MARY ROSE P.

CAMBEL 4th Year Juris Doctor Remedial Law Review LSPU-Santa Cruz, Laguna

RULE 111 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO v REGINALD HILL, and MARVIN HILL, G.R. No. L-24803. May 26, 1977 Procedural History: The killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. The appellants filed for a motion for reconsideration reiterating that the action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court; the action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata; the complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.But the motion was dismissed. Hence, the plaintiffs-appellants appealed for resolutions on the dismissal of the case, that the present action is against and violates Sec. 1, Rule 111 and that Rules of Court is applicable.

Statement of Facts: Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the

occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named AgapitoElcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the grounds that the following order was issued, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded. Hence, plaintiffs-appellants appealed in the Supreme Court the following resolutions: THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE; THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA; THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER.

Issue: Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case extinguished? Held: The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for civil case and quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

According to the Code Commission: The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and culpa extracontractual or cuasi-

delito has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery., (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.) The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.

Holding: The order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

RULE 115 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED LUMANLAW VS. PERALTA (G.R. No. 164953 February 13, 2006) Facts: Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District for illegal possession of a dangerous drug. Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw remained uninformed of the charges against him, while continuing to be in detention and despair all throughout that period of limbo. Petitioners counsel manifested his intention to file a motion to dismiss on the account of the violation of his clients right to speedy trial. Petitioner points out the fourteen postponements that resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years.

Issue: Whether there was a violation of the right to speedy trial, warranting a quashal of the Information againstpetitioner. Held: Right to Speedy Trial Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of the charges against them. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process. Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial. Petitioner cites Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998"),which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused. Speedy Trial Construed "x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered." The delay caused by Judge Arranzs retirement may be deemed a normal part of the ordinary conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable. Unjustified Delay Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them far from being reasonable.There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes for the delays, we see the lack of earnesteffort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the

postponements could have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding petitioners constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. An arraignment consists simply of reading to the accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute judge canconduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the court. Postponement Due to Absence of Counsel Respondent judges postponement of the arraignment on August 6, 2003, had no substantial basis. Thus, thepostponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioners counsel, became unreasonable and ultimatelyattributable to respondents inflexibility as regards contingencies. The Petition is GRANTED. Petitioner was ordered to be RELEASE from the Manila City Jail.