Peter Collins Professor Timothy B.

Shutt IPHS 484 20 December 2010 Essays on Seneca Introduction In the following essays I will discuss key themes of Stoic doctrine, as expressed by the Roman Stoic Seneca the Younger in his Epistulae Morales, or letters to Lucilius, as well as in his more formal moral discourses. The goal is less to provide a comprehensive exposition of Senecas ethical thought than to highlight elements of Stoic philosophy uniquely relevant to contemporary readers. Seneca serves as a valuable reference point in such an undertaking because of the important role he played in popularizing and spiritualizing an intellectual tradition that traces back to the earliest Western philosophers most notably Socrates.1 With a pithy and impactful declamatory style, guided by a keen sensitivity to the realities of everyday human existence, Seneca helped to bring philosophy to the masses. Leveraging his position as one of the wealthiest and most powerful figures of his age, as well as perhaps its best-respected public intellectual, he vaulted an enterprise that was once viewed as the exclusive province of rogues and neer-dowells into the halls of the Senate and the imperial palace.

While there is argument over the extent to which Stoic thought reflects the teachings of Socrates and the Platonists a subject that will be discussed further in the following essays the basic connection is clear, and Inwoods claim that Stoicism has its roots in the philosophical activity of Socrates impossible to deny.
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Collins 2 Thoughts on the Decline and Resurgence of Stoicism after the Enlightenment

Senecas legacy as a tragedian, philosopher, and moralist has had a profound impact upon the Western intellectual tradition. Early Christians viewed him as a kindred spirit among pagan writers,2 and there has been speculation that the authors of the Gospels may have communicated with Stoics and drawn inspiration from their teachings. Robin Campbell suggests that only Cicero, perhaps, among classical authors was better known in medieval times, noting that Dante, Chaucer, and Petrarch were great admirers and quoters of his writings.3 And, according to T.S. Eliot, no author exercised a wider or deeper influence upon the Elizabethan mind or upon the Elizabethan form of tragedy than did Seneca.4 Yet after the Enlightenment, this serious philosophical presence in the Western tradition was all but forgotten, and Stoic philosophy in general fell into neglect and disesteem.5 Since the 1970s, however, academics have shown a renewed interest in Stoicism, evinced in recent years by the publication of several volumes of essays contributed by dedicated Stoicism specialists from well-respected schools. While there are many potential explanations for the post-seventeenth century decline of Stoicism as an intellectual movement, a probable cause of its relative disrepute for much of the twentieth century, at least, may be the poor fit between Stoicisms moral objectivism and the modern academy, with its Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Epistulae Morales, trans. Robin Campbell (London: Penguin Books, 1969), 24. 3 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 24. 4 T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays (1951), 65. 5 Brad Inwood, Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 5.
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Collins 3 professionalized ethos, relativistic bent, and careful pursuit of value-neutral teaching. Even the works of Plato who, for Emerson, was the source of all things that are still written and debated among men of thought6 are typically taught with a measure of apprehension. He made a valuable contribution, we are told, by formalizing the practice of philosophy by inviting people to challenge received wisdom and investigate their own beliefs but erred in suggesting that this enterprise might lead anywhere conclusive. Thus readings of Plato that stress Socrates irony and skepticism and downplay his transcendental doctrine of the forms are popular; but to the extent that Plato may have been serious with any of his positive claims about moral truth, his thought was primitively illiberal and deeply misguided. Yet while Platos seriousness as a moralist can be debated, and strong arguments for his skepticism presented, it is precisely this moral absolutism, whether feigned or genuine, that the Stoics adopted from Socrates and made a central part of their own dogma. The Academics and the Peripatetics represent the branch of post-Socratic philosophy that concerned itself primarily with the theoretical side of Socrates thought; thus Plato, Aristotle, and their associates can be taught in a manner that minimizes discussion of their moral claims and focuses on their historical value and engagement in a proto-scientific investigation of the natural world. (By the time of the Stoics had become a powerful intellectual force in Athens, the Platonic Academy had so distanced itself from any moralistic reading of

Ralph Waldo Emerson, Plato; or, the Philosopher, http://www.emersoncentral.com/plato1.htm (Dec. 20, 2010).
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Collins 4 Socrates that they were occupied primarily with skeptical refutations of such interpretations.)7 With the Stoics, however, such disengagement is not possible. The schools founder, Zeno of Citium, found his primary sources of inspiration in partisans of the Cynical and the Megarian schools most notably his teachers Crates and Stilpo both of which emphasized Socrates moral thought: his recognition of a single good, the pursuit of which requires us to reject conventional objects of desire (power, fame, wealth and the like) and adopt simple ascetic lives devoted to wisdom and virtue. Thus Sedley writes that the Stoic ethical system is characterised by its intellectualist identification of goodness with wisdom and the consequent elimination of non-moral goods as indifferentthoroughly Socratic in inspiration.8 Senecas writings particularly stress this perceived need for continual moral selfimprovement, guided by a more or less traditional understanding of virtue; he urges readers on to such a program of life with all the directness, urgency, and selfassurance of the zealot. In short, it is nearly impossible to study and teach the Stoics without giving thorough consideration to the ethical program that is the focus of all their philosophical activity. It is easy to see how the fastidious relativism of the modern academy might complicate the study of an intellectual movement that is, at its core, an action-guiding philosophy of life: Stoicism tells people how to live. Furthermore, the Stoic ethical outlook is a robust one, incorporating spiritual and heuristic components that make it somewhat unscientific, and thus Brad Inwood, The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 11. 8 Inwood, The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics 11.
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Collins 5 unimpressive to many moderns, living as we do in a hyperrational society characterized by its near-religious devotion to the scientific method to the observable, the testable, the quantifiable. Stoic thought at times fails to furnish rules and assumptions that can be readily subjected to falsification or verification through a simple process of logical inference; instead, it occasionally relies upon a tradition of human wisdom and insight, suggesting a precept simply because it has survived the test of time and been accepted, after long consideration, by many thoughtful and learned people. Unless we are most ungrateful, all those men, glorious fashioners of holy thoughts, were born for us; for they have prepared for us a way of life.9 At times, a Stoic writer will even treat certain truths as self-evident, behavior anathema to most contemporary philosophers. Among these are the assumptions that the order of the universe is too sublime to be the result of mere chance, or matter in motion; that a human being has a soul; and that virtue something we cannot readily define with a scientific proof, but that we know when we see it10 is its best condition. Yet recent indications of a renewed popular interest in Stoicism, both in academia and in society at large, may suggest that this attitude of aversion to actionguiding philosophies is slowly softening. The first explanation I would offer for this shift in opinion is the ever-widening gulf between what is typically studied in Lucius Annaeus Seneca, On the Shortness of Life, trans. John W. Basore (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932) 333. 10 Virtue, though obscured, is never concealed, but always gives signs of its presence; whoever is worthy will trace her out by her footsteps. (Lucius Annaeus Seneca, On the Shortness of Life, trans. John W. Basore (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932) 227).
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Collins 6 philosophy classes and the everyday realities of life. While deep studies in the metaphysics of free will and the nature of being may present a fascinating and strenuous intellectual exercise, history seems to suggest that expecting meaningful progress in these areas is presumptuous. Furthermore, the increasing fixation of professional philosophers with formal logic threatens to turn philosophy into a purely abstract endeavor, only weakly connected to the important problems of life that demand action. Stoicism, as one of the many ethical traditions concerned primarily with such problems, presents a refreshing opportunity to treat intellectual engagement as a means of shaping a life not merely adorning it.

