The Japanese in Peru: History of Immigration, Settlement, and Racialization Author(s): Ayumi Takenaka Reviewed work(s): Source: Latin

American Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 3, East Asian Migration to Latin America (May, 2004), pp. 77-98 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3185184 . Accessed: 14/06/2012 03:27
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The Japanesein Peru

History of Immigration, Settlement,and Racialization
by Ayumi Takenaka Peruviansof Japanesedescent, though constitutingonly 0.3 percent of Peru's population,were broughtto the world's attentionby the election of Alberto Fujimori,the son of Japaneseimmigrants,as president,and today they are arguablyone of the country'smost influentialethnic communities both economically and politically.While well integratedinto Peruviansociety, they remaina racial/ethnicminorityanda close-knitcommunity.Prominent but closed, the Japanese-Peruvian communityhas evolved throughthe overthe pastcentury. processesof immigration,settlement,andracialization At the end of the nineteenthcentury in Japan,the rumor spread that a countrycalled Perusomewhereon the opposite side of the earthwas "full of gold."This country,moreover,was a paradisewith a mild climate, rich soil for farming, familiardietary customs, and no epidemics, according to the advertisementsof Japanese emigration companies (Konno and Fujisaki, 1984). A Japaneseimmigrantin Peru, now in her late 80s, told me, "I came herebecause I heardtherewas gold andno snow in this country." Another,in his 90s, said that he had followed his uncle to Peru because "I wanted to become a farmer.Owning land was my dream."With various dreams in mind, some 790 Japanese,all men between the ages of 20 and45, left Japan in 1898 to workon Peru'scoastalplantationsas contractlaborers.Theirpurpose was simple: to earnand save money for the returnhome upon termination of theirfour-yearcontracts.The 25-yen monthlysalaryon Peru'splantations was more thandouble the averagesalaryin ruralJapan(Suzuki, 1992). In fouryears'time, then,theyexpectedtheirsavingsto amountto 860 yen. The historythatfollowed is one of misery and hardship.Japaneseimmigration was simultaneously a form of exclusion from Japan. Ratherthan being simply voluntarylabormigrationfor higherwages, it was shapedby a
is an assistantprofessorof sociology at BrynMawrCollege. The researchconAyumiTakenaka ductedfor this paperwas fundedby the ResearchInstitutefor the Studyof Man,the ToyotaFounFoundation.The authorgratefullyacknowledgestheir dation, and the MatsushitaInternational support.
LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES, Issue 136, Vol. 31 No. 3, May 2004 77-98 DOI: 10.1177/0094582X04264745 ? 2004 Latin AmericanPerspectives 77

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broaderinternational context in which the sending country(Japan)and the receiving country (Peru) in additionto a third country (the United States) played a role. This articleexamines this context.

EMIGRATION FROM JAPAN

WHY DID THEY EMIGRATE?

Japanese emigrationto Peru was initially encouragedby the Japanese government.As soon as the Meiji government(1868-1911) hadreplacedthe closed Tokugawa regime (1600-1868), Japanbeganto look outward,particularlyto the West.Emigrationbeganin 1868 as a form of contractmigration to Hawaii under direct state sponsorship. Between 1868 and 1942, over 776,000 Japaneseemigrated,primarilyto NorthAmerica(48.2 percent)and South America(31.6 percent)(JICA, 1994). Many of them were sent by the government,eitherdirectlyor indirectly,or by privateemigrationcompanies working in close cooperationwith the government.To encourage emigration, the governmentprovided subsidies for emigrants and established a numberof institutions:the Social Affairs Bureau (1921) within the Home Ministry in 1921, the Ministry of Overseas Affairs (Takumusho)in 1929, the EmigrationCenter in 1927, and the EmigrationCooperativeSocieties (Kaigai Iju Kumiai)in 1927 (Tigner, 1981). was encouraged,above all, as a way to controlJapan'srapidly Emigration growingpopulation(Idei, 1930; Yoshida,1909; Ministryof ForeignAffairs, 1949; 1971). Althoughthe populationstayed stable at about30 million during the Tokugawaperiod, it reached38 million in 1888, 56 million in 1920, and 79 million in 1947, accompaniedby rapidindustrialdevelopment(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1958). In hindsight, however, emigrationdid not solve Japan's"populationproblem"(Crocker,1931); the approximately1 millionemigrantssent abroadover 80 yearsconstitutedmerely2.5 percentof Japan'spopulationgrowthduringthe period,a negligibleratein comparison with the comparablefiguresfor England(74.2 percent),Italy (46.8 percent), andGermany(14.6 percent)(Wakatsuki andSuzuki, 1975). Moreover,while emigration was being encouraged, there was an influx of laborers from Japan'snewly acquiredoverseascolonies. Among themwere 770,000 Koreans broughtinto Japanbetween 1917 and 1927 to meet the growingdemand for manual laborers (though 570,000 Koreans also left Japan during the period) (Idei, 1930). was morethana meansof populationreduction;in fact, it was Emigration an importantpartof the Meiji government'spolicy of industrialization and

