The Analysis of Theatrical Performance: The State of the Art Author(s): Wilfried Passow and R.

Strauss Source: Poetics Today, Vol. 2, No. 3, Drama, Theater, Performance: A Semiotic Perspective (Spring, 1981), pp. 237-254 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1772474 Accessed: 14/04/2010 09:46
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THE ANALYSIS OF THEATRICAL PERFORMANCE

The State of the Art* WILFRIED PASSOW
Theater Studies, Munich

For several years now theater studies have been in a state of change. Its representativeshad previously endeavored almost exclusively to explain in detail and in general the origin, nature and development of theater. The structural construction of a staging and the communicative process were largely ignored. Theater studies received a new impetus from the insight that a performance must be considered as collaboration between actors and audience. This had already been formulated by Goethe: "The stage and the auditorium, the actors and the spectators together constitute the whole" (Regeln fur Schauspieler [Rules for actors] ? 82). Only recently, however, have theater theoreticians concentrated on the function of the audience in the theatrical event. Using the theory of information as a point of departure, the two Polish scholars Edward Balcerzan and Zbigniew Osinski, for example, distinguish between two ensembles in a theatrical presentation: the "A-ensemble"(agents) - the "creators of the performance" and the "P-ensemble" (percipients) - the audience. The message in the theater is not only what the theater staff (i.e., director, stage designer, actors and all stage hands, etc.) transmits to the spectators, but "reactions of the P-ensemble such as cries, whistles, laughter, applause, demonstrations, etc., also belong to those elements which co-operate in the creation of the message" (1966: 68). Thus the message is "the result of the cooperation of both ensembles" (1966: 73). The authors still limited themselves to clarifying the perceptible participation of the spectators in the form of external reactions to the total message. Later, the interest of the experts was focused almost entirely on co-authorship as the imaginative work of the spectator. Dietrich Steinbeck states that "theaterdoes not exist as a 'thing' with a fixed locus, but rather as a progression with the character
*Translated by R. Strauss. ? Poetics Today, Vol. 2:3 (1981), 237-254.

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of an event. Theater is dependent on the spectator and his presence and intentional collaboration" (1970: 1). For Arno Paul, "that which is specifically theatrical [. ..] is not to be found in drama. Neither does it result through 'staging', but only when this 'staging'meets with an audience which is prepared to consider it as such, for that is what really counts. However much is 'played'on the one side of the stage, if, on the other side, no-one correspondingly 'joins in', then such a thing as theater has never existed"(1972: 34). The most extreme view taken is that of Manfred Wekewerth, for whom "the primary player in theater [. . .] is not the actor but the spectator" (1972: 48). Klaus Lazarowicz has recently made the mutual dependence of the productive forces involved in theater very clear, as a "triadiccollusion": "Actors, authors and playgoers all participate in their own way in creating the fictional world on the stage. The author drafts a unique system of literary signs, namely a play, which is not addressed to readers, but to playgoers and actors. The actors, normally under the guidance and supervision of a director, transpose this system of literary signs into a system of theater-signs, which comprise verbal and non-verbal elements. The playgoers' activity however, consists in their observing the dramatic information in an attitude of 'external concentration' (Moritz Geiger), of apperceiving and structuring it, in understanding, experiencing and finally making it part of their personal fund of aesthetic knowledge. Such sensory, imaginative and rational playgoing activities are an essential part of what constitutes theater. They are understood as a specific manifestation of 'work in progress'. That is, a triadic collusion" (1978: 58). Of this triad, drama and more recently also the role of the spectator have both been analyzed (even if not thoroughly). However, the analysis of the structural construction of the performance and the signs used, as opposed to the analysis of the literary text, is still lacking. The reasons for this are obvious. A theater performance covers a longer period of time and is highly complex in construction. A great variety of means of expression (such as speech, mime, gesture, stage design, light, sound, etc.) are combined into a message. These can complement, contradict or strengthen each other. Each individual realization (= performance) of a staging may differ in detail, from the previous and future realizations of the same staging, because man is acting and man is participating as a spectator. The character of the work makes it impossible to examine it in exactly the same form as often as one likes, and to pick out particulardetails to study it more accurately. Filming or tape-recording does permit this, but considerable qualitative changes must be accepted. All these difficulties do not, however, relieve theater research of its duty to try every conceivable approach to analyze presentation. In this case semiotics has presented and still presents itself as a basis for systematic investigation. Already since the thirties, theater has been explained and conceived as a system of signs (see Kowzan, 1975). Nevertheless questions dealing with the theory of cognition are usually in the foreground. Frequently the literary text alone is considered, it being presumed that the presentation is already completely contained and specified in drama. The means of expression, which in fact constitutes

