42 PostwarBritishPoliticalDevelopment

1989), though largely ignored within most conventional accounts, can

scarcelyheoveremphasized.
Notes
1 See,forinstance,Lukes1974;Isaac1987;Hay1997a.
Of course to some extent Heisenberg's 'Uncertainty Principle' changes all
thisatleastfor thephysicsofsmallparticles,suggestingthatthevelocityand
position of an object (a sub-atomic particle, say) cannot both be known
simultaneously. To measure one accurately is to impose limits on the accu-
racywith which theothercanbemeasured. YetcvenHeisenberg'sprinciple,
it should be noted, takes the form of a 'law' which is assumed to be
immutable,infinitelygeneralizableandtrans-historical.
3 This is nottosuggest, ofcourse, thatthe strengthofgravitationalfields does
notvary (bothovertime and from system tosystem), butthatthelaws gov-
erningthegravitationalfieldbetweentwoobjectscansafelybeassumedtobe
immutable.Itis this (useful) assumptionthatultimatelymakestrans-Atlantic
possible.
4 Itshouldbenoted thattoidentify continuityis nottoimplythatany change
is takingplace;neitheris itnecessarilytosuggestthatnochangeis occurring.
Theconcept,unlikethatofdiscontinuity,isneutralwithrespecttotheidenti-
ficationofchange.
S Sec, for instance, Nairn 1976, 1993; Anderson 1992; Hutton 1996; for cri-
tiques,seeHay1995a,1997c.
6 Pimlott 1988; Middlemas 1986, 1990, 1991; for a critique, see Seldon 1994a;
Hay1996c:45-7.
KennethMorgan,forinstance,referstotheAttleegovernmentas 'theBritish
variantofsocialisminonecountry'(Morgan1984:89).
8 Insodoingitis obviouslycrucialtoacknowledgethatthereis alwayslikelyto'
beasignificantgapbetweenwhatagovernmentwishes topresentas itsaims
andobjectives,andwhatagovernmentis everlikelytoachieve.Aswellas an
'implementation gap', there is always likely tobe a 'strategy gap' (see Hay
1996c:
9 Forarare (indeed,perhapsunique) andquiteexplicitattemptto correctthe
characteristic 'contextual parochialism' that comes with archival immersion,
seeTiratsoo1991;TiratsooandTomlinson1993.
2
Britain'sEconomicDecline:
CulturalVersusStructural
Explanations
lIy the mid-1960s the notion of an effete British Establishment,
unable to compete in the internationaleconomy thanks to an educational
. y ~ t c m thatwas anti-industrialandvirtuallypre-modern,andavaluesystem
ilild ethos that revered the landed gentry and despised entrepreneurial
I'Il'ort,hadbecomevirtuallyubiquitousintheinformedpopularmind.
Rubinstein1990:59
oIll' of the major themes within British political discourse since the
I1Ild I()60s hasbeenthenatureandextentofBritain'seconomicdecline.
Thl' gradual realization that the postwar economic boomcamouflaged
Ihllish industry's steadily declining share of global manufacturing
nUlpllt has led to a mini-industry in explanations of decline. This
.hllplcr is a contribution to this debate, and emphasizes some of the
Ihmtwmingswithintheexistingliterature.
liirst, I argue that we need a more specific definition of decline.
Wllhin theexistingliterature,thereis a tendencytoconflatethe demise
.r Brilain's manufacturing industry with general economic frailty.
"I:ond, it is importantto develop a more intricate explanation ofthe
t'l*l'IoryofBritain'seconomicdevelopment.Mostoftheexistingliter-
"Llre provides a deterministic analysis of decline. Incontrast, I argue
we need to develop a more sophisticated and non-deterministic
lyNili ofa highly complex and dynamic historical process. Finally, I
for a multidimensionalapproach. Mostexistingaccountsempha-
either ideological factors (an anti-industrial culture) or economic
(carly industrialization and the nature of industry-finance
lIuns) as themaincauseofdecline. Here,Isuggestthat,inaddition
l
44 Postwar British Political Development
to these factors, we also need to account for the postwar political failure
to rectify Britain's downward economic trajectory.
What do we mean by 'decline'?
It is important to emphasize that Britain's economic decline is not
generic. Clearly, some sectors of the British economy have been more
successful than others. Notable examples include the chemical and phar-
maceuticals industry, in which Britain has boasted and continues to boast
some of the world's leading companies (ICI, Zeneca, Glaxo, Beecham),
the aerospace industry, where leading British firms include Rolls Royce,
British Aerospace and Lucas Aerospace, and the food, drink and tobacco
sector, in which Britain has a number of the world's largest companies
(Coates and Hillard 1995: 15).
Most significantly, the City of London enjoys continued success as a
leading international financial centre. As Radice argues: 'from the
emergence of the Eurodollar market in the 1960s through to the aboli-
tion of exchange controls in 1979 and the "Big Bang" of deregulation in
1987, London has flourished as a centre for global finance' (1995: 244;
see also Coakley and Harris 1992). Therefore, in explaining economic
decline we need to account for sectoral differences in the performance
of British companies.
If we recognize both the apparent success of many sectors of the
British economy and the rapid rise in living standards which most
people enjoyed during the postwar period, it seems quite odd to focus
on economic decline. This leads to the obvious question: decline in rela-
tion to what or whom? Clearly, we need to view decline as a relative
concept. It is important to develop both a spatial and temporal analysis
of Britain's economic development which accounts for its own historical
performance as well as the economic record of its main competitors.
While there is some disagreement among economic historians over
the extent and timing of Britain's relative economic decline, it is gener-
ally accepted that, following the deep depression of the 1870s, both
Britain's total output and the output per head grew more slowly in the
subsequent forty years than they had done in the previous half century.
As Marquand argues: 'Between 1873 and 1913, total output grew by
about 1.8 per cent a year in Britain, compared with 2.8 per cent a year
in Germany and 4.5 per cent a year in the United States' (1988: 116).
Whereas globally industrial production grew fourfold between 1870 and
1913, in Britain it only doubled. In the same period Britain declined
from being the 'workshop of the world' to only the third industrial
power in the world behind the United States and Germany.
Britain's Economic Decline 45
However, as table 2.1 demonstrates, an analysis of economic growth
rates suggests that we need to be wary of viewing the historical trajec-
tory of the British economy as an inexorable downward spiral. As we
can see, Britain's annual average growth rate for the period between
III 13 and 1950 is higher than that of France and comparable with those
or both Germany and Italy. Whereas the depression of the interwar
years meant that, in real terms, Britain's economic growth continued to
he sluggish, in comparative terms the economic performance was much
stronger than in the forty years prior to World War I. Further, in the
ll10re advanced industries, such as electrical manufacturing, motor man-
ufacturing and chemicals, in which British companies had initially been
slow to invest, Britain's market share rose rapidly (Marquand 1988:
1.12).
