A Constructive Approach

to China and African Development

By Kyle Chan

China’s rapidly expanding presence in Sub-Saharan Africa1 has been making headlines

and sparking debate within foreign policy and international aid communities, fundamentally

altering the framework through which Western countries and international organizations

approach African development. While bilateral relations between the People’s Republic of China

and African nations date back to Premier Zhou Enlai’s speeches on the struggle of African

nations for independence at the First Asia-Africa Conference in April 1955,2 only within recent

years has Sino-African relations leapt forward so dramatically, capped by China’s “Year of

Africa” in 2006 and the success of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in

November that year. On a political level, countless meetings and visits at the ministerial level

and higher have taken place within the past decade including several multi-state tours of Africa

by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and their predecessors.3 In terms of economic

activity, trade between China and Africa has jumped from a mere $3 billion in 1995 to nearly

$107 billion in 2008, making China the continent’s second-largest trading partner ahead of

former colonial power France, 4 and is predicted to exceed U.S.-African trade within five years.5

1
Henceforth, Sub-Saharan Africa will simply be referred to as ‘Africa’ as this paper does not cover China’s policy
towards Egypt, Lybia, Algeria, nor any other Northern African states.
2
Fernando, Sithara, “Chronology of China-Africa Relations,” China Report, Vol. 43, 2007, p. 363
3
Ibid.
4
“China-Africa trade up 45% in 2008 to $107 bln,” Xinhua, Feb. 11, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
02/11/content_10803769.htm.
5
Harman, Danna, “China boosts African economies, offering a second opportunity,” Christian Science Monitor, Jul.
16, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/centennial/timeline/2008/07/china-boosts-african-economies-offering-a-
second-opportunity/.
China has become a leading source of foreign direct investment in Africa among developing

countries with a seven-fold increase in FDI outflows to Africa between 2003 and 2006 to 48

countries.6

Given the shockwave effect of China’s resurgent presence in Africa, two strictly

dichotomous views of China’s role in the region have arisen. At one end of the spectrum is the

prevailing sentiment among many Western governments and international organizations that

China’s policies of unconditional aid and relations with pariah states undermine current efforts

by such groups as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank,

and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to improve governance

and human rights issues in African countries through conditionality. Criticism from these groups

as well as United States politicians, human rights activists, celebrities, and non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) with vested interests characterizes China as a supporter of corrupt regimes

that operate through violence and severely damage Africa’s prospects for development.7 At the

other end of the spectrum is a still nascent but growing body of literature proclaiming China’s

activities in the region as Africa’s last chance for development after decades of failed aid policies

by the West.8 Some go further, arguing Western aid efforts have on net harmed Africa by

enforcing a relationship with the West based on dependency and subordination.9

6
As a fraction of Africa’s total FDI stock, Chinese investment accounts for less than 1 percent, far behind well-
established investor countries in North America and Europe. OECD Investment Policy Reviews: China 2008,
Chapter 3: China’s Outward Direct Investment, p. 3-4.
7
See especially the New York Times editorial “Patron of African Misgovernment,” New York Times, Feb. 19, 2007.
8
Rotberg, Robert I., China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, Brookings Institution Press, 2008; Broadman,
Harry G., Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier, World Bank Publications, 2007.
9
Moyo, Dambisa, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 2009; Collier, Paul, “Dead Aid, by Dambisa Moyo: Time to turn off the aid tap?” The Independent, Jan. 30,
2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/dead-aid-by-dambisa-moyo-1519875.html;
Spears, Collin, “The Chinese-African Relationship: Can Sub-Saharan Africans Think?” Brooks Foreign Policy
Review , Apr. 20, 2009, http://brooksreview.wordpress.com/2009/04/20/the-chinese-%E2%80%93-african-
relationship-can-sub-saharan-africans-think/.

2
 The position of this paper is that neither confrontation nor wholesale acceptance of

China’s actions in Africa represents an optimal strategy for engaging China in the region.

Instead, in the best interests of African development, Western developed countries and

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) should seek to incorporate China’s African policies into

current development frameworks through an understanding and redirection of China’s primary

motivations. Rather than blindly criticizing Chinese actions, the West and IGOs should seek to

understand reasoning and underlying logic behind its policies and focus on areas of common

ground upon which constructive collaboration can develop. This paper first covers China’s

broader motivations for involvement in Africa and then analyzes specific cases where an

understanding of China’s motivations provides opportunities for cooperation that benefit all

parties involved, especially developing African countries.