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theater, is thereby mostly put aside. Generally speaking, Umberto Eco's recent characterization of the literature on the semiotics of theater is most apt: "You might be overwhelmed by the abundance of witty remarks, of skillful analyses of avant-garde pieces, but you might lack essential definition" (1977: 108). There is no consensus as to the methodological approach, which most of the authors hardly even explain, and there is neither clarity nor agreement as to the actual subject of analysis. The following thoughts are not based on any particular semiotic model. Some existing works on the semiotics of theater are considered purely because they seem useful to the analysis of presentation. It is hoped that the detailed exposition of problems which arise in this context will render the dialogue between semiotics and theater research more factual and more fruitful. The constitutive basis of theater is the "contrat theatral" (Klaus Lazarowicz), the cultural agreement which is made tacitly at some time, and repeatedly confirmed, that in theater reality is represented or that only a play is actually being shown - real events are not happening. Actors and audience are in agreement that the acting is make-believe (als ob). In accordance with this agreement, almost all scholars who argue about the phenomenon of theater concentrate exclusively on the functional relations of the "make-believe world" on the stage and the relations between the stage and the auditorium. Thus normally, one differentiates at most between three aspects of interaction (or communication) in the theatrical event. They refer to: "a) the interaction (or also communication) between actors on stage (scenic interaction), b) to the interaction between actor and audience - i.e., actor-audience interaction and c) to the relations of the spectators with each another (spectator interaction)" (Kruse and Graumann, 1977: 153). It is overlooked in this and similar models that theatrical events do, and indeed must, have a real basis. Doubtless, the purpose of this event is the interaction within the theater between on the one hand the fictitious stage characters in their artificial world, and on the other hand, the apperception, feeling, understanding and experiencing of this "make-believe world" by the spectator. However the actor on the stage is indeed, "at the same time a part of reality (a person who treads the stage), and a representation of reality (that is, something other than what he is)" (Wekewerth, 1972: 36). That is to say, the actor is not only what he presents, the character of the play, but he always remains a creative person who is undertaking a professional job. Frequently the nature of his work requiresverbal and non-verbal communication with his colleagues on or off stage (e.g., with the prompter). He is even able to argue about private matters with a partner which bear no relationship to the play or its creation, as Denis Diderot has shown in his "Paradox sur le Comedien." This type of interaction should be strictly separated from the performed interaction, in which the actor as a part-player, acts according to the rules within the framework of the play. The spectator does not only interact with the characters and the world of the invented plot. He normally does not, or not completely, forget that an actor is facing him on the stage. Thus he is able to cheer enthusiasticallythe hero of a play

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when he has defeated his foe. He will, however, always applaud the actor for a successful personification and show his displeasure at an inferior effort. Interaction in the theater must therefore be considered from five aspects: of constitutive importance for theater is the theatrical interaction which divides into (A) scenic interaction within the "make-believe world" (fictitious scenic interaction) and (B) the interaction of the audience with this "make-believe world" (audience-stage interaction in the field of fiction). However there exists further: (C) the interaction of the members of the theater company amongst each other (real interaction on stage), (D) the interaction of the audience with the actors (real audience-stage interaction) and (E) the interaction within the audience. The division of the various levels based on the "contrat theatral" is shown clearly in the social behavior of the participants. Normally a doctor on the stage (as a role) has not studied medicine, and the injured man in the play is not bleeding. Yet the "doctor"is able to dress the "wound"professionally (A = makebelieve world). A trained doctor in the auditorium, in spite of his professional duty to offer assistance, will not help the wounded man. He does not act, but rather plays along with the fictitious (B). If however, during the performance, the actor is hurt (C = real interaction on stage) or a spectator in the theater falls unconscious, he takes action (D = real audience-stage interaction or E = spectator interaction). Actors and spectators do not solely communicate with other human beings; they are also in contact with their real environment and its influences. For example, the type and construction of a stage and of the buildings on it directly affect the work of an actor and can facilitate or hinder it (C). The climatic conditions and the design of the auditorium influence the moods of the spectator (E), yet he recognizes the objects on the stage (and the stage itself) in their real character (D) and is capable of assigning them to the "make-believeworld" (B). It would go too far to describe in detail all the phenomena which can influence the development and the perception of the message, for numerous components from and within the pre-theatrical framework play a part in this. However, the problematic nature of stratified interaction within the theater itself must be further clarified and illustrated. SIGNSON STAGE The signs which the actors require for their necessary occupational interaction (C) should remain hidden from the audience, even if this is not always the case. They are therefore of lesser importance for the analysis of presentation. Hence it seems at first justified, when almost all semiologists concerned with theater presume that every event of the stage is to be regardedas part of the theatrical message and can be decoded as a sign. For example, Umberto Eco is of the opinion that a drunk, brought on to the stage with the external signs of his depravity assumes purely as a result of this the character of a sign: "he has lost his original nature of 'real'body among real bodies. He is now a sign." The alcoholic "is referring us back to the class of which he is a member. He stands for the category he belongs to" (1977: 110; italics in the original).

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Does everybody lose their real identity on the stage and become a sign? Manfred Wekwert believes he has proved this in an experiment. In a drama school he let a pupil simply do an exercise in concentration during a lesson in which normally etudes were practised. The classmates in the auditorium were not aware of this. The young actor stood "on the stage and did nothing; he made no expression, said nothing and did not move, certainly he had an empty expression, yet nothing extraordinary,rather such as one often sees in absent-minded people. Thus one could not say he represented'nothing'; there really was nothing there." The uninformed spectators were subsequently asked what their classmate had been representing. "The result was amazing," wrote Wekwerth. "Theyhad seen an immense amount: indeed a great variety of spectators had seen a great variety of things" (1972: 46). Wekwerth concludes from this experiment that the "primary player in the theater . . . is not the actor but rather the spectator" (1972: 48). Wekwerth's experiment seems to confirm Eco's ideas. The mere appearance of a person on the stage, in their opinion, leads the spectators to consider him as a sign. Neither of them are disturbed by the ambiguity, which Eco recognizes well enough, of the supposed signs. At first he qualifies his statement about the drunk: "he stands for the category he belongs to," and declares: "apparentlythis drunk stands for the equivalent expression 'There is a drunken man'." However, he mentions numerous further possible meanings; to find them out "in one or another sense is a matter of convention." Finally he states: "at the point we are, our tipsy sign is open to any interpretation"(1977: 110). Eco is not apparently disturbed by this ambiguity. He presumably proceeds from conventions of interpretation according to which "natural phenomena are received as symptoms by a human recipient"(1972: 30). However, these conventions are usually based on the exact knowledge of the relationship between symptom and cause. Thus certain changes in his body would certainly be apparent to a layman. However, they do not tell him whether these are the symptoms of a disease, or benign skin-spots or normal signs of old age. A doctor, on the other hand, initiated to the convention of interpretation, 'reads' the symptoms as intentionally produced signs. Eco is aware of this, although he seems to wish to grant every individual total freedom of conventionalization in theater, without regard to any particularcause or to the intentions of a transmitter. However it cannot really be the purpose of theater to put the spectator into the position of a person puzzling over bodily symptoms, without being able to fathom their meaning. What is fatal for a really sick person - if in fact he misjudges the symptoms of his illness and consequently treats himself incorrectly - is also dangerous for the theater. The decoding puzzle leads to fatigue and impedes communication between the stage and the auditorium. A sign which is too inaccurate will promptly be given up by the normal theatergoer. Neither Eco's drunk nor Wekwerth's "exercise in concentration" provide sufficient features for construction of signs. The spectator may wait in confusion or boredom for further aids for interpretation of the events. For Eco admits: "a more sophisticated theatrical performance would establish this convention by means of other semiotic media" (1977: 110). The theatergoer is accustomed to encountering phenomena on the stage which