'l'IIble 2.1 Annual average growth rates (% (year)
1913-50 1950-73
II! ilain 1.3 3.0
!'Iallce 1.0 5.1
Jllpan 1.8 9.7
inmany 1.3 6.0
, IS/\
2.8 3.7
Ilaly 1.4 5.5
Swedcn 2.8 3.8
SOllrc': Adapted from Maddison (1982,1991), quoted in Crafts and Woodward
t jI)I) t: R).
....hle2.2 Share of world manufactured exports (%)
1950 1960 1970 1979 1988
, If(
25.5 16.5 10.8 9.1 8.3
t IS/\ 27.3 21.6 18.5 16.0 14.9
IllUm'c 9.9 9.6 8.7 10.5 9.1
C!I'flnallY 7.3 19.3 19.8 20.9 20.6
,IIIPlIll 3.4 6.9 11.7 13.7 18.1
Brown and Sherrif (1979) and DTI (1989), quoted in Crafts and Wood-
wnrd ( 1991: 12).
It is during the postwar period that Britain's industrial performance
'"pidly deteriorates. Although economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s
Willi impressive in historical terms, it was disturbingly poor relative to
"Iher countries. As table 2.1 clearly illustrates, British growth between
lind 1973 was considerably lower than in the other leading indus-
"hll nntions. Further, as table 2.2 demonstrates, Britain's share of world
tnnl1ul'llclured exports foil drumliticlllly during the same period,
46
47
Postwar British Political Development
especiallyin the face ofGermanandJapanese expansion. Thegradual
realization that the favourable postwar economic climate concealed a
deeply worrying acceleration ofBritain'srelative economic decline led
toanexplosioninexplanationsofdecline. Byfarthemostinfluentialof
theseaccountshasbeentheculturalthesis.
The cultural thesis
Thebasicpremiseoftheculturalthesis is thateconomicdecline is pri-
marily attributable to the stultifying influence of a uniquely resilient,
parasiticaristocracy.ThereductionofBritain'seconomicmalaisetothe
mismanagement ofa myopic and hopelessly gentrified ruling class has
led to the emergence of some unlikely bedfellows. This thesis has a
strong pedigree in both the neo-Marxist and neo-liberal literature.
Indeed,itis remarkablethatathesiswhichfirst emergedinthepagesof
the neo-Marxist journal New Left Review
1
was subsequently highly
influentialontheemergenceofThatcherism.
2
Inits initialMarxistguisetheculturalthesis attributed decline tothe
'exceptional' nature ofBritish capitalism. Britain'sindustrial revolution
arrived ata time when the oldfeudal ruling class, following analliance
with a nascent financier class, remained a powerful socio-economic
grouping. The subsequent failure of the industrial bourgeoisie to
become hegemonic and the concomitant political weakness of the
workingclass ledtoa strangelystagnanthistoricalprocess. Theancient
institutions ofthe British state were left intact as the industrial bour-
geoisie was content tocoalesce with the aristocracy in a new historical
bloc, albeitas ajuniorpartner.Throughthe developmentoftheVictor-
ianpublicschoolsystemandthepervasiveinfluenceofOxbridgeandan
elitecivilservice, themiddleclasseswereimbuedwith adecidedly anti-
industrialvaluesystem. This resulted in the developmentofa uniquely
British'gentlemanlycapitalism'whichis skewedtowardstheinterestsof
financialcapitalandisessentiallyanti-industrialincharacter.
The culture thesis, as espoused by Weiner (1981) and C. Barnett
(1986; 1996) emerged ata particularly opportunemomentfor theNew
Right?TheattractionoftheWeiner/BarnettthesistotheNewRightis
that it suggests that Britain's economic problems are cultural rather
than structural. Furthermore, it legitimizes the New Right's emphasis
on the need to create a more business-friendly culture and
system. Further,Barnett'semphasisonthedebilitatingeconomic
of a conservative trade-union movement and the failed priorities
postwar welfarism proved particularly attractive for the New Right
agenda.
Britain's Economic Decline
Anarchaicandanti-industrialrulingclass andobstructiveandselfish
trade unions were powerful rhetorical symbols of Britain's declining
globalstatus. ThetraditionalEstablishment and the trade unions were
citedas theprincipalengineers ofBritain'sdecline. Jettisoningthetra-
ditional Conservative emphasis on tradition and continuity, Mrs
Thatcher fought the 1979 election on a commitment to clear out the
staid and corrupt nooks and crannies ofthe British Establishment.
4
In
addition, she emphasized her commitment to undermine an over-
powerfulandhighlydestructivetrade-unionmovement.
ThecommitmenttoputtheGreatbackintoBritainwaspremisedon
(he reinvention of the entrepreneurial spirit which had been the
hedrock ofVictorian industrial success. This necessitated the removal
or a failed liberal ruling class from the higher echelons ofthe British
":stablishment and its replacement with a modern, dynamic (Le.
Thatcherite) capitalist class. Sir Keith Joseph argued, in terms eerily
reminiscent of the Nairn/Anderson theses, that Britain's main eco-
l10mic weakness was that it 'never had a capitalist ruling class or a
siahle haute bourgeoisie'. Consequently, 'capitalistor bourgeois values
hilve nevershapedthought andinstitutions as they haveinsomecoun-
Iries' (quotedinWeiner1981: 8),
Although Joseph conflates the capitalist class with the bourgeoisie,
Ihl' thrust of his argument remains the same as the Nairn/Anderson
IIIllI Weiner/Barnetttheses;theBritisheconomyhas sufferedfromthe
dehilitatingbackwardnessofitsrulingclass. Thelogicofbothpositions
Is IhatinordertohaltBritain'sdecline there hastobeacompletionof
lilt' hourgeoisrevolution. Inparticular,therewas anurgentneed to get
lid of a parasitic aristocracy whose pernicuous influence continues to
hlock the development ofBritish industry. Inthis respect we can see
why the Barnett!Weiner thesis was so attractive to the New Right
(which presumablysawitselfas thevanguardofthebourgeoisie).
Unlikely bedfellows
their radically differing normative assumptions, the
Weiner/BarnettandAnderson/Nairn theses offerremarkably similar
hhiloriographical accountsofdecline. Here,I will focus onanumberof
Ilmllnl'itiesbetweentheneo-liberaland neo-Marxistpositions:
IIrilnin's pooreconomic perfonnance is primarilyattributed to the absence
(1(' II technocraticeliteandthefailure todevelopstateinstitutionswhichcan
"t'jlulll(e the British economy within anincreasingly complex and competit-
IVtI cnpitalisteconomicsystem;
48
49
Postwar British Political Development
thefailure to develop sucha state is viewedas theconsequence ofthecon-
tinuedhegemonyofabackward-lookingliberalpoliticaleliteandthefailure
of the industrial middle class to realize its economic success at a political
level;
thehegemonicpositionofthe traditionalaristocracyisreproducedprimarily
throughanelitisteducationsystemandananti-businessethos;
thetradeunionsareseenas obstructiveandnarrowlycorporatist.