China’s motivations for involvement in Africa

First, we must take a moment to understand China’s key motivations for its policies in

Africa. China’s primary goals in engaging with African states can be divided generally into

political, economic, and reputational goals. China’s political goals include the accretion of

diplomatic capital in international politics, winning away Taiwan’s remaining allies and partners,

and generally finding more friends among developing countries to balance politically against

Western interests in the international community. China’s friendship with many African states

has given China more political clout in major IGOs with real implications for the advancement

of key Chinese interests. Within the UN, African states comprise half of the non-aligned member

nations and a third of all member nations in the General Assembly. 10 The support of many of

these African nations has been crucial to several Chinese diplomatic victories dating back to the
10
He Wenping, “The Balancing Act of China’s Africa Policy,” China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2007, p. 27.

3
1971 UN resolution that switched official recognition from the ROC to the PRC as one of the

five permanent members of the Security Council to the 2004 blocking of a U.S.-led effort to

sanction China for its human rights record.11 Cooperation between China and African nations in

the World Trade Organization (WTO) has resulted in successes in trade regulations. More

recently, in 2005 China and several African nations worked together to force the U.S. to cancel

its cotton subsidy among others, which directly impacted African and Chinese competitiveness in

the global agriculture market.12

In particular, the struggle over African recognition and political support has been a key

diplomatic component of the PRC’s extensive campaign to isolate Taiwan and compel the island

the Communist Party lost in the Chinese Civil War to rejoin the mainland under a “One China”

policy. Since the passing of UN Resolution 2758 recognizing the PRC as China’s only legitimate

government representative, many countries have adopted the “One China” policy and many

others have severed official diplomatic relations with the ROC. Diplomatic recognition by

smaller developing nations has been of particular strategic interest to the PRC given their

disproportionate influence in such organizations as the UN relative to their population or

economic size and their propensity for accepting aid packages in exchange for an end to official

diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This strategy of deal-making has proven to be effective in the

cases of Dominica in 200413 and Grenada in 2005,14 for example, and has also played a role in

China’s efforts in Africa. A recent string of diplomatic victories in Africa backed by aid packages

11
Ibid; United Nations General Assembly—Twenty-Sixth Session, 1976th Plenary Meeting, Resolution 2758, Oct.
25, 1971.
12
He, 2007, p. 38.
13
Painter, James, “Taiwan’s Caribbean Headache,” BBC News, Mar. 30, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/3583733.stm.
14
“Grenada picks China over Taiwan,” BBC News, Jan. 21, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4190295.stm.

4
including Senegal’s change of diplomatic recognition in 2005,15 Chad’s switch in 2006,16 and

Malawi’s switch in 200817 has left Taiwan with only a four remaining de jure supporters in the

region.18 As a result of this campaign, repeated efforts by the ROC to gain recognition and

influence in the UN and other IGOs has resulted in a consistent lack of support by other member

nations. Taiwan’s annual petitions from 1993 onwards for recognition as a member nation in the

UN General Assembly have all been denied and often fail to make the agenda due to lack of

support.19 The continued success of China’s diplomatic campaign in Africa is an undeniable

factor in China’s motivations for its African policy.

Besides these goals in international politics, China’s economic motivations include

tapping a vast wealth of resources to fuel China’s economic growth and the cultivation of new

markets for Chinese goods, among others. The country’s tremendous economic growth since the

start of its reform policies in 1978 and its commensurably tremendous appetite for raw materials

and energy resources has naturally led China to build strong relationships with the world’s

primary raw materials exporters. While the positions of numerous Western governments and

corporations have been deeply entrenched in such strategically important regions as the Middle

East, Africa’s export potential still remains relatively open to development and provides China

with an opportunity not only to diversify its resource trading partners but also to fill in a vacuum

in Western influence. Already African oil exports to China as a fraction of China’s total imported

oil has leapt from one-quarter to almost one-third since 2004.20 While competition with Western
15
“Senegal recognizes China,” Taipei Times, Oct. 26, 2005, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/
archives/2005/10/26/2003277422.
16
“Taiwan breaks off diplomatic ties with Chad,” Forbes, Aug. 6, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/
2006/08/06/afx2929963.html.
17
Wu, Debby, “Malawi drops ties with Taiwan for China,” USA Today, Jan. 14, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/world/2008-01-14-3462575361_x.htm.
18
He, 2007, p. 24.
19
“Taiwan’s UN Campaign,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/
ct.asp?xItem=26680&ctNode=1028&mp=6.
20
Hanson, Stephanie, “China, Africa, and Oil,” Council on Foreign Relations, Jun. 6, 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/.