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do not (yet) belong to the play or which he cannot (yet) easily fit into the context of the play. He knows, for example, that actors can be on the stage before the actual play has begun. He is also prepared to wait until, with the help of further information, he can put particles of reality whose interpretationhe cannot fathom into a clear relationship of signs. "World objects" are always on the stage, so that each object at first can remain a "world object among world objects." As Eco states, it must not lose its "originalnature of 'real'body among real bodies" (1977: 110), but is rather replaced in a different context of reality. Certainly, in a stage setting, appearances on stage seem more important than normal. They are also more suitable for semantic charging and can be easily introduced into sign relations. Max Frisch notes in his diary in 1946: "Thereis an immense difference between the space which lies within a framework,and space in general which is infinite." However, this difference does not imply "that everything, simply because it takes place within a framework, receives the meaning of a sign; but it receives, whether it wishes so or not, a claim to such meaning" (1965: 51). The stage is not fundamentally Bedeutungsraum (a space for meaning Peter Handke), in which all events become a sign or a play. The framework arouses interest in what it encloses, focuses attention on details which would otherwise not be noticed in the complex environmental experience. The importance which is thereby achieved should not be confused with meaning. On the basis of a convention of habit, the theatergoer may presume that he is always seeing signs in the theater. This assumption is incorrect. The "contrat theatral" is the vital point, and again and again it must be confirmed anew for each individual case. It is not valid on principle for all occurrences in the stage area, for this contract is made in the midst of reality and the means of expression is part of this reality. It is lifted out of the real sphere into the "make-believe world." For this to happen a new contract is required between the stage and the auditorium again and again, or rather the establishment of new sign conventions. Thus theater is - among other things - to be understood as the constant process of the conventionalization of signs, which may apply often for a mere instant or for a whole evening. The simultaneity and correspondence of reality and play, material and sign must be more closely elucidated. First, we must consider the function of inanimate objects. What meaning does a chair on an empty stage have, with no particular attributes which could perhaps give a lead as to the time and location of the "make-believeworld"? Jan Kott, endeavoring as does Umberto Eco to explain all stage events as signs, invents the concept of "literalsigns" (buchstabliches Zeichen): "A chair is a literal sign within normal theatrical proceedings" (1972: 56). Tadeusz Kowzan in a similar context talks of "objet-signes"(1975: 75). It seems to me that this is an inadmissable usage of the term "sign."The chair on stage is, and remains, a chair, even if it is used purely functionally in the plot. It may attract particularattention through emphasis within the framework; it does not, however, convey a meaning. Such objects can only be interpreted as a sign for a class of objects - as does Umberto Eco with the example of a drunk - by applying a subtlety neither attributable to nor reasonably demanded from the normal theatergoer.

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For the purposes of terminological and factual accuracy it is suggested that such objects introduced with a specific intention be termed "presentations"(Prasentate). These are "phenomenal units (in the context of communication), which are valued explicitly as that which they basically are" (Alseleben, 1973: 338). Naturally "presentations"can be placed into sign relations. In this case one is talking of sign construction through "ostention." The basic material appearance "has not been actively produced (as one produces a word or draws an image); it has been picked up among existing physical bodies, and it has been shown or ostended. It is the result of a particularmode of sign production"(Eco, 1977: 110; italics in the original). The object is intentionally chosen to represent something else. In order to make this clear further aids are necessary. This can come about, as happens in reality, by virtue of the situational context. In the desert, when a traveler sees a chair it raises his hopes of meeting human beings. He recognizes in the chair a symptom of their proximity. On the stage, a chair can signify that the following scene takes place in a house; but only then, if the spectator is aware that the staging is working with very spartan means of expression. At the start of the performance the chair on the empty stage will be, and remain, a chair. A spectator who is a connoisseur of furniture (that is one initiated into the interpretive convention) can deduce from the stylistic characteristics of a piece of furniture the epoch in which the play takes place. This opportunity for interpretation is ruined if, for example, the stage design represents a rubbish dump. Any type of stool can also be interpreted, with the aid of other signs, as a special representativeof the category "seatingfurniture"as a throne or perhaps an electric chair. Yet a chair can also representa mountain. From this example one can appreciate in how many different sign relations an object which has been picked up can be presented, depending on the situation and/or conventionalization by other signs. Thus Balcerzan and Osiniskigive an account of Wyspiariski'sstaging of the "Acropolis," "wherea normal bath tub with the aid of various subcodes (gestures, scenic movements and speech) which imparted new semantic values to the scenery - became in turn, a coffin, a confessional, a bed, and a burden which an Auschwitz inmate carried"(1966: 79). The Munich proT (Prozessionstheater) staged a very revealing and fascinating play with material and signs, Alexej Sagerer's "Bergcomics":A wooden cross is being bound together by actors using two tree trunks, on the summit of an imaginary mountain. Another actor takes down from the wall two black rags tied together. These had already been hanging on the wall before the performance. He then holds the rags like a little child in his arms. At the same time he says: "Likea dead little child." A little later, the cross is erected and the material is nailed on to the cross as an image of Christ ("Whereis your Lord? Careful! Don't break anything!"). Even though the rag has now also been introduced as a sign of the crucifixion, it still retains the meaning "deadchild." Again, "likea dead little child" is repeated and at the dramatic climax of the scene, the meaning changes once again. The material, as a sign-vehicle of two sign relations which refer back to dead objects, now suddenly represents a living being. "B. grabs the black rags, tears them from the cross, and presses them to her bosom as she leaps up: 'It is my

