, two flights of %2&+(M:0s were orbiting in tandem !ust south of Tawang and were tasked with securing air superiority. "ne aircraft in each flight or four aircraft was armed with laser&guided bombs for use against 7hinese helicopters, the recommended tactic against hovering attack helicopters. -inally, a second %earcher&00 had been launched from the 2, base near *omdila to allow continuous coverage of the battlefield. ,nother was on standby and ready to replace the first vehicle should it get shot down. /hatever the odds in favour of the 0,-, the 0ndian army5s local commanders were starting to feel the heat as the 7hinese tanks started approaching the border. They were severely outnumbered, and there was no denying that, but they had still seiAed the advantage from the 7hinese artillery in this sector that they had massacred, with relatively minimal losses. -our gun batteries and a single %merch *attery were still functional. The artillery units were now without the threat of counter battery fire, and thus would the first among the 0ndian army ground forces to hit at the 7hinese invasion forces. The entire defence of Tawang hinged on the ,rtillery batteries deployed around Tawang to slow the 7hinese advance with accurate gunfire, thus giving the remaining tanks coming to Tawang that crucial additional one hour to arrive and deploy. 2nfortunately, as the 0ndian artillery commanders were drawing up plans, the first flight of the 7hinese B&'(s went low and was now heading south for Tawang. They were !ust outside of the #halcon5s range of detection. *efore they entered, however, the massive 7hinese %2&.; force broke at high speed into the detection range of the #halcon which was swift to deploy the four %2&+(M:0s towards the threat and thus towards the east. The four Mig&.'s were told to scramble as well, and move to assist the charging %2&+(M:0s. /ith that done, the main threat of 7hinese B&'(s coming from the north went unattended to. There !ust weren5t enough 0ndian fighters in the region, !ust as the 7hinese had anticipated. THE "REAT HIMALAYAS
INDIA 1(&' HRS THURSDAY The main 7hinese %2&.; force was heading southeast from a point north of the great )imalayan peaks in china. 0t was therefore heading towards the Piro airfield in central ,runachal #radesh that was currently

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being used by the ,rmy ,viation helicopter units for case&evac of army casualties that were being inflicted by the 7hinese artillery on the forward 0ndian positions. *ut the main purpose of the %2&.;s was not any of these targets. They were gunning for an aerial fight. Their !ob was simple8 wrench the air superiority over ,runachal #radesh from the 0,-. ,nd the forty strong force facing barely a doAen defending aircraft was fully capable of doing this. The #6,,- had had enough, and the gloves were off. The %2&.; force was flying in three main groups of twelve, and the remaining group of four was laying back to fly close escort for the B&'( -orce heading south. The three main groups themselves were in three loose groups of four aircrafts. These three groups would be penetrating the 0ndian airspace along a front of twenty kilometres, and would do so in another twenty minutes. The entire fighter force was being supported by six )&> 3/ standoff !ammers to decrease the threat of ground based defences and missiles. Two of these were flying with the B&'( force and the remaining four with the %2&.; force. 0n addition, two :B&.((( ,/,7% were now operating over the )imalayas, coordinating the strike packages. -urther flights of %2&+(M::s were forming up to take over where the %2& .;s would leave off, and for the moment they were flying close escort for the :B&.(((s. to support this massive array of force, every available )&> tanker that was not flying in support of the air defence operations over Tibet was now flying northeast of 6hasa. The tankers themselves presented a massive fleet, and something that the 3,7 would have liked to go after but could not because of the impending hammer that was about to fall on the 0ndian army from the sky if they failed to preserve their air superiority over the north& eastern battlefields. The skies over china were now saturating with warplanes, and the same could not be said for the 0ndian side of the )imalayas. "n the defending side, the main advantage was the close proximity of the forward airfields in ,ssam. 3very aircraft that would run out of ammunition could land and rearm and be in the air again in a very short time. The same could not be said for the 7hinese fighters who would have to move to distant airfields to rearm themselves. 0n effect it meant that the combat effectiveness of every 0ndian fighter, especially the short& legged Mig&.'s, increased many times. ,lso, the 0ndian air defence network was now fully in the air. "ne #halcon ,/,7%, 07T"R&"N3 was flying southeast of TeApur and would retain overall airborne control of all 0ndian fighters in this battle. ,nother #halcon ,/,7% was being diverted from 7,7 operations to the region and was already in the air and on the way. The smaller 3mbraer based ,3/ aircrafts had been pulled south because of the threat proximity and would stay south the main #halcon line to coordinate the 0,- aircrafts coming into the region from the west, classify them on priority and ten hand them over one group at a time to the #halcon crew coordinating the battles. 0n addition, the main ground based radars were up throughout the region, and were looking north. 0n terms of fighters, fully eight %2&+(M:0s were in the air, albeit in two groups of four. They would be engaging the %2&.;s separately because of the lack of time for them to form up into a single group of eight. ,nother four %2&+(M:0s were available, but at the moment they were flying next to the #halcon as close escorts and would not separate to engage the %2&.;s unless they posed a threat to the #halcon. Their !ob was to ensure the survival of the main 0ndian airborne control aircraft in the region. -urther, four Mig&.' 4*ison5 aircrafts had scrambled off Borhat within the last few minutes and were flying up to !oin the %2& +(M:0s from the east. 3ight more %2&+(M:0s were on the way, but were too far away to reach in time. They would not be available for the first engagements, but would reach the skies over ,runachal #radesh as the 0ndian fighters mixed it up at close range with the 7hinese %2&.;s. ,t the moment they were flying over northeastern /est *engal and about to reach %ikkim. ,nother four Mig&.'s were now waiting at the end of the runway at Borhat, awaiting orders from the #halcon operators to scramble off the ground. The four Mig&.'s that had been armed with ground ordinance for support operations around Tawang were now being removed of their ordinance and refitted with R&;;s for the air&to&air role. ,ll ground support operations had been cancelled. 3very and any aircraft capable of carrying air&to&air weaponry was being fitted out at various airfields across the 3,7 as ground crews scrambled to get the !ob done. The already outnumbered 0ndian 9efences were getting weaker by the minute as more and more threats were showing themselves on radar. The defending %2&+(M:0 force was split into two groups not by choice but by the circumstances and lack of time. "ne group of four was flying northeastwards from near *omdila and was the closest group of 0ndian fighters to the 7hinese %2&.;s. %ince the 7hinese %2&.; force was heading southeast, these four 0ndian fighters were in a position to engage the rightmost group of %2&.;s from their right flank. ,t first it was thought as a mistake from the 7hinese pilots that they should enter

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obli1uely into 0ndian airspace, but it was soon realiAed that they were in effect pulling the 0ndian fighters away from the area around Tawang, thus making them incapable of interfering with the southbound B&'( force. 0n any case, even if the %2&+(M:0s engaged the 7hinese from the right flank, their own left flank would be exposed to the four %2&.;s coming along with the B&'(s. 0n addition, the choice of the 7hinese incursion direction meant that the supporting fighters from Borhat would have hit the 7hinese fighters from the front and so could not hope to meet up with %2&+(M:0s. 0n effect, what was happening was that the 7hinese were driving a massive wedge into the 0ndian air defences. /hat defending fighters there were in areas around 7habua, facing inbound %2&+(M::s from the Myanmar theatre were about to be cut off from the rest of the 3,7, unless they egressed south immediately, and that would leave the North&eastern tip of 0ndia undefended from relentless 7hinese air attacks. The whole situation was doom laden from every angle. The only way the 0,- could hold on to this piece of airspace over 0ndia was to decisively defeat the %2&.;s, and there were far too many targets than there were defenders. The first thoughts of an impending defeat were now coming into the mind of the 3,7&,"7 as he looked at the war being played out on a large digital map in his command head1uarters that had now been relocated to :alaikunda ,-*. )e felt far away and detached from the en of his command that were now facing incredibly difficult odds over the )imalayas. )e could hear the #halcon crew getting the fighter pilots into position and the frantic calls being made all around. There were three main threats heading into the region, and the first one was about to cross the border within the next few minutes. 0ndeed, exactly two and a half minutes later, the first group of twelve %2&.;s crossed the border over the large dark silhouettes of the )imalayan peaks. Two more groups followed them. Bust inside the 0ndian airspace, they were treated to the orange glow of the fires raging among the 0ndian army infantry positions around the hills as a result of the 7hinese artillery attacks that had been momentarily halted to allow the 7hinese aircrafts to burst through the airspace into 0ndia.

%"2T) "- T)3 $R3,T )0M,6,G, #3,:% ,R2N,7),6 #R,93%) 0N90, 'C@; )R% T)2R%9,G ,s the main force of %2&.;s came in over the )imalayan peaks, they had crossed over a wall and had now entered 0ndian airspace. 0mmediately their radar warning devices lit up. The ma!or threats to them at the moment were the multiple ground radars and the one airborne radar to the south. Three flying minutes behind them were four 3/ E37M )&> aircrafts and they crossed the border as well. They were to provide the close escort !amming support for the fighters in order to protect them from the ground fire. 3ach of these massive aircrafts was loaded with all kinds of !amming gear, and even alone they were powerful electronic warriors. /ith four of them together, the !amming support for the strike force was considerable. 2sually they would not follow the strike force so closely, not because of security concerns in as much as they didn5t have to. Their powerful e1uipment had significant range for them to act in the standoff support status. The problem for them was the mountainous terrain, especially the $reat )imalayas range, which created a wall separating the 0ndian and 7hinese territories. -or all the power of the e1uipment they carried, the signals could not see through solid rock, and neither did it accord them a clear picture of what was behind that mountain peaks. This meant that if they were to make sure that the %2&.;s they were supporting didn5t enter an 0ndian shooting gallery from the ground and the air, they would have to follow close behind them. This had the additional effect that the extreme close proximity of the !ammers with their intended targets would saturate the electronic space with so much power that burn through from the local radar directed ground batteries would be impossible. ,nd the %2&.;s would make sure that no 0ndian pilot got within firing range of these four lumbering aircrafts. They had to act 1uickly if they were to survive, and it took them less than a minute to orient the already worked up onboard e1uipment to the electronic environment around them.

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The three ma!or groups of %2&.;s were arranged in an arrow formation, and the middle one was the leading formation. The one group on the eastern tip of the arrow was to turn a little to the eastwards and thus surround the airbases at and around 7habua from the south while another massive force of %2&+(M::s headed from the east via Myanmar, from the north and the northeast via Mainland 7hina. These combined forces were to eliminate all 0ndian air activity in the region around 7habua, including destruction of airbases, once and for all. ,ll that stood between were two&s1uadron worth of Mig&.'s that was now scrambling all every available aircraft from the ground, one from 7habua and the other from Borhat. 2nfortunately for them, with the two other forces of %2&.;s moving to the south from their west, they had cut off the region from any reinforcements. 2nless the main 7hinese %2&.; force was destroyed, the Mig&.' -orce around 7habua T,7 was on its own against a far superior force of much better capability aircrafts. -or them the situation was very bleak. 0f they both turned to face the twelve %2&.;s, they could achieve numerical superiority over the enemy, but that meant that the Mig&.'s from Borhat would be engaged first as the aircrafts from 7habua T,7 were far to the east and would take time to arrive. 0f the 7habua force left the Borhat base aircraft to fight on their own while they attempted to engage the %2&+(M:: force, they would be fighting from all bearing from the compass, and that was unacceptable. 2nless they could eliminate on of these enemy forces before engaging the others, they had a fighting chance, else the only option that remained for them was to escape to the south, and while the commanders at ,ir&)ead1uarters struggled to come to terms with this fast developing situation and issue the necessary evacuation orders, that southern route was being cut off by the twelve 7hinese %2&.;s that were now moving south&eastwards to engage and decimate the Mig&.'s scrambling from Borhat before turning towards the northeast and head towards 7habua. The middle force of %2&.;s had a different mission from the other two barrier forces. This force was to move to the south towards another high value target8 the 0ndian #halcon ,/,7%, 07T"R&"N3. They had known the general position of the #halcon via their own airborne 3/ systems, but the exact location they had not known. This was achieved minutes after crossing the border and so the twelve 7hinese fighters realigned their bearing and were now facing more to the south than to the southeast, and the only thing to stop them from completing their mission was a force of four %2&+(M:0s flying a 7,# north of the #halcon for its security. That would have been enough if the 0ndian pilots had had to only worry about themselves. )ere, there was a chance, remote as it might have been, that one of the 7hinese pilots would be able to engage the #halcon with radar directed missiles while the rest of the forces engaged the massively outnumbered 0ndian fighters. ,s a result, further orders were given to the second flight of four %2&+(M:0s coming northeast over TeApur to divert and assist their four embattled colleagues trying to protect the at present only ,/,7% aircraft flying in the region. ,nother order came from air head1uarters to the 3,7 command centre to inform the #halcon to shut down operations and to head southwest towards safety, but that plan was shot down by the 3,7&,"7 because that would lead to disaster. The only advantage the 0ndian fighters fighting for their lives in the region had was the #halcon and its crew of radar operators. 0f they shut down, the situational awareness would be lost, and so would be the situation. )owever, the aircraft crew was informed that should the threat to them become severe, this option was indeed open to them. The mission commander in the #halcon took this message with a grunt. )e had no intention of leaving the region with his tail between his legs and his pilot agreed with him. *oth men knew the conse1uences if they did what their superiors had 4advised5 them to do. The third force of %2&.;s to the west was another of the barrier forces, and its !ob was to ensure that no reinforcements could reach the area of operations of the middle force or the B&'( force to the north. 0t was not alone in this mission. The north four %2&.;s were coming south while this main force would turn to the west, thus forming a semicircle whose diameter was continuously reducing. "ne of the !ammers was dedicated to this force and turned along with the force as they

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moved southwest. The only thing in the immediate region between this force and its mission completion were two flights of four %2&+(M:0s each. The flight of four north of *omdila was already facing the heat from the north and the east. The second flight would northeast of TeApur would have ideally assisted the flight near *omdila, but the 7,# %2&+(M:0s were asking for assistance to protect the #halcon and it had been ordered to move there, although to get there it looked as though it would have to shoot through the southern elements of the twelve %2&.;s of the western force heading towards them. ,nother force of eight %2&+(M:0s and another #halcon was rushing to the east from the %ikkim area, but it was still far away. Mig&.;s from )ashimara airbase were scrambling off the ground as well, and so were several other flights of %2&+(M:0s from :alaikunda. The disaster that had struck the main %2&+(M:0 airbase at *areilly in the afternoon was now showing the conse1uences. ,ll earlier 7,# missions had been undertaken from that base. /ith the loss of that airbase, all aircrafts had to be launched from :alaikunda, and with *angladesh not cooperating to allow over flights over its airspace, all 0ndian aircrafts had to take the roundabout route from /est *engal. ,nd air head1uarters was worried about further missile attacks at )ashimara and *aghdogra airbases so as to not allow the %ukhois to be based there. ,nd the relatively small 0,- fleet of tanker aircrafts was already straining to support all 7,7 and 3,7 operations. The 06&;Cs flying with the 3,7 were already stretched to maintain the bare minimum of aircrafts in the air continuously around the clock, and it was 1uite literally impossible to main a massive alert force of fighters in the air. ,lso, the 7hinese had more airframes and pilots. They could afford to have larger number of aircrafts in the air around the clock, and that was !ust for defence. 0f they decided to go offensive with every available asset, the strike force could assume massive levels, as it was starting to do over ,runachal #radesh. ,s a result, the 0ndian fighters currently flying over ,ssam were now facing incredible odds while their support had to take the long route to get in the right place to support them. This fact meant that by the time help arrived, the first engagements would be over. The first action in the tense situation in the air over the Northeast was taken by the 7hinese )&> 3/ aircrafts as all of them saturated the electronic battle space with large amounts of !amming signals. They were close enough to the ground based radars that were tracking the inbound fighters so that when the !amming signals went out over the entire fre1uency spectrum, sufficient power existed to make the 0ndian gun battery radars go blind with incredible return signals that saturtaded their screens and the 0ndian %,M tracking radars face immense trouble in trying to lock on to the enemy aircraft because of the redundant sand spurious signals showing up that made it difficult to see what an aircraft was and what was not. /ith these interruptions the response of the air defence systems was delayed further in a very time critical situation, much to the frustration of the radar teams. ,s they attempted to burn though the !amming, the %2&.;s continued to move towards their targets. %oon the %2&.; strike forces were across the range of the 0ndian army5s ground to air systems and reaching for the foothills. Now the loopholes existed within the air defence matrix. There were three main regions where the ground threat existed for the 7hinese. The first region was the one around 7habua where, due to the 9igboi refinery and other strategic targets, there were a total of three ,kash %,M batteries and one #echora battery. The second region was the single ,kash battery at Borhat. The third region was north of TeApur where two more batteries existed. There were isolated batteries of the #echora missiles in the region that were by now far too obsolete and the 3/ )&>s had no trouble !amming these systems. These loopholes existed in the region due to the late induction of the ,kash %,M system that were only recently starting to some off the production lines. ,s a result, while on map the air defence ground environment system or ,9$3% may have

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looked impressive, in reality there were severe weaknesses in the chain. These weak links were the older #echoras, and once the tracking radars of these were !ammed, serious holes suddenly appeared in the network. ,lthough it restricted the free movements of the 7hinese fighters, it is through these holes that the main 7hinese strike forces were able to cut thorough and move into )imalayan foothills of the 0ndian Northeast. 000 7"R#% )3,9<2,RT3R% 90M,#2R, N,$,6,N9 0N90, '=(( )R% T)2R%9,G ,s the 4friendly air5 situation deteriorated further, an order went out from ,rmy )ead1uarters to the command centre of the 000 corps at 9imapur in Nagaland. -or 000 7orps here, the air support operations ad reduced drastically since the morning operations. The @;T) Mountain 9ivision and heavy units of the '%T ,rmoured 9ivision had originally planned to move across the border in support of the loyalist forces with armoured columns at '=(( hours on Thursday, using massive air support from the 0,- ground attack sorties. These were to have been carried out by the Mig& .;s from )ashimara sometime aobut now, but instead their ground ordinance was being removed and they were being loaded up for air&to&air to help keep the 0,- alive in the region, so their support for 000 corps was out of the 1uestion. The army was supposed to have supplied large numbers of helicopters to support the region, but these helicopters were now flying out casualties from helipads all across the border regions of ,runachal #radesh that were now coming under artillery attacks. The air force was supposed to help with logistics and air control, but with the loss of the radars in the hills of kohima in the late morning, and the evacuation of all 9ornier 9o&..Cs from the local airfields to help the army move e1uipment north in order to face the massive 7hinese ground assaults, both the air control and the logistics support had run out. ,s if that wasn5t bad enough, if the 7hinese air strike went according to planned, and they neutraliAed the 7habua T,7, their fighter bombers could have a staright route from the north to attack the 000 7orps eastwards lateral movement where it hurts the most8 logistics. /ith all this in mind, the 0ndian army commanders in delhi had decided that 000 7orps could not be provided with the support it would need in the near future for combat operations in Myamar. /ith that decided, 000 7orps was told to postpone its movement across the border indefinitely. /ith that done, the last ma!or offensive operations by the 0ndian army in this war was withdrawn and cancelled. 2ntil the 0,- won the air war over the northeast, all army formations were now on the defensive. 2nknown to the 7hinese, they had secured a ma!or victory in the war against the 0ndian army. The 0ndian ground initiative was now lost.

# TACTICAL AIR CENTRE $TAC%, CHABUA RE"ION

NORTHEASTERN TIP OF INDIA 1+0' HRS THURSDAY %cramble, scramble, scrambleL ,ll flights scramble. 0nitial vector Aero three Aero, angels twenty. %witch airborne control to ictor&one. /e have bandits inbound from all directionsH? The :laxon was blaring at 7habua airbase where the pilots and ground crew were running towards their aircrafts in the nighttime darkness. The pilots stopped momentarily to pick up their helmets before they ran

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out onto the tarmac and towards the individual )ardened ,ircraft %helters where their mounts were based, armed and loaded with air&to&air missiles. The pilots ran straight onto the ladders and climbed up into the cockpit. *ehind them came the crew chiefs who strapped the pilots into the seats while they lighted up the cockpit. /ithin seconds there were massive roars around the airbase as the aircraft engines started burning fuel. Then the brakes were released. "ut of the small entrances of the hangers came the pointed noses of the deadly *isons and smartly turned towards the accompanying taxiway that led to the main runway. Then a second aircraft followed and pretty soon more and more aircrafts headed out. The taxiway was suddenly full of Mig&.'s trailing one behind the other, stopping only at the end of the runway to allow the first aircraft to take off before doing the same. The Mig&.' %1uadron at 7habua was to be fully in the air today, and while the standard T"O3 called for eighteen aircrafts, one aircraft was in for maintenance, and a second had been lost in the previous week following a bird strike during takeoff. That left sixteen aircraft, and they were all in the air now. "ne of the flights was already in the air when the warning had gone out, flying a 7,# over 9igboi. The others had now scrambled into the air. %ixteen aircrafts called for four flights of four, and the air over 7habua started buAAing with aircraft noise as the aircrafts started to assemble into their flights. The commander of each flight was in communication with the ground base operations centre. The *ase&"ps people were trying to allocate target sectors for each flight but with !ust four flights there were not enough aircrafts to defend +>( degrees around the airbase, and that5s what 07T"R&"N3 was pro!ecting the threat perception out to be. The immediate threat to the +R9 Tactical ,ir 7entre or T,7, whose responsibility lay in the defence of the 7habua region and its strategic targets, was coming from a wide arc to the north and the northeast as well as from the west and southwest of the base, which was the most shocking information of all for the *ase& "ps people. They had been downloading the data from the #halcon for some time now, and had been aware of the 7hinese incursions, but the actual 7hinese plan had started becoming clear when the 7,# supporting the #halcon started asking for help in defending the #halcon against the twelve %2&.;s dashing for it. Then the 7hinese %2&+(M::s had been spotted a minute ago, coming from the north and the northeast in a force of forty aircrafts from the 7hinese mainland. ,nd finally, the eastern 7hinese %2&.; force had started moving towards the southeast, and thus behind + T,7. The situation was finally clear for the + T,7 command here at 7habua8 they had been surrounded. The 4bandits5 were now converging at 7habua from all directions, and the defenders were all up in the air and waiting for the attack. 0t had been decided to engage the %2&+(M:: force with three flights totalling twelve Mig&.'s and the four aircrafts of the initial first flight had been dispatched to the west to assist the Borhat based force to help defeat the eastern enveloping %2&.; force. ,s a result, while the twelve Mig&.'s now northbound would harass the %2&+(M::s and prevent them from attacking the ground installations, the entire Borhat based force of twelve Mig&.'s and the four assisting aircrafts from 7habua heading east would engage and defeat the %2&.; force and thus free up the western side of the encirclement to allow reinforcements to flow to the east. That is, provided somebody else took care of the other two %2&.; strike forces. 0t was all pretty theoretical, and while the sixteen *isons outnumbered the %2&.;s, nobody was sure what was about to happen to the twelve Mig&.'s facing the forty odd %2&+(M::s to the northwest of 7habua. They were outnumbered, outgunned and outmatched in capabilities, but the concerned pilots knew that they were the first and, unfortunately, the only line of defence for the airbase at 7habua for the near future. -acing such massive odds without any hope for support, the threat to their own lives they knew, and yet, without hesitation, the twelve strong 0ndian fighter pilots lighted up the aircraft afterburners as one, and moved to engage the grave threat that now loomed in the dark night sky ahead.

AIRSPACE NORTH OF ORHAT

EASTERN ASSAM 1+0+ HRS THURSDAY The first engagement in the + T,7 Aone was initiated by the Borhat based Mig&.'s. The first flight of four aircraft were in the air, and were being trailed by two more sets of four aircraft as the entire force headed north to meet the eastern force of twelve %2&.;s coming south. The first four aircraft pilots were highly experienced. They were the same people who had engaged the four B&C00 aircrafts in the morning of this extremely long day, and between them, had four kills to their credit already. The %1uadron commander was a shrewd tactician, and knew how to make the most use of his weapon systems.

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,t the moment his flight of four was the only one among the twelve that was armed with the R&;; * R missiles, with each aircraft having two on board and holding another pair of R&;+ missiles. The follow up flights, as well as the westbound flight from 7habua were armed with R&>(s, as with both friendly and enemy fighters dashing headlong towards each other, it had been perceived that by the time the first flight could use up all its R&;;s, visual ac1uisition would be achieved and then it would turn into a melee. 0t had also a lot to do with the relative paucity of R&;;s compared to other missiles at the base depots thanks to the massive re1uirement by all airbases for such missiles throughout the region. The pilots in the follow on flights were already relishing the thought of dogfights as their fingers twitched on the !oysticks. They knew that they had the 7hinese already outnumbered %ixteen to Twelve. %ince the %1uadron commander, /ing commander %uresh Raina, knew that his first flight was armed with R&;;s having more range than that of the locally produced 7hinese * R missiles mounted below the wings of the 7hinese %2&.;s, he had full intention of taking the first shot. )e also wanted to maximise their effectiveness. ,s a result, he had his s1uadron move to the south, facing their backs to the 7hinese when they had originally entered 0ndian airspace. This had opened up the range between them and the %2&.;s, thus enabling his aircraft to garner the maximum range for the R&;; while denying the same to the 7hinese pilots. That5s when he had ordered his aircrafts to turn around by 'C( degrees and head north to face the enemy. The 7hinese realiAed this tactic for what it was and engaged afterburner to rapidly close the range between the *isons and their own aircrafts. ery soon however, the 7hinese R/Rs were screaming of ac1uisition, and that5s when the first four R&;;s were punched off and the rocket motors ignited after falling several feet towards the ground. The massive flash blinded the pilots looking into the darkness using their night&vision goggles and the promptly turned their faces away. The night vision systems magnify existing light, and the huge yellow blips showing in front of their eyes were the rear ends of the lethal missiles as they headed of into the darkness, the brightly lit smoke vanishing into the darkness. The light intensification allowed for long view, and the first night time * R engagement in the %ubcontinent region was witnessed by the 0ndian pilots as the four missiles streaked away towards their targets. The response on the receiving end was naturally not so awe struck. The radars in the 7hinese %2&.;s detected the fast moving blips heading towards the 7hinese fighter group almost as soon as they were launched. The 7hinese aircraft were flying three aircraft flights and the tactical formation was that of a diamond pattern, with three flights heading south in an arrow formation and the fourth flight behind them to watch their tail and to take care of targets of opportunity. This rear flight of three had been diverted to take care of the four *isons coming from the east from 7habua. ,nd already the 7hinese pilots were outnumbered. The now nine aircraft facing the twelve *isons from Borhat now let out chaff in all directions as they broke formation and flew in all directions in the three dimensional space. ,t first it was not clear who was being targeted by the missiles, but with this manoeuvre, they were able to tell the unlucky ones from the lucky ones when the missiles also diverted from their straight line path to follow their targets. These four aircraft now dived for the deck at full military speed, leaving behind clouds of chaff once the missiles came into visual range. /hile diving, they also made their dash northwards, and attempted to outrun the missiles that had been fired slightly within the outer range parameters. , valid tactic, and one that allowed two of the 7hinese %2&.;s to evade the missiles as one missile ran out of propulsion while the other ran into a cloud of chaff that had !ust been released directly behind the aircraft and exploded. The massive fireball and shrapnel consumed the tail section of the %2&.; before it could escape, however, and red hot shrapnel pieces hit the port engine and noAAle and caused the turbine blades to fail catastrophically which in turn caused an engine flameout. This %2&.; had been crippled. The aircraft started to gain speed with whatever flight energy it had left and the one engine it had running. The horiAontal stabiliAer had been shot to pieces, and with this sluggish flight control the 7hinese pilot turned his aircraft to the north and attempted to take his mount out of 0ndian airspace, trailing smoke from the port engine. The second %2&.; that had escaped the missile targeted on it continued to run north at low level unnecessarily and the highly relieved pilot did not think about the dangers involved in flying at extremely low altitudes over enemy territory. There was a sudden warning sound for ac1uisition and the aircraft was rocked by a massive !erk and his head turned to see the source of the orange glow in the engines. Then his cockpit warning lights came on. ,mong all the warning bells ringing, another screeching sound was what got his attention as a second 0gla launched from the ground headed towards the %2&.;. The last sensible thing done by the pilot was to pull the e!ection handle as the 0ndian army5s 0gla missile hit the already crippled

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aircraft and pushed it down into the black peaks below before smashing it into the slopes. The aircraft disappeared into a huge yellow&orange ball of fire that lighted up the sky for everybody to see. The two missiles that had not lost track had slammed into their targets !ust as the manufacturers had promised, and all that could be said of those two 7hinese pilots was that their death was swift. Their aircrafts had disintegrated in mid air and vanished from everybody5s screens. Three %2&.;s were now down and one had been sent north, crippled. There were five more %2&.;s of the southern element still alive. These had now reformed into a single formation of five and in a line abreast pattern. They were now lined up for their own shots. %o were the four * R armed Mig&.' force heading towards them. /ing 7ommander Raina ordered another R&;; 4punch off5 and these streaked away !ust as the previous four had done. %econds later the five 7hinese %2&.;s launched their * R missiles as well and it started to look like a duelling match. Now things were different. *oth sides wanted to guide their missiles into the terminal phases before breaking off to evade, and both sides continued to do the same until the last moments, when all nine aircrafts suddenly broke formation and dived in all aAimuths. The missiles were on their own now. The luck ones would survive. The first to take a hit this time was a Mig&.' that had two missiles targeted on it. The small delta winged aircraft vanished into a ball of fire which completely destroyed the aircraft. Then the second missile flew into the fireball that was its target only milliseconds ago. There was no chance for the pilot to e!ect. ,s fate would have it, his R&;; missile did not hit it5s target and went after a series of chaff clouds before detonating in one of them. The other three R&;;s hit their targets and three more %2&.;s tumbled out of the sky on fire into the hills below. "f the remaining three 7hinese missiles, two hit a single Mig&.' and in both cases caught the aircraft only in its 4-rag5 pattern and not in impact, thanks to some skilful flying, which allowed the 0,- pilot to e!ect before his aircraft wings came apart from the effects of the damage. The third missile hit a third Mig&.' that was also blotted out of the sky before /ing 7ommander %uresh Riana could e!ect. )e was killed instantly, and burning wreckage of the aircraft fell towards the ground and country he had fought for gallantly. )e had broken the back of this 7hinese %2&.; force, but his fight was now over, while for the other Mig&.' pilots it had !ust begun. There were now two %2&.;s standing. There was also now only one Mig&.' standing from the first flight. ,nd the 0ndian pilot was out of R&;;s, thanks to the limited carrying capability of the Mig&.'s. *ut the 7hinese %2&.;s had far greater capacity for such missiles, and now two more were released against the rear flights of Mig&.'s that were coming within range of their R&>(s. *efore the second flight of four could launch, they had to evade the inbound missiles. ,gain chaff was released in all directions, and the aircrafts were now evading in all directions. To the credit of the remaining two 7hinese pilots, they did not disengage, knowing fully well what would happen if they presented their engine heat to the R&>(s. They chose the chaos caused by the frantic evasion of the Mig&.'s to toggle off another pair of radar guided missiles. They didn5t have to worry about targets. The sky in front of them was buAAing with Mig&.'s, and they knew that it wouldn5t be long before they got hit. 0nstead, they now attempted to take as large a toll on the 0ndians as possible, and rolled to their sides and separated left and right to go after individual targets. The skies were full of missiles now, and soon two more Mig&.'s were knocked out of the sky in 1uick succession in small fireballs, caused by the small warheads of the heat&seekers, and another was caught in the 4-rag5 pattern of an exploding missile that left the aircraft riddled with holes and the pilot bleeding inside his cockpit. )e was barely able to maintain his aircraft in the level position and another Mig&.' diverted from the main fight to escort him back to base at Borhat. -inally the two 7hinese %2&.;s were blotted out of the night sky by the third flight of Mig&.'s in a very clinical fashion once the threat of radar guided missiles had receded. The skies were clear, but the attrition rate had been very high. 3ight %2&.;s had been knocked out of the sky and another had been sent home badly damaged. 0n return, five Mig&.'s had been knocked out. ,nother had been crippled and a seventh one had to be diverted to escort the crippled aircraft back to Borhat. That left barely five surviving Mig&.'s armed with only heat seeking missiles flying north of Borhat. The !ob had been partially successful and partially a failure. The main 3astern %2&.; force of twelve aircraft had been partially defeated, with the three remaining %2&.;s of the 3astern *arrier force now facing the Mig&.'s from 7habua. 3ven with that battle as yet undecided, the casualties had been high. The force had lost its commanding officer, and now did not have the strength to effectively assist the twelve Mig&.'s facing the %2&+(M::s, although all of them did turn northeastwards to finish off the remaining four %2&.;s of the

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7hinese eastern barrier force. That would be a small consolation against the isolated and now doomed battle about to be fought between the forty 7hinese %2&+(M::s and the twelve Mig&.'s from 7habua. , disaster of high magnitude had taken place over the skies of Borhat, even if the 0,- could claim a tactical victory, and its magnitude was about to felt in the region as the massive 7hinese %2&+(M:: force now approached the bases of the +R9 T,7.

# TACTICAL AIR CENTRE $TAC%, CHABUA RE"ION

NORTHEASTERN TIP OF INDIA 1+*' HRS THURSDAY The region north and east of 7habua was 1uite literally the northeastern tip of 0ndia, and with their proximity to the 7hinese mainland were also the most vulnerable point against a thought out air attack or a determined ground attack. /est of 7habua is 9ibrugarh, and it is the 9ivisional )ead1uarters for the .N9 Mountain 9ivision of the 0ndian army5s 0 7orps, whose units were taking hits from 7hinese artillery in the )imalayas north of this location. 0n the region is the 9igboi "il refinery. There is also an oil rich region east of 7habua, and a coal region south of there. The North&east -rontier railway has some of its ma!or !unctions in the locality and also is the support line for the .N9 Mountain 9ivision. ,ll of these above locations are south of the *rahmaputra River. There were a considerable number of Military targets in the local region, the most important being the .N9 M9 7+0. ,nd then were the economic targets like the refinery, the oil pipelines, the main bridge over the *urhi 9ihing that brings the N3 frontier railway into the region as well as the oil and coal producing infrastructure. /ith forty %2&+(M::s in hand, armed with air&to&ground munitions in addition to the air&to&air ordinance, there wouldn5t be enough targets to go around for the 7hinese pilots, and in all probabilities it seemed clear that they were expecting losses to + T,7 defences as well as the army5s ground defences. *ut the numbers also suggested that as far as the #6,,- high command was concerned, this was to be a one&time series of losses only. /ith complete saturation 0ndian defences achieved, enough aircraft would make it to their targets to devastate the area and + T,7 once and for all. 0t was a measure of the 7hinese determination to win an untainted victory in the region since morning and indeed for the first time during this war. Nobody was going to get in the way this time. "f course it was not entirely about brute force. The 7hinese had shown a little thinking as well. The main lynchpin in their plans had been the ability of the %2&.; force that had penetrated 0ndian airspace to devastate the 0,- %1uadron supporting the 7habua based Mi&g&.' force and to prevent + T,7 from getting any support from the west during the short time that the %2&+(M::s would be over 7habua region. This they had succeeded in doing. The eastern %2&.; *arrier force had kept the Borhat based Mig&.'s busy and stopped them from dashing to 7habua to provide help. They had also devastated the %1uadron itself. "ut of the original force of Twelve Mig&.'s, barely five were now flying. They had run low on missiles and fuel. ,lthough they were now closing to finish off the final flight of %2&.;s in coordination with the 7habua based force of four Mig&.'s, they would have to land soon thereafter to refuel and rearm, by which time it would all be over in the east. The %1uadron had also lost three of its senior officers including the 7ommanding officer, and their morale was low. %eeing the ma!ority of the %1uadron go down in fireballs over ,ssam had not helped either. ,s far as going to the aid of the 7habua based s1uadron was concerned, the Borhat based -orce was now combat ineffective. The 7hinese had gained that particular victory at a murderous cost. The eastern %2&.; *arrier force had been decimated. 3ight of their number had been lost and another was not sure whether he would reach back to base. Three more were literally fighting for their lives against a numerically superior 0,- Mig&.' force of nine aircrafts, and it was unlikely that they would live to see the sun rise. *ut the 7hinese pilots had done their !ob. They, along with the other two %2&.; forces had sealed + T,7 from all help. There was no support for the 7habua based Mig&.' -orce. Neither was there any time left for any last minute miracles. The inbound %2&+(M::s were flying in strengths of ten aircraft each. That meant that there were four sets of aircrafts coming from slightly different directions, although they had formed a close group for mutual security. This force was now coming form the Northeast to the %outhwest towards 7habua. This time there was little external !amming support, and the 7hinese aircrafts were carrying Bamming pods under one of the #ylons in most aircraft. There were a group of three aircrafts in each main force that was armed only with air&to&air weaponry. ,ll others had primarily ground ordinance, but none were without air&to&air missiles.

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The massive weapons capacity of the %2&+( aircraft allowed this 4self&multiplier5 capability to exist, thus negating the need for close escorts. Nonetheless, the twelve aircraft armed with completely air to air weaponry were flying a full two thousand feet above the main ground force and were flexibly moving around like a guard dog protecting the sheep. The 4%heep5 in this case were about to do their own 0ron&)and missions against the 0ndian radars in 7habua, and most aircraft carried at least one anti&radiation missile with them for this !ob. There were far more ,RMs with the attackers than there were radars with the defenders. /hile the 0ndian force of twelve Mig&.'s had the opportunity to move south now that the 3astern *arrier force of %2&.;s had been destroyed, it was 1uite clear that + T,7 would cease to exist if they did so. They would not be able to return to 0,- 7habua because there wouldn5t be an 0,- 7habua left to come back on. The ,rmy was the most serious loser in the whole scheme of things. The only army force protecting the )imalayas north of here from the 7hinese hordes was the .N9 Mountain 9ivision. 0f they lost their command centre and their main lines of supply via the N3 railway, that defence would be fatally weakened. ,nd the 0,- would be strained to deploy longer legged %2&+(M:0s in the region to protect the airspace because there would be no local forward airfields left. ,nd sure as hell the 0ndian pilots weren5t going to leave the ground air defences alone in their fight while they flew south for their own safety. They weren5t aiming to take the attacking force head on, because they were brave, not stupid. They were already east of 7habua and thus now south of the 7hinese force. They would now move north to pull this force towards the south after them. The %1uadron 7ommander5s ob!ective was to force the 7hinese to divert aircraft from the main strike to go after him. That would take the heat off 7habua by a little bit, and he had all the intentions of using his aircrafts to down a few of the bastards in the process. The 7ommander smiled within his breathing mask as he pulled his aircraft on to its left and then headed north. The enemy was about to get in rangeH

,0R%#,73 N"RT)3,%T "- B"R),T 3,%T3RN ,%%,M '=+( )R% T)2R%9,G To the west, the eastern 7hinese %2&.; force was fighting its last battle. The three remaining 7hinese %2&.;s were now under threat from the front and their rear. They were facing the four Mig&.'s coming west out of 7habua as they had been ordered to do by their now dead commander. To their southwest the remaining five Mig&.'s of the Borhat -orce were coming towards them. ,t the moment, however, the 7hinese pilots were worried about the four Mig&.'s in front of them as they were the ones who were about to get in range. -our against three was not a problem for the %2&.;s had they been within visual range, but this battle was not within visual range. This was going to be another * R engagement. -our fast moving blips showed up on radar as the 0ndian pilots 4pickled5 off a volley of R&;;s at the 7hinese. The 7hinese responded a second later with a volley fire of six missiles, three of which were being guided. The other three were riding on hope that their targets would be within range of their terminal guidance systems when they reached the vicinity. The problem was, the 0ndian pilots did not know which one was being selectively guided and which one was not. They had to treat all of the incoming missiles as guided. ,gain all seven aircraft dashed towards each other, both guiding their missiles till the last possible second before breaking off. )owever, this time the 0ndians broke off first, and pulled into steep dives towards the hills below. This allowed them to distinguish the guided missiles from the non&guided 4hope&riding5 ones because they continued straight on their original path while the guided ones followed the 0ndian aircraft down. %econds later the 7hinese pilots broke off and headed down to low altitude as well, while heading north. ,ll missiles were on their own now, but the fact that the 0ndian pilots had broken off earlier meant that the 7hinese had guided their missiles for the crucial seconds more, and as a result the chances of the 7hinese hitting the 0ndians was more than the other way around. , few

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seconds later the first missiles hit the designated targets. The first to take a hit was an 0ndian Mig&.' that was diving down and the missile intercepted him on the top of the fuselage, ignoring the chaff clouds behind the aircraft and disintegrating the aircraft into small burning pieces before the pilot could react. )e was killed instantly. ,nother missile missed the aircraft it was aimed on and went diving to the side before hitting the hills below and exploding in a small fireball. The third missile exploded !ust behind another Mig&.' and the red&hot shrapnel peppered and broke the flight controls in the rear fuselage of the aircraft. 0mmediately all red warning lights started flashing and the engine flamed out. 9espite sluggish controls the pilot brought the nose up an attempt to regain altitude and attempt engine restart, but that thought lasted only seconds as he looked at the number of things that had gone wrong and decided it was time to leave. The radio was still working and as the aircraft lost all energy and began a shallow dive without power, he shouted a emergency call to anyone receiving that he was e!ecting and pulled the e!ection lever and punched out. %econds later the aircraft slid into the hill slope below and threw up a lot of smoke and dust but surprisingly did not explode. The pilot safely came down in the hills of ,ssam under a deployed parachute canopy without further incident. The good news was that he had e!ected over friendly territory. The same could not be said of the 7hinese pilots shot down earlier, for whom an extensive manhunt organiAed by the army M# detachments in the region had been launched. The three 7hinese %2&.;s were dashing north to evade the five Mig&.'s of the Borhat force that was coming for them in addition to the two remaining Mig&.'s of the 7habua force. They however, did not escape unhurt, and out of the four R&;; missiles targeted earlier, the two targeted on a single %2&.; received a hit from one that literally threw the aircraft spinning out of control !ust from the shock of impact, with the top side of the fuselage peppered, the canopy shattered and the wings holed. The pilot died inside even before the aircraft hit the ground and vanished in a pillar of fire. The other two missiles lost radar contact with their targets among the surface clutter as the two %2&.;s flew down at extreme low altitude and literally skimmed the treetops in the hills, leaving behind chaff clouds all the way. The decoyed missiles went chasing after chaff clouds before one ran out of fuel and the other detonated in one of the chaff clouds. The 7hinese pilots were lulled into a false sense of safety in the same sense, as their comrade in the main force of nine aircrafts had done. They continued to fly low and it wasn5t long before small yellow flashes erupted all around them. The air was filled with tracer fire that let out dotted flashes throughout the sky. #retty as though it may have been in the green view of the low&light goggles the pilots were wearing, it was still dangerous. ,s the 7hinese %2&.; pair pulled up to go above this danger, one of the aircrafts !erked a little as it received multiple hits in the port wing that left big holes on the wing surface and port engine nacelle sides. , second later the port engine started spewing out thick black smoke and shut down. The second aircraft also received hits but was relatively unharmed. Then the flashes were left behind as the pilots went out of range as they headed north. Their spate of good luck ran out !ust near the border. ,s they were crossing the border hills, the damaged 7hinese %2&.; blew up into small pieces in a white flash of fire all of a sudden, and a white trail of smoke passed upwards between the two aircraft pair even as the remaining %2&.; pulled a hard left and dived forward. *elow them, the 0ndian ,rmy 0gla teams turned the launcher on a leftward aAimuth change and launched another pair of missiles in the heat seeking mode even as the 7hinese pilot above them left clouds of flares dropping all over the sky as he dived into the safety of the hills below him. This time the 7hinese got away as the two 0gla missiles went astray after the not existing threat of the flares. This last 7hinese %2&.; of the eastern barrier force exited north and crossed the border into the 7hinese airspace and safety. )e had been among the two %2&.;s that had escaped back into china from a total initial force of twelve aircrafts. Ten aircraft had been shot down, and in return the 0ndian ,ir -orce had lost seven Mig&.'s and another crippled and

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possibly out of the war. The five remaining Mig&.'s of the Borhat -orce were now forced to return to base as they were running out of fuel. The Mig&.' !ust did not have the range re1uired for these kinds of long endurance engagements of modern air warfare. The two 7habua based Mig&.'s turned by 'C( degrees and headed back east to defend their home base from annihilation. 0n addition to the twelve aircraft about to engage the 7hinese %2&+(M:: force, these were now the only two aircrafts able to come as reinforcements as against the re1uired frantic calls for the entire Borhat based force to come and assist. The 7hinese %2&.;s had effectively prevented that from happening at the cost of ten high performance aircraft. *ut they had lots more to waste. The 0,- was not so lucky. AIRSPACE NORTHEAST OF CHABUA RE"ION NORTHEASTERN TIP OF INDIA 1+#* HRS THURSDAY The twelve aircraft Mig&.' force flying ninety kilometres east of 7habua had turned north and was thus approaching from the south of the inbound %2&+(M::s. They were now receiving data from two small remotely operated picket fence mobile radars that had been placed in the hills at the northeastern tip of 0ndia. 0t was these radars that had given the absolute first warnings about the %2&+(M:: force bearing south towards + T,7, that had allowed the 0,- commanders to understand that the foolish intrusion of the %2&.; forces had not been foolish at all, but the precursor to a ma!or strike. 0t had also been these two radars that had allowed the 7habua *ase 7ontrol centre to scramble their Mig&.'s against this new threat. The #halcon had been too south to detect the %2&+(M:: force in any case, because it had been pushed south by the %2&.; forces heading towards it. )ad it not been for these two radars mounted in the hills, the 7hinese might have achieved complete surprise against + T,7 bases. ,stoundingly, these two radars were the obsolete Russian #&'= mobile radars that were out here to prove a point. The #&'=s were outdated radars and had been planned for retirement when some farsighted people had argued that instead of retiring them, they should be placed in the hilly region of the N3. This allowed these outdated radars to provide crucial warning of an inbound strike and parameters like altitude, strength and aAimuth. 0t was expected that these would be knocked out within seconds of the strike force coming in range of the ,nti&Radiation Missiles. *ut, either way, they were going to be retired anyway. *etter that they serve a purpose and then die rather than rot in some storage facility. ,nd poor capability or not, they were still radars, and the 7hinese had no stealthy aircrafts. 0t was a 4no&lose5 situation for the 0,-F whether it would become a 4win&win5 situation depended on the 0,-5s ability to respond to the warning they generated, and the defender5s response had not been enough. Two detached %2&+(M::s punched off a anti&radiation missile each and moved back into the main formations, and thirty&five minutes after they had generated the first warnings, the two mobile #&'=s received direct hits from an anti&radiation missile each and the missiles went through the radar truck5s roof so the warhead detonated inside, and this blew up the radar trucks on which the two radar receivers had been mounted, ending all transmissions to the + T,7 ,9$3% and the 0,- Mig&.'s. There had been no 0ndian lives lost since the radars had been rigged for remote unmanned operations. The two locations were now visible to the nearby army garrisons, as two fireballs had erupted against the night sky in the hills. These vanished within seconds because there had been no inflammables around. The two #&'=s had done their !ob as had been expected by the farsighted group of individuals who had advocated their placement here. The cessation of their transmissions had been the final warning in itself to all those concerned that the strike formations were now really close.

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The 7hinese pilots had not yet detected the twelve 0ndian Mig&.'s moving south of them. That delay in ac1uisition was due to the hilly terrain, and the fact that after the initial climb after taking off from 7habua, the twelve aircrafts had dropped down to low altitude among the hills. They were burning up more fuel this way, but that was from the main under&fuselage drop tank, which they intended to drop as soon as it got empty. That would reduce drag and weight, thus improving the flight performance characteristics. The hilly terrain meant that they could not see the 7hinese aircrafts, and vice versa. *ut the 4*ison5 variant of the Mig&.' is fully capable of receiving target data from ground sources using digital data links. This 4ground source5 had been the two #&'= radars, and with their loss, their screens had gone blank and had been replaced by the data from the single main long range T)9&'=@@ ,9$3% radar at Borhat and the two %T&>C TR2 radars at 7habua and %ukerating M9um 9umaN, forty kilometres east of 7habua. ,ll information about the inbound strike force was now lost, since all these radars were in the foothills of the peaks north east of their locations, and thus unless the 7hinese crossed over these hills, they could not detect them. 0deally this is where the #halcon would have helped, but it had been chased down south for its life, and thus ineffective as far as this engagement was concerned. Now the 0ndian fighters could not fly in the hills. ,ll twelve fighters initiated a 4pop&up5 manoeuvre and moved to higher altitude. %uddenly the threat board lighted up with doAens of contacts as the 7hinese aircrafts were literally !umped upon by the 0ndian fighters. The 7hinese pilots had been surprised by the sudden pop up of the threats, and were now struggling to orient themselves. The 0ndian pilots had known all along where they had been and where the 7hinese had been. This was a situational awareness war. ,nd the 0ndian %1uadron commander had achieved the tactical surprise. 0t would only be a little time before the 7hinese started taking a toll on the 0ndian aircrafts, but before that the 0ndian 7ommander intended to take down some of the bombers with him. That had been another aspect of the situational awareness game. The #&'=s had been showing how the force was distributed into two altitude levels. The higher&level force of twelve aircraft had been flexible, thus suggesting their nature as escorts. The lower level aircrafts had followed a straight&line path, and these must be the bombers. The Mig&.'s moved towards the lower altitude targets. 0f they could take out several bombers, that would take the heat off the ,9$3% and the *9P systems, and all the escorts could do then would be to buAA around, armed with air&to&air weaponry and watch as the remaining bombers fell prey to the %,Ms. The first volley of R&;+ missiles was fired by the Mig&.'s directly south of the %2&+(M:: force, and thus on the left flank of the 7hinese fighters. They were still orienting themselves south, and their fighter fleet was doing the same as well, higher above them. The engagement range was barely forty kilometres between nearest to enemy fighters, and the missiles went that length before there was any 7hinese reaction. The forty odd fighters met the volley fire of twelve missiles with a massive cloud of chaff and !amming attempts, and the radar returns for the missile guidance increased doAens of times in magnitude. There itself the success rate for the missiles reduced by more than forty percent. -irst set of missiles knocked out seven 7hinese %2&+(M::s of the southern strike element and sent them falling to the ground. *y the time the second set of R&;+ missiles were launched, the 7hinese fighters had oriented themselves, and returned a counter volley of twenty&five missiles at the twelve 0ndian fighters. The missiles headed for each other and the massive amount of missiles heading for the 0ndians forced them to break off earlier than planned, and dive back into the hills. ,s a result the second volley was not as successful, and it blotted four more %2&+(M::s of the second element north of the first one. 3leven 7hinese fighters were now down. Now the weight of the 7hinese numerical superiority bore pressure on the 0ndians. The twenty& five missiles headed for the diving Mig&.'s with all ferocity, and despite the large amount of decoys being dropped by the now southbound 0ndian fighters, it was impossible to stop all of the

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missiles. Most of the missile warheads detonated close to the 0ndian fighters and within the space of seconds the 0ndian Mig&.' force from 7habua was shattered. The twenty&five missiles had destroyed ten aircrafts, and only five 0ndian pilots had been able to bail out of the burning wreckages of what had only seconds before been flying aircrafts. ,s the 7hinese oriented southwards to engage the two remaining Mig&.'s, to their great surprise the pair of southbound 0ndian fighters failed to turn around and reengage. They simply continued to fly southwards until they were out of radar coverage of the 7hinese fighters who were anyway reluctant to go chasing after them. There were several curses at this sudden outburst of 0ndian air power at a time when there should have been none, and the two minute long combat had cost the 7hinese 3leven %2& +(M::s in return for ten Mig&.'s whose pilots had fought a more intelligent war than their counterparts. The problem was that the aircraft that the 0ndian pilots had targeted had been the bomber configured ones. %o in addition to losing eleven bombers, they now had twelve fighter optimised aircrafts flying around like idiots without a :ilogram of ground weaponry, unless they wished to play :amikaAe. %o in effect twenty&three 7hinese %2&+(M::s were out of the bombing role while the remaining seventeen were now tasked with all the targets. The earlier thoughts of having more bombs than targets had disappeared, and now the 7hinese commander had to choose the targets he would wish to attack. The brave Mig&.' pilots had done their !obs and reduced the bomber force significantly. Now it was the !ob of the ,9$3% to take over. To the southwest, the first ,kash launcher revolved on its base on the back of a Tatra launcher and turned to face the east&Northeast axis along with several others at 7habua.
%imilar batteries aligned themselves at 6edo and %kerating, and all turned 1uiet as everybody waited for the 7hinese aircrafts to storm over the hills to the east....

THE AIR DEFENCE "ROUND ENVIROMENT SYSTEM $AD"ES%, # T-A-CNORTHEASTERN TIP OF INDIA 1+&0 HRS THURSDAY The set&up of the ,9$3% at + T,7 included an entire $roup of ,kash missile *atteries, a network of Radar directed ,,,, and the short range 0gla teams linked into a centraliAed network called the + T,7 ,ir 9efence $roup. The main coordination centre was based in an underground facility at 7habua that coordinated all the facets of the system. 0n the ,kash $roup, there existed three missile batteries, one based at 7habua, %ukerating and 6edo respectively. The main $roup )ead1uarters was based at 7habua, but the mobile vehicles were spread out within the vegetation around the base. The only main cluster of vehicles consisted of the $roup 7ommand 7entre M$77N, and the associated trailers and power supply vehicles. 6ocated at the opposite end of the base at 7habua was the +9 7entral ,c1uisition Radar or +9&7,R, which was a multi beam planar array system with a )undred and -ifty :ilometres detection range. This was the nucleus of the system because at the moment, it was the only long&range radar scanning the hills to the east for the first signs of intrusion. There were other radars in the system of course, but the $roup 7ommander was playing it smart. )e had ordered all other radars shut down, including the gun battery radars, the Ra!endra 0ntermediate range ,kash guidance radars and every other emitting device at all three ma!or bases. There was a reason for this. The 7hinese fighters did not have external Bamming or 37M support like the 0ndian *&;(;s or their own 37M )& >s that were operating to the west. These kind of powerful standoff systems could fill the electronic space with spurious signals that disrupted %,M guidance radars. These aircraft did not need to worry about fre1uency spectrums or bandwidth. They simply flooded the entire bands within minutes, and unless the defenders had extremely powerful systems, they could not attempt to 4burn through5 the !amming, no matter how fre1uency versatile their systems were. 0t was because of this kind of powerful support that the earlier skirmishes in Tibet had been favourable for the 0,- and also the reason why the batteries at TeApur were currently not able to engage the %2&.;s flying nearby. *ut the numbers of such aircrafts on both sides were limited, and the 7hinese %2&+(M::s were coming without them because these )&> variants being used near TeApur were not even production aircrafts but the

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testing and evaluation aircrafts that had been pressed into service because they had been at the advanced stages of their programmes. *ut there were no more such aircrafts. The only defence the 7hinese %2& +(M::s therefore had were their own pylon mounted electronic !amming pods. These worked at a whole other level. /hile the )&>s had enough space inside their fuselages to hold powerful e1uipment, obviously the pylon&mounted pods could not hold the same. Therefore they used finesse instead of brute force. These systems first analysed the enemy emissions for determining the various signal parameters like fre1uency, the %earch *andwidth, hopping versatility, power and so on. Then they flooded that specific fre1uency with !amming signals. 0f the fre1uency changed, the process began again and the pods adapted themselves. They had enough power only for certain bandwidths of the system, and that5s where their weakness lay. %ince the entire process depended on the pod5s ability to gather details of the radar signal beforehand, if the defender could deny the pod these signals, it became blind, and rightly so, since there were no signals for it to analyse. 0t also meant that it had no 3/ pre&empting capability. 0t was a passive device, depending on after&detection !amming rather than pre&detection !amming. That was the reason why all radars were shut down except for the +9&7,R. The 0ndian group commander was denying the 7hinese any electronic information. The 7hinese commander flying in the lead aircraft was no fool either. )e had his aircrafts flying low to the ground now and moving on a north&south axis instead of charging towards his targets. )e was doing this !ust inside the detection range of the +9&7,R radar at 7habua. )e was waiting for the 0ndian commander to lose his nerves and light up the tracking radars so that he could gather the electronic information he needed. )e also had another trick up his sleeve. ,lthough the main force was !ust inside the +9&7,R range, and thus giving hits to the 0ndian $roup commander, he was also !ust outside the range of the easternmost ,kash *attery at %ukerating. Now he started to tickle the 0ndian defences. Two %2&+(M::s increased power and flipped to their left and moved westwards straight towards the battery at %ukerating. This was 1uickly detected by the +9&7,R and the information passed to the respective batteries that a pair of 4*ogies5 were inbound to %ukerating. The 7hinese aircrafts came within range of the ,kash Missiles, but the *attery commander there did not light up his systems on the orders of the 0ndian $roup 7ommander. )e wanted bigger fish, not these two small ones. The two %2&+(M::s swiftly turned back eastwards to remain outside the range of other systems, before repeating the process. ,gain they failed to get a response, although their R/Rs were warning them that they had indeed been picked up by the +9&7,R. ,fter trying once more, they returned back to the main formation. The 0ndian $roup commander smiled to himself. )e had the entire night to spend. )ow much time did the 7hinese pilots have before they ran out of fuelI The bottom line was that something had to give in this tense standoff between the two forces gaAing with cautious eyes at each other. ,nd despite the fact that the %2&+(M:: had long range, it wasn5t infinite, and sooner or later the 7hinese 7ommander would have to take his chance. 0n any case, the longer he waited the more likely it was that the %2&.; barrier forces to the west might be defeated and a whole flood of %2& +(M:0s would rush to this region. The decision was made. 0t had to be 4sooner5 rather than 4later5. The entire force of %2&+(M::s pulled to the west and started to move in. There were seventeen bombers at the moment. ,nd the targets at this time were all 0,- ones. The 0ndian army had been spared thanks to the brave efforts of the 0ndian Mig&.' pilots. The targets that were to be hit now included the three airbases at 7habua, %ukerating and 6edo. %ix %2&+(M::s each were tasked with the destruction of 7habua and %ukerating, while five %2&+(M::s would hit the base at 6edo. The remaining twelve air&to&air armed %2& +(M::s would be distributed in three groups of four and one group would follow each of the strike packages for support. ,ll aircrafts were flying in the medium altitude regime at a place where the 0ndian pilots flew at tree top height. That discrepancy was because of the unfamiliarity of the 7hinese pilots of the geography around the area. The aircrafts were picked up on radar 1uickly and now the 0ndian $roup commander had to act. This was the real deal, the main strike, and all the commanders at each battery at the three bases were 1uietly staring at the radar plots in front of them. The $roup commander had to wait as long as he dared if he wished to further increase his chances, but if he left it too late, he would lose it all. The fate of the + Tactical ,ir 7entre, 3,7 was in his hands. ,s the 7hinese forces closed in nearer and nearer there was still no response. /hen they were at murderously close level the $roup 7ommander picked up the phone on the console in front of him, which connected him by voice link to all other *attery commanders at + T,7. )e spoke one sentence and one sentence aloneH %hoot them down.?