Desire, Freedom and Control in Stoic Ethics

One fundamental concept lies at the heart of the entire Stoic ethical system: control. The question what in my experience is under my control? logically precedes, for the Stoic, all other considerations. Epictetus opens his Encheiridion with the simple observation that some things are under our control, while others are not under our control.12 He goes on to assert that, in determining with which of these categories we will concern ourselves, we make the most important decision of our lives. This is because, according to the Stoics, the best way to achieve the tranquility, freedom, and calm13 that are the essential components of a happy life is to refuse to allow oneself to be influenced by externals notably health, wealth, Epictetus, Encheiridion, trans. W. A. Oldfather (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928) 483. 13 Lucius Flavius Arrianus, Arrians Discourses of Epictetus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928) 103.
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Collins 7 and esteem and to be concerned only with what is under our constant active control: our ideas, desires, opinions, and everything else that is within us. This is simple but powerful advice; for even when external things come to bear heavily upon us, we can always modify our perception of and reaction to the experience. In Letter 63, for instance, Seneca goes so far as to suggest we should not grieve long at the loss of a loved one a claim that would no doubt strike many as unnatural and abhorrent. It is also radical advice, because it instructs us to completely disregard most of the things that people typically look to for happiness, as much of human behavior is oriented toward external objects like money, sex, and esteem. We strengthen our control over internals by cultivating (Epictetus uses the Greek verb , meaning to work out, strengthen, or bring to completion) our , or ruling principle.14 The central goal of Stoicism, then, is to conquer both fear and desire through the application of reason and human free agency, cultivating the freedom and tranquility of mind that enable a person to pursue wisdom and virtue with an unfettered conscience. Thus Seneca describes the happy man as he who allows reason to fix the value of every condition of existence,15 and the highest good as a mind that scorns the happenings of chance, and rejoices only in virtue.16 Of the things within our control, the one of principal concern to the Stoics was desire. Irvine writes: Epictetus advises us to gain contentment by changing ourselves more Arrianus, Arrians Discourses of Epictetus 105. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, On the Happy Life, trans. John W. Basore (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932) 115. 16 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, On the Happy Life 109.
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Collins 8 precisely, by changing our desires. And he is not alone in giving this advice; indeed, this is the advice offered by virtually every philosopher and religious thinker who has reflected on human desire and the causes of human dissatisfaction. They agree that if what you seek is contentment, it is better and easier to change yourself and what you want than it is to change the world around you.17 Indeed, the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism identify desire, or craving, as the root of human suffering. Christianity and many other religions treat greed, envy, gluttony, lust, and other offshoots of desire as spiritual afflictions that not only undermine our own tranquility, but also taint our dealings with others. The scientific community, too, has recognized the central importance of desire in human life: a popular theory of motivation in modern psychology, drive reduction theory, suggests that much of behavior amounts to organisms attempting to satisfy perceived or actual needs, thereby relieving negative arousal and promoting a relaxed, homeostatic state. In the modern Western world with its Romantic legacy, its cult of celebrity and materialism, its veneration of the tortured artist, the rock star, the entrepreneur there persists a certain tendency to exalt desire, encouraging its restless pursuit. But the Stoics, for their part, were convinced that there is nothing more desirable in life than tranquility, which can only be attained by limiting and modifying our natural desires not embracing them as they come to us. Your primary desire, says Epictetus, should be your desire not to be frustrated by forming desires you wont