The archaic state
Withinmuchoftheleftist literatureondeclinethereis astrongempha-
sis onthehistoricalfailure to modernizetheBritishstate; for example,
as Marquand argues, 'Britain's inability to adjust to the economic
upheavals of the 1970s and 1980s lies in her failure to become a
"developmentalstate", (Marquand 1988: 5; see also Nairn 1964, 1976;
Anderson 1964, 1987; Cain and Hopkins 1993b; Gamble 1994; Hutton
1995). Here, decline is attributed to a historical failure to develop the
institutional capacity necessary to lead the British economy in an
increasingly complex and competitive capitalist economic system. In
contrast to countries such as Japan, Germany and France, where the
statehas an activeroleineconomicaffairs,Britainis constrainedbyan
institutional settlement which has remained virtually unchanged since
theseventeenthcentury.
Here, the focus is onthepeculiardurabilityoftheinstitutional deal
which was forged in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, as a
result ofwhich, Huttonargues, 'The Conservative Partyfound itselfin
charge ofa ruleless state, handed down almost intact from the
mentof1688'(1995: 4).Similarly,Gamble argues: 'TheBritishstatehas
notsuffered a major breakin thepattern ofits development since the
civilwarintheseventeenthcentury'(1994:65; alsoAnderson1987:48).
The early development of commercial capitalism within Britain
resulted in the creation ofa politically powerful financial bourgeoisie
which formed a historical alliance with the old landed gentry. Con-
sequently,the aristocracywas able toobtain an institutionalsettlement
which restored much ofits power and maintained many ofits ancient
privileges. Inreturn,thefinanciers were assured ofthecontinuationof
Britain's imperial role, which gave them privileged access to
foreign markets. The international success of the British CWllUUll
served as a bulwark for the ancient institutions ofthe state.
imperial role facilitated privileged access to foreign markets,
Britishbusinesspeopleeagerlyexploited.
Nairn and Anderson argue that it was this imperial role which
Britain's Economic Decline
allowed a'transitionalstate'tosurvivedespitethebackwardness ofthe
domesticeconomy.Thearchaicnatureofthestatemeantthattherewas
110 attempt to formulate a leading role in the development of British
Industry. Consequently, as the extent ofBritain's economic difficulties
hecame apparent, the state was peculiarly ill-equipped to remedy the
deep-rooted structural problems which plagued British industry: 'A
l't Hlstantly weakening industrial base, a dominant financial sector ori-
l'llted towards foreign investment rather than the re-structuring of
British industries, a non-technocraticstate quite unable to bring about
Ille "revolutionfrom above"neededtoredress thisbalance:everything
rol1spired to cause an inexorable spiral ofdecline' (Nairn 1964: 5; see
IIlso Anderson 1987: 75; Hutton 1995: 286-94). In continental Europe
Ihe state acted as amajor player in promotingindustrialadvancement,
wht'reasin Britainmanufacturerswere lefttofendfor themselves. This
prevented the modernization oftheeconomy duringcrucial periods of
dl'vclopment, notably the postwar period. Within this narrative the
principalexplanation for Britain'seconomicdeclineis theabsenceofa
IIlodernizing 'second revolution'. Unlike all its principal competitors,
III\' UK never experienced a major period of social and political
IIpheaval, which would have radically remoulded the outdatedinstitu-
tlOilS ofthestateformedafter1688(Anderson1987:47).
We would expect a left-leaning literature to posit the virtues of
IJ.ll'atcr state intervention; however, this position is also developed by
Ilul'lwtt, who advocates amoreinterventioniststate. Despitehis popu-
li" ity within the New Right, Barnett'sthesis does not extolthevirtues
III laissez-faire economics. In reality, as Addison argues, 'Barnett is a
withering critic of nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism and its
h'j).m:y for twentieth-century Britain' (1987: 19). Inhis criticism ofthe
wllrlime National government,Barnettclaims thatthe only viablecure
fill' Britain'spostwar economicills was the creationofa ruthless inter-
venlioniststatebaseduponaBismarckianmodel(Barnett,C. 1986). As
MIlI'1-\an argues, thisimplied'aninjectionofvigorous Prussianinterven-
tionism in the economyin place ofsentimental utopianismand woolly
IIlllllels of voluntary partnership' (1992: to). Onlythroughthe creation
urII slatededicatedtomaximizingnationalefficiencywas economicsal-
vlltion plausible. Instead, crippled by the British tradition of 'collec-
IIV11011 11 ,, a historic opportunity to reconstruct the state was squandered
IIUI rcal economicdifficulties ignored: 'instead ofplanning for an eco-
nUl1lic miracle,thegovernmentplannedforaNewJerusalem' (Addison
lijH7: 19-20).
Burnelt bitterly attacks both the Churchill and Attlee governments
In, flliling to employ the resources ofthe state to restructure Britain's
industrialbase. Ratherthandevelopingthe institutionalcapacity
51
r
Postwar British Political Development 50
which was necessary forcibly to modernize the economy, a liberal
ical elite proposed an ad hoc, voluntary and conciliatory
between government and the two sides of industry. Barnett is savagely
critical of this approach. In particular, he derides the liberal establish-
ment's penchant for 'advice', 'persuasion' and 'consultation'. The sever-
of Britain's structural economic difficulties demanded 'ruthless and
wide-ranging intervention in British industry' (1996: 205).
The failure to introduce the 'vigorous intervention from above'
needed to alleviate economic decline is also attributed to the absence of
a 'state-class of "technocrats" or administrators' (ibid.). Instead, as
Nairn argues: 'the political and administrative class is irremediably
compromised, socially and intellectually, with the old patrician order'
(1976: 35). Unlike in .France, for example, where an influential techno-
cratic class is capable of leading economic restructuring from above, no
such class existed in Britain. In particular, Barnett bemoans the Attlee
government's failure to create a powerful executive agency such as the
French Commissariat du Plan with the necessary resources and insti
tionallegitimacy to lead Britain's industrial recovery.s
A feudalistic ruling class
A central theme within the decline literature is the notion that
industrial bourgeoisie failed to develop a real political voice.
Robbins has argued, 'Britain has lacked a political I business class
has played a directing role in its affairs either in the nineteenth
or since' (Collins and Robbins 1990: 12; see also Cain and
1993a: 70). Even at the height of their economic prosperity, the
industrialists were unable to gain political power. Instead, both
Weiner/Barnett and the Nairn I Anderson theses identify a
between the bourgeoisie and aristocracy during the mid-nineteent
century. The industrial middle class, meanwhile, lacking any real
logical and cultural justification for its interests, remained the .
partner within this new class alliance,
Despite the extensive success which the industrial
enjoyed, itnever managed to transform its economic dominance
political supremacy: 'Economically, English capitalism had
completely; but no commensurate political advance by industrial
had followed' (Anderson 1987: 23). Itachieved some political succes.
such as parliamentary reform in 1832 and the repeal of the Corn
in 1846, but on the whole the industrial middle class remained on
margins of the political process (Weiner 1981: 12; Cain and
1993a: 40). As a result, it was never able to occupy a hegemonic
Url/tlllI ',\' Dec/ine
lion within the state, and its interests remained subordinate to those of
capitalists who had formed a cultural, political and economic
nlliance with the traditional landowning aristocracy. The state contin-
Ih'd III pursue a global political and economic agenda which strongly
fnvlJured the financial and commercial sectors. Ipso facto, the early
Illiorities of the state were not industrial development and domestic
rl'olHlmic growth but the defence of empire and the search for new
IIV1'rseas markets - an imperial role.
