Against the metaphysical exposition of space

Gershom Scholem, Julia Ng

MLN, Volume 127, Number 3 , April 2012 (German Issue), pp. 456-461 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/mln.2012.0097

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Against the metaphysical exposition of space1

Gershom Scholem

(1918, Bern) Against the metaphysical exposition of space, the following main objections are to be raised: I. Kant mixes up perception and intuition. The space of perception, that of intuition and that of mathematics are confounded with one another. The s[pace] of perception is a plane. [The space of] intuition per se is to be contested. [The space of] mathematics forms the real space problem. II. The entirely arbitrary usage of represent and thinking in connection with the argument in proposition 2. Kants proposition does not provide proof.  One cannot represent that there is no space though one can represent that there are no objects in it. This proposition is false for the space of mathematics because the space of mathematics per se cannot be represented. It is false for experiential space because one cannot represent that there are no objects in it. Thus Kant confounds the two and puts thinking in the second part of the proposition, which proves nothing, because an equivocation has taken place.

Published with the permission of Suhrkamp Verlag. MLN 127 (2012): 456461 2012 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

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III. The mixing up of concept and intuition through false terminology.  Space and concept of space are two different things. Kants entire argumentation in propositions 3 and 4 is therefore without substance [lit.: without object]. He only proves that the concept of space is not a concept of a concept, which is self-evident. Result: an investigation of the problem is impossible on the grounds of Kantian determinations. The transcendental appears in Kant and Cohen as a magical concept. // In the case of a posteriori objects, to the extent that they are given, i.e., real, it is not possible to pose the question of their possibility other than under the condition of [giving] an answer in [the form of] an analytic judgment. (By contrast, it is of course possible to answer the question of the How of this object, in the sense of what properties it has (Quale), with a synthetic judgment. With a priori entities,2 the question of How in the sense of Quale (what properties does it have) is completely meaningless; rather, there is here the prospect in the Kantian sense that, even after the reality of such a priori entities has been demonstrated by means of a metaphysical exposition, the question of the possibility of such a priori entities may still be posed with a view towards getting an answer in [the form of] a synthetic judgment. Now by designating both this last question and the question of the Quale with a How, Kant gains the possibility of deviously acquiring the transcendental through the following quaternio terminorum [fallacy of four terms]:
[major premise] I can ask How of every entity. [minor premise] The question of Quale (what properties does it have?) is meaningless in the case of a priori entities. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[conclusion] The only meaningful question of How with regard to a priori entities is this: how is it possible, the transcendental question.

--Page 139 in Cohen is the height of nonsense. Link between logic and ethics: the law shall be!!! Why is he grumbling about Barbarossa?! And on what grounds shall it be? Not along the lines of morals, but rather

2 Scholem is comparing a posteriori objects [Gegenstnde] with space construed as their a priori counterpart, but he is also quite consistent in designating these a priori counterparts with the word Gebilde, which can mean thing or object as well as shape or structure. For this reason I have rendered Gebilde as entity to differentiate it from Gegenstand, while noting that Gebilde also carries a formal sense.

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the highest principle shall exist because of the fact of science and thus because of Newton! Because the earth revolves around the sun! The entire passage is groundless. We want to recognize necessityas if there were a logical willing where there isnt even a logical must. Cohen wants to claim (on page 77) that only the posing of the question of the a priori is timelessly valid, but that the content, on the other hand[the question of] which ones are the fundamental conceptsis determined by the progressive culture of the spirit. For this reason, the metaphysical exposition is supposed to possess irrefutable validity in its tendency alone, but only relative validity in its results. The mystical obscurity is illustrated most distinctly here. A critical right is granted to positivism. The conceivability of such an evolution, if it is to have serious meaning at all, is unintelligible. The metaphysical exposition aims at the unanalyzable facts of consciousness in cognizing. It is a phenomenological [exposition], and in fact the one connected to Humes investigation. It asks:
What do we mean when we talk about space. What is the eidos space?

By contrast, the transcendental exposition asks (a question that does not interest Hume in the least):
What does this space achieve for science.