William B. Irvine, A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 86.
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Collins 9 be able to fulfill.18 This is where what Irvine calls the Stoic dichotomy of control comes into play: the most effective way to liberate oneself from fruitless desire, the Stoics conclude, is to be concerned only with the controllable the internal for the things under our control are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded.19 The Stoics eagerness to understand what is and is not controllable made them keenly interested in questions of fate, free will, and chance. The conclusions they drew on these matters are striking in their simplicity and pragmatism; they also evince the unscientific spiritualism that was suggested above as a potential explanation for Stoicisms lack of repute since Enlightenment. The Stoics believed that the universe is composed of two elements, matter and cause, with cause being a reasoning substance alternately referred to as deus, or God.20 It is clear that most if not all Stoics believed that this divine cause guides the destiny of human beings; that is to say, they believed in providence. This paper will refrain from passing judgment on the metaphysical claim that the universe is guided by a supernatural power that everything happens for a reason. But since it is my personal belief that no exercise in logic can lead to conclusive answers on these matters, for reasons I will explain below, I would be hesitant to dismiss offhand any view that, like Senecas, rests at least partly on intuition: For the present purpose it is unnecessary to show that this mighty structure of the world does not endure without someone to guard Irvine 86. Epictetus, Encheiridion 483. 20 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 124.
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Collins 10 itthat while bodies which owe their motion to accident often fall into disorder and quickly collide, this swift revolution of the heavens, being ruled by eternal law, goes on unhinderedthis regularity does not belong to matter moving at randomeven phenomena which seem irregular and undetermineddo not happen without a reason.21 Many modern readers might scoff at Senecas suggestion that the regular rotation of the planets might be proof of God: had he shared our understanding of the concept of gravity, he would surely have been disabused of this nave notion. Yet I find it difficult to understand the conviction with which proponents of scientism assert, whenever the physical processes underlying a phenomenon have become apparent, that an exhaustive understanding of its causes has been reached. The debate over the psychiatric industrys classification and treatment of attention disorders offers a contemporary example. Dr. Perri Klass, a popularizer of medical issues and recipient of the American Academy of Pediatrics Education Award, recently published an article in the New York Times entitled Untangling the Myths About Attention Deficit Disorder.22 In it she seeks to dispel speculation that social and technological factors may be contributing to attention problems that attention (or its lack) [is] a marker and a metaphor for something larger in society for the multitasking, the electronic distractions, the sense that the nature of concentration may be changing, that people feel nibbled at, overscheduled, Lucius Annaeus Seneca, On Providence, trans. John W. Basore (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928) 3-5. 22 Perri Klass, M.D., Untangling the Myths about Attention Deficit Disorder, New York Times, Dec. 13 2010 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/health/14klass.html).
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Collins 11 distracted, irritable.23 The reason this cannot be the case, Klass claims, is that scientific research has already established the cause of attention problems: abnormal neurochemical states, characterized by low levels of dopamine in the brain, suboptimal activity in the frontal lobes, etc. Yet when a person is decapitated, is it safe to assume that the correspondent drop in brain activity, and not the removal of his head, was the cause of death? An important rule of science, after all, is that correlation is not equivalent to causation. Likewise, while gravity is indeed responsible for the orderly movement of the planets, we cannot rule out the possibility that there may be some prior or deeper cause to which gravity answers. The same reasoning applies, I believe, to all extant phenomena we can never be sure that the level of explanation we have reached is the deepest one, that the cause we have uncovered is sufficient. My position, then, is that any broad claim about the causal nature of reality is a belief statement. The Stoic claim that the universe is composed of matter and cause, and that events are purposive, is one such belief statement; the scientific claim that the universe is composed of matter alone, and that all events are random, is simply another. So much for the truth value of Stoic metaphysical claims. Yet while Seneca professes belief in a divine providence, he also makes a related philosophical argument that appeals to pragmatism: no alternative approach to life is more productive than a fatalistic view of past events (accept all that happens exactly as if it were an order from above)24 and a practiced indifference to the future ("the only safe harbor in this life's tossing, troubled sea is to refuse to be bothered about what
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Ibid. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 173.

Collins 12 the future will bring").25 Again, the idea is to focus strictly on what is controllable and to overcome destructive emotions desires and aversions, hopes and fears that arise from a concern with things beyond our control, particularly past and future events. In Letter 5, Seneca writes: Fear keeps pace with hopeboth are mainly due to projecting our thoughts far ahead of us instead of adapting ourselves to the present. Thus it is that foresight, the greatest blessing humanity has been given, is transformed into a curse.26 27 The main hopes the Stoics sought to quell are easily identified: desire for wealth, power, fame, and other externals. As for fears, they were concerned primarily with grief, sickness, and death; that is to say, misfortune in general or at least things typically perceived as misfortune.28 This is the company in which you must live out your days. Escape them you cannot, scorn them you can.29 The Stoics offer several techniques for diminishing hopes and fears and building up immunity to the effects of fate. Their method for extinguishing hope is a simple one, and has already been mentioned: if we desire only things that are within our control, then there is no need for hope; we need only turn inward to pursue them. This turning inward, for the Stoics, amounts to cultivating the mind. Thus Seneca writes that the happy man is he who recognizes no good and evil other than

Seneca, Epistulae Morales 190. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 38. 27 An interesting aside: the World Values Survey discovered that of all nationalities, Americans report both the most hopes and the most fears. 28 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 198. 29 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 198.
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Collins 13 a good and evil mind.30 Their approach to dealing with fear and aversive arousal is more complex, involving an ongoing series of exercises in rationalization and selfreassurance. "Well, imagine that nature is saying to you, 'those things you grumble about are the same for everyone. I can give no one anything easier. But anyone who likes may make them easier for himself.' how? By viewing them with equanimity."31 This process involves reminding ourselves of the transience of all things, anticipating pain, hardship and loss, and noting that both good and bad things will all ultimately pass: One thing I know: all the works of mortal man lie under sentence of mortality; we live among things that are destined to perish.32 One way to do this is to meditate on the thought of the things we fear, employing a technique Irvine calls negative visualization: Scorn [misfortune] you will if by constant reflection you have anticipated future happenings. Everyone faces up more bravely to a thing for which he has long prepared himself, sufferings, even, being withstood if they have been trained for in advance. Those who are unprepared, on the other hand, are panic-stricken at the most insignificant happenings. We must see to it that nothing takes us by surprise.33 34 As Irvine points out, such reflection has the added benefit of shaking us from our Seneca, On the Happy Life 109. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 183. 32 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 181. 33 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 198. 34 Here another interesting parallel with Buddhism emerges: the Buddhists are so dedicated to grasping the impermanence of all things that they encourage even young children to anticipate in vivid detail the decomposition of their corpses after death.
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Collins 14 complacency and inspiring us to make the most of the things we love, knowing we can only enjoy them for a time. Another way the Stoics reconcile themselves to loss and death is by utilizing a symmetry argument: because the universe owes us nothing, everything we have, including life itself, is either a gift of fate or a happy accident (the Stoics, as we have seen, subscribed to the former view). Stop misinterpreting the kindness of fortune. She has given as well as taken away.35 This logic applies not only to sudden and unexpected misfortunes like the loss of a loved one, but also to the entire condition of mortality. You weren't thinking, surely, that you wouldn't yourself one day arrive at the destination toward which you've been heading from the beginning? Every journey has its end."36 Furthermore, Seneca argues that if non-existence were something terrible, we should be aware of the fact, as weve already experienced it: Death is just not being. What that is like I know already. It will be the same before me as it was after mewhat does it matter, after all, whether you cease to be or never begin, when the result of either is that you do not exist?37 Seneca suggests that we should be profoundly grateful for everything that has fallen to us as a result of fate, not the least of which is the opportunity to live, however briefly. Indeed, a moments reflection might leave any person astonished at the staggering length and complexity of the causal chain that resulted in his birth at the endless number of points at which, had anything gone differently, he would not have come into being. The overwhelming improbability of existence makes it hard to know which would Seneca, Epistulae Morales 115. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 128. 37 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 104.
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Collins 15 be the more amazing explanation, chance or fate. The Stoics, then, advise us to treat everything we have, including our very lives, as, in a sense, borrowed lets get this sense of justice firmly into our heads and pay up without grumbling the taxes arising from our mortal state38 and to approach things with a measure of nonattachment and gratitude. Another method of self-reassurance Seneca suggests for overcoming negative emotions involves recourse to a sort of hidden benefit or blessing in disguise argument. While remarking on the destruction of his friend Liberalis hometown by fire, he points out that, because no individual has a complete window on time, we lack the necessary equipment to judge the value of events. It may be [Lyon] has only been consumed so as to be called to higher things. A setback has often cleared the way for greater prosperity. Many things have fallen only to rise to more exalted heights.39 An extreme application of this logic might suggest that we cannot be sure that the death of a loved one is not, in some larger sense, for the best. Consider, for example, the possibility that a dear friend of yours might go on to become a doctor who will save the life of a patient who will give birth to a child who will invent a new super-weapon that will destroy life on earth. You cannot possess knowledge of all this, but if you could, how would you feel if that friend were to die tomorrow? You would be sad, surely, that someone you loved dearly has departed from life but what kind of person would you be if you tried to prevent it from happening? This sort of thinking may seem to require a callous and depersonalized
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Seneca, Epistulae Morales 199. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 181.