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child [. . .] it isn't dead at all! It's alive!'." This swiftly made sign convention is promptly terminated and the material of the sign is returned to its material substance. The "mother" shows the "child" to all concerned: "Look, see how it moves, how it laughs! " One of the bystanders, however, "takes the rags at first with two fingers and lifts them up a little. 'Come on, don't be crazy, look! This isn't a little child! It's rubbish!' " He throws the rags to one side, these then being "spotlighted once again" (and thus appearing quite clearly as rags), until they finally are removed from the play. Even the most imaginative of spectators, on seeing the material in the scenery, can find no meaning for it. Still, he is prepared to place it into the most diverse sign references. Hence it is possible to find objects on the stage which do not yet (or any longer) have a sign relation. They can be used during the play in their real function - for example, as a chair - without acquiring individual importance. It is also possible that at first they are only material, as was the case with Wyspiariski'sbath tub and proT's rags. Only during the course of the plot do they receive their meaning(s). A collection of different objects in particular proportion may possibly create a theatrical sign (as for example a particular room can be portrayed with various pieces of furniture), but each and every piece, taken as it is, is and remains meaningless. All objects existing in the human environment also retain their real character on the stage, whether they are connected in sign relationships or not. Thus the spectator has a double contact with these objects. He recognizes them, on the level of the real spectator-stage interaction (D), as elements of his reality with which he is familiar. He is also able, under certain conditions, to consider them as belonging to the "make-believeworld" and/or constituting it. He thereby interacts (simultaneously) within the field of fiction (B). It must be added that not absolutely all objects used in theater must actually appear on the stage as objects to be found in reality. From antiquity up to the end of the 19th century, and often even today, the opposite was and is the case. The world was not brought on to the stage directly, but rather representedby artificial signs. The painted decoration dominated; there is hardly a single stage-prop that would have been able to fulfill in daily life the function it represented. The situation with regard to the actor is similar to that of "found" objects from the environment, but more complicated. The person on stage must not always represent a different, invented character. He can also, as a stage-hand, alter the scenery on the open stage, i.e., carry out a purely functional job in the working process. If, even before the start of the actual play, the actor is present dressed in jeans and pullover, or if, in a contemporary piece, he enters dressed in a normal, everyday suit, it can be deduced which part he is meant to be playing at most from a perusal of the program. Thus a sign relation is possible only with an additional reference which does not belong to the play. Within the events on the stage, the actor must at first be considered as a "presentation";he remains on the level of reality. Only with the help of further scenic signs is the public informed which fictitious character he represents. An actor, like any other person, has certain invariant attributes, such as age,

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physique, physiognomy and voice. In the theater these can, to some extent, be altered and/or concealed by costumes, masks, make-up, wigs and padding. The actor becomes in his external appearance, at least partially, an artificially produced (iconic) sign for another person. At the same time he always retains certain attributes which cannot be concealed or altered. The smaller his external, artistic transformation, the greater the clarity of his private, physical existence. The spectator will also react and act with him - to varying degrees - in the previously mentioned double fashion. He is preparedto consider him as a sign, as a representationof the "make-believeworld" (B), yet he also considers him from a quite personal, so to speak private, aspect. The actor impresses him as a person, just as a pupil sees his teacher not only in his functional role. This "naturalside of art" (Rotscher, 1864: 54) leads to the temptation, especially in theater, to see too much nature or just nature in art. Thus Wilhelm Meister (in Goethe's theatrical novel), "who otherwise followed a performance with a keen and artistic eye," becomes so fascinated by a young actress that he, temporarily at least, loses his critical faculties. "She did not always please him, and if he could not often bear her, he blamed the parts, whilst her delicate countenance and full bosom again supported her powerfully"(Goethe, 1950: 29). Recently Joachim Herz very clearly illustrated the paradox of the situation: to regard artificial is aboveall the agreement Mrs.X in the processof acting Entirely as beingmoreor less the personin whosenamehe appears,althoughit reallyis the of expectancy in the spectator actor's thateffectuates an attitude and private publicity it is theactress's himerotically, in although veryprivate legswithwhichshestimulates in a fable! (1977:136-137). a sensecertainly inherent Of course it is not the purpose of theater to eroticize the audience with the personal attractions of an actress; that is the purpose of strip tease, in which an eventual act only serves to increase the attraction and the eroticism. A real interaction on a private level dominates, in which far-reaching inactivity is imposed upon one partner as regards the execution of the act. The opposite applies to theater, which aims to create fictitious charactersby using signs; a very active mental and emotional effort is demanded. Yet man, as a sign, still retains his personal influence. The external appearance of an actor can be altered or even concealed by technical means. However the personality of a person is expressed not only in his invariant attributes, but also to a far greater extent, in his rationally controlled and particularly his emotionally produced behavior. This applies both to the actor, as a private person, and to the character which he represents. It seems plausible that expressions which are under the conscious control of a person can also be consciously reproduced (as an icon). Here, originally artificial signs are produced, to be reproduced on the stage as iconic signs of signs (i.e., metasigns). The symptoms of inner feeling are closely connected to the experienced feeling which lies at their base. It is of lesser importance whether this connection is of generic or of sociocultural origins. It is important only that expressional behavior normally takes place unconsciously.