Gentlemanly capitalism
Within both the neo-liberal and neo-Marxist variants of the cultural
it is argued that the traditional ruling class was able to remain
through the permeation of an entire set of beliefs, values,
liltIIlIdes, morality, etc. In this way it was able to absorb and neutralize
1111' interests of the industrial class. The cultural thesis, then, is Gram-
_1'11111 in the sense that the hegemonic class is 'one which has been
"hlto to articulate the interests of other groups to its own by means
IttII hegemonic struggle' (Mouffe 1979: 181). The primary basis of this
struggle was the prominence given to acquiring a 'gentle-
nUlIIly' status within society. As Bertrand Russell has argued, 'The
of the gentleman was invented by the aristocracy to keep the
",I,ldk classes in order' (quoted in Weiner 1981: 13).
111 order to strengthen its hegemonic position, the aristocracy sought
tat hllime the industrial bourgeoisie with its own values and traditions:
t'n lI'turn for accepting the values and lifestyles of the landed class, the
",""I prominent manufacturers were to be admitted as full members of
Itt, "Illtus group of "gentlemen" , (Scott 1982: 104, quoted in Overbeek
tWO: 44). The main basis of these gentlemanly values was a feudalistic
,,"dlllilt for rural life and a marked hostility towards
,.rup.rcss' and urban life generally. Weiner, for example, cites numer-
lUI pil'ces of Victorian literature and polemical articles to illustrate the
"nlliollwhich existed between England's schizophrenic existence as the
ittlll'kshop of the world' and a 'green and pleasant land'. The English
11 became the principal metaphorical antidote to the horrors of the
rk IUltanic milL
II was this hegemonic diffusion of gentlemanly values in the Victor-
"Ill.! that led to the development of Britain's 'exceptional' form of
nlism, An emphasis on maintaining a gentlemanly lifestyle with an
from the service and financial sectors led to the growth of a
Iy anti-industrial ethos: 'Tn an order domina
production was held in low repute. Working UlreClIV
l
52
53
,
Postwar British Political Development
as opposed to making it from a distance, was associated with depend-
ence and cultural inferiority' (Cain and Hopkins 1993a: 23). The cul-
tural significance of the finance and service sectors was that they
provided the aristocracy with an alternative means of generating
income which was still deemed acceptable to the leisurely lifestyle of
the gentleman. As income from these sectors was largely invisible and
indirect, a discreet distance could be maintained from the demeaning
business of working for a living. Characterized by a lofty disdain for
vulgar materialism and a distrust of scientific progress, this anti-business
ethos was antithetical to the development of a dynamic, entrepreneurial
capitalist economy.
British industrialists, grown fat on their profits from the first indus-
trial revolution, became dazzled by the grandeur of such a 'gentle.,
manly' lifestyle. Not wishing to have their hands dirtied by the
of the bleak industrial cities, they invested their profits in the
discreet financial sector, seeking to attain the leisurely lifestyle of
country gent by living off the dividends and interests of their finanl.;ltW
dealings.
The maintenance of an imperial role was crucial in this r",",npI'j\
Britain's imperial amibitions were primarily about securing
outlets for financial investment and high rates of return for
gentlemen: 'The purpose of Empire was as much the generation
invisible, gentlemanly sources of income as international
ment' (Cain and Hopkins 1993a: 115). The industrial bourgeoisie
content to accept the traditional ruling class's hegemonic position
return for the state's continued commitment to an imperial role.
sequently, Anderson argues, 'The late Victorian era and the high
of imperialism welded aristocracy and bourgeoisie together in a
social bloc' (1992: 29; see also Desai 1994: 34). Similarly, Weiner
tends that the late Victorian era saw the resumption of
history's normal pattern of ready absorption of new into old
(1981: 12).
The reproduction of aristocratic hegemony
The principal hegemonic apparatus which the ruling class employed
disseminate this essentially feudal culture among the industrial
geoisie was an elite education system. Unable to acquire the
acres and rural background, the growth of the 'public' school
provided the urban bourgeoisie with the opportunity to imbue
sons with 'gentlemanly' values. The basis of a sound and moral
tion was deemed to be theology and the Greek and Roman
IIritain '.\' ":('(JI/(}mit' Dedine
while vocational subjects, including the sciences, were eschewed as
heing too closely associated with industry: 'science was linked in the
pllhlic mind with industry, and this damaged its respectability in upper
dllss cyes. Industry meant an uncomfortable closeness to working with
IHle's hands, not to mention an all-too-direct earning of money'
(Weincr 1981: 18). As a result, a rigid demarcation was drawn between
n lIIorally virtuous and elitist education and an inferior vocational edu-
I'lIlion: 'The public school and Oxbridge ... taught the future governing
i'llit' and intelligentsia to despise "trade" as beneath a gentleman'
(Barnctt, C. 1996: 15; see also Anderson 1987: 41; Overbeek 1990: 44;
1'11111 and Hopkins 1993a: 31).
J'lIis bias against industry was continued within the university
.ysklll: 'Victorian Oxbridge, too, followed the example of the public
.1'111101, believing with John Ruskin that the purpose of a university was
III plOvide a liberal education, and the purpose of a liberal education ...
WIIS 10 train young men to "the perfect exercise and knightly continence
IIf I ill'i r bodies and souls" , (Barnett, C. 1986: 14). In emphasizing such
Yullil'S the elite education system performed a crucial role in ensuring
till' continuing hegemony of an archaic ruling class, enabling it to
.rh only the most talented individuals from subordinate stratums
(NIIIIII 1976: 12).
An obstructive proletariat
UOlh nco-liberal and neo-Marxist variants of the cultural thesis also
hhllllt' narrowly corporatist and obstructive trade unions for Britain's
'l'IlI1omic decline. An essentially conservative trade-union movement,
In ",'cking to defend its members' interests, has historically opposed the
"'llIll'rnization and development of British industry: 'British trade
UnlOlls from their birth saw their principal role as the defence of exist-
Inlll'141fti'l and existing industrial technology against replacement by new
RIiH'hinery and new methods' (Barnett, C. 1996: 16). From the outset,
'hv I radc unions have been dominated by a relatively affluent group of
OWnl workers whose priority has been to improve their terms and con-
,IIIIIIIS while defending existing manning levels (Anderson 1987: 49).