Collins 16 outlook on life, in which the cosmic and far-off takes precedence over the individual and the immediate. And, it is true, it is nearly impossible to take any real solace in such thoughts unless you believe, as the Stoics did, that a divine hand governs the course of existence, rendering every event purposeful. It is important to remember, however, that the central goal of Stoicism is to focus on what we can control; when a sad thing, a tragedy, even, befalls us, and the event itself is already beyond our control, what can we do besides make the best of the situation? Suppose our friend has died; if he would want us to become so consumed with grief that our own lives deteriorate as a result, then was he truly a friend? Or is it not the desire of friends to be a source of happiness to each other? Seneca goes so far as to suggest that public displays of extreme grief may be calculated to earn social approval: Would you like to know what lies behind extravagant weeping and wailing? In our tears we are trying to find means of proving that we feel the loss. We are not governed by our grief but parading it.40 He suggests that if we are sufficiently appreciative of the presence of our friends while alive, never failing to seek them out whenever possible and treating them with care and attentiveness, then such displays will be superfluous. The reason they lament them so extravagantly then is that they are afraid people may wonder whether they did care; they are looking for a belated means of demonstrating their devotion.41 After all, you are not proposing to keep him very long in your memory if his memory is to last just as long as your grief.42 Seneca proposes, then, that we should limit our Seneca, Epistulae Morales 114. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 114. 42 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 114.
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Collins 17 grieving and instead reflect often and with pleasure on our memory of the people we have lost: Thinking of departed friends is to me something sweet and mellow. For when I had them with me it was with the feeling that I was going to lose them, and now that I have lost them I keep the feeling that I have them with me still.43 This sort of striving toward grief immunity has given Stoics the undeserved reputation of being utterly unfeeling human beings. Yet it is important to distinguish between an emotional response and way in which it is handled. And yet I do not mean to say that the brave man is insensible to [misfortunes], but that he overcomes them.44 A favorite metaphor of Senecas that aptly represents the Stoic pursuit of freedom through control is that of a journey of life, in which the individual, guided by reason, navigates the turbulent currents of lifes tossing, troubled sea45 in search of calm and tranquil waters. Seneca urges us to see to it that we are travelling, not drifting, through life: For what if you should think that that man had had a long voyage who had been caught by a fierce storm as soon as he left harbour, and, swept hither and thither by a succession of winds that raged from different quarters, had been driven in a circle round the same course? Not much voyaging did he have, but much tossing about.46 The rough winds that threaten to keep us from making progress toward virtue, wisdom, and tranquility concepts which, to the Stoics, were virtually synonymic Seneca, Epistulae Morales 115. Seneca, On Providence 9. 45 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 190. 46 Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 309.
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Collins 18 are our protean desires: Vices beset us and surround us on every side, anddo not permit us to rise anew and lift up our eyes for the discernment of truth.47 Until we conquer desire and establish the pursuit of truth as a fixed principle by which to direct [our] course,48 we are not, Seneca asserts, really living, but merely passing time. The part of life we really live is small. For all the rest of existence is not life, but merely time.49 It is by exercising the uniquely human faculty of reason that we learn to put our free agency to good use, overcoming hope, fear, and desire, and gradually becoming uninhibited for what can possibly be above him who is above fortune.50 The following essay will explore the question of what we are to do with all this supposed freedom, discussing the nature of the tranquil state promised by Stoicism and the obligations attendant to the philosophic life.

The Beeswax Stopple: Minimalism and Tranquility in Stoic Thought

In short, you will be a wise man, if you stop up your ears; nor is it enough to close them with wax; you need a denser stopple than that which they say Ulysses used for his comrades.51