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Here again theater must insist on its claim that all stage events must have an artificial sign character. Denis Diderot stated this most clearly when he confirmed that "he [. . .] who knows the external signs and reproduces them according to the best ideal model, most perfectly, is the greatest actor" (1968: 521). However Diderot's premise that the actor may have "a great deal of discernment; [. ..] critical vision; but not sensibility" (sensibilit; 1968: 484) ignores the instinctive requirementsof the majority, even of creative human beings. It is based, if at all, on a concept of genius which may be fulfilled by only a few: "sensibility is not exactly the attribute of a great genius" (1968: 487). A metaphor which Diderot chooses for the method of the actress Clairon, who is always "self-controlled"and "acts without inner emotion," seems to be contrary to this view. He remarks that she is "the soul of a great marionette within which she has wrapped herself" (1968: 486). Genius and puppet - the apparent contradiction can be solved with the aid of Heinrich von Kleist's essay "Uber das Marionettentheater."Kleist talks of "the disorder that consciousness causes in the natural grace of a person." He establishes with a well illustrated example "that more gracefulness can be embodied in a mechanical puppet than in the construction of a human body" (1967: 13). One hundred years later, Edward Gordon Craig, influenced by these ideas, wished to replace the actor with a puppet. For him, man seems "as material for the theater [. . .] useless," for "the actions of the actor's body, the expression of his face, the sounds of his voice, all are at the mercy of the winds of his emotions [. . .] It is useless for him to attempt to reason with himself"(1962:56; italics in the original). Craig then demands that "the actor must go, and in his place comes the inanimate figure - the fiber-marionettewe may call him" (1962: 81). For Diderot and Craig the nature of man, "which tends towards freedom" (Craig 1968: 56), is considered a hindrance to stable artistic work on the stage. Kleist sees in reason an obstacle for natural gracefulness. Yet "gracefulnessreappears after knowledge has gone through eternity, as it were, so that at the same time it appears in its purest form in the human frame which either has no consciousness, or an infinite one, that is in a puppet or in a god" (1967: 16). Behavior controlled from the center within, either very consciously or unconsciously, shows the greatest grace - and is not subject to emotional fluctuations. However, it can only be possessed by a marionette or a god, or (transferredinto Diderot's human sphere) a genius. Nevertheless the stage - unfortunately? cannot only remain the domain of marionettes, genius or even the gods. Thus even here it must always be reckoned that the natural feelings of the actors may interrupt. The actor should not only be able to harness his own feelings but also to "reproducethe external signs of emotion as conscientiously as possible" so that the spectators "can be deceived"(Diderot, 1968: 488-489). Many theoreticians and theater professionals question whether this is possible without the slightest emotional engagement. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing declares in the Hamburgische Dramaturgie: "How far removed is an actor who merely understands a passage from one who at the same time can feel it!" Lessing was also the first to point out how the spontaneous and uncontrolled psycho-physical connections between

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experience and the behavior of a person could be fruitfully used in a stage performance. Lessing begins with an actor without feeling, who has "for long enough done nothing other than ape." He maintains that a great number of petty rules have been accumulated within him, according to which he himself begins to act. In observing these rules (according to the rule that those very modifications of the soul which produce certain changes in the body will, on the other hand, themselves be brought about by these physical changes), the actor achieves a type of feeling which is lacking in the endurance or fervor of those who proceed from the soul. Yet, it is strong enough at the right moments in the performance to create something of the involuntary physical changes from whose presence we almost exlusively believe we are able to reliably deduce inner feeling (1963: 15). Konstantin S. Stanislavskij's"method"of constructing a role, which influenced the training of actors all over the world, as no other method has, is based on the same lines. This "method consists in combining internal and external events and in creating feeling for the part through the physical activity of the human body" (1958: 37; italics in the original in this and following quotations from Stanislavskij). Through the external execution of expressive movements emotions are created and controlled, which otherwise largely elude cognitive control. "The body can be felt materially, it can be influenced through orders,habits, discipline, and exercises; one can more easily cope with the body than with intangible, capricious, and fluctuating emotion, which vanishes so easily" (1958: 56). Only the inner bond of the interior and the exterior within the actor and their mutual relativity results in a convincing performance of a fictitious character: "the external act and the physical existence receive meaning and warmth from the inner experience, and inner experience finds its external embodiment in physical existence" (1958: 57). The complex relationships, outlined above, in the application of the performer's physical, spiritual and personal disposition to the construction of a role can hardly be perceived through external consideration of the events. It is probably unimportant for the spectator how the actor presents his emotions. He cannot, in most cases, tell whether he has before him on the stage the symptoms of genuine and/or manipulated emotions, or the purely artificial iconic sign of such a symptom. From the point of view of a spectator, the differentiation here between "so-called natural and artificial signs" (Eco, 1977:111) is almost impossible, which is why Eco considers it also unnecessary. At least from the production side, for the theoretical solution of the performance process it certainly is necessary. Furthermorethis distinction is deemed of great importance, as can be seen in the analysis of the quoted examples from Diderot, Lessing, Stanislavskij and Craig. The close bond between nature and art in theater also induces Tadeusz Kowzan to insist on a clear distinction between natural and artificial signs: "We have just said that all the signs utilized by theatrical art are artificial. This does not exclude the existence of natural signs in theatrical presentation."However he justifies this statement very generally. "The means and techniques of the theater are too deeply rooted in life to let the natural signs be completely eliminated. In an actor's diction