5
interests in key exporting nations such as Angola and Equatorial Guinea will only intensify as

global demand for oil and other resources increases over the years, China has already established

itself as a key player in the region given its heavy investment and political efforts as well as its

willingness to deal with countries avoided by the West due to human rights issues such as Sudan,

which supplies China with 9 percent of its petroleum imports.21

As Africa’s second-largest trading partner, China also exported over $50 billion of

equipment, manufactured goods, and other products to the continent in 2008, slightly less than

total imports from Africa in the same year. 22 In spite of clear challenges such as weaker market

institutions, Africa represents a potentially lucrative and relatively untapped market for Chinese

goods and an opportunity for Chinese producers to grow and diversify end markets as the U.S.

and EU represent mostly saturated markets recently laid low by the global recession. Moreover,

contrary to common opinion, China’s export of low-end consumer products accounts for no more

than a fifth of total exports to any one African country except Uganda, and Chinese exports

thrive most in African markets for machinery, electronic equipment, and other industrial-related

items.23

Lastly, a country’s image and projection of soft power can be a vital asset or crippling

liability, and for a rising global power like China with a reputation still in flux and position in the

world order hotly debated, image is of paramount importance. In Africa, China finds a unique

opportunity to champion a new paradigm of economic development, domestic governance, and

relations with the Third World, establishing China as the leader of an alternative model to the

Western monopoly on the current world order. While China’s policy in this regard has shed the
21
Shinn, David H., “Africa, China, the United States, and Oil,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=34.
22
“China-Africa trade up 45% in 2008 to $107 bln,” Xinhua, Feb. 11, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
2009-02/11/content_10803769.htm.
23
Sautman, Barry, Yan Hairong, “The Forest for the Trees: Trade, Investment, and the China-in-Africa Discourse,”
unpublished manuscript, 2007.

6
ideological bend of Mao’s foreign policy agenda, the sense of broader leadership and return to

global influence that extends from China’s national pride is an unmistakable factor driving

China’s actions abroad, particularly in relation to developing countries. Much has been written

on China’s expanding soft power initiatives24 and the role of global status as a driving force

behind Chinese foreign policy,25 and China has cultivated a largely positive reputation among

developing African countries built on more than half a century of successful political, economic,

medical, and educational programs in the region. Many African heads of state including

Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, have explicitly

expressed their appreciation of China’s approach to development assistance, particularly in

contrast to policies of Western unilateralism.26

Driven by strong political, economic, reputational motivations, China’s increasing

activity in Africa may represent a second chance to breaking out of poverty traps, resource

curses, and the chronic affliction of poor governance. After a review of China’s primary

motivations for involvement in the region, we can now begin to examine the ways in which

Chinese interests can be directed and incorporated into models for engagement with China to set

Africa on a concrete track to sustainable economic growth and the development of key

institutions that will allow African nations to solve their problems internally.

Case Study #1: A focus on infrastructure investment

24
See especially Kurlantzick, Johsua, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, Yale
University Press, 2008; Whitney, Christopher et al, “Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of
Opinion,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008.
25
Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations, Cambridge University Press,
2008.
26
Fei Liena et al, “China’s involvement in African’s infrastructure development has fundamental, transformative
impact says Ethiopian PM,” Xinhua, Jan. 29, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
01/29/content_10731854.htm; “Special Report: Africa-China Trade 2008,” Financial Times, Jan. 24, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/reports/africachinatrade2008.

7
 One prominent example of a common basis for cooperation is investment and other

economic activity in transparent infrastructure projects that observably benefit the public good.