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NORTHEASTERN TIP OF INDIA 1+'0 HRS THURSDAY The three ma!or bases in the region, 7habua, %ukerating and 6edo, were arranged in an arrowhead like formation pointing eastwards, with %ukerating being the tip of the arrowhead and thus also the most eastwards located base. That meant that it would be the first to get hit. The bombers heading for 6edo would take a southwestern route from the border while the force hitting 7habua would have to head, first northwest and then southwest to bypass the *atteries at %ukerating and then reach 7habua. That would take them north of the *rahmaputra and then south again to reach 7habua. , round about route by any standard, it also meant that the three forces hitting the three bases would do so with significant time gap between them, and that aided the defenders once more. The 0ndian $roup commander knew this, and that5s why he had instructed each battery commander to light up his systems only when that particular base was under attack. That meant that the ,kash *attery at %ukerating was the first to light up its systems. 0t !ust could not afford to wait any more. ,t the battery level, the main radar now operating was the powerful Ra!endra #hased ,rray radar, and being phased array, it directed its beams not in +>( degrees pattern but in a small solid angle against the designated target. %ince it also directed all its power there, if some 7hinese pilot got very close to the radar, he would be turned to toast within his cockpit, and as much as this biAarre idea of 7hinese food might have humoured the missile teams, it wasn5t their main ob!ective. This was deadly work, and it wasn5t the 7hinese alone who faced the dangers. They had ,RMs too, and if one of these hit the tracked radar vehicles, the whole battery would come crashing down. To avoid that, the Ra!endra Radar at %ukerating was to be used selectively and only for guidance of missiles in a particular sector of the kill Aone. That way, the solid angle pro!ected out could be kept small and to the point and thus avoid giving emissions to the anti&radiation missiles about to be released, unless of course, the ,RM actually crossed this thin pencil beam of radar out of pure bad luck. The main :ill Aone scanning guidance, therefore, was to come from the +9&7,R at 7habua, which had sufficient range to tell the Ra!endra where to look, after which the Ra!endra took over, thus avoiding the use of the *attery5s .9 surveillance radar. The plan was only going to work until the +9&7,R got hit when the %2&+(M:: force striking 7habua reached the base. *ut it surely gave the other two bases a fighting chance to survive early hits from the 7hinese. This was another brainchild of the $roup commander and this smartly thought out plan had been his work for a year5s time since he had been posted here. 0n the next few minutes his entire year5s work was about to be tested. 0n a small forest near the base at %ukerating, the first trailer mounted ,kash turned a little on its base and stopped for a whole three seconds. Then there was a tremendous dust cloud that surrounded the trees and the first ,kash leaped into the air in front of a yellow cone of flames and headed upwards. The entire path was visible in the night sky as the bright yellow dot reached a high altitude and then turned east. There were three other such launches within a gap of two seconds. Then the first launcher launched another missile, and the other three launchers reciprocated. ,nd a few seconds after this second volley had moved skywards, a third set of missiles leaped into air, leaving the dust and smoke covered trailer behind on the ground. Then it all turned 1uiet. ,ll missiles had been expended, and the reloading vehicles screeched to a halt next to the launcher trailers and the reloading crews leaped out to get to work reloading the launcher vehicles. 0t wouldn5t matter much because by the time these missiles were reloaded, the 7hinese aircrafts would reach the base, assuming that any of them survived the twelve missiles targeted at them. The 7hinese weren5t !ust sitting 1uietly, of course. They were punching off every anti&radiation missile they had for the last few seconds, in the hope that they could hit the radar vehicles before they were blown out of the sky. %ix anti&radiation missiles were now heading towards the Ra!endra radar vehicle and the .9 battery surveillance radar at %ukerating. 0t was a 1uestion of who got hit first. This time the god of war sided the 7hinese. They had long known the capabilities of the Ra!endra system thanks to the information collected by their intelligence sources and the help of their #akistani allies in the 0%0. Their anti&radiation missile seekers were tuned to find and destroy these specific targets, and the missiles clinically carried out this !ob !ust before the ,kash missiles moved into terminal mode.

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The blacked out base at %ukerating was suddenly lighted up with three bright fireballs at different sectors of the base as the 7hinese missiles dived into the modified *M# vehicles and threw them tumbling into the air amidst fire and smoke. ,ll radars received hits and the remaining three missiles dived into the .9 *attery %urveillance radar and shattered their mounts as well. ,ll the crews inside these vehicles were killed. There was no point in reloading the missiles again. ,ll missile guidance radars at %ukerating were now down. /orse, the ,kash missiles already in the air were now without guidance. The only good news was that by the time the Ra!endra vehicle had been hit, two of the 7hinese bomber optimised %2&+(M::s had been blotted out of the sky and three fighter "ptimiAed %2&+(M::s had been blotted out as well, while the others had dived to low altitude. ,ll seven other missiles were now wasted as they continued to move east towards non&existing targets. The four %u&+(M::s that had survived the initial assault now moved towards the base. They were out of ,RMs now, and unfortunately for them the $un *attery radars were still operating, and the 0glas didn5t need any radar. *ut these were all point defence systems, and they began to take action only when the 7hinese had already commenced bombing runs. The first %2&+(M:: streaked over the base runway and dropped an entire set of 40ron5 bombs, and the resulting earth shaking explosions shattered the runway concrete, doing serious damage that would take time filling up. ,s the aircraft streaked over the runway, it was followed by small puffs of fire and shrapnel as the gun crews got into the act, and from within the trees a couple of 0glas streaked into the air and chased the aircraft down as the 7hinese pilot dropped chaff and flares all around and weaved in the air, all of which was of no use. The first %,&'> slammed into the tail section and staggered the aircraft in mid air, slowing it down during which time the 7hinese crew e!ected. The second missile streaked the wrong way and followed the flares until it ran out of fuel. The %2&+(M:: slammed into the earth below and vanished into a ball of fire, lighting up the night sky and showed the 7hinese crew landing at the end of the base under their parachutes. The gun crews now turned their guns around for another target, one of who was heading straight for the last remaining gun battery radar. The 7hinese got there first and the two cluster bombs he dropped enveloped the gun radar and left it surrounded by smoke. The last working radar at the base was down. The guns had spotted the 7hinese aircraft and the tracer rounds continued to fire into the night sky against the silhouette of the %2&+(, but to no gain. There was now no working radar left at %ukerating. ,nd the three remaining 7hinese aircrafts got to work dismantling the base. %everal explosions in the next few seconds knocked out the ,T7 building and the main base facilities. The 0gla teams were waiting 1uietly near the trees for the 7hinese pilots to make a mistake like the first aircraft and come to low or even medium altitude. Their patience was rewarded a minute later as one of the 7hinese pilots attempted a low level precision bombing run with his 40ron5 bombs against the handful of ),% that he had identified from the sky. This time the missile engaged him before he dropped his bombs and his aircraft blew up in a shattering explosion a few hundred feet off the ground and sent the burning fuselage crashing into his intended targets. , section of the wing with the bombs still attached fell near one of the ,kash launcher vehicles. *oth members of the 7hinese crew were killed instantly. ,s this grim battle was being fought at low altitude, the remaining air&to&air armed %2&+(M:: was flying much higher in a racetrack pattern over the base, watching as his comrades were flying amidst the mad amounts of tracer and missile fire and attempting to hold their own. )e had done his !ob at least, he reflected, and air superiority had been achieved. ,ll he could do now was wait and watch as the base at %ukerating was destroyed by the two flying %2&+(M::s below him. *y the time the 7hinese pilot and /%" heard the mad screeching of the R/R it was too late. There were bandits in the rear port 1uarter of the sky and already a missile was in the air. The 7hinese pilot increased power and attempted to dive down but he wasn5t fast enough. , R&;+ slammed into the rear port side and then a white flash of fire consumed their aircraft. The burning wreckage tumbled downwards, trailing massive flames as !et fuel continued to burn. The two Mig&.'s of the 7habua force that had escaped south after engaging these %2&+(M::s had returned. The %2&+(M:: pilots below saw the massive flash above them and instinctively !erked their heads upwards and saw their fighter escort coming down in a ball of fire. They too realised what had happened. There were two 0ndian *isons somewhere to their southeast and they now had no interceptor support. The two 7hinese pilots immediately lighted engine reheat and darted into higher altitude. They still had air&to&air missiles for air defence. ,s they headed high up and southeast of the base, the 0ndian soldiers and airmen on the ground realiAed what had happened as well. There was a loud uproar and cheering from all the people at

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the base as they saw the 7hinese leaving to fight for their lives. The two 7hinese %2&+(M::s attempted to locate the two 0ndian fighters only to find that the 0ndian pilots were again escaping to the southeast. *oth 7hinese pilots cursed as one and continued to light their afterburners as they chose to end this meddling once and for all. 0n all their anger it didn5t occur to them that they had !ust aborted their own attacks on a defenceless baseH

CRISIS RESPONSE CENTER NEW DELHI, INDIA 1+'' HRS THURSDAY The meeting had been going on for 1uite some time now, and till now it had focussed only on the situation so far. 0t still wasn5t over. ,bout half an hour ago, *rigadier %harma had concluded yet another situation report coming from the N3 regarding the ongoing 7hinese artillery attacks. That5s when the 7,% had taken over the briefing. ,n air war of brutal proportions was taking place over Tibet, and it was being followed in near real&time in this room. There was a large digital map of the region under attack and it had all military dispositions marked on it for both sides. The lighting in the room had been reduced to near darkness so that everybody was watching the screen as the small triangles representing threats were updated regularly. ,cross the table sat the 9efence Minister, trying to listen to the *riefings given by various people on the situation as it evolved before his eyes. )e wondered that if he was having so much problem keeping tabs of his limited resources, how in the world were the 7hinese doing it with their massive resourcesI ,ssuming they were doing it at all in the first place. That brought a smile on his weary face. ,t the moment the focus was on the markings on the map showing + T.,.7. dispositions at 7habua, 6edo and %ukerating airbases. These were marked in blue circles. There were several red triangles as well, and nobody needed to be told what they represented. Minutes before, of the two red triangles around %ukerating, each representing one flight of aircrafts, one had disappeared all of a sudden. , blue triangle had come back north after heading south. These had been the two Mig&.'s. ,nd while their pilots were at this very moment sitting inside their cockpits and sweating inside their flight suits, here in this air&conditioned room they represented a blue triangle to the military commanders. )ere the war was a clinically detached experience for the people around. Two more red triangles had !ust started to move south towards 7habua and 6edo respectivelyH That will be the %2&+(M:: strike force heading towards 7habua. "ne triangle represents the escort&optimised aircrafts and the southern triangle the ground attack loaded ones. They will hit 7habua within the nextH? the 7,% checked his watch in the near darknessF HTwo and a half minutes.? "kay, what else is going onI? the 9efence Minister asked. )e had !ust witnessed the attack on %ukerating from this room, and he wasn5t very excited by the response of the base defences there. The 7,% was naturally uneasy at the moment, having been asked for details at a time when he would have liked to see what was happening within the next two minutes with total silence. ,nd it showed on his face. The defence minister continued to wait for an answer. The 7,% motioned for his ,d!utant to brief the 9efence Minister on what else was happening. The map Aoom was reduced to encompass the whole region, and the triangles now reduced to dots with dotted lines showing expected movement paths. The briefing began in earnest as the ,d!utant to the 7,%, himself a /ing 7ommander, continued the briefing. Moving further southwest to this sector hereH? a laser dot was pro!ected by the /ing 7ommander as he showed all the people around what he was pointing to, you can see that the five surviving Mig&.'s of 0D3N force have landed back at Borhat. These two other aircrafts, also

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Mig&.'s, are returning to engage the 7hinese aircrafts at 7habua. Moving south, the %2&+(M:0s of *623 force are about to engage this southbound force of Twelve %2&.;s that are heading for the #halcon 07T"R&"N3, now egressing to the south for safety. They should engage within the next few minutes. %oon after we can expect a confirmation of the kills from 07T"R&"N3 itself. 0H? the /ing 7ommander was interrupted by the 9efence Minister. %orry to interrupt, but you are that confident of our victory against the 7hinese aircrafts hereI 0 see that we are still outnumbered in this sector.? Ges %ir. /e now have eight %2&+(M:0s challenging the twelve %2&.;s. *ut don5t look at the numbers sir. 0t5s not about numbers here. ,nd don5t compare it to the Mig&.' battle we had near Borhat some time back. These eight %2&+(M:0s will finish the !ob within two minutes of engagement, and 0 will be highly surprised if they actually took a casualty themselves. /e didn5t engage them earlier because that would involve only four of ours versus twelve of theirs. /e had to play their game and let them come south. /e ordered our #halcon to move south and also the four escorting aircrafts for some time. This has allowed four other %2&+(M:0s to !oin the battle. %o now we are moving north to finish the...? This time the 7,%, ,ir chief Marshal *hosale interrupted his ad!utant. 2nfortunately, sir, that5s exactly what the 7hinese had planned for. They knew that sending %2& .;s against our defences would result in heavy losses, but they sent them anyway. That5s because this was all a diversion. 0n forcing such a large number of aircrafts into our airspace, they got what they anticipated for. /e were forced to move south all our ma!or force multipliers like the #halcon. They thus also isolated the + T,7 boys up in the northeast near 7habua and are sub!ecting them to the massive %2&+(M:: strike that5s going on now. They also moved a considerable number of their %2&.;s westwards to cut off reinforcements.? The 7,% grunted. *ut that part of their plan is not going to work. *ut in doing so they have delayed our response so that another strike force, this time B&'(s, will be able to hit army targets in the hills around Tawang within the next few minutes.? %o what5s the upside of all thisI? the 9efence Minister asked. %ir, on the upside, we will, in the next few minutes defeat the ma!ority of the 7hinese %2&.; barrier forces over our soil. Their eastern force has already been kicked out. The western and southern elements will be engaged and destroyed by the %2&+(M:0s within minutes from now. ,t the same time, our Mig&.' boys at + T,7 have kind of dealt a blow to the 7hinese %2&+(M:: fleet with an e1ual trading ratio, and the ground defences at these three bases will account for the ma!ority of the flying %2&+(M::s, so that5s good as well.? The downside is that + T,7 is suffering some ma!or infrastructure damage in the process. %ukerating runway is definitely out of action. /e will know on the situation in 7habua and 6edo soon. The air defence systems there have taken a serious hit. /orse still is the loss of %ixteen Mig&.' *isons combined at Borhat and 7habua. ,nother has been written off on landing finals at Borhat and the fate of four more is still hanging by a thread. %ir, 0 have to tell you, the + T,7 aircraft fleet is now down to single digits. 0 suppose we have to see what happens to the bases, but we will need to do something to plug this huge hole in my airspace that the 7hinese have !ust cut out. "therwise we will lose air superiority in that sector pretty soon. To the west, it looks to all probability that the B&'( force will make it to their target Aones near Tawang. 7an5t help it sir. 0 !ust don5t have enough aircraft at this time to stop all these incursions. /e will need to move pretty fast after these attacks to re&establish our defences as they were before.? The 7,% concluded. 7an you do itI 7an you restore air superiority again in + T,7I? the 9efence Minister asked. Not sure at the moment, sir. ,sk me after an hour and 0 will be able to get you a clear idea.? "kay. /hat5s going on in 7,7 and TibetI? the defence minister asked in a now irritated voice that became evident to everybody around.

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%ir, we have had to transfer some aircrafts to the 3,7 from the 7,7. ,ll operations in 7,7 are on hold. *ut they still have enough. They can start strike against the 7hinese in Tibet again. "peration #0 "T&),MM3R is currently on holdH? ,ll through this discussion the /ing commander was waiting and reading over the latest report coming in. Then he spoke again to the assembled commanders. %ir, we have lost contact with + T,7 command at 7habua. The 7hinese %2&+(M::s have broken through the air defencesH?the 9efence Minister finally lost control. 9amn it. "kayL That5s itL The 7hinese want a real war, and then let5s give it to them. They think they are the only ones capable launching heavy attacksI ,7M *hosale, order your 7,7 commander to launch "peration #0 "T&),MM3R. Tell him he has full authority from the $overnment of 0ndia to launch and execute complete and total unrestricted air operations against the #6,,- forces in Tibet. /hat help he wants, you give it to him.? %ir, what exactly are you asking me to do hereI? the 7,% asked.
,7M *hosale, the 7hinese want ,runachal #radesh. -ine. /e want Tibet.?

# TACTICAL AIR CENTRE $TAC%

NORTHEASTERN TIP OF INDIA *00' HRS THURSDAY The battle for 7habua was now reaching a climax. There were ten 7hinese %2&+(M::s flying around. -our for top fighter cover and six armed with air to ground weapons. 2nlike %ukerating, however, the radars at 7habua had proven tricky to locate. The 0ndian radar teams had gotten more intelligence about the 7hinese anti&radar capabilities during the raid on %ukerating. ,ll radars were on standby mode. The only radar tracking was the +9&7,R at the base itself. 0t had all the range it needed to detect the 7hinese. The 7hinese didn5t have the space to evade. 0t was !ust that simple. Now the problem for them was that their ,RMs were ready to be launch, but they didn5t know anything about the locations of the 0ndian %,M radars at the base. Neither did they know where the ,kash systems had been dispersed. That had gone against them. The 0ndian ,9$3% support around 7habua had been cunningly located. There were three ,kash *atteries around the region. ,ll of them hidden and dispersed in trees and the local vegetation. ,ll of them had their radars on standby, and all of them were located in a circle around the central +9&7,R. The 7hinese couldn5t get to that radar without crossing the coverage of at least one of the batteries, and all of the battery commanders were fully aware of the 7hinese aircraft locations as they took the feed from the +9&7,R. ,nd all of them had a smile on their faces. The 7hinese didn5t know what to do. -urthermore, since they didn5t know where the hidden batteries were, they were also not aware of the point in space where they might blunder into the range of one of the battery5s launchers. 0t had been for this reason that they had got so many bombers with them. They had expected losses. *ut due to the 0ndian Mig& .'s who had killed eleven of their number before they had even reached their targets, they were now short on numbers. *eing short on numbers was one concept that was unknown to the 7hinese mission commander, and he had difficulty adapting himself to it. Then he made his first decision. )e ordered two of his four escorts to head directly to the 7habua base. This was meant to tickle the 0ndian defences. 0f the 0ndian battery commander lighted up his radar to shoot down the intruders, he would be detected and the 7hinese would then pounce on his battery radar. That would open the way into 7habua. The only mistake made by the 7hinese was altitude. Their four fighter escorts were flying above them, and were visible on 0ndian radar as such. The 0ndian $roup 7ommander had already determined them as escorts and thus not dangerous even if they came directly above the base. There was no need to light up the battery radars for such targets, and the two 7hinese pilots who were expecting to be blown out of the sky continued to fly in the night sky all the way over the hills with their threat boards clear, except for the +9&7,R and the T)9&'=@@ to the south. The 7hinese mission commander realised this mistake and let out a curse at himself for not thinking about it earlier. Then he ordered the two %2&+(M::s to return back to formation. The first attempt to bait the 0ndian defences had failed.

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/hile the two escort %2&+(M::s were returning to formation, the other two flying over the bomber formations suddenly detected two inbound threats coming from the northwest directly towards them. These were the two surviving 0ndian Mig&.' *isons out of the four that had supported the Borhat force during the earlier battles with the %2&.;s. The 7hinese delay in evaluating and attacking the defences at 7habua had allowed these two fighters to dash back. They were now coming in at medium altitude and at very high speeds in a tight pair, side by side. They had detected their targets too, after the T)9&'=@@ at Borhat had continued to direct them in the proper aAimuth for an engagement. The two 0ndian pilots had heard of the fate of their s1uadron comrades east of 7habua. ,nd in front of them on radar were the culprits. They had three R&;;s hanging under their wings, having expended one each during their short battle with the %2&.;s. Now they had the intention to use all of these. The 7hinese %2&+(M::s dipped their wings a little and dropped a little low as they moved into position to engage the 0ndian Mig&.'s at a proper aAimuth. The 0ndians were to their northwest, having been directed there by the 0ndian air defence commander for + T,7. The 7hinese had no idea of this, and they could have known in any case, but they had been !ust outside the range of the northernmost ,kash battery. "nce they moved to their sides to evade the R&;;s, they would enter the kill Aone of that battery, and the 0ndian systems were already using the data from the +9&7,R to ensure that they had most of the necessary launching information beforehand. The ,kash launchers were already oriented along the threat axis and thus facing north and their deadly pointed tips were facing into the black night sky, waiting...

# TACTICAL AIR CENTRE $TAC%

NORTHEASTERN TIP OF INDIA *0#0HRS THURSDAY The first engagement was a ripple fire of R&;;s from the two Mig&.'s. *etween them they had six missiles, and they were now firing them one after another. )owever, only the last two were to be guided by the pilots onto the two %2&+(M::s flying top cover. The other two %2&+(M::s that had been involved in the baiting mission were still far away and not an immediate threat, although they were catching up. The remaining four missiles that had been punched off first were directed at the lower bomber element of the %2&+(M:: force, without guidance. 0f they hit, they hit. 0f not, then it wasn5t their primary ob!ective in any case. The main ob!ective of firing the four missiles at the lower six %2&+(M::s, was to force them to break their formation, and hopefully some of them would evade by turning south. These would then enter the ,kash :ill Aone for *attery ,lpha, located !ust north of 7habua. 0n any case it would have been impossible for the Mig&.' pilots to find the time to fire all missiles under guidance, and it seemed a waste for them to be left hanging under the wings in case they took a hit themselves. ,t the very least it would confuse the 7hinese pilots because they wouldn5t know which of these missiles were being guided, and as a standard elimination tactic would involve them to break pattern and evade, hopefully, right into the waiting clutches of the ,kash missiles. ,s such, it was now a two&tier mission for the two 0ndian pilots. The first involved the destruction of as many of the 7hinese aircrafts as they could manage, and the second part was for them to force the %2&+(M::s into the :ill Aones for the ground defences. *ecause they had fired the four unguided missiles first, it seemed that this second part of the mission would be completed before the first part was accomplished. The 7hinese pilots responded with a barrage of four missiles of their own, fired by the two top cover %2& +(M::s as they headed straight for the Mig&.'s. There was a crucial few second delay between the time that the 0ndians had fired and the time the 7hinese had manoeuvred and engaged in return. That meant that the 0ndian missiles would reach them first and that meant that they would have to disengage and evade. The same went for the bottom six %2&+(M::s as well. ,s the four unguided R&;;s bore down on the six&element bomber force, the 7hinese %2&+(M::s spilt into first three pairs and then into single aircrafts in all aAimuths. )alf of the aircraft headed northeast and the remaining south and southeast, all of them diving low as they did so. Now the ,kash systems went to work.

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There were three %2&+(M::s in range of the missiles, and although that was only half the main bomber strike package, it was still a good amount. There were four launchers placed in the trees around the base at 7habua for the ,lpha, *eta and Pulu batteries. 0t was the ,lpha *attery that was placed to the north of the base, and it was this that was within launching range for the targets. %econds after the three %2&+(M::s came into range, the launchers swung into action. Three missiles were fired, one each from three of the four launchers in the first volley. ,nother volley fire of three missiles was launched for doubling the chances for a hit. 0n the dark night sky, the three flames of death leaped into the sky. There were also four R&;;s flying to the north of these three %2&+(M::s, and to their south now came the six missiles of the $round defences into 7habua. The 7hinese pilots finally had the battery radars located. 2nfortunately the missiles were already in the air and heading towards them. 0t was like finding the smoking gun in police work. Gou couldn5t claim that you found the smoking gun after you were suddenly looking down the barrel moments before you were shot dead. 0n this case the 7hinese had at last found the battery location, but launching anti&radiation missiles at them was the least of their worries at the moment as they attempted to evade the ,kash missiles. Then it was all over as the missiles streaked into detonation range after ignoring the radar decoys being dumped into the air by the 7hinese aircrafts. The Ra!endra radar was powerful phased array radar, and the missiles !ust followed were its beam led them. 9ecoys of no decoys, it was all the same for this air defence system. The three missiles detonated in an almost perfect harmony, and two of the %2&+(M::s were blotted out the sky in massive fireballs while the third had its entire airframe peppered by the 4frag5 pattern of the explosion next to the aircraft. The powerful detonation left the aircraft barely flying, and the 7hinese crew e!ected from the aircraft after bringing the shattered aircraft to level flight even as the wings started to break off and the engines flamed out. 0t was a miracle that the aircraft had survived so much damage, but it didn5t survive for too long as it went into a shallow dive towards the dark terrain below. %everal seconds later there was a small fireball as the aircraft came down in a wet field !ust south of the *rahmaputra River. The smoke was lost within the dark night. The two members of the 7hinese crew of the last aircraft came down in the field next to where their aircraft had been lost and no sooner had they landed than they were approached by crowds of angry villagers who captured the /%" before he could even dislodge from his parachute. The pilot was found to be dead under his parachute from the wounds he had sustained during the missile shrapnel hits and then during the explosion. The 7hinese /%" was now the seventh #6,,- crewman to be captured during this long night. ,nd as the villagers manhandled the 7hinese airman to the nearest police station, the air war over their heads continued. ,s the police took hold of the 7hinese airman, now having sustained in!uries from the manhandling he had sustained, there was another explosion in the sky above that caused everybody to look above. %econds later the sounds reverberated across the village in the form of a loud thunderclap. The first %2&+(M:: of the top cover had !ust taken a hit from one of the guided R&;;s. There would be no survivors from that aircraft as the small burning pieces of the wreckage rained down towards the earth. The second %2&+(M:: had been luckier and had survived his R&;;. Now, as he again attained level flight and aAimuth to guide his own missiles, the two Mig&.'s took a radical flip to their sides and dived during the half roll manoeuvre left and right, back towards the northwest. They had four missiles chasing themF all of them now being guided by the one %2&+(M:: of the top&cover that had survived. The other two %2&+(M::s finally caught up with their flight and also launched a pair of missiles each, but they were too late for any hope for their missiles. The only hope was from the four missiles being guided by the single %2&+(M:: crew that was now doing its best to achieve results in the 7hinese favour. That didn5t happen this time. The two 0ndian pilots streamed at extreme low altitude and disappeared into the )imalayan foothills before any of the missiles could reach them. The three 7hinese %2&+(M:: crews of the top cover let out a common curse at the suddenness of this savage attack from the 0ndian defences, and at their inability to get any positive results. -inally it was enough. The mission commander flying along with two other remaining 7hinese %2&+(M:: bomber element force heading northeast ordered the three top cover %2&+(M::s to break off and !oin them. The 7hinese force commander had taken enough losses in his two strike packages at %ukerating and 7habua, and although the nine aircraft force of five bomber and four top cover aircrafts were about to launch attacks at 6edo, after successfully destroying the main communications node for + T,7 west of %ukerating with dumb bombs, they were told to break off and head home.

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The last aircrafts to break off the fight were the two %2&+(M::s of the %ukerating force that were chasing the two surviving Mig&.'s of the 7habua force heading southeast at extreme range. The two 7hinese pilots had already lost heart at the destruction of eight of their number during the attack on %ukerating, and neither did they have the long&range radar guided missiles for extreme engagement. ,ll they had were close range self defence 0R missiles, and it was likely that the two 0ndian #ilots had all the intention to take them through a winding chase through the hills that they knew by memory and which the 7hinese were unaware of. The logical thing was therefore to disengage while they still had the advantage, and this the two %2&+(M::s executed with flawless precision, and before the two 0ndian Mig&.' pilots had any idea that their hunters had broken off, they were gone. /ith that the first battle for + T,7 was over as abruptly as it had begun. The 7hinese %2&+(M:: strike forces had taken a battering from the combined air and ground defences at + T,7, and they were now moving northeast in broken elements. The only coherent force was the intact force of nine aircrafts from the abortive strike at 6edo. -rom the ten aircraft forces to hit each of the + T,7 bases at %ukerating and 7habua, only two and six aircrafts were returning back to base. 0n all, the 7hinese had lost twenty&three %2& +(M::s in this massive raid, not to mention another twelve %2&.;s from the eastern barrier force, and that had put a big dent in their %ukhoi fleet. *ut it hadn5t been all for nothing. The 0ndian defences had been dealt a crippling blow. The main fighter force in the sector had been destroyed. The s1uadron coherence was now lost as the survivors of the 7habua force started heading towards their home base. The 0,- had lost seventeen Mig&.' *isons, and another had been damaged beyond repair, out of a total of twenty&eight aircraft split between 7habua and Borhat. The base at %ukerating had been shattered and left burning. 0t was unlikely to be repaired any time soon. The defences at the base had also been lost. The main communications centre southwest of %ukerating had been destroyed completely, and this had temporarily severed the communication data&links of + T,7 with 3,7 ,ir head1uarters before the backup facility near 7habua had kicked in. This temporary shutdown in communications had led the staff at 0,- )< to believe that the %2&+(M:: force had broken through, although that chaos had been sorted out as clear news of the 7hinese abortion of their strike had started coming through. There were now only two barrier forces of %2&.;s and another strike force of B&'(s about to hit Tawang that were left as immediate threats. *ut these were in the west, and the e1uations there were different. ,s far as the exhausted Mig&.' #ilots of + T,7 were concerned, it was not their battle. They had fought their own battle, alone and cut off from the rest of the 0,- against an enemy superior in numbers and capability, and held their own, barely. The battle for + T,7 on this night was one for the annals of military history, but it would not be the last. The 0,- had played the 7hinese game too long, and had done so only to build up its strength. /ith whole fleets of %2&+(M:0s now entering the region, the life expectancy for the two doAen %2&.;s in the west was already being measured in minutes. 0f the battle for + T,7 had been difficult for the 7hinese, the one in the west was about to become a slaughter.

IAF EASTERN AIR COMMAND C#I TEMPORARILY RELOCATED TO KALAIKUNDA, INDIA *0#' HRS THURSDAY The air battle over the 0ndian Northeast was being run from this command centre at :alaikunda airbase in /est&*engal. 0t was the temporary head1uarters for the 0,- eastern air command M3,7N, shifted after the threat of missile attacks had increased tremendously on its permanent facility at %hillong in Meghalaya since morning. This temporary facility had been recently built as one of three redundant command centres for the 3,7 in case of nuclear attacks. ,s such, it had all the command and control capability already embedded within it so that the staff here could take over control in case something happened to the primary facility in times of war without much delay, if any. Now, the 3,7 commander, ,ir Marshal %unil %hankar had taken a pre&emptive decision and

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moved his command staff with him to this base after the late morning missile strikes by the 7hinese had taken out the main radar sites in the hills east of :ohima. /ith that done, the base had come up to speed almost as soon as the main staff officers had dismounted from the 0,- ,N& +.s that had brought them here from %hillong. , caretaker crew had been left back at %hillong to run the local sector from there and await further orders from the new 4primary5 at :alaikunda. That had been hours ago. ,nd by now the centre was running at full speed, managing the brutal war for air supremacy that was being fought over the 0ndian northeastern states. The staffs were well organiAed, and the system allowed flexibility. ,s a result, the main 3,7 command staff at :alaikunda did not interfere with how the #halcon radar operators arranged the 0,- assets during tactical combat scenarios unless more assets were to be needed or included or when a strategic decision had to be made. The #halcon operators in turn did not interfere with how the flight commanders of the fighter groups engaged the enemy once they had followed the general directions of the #halcon crew. ,s a result, the final call rested with the flight commanders on how and when to take the enemy that he had been vectored to. The end result of all this was that the burden reduced on the different teams. The :alaikunda command team, therefore, concentrated in getting as many assets as they could into the theatre and then handed them off to the #halcon. This gave time and released mental energy ,ir Marshal %unil %hankar to take some important strategic decisions. "ne of these was being made now in a separate briefing room within the main bunker. "utside the room, the staff officers, all of the rank of %1uadron leader and above, were scrambling to get the situation under control, and the atmosphere was chaotic. 0nside the room, however, the atmosphere was 1uiet. There were only four men in the room, including the ,ir Marshal. The briefing officer was /ing 7ommander M/E7N *. :aria, recently transferred to this staff from )ashimara where he used to fly Mig&.;s. , freak accident had ended his flying career, and so now he was here. ,lso in the room was ,ir Marshal :. R. Reddy, from ,ir )ead1uarters, and a representative of ,7M *hosale. )e had been sent here to ensure the smooth cooperation between 7,7 and 3,7 operations for the battles ahead. The fourth and last person in the room was $roup 7aptain M$E7N . Naidu, the -light operations commander at :alaikunda. The ,"7 for :alaikunda should have been present for this meeting but he had met with an accident the day before and so $E7 Naidu was taking his place in the room. The room itself was relatively large, and consisted of a big conference desk on which a complete battle staff could sit and manage the air war for 3,7. ,t the moment most of the chairs were empty. The only person standing was /E7 :aria, and he was standing next to the large digital map showing the ongoing air war. The lighting was kept a little low and the room itself was air& conditioned. The surrounding walls were filled with television screens for video conferencing that had been switched off at the moment. , single wall on the far end of the table held the digital clocks showing the times at various places in 0ndia and 7hina. The meeting began in earnest as soon as ,ir Marshal %. %hankar put down the "ps "rder in front of him and looked up at ,ir Marshal Reddy and spoke about what had been sent to him from ,ir )ead1uarters. 0 !ust got this from *hosale. )e wants us to look at the possibility of defeating the 7hinese 3/E 37M )&> aircrafts that have crippled our ground defences in ' T,7 and . T,7. /hat do you thinkI? 0t5s certainly worth looking into. This battle itself has been bad for one of your sectors...+ T,7. ,nd the only reason they survived was because of the coordination between the ground defences and the *ison boys. 0f these 7hinese standoff !amming aircrafts slip away unhurt, then the next time they strike with this support, those crucial ground batteries will be unable to resist effectively, to say the least. /here are these )&>s flying anywayI? both 4,ir5 officers looked at the briefing officer and he took the cue to begin his !ob in the meeting. %ir, at this time we only know the rough locations for these )&>s. "ur tracking radars in . and '

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T,7 are facing severe electronic interference that5s preventing them from gathering more accurate info. )owever, we know that there are five of these aircrafts flying. "ne is in the north of Tawang and is supporting the B&'( attack force that5s about to hit the army5s defences near the town. ,nother four are supporting the %2&.;s by suppressing the ground defence systems below them. The #halcon is too far down south to detect anything at the moment, and even that is encountering some !amming attempts by the 7hinese, although these have so far been unsuccessful. The 377M systems on board the #halcon are effectively defeating these attempts by the 7hinese. /ith all the chaos in the air at the moment, we really haven5t been able to allocate much time into gathering information on these 7hinese 3/ birds. That is now changing. ,t the moment, we have an ,R7 *&;(; flying east from )ashimara, behind the formations of %2& +(M:0s and attempting to ac1uire information on the 7hinese 3/ capabilities mounted within these aircrafts. /e also know for certain that during the initial penetration of the 7hinese %2&.; forces, these aircrafts had a southeasterly course. %oon after the %2&.; eastern barrier force was defeated, the left flank for these aircraft was suddenly ripped open, and so the 7hinese mission commanders have diverted the four 3/ )&>s more to the west, under the safety of the two other barrier forces and somewhat northwards closer to the border. /e fear that once the %2&.;s detect any of our aircrafts attempting to move from + T,7 to engage these !ammers, they will issue a warning and these )&>s will escape northwards beyond the $reat )imalayan range and back into safety within 7hinese airspace.? /ing 7ommander :aria concluded. This time ,ir Marshal %hankar spoke up. /hat about chopping them off from the westI? %ir, to do that would re1uire our %2&+(M:0s to slash through the western %2&.; barrier force and move to engage these aircrafts, by which time a sufficient time would be available for the 7hinese to pull back into china. 0n any case, there are now twelve %u&+(M:0s in the northern sector here. , flight of four from +( %1n, *623&"N3 through -"2R, is hereHnear *omdila and is about to engage the %2&.; western barrier force momentarily. *ehind them are the eight %2& +(M:0s from .J %1n that will assist the +( %1n aircraft and then attempt to engage the B&'( force if there is time, which 0 doubtH? ,nd the southI? There, the twelve %2&.;s are dashing for the #halcon and the eight %2&+(M:0s of +( %1n5s *623 force in this region are about to stop them. They could possibly move to engage the )&>s after that, but the distances are against them. This problem arises because of the temporary southern retreat that these aircraft had to do when the 7hinese had initially penetrated our airspace. They had to buy time for the reinforcements from *623 force to come and assist. /ith that now done, they will put a stop to the southern movement, eliminate the twelve %2&.;s, and then again move north to restore aerial surveillance of the #halcon over . T,7. *ut all this will take crucial time, within which the 7hinese !ammers will be able to make their escape. ,nd diverting any aircraft from this force to go after the )&>s runs the risk of losing the #halcon if the 7hinese get lucky.? %o that leaves the east. *ut + T,7 is still disorganised after the drubbing they have !ust received. /hat assets do they haveI? %ir, there are six operational Mig&.'s at Borhat that are on the ground and being loaded and refuelled. There are also four other Mig&.'s at 7habua, but these haven5t even landed yet, so by the time they get ready again, it will be all over. ,lso, %ir, 0 want to remind you at this time that the Borhat force is a little low on morale. 0 !ust received a combat action report from their base operations centre. 0t seems that the %1uadron commander, /ing commander %uresh Raina was killed outright, along with the %econd in command, during combat with the %2&.;s. Two other senior officers have also been shot down and have currently not been recovered so far. Their fate remains unknown. ,s if that wasn5t enough, the one crippled aircraft landed at Borhat airbase and the undercarriage collapsed due to the damage suffered in the air. That pilot survived and lived till he reached the hospital where he succumbed to his wounds. /ith all that done, the six Mig&.'s

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are technically ready, but their pilots don5t have a senior enough pilot with them who could have led them on this mission.? 9ear $od. 0 knew Raina. )e was a excellent tactician and a good leaderHdamn itHokay, who5s in command of the force nowI? ,ir Marshal %hankar continued. %1uadron 6eader ,. #rasad. )e had !ust !oined the base a couple of months ago. Not nearly enough time for him to come to know the s1uadron. Technically speaking, he is capable, but 0 feel it takes more than that. ,nyway, with the 7hinese %2&.; force dashing south towards the #halcon to their west, these six aircraft are already behind the 7hinese force. %o theoretically they could get this mission done. *ut we need to know the exact location of the 7hinese )&>s. That is not much of a problem. The ,R7 *&;(; 0 mentioned earlier is far more capable in terms of 3/ gear. 0t5s the same type as the one we have coordinating the 7,7 air operations in Tibet. 0t will get their exact locations in no time. 0t can then pass this off to the Mig&.' force and they can conclude the engagement. 0t is important for them not to let the 7hinese know that the Mig&.'s are approaching. This means that the Borhat force will have to fly low in the hills and keep their radars on standby to prevent giving the 7hinese R/Rs any warning. Technically it can be done, and most of the pieces are in placeH? Ges. 0 guess we have no choice. These targets need to be taken out this time itself. 0 don5t want my ground defences at ' and . T,7 sitting 1uietly while my pilots fight it out. 0 guess this %1uadron 6eader #rasad will have to get the !ob done, whether he likes it or not or whether we like it or not. %end the re1uired orders immediately. /e will give it our best shot with what we got. /e have too many things going on and 0 don5t want any confusion with othersHso what are we calling thisI?
"peration %2##"RT&%/0#3.?

IAF AIR FORCE STATION ORHAT

NORTHEASTERN INDIA *0&' HRS THURSDAY The six pilots and the base commander were standing next to the front fuselage of one of the parked Mig& .'s inside one of the shelters. "utside, the base was blacked out. There were no lights except for the moonlight that was being interrupted by the clouds in the sky. ,round the base were the dark silhouettes of the hills against a partially star studded sky. The work of loading the six aircrafts had already been done within the hardened aircraft shelters and now all six Mig&.'s had been loaded with a compliment of two R& ;;s and two R&;+s each. The base commander was listening 1uietly as %1uadron leader #rasad outlined his plans for the mission at hand. The !ob re1uired these six aircrafts to move northwest of their current location after take&off. They also had to stay low order to avoid any confrontation with the %2&.;s that were now actually to the southwest of the base, much to the irritation of the base commander who had hoped to send these six aircraft to deal with them and end this long night. Now he had been ordered to send these aircraft and pilots on a mission that might or might&nor yield results. 0n any case, he really didn5t have much choice in the matter and so he kept his peace while he listened to %1n. 6dr. #rasad as he outlined details like the tactical formation they would be using and the mission flight profile. The *ase commander was also worried that the mission commander in front of him might not really be up to the task at hand, and again that was something he could not argue on. There were no other senior pilots left to command. The savage war with the %2&.; eastern barrier force an hour ago had claimed the lives of most of his senior officers. The only senior pilot left alive was now in hospital undergoing surgery after he had sustained severe in!uries prior and during take&off. )e had been found hanging from a tree under his parachute only fifteen minutes ago, and it was a measure of the speed with which the %earch and Rescue teams had done their !ob so that fifteen minutes after being located by a 9hruv helicopter the pilot was already in the operating room. /hether he would survive the night or not was another matter, but they had done all they could for him. The other four pilots who had been shot down had been killed outright, and there were sufficient

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eyewitnesses for their crashes. , young -light 6ieutenant from the base was leading a small team and visiting the local villages near the place of the air battle to ascertain the locations of the crashes, but all that was secondary. %even aircrafts had survived the battle, including one that had suffered severe structural damage and was now lying near the end of the main runway in pile of aluminium and metal. 0t would never fly again, according to the *ase engineer. ,nd neither would the pilot, who had succumbed to his wounds only several minutes ago. The remaining six pilots were again going on yet another mission, and the base commander was now wondering whether he was witnessing the results of a successful outcome to this air battle or the decimation of his aerial fighting force. %o far it certainly looked as though they were winning this battle, but at what costI /ill the Mig&.' force at + T,7 survive to see the morning or will this night see the last of their war effortI The base commander shook his head and woke from his reverie and realised that #rasad was !ust completing the mission details with his pilots. Then he shook hands with the base commander and saluted before the pilots dispersed to head towards their own aircrafts in other shelters nearby. The pilots 1uickly ran up the ladder and stepped into the cockpit to begin the procedures for take off. There were no preliminaries as there was not time for them. Time was of the essence for this mission, and every minute they wasted on the ground the chances were that the 7hinese 37M )&>s would slip away back into 7hinese airspace and safety of their own ground defence systems. The base came alive with the sound of !et engines starting up with all their power one after another, until the noise became high pitched enough in the confined space so that the ground crewmen put on their ear protectors once again. There was no re1uirement for any authoriAation from the base operations centre for permission to take off. There were no other missions being flown from the base or anywhere around. The only !ob that needed to be done by them was to make sure that the six aircrafts took off without hitting each other. ,fter what they had gone though during the night, the six pilots were actually fully enthusiastic for this mission. 0f all went well, it would be a battle on their terms. 0t would also be an opportunity for them to hit the 7hinese strike capability hard. That would make the lives lost from this s1uadron mean something as far as the remaining pilots were concerned, although they all knew that they had saved + T,7 from annihilation. *ut this was more than that. This was personal. /ith these thoughts in mind, the pilots released the brakes. The pointed nose of the deadly Mig&.'s came out of the darkness inside the shelters and under the moonlight outside.

THE BORDER CROSSIN" AT BUM)LA

NORTH OF TAWAN" ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA *0&6 HRS THURSDAY *oth sides in the conflict had abandoned the border crossing at *um&6a since Monday afternoon in order to keep 4accidental5 incidents from taking place. There were only dirt strips leading up to the crossing from the 0ndian side while the ones on the 7hinese side had seen some tar roads being built recently. *oth sides had built up guard shacks on their sides, and it was one of the few places along the entire border with ,runachal #radesh where both sides were properly placed along the international border and not encroaching on each others territories. *oth sides had pulled into the hills on either sides of the crossing and had been eyeing each other for the past two days. That had changed a few hours ago when the 0ndian troops on the southern hills at *um&6a had been ordered to move further south and !oin the defences at Tawang. The 0ndians were abandoning the border crossing, as it was far too vulnerable to protect effectively. 0t was also easily within the range of the 7hinese artillery systems, right from mortars to heavy guns. 0t was a much better tactic to let the 7hinese stretch themselves out and go further than the range of their support units. ,nd while they made this movement, they could be sub!ected to continuous attacks from the 0ndian artillery batteries around Tawang. There was no need to be doctrinally rigid. Tactical flexibility was the order of the day in 0 7orps. ,nd there was no need for keeping troops nearby to maintain eye contact with the 7hinese forces when they arrive, for that was already being done from the air by a %earcher&00

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unmanned air vehicle from the *omdila 2, base. The small guard posts and small guard buildings at the crossing were extremely 1uiet and the cold and darkness of the night was all around. The only noise was from the cold winds and snow. ,nd the only man made light was from the orange glow on the horiAon to the east where the 7hinese artillery continued to fall through the night, with the occasional thundering sound being heard above the noise of the winds. Then there was another sound, those of a high speed whipping noise and then the wind driven snow changed directions as man made winds came closer. ,ll of a sudden a 7hinese P&=/P Recon helicopter came through the air from the north and flew over the abandoned buildings at the crossing. 0t flew in a circle around the crossing before heading south and disappearing into the southern hills into 0ndia. ,s the first sounds of the helicopter started to drown out, more sounds were heard as four other similar helicopters flew in a tactical formation from the south. /hile one of the helicopters was a P&'( attack helicopter that continued to hover around the base to provide suppressing fire from half a kilometre away, the other three helicopters were the standard P&=* troop transport helicopters and they landed in a small snow covered clearing near the crossing. 3ach carried eight heavily armed Recon&troops who were dressed in white camouflage gear and all wearing N $ systems and they piled out 1uickly as they headed towards the abandoned buildings and towers with their weapons armed and pointed forward. The three teams of eight had no trouble clearing the buildings because it was soon found out that there were no 0ndian troops around. Then there was a huge yellow flash in one of the buildings along with a powerful thundering noise before all went 1uiet again. The 7hinese soldiers had taken cover when the explosion had ripped through the building and now they headed towards the burning fires to find that three of their comrades lay dead on the floor in front of them and the rooms nearby was on fire. The building had been booby&trapped by the withdrawing 0ndian troops. The 7hinese Recon&platoon commander let out a curse before ordering all his men to carefully remove the three bodies and then exit the building and demolish it from the outside using explosive charges. This building had no use fro them anyway since it was too vulnerable for them to use it for anything like a command post or a logistics centre. ,nd he had no intention to search it carefully for each little booby& trap left by the accursed 0ndians. Three kilometres away and thousands of feet above them, a %earcher&00 bird was flying with its obli1ue pointing cameras taking an intimate look at the events unfolding at the crossing. The closeness allowed them to Aoom in and see on 0R as the 7hinese soldiers piled out of the buildings carrying three bodies with them as also the large glare coming on the camera from the burning building. The suddenness of the explosion had caught the 2, operators at *omdila by surprise as well, only difference being that instead of curses, smiles had followed on the 0ndian faces in the 7. trailer. -urther south, the first 7hinese P&=/P Recon chopper was flying ever deeper into 0ndian Territory. 0t was doing so in leaps and bounds as it used the powerful nighttime scanners to locate the first defensive positions of the 0ndian army. The main problems for the 7hinese pilots were the hilly and vegetated terrain that was proving difficult to scan properly. -or example, since they were coming south, all northern slopes of the hills in front of them were clearly visible, but the southern slopes were not. The only way to avoid this was to loop left and right of the hill, but that was not possible because of the continuous ridgelines from east to west. %o they had no choice. 3ven so, they were moving very slowly in leaps to make sure that their safety was not compromised. ,s the moved past the first ridgeline to the south of the *um&6a crossing, they failed to notice an 0ndian reinforced company of rearguard troops hiding on the southern slope. 0n addition, the indian troops on the ground were waiting for the 7hinese helicopter as it flew over them because the %earcher&00 hade issued a warning via their Tawang based regimental head1uarters. ,s a result, when the 7hinese helicopter flew over, an 0gla missile streaked from within the bushes on the southern slope in a white trail and headed for the 7hinese P&=/P from the rear and below. 0t took barely two seconds to reach its target as the target itself failed to conduct evasive manoeuvres because the 7hinese pilots lacked any and all warning. The massive explosion hit the hot engine exhaust section and destroyed the turbo shaft engines. The helicopter was slashed to one side because of the force of the explosion and the lack of power forced it to go in a downward spiral path to its doom on the valley floor below. The explosion was visible as a large flash to the 7hinese Recon Troops at the *um&6a crossing in the north, and all heads turned to face the source of the explosion. The 7hinese commander was soon contacted and informed of the situation. Needless to say he was not very impressed with the loss of three soldiers and two

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pilots and one helicopter in return for capturing an abandoned border crossing, but he still accepted the victory for what it was8 they had !ust captured the first piece of land that the 0ndians had occupied for more than half a century. The first step towards Tawang had been taken. The border crossing at *um&6a was now in 7hinese hands.

INDIAN ARTILLERY BATTERIES AROUND TAWAN"

ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA *0'0 HRS THURSDAY The battle for Tawang had begun at the same time when the first %merch launchers had gone into action. /ith the air war being fought above them and the massive artillery shelling taking place along the entire border with ,runachal #radesh against 0ndian forces, this battle had become !ust one more in a series of engagements along the border. *ut the local commanders knew that it was more than !ust a 4combat engagement5. The fate of hundreds of 0ndian citiAens in Tawang hung in the balance. 9espite the situation in the air and the temporary loss of local air superiority, the defenders in this battle were about to go on the offensive. 3very advantage that could be brought to bear on the 7hinese was needed. 0t was a 1uestion of what the 0ndian army had that the 7hinese didn5t have or to which they could not respond to effectively. That meant only one thing8 the 0ndian artillery batteries. The 0ndians had their guns. The 7hinese had lost theirs. 0t was that simple. The 0ndian artillery advantage in the sector was crucial. ,nd both sides knew this. The 0ndian army planned to use the four surviving batteries of '@@mm tube artillery deployed around Tawang to eliminate the 7hinese armour threat. The entire region5s geography was not suited in any way to tank warfare, and if the defender had the means, the main armour threat could be eliminated along several chokepoints before they even entered 0ndia. "ne of these chokepoints was at the *um&6a crossing. The crossing was the only ma!or point of crossing for vehicles in the region due to the blocking walls in the form of the $reat )imalayan range to the east and *hutan in the west. %outhwards from this point was Tawang. North of it were the 7hinese forces. *ut the 7hinese infrastructure development that had developed the roads in the Tibetan mountains had only been able to build the roads as far as the crossing. -rom that point on it was a dirt track into 0ndia. ,lso, the geography dictated that the main vehicular bound force could also move only to as much as Tawang. ,fter that using armoured vehicles was too insane for anybody to consider. That didn5t mean that they couldn5t move there, !ust that doing a movement along narrow roads in peacetime is a whole lot different from doing it at wartime. 0f the lead vehicle got hit, the path is blocked, the force comes to a stop and the defenders can take easy pot shots at the attackers. Therefore, the main reasoning behind using the tanks was only to get as far as the town of Tawang so that the urban fighting could be influenced in the attackers favour with this support. ,ssuming that they got there in the first place. The 7hinese artillery had been supposed to suppress the 0ndian counterparts, but the use of the %earcher&00 2, s from *omdila with the 0ndian artillery command at Tawang had effectively negated that little surprise and turned the tables around. The 0ndian army batteries had used this intelligence&gathering platform to take out the 7hinese self&propelled artillery systems north of the $reat )imalayan range in china. %o now the 7hinese had tanks moving along chokepoint&ridden paths, with their artillery taken out, and the only side having the artillery now was 0ndian. ,nd that was very bad news for the 7hinese commanders. /ith the T,70T&R39 searcher&00 unmanned vehicle now being supported by another such vehicle from *omdila, the call signs had changed to T,70T&"N3 and T,70T&T/". The former was still flying over 7hinese territory and keeping an eye on other interesting developments while the latter was taking station !ust south of *um&6a to cover the next phase of the 0ndian artillery strikes. 0t had already covered the 7hinese takeover of the *um&6a crossing. , third %earcher&00 was on the ground at the *omdila ramp and was being prepped up to take position should either one of the two flying vehicles get knocked out by the 7hinese. The 0ndian attack was once more to be led by the %merch 6auncher battery near Tawang. This time, however, the launches were to be at night, and that was a very spectacular sight to see. 0t was incidentally, also the first 0ndian counter&counterstroke to the 7hinese invasion from *um&6a and the artillery attacks that had been going on for a couple of hours now along the rest of the border with 7hina.

The first launcher started it off for the entire battery. "ne orange cone of flame after another left the elevated

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barrels of the launcher and turned the darkness of the night into daylight and it came and went as each +((mm rocket left the launcher and vanished behind the hills. Their target was the abandoned border checkpoint at *um&6a, and so this battery was taking the data from T,70T&T/". The gun batteries were to target the rear sections of the columns, and those were still inside 7hina, so these battery commanders were taking the data from T,70T&"N3. /ithin seconds the first salvo was on its way north. *ehind them the gun crews were elevating the guns and inserting the shells inside the tubes. The first rocket salvo fell on the *um&6a border crossing which the 0ndian soldiers had abandoned since the last two days and which the first recon teams of the advancing 7hinese infantry had captured within the last few minutes. ,lso at the crossing were several light 7hinese helicopters that were bringing in supporting troops to free up the recon teams to do their main !ob of scouting. That was essential and needed to be done before the leading elements of the main attacking force came down south. The rockets that hit this location were a mix of delayed action mine types and cluster munitions. The first few rockets were the standard cluster munitions based ones and their !ob was to take out these units of the 7hinese forces that had occupied the 0ndian positions at the crossing. ,ll subse1uent rockets were the delayed action types. /ith little warning available, the former 0ndian positions at *um&6a that were in 7hinese hands for the last few minutes turned into a small mass of fireballs within seconds. The three 7hinese helicopters that were still unloading their troops were hit while on the ground and vanished within the flames. 3xcept for the 7hinese troops who were securing the outer perimeters of the landing area, most others had been caught in the open. The entire area was cluttered with hundreds of small explosions and dust clouds. /ithin seconds the crossing vanished into a big cloud of smoke that was of high temperature and so visible on the 0R cameras of the %earcher&00 aircraft as such, even in the darkness. The remaining rockets that hit the location did not raise smoke clouds but simply scattered their lethal mines around the entire area. Then all went 1uiet again. There was no movement for the first few seconds, and as the smoke cleared out, giant flames could be seen leaping into the air from the remains of the guard shacks and the three 7hinese P&= helicopters. There was little human activity, except for the few 7hinese wounded who were writhing on the ground. Then others who had been on perimeter securing duty, and thus away from the point of attack, came running to the aid of the wounded. The one helicopter pilot who turned his P&= around to perform a Medievac pickup was told to back off, with the threat of the 0ndian artillery attacks still high. *ehind the crossing the dark night sky lit up with doAens of orange explosions as the rest of the 0ndian gun batteries piled in, using the %earcher&00 data to pinpoint their targets. /ith all the hell that the 0ndian gunners were handing out to the 7hinese troops, the 7hinese response was now in the skies above Tawang. ,fter what had seemed an eternity to the 7hinese commanders, the B&'( force finally arrived to take care of the 0ndian artillery. ,s a warning ran out to all 0ndian artillerymen to take cover and for the %merch 6aunchers to scoot the hell out of the area and get into cover, the 0ndian air defence system at Tawang swung into action. 3ven though the 0ndian guns had been forced to abort their attacks to escape the air threat, one essential !ob had been completed before they shut down. ,nd for the local infantry commanders, it was the one thing that might allow the 0ndian flag to fly over Tawang till morningH *um&6a was now closed to any and all movement.

