Bachrach v CIR (1978) Muoz-Palma, J. FACTS: Petitioner Bachrach Motor Co.

., then known as Rural Transit had a pending labor dispute with its employees before the CIR. During the pendency of the case, petitioner filed a Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service, alleging that said driver violated the Motor Vehicle Law resulting to damage to property and injuries to third parties. In an Answer and Counter-Petition filed by the employees association in behalf of Jacob, the allegations were denied and it was averred that the cause of the accident was a mechanical defect The petition was heard during which petitioner only presented one witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin. Mr. Kaplin was set to appear again for cross-examination but failed to do as he already left for abroad. The employees association filed a motion praying that the testimony be stricken from the records and that the petition to dismiss Jacob be denied and that he be reinstated with backwages. The CIR granted the motion and dismissed the companys petition and ordered Jacobs reinstatement. ISSUES + RULING: WoN the CIR erred in striking out Kaplins testimony. NO. The Court cited a number of cases in upholding the CIRs decision. In Savory Luncheonette v Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino: o The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is fundamental right which is part of due process. In Ortigas Jr. v Lufthansa German Airlnes: o when cross- examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. o The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. . . . Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. Petitioner contends that it was ready to present another witness, Mrs. Silva, to identify several documents but did not proceed to do so since the respondents counsel Atty. Santiago manifested to admitting the signatures of Mr. Kaplin on the documents. o Santiago merely admitted the signature but not the contents of the documents. The opposing party was hence still entitled to cross-examine Kaplin on the matters of the documents. (case vague as to the content of the documents) o Without Kaplins testimony, evaluation of the documents for whatever they may be worth cannot be had Other matters: Considering that the CIR denied Bachrachs petition to dismiss Jacob, the lifting of his suspension and his reinstatement with backwages is a necessary consequence The relief could be granted without need of evidence; the burden of proof was with the company to justify the suspension and eventual termination of Jacob which they failed to discharge DISPOSITION: CIR affirmed with modifications as to the payment of backwages.