In discussions of China’s economic relations with African nations, Chinese investment in African

infrastructure and other public goods is sometimes mentioned but often overshadowed by

concerns over resource extraction and human rights issues. The fact of the matter is the Chinese

government and large national banks and corporations such as the Export-Import Bank of China

(China Exim Bank) have invested heavily in major infrastructure projects in the region such as

the Merowe High Dam in Sudan that will double the country’s power generation capacity.27 In

2006 alone, China committed to investing more than $7 billion in African infrastructure projects,

far outpacing aid and investment efforts from the West according to a 100-page World Bank

report.28 Even in countries where China is accused of pure resource extraction, China has in fact

helped such countries leverage their resource endowments to obtain loans for development such

as in the case of oil-rich Angola which received multiple billion-dollar oil-backed loans from

China in January 2005, March 2006, and March 2009 for infrastructure investment.29

Undoubtedly, a more scrupulous review of these individual projects will reveal problems such as

corruption, environmental impact, and labor issues typical of endeavors of this scale, but

relatively speaking infrastructure investment is unique in its inherently greater transparency and

direct benefit to the public good, which has made it a primary focus of the World Bank’s lending

strategy. Given China’s proven willingness to invest in such projects, Western countries and

IGOs should encourage and support China’s efforts in this area through direct cooperation as

well as a pooling of resources and accumulated knowledge. To this end, the World Bank and
27
Bosshard, Peter, “China’s Role in Financing African Infrastructure,” International Rivers Network, 2007, p. 11
28
Foster, Vivien, et al, “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Africa,” The
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2008.
29
“China-Africa Trade Links,” Reuters, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL01887144;
“Angola wins new billion-dollar loan from China,” AFP, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/
afp/article/ALeqM5i0hpgnhmj3GYfBFS8IbzAJ1WDf5w.

8
comparably-sized China Exim Bank signed a cooperation agreement in 2007 with an initial

emphasis on road and energy investment projects in Africa.30

In addition to encouraging investment in physical infrastructure, IGOs should also

cooperate with China on investment in other forms of infrastructure essential to economic

growth and improved quality of life including agriculture, healthcare, and education. Prominent

examples of China’s involvement in these sectors of African development abound including a

comprehensive $5 billion loan package to the Democratic Republic in Congo in 2007 that would

finance the creation of 31 hospitals, 145 smaller health centers, 2 universities, and 5,000 units of

government housing.31 While quality control is perhaps more difficult on projects that involve

logistical issues beyond civil engineering, the significance and observable returns on investment

of these non-physical infrastructure projects cannot be ignored in any serious development and

financial aid program.

China’s clear commitment to investment in African infrastructure stems directly from

China’s officially stated policy towards the region and China’s broader motivations. This type of

conspicuous development assistance strengthens China’s direct bonds with African nations and

burnishes China’s image in the region as a trustworthy, non-patronizing partner dedicated to

helping fellow developing countries. Besides these reputational issues, Chinese banks and

corporations have a vested interest in reducing corruption, increasing transparency, maximizing

effectiveness, and generally realizing a proper return on their investments. Already, official

statements and policies have been promulgated by the central government sternly admonishing

irresponsible corporate practices not only to protect China’s image abroad but also to protect

30
Wroughton, Leslie, “China’s exim-bank, World Bank to cooperate on Africa,” Reuters, May 21, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSN2136700620070522.
31
French, Howard, “The Chinese and Congo take a giant leap of faith,” The New York Times, Sep. 21, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/world/asia/21iht-letter.1.7595719.html.

9
workers and improve management.32 Such an alignment of interests among China, African

nations, and the West presents an unprecedented opportunity to establish a fundamental level of

agreement and cooperation towards a common goal.

Concurrently, there exist several salient issues of concern regarding China’s current

pattern of activity in Africa. An effective, appropriate response to these issues need not involve

direct conflict but can instead be resolved through a constructive understanding and channeling

of China’s dominant incentives. Two representative examples of such issues—China’s arms sales

to African governments with poor human rights records and the potentially negative impact of

increased imports from China on certain domestic African industries—and an analysis of

possible strategies for resolution will serve to illustrate this point.