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and mime the strictly personal habits go with the voluntarily created shades of meaning, the conscious gestures are intermingled with reflexes" (1968:60). The theatrical signs should be artificial signs, yet the private, real existence of the actor penetrates again and again into the fictitious existence of the part. Thus, through intentional introduction or control, this private existence can become an integral part of the character being acted; yet it is also possible for it to remain intact, so to speak, as a material residue outside the "make-believeworld." Within the sign relation, the actor is to be considered the material which forms the concrete appearance of the sign. This material is not completely neutral and open, but rather determined by the personality of the performer. The spectator as recipient is not only supplied with the abstract meaning of the sign, he also has an experiential relationship with the material. He interacts simultaneously on two levels. The character of the material consequently plays an important part in the theater. Otherwise one might well join in with Lessing and ask why "is a theater built, man and woman dressed up, memory tortured, the whole town invited together? If, with my work and its performance, I wish to create nothing mort than a few of those emotions which a good story read at home by anybody would also near enough produce" (1963:313). Language, that highly developed or even the highest developed system of signs, also conveys meaning. Why replace or supplement language, with the help of which information can be conveyed relatively unequivocally, clearly, and conveniently, with such an involved instrument as theater? To begin with, human communication does not only take place in reality through language. On the contrary, as Klaus Sch6rercomments "Birdwhistell[...] has pointed out that man occupies a very small percentage of the time used for interaction with other humans in vocalization [... ] non-verbal, or better said, 'non-vocal' behavior has, in contrast, a constant character and can acquire communicative value for an observer at any time" (1973:42). Insofar as theater also transmits its message through non-verbal channels, it thus complies with the normal receptive habits of the spectator. Through the introduction of non-verbal means of expression, as opposed to the written, fixed, verbal statement, theater also gains a dimension of communication which is also important in everyday life. The evaluation of a spoken statement is namely dependent, to a great degree, on the behavior of the person making it. For, "taking into account the more limited possibilities for consciously influencing non-verbal behavior, the recipient of contradictory information will, first and foremost, believe the information conveyed through non-verbal channels" (Sch6rer, 1973:6). When the actor portrays the manipulated expression of the inner experience, he is able to strengthen, refine, negate, etc. verbal messages. The producer basically has the opportunity, which for example a writer does not have, of a choice between very varied means of expression, not only from those which are dependent on the actor (=man). Almost all conventional sign systems are at the disposal of the stage, which can also use the spectator's awareness of the connection between certain symptoms and their causes and accord-

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ingly employ symptoms as indications for the causes or reproduce them as signs. In all cases, a selection is made from set repertoires of signs and symptoms. In addition, as already mentioned, new sign conventions can be made. The producer's decisions are primarily concerned with conveying a particular, rationally decodable meaning in as optimal a way as possible. Theatrical signs, on the other hand, cannot be exclusively analyzed as abstract relations; neither are they selected according to the criterion of pure cognitive intelligibility. The material substance of these signs - whether it is an object or a person or an energetic signal - preserves, as it were, its original character. Through the sign-vehicle particularconnotations are suggested; its attributes can, as simple stimuli, produce reactions in the recipient not or hardly subject to rational control (for example, when the actress's legs eroticize the spectator). Tadeusz Kowzan also confirms at the conclusion of his book "that the signs which theater uses, like those which elsewhere are manifested in all the other artistic domains, are far from satisfied with their informative function. The signs or their combinations most frequently possess an aesthetic value and an emotive (or affective) value. Their role is thus not only to communicate information, but also to transmit to the public these supplementary values." Since, however, Kowzan is only speaking about semiotics in the theater, he does not elaborate on this problem. Still he does state "that the aesthetic or emotive function can constitute the principal, if not the only raison d'etre of certain signs conveyed during a performance" (1975:212). Thus, analysis of presentation should not restrict itself to the analysis of signs in abstract relations. The different possibilities for the stage presentations of an "object" are demonstrated here once again with an example. In order to portray a baby, the producer can bring a real child into the theater. It is not able, however, to play a part, but does what it is always accustomed to doing. At first, the spectator thinks the child is "nice"or "sweet"or "touching."A doll could replace the child as an iconic sign. As with dolls, with which children play, one can move further and further unto the abstract, away from the exact representation to the piece of material which the actress carries in proT. At the same time, a connection between the verbal statement and/or the context of movement is necessary. Yet it is also possible for the behavior alone of the mother to infer that she is holding a baby in her arms, without the actual existence of an object. A different solution is found in Peter Stein's staging of Edward Bond's piece "Saved." From an empty pram issued the sounds of a baby: as "rockers"threw stones into the pram, many of the theatergoers (particularlywomen) left the theater. There is, as yet, no clear knowledge as to what special character the individual materials have. It seems certain that they possess an intrinsic value. This is particularly true for sounds, music, light, and colors. Acoustic and optical phenomena have a purely physical effect on humans, as is well known. Of course, they retain this effect as well if they jointly or singly form the material for a sign. Thus psycho-physical devices can be used both as material for signs, and without meaning, to influence the audience emotionally. Antonin Artaud, for example, wished to work in this direction with his "Theatreet la Cruaute," which

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"aims at the organism using precise devices" (1969:88): "There is continual background noise in this play: the sounds, noises, and cries are firstly selected for their vibrational qualities and secondly for that which they represent [sic]. The lighting then joins in with these refined devices, light which is not only there to color or illuminate, but which also bears within itself, power and influence and suggestiveness"(1969:87). In a different passage he talks of "the physical effect of light which can cause a man to shudder" (1969:100). Artaud's ideas exerted a great influence in the Sixties on experimental theater work. Amongst other things, he placed a much stronger emphasis on direct sensory perception of means of expression in current theater. Not only does "theater which entrances, as do the dances of the dervishes" (Artaud 1969:88), which "lets no possible suggestion [... ] be missed" (1969:66), appeal to the vital capacity of the audience. Almost any production does this. Certain forms of theater always appeal more to the emotions of the audience than to their rationality, or even aim at sensual amusements, as do farce or a great many musical comedies and shows. Such productions are, rightly, mostly rejected as being to a great extent or completely uncreative. They cannot, however, simply be banned from theater; theater is to be considered as a representational form within which poetic works can also be created. The distinction here, as in fine art or literature, is based on aesthetic values. Moritz Geiger's reflections on "the superficial and profound influences of art" can contribute to the elucidation of these questions and also to the establishment of the relationship between "conscious perception and unconscious experience in the reception of art" (1976:190-194).Geiger maintains that "profound artistic effect [...] is never a reaction to stimulation. It requires rather that the artistic value of the object should be consciously comprehended." Accordingly "those works which merely appeal to the surface of the ego, to its vital side, are eliminated from the field of art." One does not deny them, thereby, any meaning in human life. They are "pleasurable stimuli" on par with "the pleasures of a game, or hunting or gossip": "Thereis nothing to be said against the amusement of a farce nor against the excitement aroused by a detective story." Geiger also points out that in theater, it is quite wrong always to assume "that profound artistic effect is to be experienced." It should be added that the claim that the theater must always be art is also false. "The confusion between superficial effect, external to art, and profound, artistic effect is in these cases much closer at hand, because farce and artistic drama, detective story and novella, all have the same form of presentation. No-one would confuse these when this external artistic form is lacking" (Geiger, 1976). The erroneous view that theater is to be equated with art (or the wish to equate it with art) is also made manifest in that nearly all definitions of theater do not refer to the form of presentation. Ideological goals which theater should strive to attain are always quoted. Thus, amongst other things, it is described as a "moral institution" (Schiller), which must "be active in the propagation of good taste, in the refinement of morals" (Kaiser Joseph II of Austria) or should have an enlightening function (Lessing, Brecht, etc.). The resultant exalted estimation of