SKIES OVER THE NORTHEAST

* TACTICAL AIR CENTRE $TAC% ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA *100 HRS THURSDAY The 7hinese central %2&.; force was now almost within range of its target8 the #halcon. They had been heading towards this particular target ever since they had crossed the border and as soon as the active radiations from this #halcon were detected, all twelve %2&.;s altered had their bearings to bring the ,/,7% directly in front of them. *ut they were not alone in the skies around them. To their west was the western barrier force of twelve %2&.;s that was still flying. To their east had been the twelve %2&.;s of the eastern barrier force that no longer existed. The two survivors of that group were now across the border into china after being overwhelmed by superior numbers of 0ndian Mig&.' *isons coupled with better tactics. This had created a wide left flank open for the centre group and there were still some 0ndian aircraft left to make use of that open flank. To close it, would re1uire this group to part with some aircraft to patrol that

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flank. That meant that they would be losing some of their numerical superiority against the %2&+(M:0s to the south. *ut it had to be done, and despite the second thoughts of the 7hinese mission commander in the centre force, he ordered three of the twelve aircraft to head northeast and fill up the open left flank. The concerned aircraft increased power and pulled up from the main formation and turned to the re1uired bearing. /ithin seconds they were gone into the dark night, leaving nine aircraft to go after the #halcon and its escorts. 0t was a situational awareness game. ,lways. The 7hinese commander may not have dispatched the three aircraft to patrol their left flank if he had had a complete picture of what was in front and to the west. ,s such, he was under the impression that there were four escorts in front of him. ,nd there were. The only difference was that there were now more 0ndian aircraft to the west that he didn5t know of. 0n addition to the four close escorts for the #halcon, there were now four more %2&+(M:0s of the *623 force coming from the west. The only reason the 0ndians had retreated to the south in the face of the 7hinese %2&.;s was to allow these reinforcements to come through before they began the engagement. %o now there were two 0ndian fighter groups in the local skies. "ne the 7hinese knew about and still retreating in front of them. The other was to their west and which they had no idea about. That wasn5t all. The 0ndian mission commander aboard the #halcon was taking a step further. 0n ordering the southern force of four %2&+(M:0s to continue heading south, and thus pulling the %2&.;s with them, he was also making sure that the western force would be the first to engage the twelve %2&.;s of the centre force from their right flank. This was something that the 7hinese weren5t expecting at all, and so was designed to confuse them. /hen that engagement began, the southern force would engage and finish off things. The game had been set. The 7hinese had reduced themselves to nine. They knew about four %2&+(M:0s. *ut there were four more that they didn5t know about. Their numerical superiority had eroded and they didn5t know it. They had lost initiative and they didn5t know that either. They had also stepped into a trap, and that too was unknown to them. ,ll of this was because they were operating outside the range of their :B&.((( aircraft. The 0ndians had that one luxury in the form of the #halcon. ,ll in all, it had been a losing game from the start, and it was about to come to an end. The first engagement to take place started as planned, with each of the four western %2&+(M:0s releasing two ,stra * R missiles in 1uick succession. They had been taking the radar data from the #halcon and their own radars had been on standby mode for all the time until now. ,ll of a sudden the 7hinese threat picture lighted up as four active radars and eight missiles were in the air from their right. The 7hinese pilots looked at the threat data in front of them and their heads turned instinctively to the right to see a threat that was still beyond visual range. They still had time, and the aircrafts released large amounts of chaff as all nine aircrafts dived towards the earth to evade the missiles while their onboard 3/ systems went to work. *y breaking separately in +9 space in a frenAy to lose the missiles heading towards them, they had also, unfortunately, lost their strike package coherence, and that was the final nail in the coffin as far as their mission was concerned. ,s soon as the radar display showed the 7hinese breaking formation, the southern force of four %2&+(M:0s terminated their southern 4retreat5 and turned by 'C( degrees to come in front of the 7hinese who were diving to low altitude in front of them. This pair immediately ac1uired individual targets in the melee and launched a single ,stra missile each. There were now twelve 0ndian missiles in the air. ,nd so far there was no 7hinese response. *ut that didn5t last long. -our of the %2&.;s that were to the extreme left of their force figured that they were sufficiently safe and came back on station heading south. 0n front of them were four %2&+(M:0s. They launched two missiles each, out of which only one was being guided, in a tactic that they had repeated against the Mig&.'s as well. Now the situation turned hectic and chaotic, as there were twenty missiles in the air. Now everybody except the four western %2&+(M:0s was diving to escape the threat. That5s when the first missiles reached close to their targets and detonated. The first missiles to hit were from the eight originally launched by the western group of 0ndian fighters, and they claimed the lives of three %2&.;s among them that were disintegrated in mid air after receiving multiple hits from missiles. The low number of hits was due to the fact that several missiles were locked on each aircraft while a couple others failed to guide using the radar data. They simply went straight and ran out of fuel. Then more fireballs erupted in the night sky. ,s the missiles of the southern %2&+(M:0 force found their

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targets, three more %2&.;s were blotted out of the sky at low altitude with their burning airframes exploding in the dense forests below in huge fireballs. The #halcon radar showed multiple e!ections so far from the 7hinese aircrafts. The battle exactly wasn5t a washout for the 7hinese and of the eight missiles they had launched, three found their mark. Tow claimed a single %2&+(M:0 of the southern force and another hit, but failed to destroy another %2&+(M:0, although it crippled it completely and killed the /%" sitting behind the pilot. There were now three %2&.;s remaining, and they decided to cut their losses and switched on engine reheat to make their escape towards the northeast. This was a bad move in the face of advancing %2& +(M:0s, and another massive salvo of six missiles knocked them down from behind in large fireballs one after another until there were no more aircraft left. The battle had lasted no longer than two minutes from initiation to completion, and had resulted in the complete destruction of nine %2&.;s for the loss of one %2& +(M:0 and another crippled. ,nother 7hinese %2&.; force had now been defeated, barring the three patrolling towards the north. The three of the four %2&+(M:0s of the west force began to move northeastwards to take care of these bandits once and for all. The crippled aircraft headed northeast towards Borhat to make an emergency landing and was escorted there by the fourth aircraft of the wets group. Two remaining %2&+(M:0s continued to escort the #halcon and this group now began to head north to re&establish airspace surveillance and control. The eastern skies had been cleared by the Mig&.'s from + T,7. . T,7 had now almost cleared off the central skies. "nly the skies above ' T,7 remained contested by the last remaining %2&.; group, the western barrier force. ,lso, the 7hinese had succeeded in making sure that their B&'( force could hit Tawang without interference and make their escape in time. That would unfortunately happen as planned, but as far as the ,ir Marshal %hankar was concerned, the 7hinese %2&.;s were not going home. 0n all this chaos, only a few operators aboard the #halcon continued to remain detached from the battle while their comrades coordinated with the fighters. These two operators were responsible for another mission. ,s the battle for . T,7 came to a swift end, these operators ordered the flight of six Mig&.'s from Borhat to move in a northwesterly heading. The dynamics for "peration %2##"RT&%/0#3 swung into action against the 7hinese 3/ )&>s before they made their escape north. *efore that happened, however, a single message went out to all concerned command centres and battle groups from the #halcon bird in the area. This is ictor&one. /e are back on&line.?

SKIES OVER TAWAN"

NORTHWESTERN ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA *10' HRS THURSDAY The sounds of the artillery guns firing and the whooshing noises of the rockets were stills echoing around the mountains near Tawang when another noise was heard. This time it wasn5t music to the 0ndian army5s ears. The skies above were now filling with 7hinese B&'( aircrafts, and there was nothing anybody could do about it at the moment. /ith the doAens of aircraft the 7hinese had lost to the south and east to little gain, this was one success that had truly been achieved. There were no 0ndian fighters around anymore, as all of them had been pushed south by the %2&.;s and %2&+(M::s. /hat had happened to them was another matter, but here, now, the 7hinese were able to reach their targets unhindered and with full tactical coherence. This fight was theirs from the beginning. The sixteen aircraft had come south in flights of four, one behind the other. ,s such, there were four such groups lined up south to north, and minutes behind each other. ,ll were flying at high altitude for this first phase of the mission. The first two groups were armed for the %3,9 mission, and were carrying ,RMs in addition to several laser&guided bombs. The second group was also carrying cluster bombs to take care of the anti aircraft systems after the ,RMs had crippled the 0ndian guidance radars. The last two groups were not carrying anti&radar munitions, but instead were carrying dumb bombs and napalm for that special attention that they intended to give the 0ndian gun batteries. Two aircraft of the third group were also armed with a couple of self&defence air&to&air, short&range missiles. The first two groups were already searching for the 0ndian radars. "n the defender5s side, there really wasn5t much they could do as long as the B&'(s stayed at high altitude.

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There were no long&range high&altitude surface to air missiles at Tawang sector due to its close proximity with the battle Aone, and in any case there was the one 7hinese 3/ )&> that was accompanying this battle formation from the east of Tawang. 0nstead, the air defence system at Tawang was designed to accept high altitude defence from the 0,- fighters while the low to medium altitude levels were under the control of the local army Tunguska mobile ,, systems and the extreme low altitude profiles under the control of the ,, gun battery spread around the town as well as the 0gla M,N#,9 systems. *ut there were no 0,- fighter around at the moment, and the range of the Tunguska was limited to a doAen kilomtres for its %,&'= missiles and much lower for its +(mm guns. %o, unless the 7hinese dropped to that close a range, there was nothing that the 0ndian army units could do but to hunker down and wait it out. ,part from that, there was single 0ndra&00 tracking radar at Tawang that was operating. Two others were still unpacked and hidden within the hills around the townF as replacements should the first one take a hit. ,ll Tunguska systems were taking data from this radar at the moment and were putting their systems on hold. No need to tell the 7hinese where they were hiding, was thereI The 0gla crews were the only one doing their own 0R tracking, but the targets were too far away for them to reach, so all they did was look at them through the thermal scopes as bright hot spots against the cold dark night sky behind them, waiting for the 7hinese to come closer. That wasn5t about to happen very soon, and so the 0ndra&00 didn5t last for too long. The first wave of 7hinese B&'(s was near Tawang now, and the first ,RM had already been released. The town below was under blackout, and thus under a veil of darkness, but soon that veil was lifted as a huge orange flash on the hill near the town informed all civilians there that the 7hinese had arrived. Most were on the roofs of their houses and staring into the darkness despite the 7ivil ,dministration5s order to stay inside. That one flash vanished and was replaced by the yellow glow from a small patch of burning trees around the site where the radar had been placed. Then, in all absurdity, it went 1uiet again. The lack of targets was the reason behind the silence as there were no more radars operating. The Tunguska crews were sitting with the hatches of their vehicles open and listening for the sounds of the aircraft. *y the sounds they could tell whether the aircraft was roughly in their range or not. 0f their ears weren5t convinced, then the 7hinese weren5t in their range. ,nd if they weren5t in the range, why illuminate the radars unnecessarily and point themselves out to the 7hineseI %o the crews continued to sit with their headphones around their necks and all ears listening for the noise around them. /ar is always supposed to be played with a functioning intellect. ,nd the 0ndian crews were showing their resourcefulness at the grassroots level. They all knew that looking for hidden vehicles in dense urban and vegetated hilly backgrounds from the air is never easy during daytime, and at night it only gets worse, despite all the high&tech night vision systems. Their vehicle engines were also off, and had been off ever since they had arrived at their locations in the hills several hours ago, so as not to give out a thermal picture from the air to the 7hinese. ,nd with their internal systems switched off, their hatches open and the cold environment around, there were no heat sources to be found from the air, much to the frustration of the 7hinese pilots in the first wave of four aircrafts. ,nd the inaction on the 7hinese part was visible to all on the ground, as after the sudden destruction of the 0ndra radar on the hill nearby, there were no more explosions, but the sounds of the aircrafts were still there. 9espite the woollen clothes the Tunguska crews were wearing, it was still freeAing cold. *ut they were smiling through the snow at the inaction of the 7hinese around them. 0naction bears frustration. -rustration leads to mistakes, and it wasn5t going to be long before the 7hinese tried something that was against what they had planned. The problem was that with the few minutes5 separation between the four B&'( groups, the first group was supposed to have destroyed the local air defence system before the second arrived to finish the !ob. Then the others would arrive at lower altitudes to get the artillery guns that were already packing and scrambling below. The longer the 7hinese waited, the more likely it was that their strike5s effectiveness would reduce. /orse, the skies above were getting clogged with more aircraft with each passing minute. %omething had to be done fast. 2nfortunately, the 0ndian crews were holding their nerve. There was not so much as a twitch from the 0ndian side, and the 7hinese flight commander was getting weak knees inside his cockpit. This was where flexibility was re1uired, and while the 0,- strived to induce flexibility in their plans and for commanders to make decisions in such cases, the #6,,- strived for discipline and so did not attempt to induce such thinking at lower levels and this was the result. The 7hinese commander did not know what to do other than to direct his bombers into attack as planned

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earlier. )e would stay at high altitude and at suitable range so that when the 0ndians opened up at the attacking B&'(s at lower level, he would pounce on them. 0n effect he was ordering the third and fourth groups to go forward as bait, and it shocked most of the crews when that order came. )owever, there really wasn5t much that they could do other than to follow orders. ,nd so they began their bombing run on the four different gun batteries around Tawang, two aircrafts per battery, carrying napalm and dumb bombs. ,s the eight B&'(s headed towards the town, the noise changed on the ground. That5s when the Tunguska crews swung into action. They clambered into the vehicle and shut the hatch above their heads. ,s all systems were brought on&line, the turret powered up and the radar picked up the pairs of B&'(s in a shallow dive towards the batteries around the town. There were half a doAen Tunguskas in the hills, and they were spread out in a northwards facing arc around the town. The artillery batteries were to their south, so in order to get to them, the B&'(s had to literally over fly the 0ndian Tunguskas, and that was e1uivalent to suicide, but they had no idea what was below them. That changed the moment the vehicle radars switched on, and the 7hinese aborted their attacks on the ground targets to evade the numerous %,&'=s that were heading towards them from the ground. The first to get hit was a pair of B&'(s heading for the easternmost battery near the town, and the leading aircraft in that group didn5t have time to react as two %,&'=s slammed into the front part of the aircraft, sending the burning remains of the fuselage heading down. The second aircraft in that group flipped to one side and pulled to the right, dropping chaff and flares and unwittingly flew right into the gun range for another Tunguska to the right. The hill where that vehicle was based, lit up as the two powerful +(mm guns on the turret blaAed away, sending yellow tracers at the rate of thousands of round a minute towards the target, guided all the way by the turret mounted radar. The tracers were like a thin beam of light in the sky and they made contact with the aircraft body in seconds as it flew past the hill, and with that number of bullets hitting the airframe, it took only seconds more for the aircraft to break apart into small pieces followed by a orange flash that blotted the aircraft out of the sky. Two B&'(s were now down. -urther west, another group of two B&'(s were bounced by a single Tunguska who had waited as long as he dared, and when he had finally switched on his radar, the B&'(s were literally overhead. %o his guns spoke before his missiles. The two 7hinese pilots were also surprised by the suddenness of the ac1uisition and they took a bit longer to react while they dropped flares and chaff in frenAy. Then a beam of tracers went skywards from the hill below and initially passed between the two aircrafts and caused the two pilots to stare at the light between them before the both split, left and right. The aircraft on the right was hit from behind by the gunfire and the single engine was knocked out from the hundreds of bullets that hit it within seconds, thanks to the Tunguska5s massive gunfire rate. That pilot had the luxury of e!ecting. )is comrade in the east avenged him by dropping al his ordinance of napalm in a single pass on the hill slope that housed the Tunguska vehicle in a radical turn and the hill below vanished in a massive set of flames as the napalm fell. /ithin seconds the flames vanished and left the hillside devastated with fires from burning vegetation and the burning hulk of the Tunguska vehicle. More to the west, the remaining two pairs of B&'(s were engaged by the remaining three Tunguska system5s %,&'= missiles and that blotted out three of the B&'(s in 1uick succession, sending them down in balls of fire. The remaining B&'( was the lucky one to actually over fly this line of 0ndian defence intact and was suddenly over the town of Tawang. The pilot was extremely !ittery after the murderous fire they had gone through and was thus not able to calm down properly to conduct the search for his targets. 0n the mix of anger and fear, he conducted what was the first 7hinese atrocity against civilians when he released his napalm ordinance over the civilian areas of the town. The bombs fell right on the town and a ma!or part of it vanished within balls of fire and explosions that turned night into day for the areas around. the fire claimed the lives of doAens and doAens of indian civilians. ,s the pilot of the B&'( turned towards the north to go back home, his aircraft was hit from all sides by the 6& J( guns of the sole 0ndian air defence gun battery around the town. The aircraft was crippled and was blown out of the sky in a thundering explosion. *elow him the town ot Tawang was left amidst a mass of flames and smoke. *ut the battle wasnRt over yet.

SKIES OVER TAWAN"

NORTHWESTERN ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA *11' HRS THURSDAY

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Now the 0ndian Tunguska systems began taking hits. The eight %3,9 optimised B&'(s had now locked on to several radars and had released their ordinance and these hit the three vehicles out of the remaining five. The remaining vehicles moved out of their locations after shutting down their radars and moved back down the reverse southern slopes to evade destruction. That5s when the 7hinese B&'(s flew over the town at high altitude. They still had several 6$*s with them to use against the 0ndian artillery batteries that the other eight aircraft had failed to attack. *ut with so much delay in the attack, the most of the 0ndian guns were already under cover, and the 0R scanners on the B&'(s weren5t helping, thanks to the massive fires within the town and the massive thermal radiation signature. 9espite that, one battery was located and it5s several guns were hit with the guided bombs. The northern battery, which had already taken murderous losses earlier in the day was also found and hit again, and this time its command centre was hit, ending the last vestiges of what had been a proud battery of '@@mm guns. *y the time the third battery was found, the 7hinese aircrafts were running low on ordinance and were forced to break off after killing several guns. ,ll eight aircrafts headed north and made their egress back into china unchallenged, ending the first savage attack on Tawang. 0t had cost the 7hinese half of their force of sixteen aircrafts and had led to the destruction of four of the six Tunguska systems at Tawang. 0n addition, a radar system had been destroyed, but the two packed replacements were already being brought online. Three artillery batteries had been hit. Two of them were now out of action. The third was heavily damaged. *ut the %merch battery had survived, thanks to its shoot&and&scoot capability. 9oAens of 0ndian soldiers and crew had been killed. The 0ndian air defence and artillery capability in and around Tawang had been severely weakened, but at heavy loss to the 7hinese, who had lost eight of their new B&'(s in this attack. *ut the main loss of the battle had nothing to do with each side5s military. , lone 7hinese pilot had hit the town of Tawang in an act of anger. ,lthough he was now dead, he had taken at least a hundred 0ndian civilians with him. The town of Tawang was burning and as the fire fighters fought to contain the massive napalm induced fires that were lighting up the sky, the civilian casualties mounted steadily. /ithin minutes the first news of the attack was going out via the media, and it was one that was to have severe international repercussions. *efore that happened, however, the news reached the 0ndian command centres. 0t also reached the office of the #6,,- commander. )e sent out a congratulations message to the B&'( unit for avenging the 0ndian attack on :haleb in Tibet that had occurred earlier in the day. 0t didn5t bother him that it hadn5t exactly been planned, or that the attack on :haleb hadn5t exactly claimed any civilian lives. -rom there he went to directly meet the 7hinese #remier in his office with the good news in his hands. The news also reached the office of the 0ndian 9efence Minister. ,nd his reaction was to slam the table in front of him with his fist.

IAF PHALCON AWACS AIRCRAFT $CALL SI"N: VICTOR ONE% * TACTICAL AIR CENTRE $1 TAC% ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA *110 HRS THURSDAY The air war was being managed from the operations centre at :alaikunda, but it was from the inside of this aircraft that the real tactical decisions were being made by middle grade officers of the ,ir -orce. The classic example of this system was the current operation being coordinated, "peration %2##"RT&%/0#3. The decision to go ahead with this operation had been made at the 3,7 command centre by the ,ir&level officers, but the second that decision was taken, the operational command of the mission passed to the Mission commander inside the #halcon ,/,7% aircraft, and the supporting operators. They had been alone for some time now. No longer. The 0ndian aerial surveillance system over the Northeast was now expanding by the minute. ,nother #halcon, 07T"R&-0 3, was arriving on station far to the west, in ' T,7 to coordinate operations there. That meant that 07T"R&"N3 could coordinate the operations in . T,7 and + T,7. The coordination was mutually inclusive and not simply exclusive. There were several overlaps to ensure smooth transition of control over combat flight groups as they passed from

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one sector to another. There was also continuous data transfer from both #halcon aircrafts to each other. This avoided tunnel vision and produced an overall picture of the sky over the 0ndian northeast. This produced extraordinary results as far as battlefield transparency was concerned. 3verybody knew what everybody else was doing, and that led to fast track operations. 0t also produced somewhat dramatic results. ,t the moment, a battle being fought in ' T,7 was being witnessed and studied by the operators in the #halcon flying further east, covering . and + T,7 while they coordinated their current task under the fast evolving battle situation with the six Mig& .'s involved with %2##"RT&%/0#3. The last group of %2&.;s over 0ndian soil was being destroyed in a clinical fashion by the %2& +(M:0s in ' T,7. There were twelve 7hinese aircrafts in the region. -our coming on a north& south axis from Tawang and eight coming on an east&west axis to form an 6 shaped formation. *ehind them there were five 3/ )&>s that were the primary targets for %2##"RT&%/0#3. -acing them now were more than sixteen %2&+(M:0s coming from the west, and divided into three groups. 3ight of these aircrafts were of the former force that had been here from the beginning. The other eight were reinforcements from the west. The first eight had already engaged, with four %2&+(M:0s around *omdila going after the north four %2&.;s and the other four aircrafts engaging the main force of eight aircraft from their south. ,nd in the west, the sight reinforcements were directly facing the 7hinese was about to engage. This time, there were no hide and seek tactics. The 0,- pilots had been told to finish the battle with a direct assault through the main %2&.; force. The battle went badly for the 7hinese %2&.;s from the start. They were outnumbered for the first time by the 0,- in a tactical situation, thanks to the losses and the failure of their comrades in the other two %2&.; forces to finish their own !obs. This is what is called tunnel vision. They were also 1ualitatively outmatched. There was little that could have been done by the 7hinese commander to alter the e1uation this late in the game in any case. ,nd he knew it. )e also didn5t have any idea of what was ahead because the massive opposing force in front of him was keeping active radar on standby and using feed from the #halcon. The 7hinese commander didn5t have that luxury. 0t was therefore only a matter of time before it ended. The one realistic choice that he had was to pull back and cut his losses. *ut when he should authorise that was a 1uestion that he could have answered only when he knew what lay ahead. )e didn5t. *ut he made a note in his head that if something were to go wrong now, he would make that decision. The 4wrong5 part started in earnest. The northern force was the first to be chopped off. The four %2&.;s there didn5t know what was around until the first %2&.; on the left side of their force received a hit from the rear and was destroyed in the air in a massive fireball that also peppered the port wing of the %2&.; on its right with red hot pieces of the airframe. There was no warning from any system. That meant that the missiles were 0R guided close range missilesHand that they had been bounced. The 7hinese radars were active and should have given them a look at the front ac1uisition cone of the radar, but the four 0ndian fighters were not there. They had been directed to the rear hemisphere of the 7hinese aircrafts after moving northwest of *omdila, over *hutanese airspace, then north and then southeast again into 0ndia. ,t one point on this path the four 0ndian %2&+(M:0s had come close enough to Tawang that they had nearly been in range of the northwards fleeing B&'( force of eight aircrafts, but they had been too late to change the matters on the ground there since that particular battle had already been over. They had actually seen the orange glow on the horiAon caused by what must have been napalm& induced fires. That had only increased their determination, if not ruthlessness. They finished the !ob before the 7hinese knew what happened. The second aircraft took a hit three seconds after the first one had gone down, and as the first flare was dumped out by a third aircraft, it too received a hit. There were !ust too many missiles coming after the hot engines of the 7hinese aircraft and from very close range. There was literally no human reaction time. The last aircraft had !ust managed a flip to its left when the last two missiles slammed into the engines and slashed the aircraft from the air in a huge flash of fire and

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thunder in the night sky. ,nd in as many seconds, four 7hinese %2&.;s had been lost. This was the 4wrong5 part that the 7hinese commander was waiting for. )e saw that he had lost a third of his force in a span of a few seconds. ,nd there were more 0ndian fighters out there for sure. /ith the survival of the 0ndian #halcon, it had been a lost cause for his aircrafts long ago. Now he decided to save as many as he could. The order was passed to the others and within seconds the eight aircraft began to flip on their right and then move in a northeasterly course to escape back to china. The southernmost group of two aircrafts didn5t even make it that far as the southern 0ndian %2&+(M:0 force had also engaged, and claimed two shot down before the rest engaged reheat and attempted escape. The main force of eight %2&+(M:0s was not yet in range, and when they saw a 7hinese retreat, they also engaged reheat to give pursuit. The 7hinese decision to abort led to severe conse1uences for the Borhat based Mig&.'s that were going after the 7hinese 3/ )&> aircrafts. They were not yet in range, and there were other problems for them now. The ,R7 *&;(; that was to provide positional data had not anticipated a 7hinese retreat and was thus not on station yet. ,nd there was no time now. -urther, with the six remaining %2&.;s of the western barrier force heading northeast in front of them, and the three remaining %2&.;s of the former 7hinese centre force also heading northeast below them, the Mig&.'s ran the risk of being surrounded from both sides as the 7hinese aircraft flew on. "nce that happened, they would run the risk of being engaged by the %2&.;s whose pilots might see them as targets of opportunity on the way home. , fast decision had to be made by the operators of the #halcon covering . and + T,7, whose Aone of control the 7hinese were now entering after escaping ' T,7. The success or defeat of %2##"RT&%/0#3 hung in the balance. ,board the #halcon, the mission commander was reviewing the data from the radar screen before deciding that this little decision had to be taken by someone higher up the chain of command. )e was soon on the line with 3,7 )< M"perationsN, after which he was asked to hold. Then the voice of ,ir Marshal %hankar came on&line. This was the air marshal5s personal mission, and thus he had the final say. This is ,ir Marshal %hankar, what the hell is going onI? %ir, the Mig&.'s for %2##"RT&%/0#3 are about to get surrounded by the two retreating groups of %2&.;s from their north and south axis. ,lso, our ,R7 friends are not in position yet and so do not have any positional data to provide %1uadron 6eader #rasad and his combat group. /e !ust didn5t anticipate a 7hinese aerial withdrawal, sir. "ur %2&+( boys are giving pursuit, but even they didn5t anticipate the withdrawal and are struggling to catch up with the 7hinese force. The 7hinese simply pulled the plug on usHthey are cutting their losses and going home, and we !ust didn5t have time to set up a contingency plan for thisH? 0 am aware of that. "kay, calm down, sonHwhat are the chances that the #rasad can find his targets by himselfI? the air marshal said. %ir, if he uses his radar, and moves to the rough location where the 7hinese were present, he could find them, but there are other things to consider. 0f he moves further north to get to his targets, he will definitely be around a lot of %2&.;s. 0f he then so much as sends out a whiff of radar, the 7hinese will respond, as this is an easy kill for them to take back home. ,lso, the fact is that the %2##"RT&%/0#3 targets have also been informed of the retreat and they are certainly closer to the border than the %2&.;s, so they might cross over and escape even before 0D3N force gets there. 2nder such circumstances, the chances of success is less than fifty percent, and they might !ust end up fighting superior numbers of %2&.;s in all bearings around them, sir? ,nd they have certainly done a lot of tonight. "kay what elseI?

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%ir, they are also the only significant force of fighters left in + T,7, not counting the remaining 7habua based force of four aircrafts. 0f these get s1uandered, 0 am afraid we will have full view of any future air battle in the east from up here, but without the tools to do anything about it. /e need those fighters alive for the air defence missions in + T,7 for the foreseeable future. ,t least until 0 get more fighter to do my !ob properly in these two sectors. ,nyway those are my recommendations to you, sir.? "kay. )old a minuteH? the ,ir Marshal turned to face his colleague, ,ir Marshal Reddy. Gou heard what is going on. /hat do you thinkI? it took a few seconds for Reddy to reply. Gou can abort the "peration, %hankar. /e can go after the )&>s later, with a well thought out plan, not such a haphaAard one. /e have barely won this battle and your pilots have pushed themselves to their limits. $oing further immediately is only going to create losses that you will wish you hadn5t taken, later on in this war. /e can resurrect %2##"RT&%/0#3 at a later stage in the war. This is not going to end within a day or two. 7onserve your strengthF we are going to need it for sure later. 0 certainly don5t see a fifty percent chance as too good to risk the precious pilots and airframes at this time. /e will get our chance later. K7an you afford to send these pilots on this mission at the momentI? that brought a smile on the face of ,ir Marshal %hankar.
7an we afford not toI?

AMBALA AIR FORCE STATION

INDIA *1&' HRS THURSDAY The difference between wartime dispositions of the aircraft based in the east and the north and those placed further inwards was startling. Those in the east and north were under a constant threat of attack the moment this crisis had started. *ut the 0ndian air defence system was still up, and that meant that the bases that were more inwards were safe from actual attack as such and this reflected in the dispersal tactics among these bases as compared to the frontier based ones. ,nd the threat to the north and eastern bases was real and deadly. 9uring the course of the single day of war, the 0,- had suffered severe attacks at *areilly, and %ukerating. *oth had been knocked out of action for the next few hours at the minimum. The 7hinese had suffered severe losses in making these attacks, and that was the sole comfort for the 0ndian planners for the night. The dispersal at ,mbala was semi&real. That was because of the mixture of caution and risk that was being taken on the tarmac to speed up things. -or example, the aircrafts that were not involved in any action for the moment were safely housed in their individual ),%, but those that were about to go on operations within the hour were housed in the open and together, on a section of the tarmac close to the main taxiway. Technically they too should have been in the shelters, but that slowed down preparations and launching, and that was something the ,ir -orce could not afford. Things were taking place within minutes, not hours, in this initial hectic phase of the war as both sides were throwing everything they had at each other. That would slow down over the days as each side suffered the inevitable attritions and exhaustion. The theory for parking the aircraft marked for operations close to the runway was that if a threat was indeed detected, they could all scramble into the air long before the threat materialiAed. The threat itself was all theoretical, this far inland, and the #akistani threat on the western side wasn5t so much at the moment. *ut a wary eye was being kept on them as well. The #akistanis could not have failed to notice the 0ndian deployments to the east and northeast that were reducing the force structure on their border, and sure enough, a couple of #akistani 3rieyes were in the air since the aborted 7hinese strike against targets in 9elhi in the afternoon. This timeline coincidence could not be ignored, and it was possible that the #,- was indeed handing over information of 0,- deployments that were heading to the east from the /,7 bases, to china, as active real&time intelligence. *ut short of shooting sown those two aircrafts, there was really nothing that could be done at the moment. ,lso, there were no #,- fighter deployment changes as of yet, confirmed by the 90, as well as the ,erostats deployed at the border. %o there was no immediate threat. *ut that could change in a matter of hours.

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There were a large number of Baguars at ,mbala and part of the force was the entire T"O3 of the 'J %1uadron, christened *ulls?. There were now twelve aircraft being armed on the tarmac. The remaining force was in their shelters. )alf the aircrafts were being armed with cluster munitions and napalm and these aircrafts were clustered together. The second group was being armed with 6$*s. ,ll aircrafts were the 9,R0N&00 upgraded type, and all of the aircrafts armed with 6$*s for this mission were the two&seater types. The pilots were in the briefing room, going over their flight paths and target locations and attack profiles. ,lso on the agenda was the overall concept of the operation as well, since this wasn5t a single package strike. There were other groups involved and the Baguars from this base were !ust part of the force being prepped in the /,7 and 7,7 for round two of the Tibet air campaign. The situation in 3,7 was critical. There were not nearly enough planes left in several sectors to mount an effective defence, much less and offensive air campaign. /ith + T,7 and to a lesser extent . T,7 having suffered severe losses in their Mig&.' force while combating the much superior numbers of %2&+(M::s and the %2&.;s respectively, and had barely managed to hold their own. *ut they were now down in strength and what was left was needed for the immediate defence operations in those sectors. The situation in ' T,7 was somewhat betterF thanks to the %2&+(M:0s pouring in. it also had a limited offensive capability with the Mig&.;s based at )ashimara. ,nd these were being prepped for a limited ob!ective offensive strike package across the border at the 7hinese artillery batteries. *ut even these attacks were under scrutiny as ,ir )ead1uarters considered sending them off in the air superiority configuration as reinforcements to + T,7. 0n short, 3,7 was combat&ineffective as far as immediate offensive strikes were concerned. ,nd unfortunately that was the need of the hour. The 7hinese had been dictating the events since morning with their numerous pre&emptive attacks, and they had the initiative in that theatre, despite the losses. *ut there were more theatres in the war. That5s where the 7,7 came in. it had already fought the 7hinese in the air during the #0 "T&%TR0:3 operations and the conse1uent abortive 7hinese standoff missile attacks on targets in 9elhi. /hile the first operation had been carried out with minimal losses, the 7hinese bombers had been destroyed in large numbers, in return for a smashed base at *areilly. *ut both these factors had put the 7hinese on the back foot for the moment in this theatre. They lacked bases here, and so their fighter presence was limited to tanker supported *,R&7,# missions. ,nd since they were using a large portion of the )&> and 06&;C tanker fleets for the massive operations against 3,7, the %2&.; defence line in Tibet was thinly spread. The 7,7 and the /,7, on the other hand were now forming the fist that would hit this aerial defence line with knockout force to secure limited tactical air superiority in the region and force the 7hinese to release the pressure against 3,7. The point was that the 7hinese aerial defence line was composed of several ground&based systems and the airborne fighters supported by a single ,/,7% at the moment. Taking out the system is more than shooting down fighters. 0t means shutting down the radars, the %,M sites, the command and communication nodes and destroying the enemy5s will to fight by reducing morale, capability and chain of command. This was where the 0,- punch would fall on the 7hinese. The Baguars were part of a massive %3,9 operation that was going to take out the ground component of the 7hinese air defence system at the highway 7hokepoint near :haleb, where the #0 "T&%TR0:3 missions had taken place. The air component was going to be handled by even doAen %2&+(M:0s who were tasked with the destruction of the two groups of four %2&.;s that were on the 7,# missions over Tibet and to prevent 7hinese aerial reinforcements from disrupting the %3,9 missions. This was a gist of the future operations planned for the next few hours by the 7entral ,ir 7ommand staff for the Tibetan theatre of operations, but it was more complex than that. 0t didn5t include the ,/,7%, the 3/ aircrafts, the tankers and the airborne command posts. 0t also didn5t include a special part that the army was about to play in the operation. ,nd all this was about to roll into action. The 7,7 pilots had done nothing except flying patrol missions since the afternoon while the people in the 3,7 had been fighting for their lives. Now they were about to get their share of the fight. ,s the Baguars were prepped with their tools of the trade in the darkness of the night, the command staffs at 7,7 command centre braced themselves for the oncoming operation. "peration #0 "T&),MM3R was to swing into action within the hour.

CHAPTER &
THE TWENTY CLICK HAUL

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THE ROAD FROM BUM)LA TO TAWAN" NORTH OF TAWAN", ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA **00 HRS THURSDAY The sky was dark enough, but the man made fires were denying it the all&enveloping nature it normally possessed. The hills were silhouetted with the orange glow from the fires that seemed to be all around, but were actually a world away, at least for 7aptain %hukla and his men. There was the orange glow silhouetting the northern hills in china, and that was due to 0ndian artillery that had stopped sometime back. The hills to the east were glowing because of the 7hinese artillery that was still hitting the 0ndian positions in the east of here. The southern hills behind them were backlit with the same glow and they were due to the pounding that Tawang had received a short while earlier. %omething had been hit bad, %hukla and his men knew, as the intensity of the glow suggested, even from this distance. They had no idea that a 7hinese pilot had attacked the town of Tawang itself, the one thing 7aptain %hukla and his men were out here to protect. They had also had no idea of the intense air battles that their comrades in the ,ir -orce had fought in the skies to the south. The only aircrafts they had seen had been the eight B&'(s that had screamed over their head as they had gone back into china to the north on full afterburner, the orange cones of their engines making them visible against the night sky to the 0ndian troops below. ,part from that, the only thing flying that the troops here had seen had been the 7hinese helicopters buAAing around *um&6a to their north, three of whom were now nothing more than twisted piles of burning metal thanks to the %merch attack on *um&6a. ,nother 7hinese reconnaissance helicopter had been knocked out of the sky by one of the local 0gla teams, and it had crashed on the western slope of the hill to the east of the current location of the 0ndian troops, making the small mass of fires clearly visible to the 0ndians and a source of warmth to them as they sat on the rocks in the hills in the cold dark night. The current location was the 4Aero5 line of defence for the 0ndian army north of Tawang. 0t was called the 4Aero5 line because it was not so much a defence line as much as a harassment and delaying line, built up with experienced mountain troops and having high mobility e1uipment so that once the pressure from the 7hinese infantry started to build, they would simply fall back and fold the Aero line into the first line of defence further south. 0n the meantime, however, they were to cause as much delay as was possible without losing a significant portion of their soldiers and e1uipment. They were expected to fight smart. Their bravery was already assumed, and they all knew it. They were other considerations as well. ,nd this had more to do with the overall tactical situation. Tawang was a mere Twenty :ilometres to the south of the Aero line, and the easiest way to go there was by the road that went from *um&6a to the town. *ut with the closure of *um&6a to all 7hinese heavy vehicles, the threat had again changed to the 7hinese infantry that was beginning to amass in the hills to the north. They could easily overwhelm the relatively small number of 0ndian defenders here, in a situation that was becoming more like the '=>. war all over again. ,nd this time too there were to be little, if any, close air support strikes by the ,ir -orce, not because of any political bungling, but because there were no fighters in the 3,7 that could now be allocated to the close air role, and holding on to the air superiority itself was proving hard enough right about now. *ut there was a trump card that the 0ndians had. Two days ago, several T&=( %1uadrons of the '%T ,rmoured 9ivision had been airlifted to TeApur where their crews had had the unwanted honour of seeing their tanks dismantled in front of them into the smallest pieces to be then )eli&lifted part by part, tank by tank, to various locations in ,runachal #radesh. That meant that Tawang now had a group of Twelve T&=( tanks for the local defence. *ut it had been more than that. This had been a whole new war tactic, untested and unproven. Tanks in this part of the country were unheard of so far, but that was about to change. There had been a lot of teething troubles of course. The crews, for one, had only begun training for this eventuality in a training program called 4%teel /hite5 that had begun a few months back. They were all trained tankers, to be sure, but charging around the open areas of #un!ab and facing classic armoured warfare is a whole lot different from the creeping slow movement and infantry support that was their !ob definition here. They were designed to be the close support long&range firepower that was to support the 0ndian infantry who in turn would support them. 0t was all part of a system. The tanks couldn5t fight alone, as they would fall easy prey to swarms of anti&tank missiles from all around. The infantry on the other hand couldn5t move alone either, especially against the far larger numbers of 7hinese infantry. %o the idea was of mutual support and survival, if played smartly.

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Then there had been the e1uipment and logistical problem. %tores of reserve anti&tank rounds had to be built up in Tawang, most of which had to be brought in by trucks and helicopters. The crews needed familiarisation that could only be provided by the local experienced mountain troops. , new chain of command for the tanks had to be set up within the existing framework of the infantry chain of command. The tanks themselves were painted in their old overall sand coloured 9esert camouflage pattern. %o the 0ndian army had improvised a new paint scheme from the paint available locally, which gave the T&=(s a new look in the form of brown and white painted streaks that was officially known as 49isruptive pattern )imalayas5 became popularly and unofficially known as the 4The )imalayan )ue5 camouflage scheme. The crews had loved it. *ut that had been two days ago. ,t the moment, five of the twelve tanks were in their dug in positions in the gradual hills along the road from *um&6a, further south, and thus part of the main lines of defence. -ive of the remaining number were in the 0ndian army positions on the outskirts of the Town itself, where they could move more easily and thus act as fast moving reinforcements as well as the last line of defence for Tawang. The last two were not in any dug& in positions or in the town. They were out on the road itself, and at the moment were on the stretch of road that belonged to the 4Pero5 line troops, as they eyed the movements across the *um&6a crossing and waited for the 7hinese troops. The Tank -orce commander was a 7olonel from '%T ,rmoured, and he was with the rest of the commanders in Tawang. "ut here, 7aptain %hukla was leading the two tanks at Pero 6ine. ,t the moment the two tanks were parked behind a turn on the road that blocked the 7hinese view from the north. The engines were off, and the crew hatches were open. "n both sides of the road the Mountain troops were busy setting up their defences against the first 7hinese attack south that was now probably moments away. The infantry commander for the Mountain Troop battalion was Ma!or R. . #atel. )e was the overall local commander of Pero 6ine. /hile his men fixed their defences in the night, he was standing !ust around the turning on the road with 7aptain %hukla. *oth men had their low&light binoculars out and hanging from their necks. -rom this position they could see the 7hinese troops milling about at the *um&6a crossing two kilometres away. The 7hinese seemed to be waiting for something at the moment. The 7hinese on the other hand had their !obs made difficult by the 0ndian artillery attacks. 3specially the 0ndian %merch 6aunchers that had put a dent in their original plans. Now, they had Recon 0nfantry securing the perimeter while they waited for the engineers to arrive and clear the minefield that had been laid out at the crossing point. ,nd until that happened, their heavy vehicles could not begin to arrive. Their light vehicles were starting to arrive, though. The first of the heavy P&C helicopters had delivered the first set of three light Recon vehicles to this position, so that the Recon teams could start thinking about movement. %everal regiments of infantry were now coming down from the hills to the north so that they could begin the infantry assault against the first 0ndian line of defence to the south. The 7hinese had known of Pero line5s existence ever since their first P&=/P Recon helicopter had been blown out of the sky in front of them by the 0gla missile. The 7hinese commander had decided to launch a standard infantry assault against the 0ndian positions to overwhelm and then overrun them. They didn5t know about the two 0ndian tanks at Pero 6ine. /ith the crossing at *um&6a secure, and the 0ndian artillery and air defences at Tawang attacked, the 7hinese were now finally feeling a little safer. Their infantry was now coming down from the hills to the north in large numbers, and were soon beginning to show themselves on the thermal imaging scopes mounted within the 0ndian lines. This was going to be a night time infantry battle, and that was easier for the attacking side because no matter how good the night vision systems of the defenders was, it wasn5t the same as looking in daytime, and with superior numbers attacking, it was always going to be losing battle. "nly long& range firepower used pre&emptively by the defenders could ease the pressure out. )ow to use them and when were the main 1uestions at the moment in the minds of the two 0ndian commanders watching the 7hinese from the Pero line. *um&6a and its surrounding landscape was a flat area that was somewhat depressed in terms of altitude as compared to the hills to the south. 3ven the path to Tawang first went higher before coming back down near Tawang. ,s a result, the defenders were automatically on the high ground at Pero 6ine as compared to the 7hinese at *um&6a, and it had been one of the reasons behind not choosing to defend *um&6a as such. %o now the 7hinese were being forced to come lower from their hills from across the border and then attack the 0ndian troops placed higher up. *ut the 4high ground5 was not nearly as much as what one might imagine being. 0t was merely a gentle slope up from *um&6a, and about two kilometres to the south of *um&6a. ,s a result, Pero 6ine was not a permanent defensive line and it could not be. The other lines to the south were. The 7hinese were to be harried here, not stopped. ,nd there is no better way to harass the enemy other than a pre&emptive shock and awe strike.

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The main 7hinese infantry regiments were still coming down from the hills to the north, and were thus still a kilometre north of *um&6a. They were also in the open. That made them vulnerable. 0t also meant that for a little while more, the Recon troops at *um&6a were low on support and potentially vulnerable. 0t was a good enough chance. Ma!or #atel decided to go for an attack against the 7hinese Recon Troops while there was still some time. 7aptain %hukla ran back and started to clamber atop his parked T&=( under cover and shouting for his men to do the same. %oon the crews of the two T&=(s were shutting the hatches on top and lighting up the systems inside. *ut they were told not to switch on the massive diesel engines for fear of giving up the element of surprise by the engine noise. Ma!or #atel ran back to his command bunker and got on the radio to the artillery command at Tawang. There were two batteries worth of guns that had survived the savage B&'( attacks and these were now standing by. The %merch battery was not available for this mission. The target for the '@@ mm guns was not the *um&6a, but the hills to the north where the 7hinese troops were coming down towards *um&6a. #riority was given to the these targets and the Pero&6ine -orward ,rtillery 7ontrollers were given direct contact with the individual batteries as they would need to shift fire in short notices. "f the two batteries, one was to hit the peaks northeast of *um&6a and the other Northwest. /ith that coordination done, the 0ndian gunners at Tawang elevated the guns on the Aenith and aAimuth as given by the -,7s at Pero 6ine and rammed the shells into the breeches along with the propellant casing. Then they waited. 3ach gun was given a slightly different Aenith to ensure that something called as %imultaneous T"T was achieved. This would ensure minimum response time for the exposed enemy, as the shells from different guns would hit at the hills simultaneously. , final confirmation was reached and the 4-ire Mission5 was ordered to commence. 0t was directly a 4-ire for 3ffect5 type fire, with no 4bracketing5 fire first. The target bracketing would be done in real&time by the -,7s to ensure maximum effect on the enemy. The Tawang skyline was suddenly backlit with massive flashes as the 0ndian guns fired their first shells at the 7hinese. The cacophony of thunderous noises from the guns filled the air. /ith the first rounds on their way to a target twenty :ilometres away, the 0ndian gunners went into a rapid fire mode, as they rammed in shell after shell and sent them leaving the guns in continuous flashes of light and thunder. The effect on the receiving was devastating. The entire range southern slopes of the hills in 7hina that had so far been silhouetted against the dark night were suddenly lit up in all clarity as doAens of high explosive shells slammed into the rocky mountainside and sent fireballs surrounded by rock and mud flying hundreds of feet into the air. The 7hinese soldiers coming down from the hills had been on these very slopes and they were caught off guard. Nearly a hundred soldiers were killed outright, and more would have died except the 0ndian batteries had been decimated in terms of numbers first by the 7hinese artillery during the daytime warfare and then during the night by the B&'( strikes. ,s the remaining enemy soldiers !umped behind cover of the rocks, the flashes continued to erupt and they were pinned down by it. The noise from the explosions was ear shattering. That was what the 7aptain %hukla was waiting for. /ith that amount of background noise, his engines would not be heard even from twenty metres away, and that had been the plan. Now, the two 0ndian T&=(s started their diesel engines and the first )3 shell was rammed into the tank guns. The tank commander was now waiting for the artillery fire to stop so that he could move out from behind the cover and launch his own small blitA at the 7hinese Recon troops that were digging themselves in at *um&6a. )is plan was to move in, hit them and their vehicles and then pull back after a few minutes back into cover to avoid giving any 7hinese attack helicopters or any adventurous 7hinese anti&tank team a chance to hit him. )e also planned to use the confusion of the 7hinese troops who were pinned down to make his attack since the confusion would increase the 7hinese response time before they realised who was attacking them. *ut he couldn5t move in now, as it was still nighttime, and his thermal imaging systems would be blinded by the massive flashes of fire hitting the 7hinese troops. )e had to wait till they stopped. Then all of a sudden the ,rtillery indeed stopped, as the main ob!ective of killing exposed enemy soldiers was over, and now the shells were !ust raising dirt around troops who had gone under cover. ,s soon as that order from the -,7 had gone out, Ma!or #atel gave out the order to 7aptain %hukla, who in turn passed out the command to his own crew as well as to the second tank behind him. ,dvance, ,dvance, ,dvanceLLL?

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T)3 R",9 -R"M *2M&6, T" T,/,N$ N"RT) "- T,/,N$, ,R2N,7),6 #R,93%), 0N90, ..(' )R% T)2R%9,G , war is fought in the political and military command centres. ,n operation is fought from the regional military command centres, and a battle is fought from the forward unit level command centres. *ut out on the battlefield, it is fought from the mind. The survivor is always the one who used his resources in an intelligent manner. "n the battlefield, there are no commanders, only leaders. 7ommand responsibility ends as the person walks out of the command bunker or tent to !oin his troops in the front. -rom that point on, he is no longer the commander, but a leader. -rom that point on, his ability to lead his men, exhort them to advance in the face of the enemy and persevere in the face of determined resistance is more important than anything else. The task becomes even more challenging in the face of an overwhelming enemyH 7aptain %hukla was leading his force of two T&=(s forward on the road to *um&6a. ,t the moment they were still behind the small hill and moving west to east on the road before it turned northwards around the turning a hundred metres in front of him. ,fter that it was open ground all the way to the north to *um&6a. The 0ndian artillery shelling on the hills north of *um&6a had stopped only seconds ago. ,nd the cloud of smoke and debris had not even cleared the hills where the 7hinese had been coming down south. The 7hinese Recon Troops at *um&6a were now exposed, and that was where the two 0ndian tanks would hit. ,s they reached within twenty metres of the turning, all crew in the two tanks could feel the heartbeats within their chest. 0t became worse when 7aptain %hukla ordered the turrets to be traversed left at sixty degrees so that the tank5s gunfire could begin as soon as they made that bend on the road in front of them. To the east, about a hundred metres beyond the turn, Ma!or #atel was standing on the rocks outside the main dug in defences of Pero line as he and the all the mountain troops watched the two tanks rumble on the road before heading north. They watched 1uietly and within seconds the first tank, belonging to 7aptain %hukla made the turn and was now suddenly in the open and facing *um&6a at fifteen hundred metres and the smoke covered hills at three thousand metres. The 7hinese Recon troops watched in horror as the two 0ndian tanks came towards them from around that first bend to the south and headed towards them. Then there was a big flash from the lead tank and the first )3 round went over their heads and slammed into the first parked recon vehicle a hundred metres behind the dug in 7hinese troops in a searing flash of fire and a thunderous noise echoed within the hills. The burning 7hinese vehicle fell doAens of metres from where it had been parked trailing a pillar of fire. Then time started again as the two tanks went into rapid&fire mode. $ood hit gunnerL $ood )it. Next target. Machine $un nest, traverse left.? 7aptain %hukla ordered. 0t wasn5t necessary. )is gunner had already Aeroed in on the target that was !ust a few degrees off from the first target aAimuth. 0 have the targetL? The gunner shouted, and got his answer from the tank commander even before he had completed the sentence. -ireL? The massive )3 tank shell landed right smack within the 7hinese heavy machine gun position and it disappeared within a cloud of smoke and sent rocks flying into the air in an inverted cone pattern. 0t was a direct hit, and the response from the crew watching from within the tank was indicative of the hit. The gunner was the first to speak.

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%ir, now T),T is a killL? The autoloader was already loading the next )3 round as the seconds passed. The tank commander was more detached in his view. Noted. Next target8 second Recon ehicle. Traverse right.? 0 have it,? The gunner shouted. -ireL? the tank shuddered as the gun fired the explosive round on its path. %hell gone.? The gunner noted unnecessarily. %econds later the target vehicle was a mass of twisted metal and burning fuel. %hotL $ood hitL Next targetH? *y this time the second tank had slid of the road into the plains on the side and was now moving parallel to the first tank as they headed slowly towards the 7hinese positions. The idea was to not get too close to the 7hinese soldiers in the hills and to engage only as long as it took for the clouds on the hills that had been hit by the 0ndian artillery to clear off and improve visibility. "nce that happened, the two tanks would come under immense ,nti&tank missile barrages that they were ill e1uipped to handle. 9o the idea was to move in, hit the 7hinese at *um&6a fro as long as possible, then pull out. ,fter that the 0ndian artillery would open up again on the hills to provide suppressing fire and smoke cover as the tanks retreated. *ut no battle plan has ever survived first contact with the enemy. ,s the two tanks got within a hundred metres, the first 7hinese response was detected when a small explosion sent dirt and rocks flying into the air a doAen metres behind the two 0ndian tanks. Then there were more explosions and it started to become a barrage. The 7hinese were using Mortars in a depressed tra!ectory mode to try and slow the 0ndian tanks by infusing confusion and fear, the same treatment that the 0ndian crews were out here to dish out to them. , hundred metres further, resistance increased further as sporadic machine gun fire started to impact the tank5s turrets albeit to no effect. The machine gun rounds were tracer type, so in the night darkness it showed up as a line of yellow rounds suddenly leaping from within the 7hinese lines and then rapidly moving and hitting the tank turrets and body before bouncing off them. *ut the sounds of the metal impacts were distracting the crews inside. Then one of the tank5s '.@mm gunfire permanently silenced one of the troublesome 7hinese machine guns in flash of flame and light. , hundred metres further, the tanks came to a stop. They were within several hundred metres of the first 7hinese dug in positions, and there was far too much risk if they moved any closer. ,s soon as the tanks came to a stop, the co&axial machine gun on each turret opened up and started pumping ;.>. mm rounds into the 7hinese infantry positions within the odd )3 gunfire. The turrets were like a fire breathing dragon to the 7hinese soldiers at the moment, shifting left and right and not giving any respite. 0t was therefore only a matter of time. The Mortar fire was still falling around the tanks and it was only a time before the enemy bracketed the two tanks for the shelling, especially after they had stopped. )owever, things changed and the first realiAation of that was when the shells being dropped stopped creating explosions and started spreading smoke all around. *efore any of the 0ndian crews could ask the 1uestion, the answer was given to them. "n the thermal scope the gunner and tank commanders of both T&=(s saw in astonishment as the remaining 7hinese Recon Troops left the cover of their positions and started running in a frenAy towards the north. They were abandoning their e1uipment as they ran all the way and the two 0ndian gunner5s fingers were twitching on the triggers as they saw the 7hinese soldiers on foot and running away or trying to. 7aptain %hukla was wondering whether he should give the order to fire or not, and every second he delayed, the 7hinese life expectancy increased.