Case Study #2: Arms deals with problematic African governments

In contrast to investment in physical infrastructure, which should theoretically benefit the

public good more straightforwardly even under regimes with poor human rights records, arms

sales to problematic African governments such as the current regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe

are directly linked with increased violence and oppression in those respective areas.33 While

China’s arms sales to Sudan, for example, account for only 8 percent of total arms imports

according to China’s special envoy to Darfur Liu Guijin, China is still Sudan’s largest arms

supplier and wields substantial leverage in that regard.34 Despite these moral concerns, China has

a strong incentive to engage in arms trade and military training with these regimes in that such

32
Bosshard, 2007, p. 15.
33
Hanson, 2008, p. 7.
34
“China defends arms sales to Sudan,” BBC News, Feb. 22, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7258059.stm; Bristow, Michael, “China’s dilemma over Darfur,” BBC News, Feb. 13, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7242725.stm.

10
actions enhance China’s relations with these states, which also serve as political supporters in

IGOs. These states, categorically isolated by the West and international community at large, find

in China a powerful friend.

While pressure on the Chinese central government by the West may have yielded some

progress, such as over the Darfur issue leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, and China’s

stance is independently dynamic and evolving,35 a more holistic approach to engaging China on

these issues could lead to greater progress. As discussed previously, China seeks to enforce an

image of solidarity and partnership with developing African nations in contrast to the unilateral,

often paternalistic actions of the West. At the same time, there is no evidence that China desires

to support violence and oppression; to the contrary, China has played a proactive role in helping

resolve the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, for example, by contributing Chinese engineers as part

of UN peacekeeping forces and sending in a seasoned diplomat as a special envoy to the region.36

Most prominently, President Hu urged Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir directly to

push harder on negotiations with Darfur rebels and cooperate more with the UN. 37 However, in

the face of harsh public criticism from the West, the Chinese government cannot be seen as

backing down and caving in to Western demands given the negative ramifications to China’s

reputation abroad as well as at home. The more the West pressures China, the more their efforts

may backfire and further entrench China in its current position. A more productive approach may

involve private negotiations and discussions with the Chinese government over an issue like

arms deals that can be drawn down quietly without eroding China’s image or even substantially

harming China’s relations with Sudan. This form of ‘quiet diplomacy’ has been advocated most

35
Downs, Erica S., “The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Relations,” China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2007, p. 17.
36
Heavens, Andrew, “Darfur rebels reject new Chinese peacekeepers,” Reuters, Nov. 25, 2007,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L24686432.htm.
37
De Montesquiou, Alfred, “China’s Hu Presses Sudan for Progress on Darfur,” The Washington Post, Feb. 3, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201753.html.

11
recently by newly appointed U.S. ambassador to the UN Susan Rice who believes such an

approach will work with China and Russia vis-à-vis their support for Mugabe’s regime in

Zimbabwe.38 China’s arms sales to Sudan and Zimbabwe are a valuable tool in winning political

capital and loyalty among these states, and efforts to persuade China to change its course must be

sufficiently powerful to dominate these strong incentives. But this type of approach may serve as

a workable, albeit imperfect, compromise that would move the arms deal issue forward without

making a casualty of China’s image or Western relations with China.

Case Study #3: Mitigating the negative effects of Chinese exports on nascent
African industries

The phenomenal growth of trade between China and Africa, projected to exceed $100

billion by 2010, has materially benefited both sides, particularly given complementarities

between Africa’s vast resources and China’s manufacturing capabilities, but not without costs to

certain sectors of African industry.39 Leaving accusations of neo-colonial exploitation aside, the

importation of Chinese manufactured goods into African markets has sometimes left fledging

African industries such as textiles, clothing, and light electric appliances struggling to compete.

Compelling numbers including 250,000 layoffs in Nigeria due to the shuttering of 80 percent of

Nigerian textile factories caused in part by an dramatic influx of Chinese textile and clothing

products40 paint a troubling picture of private sector development, among the continent’s most

critical steps toward sustainable growth.41 The Chinese central government has duly

38
Kralev, Nicholas, “U.N. nominee wants ‘quiet diplomacy,’” The Washington Times, Jan. 15, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/15/un-nominee-wants-quiet-diplomacy/.
39
“Special Report: Africa-China Trade 2008,” Financial Times, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.ft.com/reports/
africachinatrade2008.
40
Alden, Chris, China in Africa, International African Institute, Royal African Society, Zed Books, 2008, p. 48-49.
41
Other factors such as uncontrolled currency inflation and pressure by international financial institutions (IFIs)
including the IMF to liberalize trade at an excessively rapid pace certainly played at least as important a role in the
collapse of certain African industries. Sautman, 2007, p. 18.