As we have seen, the end goal is Stoicism is to attain a tranquil state of mind, unburdened by low-order, unfulfilling hopes and fears, and characterized by the Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 289. Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 291. 49 Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 291. 50 Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 301. 51 Seneca, Epistulae Morales, trans. Richard M. Gummere, http://www.stoics.com/seneca_epistles_book_1.html (Dec. 20, 2010).
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Collins 19 steadfast pursuit of wisdom and virtue: When once we have driven away all that excites or affrights us, there ensues unbroken tranquility and enduring freedom.52 This essay will attempt to explore further the qualities of this tranquil state and consider some of the paths Stoics advise us to take in order to reach it. I will conclude by discussing the ways in which Stoicism, often mischaracterized as a philosophy of disengagement, urges us to connect with our fellow human beings and contribute to the welfare of society. The tranquil state sought by the Stoics is marked by an abiding stability of mind,53 a steadfastness of purpose, and a calm and joyful acceptance of the conditions of ones life. In his essay on tranquility, Seneca writes: What we are seeking, therefore, is how the mind may always pursue a steady and favorable course, may be well-disposed towards itself, and may view its condition with joy, and suffer no interruption of this joy, but may abide in a peaceful state, never being uplifted nor ever cast down. This will be tranquility.54 Stoic tranquility, then, appears in many ways akin to the Buddhist concept of Right Mindfulness, the seventh element of the Noble Eightfold Path. The Noble Eightfold Path, or Fourth Noble Truth, mirrors the Stoic ethical program in that it treats wisdom and equanimity of mind as closely related goals, both essential to living a good and happy life. Along with ethical conduct, praj (wisdom) and samdhi, (concentration) are the basic divisions of the Eightfold Path. Right Mindfulness, a Seneca, On the Happy Life 107. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind, trans. John W. Basore (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932) 213. 54 Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 215.
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Collins 20 subdivision of samdhi, is described in Buddhist scripture as the case where a monk remains focused on the body in and of itself ardent, alert, & mindful putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world.55 The tranquil state sought by the Stoics is similar to Mindfulness in that it is marked by a calm acceptance of events, an indifference to most conventional objects of fear and desire, and a meditative serenity; it may differ, however, in placing relatively more emphasis on constant intellectual exercise as opposed to social engagement for the sake of helping others what Buddhist call mett, or loving-kindness (though, as I will argue, the Stoics saw the two pursuits as closely connected). While Stoicism appears to be enjoying at least a modest revival in academia, there has been an explosion of popular interest in Buddhism in the West since the 1970s, evidenced by the success of several major Hollywood motion pictures on Buddhist themes (Kundun, Little Buddha, Seven Years in Tibet), strong sales of books by Buddhist authors in the West, and the global celebrity of the Dalai Lama. While the popular appeal of Stoicism may be more limited because of its pre-Christian theism and intellectualized ethical outlook, it is likely the case that both Buddhism and Stoicism are attracting some interest in the West today because of the emphasis they place on tranquility and simplicity. This is not to suggest that some mass conversion to Stoicism and Buddhism is occurring in the West; only that there might be an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the materialistic values and ethical relativism of post-World War II society, generating renewed interest in objectivist moral philosophies that advocate a relatively simple way of life focused on nonMaha-satipatthana Sutta, trans. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.22.0.than.html (Dec. 20, 2010).
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Collins 21 material sources of contentment. How does one attain tranquility of mind? The first step, for both the Stoics and the Buddhists, is the recognition and management of destructive emotions the hopes, desires, and fears that Buddhists call attachments a process discussed in the previous essay. This process begins with the simple decision to concern ourselves only with the things we can control. Once a person has understood and accepted the basic principles of Stoicism that we should focus on the controllable, that desire for externals is destructive, and that a virtue marked by wisdom is the highest good his temperament is supposed to become increasingly calm, simple, and focused. This stage of progress toward tranquility is characterized by a radical minimalism, a simple mode of existence involving relatively few internal and external attachments. The wise man [of the past] followed a simple way of life which is hardly surprising when you consider how even in this modern age he seeks to be as little encumbered as he possibly can.56 The Stoics advise us to focus only on what is truly essential, minimizing sources of distraction and mental clutter: "Everything which went beyond our actual needs was just so much unnecessary weight, a burden to the man who had to carry it let us cut out all distractions and work away at [philosophy] alone."57 Herein Stoic thought draws heavily upon the Cynical influences of its founders, inspired by a view of Socrates that is interested less in his role as theorizer than in the model provided by his life: simple, ascetic, and devoted to the pursuit of moral goods. At this stage it is not a mischaracterization to say that Stoicism advocates a
56 57

Seneca, Epistulae Morales, 165-166. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 204-209.

Collins 22 certain degree of non-attachment and disengagement from conventional life. A mind that has only just been salvaged, so to speak, from the grip of the passions is thought to remain highly vulnerable to destructive influences. Engagement with society means constant exposure to conventional opinion, which often exalts the very things the fledgling Stoic is seeking to overcome: lust for wealth, power, esteem and other external goods. The Stoics were keenly aware of the phenomenon modern sociologists call the bandwagon effect, and deeply wary of its consequences: One of the causes of the troubles that beset us is the way our lives are guided by the example of others; instead of being set to rights by reason were seduced by convention. There are things we shouldnt wish to imitate if they were done by only a few, but when a lot of people have started doing them we follow along.58 So, while the Stoics never encourage us to completely disengage from the world, they do advise us at times to minimize our attachments and to think carefully about how were managing our time and our dealings with others in short, to ensure that we are our own masters. The best [part of life] comes first. Are we going to let others drain it so as to keep the dregs for ourselves?59 This aspect of Stoic thought reflects the philosophys preoccupation with freedom and self-control, themes discussed in the previous essay. The Stoics believed, then, that a prudent marshalling of time and energy is absolutely essential for anyone who wishes to live happily and well. They viewed
58 59

Seneca, Epistulae Morales 227-208. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 208.

Collins 23 time, or life, as our most precious resource: Though all the brilliant intellects of the ages were to concentrate upon this one theme, never could they adequately express their wonder at this dense darkness of the human mind. Men do not suffer anyone to seize their estatesyet they allow others to trespass upon their lifein guarding their fortune men are often close-fisted, yet when it comes to the matter of wasting time, in the case of the one thing in which it is right to be miserly, they show themselves most prodigal.60 Stoics stressed the importance of breaking free from the means-ends relationships that can often characterize social interaction, undermining our freedom and interfering with moral self-improvement. This man desires an advocate, this one answers the call, that one is on trial, that one defends him, that one gives sentence; no one asserts his claim to himself, everyone is wasted for the sake of anotherA cultivates B and B cultivates C; no one is his own master.61 While they wrote much on the value of friendship, the Stoics also proposed high standards for the concept. They urge us to ensure that our dealings with others are free, voluntary and meaningful not simply entanglements founded on inessential concerns. This piece of advice might be valuable to modern people living in advanced industrialized societies which, though they may present high standards of living and a wealth of opportunity, also tend to see the proliferation of relationships built at least partly on utility: the employee and the boss, the grade-seeking student and the salaried teacher, the marketer and his target demographic. The Stoics interest in simplifying
60 61

Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 293. Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 291-293.