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To hell with them. These are not surrendering troops. 0f 0 don5t give the order now, they are going to come back here later again. %crew them. They thought they could take my country5s landI This is my countryL %crew them allL $unner, engage mobile infantry targets. NowL $et as many as you canL? The turret Machine gun opened up in both tanks and the tracer bound gunfire reached out to the 7hinese troops as they ran northwards, hitting some and missing some. Many were able to use the mountainous terrain to mask their escape from behind rocks and such like, so it wasn5t the result that might have been obtained out in the flat desert terrain, but by the time the last ;.>. mm round left the smoking barrels, thirty seconds later, up to three doAen 7hinese were lying face down on the plains around *um&6a. ,nd the crossing at *um&6a lay abandoned and 1uiet again. 7aptain %hukla stared at the results of his impulse decision in horror as he started to second& guess himself within his mind. )is gunner was more blunt as he said it for the 0ndian side. Gou 7hinese bastards. %o you wanted *um&6aI /ell, we showed youL Gou want more, then come and get itL? that5s when 7aptain %hukla spoke up. 3nough. 7alm down.? Then there was a voice on the radio. 0t was Ma!or #atel. R"93"&"N3, this is R"93" 7ommand. /hat the hell5s going on over thereI? R"93" 7ommand, this is R"93"&"N3. *um&6a is secure. 7hinese Recon infantry force is retreating north. They have taken heavy casualties as far as we can tell. "ver.? 7opy that, R"93"&"N3. *e advised, we cannot garrison *um&6a at this time. %moke clearing to the north and visibility is increasing. #ull back now. "ver.? 7aptain %hukla looked to the north and saw that the smoke cover was indeed decreasing. 0f he didn5t pull back now, he was going to be a sitting duck for the 7hinese anti&tank missiles from the north in !ust under a minute. 0t also meant that they would again have to leave *um&6a to the 7hinese follow on troops, but getting it back at this stage was never really an option at this time in any case. They will be back for it later in the campaign, he was sure. 0n the meantime, they had inflicted heavy losses on the 7hinese Recon troops here and those standard troops in the hills to his north. 0t was time to move back now. 7opy that R"93" 7ommand. R"93" force is pulling out.? )e changed fre1uencies. R"93"& T/", this is R"93"&"N3. /e are pulling south. 0 say again, we are pulling back south. Move to Aero line. "ver and out.? The two tanks now had to move south, and moving normally would expose their rear sides to the enemy in the hills, so the idea was to move in reverse fro some distance of a few hundred metres, then change hull position by 'C( degrees and then move 1uickly to the south and under cover. The two tanks pulled out of the *um&6a crossing area and were now proceeding south while their turrets faced north to engage any threat. ,nd there were now many such targets visible, as the smoke cover finally lifted off the 7hinese hills to reveal a mass of 7hinese infantry running around and getting some e1uipment into position. 0t was the anti tank missile systems. That5s when the things started getting messy and noisy. The first warning shrills that the tank was being illuminated by laser were heard inside the tank and the T&=(5s ,erosol screening system had detected the threat and being in the automatic mode began dispensing aerosol screens doAens of metres to the north even as the tanks were moving south. This was another reason why it was better to reverse first before making a dash for it in a retreat mode. The 7aptain was soon on the radio. R"93" 7ommand, this is R"93"&"N3. /e are clear of *um&6a. ,lso, 7hinese infantry to the

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north is illuminating us. /e expect $uided missile attacks momentarily. Re1uesting priority -ire Mission&7over. "ver.? Ma!or #atel nodded to another radioman beside him in his command centre and he called the artillery command back at Tawang. The guns at Tawang spoke up again and again the flashes of their gunfire lighted up the Tawang skyline. ,nd again shells started pounding the hills to the north with a mix of smoke and deadly high explosive shells. , few 7hinese missiles that were fired towards the 0ndian tanks went off course as their gunners had to duck behind cover to avoid the massive shelling that started up over their heads. The 7hinese 9ivisional commander shouted out a curse and threw the maps in front of him in a fir of rage inside his command centre when he received the message from the frontline troops of the 0ndian attacks on *um&6a region. ,s the two 0ndian tanks made it behind cover near Pero 6ine, they had eliminated all 7hinese presence at *um&6a, but had been forced to relin1uish control because the 7hinese were still too strong in the north and *um&6a could not be held. ,nd sure enough, within half an hour, the first 7hinese troops again arrived at *um&6a, but this time, their first !ob was to recover their dead and wounded, numbering in the doAens, both at the hill slopes and those left behind by the vicious 0ndian tank assault led by two tanks, heavy artillery support and superior tactics. The 7hinese army was holding bum&6a, but it was being bled to death in the progress. That5s when the first 7hinese attack helicopters lifted off from a helipad north of the $reat )imalayan Range and started to move south towards *um&6a. The 0ndian T&=(s were their main priority. N"RT) "- T,/,N$, ,R2N,7),6 #R,93%), 0N90, ..'@ )R% T)2R%9,G Ma!or #atel walked up to the T&=( even as 7aptain %hukla clambered down from the turret and put his earphones around his neck. 0t was still dark, but both recogniAed a friendly face when they saw one, dark or not. 0n this case the friendly face was smiling at 7aptain %hukla. The last attack had been a ma!or success, with both tanks safe and now friendly casualties. 3ven so, 7aptain %hukla5s tank was lucky to have survived as one of the anti&tank missiles had barely missed him, covering his tank with dirt and rock and causing some splinter damage on the right side of the hull. That was being checked out now, and overall, the tank was still operational. ,nd his two tanks were no longer alone. -our *M#&. ,- s were moving north to !oin the defence at Pero 6ine, and several ,,, batteries were being prepared to move as well. The "fficer in charge of all tank forces in the Tawang Aone of operations, 7olonel Gadav, had convinced his superiors to look at the possibility of 4solidifying5 the Aero phase line with the addition of more reinforcements. )e argued that it could be held, and that they need not retreat from that position unless absolutely necessary. Two days ago his ideas had been thrown out without consideration. *ut with the closure of *um&6a to enemy tanks for the time being and the success of the previous attacks by 7aptain %hukla at the 7hinese positions had forced the 9ivisional commander to look at Gadav5s plans again. Now the idea was to hold Aero line as a standard 9efensive 6ine with the use of the incoming armoured reinforcements. 7olonel Gadav was pouing his forces into these positions, but he wasn5t surging forward any more T&=(s. There was still a good possibility that the Aero line may be breached, and that the 7hinese tanks may break through the minefield laid out in front of them by the ,rtillery 7ommand at Tawang. ,nd T&=(s were a rare commodity for him at the moment. Moreover, 7aptain %hukla was still the overall ,rmoured -orces commander at Pero 6ine and he would take over the command of the four *M#&.s as well. R"93" -orce had !ust been augmented and expanded. ,nd that was bad news for the 7hinese infantry at *um&6a.

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*ut there were aspects to this terrain that could be used to negate the advantages of the few Tanks in this particular battle Aone. ,s such, the two 0ndian tanks had assaulted *um&6a with impunity because they had a clear line of sight to the target due to the flat terrain as well as the fact that they were able to move on it because of the same fact. /hen you moved half a kilometre left and right of that plain area, there were hills. 0n fact, the bend in the road was behind one such hill where the tanks were parked at the moment, denying the enemy their locations. This also meant that if the 7hinese infantry moved south via the hills instead of trying to break through the 0ndian defences along this road, they could outmanoeuvre and outflank the 0ndian tanks, denying them any substantial 6"% as well as freedom of manoeuvre. To stop that from happening were two whole companies of 0ndian ,rmy Mountain Troops deployed on the two hill patterns east and west of the Aero line. 3ven so, should the 7hinese attack these hills in numbers, the tanks could not intervene, because the battle would be on the north face of the hill, while the tanks were on the south side, so they would have to move around the hills to be of any use, and if they did that, they would be in that open plain south of *um&6a and thus vulnerable to barrages of ,nti&tank fire from the now alert 7hinese reinforced troops at *um&6a. ,nd it didn5t take a genius to come up with the plan too. ,nybody who could read a map would realise immediately as to why he should use hills if he was an infantry commander and if the other side had tanksH -urther north, the first 7hinese attempts to overcome the minefield laid out at *um&6a was underway. ,s the mountain troops were watching the north using low light optical scopes, a dark silhouette was spotted against the bright background of burning vegetation as it moved around a bend north of *um&6a and turned towards the south, towards the crossing. 0t was a tank, and it seemed to be fitted with something in front of its hullH 7aptain %hukla and Ma!or #atel ran over when one of the soldiers called #atel over with a shout. *oth men were soon standing over the rocks behind the dug&in 0ndian positions and staring through their binoculars at the advancing vehicle at long range as it attempted to move through the minefield. Then there was a flash and a delayed noise as the mine&clearing attachment in front of the hull of the 7hinese T&== detonated a delayed action sub&munitions dropped earlier by the 0ndian %merch 6aunchers hours ago. Then there was another flash and a similar noise, and after this Ma!or #atel called over his Radioman to talk to his superiors even as he motioned three of his Milan Missile crews to take position. )e was soon on the line with the artillery command at Tawang. This is R"93" 7ommand, we have 7hinese tanks attempting to break through *um&6a. 0 say again, we have 7hinese T&==s on mine clearing duty. They are sitting ducksHre1uesting -ire Mission. "ver.? Negative, R"93" 7ommand. -ire&mission Re1uest denied. /e are relocating batteries here. There are intelligence reports of elevated threats of 7hinese Tactical missile attacks against my guns. -ire mission availability in twenty minutes minimum. "ver.? 7opy that. 0 guess we will have to take care of this ourselves. "ver and "ut.? Ma!or #atel handed the speaker back to his radioman and walked over to where his first Milan crew was standing inside his trench and had placed the launcher in front of him. )e was already looking into the optical scopes but had not yet activated laser ranging. There was no need to let the 7hinese crew know until the last minute that he was being lased. That5s when Ma!or #atel ordered a 4-ire when Ready5 command and within seconds the laser rangefinders of the three launchers were activated on that first mine&clearing tank. Then a few seconds more and the guided missiles leaped from inside their tubes in a small abrupt motion, and streaked northwards towards their targets. The target itself was armed with a warning system that enabled its crew to know that they had a

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few more seconds to say their prayers, which communism denied, and hope that their defensive suite would handle the threat. The system consisted of a 6aser /arning Receiver or 6/R and an active 6aser %elf 9efence weapon or 6%9/. The 6%9/ was expected to blind the missile firing team gunner and disrupt his optical scopes. *ut the system did that only for a single source at a time. )ere there were three simultaneous missiles coming from three different directions, and so there was little hope. 3ven so, the gunner on the extreme east suddenly recorded a bright flash on his scope that came from the laser trying to destroy his optical systems. Normally the light could not be seen, as it lacked that much power, but when viewed in other spectrums, it was visible as a flashlight. That was the warning the 0ndian gunner had been waiting for. )e immediately removed his eyes from the scope and crouched into his trench and pulled the launcher down with him, leaving his missile unguidedHbut that had been the plan. Now, as the 6%9/ re&aimed, the other two missiles had already travelled their distance and slammed into the T&==. There was a massive explosion as the first missile hit the hull from the from and destroyed the mine clearing attachment and killed the 7hinese driver a full three mill&seconds before the second missile slammed into the front turret on the left side of the gun and this explosion sent the turret flying into the air, and falling behind the tank due to the force of the explosion amid a pillar of flames and smoke. The explosion was visible all the way to the Aero line defences, causing a massive cheer from the 0ndian troops there that echoed around the hills. The first 7hinese T&== had been turned into a pile of twisted and burning metal. ,nd now it was blocking the narrow road or the follow on vehicles that were making a slow retreat backwards. This surprised Ma!or #atel and 7aptain %hukla as both continued to watch through their binoculars even as their soldiers re!oiced around them. The 7hinese tanks should not have been retreatingHit was almost as if they were waiting fro something fro happenH To the east, the dominating hill overlooking *um&6a and on the eastern flank of Pero 6ine was under 0ndian control a 7ompany of Mountain troops were based there. To their north was a small hill and beyond that were the 7hinese hills across the border. ,s such, the 0ndian troops could look over the small hill but not what was beyond it. ,nd beyond this is where the 7hinese infantry troops were gathering in a large formation. Their !ob was to take control of that hilltop, after which they could control the views all the way to the west and along a large stretch of the road where incidentally, the 0ndian T&=(s were parked. The 0ndian troops sitting in their dug&in positions and facing north were unaware of this build&up, as it was outside of their 6"%, but their Night& ision goggles soon picked up activity on the small hill in front of them as the 7hinese troops came over it and started to make their assault on the sole 0ndian company defending that hill. The 0ndian 7ompany was lead by a smart young 7aptain who had trained his men in the art of efficient teamwork and so his men were 1uick to respond. The 7hinese troops running from one cover to another were out of range of the assault rifles, but not the machine guns, and soon the first burst of 0ndian fire leaped out in the darkness as a streak of light and began hitting the locations where 7hinese movement was noted. The first to be targeted was the leading line of 7hinese soldiers, and they five of them were hit and they went face down on the rocks below. They were dead before they hit the ground. The others scrambled under cover but kept moving forward doggedly. Then more came over the hills and then more. ,n entire 7hinese regimental formation was detailed for this assault, and they were making their numbers felt. Then there was an explosion within the 7hinese lines and then another, as the 0ndian Mortars got into the action. %everal more 7hinese soldiers were lying on the ground now. Then the 7hinese mortar from behind that small hill stared falling within the 0ndian positions, and this slowed down

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the 0ndian response somewhat. %till, the 0ndian machine gun fire was pumping gunfire into the 7hinese advance. Then there was a streak of light from the 7hinese side as the 7hinese machineguns opened up as well to suppress the 0ndian guns as they provided cover for their advancing troops. The entire eastern hill was now awash with small flashes and echoing sounds of gunfire as a desperate battle in the dark ensued. Ma!or #atel was staring at the hills from his binoculars as he attempted to get more troops up there to augment the 0ndian lines. The problem was, he !ust didn5t have enough troops. This line had been expected to collapse into the further lines south, but order s had come through to see if it could be held. )e was about to find that out now. 0f not, he would pull his troops out rather than let them be overrun. This was not '=>.. The army actually had a plan this time, #atel thought to himself. Then the sounds of gunfire intensified as both sides got closer and closer. 9espite heavy casualties, the 7hinese were still advancing. They had numbers on their side. , whole lot of it. ,nd then the radio came to life as the sounds got louder and louder. The voice on the radio was of the company commander defending the concerned hilltop. The voice was being punctuated with sounds of close small arms fire. R"93" 7ommand, this is ,6#),&"N3. /e got 7hinese infantryHthe hills inHof us. They are headingHus, Hover.? Ma!or #atel took the speaker from the radioman next to him. %ay again, ,6#),. 9o you 7opyI ,6#),&"N3, this is R"93" 7ommand, come in. "ver. ? ,gain the noise came back on line and by this time the sounds of heavy close small arms fire were easily heard. The eastern hill was under attack from 7hinese troops. R"93"Hthis is ,6#),. 0 !ust lost my Radioman. 0Hwe are receiving heavy fire from 7hinese troops coming south over the hills in front of us. Regimental strength, sir. 0 don5t think we can hold them off. /e need artillery support N"/L That small hill in front of us is swarming with 7hinese in the open. "ver.? Right. )ang in there. )elp is on the way. "ver and "ut.? #atel changed fre1uencies to the artillery command in Tawang. This is R"93" 7ommand. ,re your batteries in position yet, overL? 7opy that R"93" 7ommand. /e are back in business. Ready for fire mission. "ver.? -inallyL Re1uesting #riority -ire %upport. /e have 7ommies in the openL 6ocation 3cho&*ravo& Three&-ive&nine. 6ay it as close as you can. "ur boys are dug inF the 7hinese are in the open. )it them with everything you gotLL? #,6,M ,0R#"RT N3/ 936)0, 0N90, ..+@ )R% T)2R%9,G The airport was in semi&blackout. ,ll non&essential lighting was switched off. The runway lights were off, and they would be switched on only when some aircraft was approaching for a landing or takeoff. Most of those flights were now military in some capacity or the other any and all commercial flights had been diverted to the international airport where there was a huge mass of foreigners waiting to leave the country as soon as possible. That was part of the economic side of this war that was not even a day old but one that was spiralling out of control. The media was having a field day so far. ,lthough they were nowhere near the real battlefields in the northeast, they had covered the aftermath of the destruction of *areilly airfield in all its awful glory, showing the airfield coved with

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black smoke visible a doAen kilometres away. The civilians would not know of the desperate air battles fought in the air because they happened in the northeast and Tibet only a short time ago in the dark, and despite some media footage showing aircraft wreckage strewn over ,ssam with 0,- roundels on them and the 7hinese red star, the war had had not really been felt among the citiAens. The country was still in shock. 6ess than a day had passed and so much had happened. "nly this morning the #M had gone on television to address the nation that diplomacy would win through in the end by peaceful methods. Then they had seen the 3xternal ,ffairs Minister 9r. %hivdev %ingh say in a press conference that the 7hinese ,mbassador was to arrive and meet the #M to resolve the differences peacefully and that it would certainly be resolved peacefully. ,nd then all of a sudden the media started reporting that combat had taken place and everybody had the footage on their television showing *areilly ,irfield burning from end to end after sustaining the massive missile strikes. -or those who didn5t know, it was a shock to say the day5s events unfold, and yet it had seemed strange fully disconnected. This wasn5t a war against #akistan, and there was a lack of emotions against the 7hinese simply because the average citiAen didn5t regard then in the same stead as #akistan, despite the '=>. debacle. That had changed an hour ago, when the first faces of the captured 7hinese pilots had come on the television sets. The local police who had apprehended these pilots in ,ssam were speaking on television about how the 7hinese had crashed all over and their manhunt for these men. Now the 0ndian public had a face to hate, and they looked to the government to see how they were handling the war for 0ndia. ,nd that didn5t make the !ob any easier for the concerned people. Their every step was now being watched and scrutinised by an angry and concerned nation. The military situation was extremely fluid at the moment. The war had !ust started. *oth sides were at their peak strengths, despite the recent losses. Morale was still high. -atigue was low. Reserves were as yet untouched, and the ground situation was holding. Neither side was going to back off now. Not yet at any rate. ,nd this would remain the case until one side comprehensively defeated the other or when both would wear themselves out. 0n either case, the war was definitely going to last for more days to come. This was no skirmish. This was the real thing. ,nd because it was the real thing, the 0ndian $overnment was now mobilising into action. The airfield perimeter had been cordoned off hours ago by a large number of ,ir -orce #olice, airport security and local #olice teams. There were paramilitary teams in their vehicles roaming around the airfield, and M#s and local police teams were searching all buildings within reach of the line of sight of the airfield in an attempt to catch anybody keeping an eye on the comings and goings to and from this now exclusively military airfield. These would normally not be carried out in the vigour as the search teams were showing now, but then a number of very special flights were about to lift off the ground in the darkness of the night and they didn5t want anybody watching, least of all the media who might be camping outside. This one was totally under wraps. 0t had to be. ,t the airport itself, the main buildings had their lights switched off. )owever, the main tarmac where was still lighted, albeit in reduced lighting, and there were only four aircraft parked on it. ,ll other aircraft had been diverted to other airfields in the south. "f the four parked aircrafts, two were ,N&+.s which had their rear ramps lowered as 0,- flight and ground crews prepared for an imminent takeoff with their cargo of passengers. *ut they had heir engines switched off because the other two aircrafts were going to leave before them. These two aircrafts were *&;+; **Bs from the 0,-5s 0# %1uadron and they had their anti& collision lights flashing and their engines humming on the tarmac. 0nside, the cockpit lighting was on and the 7o&pilots were going over the checklists while the two pilots were standing outside of the aircraft in the cold night and giving the aircraft a visual check along with some ground crewmen. They were using their flashlights to check areas not visible to them in the dark areas.

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Normally both pilot and 7o&pilot would do this walk&around, but this was not a normal flight. This was the third and final walk&around the pilots were conducting in order to make sure they hadn5t missed out something before. , hundred metres away they could see the soldiers standing in the darkness with their 0N%,% rifles slinging from the shoulders and their N goggles in front of their eyes as they gave the blacked out runway a final security check before takeoff. Then everybody !erked around as they heard the sounds of cars approaching and from the entrance near the buildings came out a large convoy of cars in a line and approached the first *& ;+; nearer to them. This was the #residential convoy. The cars came to a halt and the security officers swung open the doors and !umped out to secure the area around the vehicle before the 0ndian #resident stepped out. ,nother 0,- %2 turned up and from it stepped out ,7M *hosale and a bunch of other officers and they walked over to meet the #resident and guide him to the aircraft. ,s the president stepped out, all unformed personnel snapped into attention and saluted, a gesture the president returned with a nod and a knowing smile. )e had done this before. ,7M *hosale wasted no time in guiding the #resident to the red&carpet&laden stairs leading into the aircraft. )e had a war to fight, and he was not the least it interested in this guiding stuff. *ut this aircraft belonged to his command, and it was one of his duties whether he liked it or not. The #resident realised the urgency of the situation and 1uickly climbed up the stairs where the 7aptain of the aircraft met him who had scrambled aboard after giving a 1uick salute to the ,ir 7hief. The rest of the presidential detail had already climbed aboard from the rear entrance before the #resident. 3ven before the doors had been closed, the engines lighted off with an increasingly loud humming noise as the turbines started moving. The cars left one behind the other as they cleared the tarmac for the first **B. ,ll of a sudden the taxiway lighted up along with the runway and the aircraft started to roll under its own power as it turned towards one of them before it taxied down to the end of the runway for take&off. 3ven as the first cars cleared the tarmac, another convoy of cars came in from the same entrance and headed for the second aircraft on the Tarmac. This one carried the #M and his entourage. The #M got off his car and was again greeted by ,7M *hosale. -rom the rear cars stepped the 7",% and his primary staff team who began scrambling up the rear stairs of the aircraft as the 7",% walked over to the #M and the ,7M. The 7N% was not present, although a Rear ,dmiral was. The 7N% was already in his point command, the 3astern fleet )<. ,nd he would remain there for the duration of this war. )is war, in particular would begin in a matter of hours and he was busy putting the final touches on his grand plan for closing the *ay of *engal and the 0ndian "cean to the 7hinese. , final relatively small convoy came in last and also headed for the parked aircraft. it came to a stop and out stepped the 9efence Minister who walked over to !oin the #M and his Military commanders. 0t was cold outside and needless to say the people weren5t exactly in the right frame of mind to begin with. 0n the background there was a large noise as the #residential aircraft lifted off the runway and headed into the dark night. ,s soon as the noise died down, the #M spoke up as he addressed his defence minister. Ravi, what5s this report 0 got on the way regarding the 7hinese missilesI 0t was very brief and non&explanatory.? The 9efence Minister nodded. Ges sir. 0t was brief because that5s all we had at that time. 0t5s from a 90, satellite pass an hour ago. 0t seems the 7hinese may be looking at using tactical missiles with conventional warheads to strike some specific targets in the northeast. ,s far as we know, one of these targets is definitely our artillery around Tawang that5s been murdering their forces and which incidentally, has blunted their entire offensive in that sector.? 0s that the one they tried to hit with their bombers. The one you were telling me aboutI? that

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brought a smile on the 9efence Minister5s face. Ges %ir. They underestimated our air defences and overestimated their capabilities. They got their ass kicked in the bargain. 6ost eight of their bombers too in the process. ,nd our artillery is still up and fighting.? %o the war isn5t going exactly as the /ang had hoped. /e aren5t defeated yet. ,nd we may !ust send them packing. "kay, so we evacuated the #resident. /hy am 0 hereI 0 should be in my office right now and working to bring this situation under control, not standing with you people and chatting in the middle of the night. 0H? the defence Minister cut him off %ir, we need you to get in that aircraft right away. The 7hinese Tactical Missile strike report is not isolated. /e don5t know what their other targets are, and it5s more than likely that this city is one of them. The 7hinese leadership has already displayed their metal ability and willingness to use cruise missiles to strike the other nation5s capital in order to decapitate our command structures. They are not interested in a peaceful resolution to this campaign sir. ,nd it5s for certain that they don5t plan on shaking your hand during any peace talks. They plan to eliminate you and this country5s leadership anyway they can. 0ts cold and simple military logic. They have tried once today and failed, and if 0 may add, we were lucky then to have friendly aircrafts nearby to eliminate that 7hinese effort. 0n the bargain we have lost *areilly and doAens of our servicemen during that attack. They have done it before and 0 can bet on it that they will do it again. ,nd despite all our defences, we can never really stop some missile from getting through. 0ts high time we moved into more secure locations.? That got the #M5s attention and he mentally thanked his god that he had selected this person to be his 9efence Minister. $od knows what would have been happening now if 0 had taken that other fool from the coalition5s recommendationsH "kay, so what5s the plan nowI? %ir, we get you in the air immediately. The #resident is already airborne. ,ll three services of the military are preparing to move to their secure command locations. The 7,% and 7",% here, and myself will accompany you along with several members of the N%,, R,/ and a bunch of other army and air force officers aboard this aircraft. 0t5s essentially an ,irborne 7ommand #ost. "nce it5s in the air, we can coordinate all other facets of the country5s 9efence -orces from the communications centre on board the aircraft. /e are also moving further south for safety purposes because if you notice, the Tibet border is not all that far away from here.? The 9efence Minister pointed to the Northeast for effect, and then continued8 0n any case, once we are airborne, we will be safe from the 7hinese threats. %ir, we have to prepare for the worst here. The ground war5s begun an hour back, and the 7hinese don5t like it. %o there5s a possibility that they might lash out at us.? $ranted Ravi, but what about 9elhi itselfI The 7hinese may attack it anyway, thinking that 0 might still be here. ,nd what about the other ministriesI? the #M asked. %ir, it5s being taken care of. "nce you are airborne, we are going to release it to the public that the N7, is airborne and that decapitation of this country5s leadership is now impossible. "nce that happens, we are hoping that the 7hinese will refrain from attacking the city itself, or else they will become the pariahs of the world. ,s for the other political ramifications, 0 guess the 3xternal affairs Minister would be able to answer them properly, not me. ,s for the other ministries, they will have to remain in place. They are important fro normal governmental functioning, and so we can5t move them anyway, even if we wanted to.? That5s when ,7M *hosale spoke up and warned the group that they were running low on time before the ma!or 0,- air offensive in Tibet was scheduled to begin and that they should board the aircraft immediately. The #M nodded and walked off with the 9efence Minister and the generals behind him over the stairs and into the aircraft. The door was closed behind them and the aircraft engines started immediately. The radio chatter between the ,T7 and the aircraft opened up as

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the aircraft taxied down to the end of the runway and began to turn to face the length of the runway after reaching it. #,TR0"T&3,$63, this is #alam $round control. Gou are cleared for immediate Take&off.? the radio chattered inside the lighted cockpit of the **B at the end of the runway. #alam $round 7ontrol, this is #,TR0"T&3,$63. /e copy clearance for take&off. Thanks for the )ospitality, $round 7ontrol. #,TR0"T&3,$63 is rolling. "ver and out.? The pilots increased the throttles and the aircraft rolled down the runway under the increased power and gathered speed before finally lifting off the runway. %oon the noise disappeared from around #alam airfield and al lights were again switched off except at the tarmac where the ,N&+. propellers now started to rotate. They would still be on the ground for some time. *ut as far as the country was concerned, 0ndia5s National 7ommand ,uthority was now airborne. NORTH OF TAWAN",
ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA *#00 HRS THURSDAY The artillery fire had done the !ob, for now. The first 7hinese assault had been stopped dead in their tracks, 1uite literally. *ut there had been more assaults in the last half hour, and now the defenders were showing signs of strain within their ranks. The infantry company on the 0ndian side of the hill had lost nearly two& doAen men, thanks not to the 7hinese soldiers as much as their mortar fire. 3ven after the 0ndian shells had knocked out several mortar crews in a series of overkill counter battery fire, the 7hinese had simply brought more down from the northern regiments and begun again. They had numbers on their side. The 0ndians didn5t. /hile the loss of an entire 7hinese infantry platoon caught in the open against the 0ndian artillery didn5t as much as put a dent in their momentum, the loss of every 0ndian soldier meant that the one next to him now had more responsibility to handle. )e had now another sector of fire to watch and the effect was cascading until a point would be reached when every 0ndian soldier on top of that hill would have to cover wide sectors of fire, and that was a precursor to disaster. ,nd it wasn5t far away. The 0ndian guns at Tawang had been firing continuously for so long now that their breeches needed cooling, and when that happened, the 7hinese would pop out of their holes and make their final assault against the beleaguered 0ndian positions. Pero line had never been meant as a main defensive line for !ust this reason. The 7hinese were too strong at the moment. The idea was of a flexible response. 0t was like a stretched rubber band. ,ny point under pressure does not cause the spring to break, simply for it to move elastically backwards, and when the pressure reduces, the band moves back into position. 3lastic 9efence was the term for this concept. That rubber&band was the ,runachal border with china, and the 7hinese were exerting the pressure at *um&6a. 0t was time to fold back into the next line of defensive positions, a few kilometres to the south. *ut making the decision of moving back was simple enough for Ma!or #atel. $etting there was going to prove difficult as the 7hinese were breathing down his neck. #atel had already ordered the infantry company at the top of the hill to prepare to move out to the south, but not to move !ust yet. The 0ndian army had to retain control of that hill until the western elements of Pero 6ine had also moved south, otherwise the 7hinese might envelop the entire 0ndian force with a eastern hook type movement. ,t the same time, the hill in 1uestion offered extensive fields of fire down the few hundred metres of the road from *um&6a that went in the east&west direction. This was the main 0ndian line of retreat to the south for the western element of Pero 6ine. 0ncidentally, it was also where the two T&=(s were parked, and the 7hinese could not be allowed to look down that road while they were still there, or else they might get their heavy gear forward and start gunning for the two 0ndian tanks, and that was highly unacceptable. ,nd yet, there really was no say in the matter anymoreH The eastern hill that was 1uiet for some time now suddenly came to life as there was a massive uproar from the north as the 7hinese soldiers attempted to storm the 0ndian controlled peak to their south in a massive and final assault backed up by a storm of mortar fire that consumed the 0ndian positions in artificial smoke and real ones as the 7hinese soldiers ran up the hill from cover to cover behind rocks and terrain. Then the 0ndian 6M$s opened up along with several machineguns that were no longer firing bursts but full automatic fire towards the 7hinese line of advance.

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The lines of yellow tracer laden bullets and the cacophony of yelling and noise of gunfire consumed the hill. There were 0ndian assault rifles firing now, not in single aimed shots or bursts but in full automatic fire as well as the 7hinese soldiers began overrunning the 0ndian positions despite horrendous casualties of their own against trained 0ndian army troops. 3very few seconds that Ma!or #atel watched, the sounds of 0ndian gunfire reduced more and more and the 7hinese noises remained as before. )e could not see the battle himself, but he knew the 0ndian positions had been overrun and captured based solely on the noises he heard. %oon the 0ndian machine gunfire ceased and there was a loud cheering uproar from the 7hinese soldiers on that hill. There were no more sounds of 0ndian infantry weapons coming from the eastern hill. That battle had been lost. Ma!or #atel lowered his binoculars and stared upwards at the sky. ,a&n. ,a&n. ,a&n. +od ,a&n it. ) le%t it too late. ) should ha$e ordered a 'ullback a%ter the %irst assault itsel%,a&n it. )ts &y entire %ault. ) ha$e %ailed &y co&&and and &y &en,ear +od. An entire co&'any. They were &y troo's,a&n it. What the hell was ) thinking? 5kayall rightcal& down, cal& downlets think it through. what the hell else could ) ha$e done anyway? That hill should not ha$e %allen into ene&y hands. But it did anywayda&n it. ,a&n it. 5kay. There will be a ti&e %or this later. <ight now ) still ha$e to get the rest o% &y &en southbut %irst ) ha$e to shut down those cheering /hinese &ouths. This kind o% thing will ruin the &orale o% &y entire unit. Those Bastards. ,a&n the& all to hell. Wheres that radio? Ma!or #atel shouted out for his radioman, who came running to him from his dug in position. )e handed over the receiver to his commanding officer. #atel was soon in touch with at the artillery command in Tawang. This is R"93" 7ommand. Re1uesting immediate priority -ire Mission on location 3cho&bravo&Three&-ive& %ix. "ver.? There was some confusion on the other side. %ay ,gain, R"93" 7ommand. $rid Reference Three&-ive&%ix corresponds to Pero&6ine&3ast hill. The location is -riendly. "ver.? #atel took a few seconds before he could gather his strength to answer that 1uestionH Not anymore.?

N"RT) "- T,/,N$, ,R2N,7),6 #R,93%), 0N90, .+'( )R% T)2R%9,G The 7hinese Regiment that had taken the eastern hill from the 0ndians was, in essence, combat ineffective. They had taken casualties in the hundreds, dead and wounded included, from both the 0ndian machinegun fire and the artillery barrages, in an hour of brutal fighting that had culminated in hand to hand combat in the final stages only minutes ago. )ad they had more time, and friendly long range artillery, the casualties could have been far less, but as the 0ndian plans had been ruined by their lightening assault, their own plan for artillery fire had been wrenched away by the 0ndian counter battery fire from Tawang. ,s a result, both sides had their plans affected, and their casualties reflected this. The 7hinese had factored this into their plans for breaking through the 0ndian defences. 0t was expected that casualties would be high, and so each regiment was supposed to do one ma!or !ob before it was to be relieved by others in a north&south movement, all the time bringing new units forward and putting battle damaged formations on holding duty as they planned to move south to the town of Tawang. The 7hinese regiment on east hill had been tasked to take this hill and some others, but they had been reduced to a shell of their former self after taking only this hill. *ut they were about to be relieved, starting fifteen minutes after taking this hill. They were still consolidating their positions on the top when the first 0ndian shells from a new -ire Mission ordered by Ma!or #atel hit the hilltop they were on. Ma!or #atel was again looking at the hill to his east from his binoculars when the night turned to day. Two and a half batteries, and almost every available '@@ mm gun in Tawang had been concentrated to this -ire Mission alone, and with simultaneous T"T from all guns combined, the

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hilltop positions were covered with orange and yellow flashes in a matter of seconds with the associated thunderous noises. The 7hinese cheering that had been going on for several minutes now was abruptly silenced with the noise of man&made thunder. , few seconds more and the entire top part of the east hill was covered with a thick cloud of smoke and dust, with the occasional orange flash visible through it. The $unfire from Tawang continued for another minute before the -orward ,rtillery 7ontrollers standing next to #atel called off the fire for a lack of visible targets. ,s the guns fell silent, Pero 6ine hills continued to echo the sound of thunder for several seconds before it died out and was replaced with the sound of silence. There was no more noise from the 7hinese on 3ast )ill. /hen he lowered his binoculars, Ma!or #atel had a smile on his face that he had no intention of hiding. %ee you in hell, comradesH 9espite the momentary victory, there was not time for cheering. There was work to be done. The 7hinese follow on regiments would soon be moving into the same positions to make a permanent presence there, and there was nothing that could be done about that by Ma!or #atel. The 4T,70T& T/"5 %earcher&00 from *omdila was now charged with directing the ,rtillery fire on these follow on 7hinese units that were so far not in the 6"% of the troops in Ma!or #atel5s force. 0n any case, with their eastern flank overrun, and the road on which supplies would come to them now clearly visible to 7hinese forces on 3ast )ill, they had to pull back south to !oin the main defences. That movement was to be completed in the time gap between the two 7hinese units replacing each other on 3ast&)ill. The 0ndian movement plan was a thing of complexity, and it had to be. The circumstances had made it that way. *ecause the 3ast&)ill overlooked the main road from *um&6a to Tawang fro this stretch, the two 0ndian T&=(s were now also exposed, and also within range of any anti&tank missiles that the follow on 7hinese troops might be bringing forward with them. That necessitated a speedy withdrawal by 7aptain %hukla, and a speedy withdrawal was not something that could be done in this kind of mountainous region. )e had to move in reverse, and that too, slowly. To make matters worse, the 0ndian troops now moving back were suddenly exposed from an elevated enemy position on 3ast&)ill which meant that 7aptain %hukla also had to provide the much needed infantry support fire as the troops pulled back using his tanks as cover until they could reach that bend in the road half a kilometre to their west where they would again be behind cover and where the trucks were waiting to pull the troops back south. *ut for that few hundred metres, the 0ndian troops had to pull back on an east&west axis with the 7hinese on elevated positions to their east. 0t was not an enviable situation. This pullback had started in earnest as soon as the first sounds of 7hinese cheering had started to come from 3ast&)ill not so long ago, and the two 0ndian T&=(s were slowly moving backwards on the road with their turrets facing the 4enemy5 hill as s1uads of troops leapfrogged in small movements to stay next to the tanks during the movement. 7aptain %hukla was in the lead T&=( and was using the commander5s sights inside the turret to scan the 3ast&)ill for any movement. %o far there was no movement and the hill was still covered the smoke and dust from the artillery rounds that had stopped only minutes ago. The second T&=( in his command was behind him to the west by a hundred metres. This wide separation was essential because the two tanks were on an east west road and facing a threat along the same axis, which meant that for the rear tank to have a chance of seeing the enemy, he had to be far behind the lead tank. This also allowed engaging the targets on 3ast&)ill by firing well over the turret of the T&=( in front of him. This was extremely dangerous and was avoided under normal conditionsF but here there was no choice. The only cover the 0ndian Mountain 0nfantry Troops had were these two tanks for their movement for the next few hundred metres, and %hukla wanted both T&=(s shooting, and not !ust one.

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*oth the gunner and tank commanders were frantically looking for any movement on 3ast&)ill to indicate that the 7hinese were setting up anti&tank missile systems or some other weapons that might hinder the smooth 0ndian movement to the west. The two T&=( turrets were rotating in fixed angles on both sides of the long body axis and the guns were in an elevated position facing the top sections of the 3ast&)ill in front of them that seemed to be getting farther and farther away by the minute, and there was still nothing to be seen with regard to 7hinese movement. *ut that didn5t last long. Ma!or #atel was also moving west with his troops, but his movement was more of a casual walk with his radioman walking beside him as they headed west. The radio buAAed with activity and the Radioman caught up with his commanding officer and handed him the speaker. R"93" 7ommand, This is 3,$63&3G3. *e advised, T,70T&T/" Reports 7hinese reinforcing troops as having reached 3ast&)ill. %uggest you expedite Pero&6ine movement ,%,#. "ver.? That caused Ma!or #atel to stop moving and abruptly turn to face the 3ast hill behind him. ,nd sure enough, %hukla5s T&=( also stopped abruptly and the turret stopped moving. The gun showed some slight elevation and then that too stopped. Then there was two seconds of silence before there was a earth shattering noise as %hukla5s $unner let loose a )3 round that left the tank amidst a white flash and headed to a point on the top most parts of 3ast&)ill. Then a second later the earth shook as the round exploded among the rocks and sent a fireball racing into the air on 3ast&)ill. #atel couldn5t see anything, but the advanced optics on board the T&=( did. Then there was silence again. ,fter a few more seconds of agonising wait, movement was spotted all across the top portions of 3ast&hill and then the T&=(s started their coaxial machineguns to engage the 7hinese troops getting in position to interdict the 0ndian movement below them. 3ven as yellow streaks of ;.>.mm rounds began striking 3ast hill in the darkness, the movement over there only seemed to increase. 7opy that, 3,$63&3G3. /e are in contact with 7hinese forces on 3ast )ill. %uggest you give us more warning time next time. "ver.? 7opy, R"93". %orry about that. "ver and out.? Ma!or #atel handed back the speaker to his Radioman even as another )3 round left the barrel of the rear T&=( and traced across the sky and sent another fireball soaring into the sky on east hill. The 7hinese had to be taking losses to this tank gunfire, #atel reflected to himself, but there were far too many of them. Then a streak of bullets from a 7hinese machinegun started up and hit the rocks close to where #atel was standing, sending him, his radioman and the nearby 0ndian troops under cover behind rocks nearby. %hukla5s T&=( let loose yet another )3 round and sent the location from where the 7hinese machinegun rounds had originated, covered with the black smoke and fire. *ut there were more 7hinese return fire now, and the 0ndian troops were getting pinned down. They were now being forced to seek cover after only short periods of movement, and that considerably slowed down the 0ndian exodus to the western locations, still a couple of hundred metres away from where the rear T&=( was. This was forcing the 0ndian T&=(s to stop more often as well, and the 7hinese could not have failed to notice that. %ure enough, after a gap of half a minute, the first 7hinese ,nti&tank missile was seen to leave a location on top of east hill towards the 0ndian tanks. %hukla was 1uick to spot the launching locations and used his commander5s remotely operated Machine&gun to fire as many rounds at that location as he could. The idea was to distract the 7hinese gunner and make him miss his mark. Then his gunner !oined a second later and sent a )3 round within that pile of rocks. The answer to whether or not the 7hinese gunner had been neutralised came a second later as the missile continued to move straight without guidance and hit the foot of the hill to the north a full twenty metres in front of %hukla5s tank, sending a dust cloud into the air that prevented their

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vision for some seconds. There were more 7hinese missiles out there on that hill now, and three more launches were now detected. Ma!or #atel was busy yelling in the radio asking the artillery command at Tawang to lay down smoke over 3ast )ill to prevent further 7hinese launches, but with three missiles heading towards the tanks and only two tank guns to return fire, the odds were against the 0ndian crews. %hukla5s tank destroyed another 7hinese launch crew with combined ;.>.mm gunfire and )3 rounds, while the rear T&=( took out a second location in the small gap between the missile launch and hits. *oth tanks had automatically released aerosol clouds in front of them, but this time there was no escape. "f the three launches, two missiles no longer had guidance and they drove their warheads into rocks instead. *ut the third round had full guidance and the missile passed through the aerosol cloud and hit the ground immediately in front of the rear T&=( and exploded. The explosion left the driver of the T& =( dead at the controls and sent parts of the tank5s tracks flying into the air in small pieces. The hatch on top of the T&=( opened and the gunner and 7ommander !umped out a second before flames leaped out of the turret hatches behind them. The gunner was holding a bleeding arm and the commander was limping as they ran for a doAen metres before the secondary explosions ripped the tank hill apart in a !arring explosion and sent the tank turret flying into the air on tops of a pillar of flames. 0t came down next to the tank a second later. #atel was in the area to the right of %hukla5s T&=(, and he turned around to see the second T&=( behind him burning furiously. "ne tank was now gone. %econds later the first 0ndian artillery smoke rounds hit the east hill and covered it within a artificial cloud that left the 7hinese optical systems blind. There were some )3 rounds within the smoke shells as well, and these were to keep the gunners from becoming adventurous and moving to better locations. This allowed the 0ndian soldiers to sprint westwards for those last couple hundred metres to safety. *ut with the destruction of the rear T&=( on the narrow road, a new problem arose. %hukla5s tank was trapped in the open. 0t was also only a matter of time before the smoke cleared and the 7hinese started to shoot again. #atel was back on the radio to ask for help. )e had the choice of telling 7aptain %hukla to abandon the tank and move west, but he needed to inform )< about what was happening. /hat5s the 7hinese positions on 3ast&)ill likeI ,re they exposedI? he was asked by the commanders at Tawang. Ges sir. They !ust moved in there. No dug in positions yet, but plenty of cover from rocks and such like against artillery shelling. %helling them is not going to be of much use at the moment. *ut they are exposed to air attacks.? "kay, $ood. There was a 7,% strike scheduled for 3ast&hill later tonight. /e had moved the time schedule up some time ago. There is a four&ship Mig&.; package on the way. T,70T&T/" has your sector covered from the air and 3,$63 3G3 has overall control. 9o not abandon any tanks or e1uipment. 0 say again, do not abandon any e1uipment. )old your positions. /e are going to fry 3ast&hill and all 7hinese who happen to be on it in under ten minutes...? N"RT) "- T,/,N$, ,R2N,7),6 #R,93%), 0N90, .+J@ )R% T)2R%9,G This close to the $reat )imalayan range and thus the altitude, the atmosphere is always light and cold. 7old winds persist during the day and at night it gets worse. Nearing midnight, it becomes impossibly cold for any person who comes here from any other part of the country. Get, this is the place where the two titans of ,sia stare at each other across the border day in and day out. The 0ndian army has fought here before, back in '=>.. 0t fought with its soldiers e1uipped with little or

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no winter e1uipment or cold weather gear and wearing tennis shoes and personal woollen gear while attempting to stave of hordes of 7hinese soldiers. Things were much better now, and the 0ndian army was much better prepared than back then. The troops had low light goggles and binoculars, assault rifles and arccurate artillery and air support, and warm winter gear. 3ven so, for Ma!or #atel and his men sitting within the rocks and snow in the extreme cold and dark night, there was an overwhelming sense of 9e!a vu. Ma!or #atel had his main force of troops retreat back to the safety of the bend in the road to the west, leaving him, his radiomen, -,7 and a platoon siAed group of soldiers behind with %hukla5s T&=(. The Medics had taken the wounded 7ommander and $unner of the other T&=( on stretchers after they had evacuated their T&=( seconds before it had blown up not so long ago. The burning hull of that tank was still smouldering and flames were visible even after exposure to the extreme cold, the turret lying beside the tank also recognisable only by its main gun attachment. The road west was blocked. ,nd %hukla5s T&=( was still stuck on the wrong side of the road. *ut Ma!or #atel was not about to leave 7aptain %hukla alone out here while he watched from safety. )e was up forward with the tank. The T&=( was on the road and facing 3ast&)ill, and #atel had distributed his men both north and south of the T&=( to provide infantry protection. )e was to the south of the tank, and about two&doAen metres away behind the cover of some rocks along with his -,7 and Radioman. )e was lying behind a pattern of rocks and peeking above them to look at the 7hinese positions using his *inoculars and to keep an eye on things on his own side, while his -,7 coordinated with the ,rtillery 7ommand at Tawang for cover fire as well as suppressive fire on 3ast )ill. 3ast&)ill itself was under a blanket of smoke, laid down by the 0ndian artillery guns. /ithin it were the random orange fireballs erupting into the air as the two 0ndian batteries at Tawang poured out )arassment and 0nterdiction rounds among the smoke rounds to keep the 7hinese from moving around and to distract them continiously. The 7hinese infantry had so far occupied only the top most positions of 3ast&)ill as 7aptain %hukla5s T&=(s had engaged them before they could move down. ,s a result, the lower positions of the hill were vacated. The 0ndian artillery fire was thus being restricted by the -,7 to the upper occupied positions. *ut the 7hinese were attempting to move down and resume their advance from under the 0ndian artillery fire. They had not done so for a few minutes but were now visibly beginning to move. 0t was obvious to the 7hinese commander that they could not have !ust sat there and waited for the artillery to stop. -urther, the smoke cover worked both ways. ,t one hand it prevented the 7hinese from seeing the 0ndian positions for the time being and at the other hand it also allowed them to move without getting targeted accurately by the tanks. ,nd thermal vision was restricted for both sides at the moment. There were !ust too many explosions on the 7hinese side and hence the residual heat and movement to properly detect human movement from the T&=(. )owever, random movement aside, whenever the 7hinese attempted to move in groups, the purposeful human movement could be made out from the random pro!ectile and debris and such targets being engaged by %hukla5s $unner using )3 shells. ,lso, to prevent the 7hinese from accurately determining the T&=( location from within the smoke, whenever the tank gunner wanted to fire a round at some target, the driver would drive forward at full speed for a hundred metres and stop. The gunner then located and fired his shot, and the driver then reversed the tank back to its original position. Thus, when the tank fire was seen within the smoke and the darkness, the 7hinese opened fire at the location but the T&=( not being there, the damage was nullified. /orse, it revealed to the T&=( gunner where from the Missiles had been fired on the hill and this had allowed him to take out three whole 7hinese anti&tank missile teams before the 7hinese had caught on and stopped taking the bait. That had been some time ago, and apart from the movement now becoming visible on the lower locations of the hill, 7aptain %hukla had had a relatively peaceful few minutes.

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*ut now the 7hinese were coming to the lower positions of the hill, and one recon team who had come lower than the lowest level of the smoke cloud hovering on the hill had been received by the 0ndian T&=( with an )3 shell right in the centre of their group, and when the smoke had cleared, apart from the two 7hinese soldiers crawling and writhing on the ground, there had been no other movement. That was thirty seconds ago. NowHthere was serious movement and the bulk of the 7hinese force was coming down. The T&=( had not yet engaged, with the gunner looking for important targets like missile teams and machinegun crews and so on. %econds later the main gun thundered again and in yet another flash of light a )3 round left the main barrel and sent a small fireball flying into the air where a 7hinese Machinegun crew had been advancing to set up positions only a second ago. The T&=( $unner checked his ,mmo left, and that brought a frown on his face. The T&=( was running out of ammunition after single&handedly firing continuously at the 7hinese for the last few minutes. There were hundreds of rounds of ;.>. mm rounds left for both machineguns, but that was not the point. The $unner informed 7aptain %hukla of the ammo situation and he called Ma!or #atel on the Radio. R"93" 7ommand, this is R"93"&"N3. /eHuhHwe are running a little low here on the presents for our 7ommunist friends. /hat should we doI "ver.? The response came immediately as Ma!or #atel looked to the tank on his left as if he was directly talking to it. R"93"&"N3, This is R"93" 7ommand. 7opy. 6ook for Targets of "pportunity from now on. -irst priority is your own safety. Target the anti&tank teams. ,lso, look out for M,N#,9s. 0f you see one, take it out. That will make things easier for 3,$63 3G3. 9o not waste ammo on 7ommie infantry or machineguns. "ver.? This is R"93"&"N3. 0 copy your last. /ill do. 3T, on 3,$63&3G3 supportI? R"93"&"N3, 3T, is momentary. )ang in there. "ver and out.? ,s #atel handed back the receiver to his Radioman beside him there was a brilliant flash of white light in front of his eyes without any noise and a shockwave that rippled through his body before everything went blackH . TTTTTTT The calm, black, star studded night sky was the first thing that Ma!or #atel saw when his eyes opened after what seemed to be an eternity for him but in reality had been only a minute. There was little noise in the background that his brain could not understand yet, and he continued to stare at the sky in his reverie. Then a pair of streaks of light flew across his field of vision in the sky and it then occurred to him that those were not the things of beauty that he thought they were but tracers flying in the air above him. That5s when his senses started to come back to him again and he started to realise what was going on around him. There seemed to be a orange glow on the peripheral sides of his vision which he could not understand. %unrise was still hours away. Then he realised that he was feeling heat when he should have felt cold. ,nd he turned his head to look to his right and saw something that brought him fully back into the real worldH )e saw what looked to him to be a pillar of fire raging into the air thirty metres away when he turned his head to see what the orange glow had been. There was another pillar of fire further away, and that looked to be coming from where the turret should have been in 7aptain %hukla5s T&=(. )e turned to look at the first pillar of fire again and now recognised it for what it was8 the turret of the tank. )e started to stare at the sky again and that5s when his brain started thinking againH "h my godL /hat in god5s name happened hereI

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)e saw his men running around before a couple of soldiers and his radioman were leaning over him and asking him whether he was okay. #atel did not answer them though he continued to stare at their faces. )is thoughts were clear to everyone around him. #atel mentally checked himself for any wounds based on the pain and his sensations and nodded agreement that he was okay and got up on his feet with the assistance of his men. )e immediately saw that there was another body lying a doAen metres away. 0t was his -,7, and the medic leaning over him was nodding his head in desolation before he walked to a third person to offer assistance. #atel asked his Radioman if he was okay and whether anybody saw what happened. The Radioman brought a soldier over and told him to tell the Ma!or what he had seen. 0t became clear that a missile had dived into 7aptain %hukla5s T&=( seconds after Ma!or #atel had conversed with him. The missile had dived in from the northeast of the current location. That put them !ust north of east hill and south of the first line of 7hinese hillsH 0t couldn5t have been a Tactical missileHelse we would all have been dead right now. 0t was an anti&tank missile. *ut fired by whomI The 7hinese infantry to the northeast do not have the range on us from their current locationsHthen it must have beenH)elicoptersL $od 9amn itL #atel ordered his radioman to get in touch with 3,$63 3G3, the aerial 0%R coordination centre for the Tawang sector. 3,$63 3G3, this is R"93" 7ommand. /e !ust got hit by 7hinese attack )elos. 0 have lost my Tank support to their attack. /hat they hell are you guys doing over thereI 0t5s supposed to be you !ob to cover us, 9amn itL? #atel snarled into the speaker even as aircraft noise overhead caused him to look skywards and see the dark silhouettes of Mig&.;s flying in a tactical formation. R"93" 7ommand, this is 3,$63 3G3. T,70T&T/" !ust detected them a minute ago. T,70T& "N3 failed to locate them at all. ,nd thanks to their low altitude approach, neither did the 0,#halcon. There was no time to do anything. 3ven if we could have detected them in time, we didn5t have any aerial support at the time to do anything about it. That5s changed now. The Mig& .; strike package should be above you by now. 9o you have a visualI? Ma!or #atel bit off what he was going to say as he stared at the speaker and regained his professional self when he spoke finally. 3,$63 3G3, they !ust flew over us. 0 had a brief visual. %uggest you start working them on those helicopters first of all. The 7ommie infantry 0 can handle myself. *ut take out those damned helicopters. "ver.? 7opy that, R"93" 7ommand. $et your men to safety. /e are directing the 0,- boys onto the 7hinese choppers. Then we will light up 3ast&)ill for you. %uggest you proceed with your previous evacuation plan to 9efence line "ne. "ver and out.? Ma!or #atel handed the receiver back to his Radioman and called his remaining leaders to tell them to fall back to the west where the remainder of his men were manning positions. /ith the T& =( gone, there was no reason for them to slug it out in an uneven battle at the moment. ,nd in any case, with the 0,- Mig&.;s already above them and the ground strike imminent, the last thing Ma!or #atel wanted to do was to place his men close to the 7hinese and risk fratricide. )e had sustained enough casualties for one day. ,bove him, the Mig&.; pilots received word from 3,$63 3G3 regarding the presence of 7hinese attack helicopters and were authoriAed to engage. The pilots brought the swept back wings to forward positions, selected guns and dived to engageH

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AIRSPACE OVER /ERO LINE

NORTH OF TAWAN", ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA *#'# HRS THURSDAY There had been five 7hinese P&'( )elicopters that had flown down from the north after the first T&=( raid on the 7hinese positions at *um&6a had been successfully carried out by the now dead 7aptain %hukla and his tank force. They had flown within the hills and beyond the coverage of the %earcher&00 from *omdila that was flying covertly over 7hinese airspace. The 7hinese pilots had not known of its existence and the fact that they had still managed to evade it had nothing to do with anything else other than luck. That had allowed them to come south undetected and reach the indo&china border east of *um&6a before being detected by the second %earcher&00 flying directly over their heads at high altitude. /ith no radar, the ac1uisition had been purely "ptical in nature and the operators at *omdila had literally 4seen5 the 7hinese helicopters getting into launching position on their screens. They had also witnessed a missile launch from one of the helicopters and seen it impact the friendly T&=( in a bright flash of light. -or them there were no sounds of thunder and screams of men caught within the blast radius, but they had seen them flying anyway. Now, the helicopters were moving southeast, and attempting to try and hit the 0ndian defences at Tawang from the northeast in a flanking attack. They !ust had no idea what was flying above them. Their radar facility to the north, 4Red&3ye5, had been laid waste by the )arpy drones launched by the T,70T&#,T)-0N93R team from *hutan in the northwest not so long ago. %o when the 7hinese crews actually saw the Mig&.;s manoeuvring in the dark skies above them, it was too lateH There were four Mig&.;s in all. They had launched from )ashimara not so long ago and had darted across the airspace over *hutan to get to this area in a hurry. They were loaded out with Napalm and cluster munitions but no guided bombs. 0n an ideal case they would remained high above the enemy helicopters and drop a guided bomb on top of them while themselves outside the range of the small close range )eat %eeking missiles of the helicopters. *ut here they had no such bombs. They didn5t even have any air&to&air missiles because their aircrafts had been loaded with only one mission in mind. 0t was supposed to have been a surgical strike. $et in, fry the 7hinese and get out. No moreH0t had !ust turned messy... The four Mig&.; pilots separated from their tactical formation and dived low and switched to guns while simultaneously attempting to locate the 7hinese helicopters. The flight was being led by /ing 7ommander ). %. *hatia, and his was the leading aircraft in this groupHthat is, when it really had been a group. Now it was a melee. %ingle aircrafts looking for single targets. The pilots were hoping that their comrades would find their targets before they found a heat seeker creeping into their !et pipes. The search for the enemy was frantic and short. /o&e onco&e onwhere are youaha. There. /E" *hatia was the first to find one of the P&'(s in the darkness using his N $s. )is aircraft5s wings were in full forward position seeing the high rate of closure with this enemy whose maximum speed was probably less than his landing approach speed. *hatia thought briefly about lowering his main undercarriage to reduce speed, but decided against it almost as soon as the thought had entered his mind. /ith this high a closure speed, the attacking aircrafts had a very small window in which they could fire a burst of ammo that might hit the enemy target. %till too fastH9amn itHcan5t do anything now. )ave to go with it as it isH *hatia5s Mig&.; was heading directly at the 7hinese helicopter whose pilot and gunner sitting behind one another also suddenly noticed the threat approaching directly towards them. The #ilot attempted to raise the nose of the helicopter so that his gunner could engage at the enemy coming from a higher altitude and diving. That was when *hatia !udged his window lay and depressed the trigger button. The aircraft shuddered and a full line of tracers left the aircraft and went down towards the 7hinese helicopter. *hatia immediately pulled up or else he may have hit the hills below. )e did so and left behind a line of flares to detract any threats to his aircraft. )is target was now behind him and in his immediate evasive manoeuvres he had not paid attention to the target itself. )e brought the aircraft around and started looking for his 1uarry again. 5kay -r. /o&&iewhere are youyou still ali$e? *hatia immediately spotted the rotating blades of the helicopter against the rocky background and headed for it. This time the 7hinese helicopter was in front of him and heading away, so the approach was somewhat slower, allowing him to align himself properly behind the 7hinese before pressing the button againHso you &anaged to esca'e, did you? 1ere you go

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*hatia5s second burst of gunfire was from behind and he kept the button depressed until the first line of bullets slammed into the rear section of the enemy helicopter in massive thuds and kept on hitting front& wards until they began impacting the engine compartment and sent the twisted and broken main rotor blades flying in all directions. The first P&'( fell like a rock and hit the rocky mountain floor below in a !arring impact before rolling down the slopes. Bye -r /o&&ie. )t was nice knowing you There was surprisingly little fire, but no one stepped out of the cockpit when the rolling finally stopped. *hatia5s Mig&.; had already flown over and was not concerned with the fate of the 7hinese crew. )e had other things to attend to. The other three Mig&.;s had similar if not same experiences and they too managed to shoot down one helicopter each. *ut no one could locate the remaining helicopter. The whole battle so far had lasted barely a couple of minutes and as each pilot reported in, *hatia did the arithmetic and called up 3,$63 3G3. 3,$63 3G3, this is 37)"&"N3. %plash four bandits. 0 repeatHsplash four bandits. No visual on fifth target. #roceeding to primary. "ver? the response was rapid. This is 3,$63 3G3. /e copy your last. #roceed to primary. *e advised8 possible low&level anti&air present. #roceed with caution. "ver and out.? The radio became 1uiet again. *hatia changed fre1uencies. 37)"&"N3 to all 37)" units. Return to #rimary. The commies may have low&level anti&air with them. 6et5s make this 1uick and in a single pass. 7ome in from the north and move south. 9ischarge your presents on the western slope of #rimary. 0ntelligence suggests the commies have moved west, applying pressure on our boys there. 6et5s reduce that pressure to Aero. 37)"&"N3 out.? The four Mig&.;s came in from the north of 3ast )ill in a single group spread out line abreast from east to west and headed south to the target. "n east hill the 7hinese infantry was in the process of occupying the abandoned positions of Pero 6ine. They were also being kept from moving forward by Ma!or #atel5s soldiers who were using the opportunity to fire bursts of machinegun fire at their tormentors. The artillery was still falling and the valley was still echoing the sounds of thunder all around. *y the time the 7hinese soldiers heard the noise of the four aircrafts coming towards them from their right flank, it was too late to do anything. The four 0ndian aircrafts were black silhouettes against the dark black sky to the 7hinese when they passed over them and discharged their ordinance from an altitude of a few hundred feet. There was little anybody could do. )uman thinking time is larger than what it takes gravity to bring a heavy ob!ect down to earth from such a low altitude. , second later the dark night sky turned to daylightH

*&00 HRS THURSDAY 8 0000 HRS FRIDAY Ma!or #atel and his soldiers !erked their heads away from the light to protect what night vision they had, but the light beat them to it. The night sky lighted up into daylight and the stars seemed to disappear from the sky before reappearing again as the intensity of the explosion reduced. The 0ndian soldiers under Ma!or #atel looked back and saw the entire western slope of 3ast )ill covered under a blanket of fire that leaped into the air in a massive fireball and vanished, leaving the smaller fires burning throughout the entirety of the hill. #atel was silently looking at the flames when the four 0ndian aircraft flew overhead on their way back to base, one of them leaving some flares in its wake as they disappeared behind the mountains. The valley was suddenly silent, #atel realised. There was no longer a cacophony of assault guns firing from either side. The artillery was falling on some target far away, and no longer was hitting this valley. The echoes were dying out and the aircraft noise had receded. ,nd there was another thing. Not one of the 0ndian soldiers was speaking. ,ll were looking at the way the orange&yellow flames had consumed what had been their dug&in positions only a couple of hours ago. The 0ndian aircraft had struck the pervious Pero 6ine locations during their single pass drop. *ut they had done so because it had no longer been in 0ndian hands. ,nd now it was slowly burning away into the nightH The crackle of the radio !erked everybody around and broke the trance. The Radioman walked over to the Ma!or and gave him the speaker. There was a friendly voice on the line. R"93" 7ommand, this is 3,$63 3G3. 7ome in over.?

