IMELDA MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6, 1998 IMELDA R. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No.

126995, October 6, 1998 Purisima, J. Facts: 1. On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25 years; 2. On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez; 3. After petitioners husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan; 4. After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them; 5. Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario; 6. On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario; 7. On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019; 8. On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS; 9. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural, was violated:

a. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation; and b. the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The said meeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations. Held: The petitioner is hereby acquitted. 1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement is indeed very low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES.. As such, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt. 2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witness for the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73. Said number of questions could no longer be described as clarificatory questions. Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. There is therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court. (NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. CJ Narvasa, Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice Vitug was the only Justice who voted for the return of the case to the Sandiganbayan to allow the corrections of the perceived irregularities in the proceedings below.) c. d. DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999 MATUGUINA VS. CA, 263 SCRA 490

e. f.

PEOPLE VS. CA, 262 SCRA 452 JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY G.R. No. L-68288, July 11, 1986 FACTS: Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred from enrolment. The school claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they have been involved in activities that have disrupted classes and had conducted mass actions without the required permits. HELD: a. It is apparent that despite the accusations of alleged violations hurled by the school against the petitioners, the fact is that it had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing. b. Under the Education Act of 1982, students have the right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, EXCEPT in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations. The petitioner were denied of this right, and were being disciplined without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in *** (the) Manuel and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted. It has already been held in Berina vs. Philippine Maritime Institute, 117 SCRA 581, that it is illegal of a school to impose sanctions on students without conducting due investigation. c. Of course, all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its rules. In fact the maintenance of good school discipline is a duty specifically enjoined on every private school. The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that: * * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified. d. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students:

a. need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in court of justice; b. the proceedings may be summary; c. cross-examination is not an essential part thereof. But the S.C. said that the following minimum standards must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process: 1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; 2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel; 3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them; 4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; 5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. a. BERINA VS. PMI, September 30, 1982

Due process in the dismissal of employees Requisites of Due Process before the NLRC 1. 2. a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Notice; and Hearing MGG Marine Services vs. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664 Philippine Savings Bank vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 409 RAYCOR AIR CONTROL VS. NLRC, 261 SCRA 589 WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES VS. NLRC, 263 SCRA 174 SAMILLANO VS. NLRC, 265 SCRA 788 STOLT-NIELSEN VS. NLRC, 264 SCRA 307 GARCIA VS. NLRC, 264 SCRA 261

4. a. b.

Effect of a Motion for Reconsideration to violation of the right to due process CASUELA VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 276 SCRA 635 CORDENILLO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 276 SCRA 652

5. In administrative proceedings, does due process require that a party be assisted by counsel and be able to cross-examine the witnesses?

David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the borthers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed. ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered at all.

ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioners house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions

the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car

Held:

A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up

the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside

Ang Tibay v CIR 69 PHIL 635 (1940)

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted. Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case

receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.

** Ateneo de Manila University v Capulong 222 SCRA 644 (1993)

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered. Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students. Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University. Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if

desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance. Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation. While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure. Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

Eastern Broadcasting Corp (DYRE) v. Dans (July 19, 1985) Digest

Facts: -This is a petition to compel the respondents Sec. Jose Dans of Transportation and Communication and Cerefino Carreon of NTC to reopen Radio Station DYRE which have been summarily closed on grounds of national security. -The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. Also no action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. -The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition"

arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs. -However, before the court could promulgate a decision, Rene Espina, the president of the station filed a dismissal to the petition because Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment and requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio station. As a result, the case was rendered moot and academic. No Issue as it is already moot and academic. Court however issues some guidelines. 1. All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent, Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out. - this analogy is applied in cases of national security. The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos, Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact

2.

3.

a.

b.

of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance. 4. The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. - The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed.