Collins 24 their lives may have had something to do with the fact that they, too, lived in a sprawling, complex, and highly litigious society. Minimalism in Stoicism applies not only to ordering relationships, but also to the selection of studies, activities, and material possessions. We are encouraged to choose these carefully, with an eye to the essential, and to remember that our central focus should always be the pursuit of wisdom for no one pursuit can be successfully followed by a man who is busied with many things.62 The Stoics therefore rejected a materialistic life organized primarily around the acquisition of wealth and property.63 They argued that most possessions are inessential, and therefore nothing but a hindrance and a distraction. Until we have begun to go without them, we fail to realize how unnecessary many things are. Weve been using them not because we needed them but because we had them.64 Furthermore, once weve become accustomed to enjoying an inessential thing, we become afraid to lose it: "Very wretched, therefore, and not merely short, must the life of those be who work hard to gain what they must work harder to keep."65 It is likely that Rousseau, a known admirer of the Stoics, is inspired by such observations when he suggests that desires, once embraced, gradually come to be felt as needs, impeding progress toward moral freedom. Even in ethical and philosophical studies, Seneca

Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 305. As the wealthiest private citizen in Rome, Seneca was accused of hypocrisy on this point. His defense was that, while he made use of extensive property, but did not depend on it for his happiness, and was prepared to lose it. 64 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 227. 65 Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 343.
62 63

Collins 25 advocates minimalism, claiming it is much better to surrender yourself to a few authors than to wander through many.66 The minimalistic attitude Stoicism advises us to bring to the management of our affairs might make it attractive to modern people, many of whom have begun to worry that the frequent stimulation and distraction of the information age could be making it harder for them to lead calm and focused lives that it might be interfering with their tranquility. The New York Times recently ran a series of articles covering new research into the potentially harmful effects of constant digital connectedness. One article, entitled If Your Kids Are Awake, Theyre Probably Online, reports that the average young American now spends practically every waking minute except for the time in school using a smart phone, computer, television or other electronic device, according to a new study from the Kaiser Family Foundation.67 The Chinese government has classified Internet addiction as an official clinical disorder, registering the condition with the World Health Organization and funding in-patient rehabilitation clinics.68 This essay is not the place for a detailed discussion of the potential social costs and benefits of Internet technology. But evidence has emerged to suggest that the behavior of particularly heavy Internet users can resemble that of gambling addicts or alcoholics, marked by a strong and frequent urge to check for electronic messages or to seek out entertaining and stimulating media content. It is exactly Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 247. Tamar Lewin, If Your Kids Are Awake, Theyre Probably Online, New York Times, Jan. 20, 2010 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/education/20wired.html). 68 Ariana Eunjung Cha, In China, Stern Treatment For Young Internet Addicts, The Washington Post, Feb. 22, 2007 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/21/AR2007022102094.html).
66 67

Collins 26 this sort of compulsive pursuit of short-term rewards a behavior pattern that, as we know from psychological research, is at least partly hardwired into the human brain which the Stoics sought to avoid. In a passage displaying some of the selfcongratulatory tendencies for which Seneca has drawn criticism, we are offered a fascinating glimpse into what might be considered the ancient Roman equivalent of information addiction: Today we saw some boats from Alexandria the ones they call the mail packets come into view all of a suddenWhile everyone around me was hurrying thus from all directions to the waterfront, I found a great deal of pleasure in refusing to bestir myself. Although there would be letters from my people over there I was in no hurry to know what reports they might be carrying or what might be the state of my financial interests there. For a long time now I have not been concerned about any profit or loss.69 If Seneca had written in 2010, he might instead have applauded himself for refraining from frequent e-mail checking or excessive attentiveness to his online investment portfolio. Much of his writing is devoted to the problem of how to handle outside distractions and remain focused on the goals of a philosophic life: I swear I no more notice all this roar of noise than I do the sound of waves or falling waterfor I force my mind to become self-absorbed and not let outside things distract it.70 In addition to using the recurrent storm of life metaphor, Seneca often likens the distractions and obstacles we face to those of a crowded, noisy
69 70

Seneca, Epistulae Morales 124-5. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 110.

Collins 27 bathhouse: One has to accept life on the same terms as the public baths, or crowds, or travel. Things will get thrown at you and things will hit you. Lifes no soft affair.71 While this essay has focused mainly on the Stoics thoughts on managing external sources of distraction, the most important sense in which Stoicism is a minimalistic philosophy is in its approach to ordering our internal lives our ideas, opinions, and desires. Here, as in all other places, the Stoics maintained that straightforwardness and simplicity are in keeping with goodness.72 They urge us not only to restrict our concerns to the controllable, but also to drop all other goals in order to wholeheartedly pursue a single one: the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, through which we might arrive at tranquility. I will conclude this essay by addressing two obvious and potentially damning criticisms of the Stoic attachment to the tranquil life. The first is that such a life might be duller, less active, and therefore less satisfying than alternatives; the second is that it appears to amount to a self-absorbed rejection of society, in which we shirk our duties to our fellow human beings and miss out on the joys of connectedness. The Stoics themselves gave thoughtful consideration to these two complaints. In addressing the first, they assert that an important distinction must be drawn between repose and inactivity, fixedness of purpose and inertia. All are in the same case, both those, on the one hand, who are plagued with fickleness of purpose, and those, on the other, who loll and yawnand live, not as they wish, but
71 72

Seneca, Epistulae Morales 196. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 99.