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This is R"93". $o.? R"93" 7ommand, did you see the fireworksI "ver.? Ges we did, 3,$63 3G3. #lease pass our thanks to the 0,- boys. There is no need for *9,. 3ast hill has been fried, and we no longer have any targets. "ver.? /ill do, R"93". %uggest you proceed with your primary evacuation back to 9efence 6ine "ne. "ver.? Back to businessMa!or #atel realised. 7opy that, 3,$63 3G3. R"93" -orce is pulling out. "ver and "ut.? The Ma!or handed the speaker back to his radioman and shouted 1uick commands to his men around him to load up and move out. The trucks behind the bend they were on now had been waiting for them for 1uite some time, and their drivers were only too pleased to start their engines up even as the soldiers continued to climb aboard behind them. Ma!or #atel was standing on the rocks and still looking at the burning remains of 3ast hill and the surrounding locations along with two of his remaining 7ompany commanders. ,ll knew that their victory had been temporary. 9espite the ferociousness of the attack, the 7hinese would still have some survivors, and their follow on units would simply overtake this position and move on again. The essence of this victory was the number of casualties inflicted, and not the change in the overall strategic situation. The 7hinese still had massive numbers pouring into the region, and they could only move south. %o now Ma!or #atel was moving south again, and as his heart kept telling him8 retreating. )is brain argued that it was the only way this would work, but his heart would not agree. They were retreating, and that was that. ,a&n, ,a&n, ,a&n. The first truck in the long convoy pulled off at the far end to the south, and as the trucks behind the first began to pull out one by one, Ma!or #atel glanced again at the hills they were leaving and noticed for the first time that the snow on the hills surrounding 3ast )ill had melted because of the heat from the explosion, showing the dark brown rocks and soil below. The melted snow was pouring into small conduits in between the rocks as they formed a small rivulet whose water glittered against the starry night. 0t was one of the most beautiful things the Ma!or had seen. ,nd it broke his heart to be leaving this to the enemy to trample upon. ,s the Ma!or and his remaining officers !umped aboard one of the last trucks before it pulled out as well, they turned and looked at the ma!estic sight once again. The Ma!or was uncertain whether they would ever see this part of their land again, but that was his brain speaking again. *ut as the trucks finally pulled out on the road southwards, and as a new day began, most of #atel5s men were thinking the same thing as what #atel5s heart was saying out loud and clear8 We W)88 be back

AIRSPACE OVER MADHYA PRADESH

CENTRAL INDIA 000' HRS FRIDAY The 0ndian N7, was airborne some time back, but it had become part of the aerial 0%R network only and hour ago. That5s when the aircraft had reached its stipulated altitude and when the 0,- 7ommunications crew had taken off their seatbelts and immediately got down to work in opening up the communications with all other nodes. -or the #M and the 9efence Minister, the !ob started when the 7",% and the 7,% led them to the conference room inside the aircraft next to the communications room where they took their positions around a table and opened up the links to the various theatre commanders via ideo teleconferencing systems. ,t the moment, the main people online via this system were the ,ir -orce5s 7,7 and 3,7 commanders, and the ,rmy5s 3astern ,rmy 7ommander. -or the last hour, the people on board this aircraft had monitored the ground war north of Tawang via various methods, vocal and optical. 0t had given them a god like view of the situation at hand and shown them the brutality of war on screen and 6ive. This had created different

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reactions among the different people present. -or the 9efence Minister, it had been a gut wrenching feeling as he had seen one of #atel5s 0nfantry 7ompanies fight out to the last man on 3ast )ill as the 7hinese had overrun them. Then the short war between the T&=(s and the 7hinese and finally the end of that battle with the 0,- Mig&.; strike only minutes ago had seen the #M visibly uneasy, as if his stomach was not agreeing with him, but he had the courage and the dignity to keep that under control for the benefit of all those present around him. , relatively young N%, member had not been able to control his sickness and had left the room in rather a hurry. Now, the 9efence Minister was sitting next to the oval window and staring at the dark night sky outside. )is earthward line of sight was restricted because of the wing outside, with the lighted engine area and the wingtip red anti&collision light periodically flashing away. 0nside the aircraft there were only few whispered talks as everybody was busy doing his or her !ob. ,part from that the only noise was the humming noise of the aircraft engines themselves, making their way inside the aircraft and reminding everybody that this wasn5t a dream. They were all rally here. They were all really facing a national emergency, and that no, this wasn5t some floating dream with a starlit sky and no noise. -urther outside were two dark silhouettes whose anti&collision lights were also flashing. They were flying with this aircraft, the 9efence Minister Realised, and against the starlit background he could only make out the dark silhouettes of the two aircraft, but they looked like Mig&.=s to him. )e took satisfaction in the fact that he could tell the difference between a Mig&.= and an %2&+( or whatever, unlike most of his predecessors. That brought a small chuckle to the Minister5s face, and broke his tension, much to his relief. There was a slight commotion and he turned his head to see inside the room and saw that the recently departed N%, was back in the room. The relaxation within the 9efence Minister was gone the moment he saw the face of that 4,dvisor5 again, and he wasn5t alone in that gesture. The two senior Military commanders also gave an ugly look. The 9efence Minster became his old self again. The kind o% 'eo'le ad$ising the (- on how to %ight a war cant kee' their dinners in their sto&achs. The bastards. ,ecides national security %or the country but doesnt ha$e the guts to e$en see a battle head on, &uch less to %ight in it. ) ha$e a good &ind to tie hi& u' to a *&erch rocket and %ir, we have the latest update now. 0 have $eneral %axena on the line for us. )e will fill us on the latest details. %hould 0 ask him to startI? The 7",% asked the #M and the 9efence Minister, waking the 9efence Minister from his reverie. The #M nodded to the 7",% who in turn asked the ,ircraft 7ommunications 7hief, a senior /ing 7ommander, to get it done. 0n seconds one of the large 679 screens at the extreme end of the room came to life, showing 6ieutenant $eneral %axena, the 0 7orps 7ommander. )e waited for one of the people aboard #,TR0"T&3,$63 to give the nod for him to start. , no&nonsense man, %axena was the 4#oint5 7ommander for the current ground situation and he had a lot to do. #ersonally, he didn5t give a damn for such meetings, but it was necessary and part of his !ob. 4To keep the #oliticians from panicking5, as he thought of it. The 9efence Minister started it up for him. $eneral %axena, has Ma!or #atel completed the evacuation of his troops from the front linesI ,nd what is the status of the 7hinese advance so farI? 0t has started off, %ir. )is troops are on board trucks and heading to our main defensive lines as we speak. )e should get there within half an hour. ,part from that, we are looking at the 7hinese very closely. Their advance has been temporarily stopped. ,nd 0 must emphasise the term 4Temporarily5. They have massive numbers of troops coming in south, %ir. 0n the last few hours worth of battles we have utiliAed the superior firepower at our disposal to maybe wipe out close to two regiments worth of 7hinese troops, but they have many, many more regiments coming in. K%o 0 am afraid their advance south will be resumed soon. ,part from their infantry, however, we have the situation bottled up at *um&6a. They were to bring a lot of their armoured support down south for what they must have thought would be their battles for the town of Tawang, but they had only a single channel to bring them through the $reat )imalayan range, and that was at *um&6a. ,t present we are concentrating our artillery to keep that closed. There are even a few 0,- %trikes planned to completely bottle up their forces. *ut their troops we can5t bottle up at the border. They are pouring through the hills to the south and into ,runachal #radesh, but only from this sector. ,ll other sectors are 1uiet, apart from the artillery duels going on. KTheir infantry we will hold at this -irst 9efence 6ine north of Tawang that 0 had briefed you earlier. *ut it will

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take a few hours for the 7hinese to get there. %o at present we are building up our defences as much more as we can.? Now the senior N%, member spoke up for his team, and his first 1uestion wasn5t his best. $eneral, what is the amount of 7hinese ,dvance in terms of kilometres at present and how much more will it be before they get to your 9efence 6inesI? this brought a frown on the 7",%, $eneral %inha and 6ieutenant $eneral %axena and the 9efence Minister again turned his head to look out the window. ,a&ned idiot. ,oesnt know anything about &anoeu$re war%are at all. 1es starting to act like *talin in !@ . A$erything to hi& co&es in ter&s o% >ilo&etres and statistical ter&s only. Where can ) %ind the closest *&erch unit? %axena looked at some figures in front of him back in TeApur, ,ssam, before speaking again to answer the 1uestion asked from him. %ir, at present the 7hinese have penetrated close to around -ive :ilometres south of *omdila. They will get to eight by the time they reach out main lines. There is no other penetration in any other sectors.? The 9efence Minister looked from %axena to the National %ecurity ,dvisor, who he realised, must have been dividing the distance from *um&6a to TeApur by the given 7hinese #enetration for one day to calculate the number of days they had. )e was about to say something vulgar to the concerned person but $eneral %axena pre&empted him. %ir, 0 hope you are not considering that this will be the continued advance for the 7hinese for each day. "n the contrary, today, or should 0 say yesterday, was the day when they should have made their most rapid advances, considering that this was their day of maximum strength. ,fter this it will !ust keep reducing, if at all it does move. 0t5s not a linear progression, but an exponential one. ,nd it works both ways. 0f on the first day you break through the enemy defences, then your advances increase exponentially as it is a cumulative effect. "n the other hand, if you fail to break through, then after your initial advances the advance per day keeps on decreasing exponentially until it stops. The 7hinese haven5t broken through yesterday. ,nd they sure as hell won5t be breaking through today.? The N%, guy didn5t look very convinced, but nodded anyway. The #M noticed all this but failed to intervene before finally looking at his most capable Minister at the moment. ,t the receiving end of this stare, the 9efence Minister decided to drive the meeting into some more useful direction. $eneral %axena, has the front stabiliAed yetI? %ir, the main attack will take place today. 0f we defeat that, then 0 can probably say that the front has stabiliAed. *ut not now. 0f you are referring to the Pero 6ine movement and battles, then yes sir. That front has stabiliAed for the moment. /e won5t be seeing serious ground combat fro some hours at the very least in this sector. 0n the meantime we will continue to bomb the 7hinese with everything we got in terms of non& 6"% artillery and air power.? "kay. %o in that case 0 think its time that you got back to your !ob. /hen there is something more significant happening, let us know immediately through your chain of command. 2nderstoodI? the defence Minister asked 6ieutenant $eneral %axena. Ges %ir.? The 679 %witched off after the 7",% had dismissed his 0 7orps commander to do his !ob. That was when the 9efence Minister asked ,7M *hosale fro his update on the events in the air. ,7M *hosale, what5s the status of "peration #0 "T&),MM3RI? %ir, it5s about to roll off any minute. /e had to delay it after the intelligence reports came in regarding the 7hinese use of Tactical Missiles to hit targets in the Tawang and other sectors, but that hasn5t yielded any results. /ith the Tawang sector relatively stabiliAed for the next few hours, 0 have asked my 3,7 commander to begin "ffensive $round attack %orties along the ,runachal border and to target the 7hinese artillery that5s been shelling our positions along the border. 7,7 is about to launch #0 "T&),MM3R, and will strike at 7hinese airbases around 6hasa, the main highway chokepoints from 6hasa to the ,ksai 7hin area and all ma!or 7hinese radar and air defence systems.? /hat will all this achieveI? the #M asked for once during this meeting.

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%ir, when #0 "T&),MM3R comes to a close, we will have decimated the main 7hinese support lines all the way from the ,ksai 7hin to 6hasa. /e will have closed down the airbases at 6hasa that are bringing in 7hinese ground reinforcements and supporting lesser&ranged fighters. /ith that done, all 7hinese airpower will be dependent on their longer ranged aircraft only, and all others will have to be supported by Tanker aircrafts. Their transport aircrafts will have to land much further away from the battlefield than what they are doing now, and that will seriously degrade their fighting capability. )owever, all this is very broad base talk. There are a thousand details to sort out, and as a result the #0 "T&),MM3R sorties will be in phases based on target priorities and carried out throughout the day. *ut within twenty&four hours, it will be completed.? /hen does #0 "T ),MM3R startI? The #M asked. %ir, as 0 had said earlier, the aircrafts are already taking off as we speak, but the final go order has not been given as of yet. That will have to come from this meeting. The aircrafts will move to the border in the meantime and wait for this final order to come through.? The #M looked at the 9efence Minister who seemed to be staring at a map of Tibet. The #M decided to speak again. Ravi, what do you thinkI? %ir, give the 4$o5 order now. /e can5t afford to wait on this. The 7hinese have !ust conducted their main aerial attack on us in the east. /e have taken heavy losses and so have they. *ut they have one disadvantage. Their entire bunch of airfields apart from those near 6hasa are far away. 0f we take these out, their capability to attack us in large numbers will be strategically reduced. 0n effect we will cut off the Tibet region from any aerial support for large swatches of time during any given period. Then we can cut it off at the ground level as well.? )ow5s that possibleI? the 9efence Minster again looked back at the Map showing Tibet in great detail and

his mind started churning details of what he saw and what he was thinking. 0t took him thirty seconds before speaking up again. %ir, 0 think we need to consider setting the %-- loose into TibetH ? INDIAN DEFENCE LINE ONE
NORTH OF TAWAN", ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA 001' HRS FRIDAY The !ourney for Ma!or #atel and his men was nearing its end. The trucks were moving in a long convoy at a slow pace on the icy roads to the south. Their front lights were off, and the drivers were using low light goggles while navigating along the curving roads. The !ourney went silently for Ma!or #atel and the Pero 6ine survivors as they stared into the darkness from the rear of the trucks and reflected about those they had been forced to leave behind. The mountains were all dark silhouettes to them at the moment, and the only reason they could be made out from the horiAon was because of the slight orange glow along the entire skyline to the north, with an occasional flash of light that disappeared long before the associated thunder arrived in a low bulky intensity. They were now a few kilometres south of their original positions, and the battle noises were receding into the background, allowing the 0ndian Mountain Troops a few peaceful minutes while they sat in the trucks. -or the drivers, there was to be no such luxury. They were being extremely careful along the road south. The danger of an attack of some kind was remote, but skidding off the road was !ust as lethal as an enemy bullet. The trucks were creeping behind one another and the entire convoy looked like a long snake crawling through the hilly road. 0n the lead truck sat a young lieutenant along with the driver. )e was in charge of the signalling. "nce the trucks reached the 0ndian positions again, the truckers had to signal the proper code both visually and by radio to avoid being shot at by their own side. This precaution had to be taken since there could have been the possibility that the 7hinese had taken over the trucks and commandeered them to infiltrate through the 0ndian lines in the darkness using these trucks, although this was unlikely at best. *ut rules were rules, and they were to be followed. The first sign of the 0ndian positions was when the trucks turned around a bend and the lieutenant sitting in

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the lead truck suddenly spotted what appeared to be T&=( sitting amidst the rocks and snow on the gradual slope next to the road, half a kilometre away from what was the main roadblock on the road to Tawang. The T&=( gunner returned the gesture when he turned the main gun towards the lead truck coming from behind the turn on the road. That caused the young lieutenant in the lead truck to snatch the radio and shout out the correct signal before grabbing a small flag and waving it outside the window of the truck cabin. The T&=( turret did not move away, but neither did it fire either. The 0ndian lieutenant breathed a sigh of relief as the truck came to a stop along with the other behind it at the main roadblock. "ut of nowhere a section of 0ndian infantry appeared with their 0N%,% pointed at the truck as they made their way to the lead truck. /hen they had checked that all was clear, the roadblock was opened and the convoy started to move again. Ma!or #atel and the Mountain Troops were now behind the 0ndian lines. 0t was time to get back to work. The road from the roadblock was flanked on both sides by two hills. *oth these hills were occupied by 0ndian infantry and were a part of the 0ndian 9efence 6ine "ne. /ith the demise of 4Pero5 6ine, there was no more need of the odd numeral based names and so this defence line was now renamed as #hase 6ine ,lpha, followed by *ravo and 7harlie behind it, with 9elta being the last line of defence for Tawang. The 7onvoy was now moving through this road and the troops inside had the first glimpse of the positions they would now be helping to occupy. "nce clear of the hills itself, the convoy continued to proceed south and bypassed the numerous T&=(s and *M#&00 ,- s lined up along the roadside waiting to be dispatched at any point along the 0ndian positions where the 7hinese may apply pressure. "f course they could not reach all the positions thanks to the terrain, but such vehicles in fact covered many of the positions on both sides of the road to Tawang easily. Ma!or #atel was a true professional in the mechanics of Military %cience and it took him less than a minute to realise that there was easily a full regiment of 0ndian troops covering these two hills alone. 0t was nice to see so many 0ndian troops milling about as their trucks ran past on the road. )is thought brought a long disappeared smile back to his face. -y single Battalion cost the /hinese one, &aybe two regi&ents worth o% troo's at Bero line. 8ets see what they can achie$e against a whole regi&ent along just this one stretch o% the line. *ure) had a lot o% indirect %ire'ower at &y dis'osal, but that will continue here as well. 8et the /hinese try to stor& these hills like they did on Aast hill. They are in %or one hell o% a rude sur'riseh&&&) wonder when we will begin to &o$e north? 1eck, ) &ight just end u' buying so&e 'ro'erty in 8hasa i% things go according to 'lan That was worthy of a slight chuckle as Ma!or #atel realised that the truck he was one had taken a turn to the side and separated from the convoy. *efore he could say a word the truck came to a full stop along what was an open field next to the road. The rest of the convoy also came to a stop, with soldiers !umping out and stretching their legs while some M#s began 1uesting some of #atel5s troops near the lead truck. "ne of the soldiers pointed to Ma!or #atel and the M#s walked over to Ma!or #atel and saluted in the darkness. , 1uick look around by #atel and a 1uick confirmation by the Military #olice #ersonnel 1uickly established this as their area of dismounting. The word was passed and the soldiers began !umping out of the trucks onto the snow filled area. There were several tents at the edge of the ground from where the several Medics and 9octors ran over as other soldiers ran with the stretchers carrying the seriously wounded towards the tents and trailers and out of the freeAing cold. Ma!or #atel lit up a cigarette and was idling away the time before a 7olonel walked over to him. The sight of the 7olonel made #atel extinguish the cigarette and !ump to attention before being told to relax. *efore the 7olonel could say another word to #atel, a group of soldiers opened the rear of one of the trucks nearby and began offloading what were revealed to be *ody&bags of 0ndian soldiers. These were the lucky ones. The unlucky ones were still on 3ast )ill and Pero 6ine positionsH The 7olonel 1uietly nodded his head in dismay, gestured and then led the way to what was revealed to be a bunch of Trailers and tents on the opposite side of the road. This was revealed to be his Regimental 7#. The tents itself were made of the new made fabric that allowed near Aero heat transfer from the outside to the inside and vice versa. This allowed the interior to be heated up and provided what were relatively comfortable conditions in the cold and windy conditions outside. 0nside were a bunch of tables and *attlefield computers on which were sitting %ignals officers and Regimental %taff "fficers, staring at a big horiAontal 9igital map on a central table. 7ompared to the hell Ma!or #atel had been through, this was a luxurious way to fight a war, the Ma!or reflected to himself, but kept his peace. )e noticed that while he was covered with dust and soot from the tank explosion, the young officers sitting here were in absolutely clean uniforms and whatnot. They %ight the war their way and ) %ight it

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in &y way, and that5s that. The Ma!or decided in his head !ust before the 7olonel spoke up to him. %o Ma!or, 0 understand that you have had a rough night so far.? A rough night.. That could be the understate&ent o% the century, /olonel *ir #atel thought, before saying what was the truth. Ges %ir. *ut the 7hinese had an even worse night. )owever, they don5t know it yet.? The 7olonel let out an amused grunt before that fragment of a smile vanished from his face and was replaced by something scarier. /hat about 7asualties, Ma!or #atelI "ur 7asualtiesI? Ma!or #atel5s thoughts went back to the sight of the body bags being unloaded from the trucks outside. ,a&n it. ) hate this 'art "ne hundred and forty six killed or wounded. This includes the two tank crews and the soldiers of 4,5 7ompany on 3ast hill who were overrun by the 7hinese. The 7hinese casualties are unknown, but 0 estimate it to be in the hundreds. /e hit them really hard, %ir, but not hard enough, 0 guess.? Gou are being very 7onservative, Ma!or. ,ll our estimates based on radio intercepts and aerial *9, suggests a much larger number. )owever, that is hardly the point right about now. The 7hinese dead and wounded, no matter how great, are still small compared to what they are bringing south. 0 am afraid this line won5t be held for too long either.? That sent a shiver up #atel5s spine. ,ear +od. We ha$e a whole regi&ent backed by artillery and tanks out here, and the /olonel thinks that &ight not be enough. Cust how &any /hinese in%antry units are ad$ancing south on us? %ir, am 0 to understand that this is their ma!or line of advance into ,runachal #radeshI? 7ertainly seems that way. There are ma!or skirmished going on along the entire border, but certainly nothing compared to the kind of shit that5s heading this way. /e are trying to hold the 7hinese tanks at the *um&6a crossing chokepoint, and that5s about all that we are holding. The 7hinese infantry is starting to swarm the hills around *um&la and preparing to head south.? The 7olonel pointed on the Map placed on a table in font of him. Ma!or #atel nodded 1uietly as the 7hinese plan of action started to become clear to him, and the room temperature !ust kept falling lower as far as he was concerned. That5s when he decided that it was enough strategy, and that it was time to be a foot soldier again. %ir, what are my ordersI? Ma!or, your men will reinforce the current battalions here, seeing that they are depleted in any case, but you won5t be with them. /e have a smaller tactical problem on our hands and 0 want you on that !ob. )ere, as you can see, our current positions along #hase line ,lpha are along this set of hills running east to west. North of them is the set of hills of a similar height but placed some distance to the north. This hill here, on grid position 9elta&6ima&%ix&-ive is so far unoccupied by us. That needs to change. -rom this position the 7hinese recon teams can look south at our positions and determine our strength and weaknesses before their main force launches an assault. /hen we burned out 3ast )ill, the main 7hinese force bearing down on you was decimated, but the smaller recon teams had already escaped the kill Aone and proceeded south. They are continuing to do so but we no longer have the assets to keep an eye on them. Needless to say, once they get to this ridge, they will begin !otting down all details. To avoid this, we are sending out a company level infantry force from +R9 *attalion to take over and hold these hills. Gou know the men from + *,T. 0 want you to lead with that force. Gour experience is wasted here at the moment. Gou are to move with this force as the commander and hold that hill until the main 7hinese force arrives. Then you pull back to our lines and we will begin hitting the 7hinese when they come over these ridgelines and into our line of fire. Thereafter your force will fold back into our main positions here and help as hold out.? That concluded the briefing as far Ma!or #atel was concerned and he walked out of the tent after saluting the 7olonel. )e had been told where to find the +R9 *attalion positions where his new force was waiting for him. , young officer passing by pointed it out to him. it was a good distance away. ,nd there was no time to waste. Ma!or #atel walked over to his men waiting outside to brief them on the situation and then decided that he better get moving to his new temporary command on that slope on the east. The slopes never seem so high until you start climbing them, and Ma!or #atel was already cursing that one cigarette he had had as his breathlessness increased within seconds. )e thought about his new mission as he began running

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towards the +R9 *,T positions. )is task was simple, he reflected. All ) ha$e to do is take a hill and hold it against the charging /hinese hordes. Thats all. =o big dealwhat could be si&'ler? ,a&n.

OPERATION PIVOT HAMMER

THE HIMALAYAN RAN"E AROUND PEAK NANDA DEVI THE INDO)TIBETAN BORDER 00&' HRS FRIDAY The first five 0ndian aircraft to cross back into Tibet after a whole twelve hours of waiting were four of the %2& +(M:0s and a single 360NT *&;(; of the ,R7. The 3/ crew were the same from the #0 "T&%TR0:3 "perations, and the bird was the same as well, but all were under different call signs now. This had been developed to manage the large fleets of aircraft of the 7,7 and the 3,7 in control. 3specially from the #halcon controller5s point of view. /ith these many aircrafts flying around, they were having a harrowing time trying to parcel them off to different strike packages. 0t had been decided from the first day itself to fix the call&signs of different flights based on the operation they were part of, followed by the regular call&sign attached. Therefore, all #0 "T&),MM3R aircrafts had the prefix8 4),MM3R5 attached to their call signs for ease of control. "peration #0 "T&),MM3R was under control of the 7,7 and the command and control chain ultimately ended there, but that strategic control. The Tactical control was under the Mission commanders on board the two #halcon ,/,7% flying on the eastern and western borders of Nepal, inside and above 0ndian Territory. Their call sign was ),MM3R&)3,9&"N3 and T/". They would not be venturing anywhere over 7hinese territory for the time being, the 7hinese ,ir 9efence 3nvironment there still being deadly. /ith the geography in mind, this meant that they were still south of the main )imalayan peaks and therefore had restricted coverage of the 7hinese airspace. This meant that the first waves of 0ndian air superiority fighters would be flying using their own surveillance systems. That could be lethal, especially since the 7hinese were flying a single :B&.(( ,3/ aircraft, a smaller version of the :B&.((( type aircraft fitted with side&looking radar and mounted on a smaller aircraft, and several 360NT G&C variants over Tibet at the moment. ,nd despite their dubious radars, they were still capable of spotting anything the siAe of a %2&+( coming over from the south and vectoring their own interceptors to engage. To ease the burden, the ,R7 *&;(; was to cross over behind the %2&+(M:0s for electronic and communications warfare support. 0n addition, they had on board a couple of controllers to provide local control of the 0ndian aircraft that were beyond the coverage of the #halcon to the south. They would help gather that crucial ultra long&range tactical air intelligence about incoming threat while also evaluating the capabilities of the 7hinese ,3/ radars for 3/ purposes in the near future. This crew was flying with the call sign of ),MM3R&7,66. The chain did not start or end here. *ehind the #halcon were the three 06&;C 0n&flight Tankers flying strike& support missions and ahead of all these aircraft and at the sharp end of the two three hundred kilometres spear were the four crews of the %2&+(M:0s, flying under the call signs of ),MM3R&,6#),. There were eight more %2&+(M:0s flying !ust south of the border near the )imalayan peaks of Nanda 9evi who were waiting for the order to deploy north when the appropriate time came. Till that time, they were to fly 7,# missions for the delicate %upport elements against any threats. ),MM3R)3,9&T/" to the east also had twelve %2&+(M:0s under control, but they were all south of the border at this time. They had support from the ,R7 $ulfstream&000 360NT bird instead of a *&;(; due to a shortage of aircraft. They would have to manage with that for the moment, as there was very little that could be changed anyway even if they had wanted it to. ,gainst this hidden 0ndian threat to 7hinese airspace control over Tibet was a mixed force of twelve %2&.;s and %2&+(M::s flying with )&> Tanker support in groups of four aircraft each, and another twelve B&C00 aircrafts flying close escort to their ,3/ and the G&C aircrafts. Their flight patterns had indicated their strict control by the #6,,- ,3/ controllers. 0t was as if they were dogs tied to a leash, moving around only as far as the leash extended. That would have to be around half of the 7hinese ,3/ coverage, seeing that the 7hinese would want to watch what5s coming towards them before moving fighters around. 7onsidering the effort and planning being displayed in the 3,7 theatre by the 7hinese, their utter lack of offensive

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operations in this sector apart from the abortive bomber attack of the previous day had been baffling the 0ndian 7,7 7ommanders for some time now. That was when the 90, had supplanted them with a theory based on %atellite imagery and communications intelligence. The answer had been infrastructure. The 7hinese had few airbases located within Tibet, primarily because of the lack of flat ground where there were roads and lack of roads at the few places where there was flat ground. The only few airbases were around the 6hasa region, where there actually were flat spaces and roadF a rare commodity indeed in Tibet. Most of these airbases were close to the 0ndian border and susceptible to attack, not unlike the *rahmos attack on the 7hinese airbase holding the airborne troops of the previous day under N"RT)&%/0#3 operations. ,s a result they were filled with aircraft that the 7hinese considered relatively expendable and those having short range only. These included mostly ground attack types and the B&C00 aircrafts. ,ll other 6ong range aircrafts like the 7hinese %ukhoi fleets were being staged from bases further away and thus needed Tanker support for missions that involved long durations like 7,# missions over Tibet. ,part from that, the 7hinese had a large fleet of tankers, but most of them were being sucked away to support the attacks in ,runachal #radesh. That left only a few tankers for the Tibet based operations, and even those were being drained from the bases located for support of operations against Taiwan, leaving that sector dangerously uncovered, making the Taiwanese very happy and whose ,mbassador was showing enthusiastic support for 0ndia and 1uietly thanking their stars. These Tankers obviously could not support a large fleet of long&range fighters for extended periods of time, and as such, the 7hinese aerial #resence over Tibet was sufficiently armed with sensors and airborne radars, but lacked the teeth to take on offensive operations simultaneously with the eastern sectors. 0t also made their defensive operations somewhat thinner than what they would have liked, and the 0ndian commanders were unlikely to fail to see that even if they were blindfolded ordered to look away. "n the other hand, most 0ndian airbases were literally placed next to the area of operations because 0ndia, unlike Tibet had a lot of plains and flat ground even up to the border itself. 0t was a recipe for disaster for the 7hinese, and something they had noticed as far back as in the '=>. war. *ut that was when the 0ndians had failed to take advantage. This time the 0ndian 7,7 commander had come calling on the 7hinese in Tibet, with 47hinese 7atastrophe5 written all over on his smile. The first four %2&+(M:0s flew west of the main )imalayan #eak known as Nanda 9evi, and crossed over into Tibet soon after. They were being closely followed by the *&;(;, which crossed behind them. This close to the Nepal border, the *&;(; crew was faced with some friendly, neutral and some unfriendly radar emissions. The friendly ones included the #halcon radar that was still tracking them, although it was getting increasingly intermittent as they moved beyond the )imalayan #eaks. The neutral ones included the Nepalese radars, of the 0ndra&00 design, given to them as military aid by the current government under the urging of the 9efence Minister. These began tracking the 0ndian aircrafts but unlike the last time, did not start pestering the flight crew for identification, instead choosing to remain 1uiet and stay out of what was happening. That was a graceful exit for them since they didn5t have anything to do about it in the first place. The unfriendly ones were the old radars near the town of :haleb south of the :ailas #eaks in Tibet. That was familiar territory too, as far as the ,R7 crew was concerned. They began interfering with it almost immediately, since all the information was available anyway, and the 7hinese on the ground began reliving that old horror again. This time, however, they had sorted out their comm&systems beforehand it wasn5t long before the five 0ndian aircraft were getting swept by the 7hinese ,3/ radars from very long range, and the passive systems on board the ,R7 aircraft were busy classifying and sorting them out under threat priorities. Then the real threat materialiAed as the ,R7 7ommunications intelligence e1uipment intercepted calls from the 7hinese airborne controller to their %2&.; comrades to move and engage on the given bearing. The 0ndian planners expected this, and that was what this small first incursion into Tibet was all about8 Ring the bells to call the person living inside to the doorHthen smash the door down on his face. The %2&+(M:0s began their movement to put themselves between the ,R7 aircraft and the incoming 7hinese %2&.;s. There were now four of the latter inbound on the 0ndians. The other two groups of %2&.;s were so far not being sent forward. That was the unexpected part. The 0ndian plan had been to bring them all south for a swift and smart engagement. %o they had to force the others into taking the bait. This meant that they had to stay over Tibet longer, and that meant that this first flight of %2&.;s had to be pushed aside.

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That was a slight deviation from the plan, but whoever would have expected it to work exactly would have been a fool anyway. ),MM3R&)3,9, this is ),MM3R&7,66. /e got four inbound suckers, but the rest are still waiting. $uess we will have to wait here a bit longer. 9o we permission to eliminate first bandit flightI "ver.? The mission controller aboard the ,R7 *&;(; called his superiors to the south. 7opy, ),MM3R&7,66. 9ivert ,6#), to eliminate the first *andit flight. 0 say again, ,6#), is weapons free. ,s for our 7hinese comradesHend their misery.?

THE HIMALAYAN PEAKS, TIBET

AIRSPACE NORTH OF THE INDO)TIBETAN BORDER 00'' HRS FRIDAY The Manasorowar and the Rakas 6ake pair is a huge water&mass present south of the :ailas #eaks in Tibet. ,nd given the general high altitude of the region, they are clearly visible from the air, especially if it is a clear day. 9uring the night, the water is a great black mass that reflects the moonlight and glitters. ,nd there is hardly a sound. The peace and silence is paramount. 0n all senses of the word, it is an awe&inspiring sight. This morning however, there the silence was broken by the sounds of man&made thunder as four 0ndian %ukhois suddenly dashed overhead and headed towards the north. The darkness was broken by the flashes of light from the four missiles that left the pylons of the aircraft and streaked across what was only seconds ago a starlit dark sky. No more. ,gainst the intensity of light present, the stars disappeared. ,nd the peace was gone, for there was a battle for air dominance being fought in the skies above. The R&;;s released by the 0ndian aircraft were being tracked by what the 0ndians were guessing to be four 7hinese %2&.;s. 0n fact, there were only three of them. The fourth was a %2&+(M::, acting as a local airborne control node for the group, connecting it with the 7hinese ,erial 0%R network, with the /%" acting as an airborne controller. *ut there was no way of knowing that at the moment from the 0ndian side, and as for the R&;;s, the seekers in their heads didn5t give a damn what its target was. %econds later the 7hinese volley materialiAed and the game of chicken began. The 7hinese would not have even known what was heading towards them and from where had it not been for the early warning handed out to them by their ,3/ aircrafts, and it was becoming clear to the 0ndian controllers that sooner or later they would have to be handled if the 7,7 was to secure any type of control over Tibet. Then there were the 7hinese ground based defences, and that was something to worry about too. 3ven though the radar&based systems were having their brains picked apart by the ,R7 *&;(;5s 3/ gear, the main threat was from the tiny heat seeking man portable systems that were literally littered to every single #6, unit in Tibet. ,nd although these weren5t nearly as advanced as their radar based counterparts, the density of these systems was massive, as had been made clear to the unfortunate 0ndian Baguar #ilot whose aircraft had been shot down over :haleb the day before during the #0 "T&%TR0:3 operations. 0t was something that was reminded again when the four 0ndian %2&+(M:0s began taking evasive manoeuvres and were forced to enter the lower altitude Aones where the might of the 7hinese numerical superiority was shown in all its glory. The 0ndian pilots pulled level a thousand feet over the ground while travelling on afterburner and left clouds of chaff behind as they attempted to evade the inbound * R missiles. )ere the terrain helped, and for both sides too. ,s soon as the aircrafts dived low in between the peaks, the missile locks were irrevocably lost in most cases, and both sides knew that. )owever, as soon as they did that, they also lost control of their own missiles, and that would make the entire mission a wasted exercise. Thus both sides had continued to guide their missiles by not pulling out until the very last minute. ,nd when the finally did break level flight, each had a few seconds left before high explosive warheads would slam into their aircrafts, and that was universally undesirable. -or the 0ndian side, the threat was worse because as soon as the dived to escape, they entered the threat Aone for the ground based point defences. *ut there was hardly a choice. 0t was a 1uestion of being in between a rock and a hard place. The %2&+(M:0s dived low and began weaving among the peaks and soon lost track of their own missiles. ,t the same time their R/Rs silenced down, thus suggesting that they had also broken contact with the inbound missiles. That was when small orange flashes and streaks of tracers flying upwards punctuated the dark sky outside their cockpits. Then there was that dreaded sight of a small trail of smoke coming upwards

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from the ground. Then there were more, and then still more. The 0ndian crews reciprocated by dumping loads of flares and chaff out behind them, and the skies were soon full of fireworks all around. "ne 0ndian %ukhoi took several tracer hits in the engine area and thick black smoke began pouring out of its port engine at the same time as when the cockpit warning lights started flashing. The pilot instinctively pulled up and came over the hilltops and into the open to escape out of the hornet5s nest below. )e was relieved to see the orange and yellow fireworks being left below and began concentrating on containing the engine crisis. -irst thing he did was to check the skies for danger. )e spotted the friendly *&;(; to his far south immediately, and otherwise his radar spotted nothing. There were none of the 7hinese %2&.;s around. )e began sheparding his aircraft southwards and towards the 0ndian border, turning his back towards the northern hills from where a single %2&.; came upwards too, after having evaded the last of the R&;;s and the only one from his group to have done so. )e also started to check the skies and found only a single %2& +(M:0 flying south at slow speed, obviously crippled from the ground defences and an undefended 0ndian 360NT aircraft. 0t was a target set that he had been wishing for all along. )e immediately let loose a radar directed missile at the fleeing %2&+(M:0 and then lighted his afterburners to bring the *&;(; in range as well. Then fate shifted hands yet again as the remaining three 0ndian %2&+(M:0s pulled up form low altitude on command of the group commander and suddenly came into the skies above, and both sides were surprised at the sudden sight of each other. That was when things started happening fast. The 7hinese missile was already in the air and heading towards the crippled %2&+(M:0. Then two of the other 0ndian aircrafts let loose a couple of missiles in a snapshot against the lone 7hinese %2&.;. The 7hinese pilot himself was too stunned at the sudden appearance of the enemy that he took that crucial couple of seconds longer to take his own shots. This is the kind of situation where training kicks in, and where technology takes a backseat against trained and honed instinct. ,nd the lack thereof in the 7hinese pilot was his undoing. The two 0ndian missiles slammed into his aircraft two seconds later, and the aircraft was destroyed immediately into small fragments in a bone !arring explosion and which threw the burning debris falling down over the :ialas Mountains. *ut his efforts were not in vain as his missile hit its target and detonated !ust behind the crippled 0ndian %2&+(M:0 and sent it earthwards in a flaming fireball of twisted metal and flames. The pilot and the /%" e!ected out safely before they were hit and their parachutes opened safely as they drifted downwards. Their aircraft splashed into the cold waters of the Rakas 6ake near its southern edge, where the cold water of the lake doused out the flames and sent the aircraft to its watery grave at the bottom. The e!ected crew drifted southeastwards under the prevailing wind conditions and landed on the northern face of the $urla Mandhata #eak that was a good fifteen kilometres from the nearest point of safety beyond the 7hina& Nepal border. 0n the skies above, the remaining three %2&+(M:0s were flying around, making sure the skies were clear and ensuring that the 7hinese ,3/ crew knew who had won and who had been defeated. 0t wasn5t long before the remaining eight %2&.;s were being directed towards the area by the furious 7hinese controllers and commanders. That was when the main 0ndian %ukhoi force of eight %2&+(M:0s, flying south of the border was directed to fly northwards while the remaining three ,6#), aircrafts and the single ),MM3R& 7,66 aircraft were directed to head south in a feigned retreat. /ith the 7hinese finally answering the doorbell with all their aircrafts and sending them southwest, the main ob!ective of #0 "T&),MM3R was being realiAed, and ),MM3R&)3,9&T/" was ordered into action. /ith the 7hinese attempting to regain control of the skies above southwestern Tibet from the 0ndian ,ir -orce, the southern sectors north and slightly west of %ikkim were being drained of the %2&.; cover. The 7hinese ,3/ controllers had unwittingly signed their own death warrants.

INDIAN CENTRAL AIR COMMAND $CAC%

CAC C#I AND PIVOT)HAMMER CONTROL INDIA 010' HRS FRIDAY The four 0ndian aircraft over the Manasarowar and Rakas lakes were now forming up back into formation

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even as the flight of eight %2&.;s was bearing down upon them from the direction of east&by&north. The ,R7 bird was inching slowly towards the south and the three %2&+(M:0s were flying to the northeast of it to make sure nobody began messing with it. The idea here was to get the 7hinese to commit their entire force of eight %2&.;s from the east for #0 "T&),MM3R to work. That meant that they couldn5t !ust leave the area immediately and move to the safe Aones to the south. They had to stay here and wait for the reinforcements to catch up. 3ight %2&+(M:0s that were flying south of the )imalayan peaks were now to be sent north as soon as the confirmation was received from the ,R7 crews that the 7hinese had taken the bait. The 7hinese were smart too. They knew that the four 0ndian aircraft on their radar screens could not be alone. %o, something was wrong. as a result, they were staying !ust out of reach of the missiles of the three 0ndian %2&+(M:0s and were refusing to commit entirely. *efore they did that they wanted to be sure that this was not some diversionary trick, that it was not designed to pull them away from some other sector where the main attacks would come. 0n doing this, they had deliberately handed over the air superiority over the twin lakes sector to the 0ndians. They were playing their cards very carefully. They knew that the three 0ndian %2&+(M:0s could not undertake heavy handed "7, missions and still be able to take heavy ground strikes in the same mission. ,nd the 7hinese had no such crucial target in the sector that could be taken out and leave the 7hinese forces crippledHexcept maybe that highway that ran east to west and connected the capital of western Tibet with 6hasaH To the 0ndian 7,7 %taff officers, viewing the data coming in, the indecision at the 7hinese command level regarding the allocation of the eight fighters to this sector was clear as sunlight. The 7hinese weren5t able to make up their mind. That was when the 0ndian 7,7 7ommander decided to make up the mind for them. )e picked up a phone and gave the order for the Baguar flights to move north from their orbiting positions north of the 0ndian airfield codenamed Bolly&$rant, !ust south of the )imalayan peaks and head towards their targets along a large section of the 7hinese National highway in the region that was host to the massive #6, logistical movements towards the ,ksai 7hin region for the past two days. 0f the 7hinese didn5t think that that was a crucial enough target to hold on to or challenge for, then they might as well !ust tell the #6, in the region to put white flags over their vehicles and trucks moving along that road, because the Baguar pilots weren5t going to show any mercy once they were over their targets. Not after having lost one of their own to 7hinese ground&fire over :haleb the day before.

INDIAN PHALCON AWACS AIRCRAFT CALL SI"N: HAMMERHEAD ONE AIRSPACE SOUTH OF THE INDO)TIBETAN BORDER 011' HRS FRIDAY $R"2N9&),MM3R&"N3 through T)R33, weapons freeL 0 say again, you are weapons freeL ,ll flights8 )ead to targets. %witch to ),MM3R&7,66 for airborne control. 7onfirm "rder. "ver.? The replies were 1uick and professional. $R"2N9&),MM3R&"N3. Roger. #roceeding to target. "ver and "ut.? T/". #roceeding.? This is T)R33&leader. 7opy. #roceeding. ? and then the RET became silent again. /ith that the three flights of four Baguars each began their movement to the north from over Bolly $rant towards their different targets over the Tibetan plains south of the :ailas Mountains. %ome of the crew had been here before, as part of the #0 "T&%TR0:3 operations, and vividly remembered their experiences. ,nd this they had shared with all the others. They had made a mistake once. They wouldn5t be doing it again. The 0ndian pilots weren5t the only ones revisiting and reliving an experience. The 7hinese ground radar controllers around the city of :haleb were doing the same thing. /hen the ,R7 bird had begun their !amming of the ground radars like before, they had known what was coming. The last time the strikes had targeted the infrastructure within the city of :haleb. This time, it was to hit the regions outside of the city. Three aircrafts in each flight were armed with the regular mix of ground attack weapons including dumb bombs and cluster munitions. The fourth aircraft in each flight was the two seated version and was carrying 6aser guided bombs for the targets involving bridges. , single pair in only one of the flights was armed with

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a particularly suitable mix of anti&radiation missiles and cluster bombs. The 7hinese radar operators at the radar station near khaleb had survived the attempt on their life by two !aguars during the #0 "T&%TR0:3 missions. *ut that attack had gone wrong right from the beginning because the 0ndian planners had miscalculated the level of defences in the area for a low&level flight&profile based attack. This time they had meticulously plotted out every single enemy radar and anti&air threat in the region of the targets for the Baguar crews. The orders given to the two crews of the 0ndian Baguars were simple8 the 7hinese ground radars near :haleb were to be hit hard. They were to be hit fast. ,nd their crews were not to be allowed to see the sun came up over the mountains of Tibet this morningH

THE HI"HWAY WEST OF KHALEB THE TIBETAN PLAINS NORTH OF THE INDO)TIBETAN BORDER 01&' HRS FRIDAY The road was filled with large convoys of trucks moving in a single file throughout the region. The sun had not some as of yet, and yet the convoys were slowly moving in the dark without their headlights on. ,ll sorts of vehicles were on the road. ,nd although most of these were trucks and other soft skinned vehicles of similar types, there were also smaller convoys of tanks moving along the road. The skies above were fully dark, and the stars were not visible. There was also partial cloud cover here, partly blocking out the moonlight but still allowing certain amount of visibility. The Tibetan plains were teeming with 7hinese military vehicles and the sounds of the man made diesel engines were filling the roads. ,long this section of the highway, the movement was simple enough, and on both sides of the road were vast flat areas that were giving extremely good coverage to the single 7hinese short&range mobile radar van parked half a kilometre away from the road. This van was being accompanied by three trailers that were serving the purpose of command centres for the local section of the air defence network. )alf a kilometre on the other side of the road were the three %,M launchers parked, camouflaged and facing southwards. ,nd on the road between these small outposts were the continuous streams of trucks heading east to west towards the ,ksai 7hin region. *ecause of the flat region here, the truck drivers driving their vehicles on the road could see both these posts on either side of the road. ,t the moment, all the truck drivers going by were getting increasingly nervous about their safety as they saw hectic activity near the radar van and the trailers as men were running around from one vehicle to another. They could see little activity near the camouflaged missile launchers so that they were somewhat certain that they were not under immediate attack. Their fears were not un!ustified. *ecause of the single length of this highway through the region, nearly all the vehicles that were passing by along this section of the road had at some time passed the section of the road near :haleb to the east that had come under the heavy 0ndian air attacks during the previous day. ,lthough the damage to the roads there had been repaired, the burnt out hulks of half a doAen trucks and a couple of armoured vehicles were still littered on the sides of the road, providing a graphic image of war to the 7hinese soldiers who passed by. ,ll had heard the details of the events of the previous day, and had heard rumours that their radars had been blinded by the 0ndians somehow. -ear is contagious, and although no 7hinese would ever admit to it to his officer, the hectic scenes at the radar centre were not very positive signsH They passers by along the road could not have known that the radars they were seeing were indeed being !ammed. The ,R7 *&;(; crew flying to the southeast were doing all they could to ensure that the 7hinese missiles remained blind for as long as possible. ,nd the result was that the 7hinese had no idea what was coming at them. The movements of the trucks along the highway were continuing as fats as was normally possible even as the 7hinese commanders were screaming at their phones and trying to get their ,ir force ,3/ aircrafts to sort out the 0ndian aircrafts !amming their ground defence systems. 0t was a classic case of electronic

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warfare. The 7hinese commanders on the ground at the radar stations were not aware of the events unfolding in the sky except that 0ndian fighters were above Tibet. ,nd even this information was based solely on the data available to them before their own systems went down due to the 0ndian !amming efforts. The 7hinese ,3/ crews were able to see the threat to the ground forces emerging from across the )imalayan peaks but could not guide the missiles from the ground by themselves. That had to be done by the ground radars, and these were being !ammed. The only way forward for the 7hinese was to eliminate the handful of 0ndian fighters and that 3/ bird before they could bring their local ground based defences back online. To do this, they would have to commit their eight %2&.;s to the fight, and that was what the 0ndian 7,7 commander was expecting the 7hinese to do. 2nfortunately, the 7hinese could not make up their mind in time to change the events on the ground, and the result was immediately made clear to the 7hinese soldiers on the ground. The darkness of the night within the Tibetan plains was shattered as a bright orange flash erupted and announced the death of the 7hinese ground radar vans and the trailer vehicles at the hands of a single ,nti&radiation missile launched by a %3,9 optimiAed Baguar. Then there was the shockwave and the noise, sending the thunder across the highway and bringing convoys to a stop as the 7hinese soldiers !umped out of their vehicles and began running away from the road. The first explosion had been somewhat small, and some of the trailers, parked a good distance apart from the main centre, were still relatively intact. The worst part of the sudden attack was that the 7hinese on the ground had no visual of the attackers. There were no 0ndian aircraft above them in the dark moonlit sky, and for a second it seemed to all that it was over. The small explosion of the radar van had turned it into a column of thick black smoke heading for the sky, with flames leaping into the air. 3verybody on the road was hectically scanning the sky above them for a sight of the attackers. ,fter a few seconds a dark entity streaked across the sky and headed northwards without making a sound. *efore the soldiers on the ground could respond, the area where the remaining trailer vans were parked suddenly shuddered with what seemed like firecrackers going off before a smoke and dust cloud enveloped everything. Then came the sound of the thunder of the aircraft engines. This first pass had been made in a very high speed dash by the Baguar crew for reasons of safety against the 7hinese defences. Then another Baguar streaked across the sky at somewhat slower speeds and dropped a load of 9umb *ombs on the three %,M launchers while continuing to head northwards. Then two more aircrafts of the same flight came across from the east and were heading to the wets directly over the road at low level. ,ll the 7hinese soldiers realiAed this for what it was and began to scramble away from their vehicles and the road even as the two aircraft screamed over in low and level profiles and left a whole line of fireballs racing for the sky as the Napalm they had dropped set everything on fire. The number of vehicles carrying ammunition made things worse and sent additional sympathetic explosions ripping the vehicles around and tossing them doAens of feet into the air. *y the time the napalm flames were turning into thick smoke, the two %3,9 Baguars that had streaked to the north came from that side heading to the south. They dropped their remaining ordinance of 7luster munitions on a section of the road further to the west in a single pass before dashing to the south, leaving the 7hinese to see the effects of their attacks in all their glory. 3ven as doAens of vehicles were burning furiously on the road and thick black columns of smoke were filling the sky, the 7hinese convoys were beginning to move once again. , 7hinese Ma!or was standing a few hundred metres away from the road and organiAing his men to get the surviving vehicles of the convoy to bypass the destroyed vehicles and begin moving westwards. )e ordered a radioman to set up his e1uipment and got hold of his commanders to let them know about the attack on the convoys. )e was told to stop and wait for further instructions.

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The seemed to be total chaos at the 7hinese 6ogistical 7oordination centre for this region of Tibet. )e knew he couldn5t !ust stop here and wait for death to come to him, so he attempted to clarify his orders from his superiors. /hile he shouted into the radio speaker over the noise of the raging fires and the vehicle engines, he felt the tremors beneath his feet and then heard the muffled thunders. )e didn5t know where they were coming from but as he looked to the east towards the direction of :haleb where he could see the horiAon was lit up with an orange glowH The 7hinese Ma!or immediately understood why his commanders were in chaos. The main supply route from this region to 6hasa in the east and the ,ksai 7hin in the west had been severely hit and damaged. )e realiAed that there was no point arguing for any orders at the moment. ,s he handed the receiver back to his radio operator, he was !oined by some !unior officers as they all stared in desolation at that orange glow that was coming from the east.
"n board #,TR0"T&3,$63, the 9efence Minister was handed over the news by the 7,% and his reaction, in stark contrast to the 7hinese one, was to slam his fist on the table in !ubilation.

AIRSPACE ABOVE THE TIBETAN PLAINS NORTH OF THE INDO)TIBETAN BORDER 0*10 HRS FRIDAY The small group of 0ndian %ukhois and the single 3/ bird had been loitering over the Tibetan plains for a long time now, and so had their 7hinese comrades, flying their %2&.;s. 3ach was gaAing at the other from long range, waiting for one to flinch. 0t was beginning to appear as if both sides would soon have to back off to conduct in&flight refueling before resuming their standoff. *ut the 0ndian 7,7 7ommander had forced his 7hinese counterpart to show his hand and make a move with his order to launch the Baguar attacks against targets along the strategic highway from 6hasa to western Tibet. ,s far as the Baguar pilot5s accounts had been put together, the attack had been a great success. Not a single fighter had been lost to ground fire, except for large numbers of bullet&holes on a couple of aircraft that were now limping back across the border into 0ndia to the south. To balance that out was the complete halt of all convoys attempting to move east from 6hasa, at least for the moment. 9oAens of 7hinese military vehicles had been left on fire. Most of their radars had been taken out completely, and many of their anti&aircraft missile launchers were now nothing more than twisted pieces of metal. The skies over the region around the :ailas mountain range in the Tibetan plains was now open for high level bombing by Mirages using laser guided weapons. That was planned for later. The battle for air superiority was not yet over. The only Mirages that were flying at the moment were either flying 7,# or were being armed for ,ir defence missions, while the -lankers were taking the brunt of the #enetration missions over Tibet. , single 0ndian %ukhoi&+( had been lost over the Manasarowar 6ake in exchange for a 1uadruple of 7hinese %2&.;s. The 7hinese commanders simply could not afford to ignore their ground situation in this critical border Aone if they had any intentions of winning the war in the region. ,nd as per the prediction of the 0ndian 7,7 commander, the eight 7hinese %2&.;s were detected spreading out, forming a line east to west and north of the location of the 0ndian fighters, and then heading south for combat.

ARC B),0, OVER TIBET, CALL)SI"N: HAMMER)CALL AIRSPACE ABOVE THE TIBETAN PLAINS 0*1* HRS FRIDAY 0nboundHinboundHwe have inbound bandits. )eading Aero&three&five, relative. ,ngels thirty. 0 say again, we have inbound 7hinese fighters. ,ll eight of them. They will attain range for extreme

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missile shot in ten minutes for the forward&most escortsH? one of the 7ontrollers on board the *& ;(; was shouting out over the collective chattering of the other controllers even as the mission commanders on board were trying to get things 1uickly organiAed, !ust as they had practiced. The senior officer switched fre1uencies and got in touch with ),MM3R)3,9&"N3, the #halcon bird flying !ust south of the )imalayan peaks that bordered the Tibetan plains. ),MM3R&)3,9&"N3, this is ),MM3R&7,66. /e confirm eight inbound bandits converging from the north. They have to be the eight %ierra&2niforms we had been looking out for. /e also detect renewed and intense chatter between the 7hinese ,3/ *irds and the fighters. 6ooks like they are guiding their fighters on to us. Re1uest permission to move out. "ver. ? the ,R7 7ommander spoke into his headset transmitter. The response was 1uick. Roger, ),MM3R&7,66. /e confirm inbound bandits. %tand by to receive authoriAation to pull out...?