12
acknowledged the detrimental effects of such activity and, in response to a heavy surge in

unemployment in South Africa correlated with an 80 percent increase in Chinese textile and

clothing exports among other incidents, has declared a voluntary limit in June 2006 on related

Chinese exports to the region.42 In-depth country-specific studies have been conducted to

understand the effect of tariff reductions and strategic protectionist policies in insulating nascent

African private enterprises, revealing a delicate balancing between positive integration and

technology transfers with Chinese corporations and detrimental market crowding.43 Moreover,

these effects must be weighed against the benefits of greater purchasing power and a

consequently higher standard of living for the African consumer due to the increased

affordability of manufactured goods from China.

Ironically, the solution to this problem may lie within China’s own domestic policies for

dealing with foreign investment and private sector competition from foreign-owned enterprises.

As many multinational corporations operating within Chinese borders know well, the country

has strict rules regarding how foreign companies enter China including compulsory joint-venture

agreements with domestic firms in many cases and explicit technology transfer and domestic

worker employment agreements.44 FDI inflows to China reached $92 billion in 2008 at annual

growth rate of over 23 percent, and the Chinese government approved the establishment of 2,562

foreign-owned enterprises in December 2008 alone.45 The Chinese model of foreign commerce

regulation is built on this vast experience in dealing with foreign firms and comprises a

42
Li Suwan, “China will take the initiative to set limits on textile exports to South Africa,” Xinhua, Jun. 26, 2006,
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1038/4529560.html.
43
“Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy,”
International Monetary Fund, December 2005; Manson, Nwafor, “Trade Liberalization and Poverty Reduction in
Nigeria: Lessons from the Past,” Africa Institute for Applied Economics, Nigeria.
44
The author has had personal experience dealing with such issues having read through several hundred pages of
PRC commercial regulations while working at an international accounting firm in Beijing. See also
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/ and http://exporttochina.mofcom.gov.cn/wcn/.
45
“China’s FDI up 23.6% in 2008,” Xinhua, Jan. 15, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
01/15/content_10662757.htm.

13
meticulously designed system that ensures domestic enterprises gain directly from interactions

with foreign companies, a system that may be similarly effective in developing African countries

conditional on further research. IFIs such as the IMF and World Bank might consider

collaborating with commerce ministries and corporate groups in Africa in seeking “advice” from

the Chinese central government on the Chinese model of foreign investment and commercial

regulation. From China’s perspective, this would be an outstanding opportunity not only to

integrate further into African economies but also to assume a leadership role on an important

matter in an area of Chinese expertise. This approach, undoubtedly, has many complicating

factors such as the transferability of China-optimized regulations to smaller, less developed

African states, coordination problems with Chinese corporations whose incentives are not fully

aligned with that of the central government, and the very willingness of international

organizations to change old habits and reevaluate current policies. However, this approach may

overcome a more critical issue: cooperation among IGOs, Western and African governments, and

China that could represent Africa’s best chance for sustainable development.

The topics of whether China’s model of development is best for Africa or whether

China’s unconditional relations with Africa undermine Western aid efforts are difficult questions

that fall outside the purview of this paper. Instead, this paper has argued that there are perhaps

less high-profile issues on which the West and China can form some basis for consensus and

cooperation. The key to identifying and properly addressing such issues lies in a more nuanced

appreciation of China’s primary motivations for involvement in the region such as image-

building and the cultivation of soft power as well as often-cited political and economic goals. As

discussed in the case studies, infrastructure investment, arms trade reduction, and the protection

14
of African industries in the face of Chinese competition exemplify areas of overlapping interest

among all parties involved. Successful cooperation between China and the West in Africa has

profound implications for the future of African development after decades of mixed results and

unfulfilled promises. Moreover, Chinese and Western engagement in Africa serves as a test of

how well China and the developed world can work together to face global challenges that no

nation, superpower or otherwise, can solve alone.

15