Collins 28 as they have begun.73 If the Stoics criticize more frequently and in harsher terms the former fault, it is likely because their audience consisted mostly of ambitious, intelligent young Romans, more likely prone to a mercurial restlessness than to directionless slacking. Many talented middle and upper class Roman youths saw themselves as confronted with a choice between two alternate life paths, each with a unique appeal: a career in politics, with the attendant status, wealth, and privilege, or a contemplative life devoted to philosophy. Through their exhortations, the Stoics hoped to sway at least a few promising minds toward the latter pursuit. Yet Seneca is careful to insist that the contemplative existence, though it involves a relative disengagement from the clamor of public life, is in the deepest sense one of action. Only by establishing a fixed plan of life, he asserts, can a person begin to make any real progress toward the fulfillment of any goal; and among the goals we might pursue, none but the development our internal faculties, namely wisdom and virtue, can lead to real and abiding contentment. For the objects sought by the so-called active life political prestige, material success, and other external sources of pleasure cannot truly be possessed by us. If we prize these things, we must rely on the kindness of fate and the ever-shifting opinions of others. Furthermore, the Stoics expect us to find these goods not only difficult to grasp, but also impossible to enjoy. This is because, in chasing after public esteem, we must engage in uncomfortable contortions of character that confine the spirit this, too, affords no small occasion for anxieties if you are bent on assuming a

73

Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 215.

Collins 29 pose and never reveal yourself to anyone franklyfor it is torturous to be constantly watching oneself and be fearful of being caught out of our usual role.74 The Stoics encourage us to seek a tranquility that is not only calm and blissful, but also stimulating and energetic for it is the nature of the human mind to be active and prone to movement,75 and there is nothing so certain as the fact that the harmful consequences of inactivity are dissipated by activity.76 They are careful to distinguish the tranquil state they seek from the fruitless disgrace crowning a life of unfulfilled hopes and aborted plans. For if the cause of a persons retirement from affairs is a mind which can find no issue, because they can neither rule nor obey their desires, then the product will be sad and languid endurance of ones leisurethe hesitancy of a life which fails to find its way clearand the dullness of a soul that lies torpid amid abandoned hopes.77 The tranquil existence prized by the Stoics, on the other hand, is active in the sense that it involves continual intellectual engagement, taking regular recourse to the solace and inspiration offered by great literature. Yet the Stoics acknowledged that engagement in such a bookish, intellectualized sort of activity is not in itself enough to constitute an energetic existence: As rich fields must not be forced for their productiveness, if they have no rest, will quickly exhaust them so constant labour will break the vigour of the mind, but if it is released and relaxed a little while, it will recover its powers; continuous mental toil breeds in the mind a Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 279. Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 219. 76 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 111. 77 Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 217.
74 75

Collins 30 certain dullness and languor.78 In offering a friend advice on how best to enjoy his retirement, Seneca recommends the usual course of reading and moral self-improvement, yet concludes by conceding that there are times when [the mind] must be drawn into rejoicing and freedom, and gloomy sobriety must be banished for a while.79 To this end he prescribes a healthy routine of brisk walks and moderate drinking, appearing for once to permit indulgence in that most-dreaded thing, non-intellectual pleasure: And, we too, ought to take walks out-of-doors in order that the mind may be strengthened and refreshed by the open air and much breathingat times we ought to reach the point even of intoxication, not drowning ourselves in drink, yet succumbing to it; for it washes away troubles, and stirs the mind from its very depths and heals its sorrow.80 Given the Roman notion that soul and mind are essentially one and the same thing,81 it struck the Stoics as natural that the two should be cultivated together. While they believed that a rational element should predominate in the personality, they did appear to have at least some concern for what is now often referred to as the mindSeneca, On Tranquility of Mind 281. Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 283-285. 80 Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 283. 81 Here it may be worth noting that the seeming inability of the Stoics to contemplate any activity that might fail to increase the vitality of the mind might be misleading. For this impression is due in part to a problem of terminology. While translators typically render the Latin word in question, animus, as mind, it carries a range of meaning. The short definition given in Lewis and Shorts popular Latin dictionary is rational soul, but the concept, derived from the Greek word , or wind, is really that of the breath of life. This was conceived not only as the source of intellectual inspiration, but also more broadly as the vital force, the basic source of change and movement within a person.
78 79

Collins 31 body connection. Here the Stoics appear to stake out an intermediate position between the extreme asceticism of the Cynics and the Peripatetic view that material and bodily goods are necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for a happy life. Senecas stance is that such goods are helpful equipment, worthy of use so long as we can avoid becoming wholly dependent upon them. Employing a somewhat dated metaphor, he encourages us to treat creature comforts as our slaves, and not our masters. Tranquility is even compatible, according to Seneca, with the occasional fit of wild inspiration, even if this requires us to embrace our impulses and momentarily abandon the self-control Stoics prized so highly: The lofty utterance that rises above the attempts of others is impossible unless the mind is excited. When it has scorned the vulgar and the commonplace, and has soared far aloft fired by divine inspiration, then alone it chants a strain too lofty for mortal lips. So long as it is left to itself, it is impossible for it to reach any sublime and difficult height; it must forsake the common track and be driven to frenzy and champ at the bit and run away with its rider and rush to a height that it would have feared to climb by itself.82 This may, at first blush, appear to be just one more point at which Stoic philosophy urges us to withdraw inward and pursue individual intellectual attainment. Yet philosophy, for the Stoics, was not a solipsistic activity; quite to the contrary, they viewed it as a moral duty. Thus we come around to the second and more weighty
82

Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 285.

Collins 32 accusation sometimes lodged against the Stoics with their precious tranquility: that theirs is a self-absorbed and antisocial philosophy of life.

Stoicism in Society

This final essay, then, will address the impact Stoics hoped to have on society through their philosophical activity, assuming that with no such an objective, a contemplative life is hard to justify. Stoicism, it is true, does advocate an intensely focused period of moral and intellectual self-improvement, during which a person is encouraged to minimize all distractions and dedicate himself wholeheartedly to the pursuit of knowledge. Our dutywill be, first, to examine our own selves, then, the matters that we shall undertake, and lastly, those for whose sake or in whose company we are undertaking them.83 It is also undeniable that this enterprise begins as something primarily inwardly directed, and that it entails a certain degree of separation from society at large. Particularly when a persons commitment to virtue is fresh and largely untested, the Stoics, as we have seen, thought it was necessary to avoid harmful or destructive influences and in some cases, even the people who might bring them to us. Even beyond this point, however, it must be admitted that the Stoics way of life may always appear somewhat disengaged compared to that of others. Yet the Stoics believed that the goals animating their philosophical activity were by no means private. In attempting to find ways to overcome negative
83

Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 235.

