Hannah Cris A.

Facts: Hello, Garci tapes

Echavez

gorgeous hannah

CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent. G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001 Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on 1March1987. On 18May1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On 26June1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. Grace- a Filipina -- and Rederick were married on 12Jan1994 in Cabanatuan City. Starting 22Oct1995, they lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on 16May1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On 3March1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. Rederick contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia. Issue1: WON the divorce decree obtained abroad ipso facto terminated Redericks marriage capacitating him to remarry. Ruling: No. Ratio: A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the NCC. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the FC allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29]Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Divorce as a Question of Fact Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Garcillano vs The House of Representatives G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
Issue: WON there is a need to publish the rules for the Senate investigation. Ruling: Yes. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Ratio: Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 NCC, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. 8792 ( Electronic Commerce Act of 2000) to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations. The Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

Hannah Cris A.

Echavez

gorgeous hannah

CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the FC would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. Hence, respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994. Decision: Remand to the lower court.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the FC is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen, Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. Burden of Proving Australian Law The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. Issue3: WON the failure of the respondent, a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the marriage. Ruling: Yes Ratio: In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. [ Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS vs.CA G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988 Facts: The case was appealed and the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA in a decision promulgated on August 17,1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a M4R, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987. The denial of the motion for extension of time to file a M4R was based on Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that thefifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Issue: WON SC decisions have to be published for them to be followed. Ruling: No Ratio: Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

Hannah Cris A.

Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Mendezona vs Ozamiz INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES INC., vs. MERLIN J. ARGOS & G.R. No. 143370. February 6, 2002 JAJA C. PINEDA Facts: This is an action to quiet the title of the Mendezonas over a property in Lahug. They trace their hold to G.R. No. 130362. September 10, 2001
such title to a Deed of Sale executed in their favor by Carmen Ozamiz, then 88 yrs old and was already under guardianship. Issue: WON advanced age (88y.o) is enough to establish mental & physical infirmities. Ruling: No Ratio: It has been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated. The respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz had allegedly lost control of her mental faculties. We note that the respondents sought to impugn only one document, namely, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, executed by Carmen Ozamiz. However, there are 9 other important documents that were, signed by Carmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28, 1989 which were not assailed by the respondents. Such is contrary to their assertion of complete incapacity of Carmen Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. We agree with the trial courts assessment that it is unfair for the [respondents] t o claim soundness of mind of Carmen Ozamiz when it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages them.[ A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the condition is presumed to continue to exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary.[ Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. [ Domingo vs CA G.R. No. 127540. October 17, 2001 Facts: Issue: WON a person of advanced years is still capacitated to contract. Ruling: Yes, as a rule. Ratio: In Rongavilla vs. CA, 294 SCRA 289 (1998), private respondents were in their advanced years, and were not in dire need of money, except for a small amount of P2,000 which they said were loaned by petitioners for the repair of their houses roof. We ruled against petitioners, and declared that there was no valid sale because of lack of consideration. In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the deed was allegedly executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed were entered in the registry allegedly on May 16 and June 10, 1966. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price was paid to and received by her.

Facts: Argos & Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of IFFI. In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporations operation in the Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director. Consequently the GMs reported directly to Costa. Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the GMs became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim on 10Dec1993. On the same date, Costa issued a Personnel Announcement which described respondents as persona non grata and urged employees not to have further dealings with them. On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel. On March 31, 1995, respondents filed a civil case for damages against Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. Issue: Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the NCC, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioners employee? Ruling: No Ratio: In instituting the action for damages with the RTC, respondents seek to enforce a civil liability allegedly arising from a crime. Obligations arising from crimes are governed by Article 1161NCC, which provides that said obligations are governed by penal laws, subject to the provision of Article 2177 and the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of Book IV of the Civil Code. Article 100 RPC is also pertinent. It provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In default of the persons criminally liable, employers engaged in any kind of industry shall be civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of their duties. Article 33 NCC provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), we held that Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature. However, we note that by invoking the principle of respondeat superior, respondents tried to rely on Art. 33 to hold IFFI primarily liable for its employees defamatory statements. But we also find that respondents did not raise the claim of primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint before the trial court. On the contrary, they sought to enforce the alleged subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa, the accused in pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely. Having established that respondents did not base their civil action on petitioner IFFIs primary liability under Art33 but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa, prematurely, we need not delve further on the other errors raised by petitioner. Plainly both the trial and the appellate courts erred in failing to dismiss the complaint against herein petitioner by respondents claiming subsidiary liability while the criminal libel cases against IFFIs employee, Costa, were pending before the Me troTC. Nothing herein said, however, ought to prejudice the reliefs that respondents might seek at the appropriate time.

Hannah Cris A.

Echavez

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CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

asked for legal separation and Php1M in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from him and an equally valid marriage to her present husband. Issue: WON the divorce is valid in the Philippines. Ruling: No

Geluz vs CA G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961 Facts: Nita Villanueva had 3 abortions done by the same doctor, Geluz. Husband Oscar Lazo sued Geluz onthe 3rd abortion (2 mo.), seeking damages. CA sustained claim of Lazo for P3,000. Issue: Whether or not the husband can claim damages from the abortionist. Held: No, he cannot. Ratio: Award for death of a person does not cover unborn fetus because it is still not vested with legal personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in utero. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. Moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Continental Steel 13Oct2009
Capacity to Act as persons Facts: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her husband was declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was authorized by the court as guardian to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity.

Ratio: The valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 NCC (RA 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided: Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The NCC does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the NCC only provides for legal separation , and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that the marriage bonds shall not be severed For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article NCC that prescribes the following: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

Issues: (1)Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity to act. (2) Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908. Held: The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The SC held that there is no evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane and therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself in a contract. From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he had property of his own and was not deprived of its management, as well as the fact that he had never squandered any large sum of money. As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving of the bond, December15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified that they observed insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally deprive her husband management over his estate knowing full well that he was insane. Issue: Whether or not parents can sign contracts on behalf of the unemancipated child. Held: Yes, parental consent is binding upon both parties. Construing Sec. 50 & 41 of the Civil Rights Law strictly, the parents consent is binding on the infant and no words prohibiting disaffirmance are necessary to effectuate the legislative intent. Neither is a prior court approval of the employment contract for child models is necessary to validate the contract, since the statute requiring such applies only to child performers
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 Facts: In 24Feb1948, Vicenta Escano married Pastor Tenchavez. They were both Filipinos. They later separated. In 1950, Vicenta went to the US and there she filed for divorce. The divorce decree was issued on 21 Oct 1950. She then married an American, Russell Leo Moran in 13 Sept 1954. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958. In 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the CFI, against Vicenta and her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and