Mariveles Shipyard V CA G.R. No. 144134; November 11, 2003; 415 SCRA 573
December 8, 2010 RPLex ObliCon case digest, civil law, digest, mariveles v ca, oblicon Leave a comment Facts: Sometime on October 1993, Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to render security services at its premises. Pursuant to their agreement, Longest Force deployed its security guards, the private respondents herein, at the petitioners shipyard in Mariveles, Bataan. According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with Longest Force, promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter. However, it found the services being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force on April 1995. Longest Force, in turn, terminated the employment of the security guards it had deployed at petitioners shipyard. On September 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages pursuant to the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees, against both Longest Force and petitioner, before the Labor Arbiter. The case sought the guards reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority rights. Longest Force admitted that it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the premises of petitioner rendering a 12 hours duty per shift for the said period. It likewise admitted its liability as to the non-payment of the alleged wage differential in the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the liability to petitioner The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that no employer-employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. It further pointed out that it would be the height of injustice to make it liable again for monetary claims which it had already paid. Anent the cross-claim filed by Longest Force against it, petitioner prayed that it be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred that Longest Force had benefited from the contract; it was now estopped from questioning said agreement on the ground that it had made a bad deal. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment that Longest Force and Mariveles Shipping be jointly and severally liable to pay the money claims of the complainants. Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC. The labor tribunal, affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the NLRC. The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed it outright.

Issue: WON Longest Force should be held solely and ultimately liable. Held: Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code which provide as follows: ART. 106. CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of the contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code. In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him. ART. 107. INDIRECT EMPLOYER. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project. ART. 109. SOLIDARY LIABILITY . The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers. In this case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the security agency that hired private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard corporation, petitioner became an indirect employer of private respondents pursuant to Article 107 abovecited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor failed to pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards wages. This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including payment of statutory minimum wage. The security agency is held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. Labor standards are enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs. Labor laws are considered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null. Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to the contract.

Thus, employers cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors or subcontractors) liability for noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage. However, the court emphasizes that the solidary liability of petitioner with that of Longest Force does not preclude the application of the Civil Code provision on the right of reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid. As held in Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC , the joint and several liability imposed on petitioner is without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement by petitioner against the security agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants, the private respondents herein. The security agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that the principals payments to it were inadequate for the guards lawful compensation. As an employer, the security agency is charged with knowledge of labor laws; and the adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any others.

astillo-co v. barbers (1998) preventive suspension

EN BANC G.R. No. 129952 June 16, 1998 GOVERNOR JOSIE CASTILLO-CO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ROBERT BARBERS, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN JESUS GUERRERO, EMILIO GONZALES, III and CONGRESSMAN JUNIE CUA, respondents. RESOLUTION KAPUNAN, J.: Petitioner Governor Josie Castillo-Co of Quirino, through this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to nullify the Order of the Deputy Ombudsman directing her preventive suspension. On 27 June 1997, Quirino Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor. Congressman Cua alleged that in the course of its investigation in aid of legislation, the House of Representative Committee on Good Government chaired by him uncovered irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and the Provincial Engineer. Congressman Cua charged that the equipment purchased was "reconditioned" instead of "brand new" as required by resolutions of the province's Sanggunian authorizing such purchase. Other irregularities claimed to have been committed included overpricing, lack of public bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment prior to delivery in violation of Section 338 of the Local Government Code, and an attempt to cover up such irregularities. Congressman Cua thus accused Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor of violating Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, 1 as amended, and Articles 213 2 and 217 3 of the Revised Penal Code. In an Order 4 dated 4 July 1997, that is, a week after the complaint was filed, Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor were placed under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months. Said order was signed by Emilio A. Gonzales, III, Director, and approved by Jesus Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor thereafter filed separate motions for reconsideration. Both motions were denied in a "Joint Order" 5 dated 1 August 1997 signed by Director Gonzales and approved by Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero. On 12 August 1997, Governor Castillo-Co filed the present petition. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion upon the Deputy Ombudsman for issuing the order of preventive suspension against her. As may be deduced from the petition, the grounds invoked in support thereof are:
(1) The Deputy Ombudsman is not authorized to sign the order of preventive suspension. (2) The issuance of such order was hasty and selective, and deprived petitioner of due process, and (3) The conditions required to sustain petitioner's preventive suspension have not been met and that, at any rate, the duration thereof is excessive.