PHALCON AWACS, CALL)SI"N: HAMMER)HEAD)ONE AIRSPACE ABOVE THE HIMALAYAN PEAKS 0*1# HRS FRIDAY ),MM3R&7"NTR"6, this is ),MM3R&)3,9&"N3 actual. ),MM3R&7,66 has detected intensive communications between the 7hinese ,3/ *irds and their -ighters. /e confirm eight %ierra&2niform inbound. 6ooks like they have taken the bait. ),MM3R&7,66 re1uests permission to take evasive action. Re1uesting authoriAation to put phase one&alpha into motion. "ver.? The Mission commander aboard the #halcon aircraft said into his communications link with 7,7 head1uarters. This time the 7,7 commander himself was on the line to his men on board the long aerial chain extending from his command centre all the way over the )imalayas and into Tibet. Roger, )3,9&"N3. /e confirm your last. ,uthoriAe ),MM3R&7,66 to hold position as long as it is safe to do so. /e don5t want the 7hinese to realiAe what they are stepping into by pulling out prematurely. ,uthoriAe all fighters to standby for action. /hen you know for sure that the 7hinese cannot de&commit, take them out. "ver and out.? The link went dead soon after the message, leaving the Mission commander on board the #halcon with his thoughts. )e was now the overall commander for this operation, and success or failure, it was all in his hands now. )is response further down the chain was as 1uick and determined as the 7,7 7ommander5s had been confident. ),MM3R&7,66, this is )3,9&"N3 actual. 9o you have confirmation that the bait has been swallowedI? 7onfirmed, )3,9&"N3. /e have definite confirmation based on 7omm&intel that the 7hinese are now committed to this battle. ,nd if we don5t pull out now, we are going to be that physical bait that is usually eaten by the fish. /e need to get the hell out of here nowL? The reply that everybody on board the three fighters and the single lumbering airliner over Tibet were dying to hear was delayed by a few seconds as the final thoughts firmed up in the minds of the "perations commander on board the #halcon. ,nd there it was8 ),MM3R&7,66, your orders are to pull back immediately. 9irect your escorts to pull back as well. Move as planned. 0ts time to finish this thing once and for all.? The changed fre1uencies, and spoke to another group of aircraft that had been flying along side for some time now. These were the eight %2&+(M:0s that had been loitering !ust out range of the

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7hinese ,3/ aircrafts, and were south of the 0ndian airfield codenamed Bolly&$rant at the foothills of the )imalayas on the 0ndian side. The call sign for these fighters was "M3$,. The current plan called for these eight aircraft to now move north as the four exhausted fighters over Tibet headed south, pulling the eight 7hinese %2&.;s behind them. "nce they were in range, these eight 0ndian fighters would pounce on the 7hinese in the skies above the :ailas Mountains. The whole idea was for the 7hinese fighters to be totally committed to this fight. 0f these 0ndian aircraft pulled north prematurely, the 7hinese pilots might abort and pull back north, thus !eopardiAing the other part of the operation. They had to be pulled all the way south from where they could not pull back. ,nd timing was all that mattered.
"M3$, flight, this is )3,9&"N3 actual. The bandits are committed. /e have four friendlies southbound. /ill advise when they are clear. Gou are authoriAed to revert to your way points and move out. 0 say again, move out immediately. Gour targets are eight 7hinese %ukhoi&twenty&sevens, southbound at angels thirty. Gou are weapons free. 0 say again, you are weapons free. 3ngage and destroy. 3xecuteH executeH.executeL?

THE TIBETAN PLAINS

AIRSPACE ABOVE THE PLATEAU 0**' HRS FRIDAY The four 0ndian aircraft were now pulling south at full speed. The !aguars had !ust crossed over into 0ndian airspace and were now in the clear, being protected by the Mirage&.(((s flying #atrols !ust south of the peaks. The 7hinese %2&.;s were converging 1uickly, and the three 0ndian %2&+(s protecting the ,R7 *& ;(; were being constrained by the speed of the latter. 3ven so, this had been planned out beforehand. The distances between these fighters and the ,R7 bird had been kept so that they would cross the border to the south together, even with the speed difference between the two groups. 3ven so, the 0ndian fighter crews were wary of the threat that was now at their six positions. To make sure that the things were as they were supposed to be, the flight leader of the fighters had his aircrafts do a loop behind to the north after every few minutes to make sure that the 7hinese didn5t sneak up on them. 0n all possibility, the three 0ndian fighters here could have taken on the 7hinese by themselves, but that bore the risk that they would take casualties, or worse, be wiped out and leave the ,R7 aircraft unprotected to the surviving 7hinese aircrafts. Three against eight was not a good number ration in combat, no matter what the 1uality advantages are. %o they were to keep pace with their support bird and leave the hunting to the eight aircraft that were now streaking over the )imalayan ranges around the Nanda 9evi #eak and heading north. To the south, the eight 0ndian aircrafts were scanning the skies to the north. They were taking the feed from the #halcon bird and knew what was in front of them. )owever, all their radars were on standby only. No emissions were to be sent out at this time. Their R/Rs were clear all the way from the south up till the time they cleared the )imalayan peaks and entered Tibet. Then everything lighted up on their threat receivers, though not to the extent that they had thought. The Baguar attacks on the 7hinese radars had taken its toll. The threat receivers on board the 0ndian %ukhois were showing minimal ground radar activity. This was in stark contrast to the air activity. The 7hinese ,3/ aircrafts flying to the north had detected them the moment they had cleared the hills to the south. ,nd this meant that the 7hinese %2&.;s were aware of this intrusion as well. 5h, wellthey were bound to disco$er it so&eti&e, &ight as well be nowthe "M3$, $roup commander thought. That was when he decided that radio silence was no longer that great a priority. )3,9&"N3, this is "M3$, 6eader. /e are lit up across the board here. The 7ommie ,3/ has us. Minimal 7hinese ground activity. $ive our thanks to the Bag crews. They did a good !ob here. /e detect inbound bandits at twelve. #reparing to engage. "ver and out.? The flight leader 1uickly gave the command to his fighters to prepare for * R combat. /eapons were checked electronically, selected and readied. ,nd then it began. The eight 0ndian fighters released their R&;;s moments before the 7hinese did the same to the north. This first shot was being taken at the extreme range for both the sides in this battle. ,nd as a result, the chances of hitting all targets were sketchy at best. 3ven so, it was a good way to destroy the cohesiveness of the

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attacking force and sending battles into individual playing fields. The 0ndian #ilots depressed the button on their control stick and this punched off the R&;; round on the port side inner wing hard&point and dropped it below for several feet before the thrust of the missile kicked in, sending it ahead and slightly upwards of the launching aircrafts, giving the pilots a very good view of the missiles as they headed north. The pilots were using N $s and were clearly able to see the smoking trail of the missile as it headed over the horiAon, lurching towards a target more than a hundred kilometres away. 0t was a good night to see the threat approaching from far away. The cloud cover was below the aircraft altitudes, and the sun had not come up as of yet to ruin the effectiveness of the low&light goggles that the pilots were using to scan the skies around. -urthermore, the moonlight was !ust enough to ensure optimum range of the light intensification devices. 0t wasn5t long before the 7hinese response showed up on radar and then soon after was within visual range !ust at the edge of the horiAon. The second crew members behind the pilot in the 0ndian aircrafts were busy trying to come up with countermeasures for the incoming salvo. 3ven so, the pilots knew that the time was coming for them to break off and leave their own missiles on their own. The flight leader waited as much as he dared, until he could wait no longer8 "M3$, 6eader to all "M3$, unitsL *reak on my markHnowL $oL? the leader pulled his control stick to the right until his aircraft was upside down, and then pulled back at the stick, pulled his aircraft in an inverted dive and pull out, thus reversing his course by a full 'C( degrees and increasing the distance between him and the missile that was after his life. The other seven aircrafts followed, and so did the missiles soon after. ,ll contact was lost with their own missiles, or what the 7hinese were doing. 0n effect, the situational awareness was gone, and would only be restored after the pilots had recovered from their individual fights for survival. The group commander was now diving lower and lower between the peaks, hoping to put some natural barriers between him and the missile behind him. )e further muddled up the overall picture for the seeker of the missile by dumping out loads of chaff behind him. The ground below was beginning to light up with tracers flying all around, and even small arms fire was heading into the sly as the 7hinese soldiers stuck in the traffic !am left behind by the !aguars were firing everything from heavy machineguns to even small arms into the sky towards the 0ndian fighters screaming over their heads. 0n all the excitement and the light show in front of him, the "M3$, leader 1uickly realiAed that he had lost the missile behind him. )is relief lasted only as long as a second before a massive fireball exploded in the sky to his far left, signalling that one of his colleague had not been so lucky. The fireball vanished 1uickly and as shock began to come over the leader over the loss of a friendly fighter, he was also brought back into reality by the shuddering of his aircraft and the alarm lights flashing in his cockpit. )e had flown over some radar directed guns that the Baguars had missed during their attacks. The leader instinctively pulled up to get above the range of the 7hinese guns on the ground even as the aircraft began to !itter violently. Red lights were flashing continuously now, and the aircraft was losing power. "ne engine had already died after ingesting metal shards from the anti&aircraft explosions around the aircraft, leading to total failure of the compressor blades and hence the pressure. The combustion chamber was still being fed with fuel that was now being ignited and without producing power. The turbines were gone as well, and flames were leaping out of the noAAles at the rear of the aircraft. This the pilot resolved by cutting the fuel to that engine, thus bringing the flames under control. *ut there were more problems. The aircraft control surfaces were gone, and the canopy was cracked at several places. The pilot brought the aircraft to a southerly heading after massive struggling. There was no way he could land this aircraft. )e had to e!ect, but that should preferably be south of the )imalayan peaks that were now before him. )e checked around. )is second crew&member was not responding after repeated calls, but there was no way for the pilot to see behind him. 3ven under the desperate circumstances, he realiAed that he was in control of his flight group. )e called out on the radio for a situation report from his other pilots. "M3$, leader to all "M3$, 2nits. /ho was hitI "ver.? The static was replaced by a friendly voice. $ood to hear your voice, 6eader. -0 3 and %3 3N are down. %3 3N seemed to have e!ected. *ut

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-0 3H? *o that &ust ha$e been the %ireball ) saw,a&n it. ,a&n,a&n the leader replied after much self control. /hat about the commiesI "ver.? Two survivors out of the eight. )eading northwestL RepeatHheading northwest. The damn buggers are fleeing from the area. "ver.? ,nother %2&+( formed up with the limping aircraft of the leader and checked in. his voice was grave. "N3, 0 am looking at your aircraft right now. Gour /e%" is slumped. ,nd your aircraft took one hell of a beating, "N3. There is no way you will be able to land this aircraft in one piece. %uggest you bail out. "ver.? The response from the leader was immediate. Negative. 7annot leave my /e%" behind. )e cannot e!ect. The aircraft is flying for now. 0 am going to take it down south.? he changed fre1uencies. )3,9&"N3, this is "M3$, 6eader. /e have splashed six bandits. The remaining two are bugging out to the northwest. 0 have two losses and am currently declaring an emergency for "M3$,&"N3. %evere engine and control surfaces damage. )eading south. /hat are your instructions, overI? "M3$,&-60$)T, good work. 9o not pursue survivors. Recover aircraft and head south. -urther instructions en&route. "M3$,&"N3, we confirm emergency status. Recover to Bolly&$rant. $round facilities are on standby. $ood&luck. ),MM3R&)3,9&"N3 out.? The losses on the 0ndian side had been heavy. Two aircrafts had been shot down and another was on critical status. The 7hinese had lost six aircraft in return. *ut most importantly, their losses had meant that the way was now clear for the second phase of the operation. "n board the #halcon, the %enior Mission commander was now in touch with 7,7 command to let them know that the western phase of their "peration was now complete, and that the way for the eastern one was clear. 0t was not long before 7,7 command in turn was in contact with ,MM3R&)3,9&T/", flying near %ikkim, ordering the launch of #hase two of the #0 "T&),MM3R operations. There, the flights of %2&+(M:0s had !ust topped off their fuel from the two 06&;Cs flying in support when their call to action came in the form of a re1uest by the 7,7 7ommander to get him some 7hinese ,3/ scalps back from Tibet.

AIRSPACE OVER SOUTHERN SIKKIM

NEAR THE INDIAN)NEPAL BORDER 0*&' HRS FRIDAY The 7hinese 0%R network over /estern Tibet had lost most of its potent fighter cover with the loss of the six %u&.;s. The airspace was now relatively open even though twelve B&C00 local 9efence fighters were riding shotgun on the five specialiAed aircrafts and the four )&> Tankers. *ut for the number of support aircrafts to be protected, the fighter cover was not extensive even in the most optimistic scenario. *ut all 7hinese aircrafts were not in danger. The situation was being rectified. There was one :B&.(( ,/,7% aircraft flying that was the main control hub for the 7hinese aerial efforts in Tibet. 0t was the most exposed, as it had been drawn south during the engagement of the %2&.;s and now been left naked. /ith it were a G&C 37M aircraft that was now also exposed. The four )&> Tankers were now exposed as well. The only aircrafts not exposed were a single G&C 7+0 aircraft and another G&C 360NT bird that had been far to the north and were mover further north at the moment. The 7hinese situation was desperate. The twelve B&C00s were being organiAed into proper groups to protect the bigger and pricier aircrafts and crews. More were being scrambled from airbases near 6hasa and from the north. ,nd all of the above aircraft that were over Tibet were flying northwards and away from the 0ndian *order. *ut time was not on their side, as it never is for anyone who has fallen into an ambush. /hile the 7hinese ,irborne controllers were desperately shouting out for all the aircrafts they could assemble, the 0ndians were already in the air and nearby. Then there were other factors. The main frontline with Tibet and 0ndia gets broken up in between by a large chunk of border with Nepal. ,s a result, the frontline consists of an eastern Aone, near %ikkim and a western Aone, near 2ttar #radesh and )imachal #radesh and then northwards from there. -or the last two days the focus of the air war for Tibet had been inadvertently constrained to the southern parts of this western sector. 2ntil a small time ago, the focus of the two sides had indeed been on

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this sector. 2nknown to the 7hinese, however, the 0ndian focus had now shifted eastwards, whereF the second claw of the great trap that was "peration #0 "T&),MM3R was now swinging into action. 0n effect, while the 7hinese were focussing on getting their immediate, and available, air support between them and the 0ndian border to the south, they were also unwittingly exposing their east. To counter that fear was the fact that all B&Cs scrambling from near 6hasa would eventually plug that gap, and that it was only temporary. 0ndeed, two B&Cs were flying 7,# !ust north of the %ikkim border, albeit without support. 2nfortunately for the 7hinese efforts, the massive 0ndian %ukhoi and Mirage force that was waiting near %ikkim under ),MM3R&)3,9&T/" was like a big steam roller in the sky. The two B&Cs were no match, 1ualitatively, and for the first time for the 0ndians, 1uantitatively, to stop the 0ndians from going after the #6,,-5s priAed assets. The two unfortunate 7hinese B&C00 pilots never even knew what hit them. The 0ndian #halcon had brought the 0ndian fighters behind the 7hinese when they had been on their western leg of the patrol loop. They had been doing it for far too many times now and had become predictable. The 0ndian #halcon crews and hence the fighter crews had thus known where they were, what they were doing and, if technology had permitted, what they were thinking. 0t was an insult to even define it as a fight. The only indication that one of the two 7hinese pilots had that he was about to die was when his wingman5s aircraft blew up in a giant ball of fire as a Matra&Magic Missile slammed into it from the rear hemisphere. ,lthough his wingman never had a chance, this 7hinese pilot had enough time for his thought process to take him towards thinking about e!ection a full millisecond before a white light consumed his aircraft all around himH %plash Two. 0 say again, %plash two. /ay is clear. $ood luck ),MM3R&/"6-. ),MM3R&$"6- signing off. "ver and out.? The 0ndian #ilot sitting in the cockpit of his Mirage&.((( had !ust claimed the kill as his missiles had slammed into his targets within visual range. 0t had been so simple that it had been almost absurd for him and his men. *ut a kill is a kill is a kill. )e scanned and checked using his N $s that the other two Mirages flying with him were good as well before the flight broke off and headed back south towards the 0ndian border again. The 0ndian Mirage fleet was at the moment only supporting the 0ndian support birds by providing 7,#. "ccasionally though, they relished and were given, a chance, no matter how small, to go into 7hinese territory and claim a kill or two. This time, the honour had fallen to this flight of three Mirages of No. ' %1uadron to clear out a couple of targets and clear the way for the bigger %ukhois. ,s the Mirage&.(((s headed back to top off their tanks and resume their protection duties, the twelve strong 0ndian %2&+(M:0 fleet supported by a single ,R7 $ulf& stream 3/ aircraft began their !ourney towards the extremely vulnerable 7hinese 0%R aircrafts to the northwest. This flight would take them deep into china, and in all possibilities, they would have to fight their way out. *ut the targets were worth it and more. The 7hinese :B&.(( detected this threat approaching towards them from the southeast and directed all available B&C00s, twelve in all, towards the 0ndian aircrafts. -or the 7hinese 0%R aircrafts and their crews, this thin wall of defence was now all that stood between life and an afterlife that 7hairman Mao had told them did not exist. *y the time the 7hinese commanders had realiAed what had happened at the strategic level over Tibet, the 0ndian aircrafts were already thundering on full power and approaching their targets. 7ommanders from both sides, whether in the 0ndian 7,7 or the #6,,- 7hengdu Regional %upreme )ead1uarters, were now holding their breath. for the 0ndian side it was the apprehension to see a master&plan come to fruition within a window of opportunity that would never again be available. -or the 7hinese side it was the realiAation that for all their numerical superiority, war was about fighting intelligently. They had allowed themselves to fall into a trap of massive proportions due to variety of reasons. Much of it was not their fault, but if they lost control of the air over Tibet now, the firing s1uad facing them would not so understand. -or all the uncertainties of war, this much was certain to everybody involved8 the fate of the air&war over Tibet was about to be decided within the next hour...

HAMMER)WOLF FLI"HT $1*9 SU)#0MKI%

AIRSPACE OVER TIBET 0#1' HRS FRIDAY The twelve 0ndian aircrafts were now deep inside Tibet. Their general movement direction was to the northwest. They were getting regular updates on the 7hinese aircrafts in front of them via ),MM3R&

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)3,,9&"N3, not T/", as they had gone beyond the coverage of the latter and entered that of the former. Their targets were aligned roughly in a north to north&east straight line axis, with the four )&> Tankers to the northern end of the line and the :B&.(( and the G&C 37M aircrafts to the southern end. *ut that was of little concern to the 0ndian pilots. /hat was of concern was that twelve 7hinese B&C00 fighters were approaching towards them from multiple directions. This was something that the 0ndian flight commander had realiAed immediately after receiving their first update from the #halcon. 0t was indicative of something that could be taken advantage of. The B&C force protecting the 7hinese %upport birds over Tibet had not been expected to get into such a situation as far as the #6,,- had been concerned. They had been depending upon their highly capable %2& .;s to keep the 0,- 7,7 under check and only in the direst circumstances were the B&Cs to be surged forward. 0t was not to say that the 7hinese had not been expecting the 0,- to go after their %upport aircrafts over Tibet in the first place. 0t was !ust that the superiority of the 0ndian %2&+(M:0 over their %2&.;s had not been known until a short while ago. 0n the battles over ,runachal #radesh, the first such signs had come forward from the way that the 0ndian %ukhois had slashed through the 7hinese ones in large numbers. Now, over Tibet, this had been made utterly clear to the #6,,- )igh 7ommand. The 0ndian %ukhoi was more formidable than the 7hinese one. ,nd that changed things dramatically. The problem was, with long range * R action now becoming the norm for both sides, it had started to resemble the medieval battles where both armies massed in front of each other before launching volleys of arrows. ,ny army that was dispersed when facing the massed army, eventually lost. %uch had been the rules of the game as dictated by the technology of the day. %o it was here. The 0ndians were surging their %ukhois with a clear thought out plan. ,ll twelve aircrafts were in line abreast formation and charging on full afterburners now. The 7hinese were still recuperating and coming to terms with the situation. ,s a result, their plan was not a well organiAed one, rather a knee&!erk kind. 7onse1uently, the 7hinese force, divided into smaller groups of three each to protect the individual support groups, was the dispersed army. 0t was still trying to get together to form a wall between the 0ndians and the 7hinese support birds. This now allowed the 0ndian flight commander to engage the smaller group of his choice and thus utiliAe his four to one numerical advantage. 0t was a cold hearted plan, and everybody knew it, all the way to the 7,7 commander. *ut the 0ndian side didn5t give a damn about it. They had driven a knife up the 7hinese Tibetan air force, and now was the time to twist itH The first volley of twelve missiles from the 0ndians was launched in a small span of two seconds, and their targets were three of the southernmost 7hinese B&Cs. /ith each 7hinese aircraft being locked on by up to four 0ndian ,stra missiles, their escape options were limited at best. 0t didn5t take long for the missiles to find the targets and each of the first three B&Cs deteriorated under multiple impacts, literally being blown to smithereens over the cold skies of Tibet. Then the 0ndian side began mopping up the now folding 7hinese air defences by moving south to north, engaging the B&Cs as they came into range. 0t was a turkey shoot all the way. The next three 7hinese were sent to see their maker without much trouble, but the last six finally were able to get together and charge southwards towards the 0ndian fighters while firing their missiles at extreme range to try and break up the invincible wall that the twelve %ukhois presented. The 0ndian response was much more massive, but similar. The 0ndian flight commander was in no mood to play along with the B&Cs while with every passing second the :B&.(( was breaking away to the north. This time twenty four 0ndian missiles were launched, two from each aircraft and with the sky literally filling with 0ndian ,stra missiles, there was little that the B&Cs could do but to break up, dive, dump chaff and flares in the doAens, and hope to get some hills between them and their killers. Three of them disintegrated before they could reach the cover of the hills below them. Two others received near misses from several missiles before their aircraft finally broke up under the severe structural damage from the missile shards and debris. The whereabouts of the last B&C were unknown by the time the last of the missiles ran their course and slammed into the hills below. The 0ndian losses were for a single %ukhoi that received a direct hit from the top while trying to evade the missiles in the hills below. The 0ndian side was organiAed enough to realiAe that with six missiles heading towards their twelve aircraft, it was very easy to tell which aircrafts were being targeted once they looked at their radars. The affected six were literally baiting the missiles to go after them and they were the ones to break from the formation and dive below. The other six had another !ob to do.

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The death sentences for the crews of the :B&.(( and the G&C 37M was now written on the wall, so to speak. They had lost all their last remaining cover. Their aircrafts were not nearly as fast or manoeuvrable as their opponents. ,nd six of them had managed to come across to them and were now within range for the missiles. ,fter the immense planning and combat operations in the 7,7, it all came down to this. The 0ndian aircrafts broke up into smaller groups of two each. "ne group went after the :B&.(( and the G&C37M. The other two attempted to take out the now escaping )&> tankers to the far north. The 0ndian flight leader realiAed what all had been done to arrive where he was now, with his fingers twiddling on the launch button. , second later the ,stra punched off from under the %ukhoi and launched itself away, heading northeast towards the most important target over TibetF the :B&.((. The pilots onboard the modified transport aircraft knew there was no escape. 3ven so, they dumped out flares in the last ditch hope that they might be spared. The #ilot was busy flying the aircraft and screaming for assistance from any available friendlies. The 7hinese commanders in 7hengdu Military district knew that there was none. *ut that didn5t prevent their pilots from desperately shouting out on the RETs for support. The 7o&pilot on board the :B&.(( was busy stretching to see from the starboard window try and spot the missile approaching. 0n the cabin behind, the mission controllers were trying to get together the B&Cs that were now scrambling off from 6hasa, but most knew it was too late. Many of them had now removed their headphones and were looking outside the few starboard windows. 0t was still dark out there, and with the lighting onboard, it was near impossible for the human eye to spot the incoming trail of smoke. ,nd from the front the exhaust flames of the missile cannot be seen. 0t was only in the last second that all those watching were able to spot a sudden movement behind the starboard wing before a massive flash erupted and the aircraft was literally thrown to the side from the force of the impact. The people inside were thrown all over the cabin by the sudden impact, and the whole aircraft went into a steep downward dive with ma!or pieces of the starboard wing breaking apart in mid air. The outermost engine on the starboard wing was no longer there. The second engine there was in flames. The wing surfaces had gone and there was a large section of the fuselage side that had broken up, revealing the cabin to the outside and sucking the air outside the pressuriAed cabin. 0nside e1uipment was literally sucked out by the pressure loss, and so were several of the crewmen. The aircraft was now spinning as it dived, leaving a large trail of smoke and fire behind it. The pilot was still alive, but the 7o&pilot was not. 0n his last desperate moves, the pilot attempted to bring the aircraft back to level flight, but it was impossible. )e finally gave up when he saw dark hills of the Tibetan #lateau appear suddenly in front of him in the darknessH TTTTTTTTT The G&C 37M had met a similar death, albeit less gruesome, as the aircraft had simply detonated in mid air after the missile had struck not the wing but the fuselage itself. To the north, two out of the four )&> tankers were struck, the other two being lucky after having outrun the 0ndian fighters. That had been because of the large original gap in the first place and something that the last disappointed pair of 0ndian fighters had not been able to close. The flight commander ordered all aircrafts to form up back into formation. 0t was time to escape. They were taking a different route for escape, following the paths of the ,R7 *&;(; to the south before heading towards the peaks of Nanda 9evi and crossing over into 0ndian Territory along with their 3/ escort. ,s the news filtered out back down to 7,7 head1uarters, there was !ubilation all around. The 7hinese ,erial 0%R network over Tibet had been smashed, along with a significant number of fighters. #hase two of #0 "T& ),MM3R was now over. The 7,7 7ommander was soon on the line with the 7,%, who was aboard #,TR0"T&3,$63 7+0. The response from both ends of the conversation was mature and sober, unlike the scene where younger officers were present. 0t had been a significant victory. Nothing more. Nothing less. The first ma!or battle for the skies over Tibet was over. "thers would take place as the 7hinese would definitely attempt to take back their loss. )owever, one thing was clear. 0f the 7hinese came here again, they could only now do so at the cost of sacrificing operations against ,runachal #radesh, relieving the pressure there and also thus completing the most important part that the 7,7 was to play in support of the 3,7. The 3,7 was now free to support the 0ndian ,rmy in their battles north of Tawang and to the east near the /along sectors. Now the skies were clear for the long awaited airborne insertion of the %--, and while the 0ndian 7,7 mopped up the battles in the skies above, the battle for the soul of Tibet was only !ust beginning.

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PHASE LINE ALPHA

NORTHWEST OF TAWAN", ARUNACHAL PRADESH, INDIA 0#1, HRS FRIDAY The valley was 1uiet at the moment. Not a sound. The artillery barrage had ceased an hour ago. The artillery batteries at Tawang were restocking their supplies after hours of intensive usage of existing supplies. The use of ammunition had been profligate. This had been noticed only when combat had begun. ,ll existing supplies at Tawang had been created with the thought that artillery fire would only be brought down on the enemy when in contact with friendly forces. That is, when eyes were physically on the targets. ,nd for that the supplies were generous. )owever, changes in modern warfare techni1ues affect the smallest of details. Now, the enemy was in contact all the time with the army5s 2, s flying overhead and providing the eye5s on target? condition continuously. That meant that the use of artillery was immense and unprecedented. The stocks were being depleted faster than they could be refurbished. ,nd that meant that the barrage had to be deliberately stopped even when the 7hinese infantry were in full view to control the drainage of supplies. -urther, emergency airlifts were being made by two of the 0ndian ,ir -orce5s M0&.>s to bring in extra supplies, thus supplementing the existing logistical layout that depended on ground transportation. /hile you couldn5t bring heavy shells very efficiently using airlifts, the airlifts could, in fact, bring other lighter e1uipment that is also re1uired. The stopping of the barrage had allowed the 7hinese to come out of their hand dug fox&holes and move south much faster than anticipated. /orse, the 7hinese Tanks were now having a wonderful time as they slowly began rolling southwards towards the 0ndian positions north of Tawang. The 7hinese infantry was swarming the hills both southeast and southwest of *um&6a. The 7hinese vehicles were, of course, road&bound. "nce the restocking was over, the 7hinese tank movement would be hit again, and again, until they gave up trying to bring down tanks along a very predictable road to Tawang. ,t the moment, however, they were rolling south, incidentally, on the same road that Ma!or #atel and his force of Mountain 0nfantry soldiers had taken not so long ago. That the 7hinese were making unrestricted, albeit temporary, movement on 0ndian soil didn5t please #atel very much, but was at the moment a secondary thought for him. )is primary thoughts were focused on that ridgeline in front of him that he was to lead the assault against. Ma!or #atel was standing at the forward edge of the 0ndian defences, staring northwards with his binoculars. 0t was still dark out, and the only light was from the east where the continuous 7hinese artillery was still hammering the 0ndian positions along the entire border with ,runachal #radesh. That orange glow was being intensified by the N $s among the 0ndian lines to provide all the illumination they needed. 0n fact, without it, there would have been problems since the weather had gone bad in the last few hours. There was now a solid cloud cover overhead that blocked out all moonlight and starlight. -or a second #atel wondered if it might even be blocking out the 0ndian unmanned aerial vehicles flying overhead from seeing the ground below. They had been crucial during his fight at Pero 6ine, providing real time enemy information to him. )e needed them now, and as luck would have it, he was told that he couldn5t have it. , message from Regimental )< to Ma!or #atel confirmed what he had feared, and the weather was seriously !eopardising the 0ndian 2, s. There were no real&time updates for him now. )e had to go with what he had, at least for the time being. "ut here the forest cover is immense. ,nd the valley in 1uestion was covered in it. The crossing points in and around *um&6a are essentially divided into two halves by a set of ridgelines that run north to south in a line inclined eastwards. The valley between these ridges is where the tracks and the roads lead to and beyond the 0ndo&7hina *order. ,t the southern end of the ridge, the valleys merge into another valley that then runs east&west, inclined slightly to the northeast, and are bordered by a steep ridge that runs parallel to it and is to the south of it. The only problem was that as this ridge went further northeast, it cut across the border and went northwards into china. ,s a result, it wouldn5t be long after the initiation of combat that the 7hinese were bound to realiAe that the 0ndian positions could simply be outflanked. *ut it was not a tactical movement, and thus it gave the 0ndian army time to inflict losses on the 7hinese and hold them at bay for considerable amounts of time. 0f things went according to plan, that is. ,s such, the 0ndian #hase line ,lpha ran along this ridgeline.

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0t was one this ridge that the 0ndian forces were now located. ,s a result, they had a de&facto frontline that now ran east&to&west and provided them with natural cover. ,ny movement along the valleys could be detected in advance and fired upon. These valleys are also covered with trees and vegetation, providing a dense green cover during the summer months. ,t this time, however, the snow was everywhere. The forest was only represented by the large trees without leaves, and provided a nice brown&white terrain colour that blended nicely with the camouflage paint that had been applied on the 0ndian T&=(s and *M#&00s after they had arrived here. -or Ma!or #atel, these vehicles were the only thing that now gave direct and heavy support. The 0ndian Tank force in this region, miniscule as it was, was placed in critical locations. The only point along the ,lpha Ridge, as the defences were locally known, where the road from *um&6a cut across to the south towards Tawang was where the 0ndian vehicles were placed as roadblocks. 0t was here that Ma!or #atel5s force had been greeted by the crew of the T&=( as his trucks had come south from *um&6a. 0t was here again that he stood, staring at that large, dark, imposing peak in front of him. #atel lowered his binoculars and looked to the left and saw a T&=( crew busy placing all sorts of bushes and branches around their parked tank to break up its distinct metallic outline. To his right were a couple of *M#s, one of them parked on the road itself and another to its right on the other side of the road. *ehind him was the entirely hidden Tunguska ,nti&aircraft %ystem that lay in wait, its small but powerful radar rotating continuously. Then there were the 0ndian soldiers who had completely gone to ground among the vegetation after having prepared their defences. The only movement was among #atel5s soldiers who were now preparing to move north, beyond the 0ndian defences, and root out any 7hinese Recon units on the northern slope in front of the 0ndian 9efences. There was no movement to be seen among the trees that covered #atel5s "b!ective, but that didn5t fool him for a second. There were 7hinese Recon troops out there. The %earcher&00 flying overhead had clearly seen these troops during their movement south. They were out there, hidingH "n a single command, Ma!or #atel motioned his men to move forward. They would have to first move down the slope they were on, cross the road that went east&west and then move up the other slope and clear it out. )ad there been no trees and vegetation, the two *M#s he had covering his back would have done the !ob for him with their heavy machine&guns. *ut that wasn5t the case. %o it was going to be a close 1uarter5s fight. 4inethats why we brought grenades along with us, didnt we? #atel thought as he moved from tree to tree, taking cover from the trunks and keeping his 0N%,% assault&rifle at shoulder level, aimed forward for the smallest sign of movement. )is men moved out behind him. 0n all the ma!estic battles between the two regional powers being played out at massive scales, Ma!or #atel led his men forward amidst the falling snow and the cold to fight a battle that he knew wouldnRt even be remembered afterwardsH

THE HILLS OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH

NORTHWEST OF TAWAN", 0##' HRS FRIDAY The movement downward from the slope on their side was uneventful. "n the way down Ma!or #atel and his men cam across some of the 7ombat 3ngineers who were busy laying mines and booby traps among the snow and rocks all the way down to the road from *um&6a. There was a small corridor within this minefield that had been marked with small red flags that was to be the path that #atel and his infantry group would use to move back and forth to the 0ndian lines. "nce their !ob had been completed, the engineers had been ordered to seal up this remaining corridor as well. They would leave the flags behind, though, hoping to fool any 7hinese soldier or officer who might think that the 0ndian 7ombat engineers had forgotten to close up this path. 0n this war, among all the high tech giAmos and weapons, you still took all the chances you get to lay your hands on. The smallest of detail mattered. Ma!or #atel simply nodded to a 7aptain of the 3ngineers as they passed by his unit and in return they stared at #atel 1uietly while thinking about the sanity of the men who were passing them on their way to the north. The 7aptain had been at Pero 6ine before the combat had begun, creating the positions for the 0ndian defences, and he had bothered to keep in touch with what all had happened there. )e knew the man he saw passing by him with his 0N%,% clasped in his hands had been the one whom he had met briefly at *um&6a before all this madness had started. )e wished him luck and got back to work to complete his second defensive line in three days.

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Ma!or #atel himself was unaware of the young 7aptain5s identity. )e had other things in mind. They were approaching the road now, and beyond it was the upward slope covered with trees that he had to clear out all the way to the top and if necessary, beyond. "nce they reached the road, it was going to be all uphill for them, and if the 7hinese had already established themselves there, it was going to be one hard night time battle. #atel ordered his men to spread out as they approached the road. )is 0N%,% was up at shoulder level now, safety was off, and fire selection was on single rounds only. )e reached a tree trunk that was barely metres away from the road, but he wasn5t looking at the road itself, but at the trees on the other side. %till no movementH -or once Ma!or #atel thanked his stars for the 1uietness. There was literally no sound now, and as he kept on his knees behind the trunk of that tree, he swept his rifle and the slope beyond the road with his eyes, his vision being assisted by the Night ision "ptics. "nly when one stands at the foot of a mountain or a hill does he realiAe its magnitude, and here it was close to that. The road represented the lowermost point in the valley. -rom here, the slope they were to head up on seemed higher than ever before. )e looked to his left and right and saw that his force of Mountain infantry soldiers were also stooped behind tree trunks and aiming their 0N%,% rifles up that 1uiet hill. #atel gave his ob!ective one last look. The topmost point of his ob!ective was about the same height as the hill they had !ust come down from. This meant that he had some limited support from the T&=( sitting in hull down position behind, and above, him. )e saw his 6ieutenants facing him in the darkness. There was no need for words. )e nodded simply and gave out the universal hand signal for the troops to advance. ,nd with that, all of a sudden, the 0ndian soldiers moved out from behind the trees on the south side of the road and ran through the snow and the darkness into the open space of the road and then towards that first line of trees at the other end. The Ma!or was in front, and while he could have sent a force to do the !ob of scouting for him, he wasn5t that kind of a man. The movement across that open and vulnerable open space was uneventful. There was no return fire from the enemy. Now came the hard part. The !ourney up the slope, feet deep in slippery snow, at night, and with enough trees all around to block fields of fire to not more than several metres. 0f the 7hinese Recon troops were here, they were going to fight it hand to hand in the darknessH The 0ndian force was roughly about two platoons strong. The 7hinese Recon force was of unknown strength, and the %earcher&00 had only seen them for a small glimpse to be certain, but it was certain that they weren5t more than #latoon strength strong if their !ob had indeed been Reconnaissance. More likely, they could even be as small as s1uad siAe, but that seemed unlikely to men like Ma!or #atel. They knew how the 7hinese fought, and more importantly, think. *ut out here, as the 0ndian soldiers struggled up the snow covered slopes, #atel couldn5t help but wonder if there were any troops here at all. There was literally no movement up the slope, except for the falling snow, that is. #atel ordered for a halt to the upward movement as he called up his Radioman who was behind him. The Radioman came up through the snow and dropped on his stomach behind #atel, who himself was taking the cover of a fallen tree trunk. The talk was all in whispers only. )e took the headset from the Radioman. $et me 7ommand.? was the whispered but firm order from the Ma!or. Ges %ir.? The Radioman removed the receiver from his Radio pack and began to set the fre1uencies to connect the )- with the Regimental )< back on #hase 6ine ,lpha. )e got through to familiar and friendly voice on the radio and was giving the receiver back to #atel when a slight thump noise rang out and the Ma!or #atel5s radioman rolled down the slope minus his radio under the impact of single heavy bullet in his chest. 0t was a 1uarter second before the Ma!or shouted out his response for all to hear8 %niperLL...3verybody downLL? ,nd with that, all hell broke loose. The whole line up from the top of the slope opened up as the 7hinese Recon troops hiding there began firing their assault rifles down on the 0ndian troops. The tree trunks were getting peppered with bullet holes and wooden splinters were flying all around. The 0ndian soldiers began to counter with return fire and the woods filled up with the noises of 0N%,% weapons firing in a cacophony of noises. /ith the bullet screaming by with swishing noises, and the rifles going off all around, it was difficult to even hear oneself thinking, much less hear out orders being shouted out. 3ven so, within seconds of the gunfight starting off, two 0ndian soldiers were already pulling the fallen body of the now dead Radioman back up into cover. 7aptain %harma, who was #atel5s second in command, dragged himself up to where #atel was firing back at some 7hinese soldiers. )e brought up the good news and the bad news. #atel stopped firing as he

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turned and spoke with the 7aptain. 7asualty reportI? was the shouted 1uestion. 6ight so far. The Radioman is dead. %o is another soldier in first #latoon. Two more in!ured. The Radio is still working sir. 0 had another soldier take 0t.? the 7aptain shouted back. $ood. $et him over here. 6ooks like we have some dug in commies above us. /hat say we give them a special welcomeI? #atel said rhetorically as the radio was brought up. )e took the receiver himself and got in hold with the T&=( 7rew on the reverse slope to the south. he looked to see in same direction as he shouted into the receiver above the sound of the gunfire. *623 6eader to 0D3N 7ommander. 9o you copyI? This is 0D3N. /e 7opy. 6ook5s like you have 1uite a party going on there. "ver.? 0D3N, do you have a visual on ThermalI "ver.? Roger, *623. /e have visual. 3stimate #latoon siAe R39 force above you. /e see you at the lower section of the slope. %uggest you stay there. 6et5s see if we can flush out the commies from here. "ver.? the T&=( Tank 7ommander responded while continuing to look through the 7ommander5s Thermal "ptics %ystem within the Turret. )is target was now half a kilometer away and at roughly the same altitude. )e was giving target information to his gunner in no time at all. $unner, target enemy infantry on top section of ridge line on my Mark. Traverse left, thirty degrees.? The turret of the T&=( in hull down condition moved by the re1uired amount until the gunner was looking at the target himself. )e was then shouting back as the proper round was loaded. The 6aser Range&finder was already doing its !ob and the gun was now stabiliAed. )3,T loadedHTarget ac1uired. RangeHJ=(. ReadyL? The response was immediate. -ireL? a second later the T&=( shook under the force as the main gun let out a massive orange flash of fire and the round went out. ,t this close range, the results were immediate. , ball of fire erupted among the trees where the 7hinese Recon troops were firing down from. The sound was thunderous, and for a second the sounds of the rifles firing were almost drowned out. The trees were uprooted by the force of the blast, and fires began immediately. The 7hinese rifle fire from that section of the slope ceased immediately. )itL New TargetH3ngage at willL? This was infantry support at its best. There were no individual targets for the Tank 7ommander to point out for his gunner. The target bearing was small so he couldn5t suggest bearing either. ,s a result, unless otherwise necessary, all he could do was watch as his gunner went into his personal hyper&drive mode for the rounds he was lashing out at the unfortunate enemy troops. , second )3,T round landed to the left of where the first one did and another section of the 7hinese defences was rolled up in fire and smoke. The 7hinese return fire was dying out now, and the T&=( crew saw whyHthey were leaving their positions and heading to the top and then beyond it to get away from the T&=(5s line of sight. *ut this T&=( $unner was not giving up right awayH %electing MachinegunsH? the $unner shouted before the tank shuddered again as burst after burst of tracers left the gun and headed towards the slopes where the 7hinese were running among the trees. The bullets were of heavy calibre, and the tree trunks were providing no protection as they themselves were being shattered into splinters. The first burst missed a group of three 7hinese soldiers, and the second burst managed to knock of the rearmost member of the group who fell and rolled downwards amidst the snow. The third burst was a long one and managed to slay the remaining two members of that group, but many more were escaping beyond the hill top. *y this time the Tank commander was also up and outside his turret, manning his gun as well. ,s the last 7hinese trooper ran behind the hilltop and out of view, the Tank 7ommander ordered his gunner to cease fire. There were no more targets. *ack at the slope, Ma!or #atel had seen the entire effects of the T&=( $unfire up close and personal. )e had suddenly earned new respect for the )3,T rounds. ,s the T&=( began to loosen up its fire, #atel ordered his men forward. The 7hinese were on the run, and were now beyond the direct view of the 0ndian defences, but they would be hunted down as far as #atel was concerned. Those had been his orders. )e was going to complete them.

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)e stood up from his cover position and brought the 0N%,% up to his shoulder. ,t the same time he shouted to his men at the top of his voice8 ,dvanceLL?

THE HILLS OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH NORTHWEST OF TAWAN", 0#'' HRS FRIDAY The running was excruciatingly slow, being uphill and through a feet of snow. The 0ndian troopers running up the hill were already breathing heavily, and in the cold, the small puffs of breath could be seen as they went along. The ground they were running up was entirely white, being almost pure, and the air was clean. There was no other sound other than their own, but as they ran and covered the distance all the way to the top of the hill, the white snow covered ground started to turn into a peppered black and white color as soot had fallen on top it. in addition, there were broken pieces of branches and wood everywhere, most of them emanating smoke. , little further and the ground was now entirely black, and there were burning pieces of tree trunks lying around on the soot covered snow. ,nd then, finally, the first signs that man had been here8 the empty cartridges for bullets lying around the half prepared 7hinese positionsH "ne of the first 0ndian soldiers to burst through the remains of these 7hinese positions was Ma!or #atel. )is 0N%,% in his hand, he was almost three seconds ahead of his main force that was running with him. This ob!ective was not yet secure. There was still a little way to go before they reached the top of the hill and then they had to clear out the remaining 7hinese Recon Troopers who were on the other slope. The running became slower now, as the first signs of 7hinese occupation came into view. 6ying in the snow was the half buried body of a 7hinese Recon Trooper. That forced Ma!or #atel to halt for a second and as he stared at the dead body of the 7hinese soldier he caught his breath. )e looked around, and sure enough, there were other dead 7hinese soldiers littering the positions. )e looked back to see the hills to the south and saw that the 0ndian T&=( had had an extremely clear view of things from where it had been. Too bad these commies had not known that fact beforehandH Ma!or #atel thought as he signalled his men to sweep clear what remained of the 7hinese defences here. 0t didn5t take long, and after he received the clear? signals from his 6ieutenants, he ordered them to move out. This time, they were going over the hill top. The 0N%,% came up to eye level as the 0ndian soldiers moved out. , small distance upwards and all of a sudden there was stunningly clear view of the night sky against the backdrop of the $reat )imalayas, silhouetted against the dark starlit sky. They had reached the top. Now the way downwards began. ,nd it didn5t take long before movement was spotted further down the slope8 the 7hinese Recon s1uad survivors were running down the hill in leaps and bounds. 2nfortunately, the 0ndian soldiers were now on the high ground behind them. Ma!or #atel crouched down on his stomach to stabiliAe his rifle and so did the rest of the 0ndian soldiers. 0t took a second before #atel blurted out the order8 "pen -ireL 3ngage at willL? ,nd with that the darkness and the silence of the night was broken up by a cacophony of noises and flashes of light as the 0ndian soldiers let loose a fusillade of gunfire down towards the running 7hinese soldiers. There were roughly half a doAen of them as #atel could make out, and it didn5t take long for his much larger force to cut down the running enemy soldiers amidst that wall of bullets. -ive out of the six 7hinese were brought down within seconds, each of them going down with several bullets hitting his back. The sixth one recovered and took cover behind a large tree trunk to return fire up the slope, but the effort was wasted, as an entire platoon worth of 0ndian soldiers opened fire on his position. 3ven the tree trunk he was hiding behind was shredded under the impacts of the bullets. The heavy machine gun fire brought down the entire tree as the

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heavy calibre bullets broke the tree trunk. 0t was only when the tree went crashing down that #atel shouted8 7ease fireLL...Move outL -irst %1uad on #ointL %weep and 7learL? The 0ndian soldiers now recovered back to their feet and replaced their empty magaAines for their rifles. The M$ teams stayed where they were, providing sweeping cover fire over the heads of the soldiers of -irst s1uad as they moved downwards to make sure the enemy was truly dead. Ma!or #atel saw them moving downwards before calling his Radioman up. )e was there in a few seconds, and gave the speaker back to the Ma!or. #atel was looking at his men sweeping the snow covered trees down the slope even as he spoke to his Regimental 7#. 0t was the familiar and concerned voice of the 7olonel on the radio. Ma!or, what the hell is going on over thereI Gour last transmission was broken upL? %ir, a 7ommie %niper took out my Radioman as 0 was about to send a message to you. That message is now redundant. 0 had 0D3N clear out the enemy positions before we mopped up. The 7hinese Recon force here is dead. /e are !ust now clearing out the hill top. /hat are your ordersI "ver? Ma!or #atel said into the receiver as he walked back up to the hill top from where he could see the ma!estic view to the north. -rom here he could see small sections of the road that he knew the 7hinese would be bringing their vehicles down on. The answer to his 1uestion proved to him that he was right. Ma!or, can you see the road from *um&6a from you current positionsI? that brought a smile on #atel5s face. Ges, sir. 0 am looking at it now.? Ma!or, we have reports coming in that the 7hinese armour force is coming down along this section of the road from *um&6a. T&==s and other stuff. The western route is being used by the 7hinese only lightly so far. /e will take care of the heavy stuff. Gour orders are to get your men into position to "bserve and 9irect. "ver and "ut.? the 7olonel5s voice said. 0t5s going to be one hell of a morning todayH Ma!or #atel handed back the receiver to his radioman. )is first order to the troops was to prepare positions on both sides of the hill top, as there was no saying which side may be re1uired if things went out of control. )is s1uad of troops had almost finished clearing the downside of the slope while he brought up his *inoculars and stared to the north. 0t was almost time for the sun to show up. ,nd sure enough, there was that orange glow to the east. )is N $ vision was going down as the glow was becoming stronger, and he removed it from the attachment and put it in his backpack. )e won5t need it today. -or all he knew, this might have been the last time he would have used it at all. Ma!or #atel looked at the way things turned out even as he stared northwards. This was the second time in two days that he was out here, at the tip of the 0ndian defences, facing a 7hinese onslaught from an exposed position. The obvious 1uestion in his head was8 /hy meI /hy always meI 9amn itL )e cleared his thoughts and resumed his observations of the road from *um&6a from where he stood. "bserve and 9irect .my footL )ere 0 am, yet again, standing in wait for the damn commie tanks to show up in all their glory. No aerial 0ntelligence by the looks of the cloud cover, and with the artillery still restockingH 9amn itH/hat else could go wrongI CHUSHUL THE LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL $LAC%

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LADDAKH 0&*' HRS FRIDAY This had been a 1uiet front for the last few days. /hile all out war was being waged throughout the skies, all the way from the ,ir 9efence Aones over New 9elhi to the northern areas of Tibet, from the easternmost tip of 0ndia to western Tibet, the skies over 6addakh had been 1uiet for far too long, and tension was thick in the air. /hile both 0ndia and 7hina fought to come to terms with the war and the way it had now spread from the skies of Myanmar to over /estern Tibet in less than three days was, in retrospect, beyond normal comprehension. 0n 6addakh, the 0ndian ,rmy sat facing their 7hinese counterparts as both sides planned their movements here. -or the 0ndian army, however, the fight northeast of Tawang was not going well. The 7hinese were forcing their way south towards the town, and $)< was busy trying to get enough troops there to hold the 7hinese at bay. 3ven if they managed to hold them there, the 7hinese were already several kilometres inside 0ndian Territory. The situation there was grim. "ut here, however, the 0ndian ,rmy5s D0 7orps was now deployed in the field. 3lements of D 7orps were now deploying, and the 0,- bases in :ashmir were filling up with close support aircrafts for the ground missions. 3ven so, the 6ieutenant $eneral in command of the region was unable to convince his superiors that they should open up the front along the 6,7 while the 7hinese were still preparing. /hile the 1uibbling went on at $eneral )<, the men of the 0ndian D0 7orps sat in their bunkers and trenches among the snow and the darkness of the northern )imalayas. The defence of the area east of 7hushul was being taken care of by a *rigade of Troops, along with some airlifted armour support. 0t was a far cry from the battles of '=>. when the 0ndian army had been deployed in the region in small groups of 7ompanies and *attalions. 3ven so, it was here that, for the first time in that war, the 0ndian army had stopped the 7hinese dead in their tracks, 1uite literally, in fact. 0t was here again that the 0ndian army stood, in much larger numbers, facing the #6,. Much to the chagrin of the local commanders, who were waiting for the chance to go on the offensive here and avenge the defeat of '=>., the indecision at the command level gave the 7hinese that much needed initiative, however slim, to go on the offensive. The starlit sky vanished as the ground shuddered under the feet of the 0ndian soldiers and the skies to the northeast turned orange as the full might of the 7hinese artillery went into action, waking everybody from the frontlines all the way to the Regional command in 6eh. ,t the frontline, the 0ndian soldiers were running into their bunkers and the trenches even as the first sounds of the man made thunder came through. Then came the sounds that every soldier dreaded8 the incoming shells. , few seconds later the ground shook more violently than ever as the first shells impacted within the 0ndian lines. The entire 6,7 was soon lit up with flashes of light as position after position along the 6,7 came under fire from the 7hinese guns. The first targets had been the 0ndian *attalion and Regimental command centres, followed by the shelling of all ma!or supply routes coming into the region. /ithin seconds of fire, the most 0ndian positions were covered in dust clouds and smoke, and all communication was intermittent or non&existent. *ut that was temporary for the ma!or node points. ,ll systems had redundancy built it. /ithin seconds the communications were back up once again. *ut several posts along the 6,7 had lost contact. Their communications had been hit and were now cut off. The 0ndian response was swift. The strategically placed 7ounter&*attery radars swung into action almost as soon as the first shells were aloft, and the computer screen showing the locations of the 7hinese guns lit up immediately. The locations were then compared with tactical maps and the artillery coordinates were plotted out automatically within seconds. , few seconds after that the information was being sent out to all 0ndian 7ounter&,rtillery designated weapon platforms as the first 0ndian counterstroke woke up from its slumber. "ne of these designated units were several *atteries of the #inaka M6R%. These trucks had been kept moving from one place to another to avoid the 7hinese from fixing their positions.

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Now, as their onboard communication systems received the data from the 0ndian ,rtillery 7ommand, the launchers moved out to the open ground in valleys behind the 0ndian lines and got into their pre&designated launch positions. The onboard -7% was fed with the pre&calculated data for the launching position and the computer compared the present location and the target location sent to it and calculated the launch angle and bearing. 0t was all handled from the command centres as the launchers mounted on the back of the trucks swung into the correct setting and locked themselves there. , second later the "fficer in command of the vehicle confirmed that all settings were accurate and flipped open the cover on the launch button. , second after that his thumb depressed the button and the vehicle shuddered around himH THE NATIONAL AIRBORNE COMMAND CENTRE $CALL SI"N: PATRIOT EA"LE% ON FINAL APPROACH AT LOHE"AON AFB, PUNE 0&'0 HRS FRIDAY The undercarriage touched the tarmac and immediately left a puff of smoke and began rolling before taking the weight of the aircraft. The aircraft nose wheel touched a few seconds later and the aircraft was fully on the ground. The spoilers on the wing upper surfaces were brought into action and the immediate lost of lift brought the aircraft to completely rest on the concrete tarmac before the brakes brought an appreciable reduction in aircraft speed. The three M0$&.=s which had been flying as escort for the ,ircraft now screamed overhead and engaged afterburner to retain their patrol altitude after having escorted their ob!ective all the way down to the airfield. "nboard the aircraft, the 9efence Minister and the #M were sitting with their seatbelts clasped in the conference room of the aircraft along with the chiefs of the ,rmy and the ,ir -orce. The aircraft finished its landing roll and now moved off the runway towards the tarmac. The security was tight. 3ven while the aircraft moved forward, several ground vehicles were moving on the taxiway both ahead and behind it. 3ven though it was darkness outside, it was still possible to make out the doAens of military vehicles parked along the airfield perimeter and the soldiers patrolling the grass on both sides of the fence in their doAens. The pilots of the **B switched off the aircraft lights that had given it the look of an ordinary airline aircraft landing in the early morning. The aircraft then moved into the Military side of the airfield and was signalled towards a location on the tarmac. The aircraft was brought into position by the pilots under the guidance of the ground crewmen and the aircraft came to a stop. The engines were shut down and the whining noise of the Turbines and compressors of the engines reduced continuously until they were barely audible. %everal vehicles now approached the aircraft and the door was opened. /hile the base commander and other senior officers of the ,ir -orce greeted the #M as he briskly walked with his entourage towards the secure location he was being taken to within the base, the 9efence Minister was still on board the aircraft as yet another urgent briefing was on the way. This time it was the 7",%. 0nwardly, the 9efence Minister wondered what else could go wrong at Tawang when he was !olted out of his thoughts as $eneral %inha moved the digital Map towards the region showing the ,ksai 7hin. Minutes later he was convinced that the 7hinese had indeed opened up a new front along the border. The battle for 6addakh had !ust startedH INDIAN ARMY POSITIONS LOCATION: #&:*1;#-6*<N, ,(:'*;#1-66<E THE LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL $LAC% EAST OF LEH, LADDAKH 0'*0 HRS FRIDAY Their deaths must have come instantlyH1uick, like lightening. They probably didn5t know what hit them, andH

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*ullshitL 9on5t try to !ustify this to yourself, damn itL They are dead, and that5s itL Nothing more, nothing less. "nly thing is, they have taken the radios with them where they have gone. Not their fault, but there it is. Gou still have a battalion to lead... $et to it, damn itL MoveHcome onL 6ieutenant&7olonel *awe!a spoke to himself in his thoughts. )e told himself that his inner voice was correct in all aspects. )e forced himself to look away from the bodies of his staff lying within the rubble of what had been his command bunker. 0t had taken one very lucky shell, or unlucky, depending on which way you looked at it, to take out the entrenched bunker where it stood among the falling shells. *ut that was how fate had dealt its hand, and the result was that *awe!a5s *attalion was now cut off from the rest of the regimental 7# further back westwards. The 6t&7olonel rested his 0N%,% over his shoulder while holding it in one hand, the way he liked it, and moved on through the trenches to see how his men were holding out against the falling shells. This position, among many others, were the ones positioned along the entire 6,7 in a manner similar to the positions along the 6"7 with #akistan. *ut unlike the current deployments along the 6"7, which were within sight of each other, both the 0ndian and 7hinese positions had been evacuated after the commencement of hostilities three days ago. Now, all that remained along the 6,7 were small observation teams making sure that there were no unexpected movements. *ut now the 7hinese were on the offensive, and the artillery had been falling for an hour now. The morning sun may have been up, but there was no way of knowing for sure amongst the smoke clouds that denied a person the sight of his hand in front of his face. ,nd the noise of the incoming shells were horrifying enough without the explosions that were adding to the deadly cacophony. The 0ndian lines were holding for the moment. There had been several casualties during the initial minutes of the bombardment, but after the 0ndian soldiers had scuttled into their trenches, there had been few deathsHuntil ten minutes ago, that is. That was when the *attalion 7# had been obliterated in a massive explosion of dust and smoke as the law of probability finally caught up with the men hunkering in their positions. Their commanding officer, 6t&7olonel *awe!a, and several medics, were moving within the trenches to check up on the casualties. 3verybody was covered with dust now, and any signs that there had been snow here was gone. *awe!a did not like what he was seeing. The men were sitting in the positions almost silent, and some were beginning to show the classic signs of mental trauma, as they sat huddled, staring into infinity. )e took it upon himself to speak to these men, and told their neighbours to continue to do so after he had gone. There was one realisation for the 7olonel as he walked, huddled, and that was that these men needed an enemy they could see, one whom they could fight and repel, and one who did not take life so randomly as these falling shells were seemingly doing. That the enemy was coming was a certainty. The artillery shelling had been going on for an hour now, and that was some serious amount of ammunition spent. ,nd something that would not be spent in vain. 0t is the fire before the stormH*awe!a told himself, and something that referred to the almost certain human waves that the 7hinese commanders would be sending out to storm the 0ndian positions all along the 6,7. )is position was more exposed than others, basically because he was sitting at the !unction of two natural valleys and where it provided a nice little attacking route all the way to his position from the 7hinese side of the 6,7. )e had extensive line of sight from here, and the same went for the 7hinese. "nly difference was that he was entrenched, while the 7hinese would have to come through the open ground to him. )e had dedicated artillery assigned to him, but that option died along with his staff at the *attalion 7#.