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the institution leads the theatergoers, even at purely theatrical entertainment, to believe that they are enjoying art. On the other hand, theaters which wish to serve simply as "pleasurable stimuli" are often denied the right of existence. Such attitudes often go together with agitation against all representations of vital human life. Representativesof such views ban from the stage the buffoon, as did Johann Christoph Gottsched in 1737, advocate scenic purity, consider theater indeed exclusively as an institution for the imparting of literary texts, or wish no matter what to allow only those stagings to count as artistic works which appeal in their symbolism purely to the rationality of man. Here once can object, as does Geiger, that "there is no profound artistic effect in which vital influences are not interwoven, indeed must be interwoven." He points out that it is wrong to assume that vital influences in a piece of art "always signify a penetration of that which is external to art into the artistic sphere," and that "theircreation should be avoided by the artist if possible." Thus the gauge of art is not the degree of rational comprehension, for "on no account, should one believe, that - because autocracy of vital elements is external to art - within art itself fewer vital elements should signify the exalted summit of art. Rather, the moment these vital influences appear in connection with profound influences they become something else, something new; they are no longer superficial effects, they gain a fundamentally new meaning." Later Geiger emphasizes this again: "Where only profundity without vitality is to be found there exists the danger of academicism, the danger of falling into that genre ennuyeux, which Voltaire so hated; just as, on the other hand, mere vitality leads to superficial art" (1976:190-194). These statements by an aesthetician on the simultaneity of the various fields of experience are confirmed by a statement from the practical side: "We make the spectator judge and argue. That is one of the natures of the theater: it stimulates the brain. There is however another which includes the emotional aspect. The spectator wanders through a complicated labyrinth of emotions, if he absorbs the forces influencing him" (Meyerhold, 1930:121).Thus "all devices which are at the disposal of the other arts must be used as an organic fusion to affect the audience" (1930:126).Here one is neither preaching irrationalityin theater, nor theater which only aims to satisfy carnal desires. Wsevolod Meyerhold, from whom this statement originates, always understood theater as an artifact. Thus, using Eugeniy Vakhtangov's words he calls "a production theatrical, i.e., fit for theater, if the spectator does not forget for a moment that he is in the theater, and if he does not for a second cease to experience the actor as a master of his profession who is playing a part"(1922:354).This reference also confirms once again that the spectator interacts in two ways with the actor. However, it is not possible to construct a very simple equation according to which, on the one hand, superficial effects are conveyed exclusively by stimuli derived from material, and on the other hand, all signs aim at profound effects because they are rationally decodable. Purely superficial effects can also be produced with signs (as is shown by the example of the detective story). The arrangement in obedience to certain rules of acoustic phenomena, which exerts a

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stimulatory influence on a listener, constitutes, for example, a musical work of art. Amongst other things, the fundamental criterion for the aesthetic value of a work is its syntactic and structural construction. Even if numerous analyses of drama have supplied important knowledge in this area, the structureof the actual theatrical event still has not been comprehended. The basic explanation with aesthetic criteria and possible rules of compositional arrangement of staging is still largely lacking. Before an analysis of presentation can attempt an aesthetic evaluation, it must first try to clarify purely descriptively the structure of theatrical communication. It is of no concern, in the first instance, whether the performance aims at superficial or profound effects, or whether it achieves these. What is being sought are the means of expression and principles of production in the form represented by theater in general. The material used on stage with its own particulareffects in the sphere of vital experience obviously plays a leading role, apart from its use and construction of signs. From an aesthetic point of view, the relationship of material to sign in simultaneity, mutual permeation, and mutual dependence and the basic system then become important. Since signs can be constructed with the most varied sign vehicles and these vehicles also have an intrinsic value, and furthermore since numerous devices are used without meaning merely because of their particular stimuli, the selection of material has become a central problem of artistic production in theater (as in art in general). "In art it is always a question of arrangementof the material"declares Wsevolod Meyerhold (1922:101),and from the standpoint of the aesthetics of information Frieder Nake confirms that "without doubt, artistic production is not (only) the manipulation of signs (abstract relations!), but also - and perhaps first and foremost - the arrangement of material and substance, that is the manipulation of the material of signs and not of the sign themselves"(1974:29-30). Accordingly, the point of departure for the analysis of presentation should be the designation of material. As a basis for this, a catalogue of the usable and already employed sign and material repertoires would be useful. For even if it seems that nearly all the phenomena of the environment can be used on the stage, there do exist actual limits as a result of the constitutive requirementsof theater and the restrictions of theatrical communication. It would go beyond the limits of this article to go into further details here. In principle it could still be meaningful to distinguish, in a rough framework, between energetic appearances (such as light, color, noise, sound, smell, temperature), naturally created phenomena (such as rocks, plants, creatures and their behavior, the weather) and products made by men (such as buildings, objects, machines, codes, fashions). To define the artificially constructed "make-believeworld" one must establish in which function, which materials (or signs) contribute to its construction or merely possess a functional role. The level of actual theatrical interaction is thereby separated from the real interaction of the spectator with the particles of reality, necessary or superfluous (yet not without effect), present on the stage but not included in the plot. It should be clear from the previous analysis that a