THE UNITED STATES vs. BUENAVENTURA SARMIENTO G.R. No. L-9059 March 14, 1914 Facts: This is a criminal case for seduction against Buenaventura Sarmiento. It was alleged that, while they were having sexual intercourse, Sarmiento promised to marry Petronila Silverio. Ha said she agreed to have carnal knowledge with him because of said promise. Sarmiento was already married and this fact was known to Silverio. Issue: WON the promise to marry induced the woman to surrender her virtue and have sex with the accused. Ruling: No Ratio: Where the deceit alleged is a promise of marriage, it must appear that the woman was induced to yield her body to the seducer by means of such promise, and that she surrendered her virtue in reliance upon its fulfillment. Manifestly a promise of marriage made after sexual intercourse has taken place, or after the woman has yielded her body to the mans illicit embraces, cannot be held to have induced the woman to surrender her virtue. Nor can a promise of marriage made by a married man, where the woman knows that he is married before she surrenders herself, be said to have induced her so to do; for in such a case it is clear that there was no reliance on the promise. And, indeed, it was frequently been held that in any case wherein it appears that the surrender of the woman was not made in reliance upon a promise of marriage, a conviction of the crime of seduction cannot be sustained on the ground that such a promise had been made, though proof of a promise a marriage followed by carnal relations will generally be sufficient to sustain the inference that they were induced by such promise, in the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer

Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLISvs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 Facts: Amos Bellis was a US citizen who executed a will in the Philippines. At the time of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of his death, he was domiciled in Texas, USA. His heirs were his 3 ex wives and several successional rights, to the decedents national law. Specific provisions must prevail over legitimate and illegitimate children.. Apparently, Amos Bellis executed 2 wills, one in the general ones. USA and one in the Philippines. His illegitimate children opposed his will and alleged that Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to they were deprived of their legitimes. govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he Texas law does not recognize legitimes while Philippine laws do. intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedents intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as Issue: Which law should apply? this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigners will to the Ruling: Texas effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with Ratio: Arts 16(2) & Art.1039 NCC, render applicable the national law of the his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to 4 items: (a) the matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of govern. the provisions of the will; & (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. the country where it is situated. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the Renvoi Doctrine Not Applicable Here person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the (Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963) This doctrine is usually pertinent property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof decedent. at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, NCC, stating the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a that reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Prevails as the exception to Art. 16(2) NCC afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second CHRISTENSEN GARCIA paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963 intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new Facts: Edward Christensen was a US citizen (California) who, at the time of his death, was provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the domiciled in the Philippines. He left several properties to his 2 illegitimate children, namely: national law of the decedent. Lucy and Helen. Helen objected to the probate of the will because she was allegedly deprived of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child. Hannah Cris A. 5

Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS CA law does not recognize legitimes while Philippine laws do. According to CA salary of S1,200 per year as a stenographer. On 11Feb1904, Frank left the service of conflict of laws rule, the domiciliary law of the decedent should be followed as to the Plaintiff and refused to comply with the terms of the contract. On 13Dec1904, disposition of his properties. While under Philippine laws, it should be the national law of Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI of Manila to recover from Frank S269.23, which the decedent. amount had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and Issue: Which law should apply? as half-salary for the period consumed in travel. Frank alleged that he is not bound to the Ruling: Philippine law, apply the renvoi doctrine contract because he was a minor according to his national law (Philippines). However, at the Ratio: The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article time and place of the execution of the contract (Illinois), he already attained majority age. 16 NCC. Issue: Which law should be applied the law of the place of celebration or the national law There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in of the defendant? the US, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and Ruling: lex loci celebrationis in force only within the state. The national law indicated in Article 16 NCC refers to no Ratio: It is not disputed that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question other than the private law of the State of California. Frank had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined b the personal property? Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows: If there is law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile. Article 946 should be such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. The Defendants claim that he was an of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult a the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines. the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the Plaintiff attempted to enforce The national law mentioned in Art16 NCC is the law on conflict of laws in the CA the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable. CC, i.e., Art 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in CA, Art946, CC, precisely refers back the Therefore, Frank being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time case, when a decedent is not domiciled in CA, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the contract was made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to CA; being enforced. such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM vs. ROBERTO REYES, its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of CA provides no legitime G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005 for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) & 894 NCC, makes natural children Facts: This is an action for damages brought under the human relations provisions of the legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. Hence, the domicile of the NCC. On 13Oct1994, Roberto Reyes was in Hotel Nikko and saw Dr. Filart who invited him deceased Christensen, a citizen of CA, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his to attend the birthday party of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. It was to be will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant Helen, should be governed by held at the penthouse of such hotel. When the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 CC of CA, not by the internal law of the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by Ruby CA. Lim, who spoke for Hotel Nikko as its Executive Secretary. In a loud voice and within the THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. GEORGE I. FRANK presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, she G. R. No. 2935. March 23, 1909 told him to leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang). Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within Facts: On 17April1903, in Chicago, Illinois, USA, the Defendant George Frank entered into hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and a contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff Govt, by which Frank was to receive a humiliation. Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Hannah Cris A. 6

Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. Like a common bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.[ Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the asked for Php1M actual damages, Php1M moral and/or exemplary damages and Php200,000 comfort room in a paper bag were lost. Valmontes car was also searched. attorneys fees. The jewelry was never recovered. Issue: WON Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party where he was After a few days, Valmonte asked Carpio to make a public apology. This not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 & 21 NCC. went unheeded. Hence, Valmonte filed an action for damages. Ruling: No, there was no abuse of rights under Arts.19&21NCC. Hannah Cris A. Ratio: Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a gate-crasher. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self -inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. However, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 & 21 NCC, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. A common theme runs through Arts19&21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional. Reyes has not shown that Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Lims alleged abusive conduct. A complaint based on Arts19&NCC must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures. SOLEDAD CARPIO vs. LEONORA A. VALMONTE G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004 Facts: Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Organizing a wedding, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already there including the bride, among those present was Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride. She left after some time but went back to the hotel after dealing with some business. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that Carpio allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha. Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmontes

Issue: WON there was a violation of Art.19 in relation to Art. 21 NCC. Ruling: Yes Ratio: In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as abuse of rights under Article 19 NCC. To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.[ When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. [ Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 NCC. The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded 7

