PHL 232 tutorial notes TA: Daniel Walsh Email: danielwalshphilosophy@gmail.com Website: http://danielwalshphilosophy.blogspot.

ca Some tips: Print off the notes (from the above website) and bring them to class. Record the sessions (on your laptop or device) and take notes later. If you do these things you can focus on the discussion instead of madly taking notes. This course deals with difficult questions. Itll be no walk in the park but Ill try to make the material accessible for you. Attend the lectures, do at least the readings and ask questions in tutorial. I may not always have the answers at the ready but when I dont Ill get them for you. This is your time. You or someone who loves you is paying for this. Take advantage of this opportunity. Wednesday, January 15th, 2013 Week 1 of Metaphysics: Universals The problem of universals (the one over the many) Particulars have qualities or properties. o Redness is a property o An apple is a particular o A red apple is a particular that has the property of redness The problem: Sometimes numerically distinct particulars agree with respect to properties. Many apples are red. Thus there is one property that many things have (one over many). What does property agreement consist in? I chart out some answers:

Realism (One-over-many)

Moderate nominalism

Extreme nominalism

Account of properties

The realist says that there is one attribute of redness (a universal) that is exemplified by distinct particulars.

The moderate nominalist says that each apple has its own redness.

The extreme nominalist says that there is no redness of the apples. To be red is just to fall under a category.

Account of the agreement

The apples agree with respect to redness because exemplify that universal.

They agree with respect to redness because their rednesses are similar.

They agree with respect to redness in virtue of falling under that category.

Illustration Redness

Apple 1 Apple 2 Apple 3

Redness of apple 1 Redness of apple 2 Redness of apple 3

(There is nothing to which the redness of the apple(s) refers. There are just red apples.)

(Some) variations on

Ante res realism (Plato): What makes an object red is that it participates in a universal that exists independently of it and which other red things participate in.

Trope theory: What makes an object red is that is has its own redness (a particularized universal).

What it is for an apple to be red is nothing other than for it to be the case that Predicate nominalism: is red can truly be said of the apple. Concept nominalism: The apple falls under the concept of red. Class nominalism: The apple falls under the class of things that are red. Ostrich nominalism: There is nothing in virtue of which this is true. It just is. This last is the most extreme!

Resemblance nominalism: What In rebus realism makes an object red is (Aristotle): What that it resembles makes an object red is other red things. that it has wholly Prof. Huber mentions present in it a resemblance universal which all nominalism. Note: If other red things have the resemblance wholly present to consists in the having them that does not of redness then itll be exist independently of a realist theory. If it those objects. consists in the having of rednesses then perhaps itll reduce to trope theory. If on the other hand it consists solely in falling under the same concept or

class (etc.) then itll be a form of extreme nominalism.

Motivations for

One-over-many universalism is needed to account for sameness-indifference. The apples are red. Red refers. To what does it refer?

Universalism of some kind is needed to account for sameness-indifference. One-over-many universalism is weird. One-over-many universalism is unnecessary to account for sameness-indifference. (Ockhams Razor)

The positing of universals at all is unnecessary to account for sameness-indifference. (Ockhams Razor (again))

Some objections to

The third man is argument against ante res realism. Does it succeed? Does it succeed against in rebus realism? Nominalist objection: One-over-many universalism is weird. Nominalist objection: One-over-many universalism is unnecessary to account for sameness-indifference. (Ockhams Razor)

Realist objection: We would need universals to account for the sameness-indifferent tropes. Extreme nominalist objection: The positing of universals is unnecessary to account for sameness-indifference. (Ockhams Razor (again))

Do these theories really solve the problem or do they ignore it? What accounts, say for an apples falling under the concept of red? What of the resemblance regress? Think resemblancereism.