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Westernization. The governmentviewed emigrationas a vital tool for gaining economic benefits, particularlyas a means to increase capital by way of remittances(Ministryof Foreign Affairs, 1971; Wakatsukiand Suzuki, 1975). Althoughthe totalnumberof emigrantsremainedsmall,the economic role of emigrationwas significant.In 1933, remittancessent to Japan(98.6 million yen) constitutedas much as 10 percentof Japan'stotal tradesurplus (Suzuki, 1992), and the Japanese immigrantsin Brazil alone brought in US$3.8 million by travelingback to Japan(Wakatsukiand Suzuki, 1975). The governmentenvisioned emigrantsas promotingbilateralties, thereby stimulating trade, tourism, and other commercial activities and helping secure resources and territorialexpansion abroad(Wakatsukiand Suzuki, 1975; Nihon KaigaiKyokai, 1950). Citingthe colonial historyof prosperous countries,Japanesestatesmenandscholarsoften stressedthatemiEuropean and territorial gration expansionwere criticalto "theprosperityof the Japanese race"(Jiho Shinpo, January4, 1896, cited in Wakatsuki,1987). In his 1906 essay "JapaneseColonialism"(Nihon Shokumin-ron),Mironu Togo assertedthe importanceof Japan'sduty to expandabroadas the only Asian countrycapableof becominga colonial power(Kumei, 1995), andaccording to ShigenobuOkumain "TheExpansionof the Yamato(Japanese)Race and Colonial Projects" (1908), "the most urgent task is to send emigrants (shokumin)... under the bannerof the rising sun" (quoted in Wakatsuki, 1987: 195). Emigrationwas correlatedwith colonialism: "Sendmillions of and"Builda counJapaneseemigrantsto Californiato constructNew Japan" in in for the race the Rockies" 1987: 192). Wakatsuki, try (quoted Japanese Indeed, the terms "emigrants" (imin)' and "colonists" (shokumin or or combined(ishokumin) were frequentlyused interchangeably kaitakumin) until well into the 1930s. Emigrationassumeda particularly strongnational and when character the flows were directedto 1910s 1920, during migratory less desirablecountries(e.g., South America)afterJapaneseimmigrationto the United States ended and emigrationwas promotedin the name of the nation. Finally,emigrationwas regardedas a way of dealing with the "problem" of poor farmers.The transformation of traditional agriculture broughtabout with the failure of industrialization, 1881, left as by coupled monetarypolicy as million households out of work 1 and Suzuki, (Wakatsuki many peasant 1975; Tsuchida,1998). Emigration,as the governmentviewed it, would provide those excess farmerswith job opportunities(Idei, 1930) and "civilize those low-class citizens"by providingthem with the opportunity to acquire advanced Western labor discipline and ethics (quoted in Wakatsukiand would benefit the Suzuki, 1975: 75). Eliminatingthose "low-classlaborers" since "their would a national threat" (Muto, 1963, country, poverty pose

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quoted in Wakatsuki,1987: 177). Thus, an emigrationpolicy officially promulgatedto controlpopulationgrowthwas a vital partof Japan's"modernization"policy.
WHO WAS THE EMIGRANT?

Throughoutthe historyof Japaneseemigration,emigrantssharedseveral characteristics. they were largely males between the ages Demographically, of 20 and45, a populationtargetedboth by employers(e.g., plantationowners) and by Japaneseemigrationcompanies. Many were second and later sons, often lacking the right to inherit family properties (Wakatsukiand Suzuki, 1975). Because of primogenitureand ancestorworship, the eldest son usually became successor of the household, daughtersmarriedwithout sharingthe inheritance,andyoungersons, single or married,migratedto the city and sometimes abroadwhile still young (Maeyama, 1994). Regionally,emigrantscame from the relativelypoor and predominantly southwesternpartsof Japan.The majority,or 99 percent,were agricultural farmers(Ministryof ForeignAffairs, 1958) and poor withoutmuch formal and Suzuki, 1975; Irie, 1951). Among the educationor training(Wakatsuki pre-WorldWarII emigrants,almost half originatedfrom just four prefectures-Hiroshima, Okinawa,Kumamoto,and Fukuoka(JICA, 1994). One was economic; rapidindustrialization reasonfor this regionalconcentration worsenedthe alreadyovercrowdedconditionsof many small-scalefarmers, particularlyin poorerruralareas. Another factor was the long traditionof emigrationthatprevailedin these poorerruralareas,with yearsof experience andSuzuki, 1975). The in sendingemigrantsto the city or abroad(Wakatsuki establishmentof networksthroughprioremigrationwas also crucial,as personal networksreducedthe costs associatedwith movementsand settlement (Nihon Kaigai Kyokai, 1950; Massey and Garcia,1987). In Peru,in particular, these personal networks played an importantrole. After the Peruvian governmentprohibitednew waves of Japaneseimmigrantsin 1927, the only way Japanesecould immigrateto Peruwas by invitationof family members alreadyresident in the country.Finally, regional concentrationwas also a resultof recruitment policy; both the Japanesegovernmentand the emigration companiestriedto recruitworkersfrom certainprefecturesand villages and ease the emigrants'adaptationto the to reduce the cost of recruitment host country(Kodama,1989). was an importantsending prefecturethroughout Okinawa,in particular, Japaneseemigrationhistory.Of the emigrantswho left priorto 1926, 11 percent were from Okinawa,and this proportionincreased to 15 percent between 1926 and 1941 (JICA, 1994). Okinawawas and still is Japan'spoorest

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prefecture,and its weak economy and shortageof revenuesmade it dependent on the centralgovernmentas "a permanent burdenon the nationaltreasury"(Kerr, 1959: 402). Emigration,encouragedby the Okinawanprefecturalgovernment,quickly became a way of coping with this situation.After the decline of sugarprices in the 1920s (a blow to Okinawa'svital industry), emigrationflows acceleratedto both mainlandJapanand abroad,primarily to Hawaii, the United States, Brazil, and Peru (Tomiyama,1990). Because of the way it was induced, emigrationcame to carrya negative connotationfor the Japanesepublic.Emigration was a formof exclusion, and emigrantswere considered"abandoned people"(kimin)"pushedout"by the government to feed the rest of the population. This image persists even today.2(Kimin also refers to "social outcasts"and "lower-classpeople" in general, such as day laborersand untouchables.)The chasm between Japanese immigrant (emigrant) communities and more recent arrivals from Japan,such as businessmen,students,andotherprofessionals,is also indicative of this statusdifference.