Wilhin much of the neo-liberal and Marxist literature it is argued
Ihlll Ihe trade unions have been decidedly successful in realizing their
"!TOW cconomistic aims;6 for example, as Glyn and Harrison argue,
'1'lw t JK working class's strong organization at factory level thwarted
"lillY of capital's attempts to increase productivity. New techniques,
MVlllving a sharp increase in the technical composition of capital, were
1tt01l effectively vetoed by unions which did not want to lose jobs'
l
54 55
Postwar British Political Development
IJriwiu's I';col/omic Oecline
(1980: 50; see also Kilpatrick and Lawson 1980; Hall, P. A. 1986a: 44),
hoth (he industrial bourgeoisie and the proletariat fail to develop their
Similarly, Barnett derides the trade unions' power 'to hold down pro-
political consciousness beyond a narrow corporate-economism. Con-
ductivity, to insist on over manning and to obstruct technological
.I'qlll'lltly, in failing to struggle at a political and ideological level the hege-
change' (J 996: 355). Fearful of job losses, a relatively powerful skilled
1111 my of the traditional ruling class remained relatively unchallenged.
workforce frequently challenged the introduction of new technology,7
thereby contributing to the UK's economic decline.
Nairn and Anderson argue that the tragedy for the British working
The determinist I voluntarist tension within the
class was that it emerged prior to .the intellectual development of social-
cultural thesis
ist ideology: 'The tragedy of the first proletariat was not that it was
immature; it was rather that it was in a critical sense premature
l
A sl mng tension exists within the cultural thesis between a determinis-
(1992: 23). The early development of industrial capitalism meant that
III' historiography and a short-term voluntarism. Throughout the liter-
the working class emerged as a political force prior to the development
"I lire there is an inherent tension between a structural-determinist
of a coherent socialist ideology. The high point of English working-
hislorical narrative and an instrumentalist-voluntarist account of the
class radicalism, Chartism, predated the emergence of Marxism. As
pl'Il"eived failings of postwar governments. On the one hand, the
such, the English proletariat was denied the political and ideological
IUl"Omplete nature of Britain's bourgeois revolution and the subsequent
leadership of Marxist intellectuals and was forced to rely on bourgeois
I"ilure to modernize the British state meant that economic decline was
intellectuals such as Owen.
(unilable, Yet, once having established the inevitability of economic
Marxist theory became politically influential at a time when the
d('dine, the narrative shifts to the failings of individual governments.
British working class was licking its wounds, following the defeat of
Illstorical inevitability has somehow become political ineptitude.
Chartism. Consequently, the British working class, bruised and lying
Much of the literature is dominated by a historical narrative, which is
low as Marxist revolutionary fervour swept across Europe, simply
owrly structural, and a short-term narrative, which is overly voluntaris-
missed the boat. This lack of revolutionary impetus within the British
III". On the one hand, there is an attempt to construct a historiographi-
Labour movement was further exacerbated by a 'supine bourgeoisie'
1'111 explanation for the apparently relentless downward trajectory of the
whose ideological passivity left the working class with no immediate I,
British economy. In this narrative the main culprits are a hopelessly
class antagonist. Having missed the Marxist revolutionary train, the.
IIrchaic British state and a fossilized ruling class. On the other hand, as
English working class fell victim to the influence of 'stunted bourgeois
Ihe narrative jumps to the postwar period, a succession of governments
ideology' in the form of utilitarianism.
lit'(.' implicated as the principal felons in this sorry tale. In this volun-
Central to Nairn and Anderson's explanation of decline is their
Ilirist account it is the ill-judged policy priorities of successive govern-
belief that the industrial bourgeoisie and the working class failed to
ments which are viewed as the main cause of Britain's continuing
develop more than a corporate consciousness. Gramsci identifies three
postwar demise.
moments of political consciousness which it is necessary to transcend
before achieving a hegemonic position. First, there is an 'economic-
corporate' phase in which the corporate group is aware of its collective
Contradictions within the Barnett thesis
interests but not of its class interests. Second, there is a 'political eco-
nomic' moment in which class interests begin to be expressed but only
There is a considerable tension between Barnett's deterministic histori-
on an economic level. The third moment is the realization of hegemony,
ography and his agency-centred critique of the Churchill coalition and
'in which one becomes aware that one's own corporate interests, in
Ihe Attlee governments. On the one hand, he argues that one hundred
their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of
years of economic decline since the zenith of Victorian entrepreneurial-
the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of
ism was the inevitable consequence of a peculiarly British anti-
other subordinate groups too' (1971: 181).
industrial ethos. Within this narrative, as shown in the previous section,
As such, the revolutionary struggle is not a purely economic one, but a
decline is attributed to the hegemony of a backward-looking feudalistic
'universal' struggle in which political, intellectual and moral objectives
liberal political elite. Accordingly, a self-serving ruling Establishment
become as important as economic aims. Nairn and Anderson argue that
was able to forward its own interests through its cultural hegemony,
56
57
Postwar British Political Developmefll
a pernicious anti-industrial culture to filter down through the
state and education system. However, on shifting to his analysis of
postwar decline, Barnett launches a blistering salvo against those who
dominated the Churchill coalition and the Attlee governments,
although there has been no discernible shift in the hegemonic domina-
tion of the traditional ruling elite. Indeed, Barnett is at pains to empha-
size that the New lerusalemers are but the latest manifestation of a long
line of 'small-"l" liberal intelligentsia' who collectively form the
'enlightened' Establishment (1986: 11).
Although Barnett argues that the same traditional liberal political
elite which is culpable for one hundred years of decline remains the
dominant influence on the Churchill and AttIee governments, he
somehow expects it to perform a volte-face and abandon its own inter-
ests to promote national reconstruction. Given the pathological trajec..'
tory of decline outlined in the historical narrative, it seems implausible
that we would expect the ruling elite suddenly to jettison the very cul-
tural ethos which was the historical basis of its hegemonic position,:.
Barnett fails to develop an adequate explanation of why the
and Attlee governments should have acted any differently than
ous governments when faced with economic realities. He
believes that the wartime leaders missed a historical opportunity
modernize the British economy. However, in seeking to blame the
lerusalemers for prioritizing welfare over industrial
Barnett accords the wartime coalition and Attlee governments a
ical autonomy which he denies previous governments.
Contradictions within the neo-Marxist historiography
Within the Marxist historiography it is arguable that the period
1688 to the 1960s is viewed as a unified conjunctural moment;
example, as Nield argues in a critique of Anderson's 1964 article in
'Anderson operates with a notion of conjuncture
expanded to embrace some three hundred years of historical proce"'"
(1980: 496). This leads to the development of a deterministic analysis
which economic decline is attributed to the historical hegemony of
archaic ruling class.
Fine and Harris argue that Nairn and Anderson's historicist
ology leads to a 'curiously monolithic view of British history"
understates the complexity and dynamism of economic, societal,
and political change (1985: 55-80). Similarly, Barratt Brown criticizes
Nairn / Anderson thesis for analysing historical movements from a
height: 'History is more complex than what appears in the Olympian
/lrlltll" ',\' 1';(,(l1Iol1lic /)ec/ine
tWill great arches' (Il)HH: 24). lie argues that it is a preoccupation with
hklltifying historical continuities which has led authors such as Nairn and
t\ Ilderson to take a synoptic view of the overall picture while ignoring the
IIllderlying detail. Consequently, Nairn and Anderson develop a deter-
IIIl1listic analysis of Britain's economic position in which recent economic
dJllit:ulties, such as unemployment and industrial decline, are explained in
h'IIIlS of the continuing hegemony of a seventeenth-century alliance
Iwlween financiers and the traditional aristocracy.