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)is companies were spread out over several positions, and before he had lost radio contact, he had confirmed that they too were taking fire but were under cover. )ere he had two companies under his direct command, and had initially been positioned here to curb any 7hinese movement along the valleys towards the 0ndian side, and conversely, to secure the same paths from 7hinese defences in case of any push by the 0ndian army went eastwards. *ut thinking about that was the !ob of the higher brass. )is !ob at the moment, and as far as he was concerned, his only !ob, was to defend this position and lead his men. )is ears suddenly confirmed what his eyes did a few seconds later8 the artillery was slackening off. ,nd sure enough, the explosions within the dust clouds that occupied his positions suddenly ceased with an abrupt pause. )e wasn5t the only one who poked his head over the trenches when this happened. The noise had stopped but the ears were still ringing for everybody. 3verybody was busy dusting off their uniforms and getting their ears to stop ringing when the first movement over the top of the trenches behind the 0ndian defenses were several Medics running about. %everal other men were running with empty stretchers towards the trenches only to return with a blood&soaked body lying on them. *ut 6t&7olonel *awe!a was not looking behind, he was looking forward. )e had his binoculars to his eyes, and even though the dust cloud was still settling down, the views were relatively clear. There was only one reason why the artillery fire had stopped, and it wasn5t because the 7hinese had run out of ammunitionH MovementLL...we have movementL? was the shout from one of the other officers also busy with his binoculars and looking east. *awe!a turned to look what he was gesturing to and sure enough, there was movement. 6ots of it. Regimental siAeH 3verybody into their positionsL /e have incoming enemy soldiers. )eavy concentration. 3verybodyHcheck weapons. 9o not fire until my commandL $oHgoHgoL? *awe!a shouted out after had seen enough. )e did his math in his head while he shouted commands to the frantically scuttling men running into firing positions. There were too many 7hinese for his two companies to handle alone. )is radio was out, and his Regiment had probably no idea what was going on here. *ut he couldn5t retreat now, or else it would turn to rout as the 7hinese simply bombarded them with artillery while they attempted to do so. 0t would also open up a large gap in the local defences in this sector, and he was not going to be the one about responsible for that if he had any say in the matter. 0n any case, the radio blackout was only temporary. )is Regimental 7" would have already dispatched a s1uad or so with the new radios, and would probably have an army or air force 2, overhead in no time. ,nd then the payback would beginH *ut for now, he had to hold the line, despite the odds. )e knew his men were smart, and that they would have reached the same conclusion already, but he still had to stir them up before the combat actually began. )e had precious minutes to do so, as the 7hinese were now almost into the firing range for his precious 0N%,%. )e put it back on his shoulder as he like to do before he shouted once again for all his men to hear. 3verybody listen upL Gou all know the value of this position to our side. The chinkis have started this war, yet againL ,nd they are coming for usHand the ground we are holding right now, yet again. They think they have broken our spirits with their artillery fire. They think we will retreat before themHthat we will give away our ground without a fightL? the 6ieutenant&7olonel stopped for a second to emphasise his next statement8 /e are going to do none of these things. This *attalion will N"T retreatL 0t will N"T surrenderL /e will engage the enemy and we will 93%TR"G themHor die tryingL? The response from his men was electric, and it was what their commanding officer aiming for. ,ll weapons were immediately brought forward and aimed towards the rapidly oncoming enemy. it

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was one hell of a morning, *awe!a thought, not knowning that he echoed the sentiments of another 0ndian officer sitting on top of a hill in ,runachal #radesh, facing a similar situation and still over fifteen hundred kilometres away. 3verybody lock and loadL 0 want fire superiorityL Make every round countL )old fire until my commandL? the 7hinese were within the extreme range, but the silence continued. "ver two hundred 0ndian assault rifles were trained out facing an enemy many times their siAe. %teadyLHsteadyLH? INDIAN AIRBASE AT LEH LEH, LADDAKH 0'*' HRS FRIDAY The :laxons were sounding off all around the base. The battle for 6addakh had begun this morning, the third day of the war, and the 0ndian air force was responding. $round crews and pilots were scrambling to get all available aircrafts off the ground. The airbase was the main hub for the daily airlifts that brought in supplies for the region and also maintained an aerial logistical node point for the 0ndian army. ,s a result, for the last few days the airbase was teeming with large numbers of ,N&+.s and 06&;>s from ,gra and 7handigarh who were providing a wartime re&supply effort for the 0ndian army whose numbers had been surged many times their peacetime number to deal with this crisis. This created a problem, however. The airfield had only one usable runway, and relatively small parking space to deal with the incoming flights, let alone to house the needed numbers of ground attack aircrafts or air defense fighters on the ground. , method to clear space for stationing these aircrafts had been developed and was in essence a racetrack from 7handigarh to 6eh. ,ircrafts going to 6eh were on one segment of the racetrack while those departing 6eh were kept on the other segment of the track to form a closed loop. "n the ground, the ground&crews were working like pit&stop crews and turning around aircrafts for their return flights as soon as they came to a stop. To further create problems was the fact that the local civilian carriers, especially 0ndian ,irlines, were still flying in aircraft to evacuate the civilians from the region to further safety to the south on the orders of the $overnment. 6addakh was rapidly being drained of its non&local civilian population to be replaced by much larger numbers of people moving around in combat fatigues. ,nd while the 0ndian air force commanders had protested to the government heads against this decision, mostly on the grounds that it was impeding military flights to the airfield already struggling with low tarmac space, the decision still stood. "ne of the reasons the decision still stood was the fear in some departments that akin to the '=>. war, the 0ndian army might not be able to hold back the 7hinese advance in the region. The only difference this time, was that the there were lot more civilians here this time around. 0t had therefore been decided to evacuate these people from the region to prevent them from being caught at the frontlines of the battle, or worse, behind the 7hinese lines. 0t reflected the institutional lack of faith in the 0ndian army being displayed by the government leaders both at the national level as well as the regional one, and something that was vastly irritating and frustrating to the local army commanders. /hat was worse, however, was that the local government establishment, which had always been fragile because of the fact that the 0ndian government had never truly paid much attention to it as it did throughout the rest of the country, was now beginning to show signs of failing. There were no directives to the local population outside 6eh from this body, mainly because it had considered 6eh to be the epitome of 6addakh, and as a result, the outside regions were rarely visited or

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reached out to. This !ob had been left to the 0ndian army, and while it worked during peacetime, during the last few hours it had shown that it did not work during wartime, mainly because the 0ndian army was still coming to grips with the tactical situations to even begin to think on broader terms. More importantly, the lack of proper functioning of the local governance meant that many villages close to the 6,7 had never even received warnings for evacuation or in general, to be ready for evacuation. ,s a result, several villages in the region closer to the 6,7 had been bombarded by the 7hinese army on suspicion that the 0ndian army was there, only to end up hitting these civilian occupied dilapidated communities with heavy caliber artillery and cause extensive loss of life. The details of these attacks were being brought in army units as they moved in convoys towards the 6,7 and passed the burning remains of what had been peaceful communities. 0n many cases there were only few survivors, looking for their loved ones and cursing the 0ndian government for its negligence. -urther, in stark contrast to the 0ndian armed forces, who were willingly and even enthusiastically moving towards the front, the civilian government officials, many of the senior ones, had been on the first 0ndian ,irlines flight to %rinagar, ostensibly to reestablish control from there. )ow they intended to maintain civilian control from all the way in %rinagar to 6addakh was not being discussed, and the local 0ndian army commanders couldn5t care less at the moment. They had a war to fight, and it had come knocking on its doorsteps. ,part from the transport flights coming and leaving 6eh, there were also some fighters deployed at the airbase. Two flights of M0$&.=s belonging to the No. ..+ %1uadron were on <uick reaction alert or <R, at the airbase readiness platforms. /ithin minutes of the klaxons sounding off, the pilots were already strapping into their cockpits within the few hardened aircraft shelters that were available and soon afterwards, three M0$&.=s roared out of their shelters and moved towards the end of the runway even as the first rays of sunlight appeared over the airbase. "n the other side of the airbase an 06&;> of JJ %1uadron was told to stand on 4holding5 status to allow the fighters to take off. The three aircrafts scrambled off the ground within seconds of each other, and they constituted the first 7,# mission of the day. Three more fighters were on five minute standby to take over once the first group landed or take off in case of any enemy contact and support the original group of three. ,fter the 06&;> had taken off behind the fighters, the next aircraft to lift off 6eh were several %earcher 2, s of the local resident 2, %1uadron. The 0ndian army had lost contact with some of its units near the 6,7 soon after the artillery bombardment had started. Now, the 0ndian air force had been told to go over and take a look even as the ground contact was reestablished. "ne of these %earchers went east by southeast. 0t was soon over what appeared to be dust clouds covering whole mountain slopes. The unmanned aircraft soon established a flight pattern over the region as the ground controllers back in 6eh Aoomed into various sectors using the advanced optics to see? what was going on. "n one location the screen showed what looked like a bunch of 0ndian troops in a firefight with a much larger invading force of 7hinese troops. The ground controller checked the coordinates on the screen that were being displayed8 +JU.'R+.>.KN, ;CU@.R+'.>>K3. 0t confirmed with what the D0 7orps commanders had informed the air force to look at. )e soon picked up the phone next to him and passed the information up the chain of command.

INDIAN ARMY HELIPADS CHUSHUL LADDAKH 0'&6 HRS FRIDAY

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2p the chain of command, the 0ndian air force passed the information over to the 0ndian army, and it was here that it again went down the chain of command to end up in the hands of the Ma!or who was in charge of a flight of /eaponiAed ,6) 9hruv helicopters. 0t stated that he had been ordered to go over to location +JU.'R+.>.KN, ;CU@.R+'.>>K3 and provide air&to&ground support to a 6ieutenant 7olonel *awe!a, whose infantry unit was involved in a bitter firefight with heavy enemy forces. -urther, it stated that 7ommand had decided that artillery support was out of the 1uestion given the close proximity of the 7hinese troops with the 0ndian defenders. 0t didn5t take long for the Ma!or to get the two helicopters spooling up their engines while they strapped themselves inside. 0t was to be the first operational deployment of the /eaponiAed ,6) in actual combat, and it would be done using a weapons load of unguided rockets and turret mounted gunfire. ,s the big rotor blades began to rotate, the snow was sent flying in all directions and soon after the helicopters lifted off the helipads and headed northeast. /hile his second crewmember flew the helicopter towards the target Aone, the Ma!or continued to read the part of the message that dealt with the ground coordination during the strike. The paper in his hands said that there was no ground contact at the moment, and what all that was being done was through the eyes of the 2, crew. That was all right as far as the higher decisions were concerned, but when it came to a ground attack mission in such tight corners and against such closely spaced enemy and friendly forces, using anti&infantry weapons such as strafing and unguided weapons, a close coordination with the -,7 or -orward ,ircraft 7ontroller was a must. 3lse the chances of fratricide increased. *ut the message emphasiAed that the area was target&rich, and more to the point, the situation on the ground there was desperate. The Ma!or folded the papers and put it inside his flight uniform pocket as he thought over his attack patterns using the Maps on his lap. *ut while all this was by the book, much else was not. ,nd it was worrying the Ma!or more than he would have liked. 7lose anti&infantry air&support without muchHno, without any ground coordination. 0t5s going to be one hell of an attack missionH the Ma!or thought as the two helicopters flew over the )imalayan Mountains towards the front line of the war for 6addakh. INDIAN ARMY POSITIONS LOCATION: #&:*1;#-6*<N, ,(:'*;#1-66<E THE LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL $LAC% EAST OF LEH, LADAKH 0''' HRS FRIDAY The piles of empty cartridge shells were piling up within the trenches. ,nd so were the bodies of fallen comrades. *ut not nearly as heavily or 1uickly as the number of 7hinese soldiers that now lay motionless on the snow covered rocks outside the trenches and in front of the 0ndian defences. The air was filled with sounds of assault weapons and explosions. The blue sky above was now interrupted by columns of smoke and dust. The sun was up, and in another world it would have been a beautiful morning. *ut not here todayHand certainly not now. The battle was raging in full intensity as the 0ndian defences under the command of 6ieutenant& 7olonel *awe!a were battling the invading 7hinese forces of much larger numbers from within their trenches. There was still no radio contact, but *awe!a had dispatched a couple of runners with the re1uired information back towards Regimental )< before the attacks had begun. )e was sure that 7ommand must have already got some kind of aerial coverage for this battle, and that he would get some support from some place pretty soon. )e !ust had to hold on for some more time. )e knew that if he could do that, this initial 7hinese offensive in front of him would be crushed. Not that he had any choice in the matter anyway, but hope was something you clung on

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to under these circumstances, for they were the one definite support platform that you could count on. *awe!a was standing inside his trench which had been further lined with bundles of sandbags. )is 0N%,% was resting on the ground in a small gap between two sandbags which narrowed his fields of fire but provided much more cover. That was how it worked. Gou restricted your vision and concentrated on a given sector of fire and let your comrades do the same for other sectors. 0t was known as teamwork. *awe!a5s eyes were focussed on the metallic aim on his rifle and it was this that he ad!usted slightly by moving the rifle each time he shifted his aim. ,ll he had to do was bring this metallic aim in front of a charging 7hinese soldier and let his finger pull the trigger. 3ach time he did this, his shoulder and his body shook with the recoil and his eyes were momentarily blinded by a flash. *ut at the end of this time, which was barely more than two seconds, his eyes again shifted back on the metallic aim only to see that the charging 7hinese soldier was face down in the snow a hundred metres in front of him. 0t was all about single shots and small bursts, unlike the movies where the epitome of a fire&fight was the use of automatic fire fired without taking aim. Reality was different, but !ust as deadly. The doAens of dead 7hinese soldiers that now lay in front of the 0ndian defences could testify that had they still been alive. 2nfortunately for them, that was no longer the case. 9espite the personal satisfaction of seeing the 7hinese fall for every bullet he was expending, 6t& 7olonel *awe!a had to face a hard truth. ,nd it was that for every 7hinese soldier that he and his men were killing, there were a doAen more behind. ,nd for every doAen or so 7hinese soldier being killed, he was losing one of his own. /orse, because of the massive momentum that heavy numerical superiority gave to the 7hinese, they were rapidly closing the distance between them and him. )e had begun the engagement at two hundred metres, and that was long enough under such cases, but it was now closing up and he was already shooting at 7hinese soldiers that were within a hundred metres from him. 0f he failed to receive support soon, he would be soon be fighting the 7hinese within his own trenches. 0f he had had artillery support with him, he could have called in heavy concentrated fire even if it meant endangering his own people, and that would have levelled the 7hinese on the open ground they stood on. *ut that was unfortunately not to be the case, and he was on his own. *awe!a continued to fire single accurate shots at the enemy even as he thought through his options. The 7hinese were running from rock to rock, using the cover to move closer and closer while continuing to return fire. %ome of them were within fifty metres now. The situation was no longer remaining tactical8 it was man to man now. *awe!a fired another shot that left another 7hinese soldier with a bullet in his chest and fallen within the snow, or what remained of the snow. That was when a single 7hinese bullet hit the sandbag next to *awe!a5s head, and that told him that he was being targeted by some non& charging 7hinese soldier. ,nd sure enough, a small peek to the left sent a burst of fire smashing into the sandbags again. %o, this commie is no fool. *ut he !ust revealed his positionHthe poor bastard. Time for a barrel grenadeH *awe!a pulled a 2*$6 $renade and loaded his 0N%,% mounted grenade launcher before taking aim for that one group of rocks. , second later the rifle recoiled back and sent a fast moving grenade into the small pile of rocks behind which his adversary was hiding. The explosion sent fragments of the rock flying into the air and left a hanging dust cloud where the 7hinese soldier had been. *ut there were more, and a second later another group of charging enemy soldiers emerged from behind the dust cloud. )alf a doAen of themHand while *awe!a sent another 7hinese soldier into the ground with yet another accurate shot, the rest of the group were suddenly strafed with 6M$

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bullets that left all five of them motionless after the dust cleared. *awe!a looked to his right and gave the approving nod to the crew of the 6M$ who were several metres away, in a separate foxhole, as they resumed their burst fire against another group of 7hinese soldiers. The weapons fire continued for some more seconds and left another half doAen 7hinese soldiers dead before the fire slackened off, and both sides ceased fire. The first wave of 7hinese infantry had been halted by the 0ndian defences, and the response from the 0ndian side was led by a bunch of hoarse shouts of exhilaration as the 0ndian troopers celebrated the momentary victory. The fact that it was momentary was not disputed. The 7hinese commanders were simply regrouping, and their first attacks had brought them within three doAen metres of the 0ndian defences. 9espite the expected heavy casualties, the next wave would take them much closer. ,nd the one after that would overrun the 0ndian defences. The luxury of relaxation between the next attacks was short, and it gave *awe!a and his men !ust enough time to remove the empty cartridges on their weapons and reload fresh and full rounds. Medics were running within the trenches as calls for them now came out. The 0ndian soldiers had taken relatively heavy casualties as well. *awe!a went around checking his men and asking about their ammunition situation as well as the casualties, and to his satisfaction, he found that although they had taken losses, the fighting morale was still high. 3specially after this minor victory. The men were ready and willing to fight. 0t was !ust as well because a few minutes later the first of the 7hinese mortar shells began to fall outside of the 0ndian trenches. The explosions were heavy, and the high vertical tra!ectory of the shells gave it much more accuracy when trying to hit entrenched defenders as against the heavy tube artillery that had pounded the same positions an hour ago. This was confirmed when at least two shells fell within the trenches and sent dirt and fire racing through the trench lines for many metres, killing several 0ndian troopers in the process. *ut for the most part the 0ndian lines withstood the barrage that left them covered with smoke and dirt clouds yet again. That was intentional of course, as the reduced visibility gave the 7hinese soldiers that much needed cover to charge up the small distance between them and the 0ndian lines. %ure enough, a chilling yell erupted from outside of the dirt and smoke that signalled the next wave of attacking 7hinese infantry as they clambered uphill. The 0ndian return fire was 1uick, heavy, and less accurate than before, thanks to the lowered visibility levels. This time there was no single shot or burst fire, but full automatic fire as the 0ndian assault guns and machine&guns swept their respective bearings with their deadly bullets. The only way the results were being known from within the smoke was when a shout died half way through and the intensity of the 7hinese shouts decreased. 0t wasn5t enough, and several 7hinese soldiers ran through from within the cloud to end up staring at the 0ndian defenders from several metres range only. Most were shot before they could reach the trenches, but a few managed to !ump into the trenches where they opened fire for barely more than a second before being gunned down from multiple directions from ranges of only a few feet. 0n all this madness *awe!a removed his sidearm from its holster after the rifle magaAine was expended, rather than trying to reload at that time. , yell immediately in front came out as a 7hinese soldier came out of nowhere and !umped into the trench to the right of 6t&7olonel *awe!a. *awe!a dispatched him with three 1uick rounds from his sidearm before he could bring his rifle into a firing position. The dead 7hinese soldier went crashing down on the ground covered with empty cartridges. 0t wasn5t over yet, and another two 7hinese soldiers appeared behind this first one only to meet the same fate as the first one, albeit without even making it to the trench. *oth of them fell only a

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couple of metres away from the trench. 0t had taken five rounds from *awe!a5s sidearm to get the results. ,nd then it was silent again. *awe!a removed the almost empty clip from his sidearm and replaced it with a new one as he stood with his one leg resting on the body of the dead 7hinese soldier lying in his trench. )e brought up the weapon as he heard sounds coming towards him within the trench. 0t was a tense few seconds before he realiAed that the newcomer was an 0ndian trooper. *awe!a asked him to take position where another 0ndian soldier now lay motionless. *awe!a walked back to where his 0N%,% was and picked it up, dropping the empty magaAine and loading a new one. The sounds of the gunfight had died out, except for the odd single rounds being fired all around. That was when helicopter noises came out from behind the 0ndian lines. The ground in front of the trenches suddenly got covered with dust as heavy calibre bullets hit in waves. The 7hinese soldiers running on that ground towards the 0ndian lines were shredded as they ran, and several went dead even before they hit the ground. Then several unguided rockets streaked overhead and smashed into the same ground and sent inverted cones of fire raging into the sky. The 7hinese wave disappeared within the fire for the most part, and sent the survivors racing behind cover and away from the 0ndian defences. The dust cloud was still heavy over the trenches to see what was going on, but *awe!a didn5t need to. )e knew exactly what was going on. 0t became clearer as two stubby helicopters streaked overhead and momentarily cleared the hanging dust clouds to show the blue sky above.
To the besieged 0ndian soldiers within the trenches, it had never looked clearerH

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA RE"ION UST SOUTH OF THE SOUTHERN ED"E OF THE CHINESE COASTLINE 0,1' IST FRIDAY The skies above were clear. There was partial cloud cover but it was less than fifteen percent in most areas. 0t was the first pass of the day for this sector as far as the 0ndian 7artosat satellite was concerned. The 90, and the Navy had been keeping a wary eye on this region for the past three days, and so far it was appearing as if the 7hinese Navy, known as the #6,N, was not being deployed in this as yet early stage of the war. *ut wars of this kind grow old 1uickly, and it didn5t take long for the satellite to spot the hectic movements taking place at most of the 7hinese ports in the south&eastern sectors as well as the southern sectors of the 7hinese coastline. The message was clear. The 7hinese naval assets were putting out to sea. *ut there was more disturbing news in store for the 0ndian Naval 7ommanders. The last pass over the region had been at exactly ten minutes to midnight, and that was several hours ago. ,nd it took the photo& analysts only a few minutes to recogniAe the two main differences between the set of photographs taken then and those taken now. There were some berths in the port that were no longer occupied. The 7hinese submarines were no longer in the ports. , 1uick and actually somewhat frantic search was carried out of the surrounding seas and for the most part no success was achieved, nor was it expected. *ut a last search at high obli1ue angles finally spotted what looked like a dark, black cigar shaped structure submerging into the south china sea...and more importantly, heading south.
-ifteen minutes later a 6ieutenant&7ommander of the 0ndian Navy walked into the conference room of the N,77 where the 9efence Minister and the ,rmy and ,ir&-orce officers were winding up their meeting. The look on the naval officer5s face said it all. The 9efence minister sighed and sat down again as the map was shifted to a section and Aoomed out to now show the entire 0ndian "cean regionH

THE ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR COMMAND $ANC% THE SOUTHEASTERN INDIAN OCEAN RE"ION 0,*0 HRS $IST% FRIDAY

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"ne of the first people to be informed about the 7hinese naval threat apart from the 7N% was the 7ommander of the ,ndaman and Nicobar 7ommand, or the ,N7, and who in turn, ordered the immediate launch of a single 06&+C that was on the ground at #ort *lair and also ordered two 9o& ..Cs to be prepared for the Maritime surveillance mission. The activity at #ort *lair was hectic, and the ,T7 was a busy place. -lights were being diverted as space was being created for the Military aircrafts to scramble off the ground. 7ivilian flights that were on the ground were now ordered to stay there for the time being, and the already crowded tarmac was emptying fast. The weather was wonderful as far as flying was concerned, and a nice bright sun was up in the sky. %everal different aircrafts were being scrambled today. ,fter the four engine rumble of the 06&+C filled the sky and the massive beast lifted off the ground, there was a line of spectators to see it go. ,nd most of them did not miss the fact that this grey colored bird was carrying some long, thin cylinders below its wings. There were some informed spectators among the watchers who knew exactly what it was, and the fact that it was carrying those things at this time of crisis meant only one thing. Trouble was on its way. , few minutes after the departure of the 06&+C, the noise of an engine spooling up again filled the airfield grounds as the rotor blades of the :a&+' began to rotate as the pilots started up the systems on board on the directions of the ground crewmen. Three minutes later it was ordered into the air, and the stubby helicopter lifted off the ground and headed east, deploying its ,3/ Radar after the undercarriage had been retracted and the flight altitude increased. This was the 0%R Node that the ,N7 was waiting to get in the air. ,t the ,N7 7+0, "perators from all three services were sitting in the large control centre where the massive radar plot of the entire region under ,N7 control was visible. ,s soon as the :a&+' deployed its radars, the existing radar range plot expanded substantially, and brought into view a lot of unknowns. Many were 1uickly classified as harmless, being either airlines or civilian aircrafts. %ome were identified as the military aircrafts belonging to the 0ndonesian ,ir -orce, and some others that belonged to the Malaysian ,ir -orce. -inally, some were identified as belonging to the Myanmar ,ir force. Most of the last mentioned were flying combat missions against the 6oyalists in the southern half of the country as the civil war in Myanmar was raging. The aerial surveillance of the region was being handled by the somewhat inade1uate 0ndian Navy :a&+'s because of the total lack of the #halcon ,/,7% that were now totally committed to the battles on the borders of 0ndia and 7hina. There were simply no other aircrafts in this capability that could be diverted to the ,N7 for this role. ,s a result, the navy had stationed three of these helicopters with the ,N7 for the last three days with the understanding that should they be re1uired for any surface fleet taskforce, then they would be directed accordingly. 0n any case, for the time being the Navy had a large enough fleet of the ,3/ )elicopters for its current role. 0n the 3/ role, however, the ,R7 had based a single *&;(; on the islands. This was the next aircraft to lift off the ground with all four of its engines screaming at full power. This was the second node of the aerial 0%R network, and the presence of this aircraft allowed the ,N7 7+0 centre to establish %0$0NT and 360NT on the going&ons of the region. 0t had been doing this !ob for the last three days with respect to Myanmar5s southern regions, trying to find out intelligence on the civil war going on there. Now, however, the aircraft headed east, and its eyes were and ears were scanning the straits of Malacca. -inally, the last group of aircrafts to begin deployment were what amounted to the teeth of the ,N7 air defence. The No. > %1uadron had deployed to the islands at the beginning of the crisis three days ago, and were now on the ground at the various small airfields that had been brought up to working standard in the last few years. Three alert ready %2&+(M:0s lifted off the ground even as one of the last military aircraft on the ground began to spool up its engines. This was the single 06&;C Mid&,ir Tanker bird that was allocated to the ,N7. *y the current standards, and operational demands, the single tanker aircraft was woefully inade1uate, but it was all that the 0,- could afford to allocate here. ,nd even this had been taken off its "R*,T after much heartburn at high command, which was already struggling to cope with the demands of the air operations along the Tibet and ,# *orders.

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This single 06&;C would therefore be hard pressed to refuel all available strike assets. To reduce this workload, two of the %2&+(M:0s that were also on the ground were being fitted with the *uddy&refuelling e1uipment. This forced them to be taken off the "R*,T but also allowed the ,N7 to keep at least a decent number of aircrafts in the air at any one time. *esides, the air threat was not perceived to be severe as the only 7hinese aircraft carrier was still under construction at the shipyards.

SOUTHERN CHINA 0,*' IST FRIDAY -ar from the frontlines, and away from any observation, sixteen 7hinese aircrafts were being loaded with expensive ordinance at three different airfields. 3ight other aircrafts were being fuelled up to act as the tankers for the twenty %2&+(M:: fighter&bombers and %2&++ fighters of the #6,N who were getting ready to lift off the ground at various airfields. The timing had been chosen properly. There was thick dark clouds above many 7hinese airbases, and that meant that as the eight tanker versions and sixteen cruise&missile carrier versions of the )&> lifted off one after another, they escaped the view of the 0ndian satellites. The 90, thus remained unaware of the bomber threat, and no warnings were initiated to anybody. They did, however, see the fighters getting ready, but the threat was analysed as being future based. The only warning the ,N7 received was about the fighters being made ready for combat, probably after several hours, no less.
0n the meantime, the twenty four heavy 7hinese aircrafts turned southwards, at which point they were soon over Myanmar airspace, where a few of the pro&7hinese rebel M0$&.= fighters formed up alongside the massive formation as it headed south against an unsuspecting island fortress.

THE NATIONAL AIRBORNE COMMAND CENTRE $NACC% CALL SI"N: PATRIOT)EA"LE SECURE TARMAC AREA, LOHE"AON AFS 0,#' IST FRIDAY The empty berths in the naval harbours can be seen hereHand in this image you can see them hereHand here. -urther, here in thisH? The brief was interrupted by the raised hand of the 9efence Minister. The 6ieutenant&7ommander removed the pointing&stick from the point on the board he was showing. %on, 0 will take your word that the commie subs are not in their ports. 9on5t waste time in trying to convince me to that effect. /hat 0 want to know is how they sneaked past our surveillance. 0n the last meeting 0 was told that there was little activity within these ports. /hat the hell happenedI? the voice was stern but not rude. The reply was straightforward8 %ir, the facts you state are true. There was little activity the last time we checked. *ut that last time was near midnight. There was poor cloud cover in many areas and 90, decided that the few space assets we have be diverted to cover the opening frontline over 6adakh and to monitor activities in the North&east. The second pass was not made until a half&hour ago. 0t was then noticed that the 7hinese had surged out their submarines during this time. Nonetheless, given the short time between these two passes, the 7hinese were not able to surge everything out. Most of their surface fleet is still in port, getting ready. ,nd the submarines were only able to move a certain distance before our birds came overhead. ,s a result, we were able to spot the last of these vessels submerging after leaving port.?

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%o we know where they are headingI? the 9efence Minister asked. Ges. The subs we spotted were heading south.? that5s obvious enoughHdumb 1uestionH"kay, 6et5s try thisHThe defence Minister Thought. )ow many vessels have been surged outI? /e counted at least half a doAen. More are launching now as we speak. /e expect the entire 7hinese submarine force to be heading into the %outh 7hina %ea within the next several hours. /e expect the first of the 7hinese submarines to enter the 0"R within the next twelve hours.? The answer caused the non&Naval officers and chiefs of staff to look at each other as a sudden atmosphere of discomfort entered the room. This is about the crux of itHtime to get the ,dmiral on the phoneH /here is the 7N%I? the 1uestion was directed yet again at the lone Naval officer in the room. )e was beginning to feel real lonely against the wall of medals staring at him from across the table. *ut his voice did not show what he felt. %ir, the ,dmiral is at the 3astern Naval )ead1uarters. )e is coordinating current Naval "perations along with the 7ommander of the 3astern -leet.? $et him on the phone.? Ges sir.? The 6ieutenant&7ommander got up and left the room to make the arrangements. 0n the meantime a $roup&7aptain entered the conference room and spoke 1uietly with the 7,% before waiting behind his commander. The 7,% bent forward in his seat as he looked at the 9efence Minister. %ir, the ,ircraft has been refuelled and is ready to take off again. 0 suggest we get the N,77 airborne immediately.? The response from the minister was a slight shake of the head. Not yet. 0 want to get this naval thing sorted out before we do that. )owever, inform the #M about the situation. /e will depart as soon as 0 have spoken to the ,dmiral.? The 6ieutenant&7ommander entered the room once again and took his seat. %econds later the digital screen showing the map of the 0"R switched to a screen showing the 7N% in his command centre. The ,dmiral spoke before the Minister could. %ir, 0 am guessing that you have been briefed about the 7hinese submarine threat that we will now be facing within the next twelve hours. 0 think it5s about time we discussed our defensive and offensive options.? The Minister laid back in his seat. $o on.? 6et me begin by briefing you about the recent activities taking place within the *ay of *engal. ,s you know, by the direct orders of the government, all 0ndian Naval forces were tasked with the sole responsibility of maintaining a forward stance and a continuous 0%R Network in the 0"R. This order was initiated two days ago, and has been carried out diligently. /e are currently maintaining a thorough surveillance from the air, space and through sensors. 0n addition, all naval surface vessels belonging to the 3astern -leet have been on patrol in the region as part of two taskforces. Taskforce ,lpha was created around the 7arrier 0N% iraat and holds in it the 0N% Balashva and most of our other ,mphibious assault platforms. Taskforce *eta was created around the 7arrier 0N% ikramaditya and its air group. This force is our primary offensive taskforce and consists of most of our advanced surface vessels. 0n addition, we activated a third Taskforce around all our submarines. This is Taskforce 7harlie.

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K*ut 7harlie is not yet ready to begin deployment. /e are still bringing together our submarines from the western fleet and the eastern one and sending them off to separate sectors within the region. -urther, the ,N7 has been activated and is now on full alert. 0t is deploying its aircrafts and 0 have been told that the first two %2&+(M:0s are ready to move into patrol over the mouth of the straits of Malacca. 0n essence, this will be our fourth and final Taskforce. To be 1uite honest we have a substantial combat force out to sea and these give us several options.? ,nd what are those optionsI? the 9efence Minister asked. /ell, for one thing, Taskforce ,lpha was created around our ,mphibious ,ssault ships for a reason.? The 7ocos 0slands.? it was a statement and not a 1uestion. The Minister began to see the chess pieces being arranged by his admirals. -or once he was impressed8 ,dmiral, when can Taskforce ,lpha begin operationsI? 0t5s ready to be activated now. ,ll that needs to be done is to take out the probable locations where the 7hinese coastal defence Missile batteries might be placed using surgical strikes. ,lthough we doubt any such batteries, we have still finaliAed the locations on the island that could be used for such an attack. There are also a few buildings and so on that needs taking out.? The 9efence Minister looked at $eneral %inha. )is response was simple8 There is a single *rahmos Missile Regiment deployed with the ,N7. 0t was flown in two days ago at the beginning of the crisis. ,dmiral, how many targets have you locatedI? -ive. ,ll well within range of the ,N7 batteries.? %inha 6ooked at the 9efence Minister. $ood. $eneral, 0 presume that there are enough troops on those ships for the !ob at handI? More than enough, sir. /e have around a *rigade worth of troops on board those naval ships. This was one of the contingencies that were built into the planning beforehand. /ith air support from the iraat5s )arriers, and Naval gunfire support, we can take the islands in no time. There really is not much of a 7hinese threat from the islands, and we can overwhelm them within a matter of a few hours.? 3xcellent. 0 will present the plan to the #M. $et everything in position so that as soon as 0 get the nod from my superiors, 0 want you to tell me that the cruise missiles are already airborne. 2nderstoodI? the defence Minister said. Ges %ir.? /as the simultaneous reply from the 7N% and the 7",%. The next 1uestion was directed towards ,7M *hosale in a somewhat !olly manner. 7an we get airborne nowI? the 7,% !umped to his feet and followed the $roup&7aptain outside the room. Minutes later the #M5s vehicle convoy pulled up near the aircraft on the tarmac even as the first sounds of the turbofan engines spooling up filtered through the cabin. , few minutes later the #M walked into the conference room and sat down at the head of the table. 3verybody else was asked to leave the room before the #M broached the 1uestion. %o what have you been up to, RaviI? Gou are going to love this, ,tul. "ur admirals have come up with something that will finally allow us a 1uick victory to give to the 0ndian people. 0t will also remove a thorn that has been on our side for far too long in the *ay of *engal. They Navy guys are calling it "peration %3,& %TR0:3H? INDIAN ARMY POSITIONS THE HILLS NORTHEAST OF TAWAN"

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0,#' IST FRIDAY The day had started uneventfully for the area. The 7hinese had not attacked even after the sun had come up over the region to reveal the beginning of the third day of the war. The bright sunlight and the blue skies now revealed the scale of the carnage of the bitter night battles that had been fought several hours ago between the 0ndian and 7hinese forces. The horiAon to the north was covered with innumerable black pillars of smoke rising into the cool air of the morning. The 0ndian artillery had started up again half an hour ago, and this time it had begun to hit the 7hinese armour attempting to move across south on the road from *um&6a. 3ach pillar of smoke therefore in all probability represented a burning tank hulk. 0t was a pleasant sight for any 0ndian commander. *ut for Ma!or #atel standing on the northernmost hill in 0ndian hands, with binoculars to his eyes, 7hinese tanks were not the main concern. 0t was the 7hinese infantry that had been moving through the hills all the way to the south through the night that was concerning him. The only good thing was that the skies had cleared during the last few hours to allow the 0ndian unmanned air vehicles to get back up in the air and start looking for things. 0n addition to the %earcher&00s now flying, the local Mountain 9ivision in charge of the defence of Tawang was now deploying Neshant 2, s to go up and take a look. ,nd the view wasn5t pretty. The real&time data showed the 7hinese infantry moving south, using the thick forest cover&or what remained of it&to good advantage. 0t also gave them far too much coverage than what the ,rtillery 7ommand at Tawang would have desired, which was why their focus was on the 7hinese tanks that were in the open !ust south of *um&6a. ,nd the fire was immense and devastating. The weather may have been clear but the noise was not. There was a constant rumbling being felt as the man made thunder rained down on the 7hinese. *ut #atel couldn5t have cared less at the moment. 6ess than five minutes ago one of his officers had spotted movement to the far north. , few seconds after that first yell, so had he. ,nd it had been a full three minutes ago when he had radioed the information to the Regimental )< on the ridge !ust south of his position. )e was still looking at the ant like movement of the 7hinese using his binoculars when his radioman next to him closed his eyes as he listened intently into his headset and started nodding before calling out his 7". Ma!or #atel walked back to him and took the RET headset from his radioman after being told that it was his Regimental )< calling for him. #atel continued to stare north at the white and brown peaks while he spoke with his Regimental 7". *623 6eaderH*e advised, we have -riendly&,ir inbound. 0 say again, -riendly&,ir inbound. 3T, over ," in three minutes. #repare the reception. "ver and "ut.? The line went dead almost as abruptly as it had started, only to be replaced by static. *ut it gave Ma!or #atel what he wanted to hear. )e called out for a young 7aptain who had been attached to his group beforehand to work as a -,7, or -orward&,ir&7ontroller. The concerned officer came running and began to coordinate with #atel5s radioman after removing his backpack from his shoulders and taking out from it the re1uired -,7 e1uipment and ,uthentication codes for the day that would allow him to communicate in real&time with the pilot of the attacking aircrafts. The Radioman made the changes in the settings of his radio as he also handed over the headset to the 7aptain. #atel was standing nearby and 1uietly watched as the two men in front of him moved 1uickly and professionally to set up what now amounted to a forward coordination centre for the attacking aircrafts, allowing them to pinpoint the enemy forces in con!unction with the data being given by the 2, imagery and thus conduct highly accurate and lethal attacks. The 7aptain removed from his backpack a battlefield 6aptop computer which he then connected via cables to the modified radio e1uipment. , few seconds later he was busy tapping into the keyboard on the computer as he spoke with the 2, 7oordination centre at the regimental 7#. )is computer screen then lit up with the 2, image feed. , few seconds after that he finished sending his information marked out on the 2, feed to the #ilot of the incoming aircraft. Then he

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spoke into the headset and looked up to #atel and told him what was being sent in, its composition, its cargo and 3T,. This time it was to be a single M0$&.; coming in with a full bomb load&out of 7luster&Munitions, the desired weapon of choice given the terrain, the enemy makeup and their layout. The -,7 continued to hand out specific coordinates to the M0$&.; pilot that allowed him to double check the data in front of him that had been given out by the %earcher teams. , few seconds later the 7aptain 1uietly nodded as he heard the pilot5s reply and then looked at Ma!or #atel before raising two fingers and pointing with his arms to the southwest. This was what #atel wanted to hear. )e shouted out for all his men to hear8 3verybody, listen up. /e have friendly aircraft coming overhead in two minutes from the southwest. 9o not open fire on it. #repare yourself. 0 don5t want any knee&!erk reaction fire, understandI? the response was a silent nod or a mumbled grunt. ,ll 0nfantry personell feared the low level screaming attack aircrafts. ,t the altitude they flew in, there was never a way of telling what the pilot saw and what he attacked. 7ombined with the difficult terrain, the chances of fratricide were heavy to say the least. The attack was meant to be a single pass only, since that gave the pilot a good chance to avoid any, if not all, enemy missile fire. 0t also meant that the first and only pass could be made at very low level, at !ust enough altitude to be able to accurately drop the cluster&bombs. The pass was also going to be at full supersonic speeds, and at full afterburner, so that there was literally no sound before the aircraft was actually overhead. This prevented the enemy from taking cover before the attack. -or this mission the target chosen was the hill slopes on a single side of the road coming south from *um&6a that was now literally covered with 7hinese soldiers heading cautiously to the south. The 0ndian soldiers knew what was in store, but the 7hinese soldiers did not. Ma!or #atel was looking to the southwest behind him and was able to make out the small speck against the blue sky that suddenly emerged over some hilltops before it dashed overhead. *y the time he brought his eyes to see the target Aone, the ground underneath his feet suddenly shuddered both from the noise of the aircraft noise catching up as well as the crumpling noise of the sub&munitions dispensed from the cluster bombs as the full war load of the M0$&.; smashed down on the snow covered hill slopes, leaving the target Aone covered in a low hanging dust and smoke cloud. 9oAens of trees had caught fire and were burning furiously when the dust and smoke cleared. The white sheet of snow that had been covering the slope of the hill was no more. ,ll that remained was a burnt brown&black ground and the burning trees all over the slope. There was one more thing to note8 there was no more movement on that hill slope. Ma!or #atel was still doing the *9, in his head when the aircraft screamed overhead again as it dashed southwest where it had come from. There was no enemy return fire. There had literally been no time for that. The -,7 was busy returning the *9, assessment of his own to the pilot over the radio while the 0ndian soldiers were busy staring at the now burning hillside that had 1uite literally been an immaculate white colour beautiful hillside !ust several seconds ago. The ant like movement of the 7hinese soldiers on one side of the road had been stopped dead in its tracks within a matter of seconds. ,ll the 0ndian soldiers could do to comprehend the situation was stare silently as the -,7 continued to act professionally when all his instincts were asking him to leap up in the air with a !oyous shout. 60M,&"N3. 9elivery on target. Target survival probability is Pero. )ave a nice day. "ver and out.?

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This brought an end to the first attack mission of the day. Ma!or #atel put a tick mark in his mental scoreboard that read8 9ay threeHRound "ne...0ndia "ne, 7hina PeroHV INDIAN ARMY POSITIONS THE HILLS NORTHEAST OF TAWAN" 0(1' IST FRIDAY The cold had extinguished all of the burning trees within minutes. The fresh snow was beginning to fall back on the charred landscape to again cover it with a fresh layer of white. The smoke and dust clouds had all but settled down. 3xcept for the continuous, deep muffled thunder that everybody felt reverberate through their bodies, the valley was tran1uil again. 3verything was back where it had been twenty minutes ago, including Ma!or #atel who had recovered back to his earlier stance of looking through the binoculars towards the north. The 7hinese infantry movement to the south had been stopped yet again. ,gain they had suffered heavy losses, and to the frustration of the 0ndian commanders, they were preparing to move south again. ,s far as Ma!or #atel was concerned, the 7hinese were still licking their wounds. Their movement on both sides of the road had been stopped twenty minutes ago by a single 0ndian M0$&.; who had wiped out the eastern part of that manoeuvre with a single low level strike. That strike alone had left this unfortunate 7hinese battalion stuck on a single, western side of the road. ,nd they were waiting there now, collecting their wounded survivors from the eastern side of the north&south road. They were right there, in front of him, but he could not touch them because he had no long&range firepower at his disposal. 0n this aspect the 7hinese decision to bring tanks along in this inhospitable terrain was proving correct, since it was taking the attention of every 0ndian artillery gun in the sector. The 7hinese tanks were taking losses, severe ones at that, but it also meant that they were helping give their infantry a free reign to the south. ,nd the tree cover doesn5t help muchHMa!or #atel thought as he stared silently, trying to find out what the 7hinese soldiers were doing. They were !ust sitting there, as far as he could tell. They should have been moving south. They were wasting valuable daylight time. 0t took Ma!or #atel a second before the obvious came to him. They were waiting for something to happen. /aiting...but for whatI #atel removed his binoculars, picked up his 0N%,% rifle from the snow covered rocks and began to walk back down the slope towards the hand dug&trench that his radioman and his -,7 had dug for themselves behind the cover of some trees. )e called out to the radioman who got to work instantly, trying to tune into the fre1uencies for his radio to patch up with the Regimental )< on the northern slope of the ridge behind this peak where the 0ndian defenses were located. )e handed over the radio speaker to the Ma!or as he kneeled down to pick it up. )e was soon on the line with the 7olonel. This is *623 6eader. 0 am re1uesting an 0ntelligence 2pdate on 7hinese movements in sector Three&-ive&Nine&*ravo. 0 have the commies in my sight but they are not moving. /hat the hell is going onI "ver? Ma!or #atel said into the speaker. *623, be advised, there are no intelligence updates at this time. /ill update in future. 0s there anything else to reportI "ver? the 7olonel5s voice said. Negative. ,ll 1uiet here. 0 have the 7hinese infantry in my scopes. ,ny chance for artillery supportI 0H? Ma!or #atel !erked his head upwards as the blue skies above were interrupted as something streaked over their heads and to the south. 0t was !ust there for a moment and then it was gone. *ut #atel knew what it was.

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,nd sure enough, a fraction of a second later an ear&shattering thunder echoed through the valley and the ground shook violently under the feet hard enough to shake the snow loose of most trees. %mall rocks came loose and were rolling down the mountain even as #atel5s instinctive reaction was to throw the radio speaker and grab his 0N%,% rifle a full second before the rest of his men did the same in their foxholes. The thundering seemed to echo within the peaks forever, and yet it had only been seconds. #atel was one of the first to reach the top of the hill they were on so that he could see !ust what had happened. ,nd the sight wasn5t pretty at all. Two massive black pillars of fire were reaching for the sky from the 0ndian positions on the south ridge. The main 0ndian defensive line had been struck, and struck hard. "ne of the smoke pillars seemed to be coming from the general direction of #atel5s Regimental )<. )e was struggling to control his shock even as he asked his radioman to get him the 7olonel, half expecting the answer he didn5t want to hear. 0t took a few seconds for his radioman to try his best to achieve the impossible before he gave up. %ir, 0 cannot get the )< on the radioH? the voice trailed off as the significance of what he was saying caught up with the young soldier. My godHthe 7olonel was in thereH *ut #atel was already looking at the second #illar of fire that seemed to be coming from a position further to the south. %omething else had been hit, but it was impossible to tell what. , few seconds later one of #atel5s men shouted a warning and a second later several more shiny, metallic, cylinder shaped ob!ects streaked over the mountain top and streaked southwards. This time there was return fire from the 0ndian air defences, and a Tunguska vehicle blasted a single 7hinese cruise missile out of the sky as it passed over its position. The explosion shattered the ground below and sent doAens of trees burning as the multi&hundred :ilogram warhead of the missile detonated in the air close to the ground. *ut many more missiles went uninterrupted and soon thereafter the ground shook once again, albeit much less violently as more targets were hit to the south, sending more black pillars racing into the bright blue sky. Ma!or #atel was standing there, on the top of his hill, 0N%,% in one hand and the other hand balled into a fist as he muttered out curses to himself because of the helplessness he felt as the explosions rocked the horiAon to the south. #atel5s radioman was busy trying to get any 7ommand centre on the line. *attalion )< was still there, but the Regimental )< was goneHso was the *rigade )<Hand so were several communication links. #atel looked around. The 7hinese had !ust taken out his 7ommand link. )e could not know, nor could he predict what kind of chaos was flooding the radio waves as one infantry unit after another was on the radio trying to find out what was going on. The last of the cruise missiles had hit a few seconds ago, and now there were at least a doAen black pillars of smoke racing into the sky. %oHthat was what they were waiting forHthe bastardsL Now #atel knew what was coming. )e was already walking back towards his foxhole a full ten seconds before the first shout ran out from one of his officers to the east8 the 7hinese infantry was moving south again, heading towards themH ,ll the 0ndian soldiers ran into their foxholes and the M$ crews settled down into a firing position even as #atel was silently looking around. )e didn5t utter a single word, but his mind was racing continuously8 "kayHso now they have finished their stand off stuff, they are moving south. 0 no longer have contact with my artillery fire, so 0 should be retreating. *ut the line behind me has !ust been hit hard. The 7# is gone. The 7olonel is probably gone as well. %o the %enior *attalion 7ommander should be taking over command by now. *ut they need time to get reorganiAed. /ithout organiAed defences, we will be overrun. 7an5t let that happen. /e have to buy timeL %o that5s where 0 come into the pictureH

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Ma!or #atel picked up his rifle even as shouted out to all those around him and explained what he intended to do. They were going to fight and then retreat. They were going to delay the 7hinese !ust long enough for the rear defences to get organiAed and get back on their feet. /ithin seconds of his orders being dictated, the 0ndian soldiers were scrambling into their foxholes, rifles facing northwards. #atel found a good position for himself from where he had excellent fields of fire on an enemy further below on the slope. -ive minutes later the 7hinese were into view for the first time without the binoculars. , few minutes after that the first screeching noise was heard in the air above... 0ncomingLL? That first Mortar round crashed into the ground a full ten metres in front of the forward most 0ndian foxhole. The three 0ndian soldiers in the foxhole were unhurt but covered with snow. Then more rounds landed and then yet more. ,nd then came that chilling yell as the first 7hinese 7rack troops started their suicidal run up the slope to face the 0ndian 0N%,% rifles trained out on them. 0n all the confusion and noise #atel checked his Rifle MagaAine to make sure he had a full set of rounds before loading it into the rifle and chambering the first round. )e brought up the rifle to shoulder level and pulled it in. )is fingers were on the metallic trigger now and he was feeling its pressure even as the first unaware 7hinese ran into his gun&sight. #atel focussed his aim on his first target8 "kay you commies, bring it onLH6et5s do thisL THE NATIONAL AIRBORNE COMMAND CENTRE $NACC%
CALL SI"N: PATRIOT EA"LE AIRSPACE OVER MAHARASHTRA 0+00 IST FRIDAY The M0$&.=s had taken up their usual position alongside the lumbering ,irborne 7ommand post. The flight had broken the top cloud cover almost together and was greeted by a bright sunny blue sky above. 0t was bright enough, in fact, to force the passengers to pull down the shades on the windows. 0nside the aircraft, however, a different kind of heat was on. The 9efence Minister was inside the 7ommunications cabin of the aircraft alongside the 7",% and the ,ir 7hief. They were busy monitoring the incoming transmissions from the 0 7orps 7ommander in ,runachal #radesh. ,t least, they had been trying toH ,ll 7ommunications from 0 7orps )< had ceased fifteen minutes ago very abruptly. The 7ommunications officers on board the aircraft were being chewed by their seniors to try and regain contact. *ut that stopped after the &7",%, currently in the $)< in 9elhi called to confirm that they too had lost contact. Then the other two 7orps 7ommanders in the region, commanding the DDD000 and 000 7orps respectively, had called in to say that they too had lost contact with 0 7orps. More commanders were filling the radio waves, but it was suffice to say that 0 7orps had dropped out completely. The 9efence Minister and the 7",% were half expecting the worst possible news when it came forward from a different source altogether. The ,ir -orce 3,7 7ommander had called in almost as soon as the rest of the army people to say that one of his M0&'; crew had visually confirmed that doAens of black pillars of smoke were reaching for the sky around 0 7orps head1uarters area as well as from other important bases in the region. The 2, 7rews at *omdila were also checking in by that time to inform that similar fires had been spotted near Tawang as well. They, however, had more definite news as to what had happened. *eing directly above the action, their screens had captured the 7hinese cruise missiles moving south for a few seconds. *ut that did not entail enough time for them to send out a warning to anybody before the impacts. The fact that their own base had escaped destruction was because they were not using their traditional base to the south near the 0 7orps )<. This latter base had also been hit, but the 2, s had not been there. 0t had taken good luck or in&depth foresight by someone to come up with the idea to move these units further to the north for a variety of reasons !ust before the war had started. Nevertheless, the end result was that the 7hinese had attempted to neutralise the 0ndian 2, force in the region, but had completely missed them. *ut they had managed to hit numerous other targets using the element of surprise that their saturation tactics had allowed. 0 7orps )<

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was no more. %everal *rigade )<s had dropped off the map as well. The 9ivisional )< at Tawang was still alive only because one of the few Tunguska systems north of there had destroyed a couple of 7ruise missiles as they had passed overhead. 0n return for this, one Tunguska unit lay wrecked after the massive warhead detonation close to it had shredded the top mounted radar and guns. This vehicle was now being pulled out from the battlefield. ,nd the survival of the 9ivisional 7+0 was only a partial victory since the 9ivisional 7ommander ad his staff were still trying to raise their *rigade )<s to no avail. 0t was like a head without a body. That was when the 9efence Minister took over the decision making role. )e ordered the 7",% to dispatch another $eneral "fficer from some other theatre to go over and take control of the ground situation. )e also ordered the 3,7 7ommander to dispatch his )elicopter force to allow the rapid movement of these new commanders and their staffs to re&establish the various command nodes. New e1uipment was to be brought in anyway it could. ,ll command centres were to be now dispersed. Then he gave the order that amounted to retribution. The *rahmos Missile batteries that had taken part in the N"RT)&%/0#3 "perations were to be reactivated from their dormant status levels. The 90, was ordered to prepare intelligence of the 7hinese command centres that were coordinating the 7hinese advance towards Tawang. The 9efence Minister was suitable impressed when he was told that all such intelligence was already being compiled for some time now. *ut he was forced to raise an eyebrow when he was told that most of these targets, barring the higher level ones, were already on 0ndian soil. The 7hinese were moving their command units south almost as fast as their fighting units. 0t was almost as if it had all been practiced and planned out.

,nd the crux of the statement was significant8 it was no longer a *order war. The 7hinese were now on 0ndian soil, and the war had come homeH

THE STRAITS OF MALLACCA

10&' IST FRIDAY The first sign of trouble for the 0ndians came much sooner than planned for by the 7hinese commanders. ,nd it was a result of the chaos that was present over the skies of Myanmar at this time. The #ro&7hinese forces were attacking the loyalists in the south of the country with all available aircrafts. *ut the loyalists had aircrafts too, and the Rebel pilots were understandably !erky. -urther compounding matters was that the Myanmar armed forces had a communications network that was patchy at the best of times, and this was hardly that. ,s a result, even though the 7hinese bombers had been given clearance to overfly the airspace by the rebel commanders, it still did not prevent one of their Mig&.= pilots to come up into the air and challenge a separate group of )&> 37M aircrafts on the issue of their over flight. 0t was yet another instance of what one might consider to be incompetence during peacetime but which was normal during war. The issue was resolved 1uickly, but not before the radio silence was broken, and the Myanmar communication networks were hardly what one can call secure, especially given the fact that the 6oyalists were already liaising with their 0ndian counterparts on the exact same issue for the past forty hours. 0n short, the 0ndians were reading most of what was being said in the air over Myanmar. The 7hinese knew this. ,nd it was why they had maintained total silence during their flight south. *ut this incident sent out a small whiff of the brewing trouble to the single 0ndian *&;(; 3/ aircraft flying out of #ort *lair where it was processed and analysed 1uickly. , few minutes after that the news was being sent out over encrypted networks to almost everybody in the ,N7 chain of command8 the 7hinese were coming... The problem was that the 0ndian eyes and ears had been facing east, not north. ,nd that was the first thing that needed rectification. The three 0ndian %2&+(M:0s flying to the east were ordered to scramble to the north, along with the single :a&+' ,3/ helicopter attempting to follow behind them. The other two :a&+'s on the ground at a secure helipad on the ,ndaman 0slands were also scrambled, along with the three more %2&+(M:0s that were at #ort *lair. The single 06&;C was told to meet up with the three %ukhois already in the air and tank them up before pulling away from the battle Aone. ,ll 0ndian Maritime surveillance platforms were also told to back off temporarily. The 7hinese threat was significant. ,nd to make matters worse, the 0ndian pilots did not know the numbers of enemy aircrafts. ,ll they had was bits and pieces of information intercepted by the 37M birds that told

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them that something was coming. 0t would take some time before the matters became clearer. 2nfortunately, any cruise missile launched by the 7hinese would be done from the outer limits of the missile capabilities. That meant that the chances of the 0ndian fighters meeting up with the 7hinese )&>s before they could launch was remote. The ,N7 commander understood this. )e had already sent out -lash messages to the 0ndian ,rmy 7ommander who commanded the 0nfantry brigade to tell his men to scatter into their defensive positions. )e had also ordered the immediate surge of all remaining naval and civilian ships still in port on all islands. The civilian side to this was worrying. The number of 0ndian vessels still in the waters around the islands ran into the doAens, from the smallest fishing vessels to Merchant ships, and these were spread out over a very large area of the sea around the islands. The 7hinese would surely be gunning for these unarmed 4economic5 targets, and all he had to protect them, his command and the 0ndian control over the islands was a doAen or so Naval aircrafts and another half a doAen 0,- aircrafts. The bottom&line was clear8 he needed help. ,nd the only help around was too far to reach him in time. *ut he called out for it anyway... THE BAY OF BEN"AL 10'' IST FRIDAY "n the other end of his helpline was a person who was looking through his binoculars from the bridge while his !uniors were frantically working to get the !ob done. The first M0$&.=: screamed forward and leaped off the steel deck with a full load of missiles underneath the wings. The undercarriage came up and the afterburner went off several seconds after that. , second aircraft was already taking its position on the flight deck, while a third and then a fourth awaited their turns. The ,dmiral removed his binoculars and walked over to chart table where the 7aptain of the ship was buried in his thoughts. The problem was clear to both men8 they were too far away. The threat axis !ust was not covered enough. *y the time these aircrafts would reach the combat Aone, the 7hinese would be on the way home. ,nd that was precisely why the M0$&.=:s were not heading towards the combat Aone, but to a location north of it, where they would stay in a holding pattern. The 7hinese could not be stopped from making their attack runs this late in the game, but they were certainly not going home to tell about it either. Not if the commander of the 0ndian 7arrier Taskforce had anything to say about it...