IMMIGRATION TO PERU: CONTEXT OF INCORPORATION Peruemergedas a destinationas a resultof yet anotherform of exclusion. Although the United States was not directly involved in Japaneseimmigration to Peru,it nonethelessplayed an influentialrole in inducingthis migration by shuttingits doors to Japaneseimmigrationby a 1907 "gentlemen's Priorto the agreement,the United States and Hawaii had been agreement." the primarydestinations for Japanese emigration and had been preferred because of their higher wages. Denied access to these traditionaland more profitabledestinations,Japaneseemigrationcompanies had to seek others, and subsequentmigratoryflows were directedto South America.Japanese emigrationto South America, reaching its peak in the 1910s, was directly correlatedwith diminishingflows to North America. Peru was the first South American country to receive Japanese immigrants.The contractlaboragreementwas a resultof the diplomaticrelationship establishedwith Peru in 1873 (the first between Japanand any South American country) and of the personal relationship between Augusto Leguia, the managerof a sugarmanufacturing company and laterpresident of Peru, and TeikichiTanaka,an emigrationagent for the MoriokaEmigration Company (Gardiner, 1975; Normano and Gerbi, 1943). High labor demandfor plantationsalso contributedto the initiationof Japaneseimmigrationto Peru (see Fig. 1).

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0 Illlf I
0 Sq

II I I IIIIII III III III II II III III III I I Ino rt e: 9?9 3 3?9 5 q:b ,,< ,, ,< ^9'.~2

I III II III II Ifiil Irl II II In

0 ~2 Co K

9(b 9,x? I ~ ~~lx ?09?9 9ro9962x 009?bb ~q:) I 5b

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Figure 1. Japanese Emigrationto Peru

In the late nineteenthcentury,after the Pacific War with Chile (18791883), Peruentereda phaseof rapideconomic growthas a resultof economic expansionin WesternEuropeandthe subsequentincreasein demandfor raw materials.The rushof European revolution" capitalbroughtthe "agricultural of cottonincreasedfrom to the Peruviancoast (Fukumoto,1997). Production less than 5,000 tons in 1891 to 24,000 tons in 1913 (Masudaand Yanagida, 1999). Exports of agriculturalproducts,particularlyof sugarcane,cotton, and guano, also increased-from 14,000 soles in 1900-1904 to 150,000 soles in 1940-1943 (Fukumoto,1997). This requiredarmiesof cheap labor, but it posed a problem.Peru'splantationshad long dependedon slave labor, but slavery was abolished in 1854. The "coolie"trade,which broughtover 87,000 Chinese indenturedlaborers,was abolished in 1874. An alternative was to bring indigenous populations from Peru's interior,but this failed to theirlands andthe extremelyharshlabor because of peasants'attachment conditions (Normanoand Gerbi, 1943; Masudaand Yanagida,1999). The otheralternativewas to rely on immigration. The Peruvianstate,dominated descent,hadalways by people of European considered Europeanimmigrationdesirable. In 1892, one statesman obourrace"by incorporating servedthatit was necessaryto "improve European immigrants;Indians, blacks, and Asians were considered "inferiorraces"

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(Fukumoto, 1997). Since achieving its independencein 1821 throughthe efforts of criollos (South American-borndescendantsof Europeans),Peru has been practicallydominatedby whites constitutingroughly 10 percentof the population;the majorityof the indigenouspopulation(47 percentof the populationtoday), the mestizos (40 percent), and the small populationof Asians and blacks (3 percent)were not partof the independencemovement and always fell below whites in Peru's racial hierarchy.This hierarchyhas remainedfundamentallyunchangedto this day. In an attemptto attractEuropeanimmigrants,the Peruviangovernment implemented various laws to give them incentives; the "white preference laws" of 1873 and 1906 subsidized Europeanand U.S. immigrantsexclusively, and special labor recruitmentprogramstargetedthe Irish (in 1851) andthe Spanish(in 1860) (Suzuki, 1992;Vasquez,1970). Yet,becauseEuropeans often preferredto immigrate to other countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, these efforts largely failed. Relative to these countries, Peru was politically unstablebecause of its long historyof militaryregimes and was consideredeconomically undesirable,with lower standardsof living. The economic and political dominance of the latifundistasalso posed to cultivateandown obstaclesfor immigrants, leaving themlittleopportunity land (Vasquez, 1970). In fact, several Europeangovernments,notably that of Italy, strongly advised their citizens against emigratingto Peru (Tigner, 1978). the PeruviangovernFaced with the "nationalcrisis of labor shortages," ment, underpressurefrom plantationowners,turnedits eyes to the Orient.It reluctantly acknowledged the need to allow Japanese immigration,hoping that this would encourage European immigration.The TokyoKeizai Shimbun(quotedin Rippy, 1949: 52) describedthe situationas follows: Thegovernment of Peruwelcomeswhiteworkers andis notanytoo fondof in thiscountry butbusiness is not sufficiently to developed yellowlaborers, Itwill,therefore, be obliged to whitelabor. to depend uponFarEastern appeal
immigrants.If the JapaneseMinister of Foreign Affairs and the emigration

thiscountry willbecome a second alltheir Hawaii. efforts, putforth companies Perudid not become a second Hawaii,but it nonethelessled the way by redirectingJapaneseimmigrationflows from North America to the South. as indentured laborersin Japaneseimmigrantsin Peruwere incorporated its transitionfrom a slave economy to capitalism.Duringroughly the same for laborerswere similarlysubstituted period,IndianandChineseindentured Africanslaves in the Americas;this succession, Vander Veer(1995) argues, was effective in undercutting Africanworkers'abilityto bargain.As did their African and Chinese predecessorsin Peru, Japaneseimmigrantsresponded

