Tupas v. NHC Facts: National Housing Corporation is a corporation organized in under Executive Order No.

399 of the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. Its shares of stock are and have been 100% owned by the government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the GSIS, SSS, DBP, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. On the other hand, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. In 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with DOLE Regional Office in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by the med-arbiter holding that NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. TUPAS appealed to BLR which, in turn, reversed the med-arbiter and ordered a certification election to be conducted. However, the same was reversed in the MR. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON a certification election may be conducted among the NHC employees Held: Yes. Under the present (1987) Constitution, the civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. Since the NHC is a GOCC without an original charter, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code. Anyway, whether the NHC is covered by Labor Code or the Civil Service Law is beside the point. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX-B which provides that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. The rationale for this is that the government for all its sovereign functions also performs mundane tasks such that it is also an employer in the true sense of the term. In fact, it is the biggest employer in the nation.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. CA and TITO B. DATO FACTS: In January 1, 1960 - private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov. of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza. October 12, 1972 - Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr. Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which was renewed annually. January 1, 1974 Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was extended to him. March 16, 1976 Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination. Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla. Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Gov. for reinstatement and backwages. His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action before the RTC. RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent to five years. Province of Camarines Sur appealed the decision to the CA.

CA: Affirmed RTCs decision. Hence the present petition. ISSUE: W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16, 1976. Petitioners contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the employment status of private respondent from temporary to permanent, which the CSC approved as only temporary pending validation of the results of private respondent's examination for supervising security guard, private respondent's appointment in effect remained temporary. Hence, his subsequent qualification for civil service eligibility did not ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent. SC Held: Agrees with Petitioners contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to his claim for backwages for the entire period of his suspension. Ratio: At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. What is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to the appointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. CSC should have ended its participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter. CAYETANO v MONSOD

FACTS Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. HELD: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer -economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.