INDIAN ARMY POSITIONS

LOCATION: #&:*1;#-6*<N, ,(:'*;#1-66<E THE LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL $LAC% EAST OF LEH, LADAKH 10 HRS FRIDAY The 7hinese were massing up their troops yet again. This time, however, their motive was clear. Maximum effort. No effort unexpended. Their Reserve *attalions had finished moving into the forward positions a few minutes ago. The 0ndian positions were already under heavy artillery fire for forty plus minutes now, and the positions were again covered with that all&too&familiar smoke and dust clouds as shell after shell rammed into the hilly terrain around the 0ndian trenches. The 0ndian aerial assault using the helicopters was long over, and was yet to return. The situation was vastly similar to the first round, but with two crucial differences8 this was to be the last such round as far as the 7hinese were concerned. 3ither the 0ndian positions would be overrun or the 7hinese assault force would be littering the rocks around the 0ndian trenches. The other ma!or difference was that this time around there was no confusion on the 0ndian side. 6ieutenant&7olonel *awe!a had lost doAens of soldiers by now, but what remained was a battle&hardened combat team. ,nd in the time during the attack by the 0ndian helicopter gun&ships, he had recovered his situational awareness after a new replacement team from Regimental )< had !oined him from the rear positions with a new set of 7ommunications e1uipment. *awe!a now had access to the same 0ndian artillery guns that had been at his disposal all along, but which he had not been able to call upon earlier thanks to the 7omm&*lackout within his *attalion. Now the 0ndian artillery lay in wait, its guns pointing eastwards and with its crews waiting to pull the lanyard that would send the first 0ndian artillery shells raining down on the 7hinese assault troops. The fact that they were not already doing so was because *awe!a had kept it that way. There were several reasons for this. "ne was the threat of the 7hinese 7ounter&artillery fire that could kill off his support even before the battle started should he commit too early on. The other was that he wanted to let the 7hinese think it was their game. )e wanted the artillery to drop on the enemy at the last possible moment, when they

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were charging up the open hills towards his positions. 0t also gave time to the 0ndian #inaka *atteries that were mopping up one 7hinese ,rtillery battery after another in a counter&battery mode that the 0ndian )igh 7ommand had committed them as, to kill the 7hinese artillery that was pounding his positions. )e had been told over the radio that the #inaka crews were having a ball of sorts. They were crushing the 7hinese artillery systems within 6addakh because they outranged the 7hinese tube artillery by a long margin. 0n effect, they were facing Aero 7ounter&*attery fire as they lay waste to the 7hinese guns up and down the 6,7. The fact that *awe!a5s position was still under the effect of the 7hinese artillery was more due to the vast number of guns with the 7hinese army than anything else. 0n other words, it was going to take some time before all of the 7hinese guns had been neutraliAed, and till that time, some 0ndian positions would continue to suffer. That his position was among the unlucky ones was pure coincidence. Nevertheless, he was more relaxed this time than he would have been without that piece of news behind him. *o the war here is not going as badly as ) thought. +ood The 7hinese commanders directly in front of him probably were aware of the situation around them !ust as 6t&7olonel *awe!a was, and that helped explain the desperation within their moves8 they were trying to get as much out of their initial advantage as possible before they were bogged down by the 0ndian artillery. 0t also meant that they were probably not as well prepared here as they appeared to be in ,runachal #radesh.

*awe!a was no fool. )e was very much a thinking soldier as he was a tiger when it came to close combat situations. )e was clever enough to take the actions of the 7hinese soldiers and calculate from it the thoughts of their commanders and from that the overall enemy strategy or planning. ,nd while he made a mental note to address this point later on, it did hatch some interesting ideas in his head.

INDIAN ARMY POSITIONS

LOCATION: #&:*1;#-6*<N, ,(:'*;#1-66<E THE LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL $LAC% EAST OF LEH, LADAKH 10*0 HRS FRIDAY The first movement was detected by the alert 0ndian defenders within moments. The 7hinese infantry force was advancing. This was detected despite the heavy artillery bombardment that was still hitting the 0ndian positions. The lingering dust clouds from the bombardment were not sufficient to block out the movement of such a large infantry force behind it. There seemed to be some rare lack of coordination among the 7hinese side, because their artillery was still dropping explosive rounds rather than the smoke rounds that were now necessary to mask the 7hinese movements. There was no explaining it, and to be sure, 6t&7olonel *awe!a did not care. )e already had his radioman next to him and the headset for the radio in his hands. 0t was time for the 0ndian artillery boys to !ump into the chaos... P262 6eader, 0 have guests at grid three&four&7harlie...relative. %uggest you bring in the sweets. "ver.? *awe!a spoke into the telephone like headset as he continued to look from his positions towards the 7hinese forces in the open area of the valley in front of him. They had now left their holding positions where they had had some cover due to the rocky terrain. No more. Roger. 0nitiating fire scheme8 47losing *rackets5. %tand by for simultaneous T"T.? 47losing *rackets5 was the nickname given by the local artillery commanders to the art of Aeroing in on an enemy target when it was extremely close to friendly forces, without using the traditional 4Ranging5 techni1ues. Traditional ranging was good only when there was space to play around in, and the time for a local -,7 to ad!ust the fire until it was hitting the targets. 0n extreme cases, this was !ust not possible. %o the idea was to drop fire behind the advancing enemy which was then confirmed by the local -,7, and then to reduce the range 1uickly, thereby bringing the fire closer and closer to the friendly forces but also hitting all enemy forces that lay in between. )ow much to reduce the range by was decided after the first rounds hit the ground. 0t was in effect the range between the point of contact of those rounds and the minimum safe distance in front of the friendly defences. T"T was the acronym for 4Time "n Target5, and simultaneous T"T therefore implied a instantaneous impact for all rounds fired by the battery. 0n effect, a rough line of fire drawn almost at once. %o the entire artillery

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scheme that 6t&7olonel had fixed for this battle involved moving these lines which were parallel to his defensive axis, in small steps closer and closer. This would be used to attack the successive waves of 7hinese troops in each such step. 0t also prevented them from retreating since the fire was dropping behind them and closing. This left the only way out as forward, and into the fire of the 0ndian rifles. 0n theory this was a decent plan. )owever, with all such plans, complications are found on the battlefield when it is actually put in effect. -or one thing, *awe!a5s -,7 could not see his hand in front of his face, let alone the 7hinese infantry on the bottom of the valley, because of the massive dust cloud and smoke being raised by the 7hinese artillery fire. 2nless this fire stopped, there was little in the way of control that could be exercised on the friendly artillery fire. There was also the risk that the 7hinese artillery control would use its counter&battery radars to find the 0ndian guns, which, being field artillery, had ranges much smaller than the 0ndian #inaka M6R% and was thus within range of 7hinese counter&artillery weapons. 0n other words, *awe!a had to decide exactly when to drop the fire on the 7hinese infantry to enable his artillery to finish the !ob and perhaps even escape from their current area before the 7hinese counter&bombardment started. This was no easy task, and it almost always came down to mathematical calculations, made worse by the fact that his one hand was holding the rifle and his other glued to the headset of the radio almost all the time. Nevertheless, *awe!a had done these calculations in his head along with the commander of the artillery battery some time ago. ,s for the artillery control, both had decided that the -,7 option was out of the 1uestion. 0n turn, )< had detached a Nishant 2, overhead some time ago and its crew were now continuously in touch and under the command of the Ma!or in charge of the 0ndian guns for this sector. This temporary attachment to the Ma!or5s unit allowed him to control his fire in much the same way as the -,7, but with lesser accuracy, mostly because seeing the enemy from above was not the same as seeing them on the ground and 4eyes&on5. ,lthough this seems contradictory, the -,7 exercises a much better control that a computer screen officer can ever do, even though the -,7 has limited visibility of the battlefield as compared to the 2, . *oth have their respective advantages and disadvantages, and the best result is actually the combination of the two. *ut for 6t&7olonel *awe!a, that option was not on the cards. ,s for the enemy counter&fire, there was nothing much to do other to keep the fingers crossed. The first #inaka battery was not going to be free to move fire into this sector for at least a few more hours, and by that time it might all be over, one way or another. To this effect *awe!a5s regiment had received a Military 0ntelligence, or M0, update some time back, and it suggested that the 7hinese had no counter&battery radars in this sector. -or *awe!a and the other regiment officers on the ground, it made no sense that the 7hinese would not deploy such systems in a sector where a ma!or battle was sure to take place because of the terrain. The bitter !oke among the artillery officers was that this report was more a 4boost your morale5 type rather than actual credible information. The artillery guns were all of the obsolete type that the ,rmy had been attempting to replace for decades now with no effect. The 7hinese guns on the other side of the 6,7 were of the modern, accurate kind. 0n fact, the only accurate artillery for the 0ndian ,rmy in the hills of 6addakh was the home&grown #inaka M6R% that had taken over the older Russian 4$rad5 systems in recent years. 2nfortunately, their numbers being low, the M6R% crews were almost entirely devoted at this time in the counter artillery role, using the ultra& long range rockets developed by 9R9" to outrange, outgun and kill the 7hinese artillery network beyond the 6,7. , similar work was being done by the %merch M6R% in the hills of ,runachal #radesh. *ut the 0ndian tube artillery was hopelessly outclasses both in numbers and 1uality by their 7hinese counterparts. 0t was a bunch of these systems that now found themselves supporting 6t&7olonel *awe!a and his besieged *attalion as the 7hinese infantry advanced towards them. ,t the battle itself, the 7hinese artillery fire was now dropping chemical smoke rounds around *awe!a and his men, providing a cover for their troops as they advanced up the gradual slopes to snatch the hills from the 0ndians. *awe!a had already ordered the bayonets to be attached to the rifles and was prepping his men for the hand to hand combat that was sure to take place once the 7hinese broke into view. "verhead, and slightly to the northwest to be out of the way for the artillery, a Nishant 2, was hovering undetected. The optics were already ad!usting the view even as the first of the 0ndian guns to the east began elevating their barrels...

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SKIES ABOVE THE BLUE WATERS 111' IST FRIDAY Roger, 0 have visual.? The pilot responded over the comm&link even as he held the helicopter altitude. , few minutes later the helicopter passed west of the last 0ndian radar picket node in the form of the 0N% Talwar5s -regat M.3M 4Top #late5 radar. , few minutes after that 0N% Talwar5s radar went silent and the ship changed course to the south to leave the designated high threat Aone. The pilot looked over to his navigator beside him silently even as the first 0N :a&+' ,3/ streaked over the blue waters and headed northwards. They now represented the most exposed node in the first and only line of defence around the ,N7. The pilot now increased power and allowed the helicopter to increase altitude. The flight was no longer covert, and as the helicopter engines screamed under the stress and the helicopter rapidly increased altitude, the ,N7 7+0 radar plot increased in radius as the line of sight of the 3&C('M ,3/ radar on board the helicopter increased further and further with a rapidly retreating horiAon. The helicopter was soon at five thousand feet and still climbing... AIRSPACE WEST OF BARREN ISLAND THE ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS 11*0 IST FRIDAY The Mission&7ommander looked over at the radar plot and was silently evaluating the positioning of his aerial assets above the muffled humming noise of the four large turbofan engines reverberating through the skin of the aircraft5s fuselage. )e had long forgotten what a smile was supposed to have been... The first :a&+'s were getting into position north of the islands and were taking over the !ob from the line of radar picket surface vessels that were now 1uite literally escaping from the area under total radar and communications silence. The flight of six %2&+(M:0s was in the air and patrolling in between the line of radar helicopters to the north and the single 06&;C tanker to their south and east of the islands. The other maritime anti&shipping aircrafts were basically hounding the few large 7hinese merchant vessels in the surrounding seas with simulated attack runs and low level passes even as the government considered whether to take the war to the next, 4economic5 level. *ut that was beside the point !ust about now as far as the M7 on board the *&;(; ,7# was concerned. )is !ob was to fight the air war. ,nd at the moment the 7hinese were on their way in far larger numbers than he was e1uipped to handle. )e had 7hinese )&>s bearing down on him with ,67Ms and anti&shipping ordinance and escorted all the way by #6,N %2&++s and #6,,%2&+(s. These were currently expected to flying southeast of Rangoon in Myanmar, and had not broken into the skies above the blue waters !ust yet, but that was only temporary. ,nd the truth of the matter was that he had no idea on how to approach this problem any more than the younger officers sitting in front of the radar consoles did. The only advantage on the 0ndian side was that they had a very well developed 0%R network deployed and basically knew everything that was needed to know about the upcoming battle. But what good does that do i% ) dont ha$e the da&n tools to do so&ething about it.. .The M7 thought even as the first contacts emerged on the radar plot and which when referenced on the geographical overlay confirmed that the 7hinese aircrafts were now flying south from the south& western coasts of Myanmar. The message from the console operator on board the *&;(; only made it official8

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-eet wet, feet wetL /e have inboundsL?

THE INDO)MYANMAR BORDER

MANIPUR 11#0 IST FRIDAY The men snapped to salute as the 6t&7olonel entered the tent and removed his beret. The temperature and humidity outside was not forgiving and the sweat on the faces of the 6t&7olonel and his small entourage showed it. 0t had taken an hour of driving through the thickly forested region on dirt roads barely wide enough to allow a single lane of movement either way. The bright sunlight meant that even looking outside the tents was impossible without a pair of sunglasses. The sticky heat was !ust as unforgiving as the movement through the traffic !am of military vehicles to this location had been. 0n short, 6t&7ol 7hauvan was not a happy man at the moment. The Ma!or in charge of the unit walked away from the charts laid out on a wooden table aside the bank of battlefield computers and radio sets and walked to greet his commanding officer. The talk was to the point in meaning but not rude in the tone8 /e are nearing the 3T6, $upta. 0s everything ready to rollI? 7hauvan asked. Ges sir.? The 0nfantry Ma!or said as he motioned his !unior officers to move out. ,s the small group of 6ieutenants and 7aptains walked out of the tent one by one after picking up their rifles and backpacks, the Ma!or turned to face 7hauvan again8 /e got some 0ntel on the enemy dispositions !ust across the border. Mostly 6oyalist units fighting for survival against the rebels. The logistical arteries are going to be a nightmare to maintain, though. The dirt tracks continue for at least another few doAen clicks beyond the 0*. 0 am counting on a stream of air&lifts to maintain my forces as they move across and secure consecutive dust&off points.? 9on5t worry. Gou will get the support you need. 0 will be !oining you when the ground convoys break through to the secured 9"Ps. 9o not progress beyond what is planned, even if the enemy action seems low. The last thing 0 want is to have a group of my best men wiped out because they overran their supporting elements. 2nderstandI? 7hauvan said. The reply from $upta was short8 Ges %ir.? , few minutes later both men walked outside the tent into the bright sunlight and the blue sky above. The dust flying into the air as the 6ancer helicopters streaked across the sky heading beyond the 0* made both men appreciate their decision to wear their sunglasses. The tents were on one side of the road heading to the border crossing, and one the other side of the road were a group of three *M# 3ngineer vehicles that would be heading the first recon&in&force efforts into Myanmar. *ut before they moved out, Ma!or $upta walked away to where his men were checking their rifles and e1uipment next to a large plain that had been carved out of the !ungle to act as the ,dvanced&6ogistics& 7entre and a -,R# or -orward&,rea&Rearming&#oint for the helicopters that were supporting the ground troops. 6t&7ol 7hauvan stared silently as he held his beret on his head with one hand as yet another helicopter, this time a 9hruv variant, streaked across the noon sky and headed beyond the hills of Manipur and into Myanmar. 7hauvan turned his attention next to the border crossing itself, and saw the stream of refugees walking in columns across the border under supervision from 0ndian soldiers and #olice units. The civil war in Myanmar was taking its toll on the country and its people, 7hauvan reflected. *ut in a much larger regional war now spreading by the hour, the fact of the matter was that both 0ndia and 7hina had written off Myanmar as a strategic casualty in their struggle for dominance. ,nd so 6t&7ol 7hauvan5s convoy, among many others, would be rolling across the border towards the western banks of the 7hindwin River in their assistance to the 6oyalist $enerals of Myanmar. ,nd in so doing, would only make sure that the stalemate in the civil war continued. 0t was in 0ndiaRs strategic interests to make sure that the 6oyalists were not defeated. 0t was in 7hinaRs interests to make sure the rebels were not defeated. ,ll in all, it was Myanmar that was to suffer. *ad, but so is the current state o% a%%airs elsewhere today...7hauvan thought.

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The more he thought about it the more he felt what most of the men under him were feeling8 they would rather fight the 7hinese head on in 6addakh or north of Tawang or even /along, which was not very far if the ,rmy )< was interested. *ut 7hauvan also knew one more thing8 his !ob was to execute at the tactical level, not plan at the strategic one. ,nd as the first T&;.s rolled down the turning on the road to the west, 7hauvan threw his doubts out of his mind. The time for that was now over, and there was no place in his thought process for anything that wasn5t concerned with his immediate mission. "nly one thing mattered8 his commanders had tasked him with reaching the 7hindwin as soon as possible. 000 7orps was about to open a new theatre in the ground war, and all other things were inconse1uential now...

THE UN"LES OF MYANMAR

11'0 IST FRIDAY Their identity was unclear. The four *urmese T&;.s were moving westwards towards the town of Tamu from the east leading a larger convoy of trucks and other soft&skinned vehicles. Tamu itself was by now all but deserted, being !ust across the border with Manipur. There were no 6oyalist or Rebel factions within the town itself, but within the last hour this convoy had been seen moving eastwards to the town, possibly bringing in a garrison force. ,nd that was what was making the 0ndian commanders across the border highly suspicious. ,n arrangement had been made with the 6oyalist 7ommanders at %ingkaling&)kamti to tell whatever units that were still under their control to move away from the border once the .'%T 0nfantry 9ivision of the 0ndian ,rmy and elements of the '%T ,rmoured 9ivision began to move across. To that effect all 6oyalist forces had been moving away all the way to the western banks of 7hindwin River during the last day. This convoy was moving in an opposite direction altogether... Roger. 0 have visual...? the pilot moved the control stick backwards and correspondingly the nose of the helicopter lifted up as the forward speed died and the chopper slithered into a hover a few feet above the swaying treetops. The systems operator was already settling into his part of the !ob now. Tell me you have ac1uisition.? The pilot ordered. %tand by...? was the reply as the gunner checked as to which one of his optronic packages would do the !ob for now. The outside weather was hot, humid and very bright and sunny. %o the -60R option was out of the 1uestion. The multi&mission optronic stabiliAed payload package or )M"%# was already active. The on& board mission management computer had already re!ected -60R and selected visual target ac1uisition. The gunner was then basically confirming his place in the Man&0n&The&6oop or M0T6 network by validating the mission&computer5s choices. 0n addition he was also providing what was in effect the commentary as things rolled along in seconds8 %elected isual tracking...ac1uired target...lead T&;....%witching to automatic track...NowL 0 have target track. Re1uest weapons release.? %tand&by...? the pilot responded from behind before he switched fre1uencies8 )otel&Romeo&"ne to all )otel&Romeo units8 7onfirm ac1uisition. "ver.? The pilot looked away to either side from the cockpit glass to see the other three helicopters hovering above the trees as if he was in fact talking to the machines themselves. The response was 1uick8 Two has ac1uired.? Three has ac1uired? -our has ac1uired and ready to roll. "ver.? The lead pilot smiled to himself as he again looked forward to see the green canopy of trees swaying in front of the bullet&proof cockpit glass. )e was unable to see the targets with his eyes at this range, but the )elmet&Mounted sight was showing his other eye the magnified view of the lead T&;. with a diamond box

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centred on it as it moved on the road totally unaware. *ut weapons release was not yet authoriAed, and that was the next task on his list...

THE INDO)MYANMAR BORDER CROSSIN" MANIPUR, INDIA 1*00 IST FRIDAY 7hauvan was rubbing his eyes in frustration as he awaited the reply from the 0ndian -orward 6iaison team on the ground with the *urmese 7ommanders on the status of the current armoured force speeding towards his first ob!ective. *ut the fact of the matter was that the 6oyalists themselves were not sure who these units were. They were possibly rebels based on their actions, but that was not for him to decide, and that was what was irritating him. )ere he had his forces ready to pour across the border and he was being told to wait as his personal time plan got shot to hell... /ellI? he asked the 6ieutenant who walked over to him from the 7omms&Trailer. They are still not sure. They think it might be a case of botched up communications between %ingkaling& )kamti and the ,rmoured -orce 7ommander heading towards Tamu now.? 0 wouldn5t be surprised if that was indeed the case. *ut all indications point otherwise. They are definitely rebel forces that had been tipped off by the 7hinese regarding our movement.? 7hauvan turned to look into the screen of the battlefield computer that was taking the feed from the Nishant 2, flying in the skies above Tamu that had been tracking this inbound convoy head on at high obli1ue angles. "nce those forces entered Tamu, the fighting would get bogged down on the main arterial route that 7hauvan5s forces had to take to reach the 7hindwin River a mere doAen kilometres away. ,nother officer entered the conversation and broke 7hauvan5s thoughts8 %ir, )otel&Romeo -light confirms target ac1uisition. They are re1uesting weapons release authoriAation. /hat are your ordersI? 6t&7olonel 7hauvan looked away from the two officers standing next to him as he contemplated the options. 0f he gave the order now and they turned out to be 6oyalists, he would be in a load of trouble. *ut if he did not give the order, and they turned out to be rebels, he would once again be in a load of trouble. ,a&n it. ) ha$ent e$en ste''ed into -yan&ar yet...)e thought. *ut then again, the situation was inherently difficult to begin with. The complex political and military situation currently in Myanmar made these kind of decisions the norm rather than the exception. %o what was the deciding factorI *i&'le. 5ne o'tion will cost the li$es o% Bur&ese soldiers and the other will cost the li$es o% &y soldiers. -y &en are &ore i&'ortant. The rest o% the 'olitical stu%% can go to hell... /eapons release is authoriAedL?

THE UN"LES OF MYANMAR 1*0' IST FRIDAY )otel&Romeo&"ne to all )otel&Romeo&2nits8 weapons release is authoriAed. Take them out. NowL 0 say again, )otel&Romeo is weapons freeL? the lead pilot ordered over the comm.&net before shifting fre1uencies so that he was again talking to his gunner in front of him8 "kay, you can let go of your trigger&fingers now.? That brought an unseen smile on the gunner5s face as he went active8 Ges, %ir. %electing %pirals...confirm ac1uisition. Releasing now...now...nowL? The helicopter shuddered slightly as the =:''+ missile leapt off the rail and streaked past the cockpit and heading beyond within a second. *oth crewmembers were now looking into the T like screen that was tracking the lead T&;. from the left side at five kilometres. The ,T$M went supersonic a few moments later and the semi&active guidance delivered the missile to the lead T&;. a few moments later.

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The screen flashed white and then went black and both crewmembers !erked their heads upwards to see the minuscule orange fireball racing to the blue sky on the edge of the horiAon followed 1uickly by three others to the east. ,ll four helicopters had scored direct hits on an unsuspecting enemy, and now the lead four tanks were burning wrecks. The convoy movement had been stopped dead in its tracks, but most of the composing soft&skinned vehicles were still very much alive... ,s the gunners on board the four 0ndian Mi&+@s now switched weapons to $2N% and lowered the helmet mounted sights to allow the gun to track their head movements, the pilots were already bringing the helicopters out of the hover and into forward flight as they moved in for the first ground kills of the Myanmar theatre of operations...

THE UN"LES OF MYANMAR 1**0 IST FRIDAY ,t over two hundred kilometres an hour speed, the trees below were nothing more than fleeting green canopies that characteriAed the *urmese landscape. *ut then again the Mi&+@ was all about high speeds. 0ts wings produced lift to help direct more vertical thrust forward. 0ts fuselage was shaped to reduce drag unlike its other contemporaries and had its main rotor tilted to a side to allow fuselage firing stabiliAation at high speeds. ,t altitudes that basically trimmed the tree tops, the ride was exhilarating to the layman, but common to its crew. /hat was exhilarating for the crews of the four Mi&+@s of )otel&Romeo -light was the current high speed engagement that had !ust begun east of the town of Tamu... )&Tee&"ne to all )&Tee&2nits. #rioritiAe hostile triple&, systems. "ver? the lead pilot spoke his final orders before shifting focus to the rapidly approaching pillars of smoke rising above the green canopy from the four burning T&;. hulks. -orward of him the gunner was already scanning to the front, left and right and the helmet sighting allowed the chin multi&barrel cannon to follow his eye movements. They were now approaching the stranded convoy from the south... Trucks sighted. 3nemy soldiers are !umping out. 3ngaging now...? the gunner reported a few moments later as he flicked open the firing button and pushed it down... The chin mounted three&barrelled .+mm cannon now spoke up with massive flashes of light and the shudder from the .+mm rounds leaving the helicopter were felt all through the tandem cockpits. The flashes of light directly in front and below the cockpit were followed by streaking laser&like lights heading at phenomenal speeds towards the trucks parked behind the rearmost T& ;. hulk. The results there were devastating... )it. )it. )it. $one. Target eliminated. %hifting fire...? the gunner reported calmly as the first burst of rounds slammed into the first truck and sent a small smoke cloud forming around it surrounding by bodies of dead *urmese soldiers lying nearby. The pilot in the rear cockpit looked left and right to see the front ends of the other three Mi&+@s also trailing grey smoke and yellow flashes as their gunners also engaged the rapidly approaching convoy. The *urmese soldiers on the ground were now aware of what and who was attacking them and from where. The Mi&+@ pilots had a helmet mounted display over one eye that allowed a closer look at the road they were attacking. They were close enough now to see the frantically running soldiers amidst the burst of heavy rounds that was churning up the mud on all sides of the road as they waved to the others and began taking up positions behind the burning vehicle hulks to fire their rifles... "kay boys. They have spotted us. $et ready for inbound fire...? The 6ead&pilot reported over his comms&mouthpiece as he scanned the line of smoke pillars in front of him now. They were rapidly approaching the road so that after a few seconds they would be streaking over the road.

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The convoy was basically dead. ,lmost all vehicles were by now burning. *ut that did not mean the !ob was over. Most of the rebel soldiers within those trucks were already outside the vehicles soon after the lead four T&;.s had taken missile hits. Their mobility was gone, but the infantry firepower was still there. ,nd it was beginning to make its presence felt... The first metallic 4dings5 were heard by the pilot as they streaked over the convoy a few moments later. the sight of the massive helicopters streaking a few metres overhead the burning hulks of the convoy vehicles was massively scary to say the least. The smoke pillars dispersed under the massive power of the main rotor blades of the Mi&+@ and sent dirt flying in all directions that helped blind the soldiers on the road below for the crucial seconds re1uired to finish the first high speed pass. *ut the noises represented bullet hits on the fuselage. 0t was not unexpected but it was not something desired either. The Mi&+@ was basically a flying tank, designed to take immense damage from ground weapons and small arms. *ut one extremely unlucky shot could still ruin the crewRs day... ,ll right. 6et5s make this 1uick. 0 don5t want to make another pass over these guys. $unners8 light them upL? the 6ead pilot reported as the streaked away from the road for a few kilometres to allow a safe turn by one&eighty degrees and another low&level pass. #laying by the infantryman5s rules was not something the attack&helicopter crews desired. ,nd sure enough, the gunners on all four choppers now shifted weapon selection to the 4R"7:3T5 option. The surviving soldiers of the convoy were taking cover behind burning hulks and tree trunks on the sides of the road as they waited for another attack run by the 0ndian helicopters. They were going to pay for their bravery. The second pass began with a massive release of rockets by all four helicopters flying in a line abreast formation from extremely close range to the road. The rocket pods were basically empty save for a few rounds in each pod. The green canopy on either side of the road disappeared within the mass of small fireballs rising towards the smoke filled sky. ,nd this time when the helicopters streaked over the road, there was no return fire... )otel&Romeo to ictor&"ne. The crocodiles have struck. The convoy is dead and we are RT*. "ver.? The 6ead pilot reported to the #halcon crew over eastern ,ssam in a matter of fact voice. The reply was 1uick8 Roger, )otel&Romeo. $ood work. Gou are clear to RT*. "ver and out? the unnamed voice said. The four Mi&+@s turned westwards again after heading south for a few more kilometres and headed for the Manipur border. They passed a few kilometres south of the border crossing where 6t&7ol 7hauvan now walked out of his command trailer and walked over to the waiting ,D3 multi& terrain vehicle which had its engine running. ,s he got into the side seat and shut the door, he could see the first ,rmoured 3ngineer Reconnaissance ehicles or ,3R s based on the *M# chassis !erk forward as they headed for the road crossing. , few seconds later the first ,3R smashed its way through the small wired gate that delineated the border between 0ndia and Myanmar. The heavy vehicles basically crushed the gates under their treads and then drove down the road into Myanmar before disappearing beyond the turn. The hills on either side of the arterial road towards Tamu had already been captured beforehand by 0ndian troops, and that gave 7hauvan5s men the opportunity to drive for the first kilometre or so without opposition. ,s the line of T&;.s now began to roll on the road after the departure of the three ,3R s, 7hauvan ordered his driver to pull out behind the line of tanks. )is personal convoy was three ,D3 vehicles fitted out with the minimum re1uired comms systems. )e kept his personal rifle on the dashboard as he looked over to his driver who had a simple 1uestion8 /here to, sirI?

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6t&7ol 7hauvan looked around outside the vehicle front glass to see his battle&group of T&;.s and *M#&.s rolling across the border into Myanmar. The .+%T 0nfantry 9ivision was now moving into Myanmar and the ground war in a third theatre in this massive and spreading regional war had now begun. 7hauvan stared silently as the vehicles passed one after another until he finally turned back to face his driver8
The 7hindwin River...?

THE SKIES ABOVE NA"PUR A-F-B INDIA 1#*0 IST FRIDAY %o what5s going on in 6addakhI? the 9efence&Minister asked after removing his glasses and putting them on the table to rub his eyes for a few moments. $eneral %inha was !ust as tired but tried his best to hide it until his voice revealed it for him... )olding. *y a thread...? he looked over to ,7M *hosale as he continued8 ...but the ,ir&-orce seems to have taken over control of the skies over western Tibet after their recent "peration #ivot&)ammer and are choking the 7hinese resupply efforts. %till, the situation is still extremely dire. /e !ust don5t know what way it will swing before the effect of our air superiority begins taking effect on the ground. 0 guess we will !ust have to wait and see.? Wait and see...how a''ro'riate. 1ow the hell did we end u' here in the last three days? The 9efence&Minister thought as he opened his eyes to look at the battery of uniformed men sitting before him. They were flying over Nagpur now, and any minute they would begin the descent to conduct yet another refuelling stop at the ,ir&-orce base below. *ut the decision making continued. 0t had to. /hat about the eastI? he asked next. ,gain, we are holding. *ut the 7hinese are focusing efforts on the Tawang front. The cruise& missile attacks and now the massive influx of ground troops are basically killing the @T) Mountain 9ivision where it stands. .N9 Mountain is taking fire north of /along on the easternmost tip of that front and is holding. They also took heavy fire from the 7hinese cruise missile attacks and...? 9amn itL Tell me where exactly we are not !ust 4holding5. 0 have been hearing this for the last few days and there seems to be no change. /e need to change the rules of this war, people. /e cannot !ust 4hold5. /e need to 4attack5 and 4ad$ance5. This war will be lost otherwise. 0s there any front at all where we can do that or should 0 tell the #M that we give up right away and save lives of our men in the processI? The outburst had silenced the members in the group because of its sharpness. *ut %inha put that down to the exhaustion more than anything else. )e took the 1uestion anyway8 %ir, the Myanmar front has !ust been opened on the ground in the last couple of hours. /e have convoys moving in from Nagaland and Manipur towards the 7hindwin River on scheduled and as planned. /e are moving forward, but you have to give it time. These things are not immediate and have a lead in time. ,lso, "p %hadow&/arrior is set to be launched.? That caused the 9efence&Minister to raise an eyebrow as he looked over to %inha8 Talk to me about %hadow&/arrior.? The %-- units are getting ready now. /e had to wait till the ,ir&-orce had finished #ivot& )ammer and secured the airspace over south&western Tibet. /e are going to start with an initial drop of recon teams that will scout out the area and give the all clear for the larger 7ompany level drops. "nce on the ground the units will move north&eastwards and start independent operations. /e will have operational control at the strategic level from the 9epartment of 9efence in the

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M"9, but tactical control is being maintained directly by the %-- 7ommander. 0n essence we provide the support while the %-- move to their ob!ective? /hich is what, exactlyI? the 9efence&Minister asked in response to the cryptic answer from %inha. To take out the enemy5s ability to wage war, inside out...? THE WESTERN OUTSKIRTS OF TAMU MYANMAR 1#&' IST FRIDAY The convoy had moved at speeds no greater than ten kilometres an hour and as such then it had taken the lead tanks to reach the westernmost outskirts of Tamu within half an hour after crossing the border. *ut that was where they now waited for the supporting infantry moving via helicopters and *M#&.s to deploy on the flanks of the main axis as they moved into the urban environment. This was not an expected feature of the 0ndian ,rmy5s movement, but events had dictated otherwise. No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy, and as it had been planned to move through towns such as Tamu unopposed by enemy forces, that idea had flown out of the window for 7hauvan5s men an hour ago. 7hauvan himself was not pleased with the unexpected delays. ,s his ,D3 troop transport convoy turned the final bend in the road and suddenly !oined the assembling friendly forces in the outskirts of the town, he had a distinct frown on his face that told others to back off. )e spotted Ma!or $upta standing with some other officers behind one of the waiting T&;.s. )is vehicle stopped on his orders and he picked up his rifle and stepped out of the vehicle into the blaAing afternoon sun and humidity that was taking its toll on the physical strength on everybody. $upta left his small entourage to meet up with the 6t&7olonel stomping his way... )ow are things goingI? was the stern 1uestion from 7hauvan. #roceeding. /e are deploying '%T *attalion on the flanks of the main road into the town. No hostiles sighted yet but the 2, boys spotted some surviving soldiers from the rebel convoy moving into the eastern outskirts of the town soon after our attack helos left the area. They have called in air support to take out what targets they can identify but the final execution lies with us. The +R9 -%$ is deploying to the rear now on some of the rice fields northwest of here. JT) #latoon is charged with their security. 0 will be leading the assault with , 7ompany, '%T *attalion in direct support of the tanks while other 7ompanies move into the town on the flanks with direct support from the *M#s and the +R9 -%$.? $upta said. +R9 -%$ or -ire&%upport&$roup was an artillery combat group formed in much the same way the ,rmour&7ombat&$roup had been arranged for this operation. 0t consisted of several batteries having things from Mortars for close range support to even a single #inaka *attery for the ultra& long&range firepower that would be immediately available to the *attle&$roup 7ommander. These were not the standard procedures for such formations in the field, but the situation was not standard either, and innovations and improvisations were the orders of the day... ,ll right. 0 will be at '%T *,T 7#. Move carefully and watch for booby traps. 0f anything feels suspicious, blow it out of existence. 0ntel suggests that all civilians have evacuated days ago, so that should not be a problem. 7all in the fire support as and when you need it. ,nd be 1uick. 0 want to be at the western bank of the 7hindwin by tonight.? 7hauvan responded before walking away to the single mobile trailer that would be his 7#. $upta was already signalling the go order to his men as he walked away to organiAe his men. , few minutes later the first T&;. bellowed out grey smoke as the engine thundered into life. The Tank 7ommander or T7 was sitting with the hatch open, and had his binoculars to his eyes as he

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prepared to move out. The other T&;. engines were by now roaring as well. Tamu was not a very large town, but it was thickly developed with long stretches of shoddy hovels. 0t could be bypassed, but being on the direct flank of the expected 0ndian movement eastwards, any hostiles within it presented a threat to the logistical underbelly of the 0ndian forces and thus had to be cleared out completely. The first to move into the town were the soldiers from '%T *attalion. Ma!or $upta signalled his men forward with a hand wave and then brought his rifle up and ran that first two hundred metres of open space over farm lands towards the first line of houses. The dash had to be fast. This was the land between the line of trees that had been the staging area and the first line of houses of the western outskirts of the town. 0t was extremely exposed and if there were any snipers on the other side in the houses, it would be very bad news for the charging 0ndian soldiers. *ut as it turned out, $upta and his men dashed across the field in the bright sunlight but made no enemy contact. *y the time they reached the first line of walls and took cover behind them, they were breathing heavily but keeping a wary eye beyond the wall. Ma!or $upta looked back down towards the tree&line to see the T&;. commanders shutting their hatches as they clambered below. The turrets of the tanks were sweeping left and right on fixed arcs to provide devastating fire support at point blank range against any house that showed enemy activity. $upta then looked left and right and saw his men ready to move now. )e nodded to them slightly and one of them removed a grenade that he 1uickly tossed into the first house through a window and then dived back into cover. , few seconds later the explosion ripped through the house and sent a dust cloud flying into the main street nearby.
, second later $upta brought his rifle up to shoulder level, ran around the corner and charged into the smoke filled room as the 0ndian assault on Tamu began...

BOEIN" B),#, BB $CALL SI"N: PATRIOT EA"LE%

NA"PUR A-F-B1&*' IST FRIDAY %o what are they staging from thereI? Mostly B&C00s in the light interceptor capacity and the odd transport flight. 3ver since we shut down their ,3/ coverage over southwest Tibet in the aftermath of #ivot&)ammer, they have relegated back to airbase protection duties, flying 7,#s directly over the airbase. 0t5s the closest airbase within our grasp. This would be the logical way to proceed.? The $roup&7aptain said, as he handed over the satellite images to ,7M *hosale. ,greed. %o what are the strike optionsI? *hosale replied as he scanned the images being handed out to him. These had been marked with printed text highlighting known targets and identifications. The battery of officers standing in the cabin conference room waited 1uietly as the $roup&7aptain removed the "R*,T listing for the !ob. Three options, actually. "ne8 we launch saturation cruise missile attacks from %ikkim and level the place. Two8 we send in our strike aircrafts and achieve the same. Three...we capture it.? 3xcuse meI? *hosale asked, removing his eyes from the pictures for the first time since the conversation began. The $roup&7aptain knew he had crossed the line and there was no turning back now, and so he pushed the idea he and some other 0ntel officers had been discussing8 /e send in strike fighters to devastate the airbase and the aircrafts based there but leave the runway intact. Then we send in the %-- recon teams to secure the airbase before sending over the %"7"M 7&'+(Bs and then use it as a hub for the %-- 7ompany level insertions. 0t is far better than scatter paradrops over the Tibetan mountains. /e use the airbase for the dispersal of the %-- troops and once in the field, we evacuate from the base and let another flight of strike fighters destroy the runways.

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-urther, if you look at the map here, you can see that %higatse airbase is actually very nicely placed in a ma!or concentration of Tibetan indigenous people with primary centres being around the ma!or hubs of DigaAe to the southwest, $yangAe to the south and 6hasa to the northeast. 0t is in fact the perfect dispersal for the ma!ority ethnic Tibetan %-- to blend into and disappear after we seiAe the airbase. 0t will also present a far larger target to distract the #6, than any of the pin&prick attacks ever would.? The $roup&7aptain concluded and awaited his head being torn off by the ,ir&7hief for suggesting the outrageous plan. *ut the head&ripping ceremony never came. 0nstead, *hosale turned to face outside the window at the fuel&bowser moving away as the aircraft prepared for yet another flight. The bright sunlight was shining off the concrete tarmac and there was a clear blue sky overhead. *hosale had other things on his mind though... The fact of the matter was that the plan was not as foolish as it appeared on first glance. ,nd it also provided a solution to one of the ma!or problems being faced by the planners of "peration %hadow&/arrior. This was the 1uestion of insertion. 0nsertion by foot was the safest and the most covert option, but far too time consuming. *y the time the %-- got anywhere near their targets, the war would be over one way or another, not to mention the fact that insertion by foot would mean crossing the frontline at some point, and that idea was !ust as ridiculous. That meant that the only other way was to go over the frontline. There again problems emerged. #aradrops in the Tibetan mountains and rocks would be !ust as lethal to the %-- soldiers !umping out of the back of the aircrafts as a 7hinese bullet. ,nd there !ust were no helicopters that could be freed up from the hectic operations in 6addakh and ,runachal #radesh to support the insertions. -urther, at such high altitudes, the carrying capacity of the larger helicopters like the Mi&'; was a few hundred kilos while the smaller birds could not haul the distance. The capture of %higatse then represented a uni1ue and innovative way to solve this problem. ,nd the side effect it would have on the #6, was !ust as tempting to the 0ndian planners. Besides, i% they send in tanks and ar&our to take back the air%ield, we will ha$e Cags o$erhead to take care o% the&. As %or the (8A in%antry and other security %orces, the /hakrata boys can handle the&. This &ight work as long as we ha$e air su'eriority, and that cannot last %or long. )t could work... *hosale surprised everyone including the $roup&7aptain who had suggested the plan when he turned away from the windows and looked at the assembled mass of officers and spoke simply8 $et me a workable plan...?

THE ASSAULT ON TAMU

MYANMAR CONVOY *)ALPHA, *# INFANTRY DIVISION 1&&' IST FRIDAY -rom the hills, Tamu was now no more than a bunch of smoke pillars rising into the blue afternoon sky. The thunder and gunfire noises were echoing within the hills. The odd helicopter was flying over the remains of the town while streams of tracer lit gunfire were flying in every direction. To the massive convoy of 0ndian ,rmy vehicles still pouring over the border crossing with Manipur, the sight was that of a brutal war that was being fought on the streets of the city. The reality was much worse... 7ontact had been made. The rebels were outgunned and possibly even outnumbered, though the latter was hard to tell. *ut in what were now the smouldering ruins of a town laid waste by the 0ndian ,rtillery batteries, the odds were made even by the congested urban terrain that gave the *urmese rebels the advantage of fighting in their own streets and buildings. The 0ndian ,rmy, on the other hand, was on foreign soil, but had far higher firepower to basically demolish building after building as the bulldoAed their way to the other side of the town. The town was not to be captured intact. There were no civilians. 0t was then merely a chaotic close combat battle being fought between two armies... 6t&7ol 7hauvan5s 0nfantry force was moving into the town in three penetrations. The outer two were sweeping around the outskirts as they attempted to encircle the town by moving eastwards. The centre force was being led by Ma!or $upta and his men supported by a T&;. tank platoon down the main single street of the town, basically carving their way from west to east. 0t was not easy going. 3very window held the potential of a firing position. 3very turn or an alley could hold a guy sitting with a :alashnikov or a 7arl&

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$ustav R6 to blow out the turret of the advancing T&;. from point blank range, probably killing the soldier firing it too, given the extreme close ranges being encountered. ,nd so $upta5s men were moving along with the tanks and both now mutually supported each other as they creeped along. The T&;. would support the soldiers taking cover behind its hull by blowing out the sidewalls or even the entire houses themselves that the rebel used as firing positions and the infantry supported the tanks by bursting into every house on the side of the road !ust before the tanks came into view. %ince they were taking no chances and blowing up first and asking 1uestions later, the casualties were at a minimum. "f course the same did not go for the rebels, who were now adapting their tactics by firing short bursts at the advancing 0ndian troops before escaping from the building before the T&;. main gun bored down on them. 0n effect then they were losing ground all the way, but were not giving up the fight !ust yet. $upta was behind the hull of the lead T&;. with a few other soldiers as they watched a section of 0ndian troops slam down the door of yet another house and storming inside following the explosion of the grenades. $upta removed the ammo clip from his 0N%,% rifle and checked the ammunition left. *e$enteen rounds...no need %or a reload just yet...he thought while reloading the magaAine in the rifle. a shout from nearby forced him to turn his head to see one of his soldiers on the roof of the building they had !ust stormed into and giving the thumbs up sign. 5kay...our turn now... $upta and three of his men now got up from where they were crouching and ran across the few metres of open ground on the road and took cover aside the walls of the next house. $upta ran up next to the window and threw in a grenade that exploded and sent a smoke and debris cloud rushing out of the windows. ,s he clambered through the window along with another soldier, the two others stormed the house from the main door... "nce inside, $upta immediately had his rifle at shoulder level and pointing forward into the murky smoke filled room. )e could hear the crashing noises from the other rooms as his other men were also clearing out the building. There was no way of knowing whether anybody had in fact been in this building, but procedure was procedure. This was a single storey house with no staircase. 0f there had been any booby&traps, they had been destroyed by the explosion of the grenade. isibility was down to few feet as the smoke hung around in the rooms. $upta walked forward with another soldier directly behind him into the last room... MovementL? $upta shouted as he saw someone moving on the floor of the room. )e peeked again from the door to see a badly wounded rebel soldier on the ground trying to grab his ,:&J; that had fallen away from him. $upta now ran into the room and brought his rifle to bear on the face of the wounded man after pushing the ,: away with his feet... Make one move and you dieL 2nderstandIL? $upta shouted from behind the rifle. The man responded with a slight nod as his face struggled with the pain. $upta turned to the other soldiers who had now entered the room8 This one5s aliveL $et a medic in here now. /e are going to see if he can talk. MoveL? ,s the other three men moved to secure the prisoner, $upta walked out of the room as a medic passed him on the way in. The tanks were beginning to roll again as $upta stepped outside the smouldering house. )e directed another s1uad of troops to accompany the lead tank and motioned his radioman forward with a hand wave. )e came up running and gave him the speaker8 *,T 7#, sir. 7olonel 7hauvan.? )e said. "kay. $ive it to me.? $upta ordered as he turned his head to see the first T&;. roll forward again... Ges sir.? $upta said into the speaker. $upta, what the hell is taking so longI? the voice on the radio demanded. %ir, we are having to clear out every house on every road. The buggers are spread all over the town. Moving any faster would endanger the lives of my men. ,lso, we !ust took a #"/.? , rebel #"/I 3xcellent. The M0 people have been gunning for these guys for far too long now. Maybe we will get something out of him. )ave him transferred back here right away. )owever, coming back to the

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point, we are lagging behind the other convoys to the north and south and their flanks are getting exposed thanks to our delay. 0 have tanks waiting to roll but no way for them to move forward. The crossing is becoming a giant traffic mess. ,nd 0 have 7ommand bearing down on me like a ton of bricks. /e need to end this right now. 0 have called in heavy air support. 7an you direct them onto the targetsI? 7hauvan said in a calmer voice that belied the undisputed fact that it was an order and not a re1uest, despite the vocal disguise... Ges sir. /hat5s the 3T, on -riendly&,irI? $upta, they are already overhead. Move your ass...? That caused $upta to raise an eyebrow as he suddenly !erked his head upwards but saw nothing but the clear blue sky and the odd white clouds. , moment later he was shouting out for his -orward&,ir&7ontrollers or -,7s even as the first rumblings of !et engines became audible overhead. The assault on Tamu was now entering the final phase...

THE ASSAULT ON TAMU MYANMAR CONVOY *)ALPHA, *# INFANTRY DIVISION 1'10 IST FRIDAY /e need to get on the highest rooftop you can find around here, immediately.? the -,7 told Ma!or $upta over the sound of the small arms fire. 6ike that oneI? $upta pointed to the only two storey building that stood up above the mass of single storey houses in that part of the town that was now under 0ndian control. Geah. That will do. /e need to get there right away and set up the -orward ,ir 7ontrol systems. There is no way we can do that from here. /e need visibility above this dust and smoke, a clear sky above and a good 6"%.? The -,7 responded as yet another group of soldiers ran by to !oin the main T&;. platoon fighting eastwards into the town. "kay, let5s go.? $upta said as he waved for a small s1uad of soldiers to follow him towards that building. The -,7 and his handful of men followed behind, lugging their heavy electronic and comms systems packages. The building in 1uestion was relatively intact, even if the top floor was a gutted black mass on the inside with a side wall blown out by a T&;. )3 shell. ,nd sure enough, there were several bodies of dead rebel soldiers lying near the point of impact of the tank shell. 0t was not a pretty sight, but war never was. The smoke was still hanging in the rooms but fortunately the staircase leading to the roof was relatively intact. $upta and his men were leading in front of the relatively unarmed -,7 troops. $upta was !ust behind the lead soldier as they moved through the rooms with their 0N%,% rifles at shoulder level and with full&auto selection modes switched on. *ut there was no contact among the charred mess of a building, and $upta and his men were soon on the roof of the building. The air was vastly clearer and there was a blue sky above with white clouds finally visible. More importantly, the line&of&sight or 6"% was extremely good, despite the lack of very high altitudes with respect to the surrounding areas of the town. 7learL? That was the order the -,7 and his group had been waiting for on the first floor of the building. ,nd now they moved 1uickly through the rooms and up the stairs to !oin $upta strolling around on the roof with his 0N%,% on his shoulders and a smile on his face8 This is good enough for youI? he asked the -,7 lightly, despite the grim atmosphere around him.

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Ges sir...? the -,7 turned to face the others in his group8 "kay. $et to work. %et it up right here.? %o what5s the planI? $upta asked now in a more serious tone as he watched the -,7 men remove their heavy backpacks and remove a lot of battlefield communications e1uipment. The first things they removed were %hort&*urst&Transmission %,T7"Ms and a few battlefield computers, laying down most of that e1uipment on the roof floor while the regular troops strolled around with their eyes scanning ther other rooftops for hostile activity. This roof had a wall that allowed certain protection, but one enemy 7arl&$ustav hitting that wall from some other rooftop to the east would spell doom to all those here. *ut nobody had ever said this !ob was safe... The plan, sir, is simple. /e have a flight of two Mirage&.(((s overhead waiting to hear from us. /e also have some other assets moving into the airspace, and we need to be ready to take over from the #halcon crews as and when they enter our killAone. Now, while my men set up the e1uipment, show me the targets you want hit on a priority basis so 0 can pass that information to the flight&crews? the -,7 said as he handed over a binoculars to $upta and took one for himself and walked over to the eastern wall of the roof. *oth men were now looking over the wall and peering through their binoculars... "kay...Right there...that apartment complex area !ust beyond that clump of trees. That one and the one next to it on the other side of the road. Those two are the last remaining enemy strong& points wherefrom we are taking fire. 6evel those places and 0 can secure this town.?$upta said. "kay, where are our guys on the ground at the momentI? the -,7 asked. This information was very important. The last thing that was needed was the Mirage crews dropping two thousand pounder bombs among friendly forces. The dreaded BlueDonDblue e$ents... 0 will order a pullback of my men across that main north&south road you see there. it cuts orthogonally across our line of advancement. $ot itI? $upta replied. )e received a nod from the -,7 as they moved below the wall and $upta headed to get his radioman and the -,7 moved to take the receiver connected to one of the %,T7"M channels8
*623&-60$)T, this is *623&7"N. #lease respond. "ver?

THE SKIES ABOVE TAMU

1'*' IST FRIDAY Ten thousand feet above the grinding, smoke and dirt covered ground war, the air was pure and the skies were clear. -or the two pilots and the single /%" sitting in the cockpits of the two Mirage&.(((s, *623& "N3 and *623&T/", with their dark visors lowered to protect against the bright sunlight, the stress was relatively lower. ,nd the difference in tone of the voices between the -,7 calling them from below and their voices heading below visibly reflected this fact. The flight leader was the one to respond to the -,75s radio contact8 This is *623&"N3. /e are reading you -ive&-ive&-ive. /e are on station and ready to roll. "ver? Roger. *e advised, *&"N3, we have targets assigned for you. Targets include two apartment complex buildings amongst highly urban terrain. 6ocation of targets alpha and bravo are at grid reference November& one&two&four&five, 3cho&one&eight&five&one and November&one&two&four&five and 3cho&one&eight&three&three. *lue forces west of central north&south road going through reference 3cho&one&eight&five&four. 9o you copyI "ver? the -,75s voice said in the cockpits. The /%" was sitting behind the cockpit on one of the two two&seat Mirage&.(((T) armed with a 6aser& 9esignation&#od or 69# while the other single seat aircraft carried two #aveway&00 6aser&$uided&*ombs or 6$*s. The former aircraft was the designator and the system was known as *uddy&6asing. The 9esignator aircraft /%" had already entered the grid data into the computer and had a geographical lock&on. 2nfortunately, the weapons were 6aser&$uided, not $#% guided, and so he now switched on the 69#

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hanging from one of the pylons of the aircraft. The 69# in turn came online and the small sighting screen lighted up in the rear cockpit of the aircraft for the /%" to see. That was where the first problem was noticed8 *623&7"N, this is *623&"N3, 0 have negative visual on target. 0 say again, 0 have negative visual on targets alpha and bravo. The darn smoke columns are obscuring our screens. 0 have negative lock on targets. "ver? 9own on the ground, the -,7 was swearing at nobody in particular but at the situation itself. That was when he stood up and saw the target that was visible from his rooftop... *623&"N3, 0 have targets in my 6"%. %uggest we go for local 6asing.? The -,7 shouted into the speaker even as he waved one of his men to set up the Man&#ortable&6aser&9esignator on the eastern sidewall of the roof from where they could 46ase5 the target. The M#69 itself was like a small ,T$M system and had a similar tripod that one of the -,75s men positioned on the wall before opening the optics panel. Then he switched on the power and the small reflector lights lighted up before his eyes. Now the system was active and he Aoomed in using the focusing e1uipment and brought the target building into sight. ,fter that he switched on the laser and moments later the building was 4lit5... *623&"N3, this is *623&7"N. Target alpha is lit. 9o you confirmI? Roger. The target is lit. Target is ac1uired.? The /%" now pushed the weapon selection options on the M-9 and selected the port side #aveway&00 for release. ,nother push of a button and the weapon was armed. 0n the meantime the pilot was ad!usting his flight path to come down towards Tamu from the north on a north&south axis to avoid chances of friendly fatalities during the weapons flight towards the earth. The weapon release was at ten thousand feet with a Aero degree dive. *623&7"N, this is *623&"N3. The weapon is ready to drop. 7onfirm that all blue forces are in the clear. "ver? the /%" said even as he gave the instrument readouts a final check. 9own below, the -,7 looked over at $upta and received a nod. ,ll friendly forces were clear... *623&7"N to *623&"N3. Gou are weapons free.? Roger. 7onfirmed weapon release authoriAation. *omb release...now...now...nowL bomb goneL? the /%" said as the aircraft became lighter by a thousand pounds... TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT The #aveway&00 was now in the short timed ballistic mode as it headed earthwards. 0n a purely ballistic flight from the given altitude, the time to impact was twenty five seconds. *ut it was not an entirely ballistic path. ,fter the first few seconds the weapon5s photodiode based 6aser reflected energy detectors were active, and ac1uisition was made. ,t this point the weapon went into a transition phase as the flight canards 4flew5 the weapon into a direct line to the target. , few seconds after that the weapon was aligned in a path such that its velocity vector coincided with the target 6"%. ,t that moment the 6asing signal peaked and the canards went into trail mode. The weapon was now in terminal phase... TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT Ma!or $upta was already looking at the first target building complex along with the -,7 when the massive flash of light forced both to face away from the direction of the target. , few moments later the ground shook and the first massive thunder passed through the area. *y the time the 0ndian soldiers were again facing eastwards, the target area was characteriAed only by a massive pillar of smoke rising into the blue sky above... , few seconds later another massive explosion ripped through the heart of the small town as another #aveway&00 slammed into the second target area. *y this time the shockwaves were ripping through the weakened structures nearby and had decimated a very large region around the actual point of contact. $upta was immediately on the radio to confirm any friendly casualties and was relieved to hear that there were none. *y this time the -,7 was again looking through the binoculars to conduct a visual *omb& 9amage&,ssessment, and was gratified to see the targets completely destroyed.

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*y the time $upta had finished talking into the radio, the air was abuAA with the muffled thumping noises of the four Mi&+@s that were now hovering west of the forward 0ndian positions and waiting for target information even as the chin turret guns were turning left and right, indicating that the gunners were already busy at that !ob. *ut in the event it turned out that their participation was not re1uired. $upta had other orders for the -,78 7all the remaining air&strikes off. 0 !ust received word from the 2, 7+0 that they are detecting a rapid egress of enemy soldiers from the eastern outskirts of the town and into the !ungles beyond. $uess they couldn5t take what all we could throw at them. 0 am ordering my men forward to capture all vital locations within the town. "rder the Mi&+@s to provide cover as we move.? $upta then turned to his radioman and took the receiver from him as he contacted 7hauvan8 /hat5s the newsI? 7hauvan asked from the 7# trailer. The enemy5s back has been broken. /e are detecting a rapid egress of enemy forces leaving the town in a haste. 0 am ordering my forces to go into pursuit mode. 0 am going to need some rapid mobility here if we want to take advantage of this situation.? Roger. 0 have *M#&00s moving on the road eastwards. Meet up with them on the north&eastern outskirts and move out. 0 want to be on the eastern banks of the 7hindwin by nightfall. -ind, intercept and eliminate all remaining enemy forces...?

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