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to the harshworkingconditionsand discriminatory treatment on the plantations by rebelling,protesting,andrunningaway,andmanyof themeven died there. Even after slavery and the "coolie" trade officially ended, colonialstyle workrelationspersistedin Peruwell into the latetwentiethcentury.The plantationowners,mostly Italians,English, or Peruviansof Europeanancestry,generallymistreatedJapaneseimmigrants,whippingthem occasionally, delaying payments, and violating other conditions stipulated in their contracts(Irie, 1951). to what the job advertisements stated,work conditionswere so Contrary harsh,the climateanddietaryconditionsso different,andtropicaldiseases so prevalentthat 150 out of 790 immigrantsin the first group perishedin epidemics before theirfour-yearcontractsexpired(Irie, 1951). On one plantation, Casa Blanca, only 30 out of 226 Japaneseimmigrantswere fit to work afterthreemonths(PeruShimpo, 1975). By 1909 the deathtoll hadincreased to 7.6 percent, or 481 out of 6,292 migrantswho were sent by emigration companies(Irie, 1951). Many othersfell sick and fled the plantations.Even as they acknowledgedthese problems,emigrationcompaniesfailed to stepin and, in fact, continued to send emigrantsto Peru (Wakatsukiand Suzuki, 1975). theircontracts,the majoritydid not returnto Upon fleeing or terminating their within the first ten years after immigration, intentions; Japandespite returned been unable to save enough money 6 home, having just percent (Peru Shimpo, 1975). Another 4 percent left for other countries such as Bolivia, Argentina,Mexico, and the United States (Peru Shimpo, 1975). Some remainedin Peru'sruralareas.Yet,farmingopportunities beyondcontract plantationwork were limited for Japanese immigrants,arable lands belonged to the colonists, and the preestablishedSpanish-controlledland system deniedJapaneseaccess to new lands.The decreeof May 1910 clearly stipulatedthat"thecolonists in the Sierramountainregioncan only be Peruvians or Europeans"(Gardiner,1975). Consequently,the majorityof Japanese immigrantsheadedfor urbancenters such as Lima and its neighboring port city, Callao. SETTLEMENT IN PERU: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
SOJOURNING AS URBAN MIDDLEMAN MERCHANTS

therewere 493 Japanesein In 1909, ten yearsafterthe initialimmigration, Lima (Fukumoto, 1997). Upon arrivingin cities with little capital, limited

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commandof the language, and few personalcontacts,Japaneseimmigrants became street vendors or domestic servants.Major industrieswere dominated by Europeansand Peruviansof Europeandescent, because the Peruvian government permitted only Europeans to develop them (Vasquez, observedthe prevalenceof foreign-ownedstores,and 1970). The immigrants as they amassedcapitalthey establishedtheir own. The host society's efforts to undermineimmigrants'economic activities in certainoccupations(Bonacich, 1973). often resultedin theirconcentration Just as Japaneseimmigrantsin San Franciscoand Buenos Aires were conin the laundrybusiness, so in Limathey startedout as barbers.Barcentrated ber shops requiredrelatively little capital and skills and thus were easy for immigrantsto start.The first Japanese-ownedbarbershop was opened in 1904, and within two years the numberhad jumped to 15 (Peru Shimpo, 1975). After the JapaneseBarbers'Association was establishedin 1907 as the first formalJapaneseassociation,the numberof Japanese-owned barber of further In out the 110 barber in Lima were increased. 80 1914, shops shops owned by Japanese(72.7 percent),and by 1924 their sharehad increasedto 73.9 percent(130 out of 176) (Peru Shimpo, 1975; Irie, 1951). Gradually, Japaneseimmigrants expandedtheirbusinessesto otherareas, small andestablished stores, notably grocery clothingstores,andrestaurants, theirstatusas a "successfulmiddlemanminority"(Gardiner, 1975). In 1930, 45 percentof Japaneseimmigrantswere owners of small businesses, mostly in food-relatedenterprises(60 percent) such as grocery stores (20 percent) and cafds (11 percent), followed by barbershops (9 percent). They soon came to dominatecertainsectors;by the late 1930s, three out of every four small coffee, candy,or refreshmentshops were runby the Japanese(Alegria and Saco, 1942). Almost a quarterof the mechanical, watchmaking,and repairshops in Lima were Japanese,as were 42 out of 53 machineshops, 92 out of 192 restaurants, and78 out of 114 bakeries(Morimoto,1992). Among and street peddlers, Japaneserepresentedsome 20 market vendors public of the while Peruviansconstituted55 percentand Chinese 12 total, percent and Gerbi, 1943). percent(Normano This high concentration in small businessesreflected,apartfrom a lack of the immigrants' desireto save as muchmoney as possible before alternatives, home. Unlike an industrial returning plant,a smallbusinesscan be liquidated Another for reason their success as merchantswas the immigrants' easily. it First, sojourningmentality. encouragedthemto be thrifty,relyingon cheap or nonwage family labor (Bonacich, 1973). Their limited contact with the outside world helped them to save insteadof spendingmoney on social and culturalactivities,andmost of themused theirstoresfor living quarters (Peru Shimpo, 1975). Second, it helped cultivatea sense of ethnic solidarity,since

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they had little reasonto assimilate,and this solidarityprovedconvenientfor theirbusinesses.In additionto the availabilityof cheaplabor,theireconomic ties with Japanpermittedaccess to Japaneseproducersof low-cost goods (Tigner,1978), and numerous"ethnic"associationshelped theirbusinesses flourish.Above all, tanomoshigroups,smallrotating-credit unions,played a key role in financingand expandingtheirbusinesses (Morimoto,1979). By 1915 there were over 40 such groups, some of which latergrew into formal financial institutions, immigrantsoften being unfamiliarwith and denied access to Peruvianbanks.These trust-based groupshelped foster communal half a solidarityand a sense of ethnic identityand continuedto be important for the most part, still engaged in century later, when Japanese-Peruvians, small businesses. The immigrants'ethnic solidarity was furtherreinforcedby increasing the world hostilityfromthe outsideworld.Middlemanminoritiesthroughout face increasing discriminationas they become economically successful in turn,reinforcestheirsojourningmen(Zenner,1991), anddiscrimination, tality.This dilemmalies in the natureof being middlemen,who feel alien in the very countrywhere they exerteconomic influence (Bonacich, 1973). As resentmentagainst them grew, it took on a racial tone. The Japanesemerchantscame to be known as chinos de la esquina (street-corer Chinese) and began to face animosityfrom the host society.
BECOMING A RACIAL MINORITY

The Japaneseimmigrants'success led to their "racialization," which, in The anti-Japanese movementproducedvarturn,accelerateddiscrimination. measuresagainstimmigrants andeventuallyexplodedin ious discriminatory the racialriot of 1940. Exclusionary measures. Resentment against the Japanese first surged amongPeruvianworkers.In 1917, Lima'scentrallaborunionestablishedthe Anti-Asian Association and appealed to the president to abolish "yellow immigration" throughits newspaperLa Hoja Amarilla (The Yellow Page) measuresfollowed, mostly aimed (Suzuki, 1992). A series of discriminatory at curtailingfurtherJapaneseimmigration.The first such measurewas the abolitionof contractmigrationin 1923. The pretextfor this was thata large numberof Japaneseimmigrantshad fled the plantations,but the truthwas thatdemandfor plantationlaborhad declined (PeruShimpo, 1975). The end of contractmigrationmade future Japaneseimmigrationpossible only by invitationby family members alreadyresiding in Peru. A 1936 decree restricted Japanese reentry into Peru (Peru Shimpo, 1975) and practically

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haltedJapaneseimmigrationby limitingthe numberof qualifiedimmigrants to 16,000 per nation (the number of Japanese in the country-20,385 in 1930-already exceeded the quota) and forbiddingimmigrationof "racial Althoughthis termwas left undefined,it clearlytargetedAsiatic and groups." Japaneseimmigrants(Peru Shimpo, 1975; Tigner, 1978). (Chiparticularly a 1909 agreementlimitedChinese nese immigrationwas similarlyrestricted; immigrationto families of those residentin Peru, and two additionalprotocols [in 1932 and 1934] broughtit to halt [Tigner,1978]. Also, between 1923 and 1944, regulations were imposed on Chinese emigration and reentry [Wong, 1994].) Legal restrictionsextendedto the realmof citizenshipeven among Peruvian-bor children (thus Peruvian citizens) of Japanese immigrants.One year after the 1936 immigrationlaw was introduced,the Peruviangovernment added anotherrestrictiveclause, prohibitingregistrationof any alien 1962; Suzuki, 1992). Thereafoffspringbornin Perupriorto 1936 (Barnhart, ter,Japanesewho had not registeredthe birthsof theirchildrenbefore 1936 were unable to do so. Not having proof of birthin Peru implied a denial of restrictionson further Peruviancitizenship.Moreover,a 1940 act introduced who left for their parents' Peru citizenship: second-generationimmigrants homelandto live, study, or undergo militarytrainingduringtheir minority automaticallylost their Peruviancitizenship. (This clause applied only to personsborn in Peru of foreignersfromjus sanguinis [blood-basedcitizenship] countriessuch as Japan[Barnhart,1962].) Although the word "Japanese" nowhere appeared,these measures implicitly targetedthe Japanese. ThatJapaneseimmigrantsoccasionally sent theirchildrento Japanfor their education was viewed as an act of betrayal and a sign of anti-Peruvian militancy. Discriminatorymeasures also restrictedeconomic activities. Although the Japanesewere notthe sole target,these measureswere implicitlyaimedat breakingthe Japanese "monopoly"over various retail businesses in Lima (Normanoand Gerbi, 1943). The most notoriouswas the "80 PercentLaw" of 1932, which requiredthat at least 80 percent of the employees in every restricted business enterprisebe Peruvian.The 1936 decree further Japanese businessownership(PeruShimpo, businessesby makingit illegal to transfer Commerce Treatyof 1928 was 1975). In addition, the Japanese-Peruvian annulledin 1934, and importsof Japanesetextiles were regulated(Normano and Gerbi, 1943). Funds in the hands of Japanesewere frozen, while some Japanese-owned shops were expropriatedand Japanese-heldland leases to native Peruvians(Titiev, 1951). were transferred with resentHostilities eventually extended into the realm of "culture," into the attachment to the Japaneseof negativecultural mentbeing translated

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attributes. The Japanese,it was argued,were well suited to hardplantation workbecause,like all "Asianimmigrants," they were accustomedto working as semislaves (Vasquez,1970). Since theirstandard of living was "as low as thatof highlandIndians"(Beals, 1935), they were "happywith the little they got" (Vasquez, 1970: 82). As Japaneseimmigrantsbecame successful middlemanmerchants,theirsuccess was attributed to their"cunning," "shrewdLa Cronica,an anti-Japanese ness," and "stinginess." newspaper,remarked in 1937: "They are dishonest and aggressive when it comes to money and they break laws. So, there is no way we can compete with Japanesemerchants"(quoted in Peru Shimpo, 1975: 107). Alegria and Saco (1942: 83) arguedin a foreign policy journalthat stinginess was the secret of Japanese success: "Theynever go out to shows or events. Any clothing will do if it is clean. Theirlives are dedicatedto their work."The formersenatorand antiJapaneseadvocateSeoane (1943) also explainedthatthe Japanesewere successful because "Japanese barberslived frugally,paid little rent,andcharged less for a haircutthan the Peruvian." Such negative culturalcharacteristics were noted not only by Peruvian authoritiesbut also by journalists and (pseudo-) historians(Nakamoto, 1988). Since the Japanesewere "racially"and "culturally" different,they were unfit to adaptto Peruviansociety: so went the argumentin the "naturally" lower house for the 1903 JapaneseExclusion Act. Pointingto the high Japanese death toll on the plantations,Peruvian officials concluded that they could not adaptto Peru and thereforeshould returnto Japanimmediately (Suzuki, 1992). In explaining "theAsiatic laborproblem"in the context of increasingJapaneseimmigrationto Peru, a congressmanexplicitly referred to the Japaneseas "analien race dissimilarin habits,morals,and process of thought" (in the American Review of Reviews, 1907: 622-623). Seoane (1943: 675) also pointed to the Japanese's"obscureculturalpractices,"describingthe tanomoshias "a strangeprocedureto obtaincapital"andpicture brides as "strangeJapanesemarriagepractices."He went on: "Whenthere are no marriageable Japanesewomen available,young Japanesebachelors find their wives through 'sweet-heartships' which bring Japanesegirls in groupsof 50 to 100 who smilingly greet theirhusbandseven withouthaving met them before"(674). Such culturalcharacteristics were describedas not only negativeand differentbut also dangerousand threatening. First,it was suggestedthatrather thancontributing to the Peruvianeconomy, the Japanesedrainedresources. Accordingto a Peruvianstatesman,they "earn,save, and send money home" with the "Anglo-Saxonpowers"(refer(Alegriaand Saco, 1942). Compared ring to white Europeansin general) who "sent immense capital to Peru to develop mines and factories, the Japanese solely sent labor, not capital"