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. CA is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960 jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and Facts: Soledad Cagigas and Francisco Hermosisima had a relationship and Soledad good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice got pregnant. When Francisco found out, he promised to marry her. However, after respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation the birth of their child, Francisco married another woman. Hence, Soledad filed an to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable. action for damages. Issue: WON Soledad is entitled to damages. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA and MARILOU T. GONZALES Ruling: No G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 Ratio: the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such Facts: Baksh, an Iranian, promised to marry Gonzales, a Filipina. Because of this promise promise, Gonzales agreed to live with Baksh. However, during their cohabitation, Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the they fought and Gonzales sustained injuries thereby. Baksh then told her that he was paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the CA, and the language already married and that he wanted her to move out. Gonzales then filed an action for used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the seduction therein contemplated is damages. the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 RPC, which Issue: WON damages under Art. 21 can be awarded to Gonzales. admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that Ruling: Yes petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately 10 Ratio: Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the years younger than the complainant who around 36 years of age, and as highly acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant surrendered herself promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to to petitioner because, overwhelmed by her love for him, she wanted to bind by accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy. damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916 committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Facts: A month after Don Teodoro Exposito and Eloisa Goitia Dela Camara got In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioners married, Teodoro started asking Eloisa to perform lewd acts. She refused. Teodoro fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that did not stop from making such requests and Eloisa continued to refuse. This resulted made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the in fights until Teodoro left the conjugal abode. Eloisa here is asking for support. honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these Issue: WON Eloisa is entitled to support. fraud and deception on appellants part that made plaintiffs parents agree to their Ruling: Yes daughters living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. In short, the 8

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Ratio: The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes will not invalidate the marriage. so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole. specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to RODOLFO G. NAVARRO vs.JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY administrative liability. A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 VERONICO TENEBRO vs. CA Facts: This is a complaint for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004 and ignorance of the law against Judge Domagtoy. The complaint arose from 2 Facts: Veronico Tenebro married Leticia Ancajas in 1990. Afterwards, he told incedents: the solemization of a marriage where Judge Domagtoy knew that the man Leticia that he had a prior subsisting marriage with Hilda Villareyes. Such marriage was solemnized in 1986. He then left their conjugal dwelling. In 1993, Veronico married Nilda was still married to his first wife and the solemnization of a marriage outside of his Villegas. When Letitcia heard of this, she filed a complaint for bigamy. Veronico alleged jurisdiction. that his subsequent marriage to Leticia was null and void on the ground of psychological Issue: What is the effect to the marriage if it is solemnized outside of the judges incapacity. This, according to him, means that he did not commit bigamy. jurisdiction? Issue: WON the nullity of the subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological Ruling: still valid. This is merely an irregularity in the formal requisites. incapacity can be a defense against the charge of bigamy. Ratio: A marriage can be held outside of the judges chambers or courtroom only in Ruling: No the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance Ratio: A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned. this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners
valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio

Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. Pertinently, Article 349 RPC criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision Republic of the Philippines vs Jose A. Dayot penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the GR No. 175581 March 28, 2008 subsistence of a valid marriage. Facts: On 24Nov1986, Jose and Felisa Dayot were married. In lieu of a marriage Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, license(ML), they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them are legally during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been capacitated and that they cohabited for at least 5 years when in fact they only barely consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a known each other since Feb1986. On 1993, Jose filed a complaint for Annulment subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage contending that their marriage was a sham, marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological as no ceremony was celebrated; that he did not execute the sworn statement that he incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal and Felisa had cohabited for at least 5 years; and that his consent was secured through laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of fraud. this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly The complaint was dismissed by the RTC stating that Jose is deemed estopped done. from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of marriage license. It is claimed Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, and that it took Jose 7 psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the years before he sought the declaration of nullity; The RTC ruled that Joses action essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by had prescribed. It cited Art 87 NCC which requires that the action for annulment must the FC into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given be commenced by the injured party within 4 years after the discovery of fraud. in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, Issue: marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their (1) Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the witnesses). Under Article 5 FC, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards marriage voib ab initio for lack of ML. not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage. (2) WON the action for nullity has prescribed because the complaint was filed after 7 In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over 18 years of age, and they voluntarily years from contracting marriage. contracted the second marriage with the required license before a Judge in the presence of at Held: least two witnesses. (1) Yes. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite ML or Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior ML is a clear violation vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore prevent by making a prior ML a prerequisite for a valid marriage. a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely Hannah Cris A. 10

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Ratio: Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the 1930. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the ML, and not to the evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no absence of one. Here, there is no ML at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas validity are. cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things no affidavit at all. have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. (2) No. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas Once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached fact. except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time. Under Title VI of the FC, there are only two classes of children legitimate and Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the fiveillegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period eliminated. Art 172 FC provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Jacintos birth certificate is a record immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private continuity that is unbroken. respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the Decision: Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, documents required by Art172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto. is AFFIRMED.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL. vs. CA, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992 Facts: Lupo married 3 times and had children in all 3 marriages. He died without a will. The children of the first and second marriages were able to partition among themselves parcels of land, leaving behind the children from third marriage. This prompted them to file an action for partition and alleged that they have been prejudiced in their rights. Issue: Ruling: In view of the foregoing, private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner The registration in the names of petitioners of the titles to the properties is not an act of repudiation of the co-ownership.

11

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper JR. vs. NORMA BAYADOG interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000 Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on 26Sept1974. Out of their except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect death on April 24, 1985. On 11Dec1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to married without any ML. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 FC. On the contrary, the property stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On 19Feb1997, Pepito died in a car children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it for lack of a ML. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing. invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since Issue2: WON the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage null and void ab initio. under Article 47 FC. Ruling: Yes Issue1: WON petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their Ratio: There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent fathers marriage void after his death. Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an Ruling: Yes affidavit stating that they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire Ratio: Article 47 FC cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of to marry each other. The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 NCC to warrant the counting of the trial court, which allows the sane spouse to file an annulment suit at any time five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage before the death of either party is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a is nnullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period? source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as husband and wife where the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from 12

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately voidab initio because of the absence of such element. before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not require a computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly court of competent jurisdiction.[ Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. It is not like a voidable marriage in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 FC expressly provides that In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a husband and wife. Having determined that the second marriage involved in this final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous 13

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived marriage void in Article 40 FC connotes that such final judgment need not be together for several years producing two offsprings, now adults themselves. It obtained only for purpose of remarriage. took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. We are not ready to JAIME O.SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006 and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. Facts: On 19May1969, Jaime O. Sevilla, through machinations, duress and MERCEDITA MATA ARAES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latters father, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002 retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the AFP, married Carmelita. According to Jaime, he Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges Judge Occiano with Gross never applied for a ML for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the MTC of obtain any ML from any Civil Registry, consequently, no ML was presented to the solemnizing officer. Balatan, Camarines Sur. Mercedita alleges that Judge Occiano solemnized Issue: WON the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of ML and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this initio. marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a Ruling: No nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was Ratio: Pertinent provisions of the NCC which was the law in force at the time of the not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of marriage of the parties are Articles 53, 58 & 80. Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. Petitioner prays that marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception. sanctions be imposed against respondent judge. Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that hope and Issue1: WON the judge should be disciplined/sanctioned by the court. understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above Ruling: Yes problem. It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Ratio: The territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its loaded work. Likewise, both in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he issued. allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein. issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. 14

