Summary & Additional Notes for Unit 1 MPJ5231

1. The birth of modern philosophy of science happened in the 17th century. With the emergence of this modern philosophy of science the question What is the method of Science? was raised afresh. In the whole period of three centuries, ie from 17th to 19th century, two views stand out prominently as answers to the above question. The first view is called Inductivism according to which the method of science is the method of induction. The second view is called Hypothesism (or Hypothetico Deductivism) according to which the method of science is the method of hypothesis and deducing predictions from that hypothesis. Francis Bacon was the leading figure in Inductivism, while Galileo was the leading figure in Hypothesism. Inductivism is rooted in the school of philosophy called Empiricism according to which sense experience is primary in gaining knowledge and only those ideas which are traceable to sense experience are legitimate. Hypothesism is rooted in the school of philosophy called Rationalism according to which the mental faculty is primary in gaining knowledge and most of human knowledge cannot be traced to, and therefore is independent of sense experience. According to the method of induction, we first collect observational data without recourse to any theory (or hypothesis). We then put forward a tentative generalization which we verify. Once verified, the tentative generalization becomes a law, enabling us to go from a limited number of already made observations to an indefinite number of as yet unmade observations. (i.e. a leap from observed territory to unobserved territory). By accumulating such established inductive generalizations, inductivists claimed, that we will have at our disposal an enormous amount of observations the totality of which constitutes reality. According to Inductivism the hallmarks of scientific knowledge are certainty and breadth and according to Hypothesism the hallmasks of science are novelty and depth. That is to say, (according to Hypothesism) science must aim at knowledge which is new in the sense of being trans-observational and deep in the sense of referring to entities underlying the phenomena given to us in observations. In other words, according to Hypothesism, genuine science must not remain content with generalizations based on observations but must seek to explain observations in terms of unobservable or deeper entities and processes. A theory can be considered as a stronger or a tested as repeatedly verified hypothesis. A theory is a statement or set of statements involving at least one theoretical term (eg. electron, proton, force, etc.) Indutivists are empiricists who maintain that anything which exists must be observable. Therefore inductivists claimed that theoretical entities are fictitious entities created by us (humans) for the purpose of either economic description of observations or predication. Hence, according to inductivists theories are not descriptions of a real world of unobservables. As against this the Hypothesists maintain that the theoretical terms designate real entities not given to us in observations and theories are descriptions of a real world of unobservable entities.

2. The method of induction advocated by Inductivists like Francis Bacon is based on observations (or in other words sense experience). Bacan himself emphasized the primary status of observations in his writings. Therefore Bacon belong to the Emprrical school of philosophy but the strongest critique of the principle of induction came from the most prominent Empirisist of all, namely David Hume. Hume showed that the very principle of induction allowed us to draw generalizations from observed phenomena to as yet unobserved phenomena. Therefore this inductive leap from observed territory to unobserved territory stood unjustified and iriational according to Hume. He did not accept the method of hypothesis (Hypothesism) because of his commitment to Empiricism. Hume concluded that since we have no alternative to the principle of induction our belief in which is irrational, we have to boldly accept that the whole of our knowledge including science rests on an irrational belief, an animal faith. The critique of the principle of induction by Hume shook the very foundations of science, because causality (or the cause and effect relationship) which is very important to science is based on the principle of induction. Hume conclusively showed that any attempt to justify the principle of induction (eg: uniformity in Nature) leads to circularity in argument. Humes position with regards to the problem raised by him on the principle of induction and finding causal relations by that method was something like this. He had no straight forward answer to this problem but accepted that it is human nature to draw generalizations from observed phenomena to unobserved phenomena and also to link cause and effect relations from similar causes and similar effects. 3. The 20th century begins with the emergence of a school of thought called Logical Positivism. Some of the basic tenets (principles) of Logical Positivists are mentioned below. (i). Science is district from other areas of human creativity (or knowledge) because it possesses a method which is unique to it. (ii). There is only one method common to all sciences irrespective of their subject matter (Methodological monism). (iii). The method of science is the method of induction (Inductivism). (iv). Observations in science are pure in the sense that they are theory independent. (v). The Hallmark of science is that its statements are systematically verifiable H P P H (vi). A theory is nothing but a condensed version of a set of well ordered observation- statements. Therefore a theory is reducible to a set of statements describing observations.