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(Alegria and Saco, 1942). "Unlike Anglo-Saxon immigrants,not a single Japanesenamehas endeareditself to Peruviannationalfeeling andnot a Japanese is knownbutfor his mercantileactivities"(NormanoandGerbi, 1943). Second, it was arguedthat the Japaneseposed a threatto the Peruvian economy. This view became widespread especially in the 1930s after La Prensa waged a fierce campaign against "Japaneseinfiltration"(Gerbi, 1943; Suzuki, 1992). During the campaign,one editor of the paperinsisted thatthe foods and drinkssold by the Japanesewere poisonous. Nationalism was mobilized againstthis alleged danger;white Peruviansmade statements of chicha, an exclusively nationaldrinkof such as "Eventhe manufacturing Peru,is now in the handsof the Japanese" (Zegarra1941, quotedin Normano and Gerbi, 1943: 99). Third,it was assertedthatthe Japaneseposed a threatto Peru'sracialand nationalintegration.According to formerForeign MinisterUlloa, Asiatics to this "European" were "unsuited" country and a "menace"to the "racial the of Peruvian homogeneity people"(NormanoandGerbi, 1943: 114) even descendants of though Europeanswere clearly a numericalminority.Moreover, since they did not assimilatequickly into Peru'sEuropeanculture,the Japanesewere considereda culturalthreat."Unlikewell-assimilatedItalians, Japanesedid not speakSpanishor practiceCatholicism"(La Prensa, quoted in Normano and Gerbi, 1943: 122). They did not even attemptto become in rotating-credit unions integratedinto Peruviansociety; they participated insteadof depositingtheir savings in Peruvianbanks, and not a single Japanese was listed among the foreign borrowersfrom the Banco Industrial, the majorPeruvianbank, in 1941 (cited in Titiev, 1951; Seoane, 1943). La Prensa (quotedin AlegriaandSaco, 1942: 84) also criticizedthe Japanesefor their "closed and secretive"community: is toJapan. Theseboysspeak better than andfeelthemselves Japanese Spanish bound in no wayto thecountry of theirbirth. TheJapanese flagwavesin the The Japanese schoolsarealwayssurschoolbelowthe Emperor's portrait. thepasser-by rounded fromseeingwithin. by highwallsthatprevent It was argued,moreover,that studentsin Japaneseschools swore allegiance to EmperorHirohitoevery day (Ulloa, cited in Normano and Gerbi, 1943: 123) andthatthe only social activitiesthey engagedin were "themeetingsof their Japanesesocieties and for their national festivity, the birthdayof the (Alegria and Saco, 1942: 83). Emperor" Japanese endogamy furtherstirredcriticism. Unlike the Chinese, who came to Peruwithoutwives and "mingledfreely with natives,"the Japanese
In the Japaneseschools in Lima, the child is taughtthathis primaryallegiance

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were overwhelminglyendogamous (Normanoand Gerbi, 1943). Peruvian marriagerecordsfor 1939 show thatJapanesewere the only nationalgroup thatregisteredmore endogamousmarriagesthanmixed marriagesto native Peruvians.According to Normanoand Gerbi (1943), only 79 Chinese children were born of Chinese parents,as against268 born of a Chinese father and a Peruvianmother.In contrast,out of 25 marriagesinvolving Japanese men, 6 were to Japanesewomen and 19 were to "Peruvian-born Japanese." Althoughthe validityof these figureswas questionable,since most Japanese were reluctantto registertheirmarriageswith the Peruvianauthorities,their ratesof endogamywere neverthelesshigh enoughto be criticizedas a sign of "disloyalty"to Peru. In part,Japaneseimmigrants'resistanceto assimilationwas due to their sojourningorientation;since they plannedto returnto Japan,they had little with membersof the surrounding host reasonto developlastingrelationships society (Bonacich, 1973). Also, it was a form of self-defense in a hostile environment (Nakamoto, 1988). One reason Japanese immigrantsbecame small-businessowners was that institutionalbarrierspreventedthem from on theirown land. establishinglarge businesses and engaging in agriculture Similarly,the Japanesehad to constructtheir own school in Lima because therewere too few schools to accommodateeven Peruviannationals(Titiev, 1951). Regardless of their motivations, however, Japanese resistance to movementin Peru.The assimilationresultedin reinforcingthe anti-Japanese to the was attachment homeland was enhancedby cycle self-perpetuating; host hostility and at the same time increasedhost hostility by being interpretedas a sign of disloyalty (Bonacich, 1973). Discrimination in context. The series of anti-Japanesemeasures just describedemergedat a time of a growingJapanesepresencein termsof both demographicandeconomic influence.Between 1918 and 1930 the Japanese populationin Perugrew from 9,890 to 20,385, fasterthanany otherforeign group (Peru Shimpo, 1975). By 1925 the Japanesehad become the largest foreigngroupin Peru,surpassingthe Chineseandthe Italians,who hadbeen (Gerbi, 1943). Theirpresence was partiallyabsorbedthroughintermarriage in cities; 87 pernoticeablebecause of theirhigh concentration particularly cent were concentratedin Lima, constituting32 percentof all foreign residents in the metropolitanarea (Peru Shimpo, 1975). Perceiving this as a the size of the Japanese threat,nativewhitePeruviansfrequentlyexaggerated population. Although the 1940 census counted 25,000 Japanese citizens (Normano and Gerbi, 1943), Seoane (1943: 674) declaredthat there were over 50,000 Japanese, including "Peruvian-born Japs."According to the with Japanese workmen 1933 Enciclopedia Italiana, Peru was "saturated