In a Resolution dated 26 August 1997, 6 this Court resolved, among others, to grant petitioner's prayers for a temporary restraining order. The petition has no merit. I Petitioner claims that under Republic Act No. 7975, 7 only the Ombudsman has the authority to sign the order placing officials with a 27 salary grade or above, like petitioner-governor, under preventive suspension. 8 In this case, the suspension order was neither signed nor approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Rather, said order was signed by Director Emilio Gonzales III and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero. There is nothing in RA 7975, however, that would remotely suggest that only the Ombudsman, and not his Deputy, may sign an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above. On the other hand, Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 9 provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong. and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied).

but not more than six months,

Similarly, Section 9, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman 10 provides:
Sec. 9. Preventive suspension. Pending investigation, the respondent may be preventively suspended without pay for a period of not more than six (6) months, if, in the judgment of the Ombudsman or his proper deputy, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employees involves dishonestly, oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, (b) the charge would warrant removal from the service, or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. If the administrative investigation is not terminated within the period the respondent is suspended, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated unless the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or any cause attributable to the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under these provisions, there cannot be any doubt that the Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend an officer or employee, where appropriate, as indicated by the word "or" between the "Ombudsman" and "his Deputy." The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated. 11 The law does not require that only the Ombudsman himself may sign the order suspension. II Petitioner next questions the manner by which the suspension order was issued. She claims that she was denied due process because she was not afforded the

opportunity to controvert the evidence against her before the order of preventive suspension was issued. 12 A preventive suspension, however, can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a penalty, 13 but merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. Thus, in Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, 14 we quoted with favor our pronouncement in Nera vs. Garcia: 15
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension as a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of facts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove his innocence.

The fact that the said order was issued seven days after the complaint was filed did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The immediate issuance of such order is required in order to prevent the subject of the suspension from committing further irregularities. Such prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts the Ombudsman to:
. . . give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.

We do not give much credence to petitioner's suggestions of a malicious conspiracy between the Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero and Congressman Cua, reputedly petitioner's political adversary, to harass her. The Deputy Ombudsman and the Congressman, being public officials, enjoy the presumption of regularity of performance of dutes. Such presumption can be overcome only by strong and convincing evidence. 16 No such evidence exists in this case. III Contrary to petitioner's contention, the conditions required to sustain her preventive suspension have been met in this case. These conditions are:

(1) That the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) That any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. 17
The first requisite rests upon the determination of the disciplining authority, the Office of the Ombudsman in this case:
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case. The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "Judgment" of the 18 Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint . . .

We find no reason to disturb such determination in this case. All the circumstances enumerated in the second requisite are likewise present. Petitioner is charged with, among others, fraud against the public treasury and malversation, offenses indubitably involving dishonesty and grave misconduct. These charges, if proven true, also constitute grounds for her removal upon order of the proper court. Section 60(c) of the Local Government Code states.
Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective official ma be disciplined suspended or removed from office on any of the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx, c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner's high position likewise gives her access to public records and the cloud to influence possible witness. Her continued stay in office may thus prejudice the prosecution of the case filed against her. It is immaterial that, as petitioner contends, no evidence has been adduced to prove that petitioner may influence possible witnesses or may tamper with the public records. It is sufficient that there exists such a possibility. Finally, the duration of petitioner's suspension is not excessive. Petitioner's suspension for six (6) months is within the limits prescribed by Section 24 of R.A. 6770. The length of the period of suspension within such limits, like the evaluation of the strength of the evidence, lies in the discretion of the Ombudsman. WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court per its Resolution dated 26 August 1997 is hereby LIFTED with immediate effect. SO ORDERED.

Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING: On Jurisdiction The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation. The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant. How Jurisdiction is Acquired Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world. In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a

general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. xxx It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem. On Due Process xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendants last known address constitute denial of due process? The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings. It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringe