Philosophical Review

Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. by Alan Sidelle Review by: Stephen Yablo The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 878-881 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185945 . Accessed: 16/12/2013 23:27
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BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review,Vol. 101, No. 4 (October 1992) NECESSITY, ESSENCE, AND INDIVIDUATION: A DEFENSE OF CONVENTIONALISM. By ALAN SIDELLE. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1989. Pp. xv, 216. Near the middle of his book Meaningand Modality, Casimir Lewy takes up the theorythat"necessarypropositions. . . 'owe theirtruthto' linguistic conventions."' All that conventionscan do, he protests,is help to determine what a sentence says,or what propositionit expresses; whetherthe propositionholds true is thenanotherquestion,to whichrules of usage are quite irrelevant. Such a view does not rule out conventionaltruthentirely, since our fiatmighttake the form: sentenceS shall express a proposition that is (among other things) true.Far though from showing how p, the propositionexpressed, could be conventionally true,thisapproach willbe circular unless p has its truthvalue independently of the convention.With doubtful historicalaccuracy I will call this the Lewy point.2 Much of Alan Sidelle's ingenious projectseems to me to underestimate the Lewy pointand the thinking behind it. For whileSidelle'sposition is that "all necessity is grounded in our conventions, thatthereis no necessity 'out there'" (xi), in his arguments this becomes blurred with,first, semantical claims about the grounds of modal sentences'truth,and later,epistemological claims about the sources of modal knowledge. Examples of the firstblurringoccur in chapter 1, "Realism and Conventionalism."Accordingto conventionalism, "if wateris essentially H20, thisis going to have somethingto do withour intentions in using 'water'" (14). Unlike the realist,then, for whom "someone who thinksthat Twin Earth XYZ is waterisjust wrong" (16), the conventionalist maintainsthat
he "is not just wrong; he is . .. using 'water' differentlythan . .. the rest of

us" (17). But, how could it mitigatethe wrongnessof thinkingthatXYZwateris possible for'XYZ-wateris possible',in the mouthof one who does not mean waterby 'water',to express a truth?(By thisreasoning,it is not 'just wrong" eitherto regard snow as inflammable, for 'inflammable'can mean notflammableand 'snow' can referto cocaine.) Before consideringexamples of the second blurring, let me tryto locate Sidelle's conventionalismwith respect to the traditionalversion. Where Carnap and others equated the truthof LRSwiththe analyticity of S, for

Truth Necessary (New Haven: Yale University Press,1958). 878

n.s. 40 (1940), and A. Pap, Semantics tions,"Proceedings oftheAristotelian Society, and

'Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1976,53. 2Forrelated ideas see A. C. Ewing, "The Linguistic ofA Priori Theory Proposi-

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BOOK REVIEWS modality-involving, Sidelle thereneed onlybe an analytictruth Q,typically LS.3 So, using nonmodaltruth that,togetherwithsome synthetic R, entails

to similartreatment, necessitiessubmitting entail Ea = b. Other synthetic the metaphysical"must" remains in some sense semantical. line In whatsense, though?At timesSidelle seems to echo the traditional adding only thatsome sentences' is a formof analyticity, thatall necessity but that of related sentences. analyticity necessityis a matternot of their But while this would be a tidyresult,I wonder whetherhis theoryreally thateach true CLSis provablefromsome analytic deliversit. Even granting in the Q plus nonmodal auxiliarypremises,thishardlyputs Q's analyticity for the factthat it is analyticplays no role in the role of necessity-maker, proof. More likely Sidelle is advancing a slightlylooser claim. Whether the modal "must"derives its forcefromthe analyticone or not, still,when we nonmodal truths claims followfromsynthetic thatall true necessity reflect we see that the first"must" expresses nothing plus analytic trivialities, principle' that identicals deep" (9-10). Thus, the a priori "metaphysically are necessarilyidenticalis is notonly identical to Phosphous to conclude ... thatHesperus what allows tellus nothing ofthe so .... Butsuchprinciples itis necessarily rus,butthat or emThe conclusion, shouldbe thatthefactual, world. then, independent identical to Phosphorus' and kincontent of 'Hesperusis necessarily pirical, to Phosphorus'. thatof 'Hesperusis identical is nothing dred truths beyond
(93)

a for Hesperus and b for Phosphorus, a = b -- Wa = b combines with a = b to

Here Sidelle reasons that since (A) modal truthsare deducible fromnonmodal truthsplus a prioriprinciples,(B) modal truthshave no "factual content"beyond that of correspondingnonmodal ones. Holding the argumenttogetheris his assumptionthat"the objectsof [a prior] knowledge are not factsabout the world" (1), thattheyare "devoid of factualcontent." being an epistemologicalnotion,and "factualcontent" Now, "a priority" A thisassumptionis bound to be controversial. coming frommetaphysics, contingencieslike 'I exist' and 'thisstickis one meterlong' certainly priori and so, perhaps, do certaina priorinecessities,like 'wr is seemfact-stating, to itsdiameter',and 'everyanimal shall the ratioof a circle'scircumference remain one until its death'. Applyingthisto the case at hand, whatpreventssomeone fromconstrusubstantive and so ing Sidelle's a priorimodal principlesas metaphysically willrequire several truths and R-like 3In somecasestheargument Q-like analytic ones. synthetic to a priority; Sidellelayslittle on the fromanalyticity weight 4Notethe switch to follow himin this. and I willtry distinction 879