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and peasants,"althoughin reality the Japanesemade up far less than 1 percent of Peru'spopulation(1933, vol. 17, p. 19, cited in Normanoand Gerbi, 1943: 75). Animosities against the Japanese furtherincreased in the context of a growing trade imbalancebetween Peru and Japan.As a result of the rapid expansionof the cotton trade,Japan'sbilateraltradesurplusincreasedfrom US$3.3 million in 1913 to US$74 million in 1937 andUS$87 million in 1940 (Rippy, 1949). Adding remittances,as much as 113 million yen was drained out of Perubetween 1916 and 1935 (Suzuki, 1992). Beals (1935) warnedof in an articleentitled"Japan this "threat" InvadesLatinAmerica."Such criticisms intensified in the 1930s as Peru sank in the midst of a worldwide economic depression.Political instabilityfollowing the end of Leguia's 11year-long dictatorial rule (1919-1930) further aggravated anti-Japanese sentiment. Duringthis periodof economic andpolitical instabilityin the 1930s, Peru experienceda wave of nationalism.The GreatDepressionandLeguia'smishandling of the country's finances galvanized the forces of the left. The nationalistsattributed Peru'sgrowingeconomic andsocietalproblemsto the of foreign capital,which had increasedto US$400 million in the penetration mid-1930s (Connell, 1995). Indeed,the UnitedStates,Peru'smajorcreditor, controlledmost of its largest corporations,while the British dominatedits principal railways, petroleum, mining, agriculture, manufacturing,and trade.Italianscontrolled50 percentof Peru's banking,Germanscontrolled in the retail nearlyhalf the sugarproduction,andthe Japanesepredominated tradesandin cottonproduction(Fortune,January1938, pp. 124-126, quoted in Connell, 1995). The growingnationalistsentimentfurtheraggravated the movement (Gerbi, 1943). anti-Japanese Animosities againstthe Japanesein the Americaswere intensifiedby the increasingJapanesepresenceon the continentsand Japan'smilitaryaggression in Asia during the 1930s. The United States viewed these expanding interestswith uneasiness and, particularly throughthe Pan-AmericanConferencesheld between 1920 and 1940, encouragedLatinAmericancountries to take measuresagainst them (Rippy, 1949; Peru Shimpo, 1975; Connell, 1995). HavingbannedJapaneseimmigrationin 1907, the United Stateshad annulledAsians' right to naturalizein 1917. The subsequentNational Orifrom southernand gins Act of 1924, intendedto limit increasingimmigration eastern Europe, also targetedthe Japanese, whose economic success was viewed as a threatespecially in the context of recession (Kumei, 1995). Following the lead of the United States, Centraland South Americancountries introducedsimilaracts of exclusion. In Guatemala,Panama,Venezuela,and Paraguay, these laws excluded any "nonwhite race" (Rippy, 1949).

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in its constiArgentina,which statedits preferencefor European immigrants and Suzuki, 1975). tution,also allowed no Japaneseimmigrants(Wakatsuki Likewise, Brazil, home to the largestJapanesepopulationon the continent, passed anti-Japanese immigrationlegislation in 1923 (laterblocked by the parliamentby a small margin).It went on to enact the "2 PercentLaw" in 1934, restrictingJapanese immigrationby setting immigrantquotas at 2 and Suzuki, 1975). percentof each nationalgroup (Wakatsuki U.S. involvement spurreddraconiandiscriminatorymeasures, particularly during World War II, in Peru. As an ally of the United States, Peru annulledits diplomaticrelationswith Japanas soon as the formerwent to war with Japanin 1941. This made the Japanesein Peru de facto enemy aliens, andanti-Japanese measuresescalatedwith aid fromthe UnitedStates.Thereafter, all community institutions were disbanded, and Japanese-language as spypublicationsandmeetingsof morethanthreepersonswere prohibited businesses were eitherexpropriing (PeruShimpo, 1975). Japanese-owned atedor subjectedto forced sale to the highestbidder,Japanese-owned deposits in Peruvian banks were frozen (Thompson, 1974), and land leases to Japanese (as well as Germansand Italians) were canceled by a 1942 law enactedjointly with the United States (Gerbi, 1943). The freedom of Japanese to traveloutside theirhome communitieswas also restricted. of 1,800 Japaneseto U.S. All these actions culminatedin the deportation detention camps. Mostly community and business leaders, these Japanese were blacklistedby the U.S. embassy in Peru, "kidnapped" by the Peruvian or so Japanese and to with 500 Texas, police, together shipped CrystalCity, from other Latin American countries (Connell, 1995; Emmerson, 1978). to Among the 11 LatinAmericancountries,Peru was the majorcontributor to of of the Japanesedeportation Home 75 percent people Japanese program. origin on the Pacific side of SouthAmericaand most aggressivein its efforts to eliminatethemfromits land,Peruquicklybecame the targetof the United States, whose intentionwas to deportfrom Peru all 30,000 Japanese,both first-generation immigrants and the Peruvian-born second generation, justifiedin the name regardlessof citizenship(Connell, 1995). The program, of nationalsecurityto eliminate"dangerous enemy aliens,"was carriedout in order to exchange them for U.S. soldiers detained by the Japanese army (Connell, 1995). The deportationprogram succeeded in debilitating the alreadydamagedJapanesecommunityinstitutions. As hostility againstthe Japaneseescalatedin Peru, so did the process of Seoane (1943: 674), "evenPeruvian-born racialization."After all,"remarked children of Japaneseimmigrantswere in reality 'Japs' in their spirit, their will, andcustoms."The Japanesewere perceivedas dangerous organization, and problematicto Peru, as Guevara(1939) arguedin his book TheBiggest

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National Problems. Moreover,they were considered racially inferior.The use of the conceptof raceaggravated andsimultaneously justifieda varietyof measures.This notion of racialdifferenceand inferiorityfildiscriminatory teredthroughto the Peruvianpublic and ultimatelyexploded in a riot. In May 1940 a mob of student-ledprotesterslooted Japanesebusinesses andresidencesin downtownLima one afteranother.Duringan entireday of looting, over 600 establishments-almost all Japanesebusinessesin Limawere damaged(PeruShimpo, 1975); dozens were injuredand one Japanese was killed. The police failed to step in. The damageamountedto more than US$1.6 million (Gardiner,1975; PeruShimpo, 1975). In its extent anddamage, this was the worst rioting in Peruvianhistory.Moreover,it was the first raciallymotivatedriot to targeta specific population.Accordingto Peruvian officials, the rioterswere mostly lower-classpeople actingout of envy of Japanese economic success (Connell, 1995). Whatevertheir motives, the riot became a symbol of racial hatred.