Cohen does not explain how the results of an eidetic investigation are supposed to be relative. In science, the metaphysical a priori becomes transcendentala priori. In this way Leibniz ripens, purified by Hume, into the philosopher reinforced in Newton: Kant. (Style!!) --The fundamental concepts of science are, according to page 78, provided by literary proof. The reversal of a deep thought into a bogus facticity cannot prove any worse. This is pure nonsense. With respect to this entire passage:
You see now, there he comes / Big steps hes taking!

The chasm of the Middle Ages!

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The metaphysical exposition of space has 3 stages that only appear to build on each other (and do not really do so, as Cohen would like to show). In principle one could begin with any one of the propositions. Representation = content of consciousness = every intentional object (in its precise definition in Cohen). 1.  Space, i.e., the eidos that we call space, is not an empirical concept, or better yet: the concept of the eidos space is not a concept of something empirical. Priority is to be given to space. 2.  Space is a necessary representation a priori, it is the condition of possibility for appearances. 3.  There is a type of eidos called concept. Space does not belong to it but to another type, that of pure intuition. Space is an intuition a priori. All of this is now discussed with the greatest obscurity and confusion conceivable. At many points Cohen advances this obscurity more than he eliminates it. His many mysticisms (e.g. page 81, line 12!) cannot all be noted down; they are also completely unproductive. Section after section, Cohen follows the principle of large tomes in order to make the reader curious about what is coming in the most obscure manner possible. On page 84 absurd and false comparison with an apparatus. On page 114 Kant did not succeed in demonstrating that the prescription of the problem of synthetic a priori judgments is necessary. The first proposition of the metaphysical exposition of space states: 1.  By space we mean something determined and to be further determined. 2.  What we mean by space does not appear in perception in its pure form. Yet something spatial appears in perception. 3.  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Therefore space must exist before perception. (Priority in some sense is claimed.) Critique begins with proposition 3.) It must be denied that something spatial in the sense of 1.) appears in perception. -----------Page 191. The construction of concepts is the mystical terminus that is supposed to fill in the gap in Kant. Because his concept of mathematics is weak, he takes refuge in an absolute indeterminacy.

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The metaphysical exposition is annihilated by the following: 1.) empirical mathematical a one cannot represent b but one can very well that there is no space think it without absurdity 2.) One cannot represent space without objects One can think it very well in such a manner

The link is of course completely impermissible, and those that are permissible of course say absolutely nothing. | and | a b 1a and 2b comprise Kants argument. The pure, eidetically intelligible error that prevented him from recognizing the other two is the reason why a theory could be constructed based on this determination. These 4 propositions make all of that impossible. Cohens exposition on page 103 is entirely false. What are intuitive objects without categories? Everything here amounts to the mysticism of construction. But above all: (Page 124) It is not propositions but states of affairs3 that are being seen. Everything that Cohen says about pure intuition is based on this mix-up: it is not the proposition that a + b > c is in the trianglea proposition generated only in the categoriesthat can be seen, but the state of affairs. Cohens bogus science thus falls back upon itself. e.g., page 117, where the error is already introduced: the intuition that wants to be valid a priori must prove this apriority in the discovery of geometric propositions. On page 123, synthetic propositions are supposed to proceed a priori out of their construction. This is absolutely obscure. In Kant, the mystical concept of construction acts in place of the categories of intuition that admittedly destroy his system. Things in general = appearances in the first sense Ad 4.) Is the relation table = furniture different from the relation of triangle to space?

3 A technical term that gained philosophical currency in the years leading up to the First World War, Sachverhalt is generally translated as state of affairs. Both Sachverhalt and state of affairs derive from a juridical context in which one speaks of a state of affairs or state of things (status rerum) in reference to the disposition of events or circumstances at a given time or place (as it pertains to a case or matters raised in a trial). For a history of the philosophy of Sachverhalt, see Barry Smith, Logic and the Sachverhalt, The Monist 72:1 (January 1989): 5269.

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If what Cohen has to say against Ueberweg is correct, then Kant is finished. Propositions 3 and 4 prove only what is eidetically intelligible. Moreover, the two of them are marked by such a limitless conceptual confusion, which Cohen (against Wundt on page 127) pursues to the point of paradox, that every individual pursuit is unproductive. Together, false concepts of perception, mathematics and of the concept itself will hardly result in a correct concept of cognition. Thus the question remains great, but unresolved.
Translated and annotated by Julia Ng