Collins 33 emotions, accept the things we cant control, and generally lead productive and happy lives, they believed they were seeking out solutions to universal human problems. Whenever a man has the set purpose to make himself useful to his countrymen and all mortals, he both gets practice and does service at the same timewherever he secretes his leisure, he should be willing to benefit the individual man and mankind by his intellect, his voice, and his counsel.84 In a lecture on the importance of avoiding fruitless, self-indulgent intellectual exercises Mouse is a syllable, and a mouse nibbles cheese; therefore a syllable nibbles cheese. Seneca offers a heartfelt and even moving call to duty for the philosopher. Marshalling some of the rhetorical genius for which he was famed, he argues that engaging in such childish fatuities not only wastes our own time, but is also deeply immoral for a philosophy that ignores its social responsibilities is soulless and inhuman: Is this what we philosophers acquire wrinkles in our brows for?...One man is suffering at the hands of men, another at the hands of the gods. Whats the point of concocting whimsies for me of the sort Ive just been mentioning? This isnt the place for fun youre called in to help the unhappy. Youre pledged to bring succour to the shipwrecked, to those in captivity, to the sick, the needyWhere are you off to? What are you about? The person youre engaging in word-play with is in fear go to his aidAll mankind are stretching out their hands to you on every side.They are begging you to extricate them from this awful

84

Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind 223-225.

Collins 34 vortex, to show them in their doubt and disarray the shining torch of truth.85 The Stoics, then, believe there is a better way to contribute to the welfare of the people around us than thrusting ourselves headlong into society, in whatever condition we might find it. Rather than unquestioningly accepting its beliefs and eagerly adopting all its favorite behaviors, they wanted to inquire into how it might be made better. They sought to promote the ascendency of philosophical principles the acceptance of which, they believed, could vastly improve the life of any person. In attempting to act as moral tutors to society at large,86 Stoics might be accused of a vain and self-important presumptuousness. It may be a legitimate criticism of the Stoics in general, and of Seneca in particular, that they display excessive and perhaps unfounded sureness in their beliefs. If it is true, however, that all significant metaphysical claims are belief statements (as I argued in the first essay above), then why should the Stoics not be entitled to theirs? If no simple process of pure logic can lead to the bottom of things, then anyone who gives advice based upon his understanding of reality must be relying at least partly upon intuition. Offering such advice to other people in the belief that it might help them live happier, more fulfilling lives might be considered arrogant; indeed, if we are to accept the relativistic claim that all views are equally valid, then the mere act of offering advice becomes an offense. But the Stoics, who believed in the existence of truth and the possibility of knowledge, thought that sharing whatever they had learned was their mortal duty, the justification for all their efforts in philosophy.
85 86

Seneca, Epistulae Morales 91. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 229.

Collins 35 Operating under the guiding principle that people should live in accordance with nature, the Stoics believed they were uncovering moral laws that reflect the natural structure of the universe: For [philosophy] imparts a knowledge of the whole of nature, as well as of herself.87 They believed they were shedding light on the designs of nature and paying homage to the glory of creation: Tell them what nature has made necessary and what she has made superfluous. Tell them how simple are the laws she has laid down, and how straightforward and enjoyable life is for those who follow them and how confused and disagreeable it is for others who put more trust in popular ideas than they do in nature.88 For they were convinced that humans had been endowed with reason for the sake of perfecting themselves. What is peculiarly a mansis his spirit, and the perfection of his reason in that spirit. Mans ideal state is realized when he has fulfilled the purpose for which he was born. And what is it that reason demands of him? Something very easy that he live in accordance with his own nature.89 It may at first seem an ungainly and paradoxical conclusion that man should use his free agency to, in a sense, seek out and follow orders, even if it means restraining his own urges and desires.90 But the Stoics believed that even and in fact, especially under such constraints, human life offers the potential for a unique and profound Seneca, Epistulae Morales 171. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 98. 89 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 188-189. 90 Isaiah Berlin has written on the distinction between the negative liberty favored by Hobbes and most moderns (freedom from external constraints), and the positive liberty advocated by Rousseau and the Stoics (freedom from internal constraints that might prevent a person from realizing his full potential).
87 88

Collins 36 satisfaction.91 For while rocks and beastshave no comprehension of bliss, and no man can be said to be happy if he has been thrust outside the pale of truththe life that is happy has been founded on correct and trustworthy judgment, and is unalterable.92 Reason leaves open to us a freedom unattainable for other living things, enabling us to experience the beauty and splendor of existence with a clear conscience, a god-like immunity to fate, and a uniquely deep perception. For we, unlike the rest of the animal world, [have] followed nature with more than just a pair of eyes, things slow to grasp divinity.93 Perhaps it is the case that one cannot improve the lot of others; perhaps it is ostentatious to try. But so long as we assume that the conditions of our lives are indeed flexible, and that things can be made better, we must conclude that the Stoics were engaged in a valuable public service when they dedicated time to trying to figure out how it might be done. Let us grasp the idea that there are two commonwealths the one, a vast and truly common state, which embraces alike gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner of earth nor to that, but measure the bounds of our citizenship by the path of the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of birth.94 While Seneca has been criticized for his use of soaring rhetoric, his urgent and direct Here I feel compelled to remark upon the strangeness of our species strong desire to prove the supreme blissfulness of its own existence, and the relative lowliness of that of other forms of life; it seems to arise from an oddly jealous and insecure self-consciousness, as if we were disturbed by the possibility that snails and trees might enjoy themselves. 92 Seneca, On the Happy Life, 111-113. 93 Seneca, Epistulae Morales 172-3. 94 Seneca, On Leisure 189.
91

Collins 37 tone, and the simplicity of his philosophy, it is exactly these qualities that give his writing force and make it meaningful to the average person. This is the method by which he goes about making his contribution to the vast and truly common polity of humanity. It is possible that there is relatively little wholly original thought in Seneca; yet to this reader, at least, his writing has the unmistakable ring of truth, the inspiring and penetrating quality of something intended to change lives. If this is an unacceptable objective for philosophy, then the value of the discipline may be doubtful.