CONSEQUENCES OF RACIALIZATION: JAPANESE-PERUVIANS TODAY The 1940 riot had significant and somewhat paradoxicalconsequences for the Japanesein Peru.It was a turningpoint, promptingthe immigrants to reflect upon theircommunity.Forthe first time, they recognizedthe need to into Peruviansociety. Havinglost muchof open up to andbecome integrated theirproperty, had to start they againfromthe beginningandgive up any idea of returning home, at least anytime soon. In addition,Japan'sdefeatin World War II made it impossible to returnto their devastated,poverty-stricken to Okinawa,which was severelydamagedby the ground country,particularly battle there. Thus, the riot set a new directionfor the Japaneseimmigrants and their community. Paradoxically,however, it also reinforced their communal solidarity. As the "most traumaticevent in Nikkei history" (Fukumoto, 1997: 521), continueto talk aboutit to this day and use it to express Japanese-Peruvians other toward Peruvians andto legitimize their"difference" fromthem. anger Those who experiencedthe eventvividly remember the looting of theirstores andtheirhavinghiddenin nearbyhouses. Even those who did not experience it directlymentionthe riotwheneverthey talkabouttheirhistory,discriminain his 50s asked tion, and suffering.A second-generation Japanese-Peruvian me angrily,"Do you think you can trustthose people who once attackedus and confiscated all of our properties?"According to a Japanese-Peruvian communityleader,in a community-sponsored essay contest for childrenin

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1990 titled "AboutMy Grandparents," virtually every Japanese-Peruvian child wrote aboutthe riot. The riotwas also a significanteventfor Japanese-Peruvians in reinforcing Even 60 yearslater,Japanese-Peruvians theirfearof "outsiders." continueto andtryto maintaina low profile.Most of them did live in fearof a recurrence not support election in 1990 for fearthat Fujimoriduringhis firstpresidential if elected might lead to anotherriot. It was the nation's his poorperformance majority-the poorerindigenous and mestizo populations-who saw hope andchangein this nonwhitecandidate.Among ruling-classwhite Peruvians, his emergenceas the firstnonwhitepresidential candidatecreateda considerable backlash.Some Japanese-Peruvians reportedthattheirbusinesseswere attackedduring the election campaign;others were denied entry to exclusive discos and clubs (for whites) on racial grounds. Similarly, whenever there were anti-Fujimori protestson Lima's streetsin the 1990s, JapanesePeruviansfeared a second riot. As a legacy of discrimination,the riot provides them with a renewed sense of communitywith a distincthistory. The significance of the 1940 riot indeed reflects the salience of race in organizingPeruviansociety. Although racial labels-"mestizo," "Indian," "white,""Negro,"or "Asian"-have been eliminated from official documentssuch as the census andpersonalidentification forms,the Peruviangovnot diminishedthe salience ernment's"race-blind has significantly policy" of race or alteredthe racial order,with numericallyfew whites on top, the numericalmajorityof Indiansat the bottom, and othersin between. continue to be treated primarily in racial Today, Japanese-Peruvians or "Chinese." A third-generation nativeof terms-as "Asians," "Orientals," Limarecalledhow he was botheredby his schoolmates:"Theyyelled at me, 'chino, chino cochino' (Chinese, dirty Chinese). I knew I looked different, butI hatedit when otherscalled me Chinese."As a racialminority,JapanesePeruviansare also treatedas foreigners.They are often asked aboutJapan, aboutwhich theyknow nothing.Whentheytravel,they arefrequentlytreated as Japanesetourists,andwhen they travelto otherSouthAmericancountries they often impressnativeswith theircommandof Spanish.At the same time, they areimmediatelyassociatedwith (former)PresidentFujimori.Although he had no personalties with the Japanese-Peruvian community,he quickly of all Japanese-Peruvians became "representative" (as well as Japanesein general) as the most famous "Chino"in Peru. In a way, the fact that he was elected presidentassuredthemof being acceptedas full-fledged membersof Peruviansociety. As one second-generation said, "After Japanese-Peruvian Fujimoriwas elected, we felt we were finally accepted in this country.We didn't vote for him [in 1990], so Peruviansthemselves voted for this son of just like us and you have Japanese.They were saying thatyou arePeruvians

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all the rights, includingthe rightto govern the country." Yet, they were also awarethatwheneverhis opponentscriticizedhim, the issue of nationalmemcame up (e.g., doubts about his "Peruvianness" bership and, particularly, whetherhe was trulybornin Peru).In criticizingthe Fujimorigovernment,a prominent(white)journalistoccasionally maderemarkssuch as "Weshould recoverPeru for Peruvians." Japanese-Peruviansare distinguished by their physical appearance, which often stands out in a mostly Indian-mestizocountry,and have been treatedpositively or negativelydependingon the economic andpoliticalsituation (see Lesser, 1999). Although Japanese-Peruvians perceive little racial discrimination today,theirhistory of immigrationand settlementas a racial minority has had a significant impact on the creation and maintenanceof whatis often describedas a thrivingandsimultaneouslya closed majorracial ethnic community in Peru. Their racializationhas increased as they have become economically successful; in a country where the majority of the population are poor Indian-mestizos,economically advantagedJapanesePeruvianshave a reason to want to remaina distinctracial minority.

NOTES
1. Yet, imin meanta "laborer"; accordingto the Encyclopediaof JapaneseDiplomaticHistory, it referredto "people and their families who voyaged to countriesother than China and Koreafor the purposeof labor"(quotedin Kumei, 1995: 13). 2. See, for example, Nihon o Suteta Nihonjin (The Japanese Who Abandoned Japan) (Ishidoya, 1991), SuteraretaNihonjin (AbandonedJapanese)(Fujisaki, 1986), and Dominika to the DominicanRepublicWereAbandonedPeoIminwa KiminDatta (JapaneseImmigrants ple) (Konno and Takahashi,1993).

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