Yet, on the other hand, we jump effortlessly from 1688 to 1945 and
Ihl' failings of the Attlee government to implement radical institutional
Within this narrative, political actors are deemed to have a
11I11',C degree of autonomy in pursuing policy preferences. Here, eco-
1I!111lie decline is attributed to the catastrophic policy priorities pursued
hv specific governments. However, given the inevitability of decline
11111 lined in the historical narrative, thcre is a failure to develop an ade-
qilate explanation of why postwar governments have the political auto-
tit lilly to address Britain's economic malaise. If the state has remained
unchanged since the seventeenth century and it is the
character of the state which is the major problem, it seems
pointless to address the policy priorities of postwar governments, which
III (' surely irrelevant to the onward march of a historical process set
III stone three hundred years earlier. As Hay argues, 'The tension
111'1 ween a structural-determinist account of British decline ... and an
Illstrumental-voluntarist account of specific political projects and their
hl:-.litutional effects is once again starkly exposed' (1996b: 12). As such,
IIH're is an inherent contradiction between an instrumentalist view of
11i(' slate and a historical determinism.
Ilowever, in rejecting the Nairn / Anderson theses as inherently
,klt'rministic, there is a real danger of throwing out the baby with the
hUlh water. For, it is implied that the schematic approach which is
utilized by Hutton, Nairn and Anderson inevitably leads to a determin-
Ie and teleological analysis. Yet, the principal critique of the Nairn /
t\lIllerson theses is empirical rather than theoretical. E. P. Thompson
hl'l'ates Nairn and Anderson for over-simplifying three hundred years
01 I history, arguing that 'the real history will only disclose itself
nller much hard research' (1978: 66). While this is certainly a truism in
Il'spect of the study of history, it is rather disingenuous within the
l'ontext of Nairn and Anderson's original aim. As Nield argues, Thomp-
lion's critique of Anderson relies: 'on (unequivocally solid) empirical
and the insinuation that "Origins" is illicit as a historical
IIceount' (1980: 493). Cries of empirical paucity can easily stifle
theoretical generalizations within an academic environment which
I'nvours the rigour and parsimony of a scientific approach.
58
59
Postwar British Political Development
Anderson argues that this thesis was not intended to provide the
definitive account of the history of English capitalism. Rather, it was
intended to 'start discussion at the point where it should properly
begin'. In this vein, he accuses Thompson of treating 'a 10,000 word
article as if it were a Cambridge History' (1966: 4). Rather, as Leys
'Theirintentionwas nottowritethehistoryoftheprevious
three hundred years, but to quarry it, using new concepts and asking
different questions, for information which
presentcrisis. Theywantedto"think"thepresentcrisis "historically'"
(1983: 13; see also Nield 1980: 501). While we may take issue with
Anderson's success in achieving this aim, this does
underminethebasisofhisapproach.
In seekingtocover threehundredyears of
erations are bound to dominate over
methodological difficulties in providing an
extended historical period inevitably leads towards
account; what Anderson refers to as the methodological necessity
compression'.However,theaimis nevertoprovideadefinitive account,;:
ofthe historical period which is examined. While it does notprovide
full explanationofhistoricaleventsit canbeusedas theframeworkfor
more empirical work: 'the real justification ofthe theory is thatit
yieldedconceptsthatcanbecashedempirically'(Anderson1966:39).
Therealfailure ofthe Nairn,Anderson and Hutton approachis
their methodology, but their failure to
theoretical concepts which could inform our
particular, the Nairn/Anderson thesis is idealistic and, as such, placeS:
almostexclusiveemphasisuponthesuperstructure. Forexample,
and Andersonwork with a deterministic notion ofhegemony which
clearlycontrarytoits Gramscianorigins. Withintheirthesis,econmnitl"
decline is primarily attributed to the hegemony of an archaic
class. However, thereis a failure toexplaintheprocesses and
ismsthrouQ.h whichthathegemonyis reproduced.AsJohnsonargues:
the Anderson/Nairn view is very undialectical. Stuck in its corporate
theworkingclassseemsincapableofanykindofchallenge.Secure
he:f!;elnony, the dominant class is spared the trouble ofcontinually
its armoury, accommodating new
hegellloiny from a selection of the materials offered bv real relations.
(1976:
As such, hegemonic domination is viewed
unchanging. Incontrast,we needtodevelopamuchmoredynamic
Gramscian conception of hegemony which
struggle,notonlybetweendifferentsocialclasses, butalsobetween
would help explain the
not necessarily
empirical detaiL Clearly,
informed analysis
a more
develop sufficiently
empirical analysis.
elements, constructing
as being static
allows for a contin-
tI
1Ill'1I! alwaysonahigherlevel' (ibid.).
ulhn' in a
it surelyseems futile to
Il'sponsibleforBritain'sdecline.
t\ nderson ignore
IIIIt have a
I,rosper without one
Clpmentofproductivecapital.
Urilllin',\' Hl'OIwmic Decline
dillcrent fractions of the ruling bloc. Again as Johnson argues, 'one
would wanttoinsist onapatternofchallengeandresponse,actionand
II' action,problemand"solution",threatandcontainment,butcontain-
III their haste to demonstrate the dominance of a moribund eco-
1IIll1lic class within the British state, Nairn and Anderson unwittingly
1I'lIloVeclassconflictfromtheirhistoricalanalysis.Thehistoricalfailure
ofthe industrialbourgeoisietobecomehegemonicandtheconcomitant
pilli!ical weaknessoftheworkingclasssupposedlybluntedclassconflict
Within Britain. NairnandAnderson'semphasis onthe weaknessofthe
'Iwogreathostilecamps'impliesthattheywerenot'directlyfacingeach
continual struggle. In contrast to orthodox Marxism, in
whil'll, 'thehistoryofall hithertosocietyis thehistoryofclassstruggle',
Nnim andAndersonconstructastatichistoricalsnapshotofuntroubled
III islocratichegemony.Historyisnolongeraseriesofclassconflicts.