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BOOK REVIEWS capable of boosting the factual content of his nonmodal auxiliary premises? Such a person mightaccept (somethinglike) Sidelle's epistemological thesis(A) whiledissentingfrom(B), itssupposed metaphysical upshot. True, she would say, determinate itis no longer oncewehaveachieved reference, an openquestion are-forwemust what themodalproperties of[the] thing settle uponthem, by in orderto achieve suchreference our choiceof referential intentions, (109), stillit was only because the thing antecedentlyhad those propertiesthat our referential intentionfound its mark. As for Sidelle's claim that wecomeaboutmodalknowledge themodalintuitions are reflections whereby what itis that weare talking. . . about, ofhowwe havedetermined and notof thething pickedout ( 11), she would perceive in it a false dichotomy: if we intend to talk about and the intention somethingof the kind statue, succeeds, then whatwe are talkingabout is a statue,withall the modal propertiesthat entails. This, thatit indeed, is how we know thatold Goliath thereis a statueessentially, could not have originatedfromwhollydifferent matter,and so forth.5 Even if Sidelle's epistemologicalthesis (A) is accepted, then, its metaWhat is worse,the failureof this physicalcounterpart(B) does not follow.6 "direct" argument for (B) tends to undercut Sidelle's preferred argument for the metaphysicalthesis, namely that nothing else can explain our For on the face of it,the realistwho modal truths. knowledgeof a posteriori embracesjust (A) would seem to have about the same resources as Sidelle to account for this knowledge. on Lewy'sidea thatwhile sentencesmight Throughout I've been relying conventionallyexpress true propositions,the latterwill have their truth This was unfairbecause Sidelle thinksconvenvalues nonconventionally. tionscan make propositionstrue,by "making"the truth-conferring objects and kinds:

we know meets 5Forinstance, a priori that thecategorical conditions (i) ifGoliath is essentially forstatuehood, and that(ii)every statue a statue. Add to itis a statue, theconditions, this thea posteriori that meets and itsessential knowledge (iii)Goliath statuehood follows. isanticipated inNaming andNecessity: theepistemological thesis "Allof 6Tellingly, the cases of the necessary a posteriori advocated in the texthave the [following] ... : Philosophical tells us that cannot character be contingently special analysis they isautomatically so anyempirical oftheir truth true, knowledge empirical knowledge of necessary truths" these intended posteriori knowledge (159). I doubtthatKripke as a prolegomenon to conventionalism. remarks 880
of a that theyare necessary. . . [This] maygive a clue to a general characterization

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BOOK REVIEWS If whatitis to be an individual ofa certain sort is to havecertain features ... . .. then[there essentially is] reasonto think thatifthereare anysuchindimust... notbe 'fully viduals, they butshouldariseoutof our independent', individuative practice (57). How can our conventions do morethanmakesomesentence necessary? ... [A]ccording to theconventionalist, our conventions also articulate theworld.
(76-77)

But then conventionalism is a far more radical doctrinethan initially appeared. To any ordinaryway of thinking, 'just as ... we have nothingto do withthe factthatKareem Abdul-Jabbar is tallerthan WillyShoemaker, so we have nothingto do withthe factthatwater is necessarilyH20" (6). Althoughone would have expected the conventionalist to correctcommon sense on the second point only, by the end of the day, both claims have been rejected.8This leaves me wonderingwhatmakes Sidelle's courageous theorya conventionalism especiallyabout necessity.
STEPHEN YABLO

Ann Arbor University ofMichigan,

7Other passages that itis not justindividuals suggest ourconvenqua modalthat tions create butalso individuals with determinate qua items extent. spatiotemporal

it seems, theonly"objective" 8Ultimately, facts on Sidelle's viewconcern somecalled"stuff," thing "stuff of course, looking, just as theworld looksbutdevoidof modalproperties, and all that identity Fora slogan, conditions, imports. one might stuff is preobjectual" saythat (55). Butevennonmodal have modalpropproperties erties, identity and so on,so itseems we should conditions, digdowndeeperyet, to somesortof prequalitative goop.

(53-56)

The Philosophical Review,Vol. 101, No. 4 (October 1992) MATERIAL BEINGS. By PETER VAN INWAGEN.Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1990. Pp. viii, 299.

PeterVan Inwagen has written a fascinating, denselyargued, and highly originalbook on the metaphysics of materialobjects. The account of materialobjects he develops is based on a radical theoryof parthood,namely thatthere is a materialobject thatobjects 01-O., compose if,and only if, the activity of 01-On constitutes a life.This proposal is motivatedin part by the difficulties faced by standard criteriafor materialobject parthood (e.g., appeals to contactand various sortsof physicalbonding) and in part by its power to dissolve the great philosophical problems concerningthe identity of materialobjectsand theirendurance throughchange. Included 881

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