(vii). To a given set of observation- statements there corresponds uniquely a (one) theory such that we can deduce the latter from the former. (viii). The aim of philosophy of science is to discover and systematize those universal and changeless norms which science follows, and by following which science has become the most rational enterprise. Philosophers of science seek to understand science in terms of these norms which determine scientific practice. (ix). In doing so, they provide an account of science which is normative. Since these norms constitute the very logic of scientific practice, philosophers of science provide what may be called a logic of science. Logical Positivists thought that through the above mentioned tenets (principles) they could defend the principle of inductions in the face of the formidable attack made by David Hume. They took up the challenge of Hume to show that the principle of induction can be rationally justified. Logical Positivists argued that if they could show that the inductively arrived at scientific theories are related in certain specifiable ways to the bedrock constituted by indubitable observations, they would succeed in establishing the rationality of our belief in the principle of induction. But the whole programme of Logical Positivists collapsed like a house of cards. Not only they failed to identify the specific ways in which the observational base (foundation) and the theoretical superstructure of science were related; they also dismally failed to show that our observations are theory free or theory independent. Logical Positivism dominated the scene during the first half of the 20th century, but every tenet of Positivism has been successfully overthrown (demolished) by the subsequent developments in the philosophy of science. The first tenet of Positivism to fall was the one that observations are pure or theory independent. The critics of Positivism exploded the myth of pure observation by showing how our observations presuppose theory as mentioned below. (a). Firstly, observations presuppose some principle of selection. We cannot go on observing anything we come across. We need relevant observations. Before we can collect data, our interest in the data of a certain kind must be aroused. There cannot be observations without a prior problem. The problem always comes first. (b). (c). Secondly, in science, observations are taken into account only if they are describable in a language that is currently used in a particular science. Thirdly, most of the observations in science are made with the help of instruments which are highly sophisticated. These instruments are constructed or designed in accordance with the specifications provided by some theories. Reliability of these instruments implies the acceptance of those theories which have gone into designing these instruments. Thus, observations presuppose prior theoretical commitment.

(d). Fourthly, observations in science need to be legitimized or ratified by a theory. For example, the opponents of Galileo rightly demanded from Galileo a theory of optics which could justify the extension of the use of telescope from terrestrial to celestial sphere. Galileo had no such theory, but he believed that in future such a theory would be formulated. 4. The Logical Positivists ambitious programme regarding the theory of science and its method was most systematically attacked by Karl Popper. He provided an alternative theory of science and its method which won a lot of admirers both in science and philosophy. While the Positivists tried to work out a sophisticated version of Inductivism, Popper sought to resurrect its rival, namely Hypothesism. Both the Positivists and Popper claimed the uniqueness and supremacy of science in the overall scheme of our activities aimed at knowledge acquisition. Hence both Positivists and Popper felt the need to demarcate science from the rest of knowledge acquisition activities. Logical Positivists who were inductivists maintained that the hallmark of scientific theories is their systematic verifiability. Karl Popeer replaces verifiability by falsifiability. According to Popper, scientific theories are falsifiable in the sense that they transparently state what circumstances lead to their rejection. Popper also demanded that once a theory is falsified it has to be rejected and replaced by a new theory. We should not try to make ad-hoc modifications to a theory in order to save it from being falsified. A more falsifiable theory is a better theory. A theory however plausible and perfectly consistent with what we observe is not scientific unless we can easily deduce testable consequences from it. It is in this connection, Popper attacks Marxism as being pseudo- scientific. When Karl Marx propounded his theory of capitalist society, his theory was a falsifiable theory because it yielded test implications such as disappearance of middle class, revolution in advanced industrial societies, etc. However, these test implications were not borne out and hence the theory was falsified. But the followers of Marx tried to explain away the fact that the Marxist predictions did not come about by taking recourse to ad-hoc modifications (explanations) and thus insisted that there was nothing wrong with the theory. In the process, they went on building safety valves for the theory with the result the theory became unfalsifiable. Hence, according to Popper, Marxist theory is not only unfalsifiable and therefore unsicientific, but also pseudo-scientific. It is this pretension to be scientific while being unfalsifiable makes the theory pseudo-scientific. In Poppers scheme no amount of positive results of scientific testing can prove our theories, whereas the Logical Positivists speak of confirmation of our theories in the face of positive results of the tests, Poppr only speaks of corroboration. In other words, in the Positivist scheme we can speak of scientific theories as established truths, whereas in the Popperian scheme a scientific theory however well supported by evidence remains permanently tentative. How does Popper characterize scientific progress? According to him, one finds in the history of science invariable transitions from theories to better theories. What does the word better stand for? Popper contends that no scientific theory however

corroborated can be said to be true. Hence, Popper drops the very concept of Truth and replaces it by the concept of Verisimilitude (truth-likeness or truth nearness) in his characterization of the goal of science. In other words, though science cannot attain truth, that is, though our theories can never be said to be true, science can set for itself the goal of achieving higher and higher degrees of verisimilitude, that is, they can progressively approximate to Truth. So, according to Popper, in science we go from theory to better theory and the criterion of betterness (being better) is Verisimilitude. But what is the criterion of Verisimilitude? The totality of test implications of a hypothesis constitute, what he calls, the empirical content of the hypothesis. The totality of the test implications which are bone out constitute the truth content of the hypothesis, and the totality of the test implications which are not borne out is called the false content of the hypothesis. The criterion of the Verisimilitude of a theory is nothing but the truth content minus (-) the false content of a theory. Thus, according to Popper, out of two successive theories at any time in the history of science, we find the successor (latter) theory possesses greater Verisimilitude and is therefore better than its predecessor.