('!early, theprincipalaimofanalysingthelongue duree is toidentify
!lllIIdural continuities. However, in developing a totalizing view of
thereis a dangerinconstructinga teleologicalanalysisin which
Ihne is little room for human agency. In suggesting that politics is of
importancetotheunrelentingpathologiesofapoliticalprocessset
NairnandAndersonnegatetheusefulnessofempiri-
ifpolitical actorshavehada negligible impacton
theirrole empirically. Para-
it also absolves those very governments which they hold
The contested nature of the English ruling class
Wilhin structuralistaccountsofdeclineitis also arguedthatNairnand
the extent to which the state has
rurwardedtheinterestsofindustrialcapital.Variously, it is arguedthat
the aristocracy survived as a capitalist class, that the industrial middle
dllss achievedahegemonicpositionwithin thestate,orthatBritaindid
second revolution because the bourgeoisie was able to
(Mooers 1991). In reality, the state has always
1Il'll'd in theinterests ofindustrial capital: 'Thefact is thatlaissez-faire
Il1lplicd apowerfulstateframeworkwithinwhich capitalcould operate
rlwly' (Barratt Brown 1988: 35). Further, while Nairn and Anderson
that Britain's imperial role was uniquely favourable to financial
nnd commercialcapital,hereitis arguedthatitalsofavouredthedevel-
Thompsoncontends that Nairn and Anderson misinterpret the fun-
tlulncntal natureofthe rulingclass (1978: 53). Althoughcertain
61 ,
60
Postwar British Political Development
.,5
elements of the aristocracy retained some political influence, this
due to their metamorphosis into a capitalist class.
Thompson argues, the industrial bourgeoisie gradually became
dominant political class during the Victorian epoch. Similarly, NichuUI'
holds that 'Anderson seems to have forgotten the quintessential
about the English aristocracy ... namely, its remarkable wealth,
prise and longevity as a capitalist class. It is precisely this point
makes a second revolution unnecessary' (quoted in Mooers 1991:
Whereas Nairn and Anderson emphasize the gentrification of the
geoisie, Thompson argues that the aristocracy survived as a
stratum within a formidable new ruling bloc, formed by the
middle classes. This point is emphasized by Walter Bagehot's
English Constitution (1867): a 'locus classicus which Anderson
Nairn appear to have overlooked' (1978: 53). Bagehot divides tht
British constitution into its 'dignified parts', including the monarchy
aristocratic institutions which are essentially ceremonial, and its
cient parts', principal1y the House of Commons where
business is largely conducted. Thompson argues that Bagehot wa.
clearly convinced that the latter was 'under the "despotic" control
the middle-classes' (ibid.).
In similar vein, Mooers argues that Britain failed to have a second
modernizing revolution precisely because the bourgeoisie was able to
prosper without recourse to such a struggle. Whereas Nairn and Ander-
son argue that an archaic state proved deleterious to the development
of the British economy, Mooers claims that the state performed a
central role in facilitating the development of British capitalism. The
state was not backwards; instead, 'In all its major respects - Parliament
and the civil service, taxation, property and criminal law, foreign policy
and war the British state in the eighteenth century was uniquely
suited to the requirements of capitalism' (1991: 171). However,
although the state performed a crucial role in terms of legitimizing
property rights of nascent capitalists, it had no direct role in the running
of the economy,
The negative impact ofearly industrialization
There are also a number of authors who explain the development of the
British economy in terms of its initial development (Jessop 1980;
Zysman 1983; Ingham 1984; Hall, P. A. 1986a, 1995; Marquand 1988;
Radice 1995; Cain and Hopkins 1993a, 1993b; Hutton 1995). The basis
of this argument is that the huge economic advantages which early
British companies enjoyed as a consequence of bein8 the firsl nation to
Britain's Economic Decline
IlidustriaJize meant that they were able to fund their own expansion and
dl'vclopment through retained profits. Consequently, there was no need
lu develop the institutional links between finance and industry which
al'!..' seen as the foundation of economic success in countries such as
lapan, Germany and France.
s
Further, the majority of early industrial firms were relatively small,
lamily-owned enterprises which were largely self-financing (Hutton
11)1)5: 118). Any coherence within industry tended to occur at a regional
III local level. Significantly, there was no need for the national industrial
hanks such as those that developed on the Continent. As investment
was largely met from retained profits, companies tended to borrow only
amounts from the banks and on a short-term basis. Consequently,
'!he banks generally saw no need to take an equity share in firms or
play an active role in their management' (Hall 1986a: 38).
'rhe development of an arms-length relationship between industry
ultd finance and a limited role for government was initially compatible
wilh the interests of British capital generally. As the first country to
IIlIlustrialize, Britain enjoyed a huge advantage in the initial staple manu-
Iad uring products. The early success of British manufacturers
I'llll11pted them to plough most of their resources back into the areas
where they had a market advantage. As a result, there was little interest
III diversifying into developing markets which were much more science-
such as the chemical industry (Marquand 1988: 118).
The early advantage of British manufacturers was strengthened by
I Ill' country's military dominance. UK companies had privileged access
tn a number of overseas markets as a consequence of British imperial-
ISIIl. In contrast to the Nairn/ Anderson theses, Barratt Brown argues
thai this imperial role furthered the interests of productive capital as
IIl1l1:h as financial capital: 'The Empire was an economic business,
Illvolving production as much as commerce' (1988: 37). The Empire
offered privileged access for many British manufacturers to invest in
production (ibid.:
Additionally, industrialists also had the option of investing their
profits in the rapidly expanding financial and commercial sectors. By
illVl'sting in these areas, additional profits could be realized with far
""wer risks and much more quickly than through risky and long-term
Illvestments in industry. The concentration of investment in commercial
IIml financial activity was not the consequence of a markedly anti-
Industrial culture but was the inevitable consequence of profit-
mllximizing capitalists. This has led a number of authors to argue that
Itritain has never been a primarily manufacturing and industrial
(Ingham 1984: Leys 19X6; Anderson 1987; Rubinstein 1990,
1
1
)94). Rubinstein', claim I. Indicative of this position. He argues that
62
Postwar British Political Development
Britain, 'was always, even at the height of the industrial
essentially a commercial, financial and service-based economy
comparative advantage always lay with commerce and
(1994: 40),
In contrast to the cultural thesis which seeks to explain the
economy in terms of an anarchic state and cultural
Ingham views Britain's role as being integral to the international
talist system, This is a position which is also supported by Leys,
argues that global capitalism requires a centralized financial
which can settle international accounts through a trusted world
rency. As such, the distinctive nature of the British economy can
explained in terms of its role as a global finance centre (Leys 1986: 11
Global capitalism needs an international currency and a state
ted to defending the value of that currency: 'the political requirement
a world currency is above all that the issuing state can be relied not
subordinate the interests of foreign users of that currency to
national needs' (Ingham 1984: 114). Ingham suggests that the esseuU<lu)'
commercial character of British capitalism meant that it was uniquely
placed to perform this role.
Despite pointing to a Hegelian fallacy in Nairn and Anderson
work, Ingham remains broadly supportive of their theses and has
explicitly acknowledged the particular influence of Anderson on his
own work (1984: 225). In turn, both Nairn and Anderson have accepted
Ingham's overall argument. As such, they now provide a more material-
istic explanation of ruling-class hegemony than in their earlier
for example, Anderson now attributes the peculiar development
British capitalism to:
The sum of perfectly rational choices for particular capital to persist in
traditional sectors in which investment had already been sunk, to move
into those overseas markets where competition was least, to avoid re-
organisation of labour processes at home, or simply to shift from profit-
making altogether into rent or interest all together determined a
creeping loss of competitive capacity for British capitalism as a whole,
confronted with Germany or the USA. (1987: 72; see also Rubinstein
1994: 40; Hobsbawm 1969: 187-92)
Therefore, in his later work Anderson attributes Britain's decline,
not to the bewitching allure of a leisurely lifestyle, but the consequence
of 'perfectly rational choices for particular capitals'.
Britain's Economic Decline 63
Conclusion
1\ dominant theme within the literature on Britain's relative economic
decline is an alleged political failure to modernize the state in order to
meet the demands of a highly competitive and increasingly globalized
capitalist economic system. From all sides of the political spectrum,
political scientists, economists and historians have rued the failure to
lTeate new institutions with the power and autonomy to reverse the
spiral of decline. From neo-Marxists such as Nairn and Anderson,
through centre-left critics such as Marquand and Hutton to right-wing
authors such as Correlli Barnett, the lament is strangely cognate. While
Britain's close competitors, such as France, Japan and Germany,
henefited from highly active state / economy relations. Britain remained
\'Ilcumbered with an anachronistic state unable to lead industrial
development. In key areas such as investment, rationalization, training
IlilU research and development Britain lagged well behind its European
ighbours. However, within these accounts there is a strong residue
Ill' determinism. In particular, there is a failure to explain why the
Ilumerous political attempts at developing the institutional capacity
which they call for were so unsuccessful.
Too often, in wandering through the mists of time, the discerning
historiographer loses sight of politics. In particular, in providing a
p,l'neralized historical overview there is a tendency to develop a
llciwmatic model which emphasizes structural continuities and leads
inl:vitably towards a teleological analysis in which the absence of polit-
Ical actors is telling. The teleological nature of their historical analysis
Illeans that it is of little heuristic utility in explaining the role of agency
III postwar British politics.
Clearly, I reject any suggestion that Britain's relative economic
was inevitable. Comparatively slow levels of economic growth
In the postwar period cannot be explained solely by the absence of a
Illodernizing bourgeois revolution or by the initial character of British
Industrialization. While these factors may have indeed been highly
Inl1l1ential on the particular development of British capitalism, they do
lIot provide an adequate explanation of why successive postwar govern-
IlIenls have failed to create a more developmental state. In particular,
is a failure to recognize the increasing support for a more inter-
ventionist state, not only within the Labour Party but also within some
Mcctions of the Conservative Party and British industry (see chapter 7).
Arguably, as the extent of Britain's relative decline became more and
more apparent a conjunctural moment emerged during the early 1960s
In which there was the pussibility of a structural shift in the balance of
..
l
64
65
COI/lillllily (//11/ /)iscOfttinuily
Postwar British Political Deve[oprnent
who argues that 'both thl: Lahour Party and the Board of Trade had
class forces within the state. Indeed, in Ingham's view, 'The lSlgIllll\;i;\U\iII
developed highly credible industrial strategies which had become homo-
of 1964 cannot be overestimated: for the first time in British history,
I'."nous by 1944' (1991: 30; see also Tiratsoo and Tomlinson 1993). Although I
progressive forces of industrial capital were in accord with a
"l'l'ept the argument that industry has traditionally opposed greater state
party in power' (1984: 208). This suggests that from time to time
11l1l:rvention, I also question the extent of the Labour Party leadership's
possibilities do open up for radical governments to exploit.
mmmitment to large-scale intervention (see chapter 7).
Ultimately, what is missing from most accounts of Britain's econorm " I'()I' a critique of this position, see Fine and Harris 1985: 29-37. They argue
decline is any analysis of the political. While an historical analysis Ihat the British trade-union movement has been historically weak. This is
useful in identifying the nature of the structured environment in illustrated by the relatively poor wages which British workers enjoy in com-
to other European workers. Richardson also argues: 'the limited hard
political conflict occurs, we also have to account for the manner
['vidence that was and is available, as opposed to anecdotes and newspaper
which political actors evaluate the possibility for change and devise
headlines, gives surprisingly slender support to the view that trade unions or
strategy for achieving their party's goals and aims within
Illdustrial relations arrangements were themselves major contributors to our
structural constraints. However, this is not to suggest that we
....:onomic difficulties' (1991: 416).
the political in explaining change. Rather, we need to contextualize
! III contrast to Barnett, Tiratsoo and Tomlinson (1993) argue that the trade
political response to Britain's economic malaise within the ideologl\;a.:.I
uilions were fully committed to improving industrial productivity in the
economic and political constraints which postwar governments faced.
period. For example, they emphasize the 1946 document produced
hy the General Council of the TUC, 'Production Under Full Employment',
which accepted the need to increase productivity. Additionally, the TUC was
behind the attempts of the various initiatives of the Attlee government
Notes
,,, improve productivity levels and furiously lobbied its member unions to do
1 In particular, see Anderson 1964 and 1996 and Nairn 1964. For an likewise.
hll' example, Japan, France and Germany all have long-term development
Marxist critique of the Nairn I Anderson theses, see Thompson 1965.
hanks aimed at securing the long-term finance required for sustained invest-
7 The impaet of the cultural thesis on the Thatcherite agenda can be
111\.:nt: Japan has its Industrial Bank of Japan; Germany its Kreditanstadt fijr
Sir Keith Joseph's 1985 Green Paper on Education. In it, he warned
Wiederaufbau (KfW); France its Credit National. They are all given tax privi-
universities needed 'to be concerned with attitudes to the world
leges in order to encourage long-term investment. Additionally, each nation
higher education, and in particular to industry and commerce, and to
has a close network of industrial banks such as the banques d'affaires in
aware of anti-business snobbery. The entrepreneurial is essential for
I ;rance, which have developed a close involvement with many domestic com-
maintenance and improvement of employment' (quoted in Rubinstein
panies and take an active interest in their performance (Zysman 1983; see
3). Mrs Thatcher's frequent reference to her status as a science graduate
comes to mind here.
nlso Hutton 1995: 132--{)8).
Weiner's work in particular gained a great deal of pUblicity. Published in
at the height of a crippling recession it was widely reviewed within the main-
stream media and formed the basis for two Granada TV World in Action pro-
grammes (Baxendale 1986: 171). Arguably, this helped to legitimize the
Thatcherite assault on the whole fabric of British society.
4 The 1979 election was the first to be fought primarily around the question of
Britain's economic decline (Weiner 1981: 162).
There are a number of authors who argue that the Attlee government was
committed to developing a much more interventionist industrial policy. The
work of Helen Mercer (1991) is especially instructive in this area. In contrast
to Barnett, who argues that the Attlee government's preoccupation with
building the New Jerusalem meant that it ignored the needs of industry, she
argues that it developed a number of institutional initiatives aimed at improv-
ing industrial performance. However, it was thwarted in its attempts at
greater state intervention by peak industrial organizations such as the Feder- "
ation of British Industries (FBI). This position is also supported hy Johnman