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a ML to impugn the validity of his Issue2: WON the judge should be exculpated due to the Affidavit of Desistance marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a ML as a ground for executed by the complainant. considering the marriage void are clear-cut. Ruling: No In Republic of the Philippines v. CA, the LCR issued a certification of due search Ratio: Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that ML No. 3196182 was issued to the filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the parties. The Court held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating entry as to the purported ML, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. of a ML. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a ML that would Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. render the marriage void ab initio. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for In Cario v. Cario, the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S.Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no ML number and, as certified by act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts constitutional power to the LCR of San Juan, MM, their office has no record of such ML. The court held that the discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a ML. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary ML and not being one of disciplining authority. Decision: Judge Salvador M. Occiano is fined P5,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA vs ROSITA A. ALCANTARA G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007 Facts: A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by Restituto against Rosita. On 8Dec1982, he married Rosita without securing the required ML. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a ML. The alleged ML, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the MC, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license. On 14Oct1985, Rosita gave birth to their child Rose Ann . In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Issue: WON the marriage is null and void for lack of ML where the evidence relied upon is the certification given by the LCR. Ruling: No Ratio: The requirement and issuance of a ML is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.

the marriages exempt from the ML requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. In Sy v. CA, the ML was issued on 17Sept1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15Nov 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a ML. In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a ML which rendered the marriage void. Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a ML, the law requires that the absence of such ML must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the LCR that no such ML was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a ML number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the LCR of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the ML was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a ML was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the ML was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a ML was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.

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Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the ML, claims that Issue: WON the marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a ML at the time of neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there the ceremony. is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a ML in a city Ruling: Yes or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a ML Ratio: From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on Sept despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on Nov15, 1973. The publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively Article 80 NCC is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an liable. exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the ML number in the respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79NCC. certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to We thus conclude that under Article 80 NCC, the marriage between petitioner and the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the ML number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to private respondent is void from the beginning. assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage Republic of the Philippines vs Cipriano Orbecido III contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the ML may read either as GR No. 154380 5Oct2005 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva existence and issuance of said ML to the parties. Hannah Cris A. FILIPINA Y. SY vs. CA, RTC, and FERNANDO SY G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000 Facts: Filipina Y. Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage on 15Nov1973. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll. On 15Sept1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses have been living separately, and their 2 children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his fathers residence 15May1988, and from then on, lived with his father. On 11Feb1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation. The action was later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties. Filipina was granted custody of the children. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. Filipina testified that she suffered injuries and was even choked by Fernando. A declaration for nullity was also sought by Filipina and she alleged that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their ML. at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz and Lady Kimberly. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the US bringing along their

son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Article 26(2) FC. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? Ruling: Yes Ratio: The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26

as follows:
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Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR and Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and RICHARD UPTON G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse Facts: Alice is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard is a citizen of the US. They capacitating him or her to remarry. were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and they begot two children. The parties were divorced in The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time Nevada, USA, in 1982 and Alice has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid On 8 June1983, Richard filed suit against Alice stating that her business in divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking remarry. that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein Richard had acknowledged that he and her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife petitioner had no community property as of 11June1982. The Court below denied subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Article 26(2) are both is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding. should be allowed to remarry. Issue: WON the divorce decree granted by a Nevada Court is valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy. Orbecido must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as Ruling: YES!!! an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be Ratio: Pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the would have no standing to sue in the case below as Alices husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

To maintain, as Richard does, that, under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard and still subject to a wifes obligations under Article 109 NCC cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

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Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 Facts: On 7Sept1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for complaint or petition. some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born In cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis--vis the accused on April 20, 1980. Marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal eventuated in Erich initiating a divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany in effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is Jan1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status living apart since April1982. of persons. Erich, being no longer the husband of Imelda, had no legal standing to In Manila, Imelda, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at support and separation of property. On 15Jan1986, the German Court promulgated a the time he filed suit. decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The records The allegation of Erich that he could not have brought this case before the show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of On 27June1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for decree, Erich filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no alleging that, while still married to him, Imelda had an affair with a certain William spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would 1983. not affect or cast obloquy on the other. Issue: Whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former Republic of the Philippines vs Crasus Iyoy against the latter. G.R. No. 152577 21Sept2005 Ruling: Yes Facts: Crasus married Fely on 16Dec1961. As a result of their union, they had five Ratio: Under Article 344 RPC, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes children. After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered that Fely was against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, U.S.A., leaving all of their children. Sometime in 1985, Crasus learned that Fely got that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came requirement. 18

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS back to the Philippines with her American family. Fely returned to the Philippines nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the several times more. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a Fely left and abandoned Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to between them. Crasus finally alleged Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 FC, by constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos, Crasus must still have complied to Articles 68, 70, and 72 FC. with the requirement laid down in Republic v. CA and Molina that the root cause of In her answer, Fely asserted therein that she was already an American citizen the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. After securing a divorce from be fully explained. respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American Issue2: WON the divorce can be recognized here in relation to Art26(2) FC. citizenship. Ruling: No Issue: WON Felys psychological incapacity was established. Ratio: Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple Ruling: No getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage Ratio: The totality of evidence presented by Crasus failed miserably to establish the was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot PI of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time void under Article 36 FC. Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date The only substantial evidence presented by Crasus before the RTC was his was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the US in of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed Contract between Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16Dec1961; for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle and (2) the invitation to the wedding of their eldest son, in which Fely used her embodied in Article 15 NCC, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights American husbands surname. and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 FC contemplates downright incapacity abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. respondent Crasus. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, WOLFGANG O. ROEHR vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ & HON. and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA incapacity under the said Article. G.R. No. 142820. June 20, 2003 The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and Facts: Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married embarrassed Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on 11Dec1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage extravagance; her abandonment of Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her was subsequently ratified on 14Feb1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine. manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; 19

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Facts: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis On 28Aug1996, Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his marriage. On 6Feb1997, Roehr filed a motion to dismiss. It was denied. On lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia 5June1997, Roehr filed a MFR but was also denied. Meanwhile, Roehr Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born 6 children. obtained a decree of divorce from the CFI of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on 16Dec1997. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with Issue: whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on 15Oct1971, Merry Lee, an American Ruling: citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce in Hawaii, U.S.A., which issued a Decree Ratio: A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on 14Dec1973. provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held Sagalongos, before in LA, CA, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on 18Dec1992. Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On 17Dec1993, she filed a petition In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated for letters of administration. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce 16Dec1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the 26 FC and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. Thereafter, custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner. Felicisimos children from his first marriage asserted that Felicidads marriage to As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argued that paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, e.g.on custody, care and support of the children, must still be cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment administration. had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Issue: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly Edgar San Luis vs Felicidad San Luis G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 RODOLFO SAN LUIS vs FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 remarry under the NCC, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. Ruling: Yes Ratio: In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the FC, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. 20