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perfectly clear distinction is not always possible here, yet it should still be attempted. Finally the relation between material and sign should be exactly defined. The method with which material as a sign vehicle is presented in sign relations is to be clarified; that is, how new sign conventions are made in theater on the basis of well-known codes. However it is not a question of merely communicating meanings. Therefore, it is imperative to analyze the affective and emotional effects of those materials integrated into the "make-believeworld" - no matter how they are used - and to analyze their co-operation with the rationally comprehensible messages.

REFERENCES

1969.Das Theater und sein Double (Frankfurt: Fischer). ARTAUD, ANTONIN, ALSLEBEN, KURD, 1973. "Informationstheorie und Asthetik," in: Hans-Georg Gadamer & Paul Vogler, eds., Neue Anthropologie, Vol. 5 'Kulturanthropologie' (Stuttgart: Thieme), 321-356. EDWARD AND OSINSKI, BALCERZAN, im Lichteder ZBGNIEW, 1966."Dietheatralische Schaustellung Informationstheorie," in: Zagadnienia Rodzaj6w Literackich, Tom VIII, zeszyt 2 (15) (L6di), 65-88. EDWARD 1962.On the Art of the Theatre (London: Mercury Books). CRAIG, GORDON, DIDEROT, DENIS,1964. Paradox uber den Schauspieler (Frankfurt: Insel). 1972. Einfuhrung in die Semiotik (Uni-Taschenbiicher 105) (Miinchen: Fink). Eco, UMBERTO, 1977 "Semiotics of Theatrical Performance," The Drama Review, 107-117. FRISCH, MAX, 1965. Tagebuch 1946-1949 (Miinchen-Ziirich: Droemer-Knaur). 1976. Die Bedeutung der Kunst (Miinchen: Fink). GEIGER, MORITZ, GOETHE,JOHANNWOLFGANG VON, 1950. WilhelmMeisters theatralische Sendung (Berlin: Henschel). HERZ, JOACHIM, 1977. "Contents of Theatrical Communication," in: James F. Arnott, Joelle Chariau, Heinrich Huesmann, Tom Lawrenson and Rainer Theobald, eds., Theatre Space [Der Raum des Theaters] (Miinchen), 135-141. HEINRICH KLEIST, VON, 1967. "Uber das Marionettentheater," in: Helmut Semdner, ed., Kleists Aufsatz uber das Marionettentheater (Berlin: Schmidt), 9-16. KOTT,JAN, 1972. "In welchen Zeichen spricht das Theater," in: Spektakel-Spektakel (Miinchen: Piper). KOWZAN, TADEUSZ, 1968. "The Sign in the Theatre," Diogenes 61, 52-80. 1975 Litterature et spectacle (La Haye-Paris: Mouton). ANDGRAUMANN KRUSE, LENELIS CARLF., 1977. "The Theatre as Interaction and as Interaction Space," in: James F. Arnott, Joelle Chariau, Heinrich Huesmann, Tom Lawrenson and Rainer Theobald, eds., Theatre Space [Der Raum des Theaters] (Miinchen), 149-157. LAZAROWICZ,KLAUS, 1977. "Triadische Kollusion," in: Das Theater und sein Publikum (Wien: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften). GOTTHOLD LESSING, 1963. Hamburgische EPHRAIM, Dramaturgie,Otto Mann, ed. (Stuttgart: Kroner). 1922. "Der Schauspieler der Zukunft" in: Ludwig Hoffman and Dieter MEYERHOLD,WSEWOLOD, Wardetzky, eds., Wsewolod E. Meyerhold, Alexander I. Tairow, Jewgeni B. Wachtangow. Theateroktober (Frankfurt: Roderberg). 1930 "Rekonstruktion des Theaters," in: Ludwig Hoffmann and Dieter Wardetzky, eds., Wsewolod E. Meyerhold, Alexander I. Tairow, Jewgeni B. Wachtangow. Theateroktober (Frankfurt: Roderberg). NAKE, FRIEDER, 1974. Asthetik als Informationsverarbeitung (Wein-New York: Springer).

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PAUL,ARNO,1972. "Theaterwissenschaft als Lehre vom theatralischen Handeln," Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 23, 55-77. 1864. Die Kunst der dramatischen Darstellung (Leipzig: Wigand). HEINRICH THEODOR, ROTSCHER, "Eine heiBe Sommernacht im lindgrunen Hochwald - Bergcomics" (manuscript). ALEXEJ. SAGERER, KLAUS, 1973. Non-verbale Kommunikation (Forschungsberichte des Instituts fur SCHERER, Kommunikationsforschung und Phonetik der Universitat Bonn, 35) (Hamburg: Buske). KONSTANTIN S., 1958. Theater, Regie und Schauspieler (Rowohlts Deutsche STANISLAVSKIJ, Enzyclopadie, 68) (Hamburg: Rowohlt). STEINBECK, DIETRICH, 1970. Einleitung in die Theorie und Systematik der Theaterwissenschaft (Berlin: de Gruyter). EUGENIB., 1922. "Uber das Theatralische," in: Ludwig Hoffman and Dieter WAKHTANGOV, Wardetzky, eds., Wsewolod Meyerhold, Alexander I. Tairow, Jewgeni B. Wachtangow. Theateroktober (Frankfurt: Roderberg). 1972. Theater und Wissenschaft (Deutsche Akademie der Kunste zu Berlin: MANFRED, WEKWERTH, Arbeitshefte 3) (Berlin: Henschel).