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and his office. capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that if the foreigner obtains a valid G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006 foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Facts: Clemente G. Bailon contracted 3 marriages. On April 25, 1955, Clemente law. and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15 years The Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce later or on 9Oct1970, Bailon filed a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. By is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Order of 10Dec1970, the CFI granted the petition. Sometime in 1958, Clemente Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already began cohabiting as husband and wife with Elisa Jayson. Close to 13 years after his established through judicial precedent. wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on 8Aug1983, Bailon contracted Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance marriage with Teresita Jarque. intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, On 30Jan1998, Clemente died. Teresita filed a claim for funeral benefits and relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and shared for additional claim for death benefits. The children from the second marriage also commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the filed claims. It was alleged that Alice, the first wife, and Elisa, the second wife, were society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other still alive. remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid Issue: divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case. Ruling: Petitioners cite Articles 15and 17NCC in stating that the divorce is void under Ratio: A subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid until declared null Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly and void by a competent court. It follows that the onus probandi in these cases obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have rests on the party assailing the second marriage. vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the remarriage. Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and Under the NCC, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or Under the FC, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy necessary. thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued 21

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the Ratio: The respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias right to due process effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the FC, the applicable law to determine their validity when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the is the NCC which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally period, was still pending resolution. except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only What happened in the case is a classic example of railroading or procedural during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the short-cut. Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, The respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs. Bailons and respondents marriage prior to the formersdeath in 1998, respondent is Macias Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr. Macias rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter, considered the case submitted for decision despite Mrs. Macias filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying her Motion to Dismiss. In holding the trial of MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA the case up to its completion, the respondent judge had acted utterly oblivious to the A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1861. July 30, 2004 Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the pending Motion for Reconsideration. verified Complaint of Margie Corpus-Macias accusing Ochotorena of bias, partiality It is also worth mentioning that even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to and violation of judicial conduct in connection with his disposition of a Civil Case for the complaint after the period therefore had elapsed, the respondent judge was not declaration of nullity of marriage. authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court A verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed against prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of Margie by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias. The case was raffled to the respondents marriage. court. On the same day the Complaint was filed, the Judge Ochoterena immediately issued Summons to Margie. However, the Summons was not served on her because JUDGE MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS vs. MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS her whereabouts were allegedly unknown. Consequently, Marciano filed a motion to G.R. No. 149617. September 3, 2003 serve summons by publication. Judge Ochoterena granted the motion, with the Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of directive that Margie should file her answer within 30 days after notice. Thereafter, Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decisiondated July 13, 2001 and the Mariano caused the publication of the Summons in the local weekly newspaper. Resolutiondated August 30, 2001, both rendered by the CA in Margie Corpus Margie claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons during the Macias vs. Hon. Wilfredo G. Ochotorena and Hon. Judge Mariano Joaquin S. first week of April 2001. Without delay, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she set Macias. for hearing. However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the respondent judge Issue: set the hearing on the merits of the subject case one day before. After the scheduled Ruling: hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case Ratio: In the case at bar, the trial court did not observe the rudimentary principle of submitted for decision. Margie believes that the respondent judge deprived her of due process enshrined in our Constitution. Neither did it comply with pertinent the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and partiality for Mr. Macias. procedural rules. More to the point, the trial court, without even waiting for respondents Issue: motion for reconsideration of the April 19, 2001 Order denying her motion to Ruling: dismiss, hurriedly set the case for hearing. Also, without allowing the respondent to 22

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS file her answer to the petition and knowing there was no joinder of issues as yet, the manifestation, stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not trial court hastily authorized petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte. actively participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of Pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the case, nothing more was heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any amended, where the defending party fails to file his or her answer to the petition, the step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings. trial court should order the prosecutor to intervene for the State by conducting an The Family Code mandates: investigation to determine whether or not there was collusion between the Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute parties. Here, the trial court disregarded such procedure. Obviously, the summary nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or proceeding is a patent nullity. fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to And assuming arguendo that there was an answer filed by the respondent, prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence still, the hearing of the case on May 2 and 3, 2001 is a procedural flaw. As stated at is not fabricated or suppressed. the outset, respondent received the notice of hearing only on May 8, 2001. So how could she be present in court on May 2 and 3? In the cases referred to in the preceeding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. We are convinced that respondents fundamental right to due process was blatantly transgressed by the trial court. And resultantly, the proceedings conducted, Since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented including the trial courts Decision, are void for lack of due process. (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social Indeed, in depriving respondent her constitutional and procedural right to due institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere proprocess, the trial court gravely abused its discretion. It is, therefore, imperative that forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the instant case for declaration of nullity of marriage be litigated anew in accordance the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. with the Rules. The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case not just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN vs. PHILIPP T. SIN Appeals as well. Other than the manifestation filed with the trial court on G.R. No. 137590. March 26, 2001 16Nov1994, the State did not file any pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage Facts: On 4Jan1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and of the proceedings. Philipp T. Sin, a Portugese citizen, were married in Manila. In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, while we upheld the validity of the marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court On September 20, 1994, Florence filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of as prematurely rendered since the investigating prosecutor was not given an marriage against Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. This documentary and testimonial evidence. Throughout the proceedings, the State did not stresses the importance of the participation of the State. participate. The petition was dismissed. Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this Issue: WON it is still necessary for the State to participate in an action for the being within the province of the trial court upon proper re-trial. declaration of nullity of marriage although it was later dismissed by the court. Decision: Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial. Ruling: Yes REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO Ratio: Throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005 proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson filed with the trial court a 23

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Facts: Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987. It was fortunate, though, that the CA, acting through its Special Fourth Division, Out of this marriage, she begot three (3) children. Before they got married in 1987, with Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion as Acting Chairman and ponente, denied the Gloria was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent Republics appeal and affirmed without modification the final and executory character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being judgment of the lower court. unable to engage in any gainful work. But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was behind and decided to go back to her parents together with her 3 children. From the immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The CA at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his relatives. acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright On 14Aug2000, 9 years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified on that ground. petition the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the FC. The petition was granted and the court declared the presumptive Lolita Enrico vs HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND death/absence of Francisco Lorino, Jr. The problem came about when the judge gave TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. due course to the Republics appeal upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal, and had ARTICULO the entire records of the case elevated to the CA. This is a violation of Art. 247 FC. G.R. No. 173614 28Sept2007 Under the said provision, the judgment will be immediately final and executory. Facts: The heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and Lolita D. Enrico. Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14June1962. They begot 7 children, Issue: WON the judgment could be appealed. herein respondents. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26Aug2004, Eulogio married Ruling: No Lolita. 6 months later, or on 10Feb 2005, Eulogio passed away. In impugning Lolitas marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same Ratio: In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the FC, there is no reglementary was entered into without the requisite ML. They argued that Article 34FC, which period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least 5 years thereunder, by express provision of Art 247FC are immediately final and without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to executory. It was erroneous, therefore to give due course to the Republics appeal Lolita and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the CA. circumstances required by said provision. To further their cause, respondents raised An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in which made its performance impossible. Veloria vs. Comelec, the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due Lolita maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the 247 FC, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are requirement of a ML. From their union were born 2 children. immediately final and executory, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the Issue: WON the compulsory heirs can file a petition for declaration of nullity of parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for marriage. declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to Ruling: No appeal the RTC decision. 24

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Ratio: A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional SC En Banc : Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz: 1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the 1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of Section 2, par. (a) that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a paragraph a] petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void. prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the NCC, which was the law in quo . Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongs to a different declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or effectivity of the FC. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect Eulogio was celebrated in 2004. their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question in its scope, to wit: the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. CA and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993 Facts: Delia Soledad A. Domingo and Roberto Domingo were married 29Nov1976. Unbeknownst to Delia, Roberto already had a valid subsisting marriage. He was 25

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS married to Emrlina Dela Paz on 25April1969. This fact only came to Delias and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, attention when Emerlina sued both her and Roberto for bigamy in 1983. consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . Furthermore, Roberto was entirely dependent on her for support since he was ." As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of unemployed. She had been working in Saudi Arabia since 23Jan1979 and would only contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of return to the Philippines for one-month vacations every year. She also found out that both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential during her absence, Roberto had been cohabiting with another woman. When asked requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal to return her properties, he did not. Hence, Delia filed a petition to declare their effect and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be marriage null and void. reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the Issue: WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage. ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an Ruling: Yes, it is necessary. It can be filed for other purposes than remarriage. official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the Ratio: Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone. party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other Issue2: WON a petition for separation of property has to be filed in order to recover than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and Delias properties. separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the Ruling: No custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' Ratio: When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party previous judicial proceedings." who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter Delia 's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous relations governing them. marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR. acceptable? A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995 Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an Facts: This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr. protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the FC characterizes it as "a special Lupo had 2 children with Yolanda De Castro. He found out that Judge contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance Brillantes had been cohabiting with Yolanda. On the other hand, Judge Brillantes was with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." So crucial are marriage 26

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that Facts: Gregorio was a seaman. He had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. On 15Jan1982, De Castro inside the latter's office. Gregorio married Janet in Antique. After the marriage celebration, he obtained Judge Brillantes claimed that when he married De Castro on December 4, another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents. While 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was working overseas, Gregorio received a letter from his mother informing him that single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. He further argued Janet had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had that the provision of Article 40 FC does not apply to him considering that his first left. Gregorios efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the NCC; while the second proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the FC. the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. Issue: WON FC is applicable and a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is Hence, Gregorio filed a petition to declare Janet presumptively dead. necessary to remarry. Issue: WON has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. Ruling: Yes, FC is applicable. Ruling: No Ratio: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Ratio: Here are 4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 FC on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under FC: Article 256 FC, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, case. Civil Code; DOROTHY B. TERRE vs. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992 Facts: Jordan was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by Dorothy Terre. Dorothy was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin, with this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre succesfully convinced complainant that her marriage was void ab initio and they are free to contract marriage. After getting the complainant pregnant, Jordan abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem believing again that her previous marriage was also void ab initio. Issue: WON Atty. Jordan Terre be disbarred. Ruling: Yes Ratio: The SC ordered disbarment of respondent finding his conduct 'grossly immoral' and is in violation of Sec 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO 27 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS The Court believes that Gregorio failed to conduct a search for his missing Ratio: The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead. goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief present spouse. that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the chided her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast that it would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. We do not consider that single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search. marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. Republic of the Philippines vs CA & Alan B. Alegro It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005 his parents-in-law about Leas whereabouts considering that Leas father was the Facts: On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition for the declaration of owner of Radio DYMS. presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. Alan & Lea were married on The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and 20Jan1995. They had a fight on 6Feb1996. After that, Lea did not return to their the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG house anymore. Alan looked for his wife in her parents house but she was not there. filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC. He also asked her friends as to her whereabouts but he found nothing. Alan even left In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he for Manila on 27Aug1995to look for Lea there. He decided to work as a part-time taxi had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead. returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed. Alan subsequently filed a petition to declare Lea Prsumptively dead. After JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004 General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On 8Jan2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA Facts: Juanita Carating-Siayngco & Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June which rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC. 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CAs decision could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, alleging that respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded who they named Jeremy. belief that Lea was already dead. It averred that the respondent failed to exercise On 25 September 1997, or after 24 years of married life together, Manuel filed reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of Issue: WON Alan had a well-founded belief that Lea was dead. petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an Ruling: No 28

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere extremely volatile and bellicose nature. showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity Juanita argued that they had a happy marriage. She said that Manuel had a paramour and it was the paramour who encouraged him to file the petition. Issue: WON the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Ruling: No Ratio: Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.[ In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. The report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive. Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination. Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out. DAVID B. DEDEL vs. CA & SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent. G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004 Facts: David B. Dedel married Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel on 28Sept1966. The union produced four children. Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men. Sharon was once treated by a clinical psychiatrist. Despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. David accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on 9Dec1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Dr. Dayan, an expert witness during the trial, declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. After trial, the petition was granted. Issue: Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity? Ruling: No 29

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Ratio: In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being Ratio: Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of assumption thereof, It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. four children. It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in FC. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sexual promiscuity. sublime social institution. At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. CA and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH separation under Article 55FC. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos that BUENAVENTURA Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005 rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on July interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of both him and his wife, the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal Isabel Singh Buenaventura. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the separation, not for declaring a marriage void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church. CHI MING TSOI vs. CA and GINA LAO-TSOI G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 Facts: On May 22, 1988, Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao-Tsoi. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. Hence, Gina filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Issue: WON the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Ruling: Yes
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. The petition was granted by the TC and Isabel was granted the following: damages, one-half of the retirement benefits of Noel from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of his shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies. The last 2 were given as a result of the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. Grounds for PI Noel deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work. Issue: WON damages can be awarded when there is a finding of PI. Ruling: No Ratio: The CA and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his PI, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful

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Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a The provisions on co-ownership under the NCC, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in product of PI, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while relation to Articles 102 and 129 FC, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between commonentering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 FC, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially For the same reason, since PI means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact. present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of 42FC, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the exemplary damages cannot stand since the NCC provides that exemplary damages are subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his PI, and his one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners PI, latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the Article 148 FC. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation the provisions of the FC on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer 2, FC, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, to have Issue2: WON Isabel should get of the retirement. been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the coRuling: Yes. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner ownership. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Ratio: When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA and RORIDEL OLAVIANO therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the MOLINA spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings. G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted Facts: Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985. They had a son, Andre or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the O. Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and contrary is proved. Hannah Cris A. irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with 31

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his "protected" by the state. parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. Sometime in February 1986, The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole thepermanence, inviolability and solidarity breadwinner of the family. In October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged. In March 1987, Roridel resigned (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court them. Roridel then claimed that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the king to be served. application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must Issue: WON there was PI. Ruling: Yes
Ratio: In Leouel Santos vs. CA, this Court ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." And hat "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness. The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 FC are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 FC as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 FC in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

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Hannah Cris A.

Echavez

gorgeous hannah

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(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. Since the purpose of including such provision in our FC is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the FC provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within 15 days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on 29Aug1988.
Issue: WON the marriage is void because of the vitiated consent of Orlando. Ruling: No Ratio: The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.

Orlando Villanueva vs CA & Lilia Canalita-Villanueva G.R. No. 132955 27OCT2006 Facts: Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-

Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988. On 17Nov1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that

Leonilo Antonio vs Marie F. Ivonne Reyes G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 Facts: Leonilo and Marie got married on 6Dec1990. Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died 5 months later. On 8 March 1993, Leonilo filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 FC alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that 33

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the subsists up to the present. time this case was tried by the RTC more than 10 years ago. From the totality of the As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were Herrera Abcede , a psychiatrist, and Dr. ArnulfoV. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that Maries persistent and constant the degree that annulment was warranted. lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, Oppositor. since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair G.R. No. 161793 13Feb2009 with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was Facts: Around 3 months after their first meeting, Edward Kenneth Ngo Te eloped psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. with Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te. On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the Issue: WON the marriage of Leonilo & Marie is void on the ground of Maries PI. two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. The two then Ruling: Yes continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe Ratio: In Pesca v. Pesca, the Court countered was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Later, Edward escaped from the house of an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. In June 1996, Edward was constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. Yet we approach this able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one ways. that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there After almost four years, or on 18Jan2000, Edward filed a petition for the was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal incapacity. necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not Issue: W hether, based on Art36 FC, the marriage between the parties is null and accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there void. would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially Ruling: Yes, Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of 1996 is thus, declared null and void. incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological Ratio: In the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality court level. disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, 34

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday William argued that since Lucita is guilty of abandonment, the petition for LS decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) FC. William said that since Lucita herself decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes has given ground for LS by abandoning the family simply because of a quarrel and they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed in the are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or administration of petitioners in-laws, no decree of LS should be issued in her favor. helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As Issue: WON the petition for LS should be granted. clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the Ruling: Yes persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as Ratio: Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her Art. 56, par. (4) of the FC which provides that legal separation shall be denied when being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the the FC is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision. limitations imposed by society. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her Republic of the Philippines vs Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio threats of blackmail and of committing suicide. G.R. No. 171042 June 30, 2008 Hernandez v. CA emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to Facts: Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on 12Aug1997. Less establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it than three years later or on 12Oct2000, Lynnette filed a complaint for existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Martinis requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be psychological incapacity. Lynnette claimed that Martini was a Mamas personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to boy. sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, The court granted the petition however the OSG protested. The medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. OSG said that Martinis abandonment is a ground for LS and not for ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs LUCITA G. ONG G.R. NO. 153206 October 23, 2006 Facts: William and Lucita were married on 13July1975 . They have 3 children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) FC alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. The physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon [Lucita] by [William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. She even presented the doctor who examined her injuries.

annulment of marriage.
Issue: WON the expert testimony of the doctor was enough to establish PI. Ruling: No Ratio: Dr. Gerong found that Martinis personality disorders including his being a mamas boy are serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period and incurable and concluded that Martini appeared to be dependent upon his family and unable to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family. The doctors findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her sister and Lynnettes deposition. From Lynnettes deposition, however, it is gathered that Martinis failure to establish a common life with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or 35

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS her business ventures and became the primary provider for the family. Allegedly, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on the ground of PI. In another vein, how the doctor arrived at the conclusion, after Wilson was also physically abusive to her and the children. They separated in 1992. interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition, that any such personality The most serious fight happened in 1994 and that was when Brenda filed a petition to disorders of Martini have been existing since Martinis adolescent years has not been declare their marriage void due to the PI of Wilson. The petition was granted by the explained. It bears recalling that Martini and Lynnette became pen pals in 1995 and RTC but it was reversed by the CA. The CA claimed that Wilson should have been contracted marriage in 1997 when Martini was already 32 years old, far removed from subjected to personal medical or psychological examination adolescent years. Issue: WON a personal medical or psychological examination is needed to establish Dr. Gerongs citing of Martinis appointment of his mother as a beneficiary PI. and his representing himself as single in his Seafarer Information Sheet, without more, Ruling: No. The personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not as indications of Martinis dependence on his family amounting to his incapacity to a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality fulfill his duties as a married man does not logically follow, especially given that the of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. Seafarers Information Sheet is not even datedand, therefore, there is no certainty that Ratio: The guidelines (Rep. vs CA & Molina) incorporate the three basic it was prepared after Martini contracted marriage. requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. CA, "psychological While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) psychological incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be medically incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine or clinically identified. There must thus be evidence to adequately establish the the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause same. There is none such in the case at bar, however. may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Marriage, an indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to need not be resorted to. show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in Article 36 FC, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious nullity. psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It Decision: Lynnettes marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of the and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. insufficient evidence presented. Issue2: Whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically BRENDA B. MARCOS, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS incapacitated. G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000 Facts: Brenda and Wilson got married on 6Sept1982. They had 5 children. Wilson Ruling: No was a member of the AFP and he was one of President Marcos Presidential Guards. Ratio: Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide When Pres. Marcos left, Wilson also asked to be formally discharged from the material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and service. He made some business ventures but none were successful. He never had abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological gainful employment. Brenda, on the other hand, also worked as an escort for Imee incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already Marcos. She left the service at the same Wilson did. She, however, was successful in present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. 36

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost Ratio: The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left moral support, and even left the family home. him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from driver. Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Noel B. Baccay vs Maribel C. Baccay & Republic of the Philippines Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to G.R. No. 173138 1Dec2010 Facts: Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology. sustain one.[24] Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found law. attractive. On 23Nov1998, they got married after Maribel informed Noel that she The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove was pregnant. that private respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel lived with Noels family in psychological disorder renders her truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants their house. During all the time she lived with them, Maribel remained aloof and did that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. not go out of her way to endear herself to them. Maribel never contributed to the Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a familys coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. is not a null and void marriage. Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. In January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. CA and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999 miscarriage. Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February Facts: Lucita and Mario met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in 1999. The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole Dasmarias, Cavite. Mario, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive household. Maribel left Noels house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer his communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted teacher. to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls. Lucita Estrella Hernandez and Mario C. Hernandez were married 1Jan1981. 3 On 11Sept2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a children were born to them. On 10July1992, petitioner filed a petition seeking the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC found that Maribel failed to annulment of her marriage to Mario on the ground of PI of the latter. She alleged that perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, Mario failed to personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his Issue: WON the PI was sufficiently proved. friends. She further claimed that Mario, after they were married, cohabited with Ruling: No another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with 37

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, Mario endangered her health G.R. No. 167139 25Feb2010 by infecting her with a STD. Facts: Susie & Jesse were married in June of 1989. They were blessed with 2 sons: Issue: WON the marriage is void due to Marios PI. Justin, who was born in Canada in 1990 and Russel, who was born in the Philippines Ruling: No in 1993. In 2001, 12 years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the annulment Ratio: In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to of the marriage under Art 36 FC. establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the file pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondents omnibus motion to amend essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. No evidence was the partial judgment as regards the custody of the children and the properties in her presented to show that Mario was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It possession. Petitioner claims the trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying was not sufficiently proved that Mario was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due solely on the testimony of respondent. Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Lucita says applying to her motion to dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of that at the outset of their marriage, Mario showed lack of drive to work for his Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner family. Marios parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his argues that if indeed the provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family. retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on Issue: Whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the himself. For a greater part of their marital life, Mario was out of job and did not have trial court have attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process. the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, Ruling: Yes, the decision has attained finality. and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents Ratio: The decision annulling the marriage had already become final and executory condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very when the husband failed to appeal during the reglementary period. The husband objectives of marriage. claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity to due process. He argued he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the evidence and rendered judgment based solely on the evidence presented by private Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered respondent. We upheld the judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it was based personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the solely on evidence presented by therein private respondent. essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondents We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client of an adverse Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the judgment resulting in the loss of the latters right to appeal is not a ground for setting precise cause of private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the reglementary 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social period to appeal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolution, which the trial court received on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed out of resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. time. Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioners loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial courts judgments. Susie Chan-Tan vs Jesse C. Tan 38

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 RPC. counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court. Records show petitioner, That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by motion. then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy When petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without case. We cannot allow that. any timely appeal having been filed by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and NOTE: Jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage the 17 May 2004 resolution may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated has been characterized as conflicting. In People v. Mendoza,[ a bigamy case involving an accused motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the petitioners motion to dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. The reason is was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon, which at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some involved substantially the same facts. definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has become final and executory, the But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda issues there should be laid to rest. VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000 Facts: On 27June1991, Dr. Vincent Paul Mercado married Consuelo Tan. They later had a son. However, on 22Jan1993, a charge for bigamy was filed against Vincent. Apparently, Vincent married Ma. Thelma Oliva on 10April1976. They had 2 children. On 13Nov1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, Vincent filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Issue: WON Vincent is guilty of bigamy. Ruling: Yes Ratio: In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a

de Consuegra v. GSIS, Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[ the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial

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Echavez

gorgeous hannah

CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x. Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity. In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: The FC has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.[ Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless,Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the FC, which came into effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.

Ratio: Erlinda failed to comply with the guidelines. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of PI must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged PI of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered. NOTE: WON PI exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis ofa priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to PI as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the TC. MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS vs BRIX FERRARIS G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006 Facts: This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by Ma. Armida PerezFerraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the CA. Issue: WON there is PI. Ruling: No Ratio: The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 FC, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate. 40

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001 Facts: On 7Sept1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old. They begot two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her. On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail on 22Oct1985. Avelino remains at-large to date. On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 FC. Issue: WON the TC and the CA correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 FC, on the ground that the husband suffers from PI as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice. Ruling: No

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not has a mixed personality disorder called schizoid, and why he is the dependent and by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on PI. avoidant type. In fact, Dr. Dayans statement that one suffering from such mixed While petitioners marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayans void ab initio on the ground of PI. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner and void marriage. herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents alleged LORNA GUILLEN PESCA vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001 inconclusive. She replied that such disorder can be part of his family upbringing x Facts: Lorna G. Pesca and Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on x x. She stated that there was a history of respondents parents having difficulties in board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondents they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the was really a natal or supervening disabling factor on the part of respondent, or an country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. The adverse integral element in respondents character that effectively incapacitated young couple established their residence in Caloocan City. It was blissful marriage him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together when obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondents supposed respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children. psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that Zosimo surprisingly the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum. "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-theapparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some and kick her. At one time, he chased Lorna with a loaded shotgun and threatened to debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from essential obligations of marriage. physical violence. On 22 March 1994, about 8am, Zosimo assaulted Lorna for about In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein respondent preferred to spend half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, submitted herself to medical examination then filed a complaint with the barangay depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife authorities. A case was filed against Zosimo for slight physical injuries. He was regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were convicted and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. Thereafter, Lorna sued more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of Zosimo for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking PI. some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and Issue: WON there is PI. conflicting personalities in no wise constitute PI; it is not enough to prove that the Ruling: No parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is Ratio: The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment psychological, not physical, illness. of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos 41

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos defects are incurab le when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, or grave. has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos. At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Rosa Yap Paras vs Justo J. Paras G. R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007
inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 FC is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 FC. Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. NOTE: In Dedel v. Court of Appeals, which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one of her many paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the marriage In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, the wifes inability to conceive led her husband to other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa, this Court declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable differencesand conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy, a Filipina left her husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of marriage; and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment per sedo not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Facts: Rosa met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy, Negro Oriental. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. On May 21, 1964, Rosa Yap married Justo. They begot 4 children. Their wedding was considered one of the most celebrated marriages in Bindoy. Justo lived the life of a bachelor. His usual routine was to spend time with his barkadas until the wee hours of the morning. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his barkadas. To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the US. Her sisters supported them throughout their two-year stay there. However, after 3 months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her Botica and other businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. Justo maintained a mistress and sired an illegitimate child. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras. Issue: WON PI was established. Ruling: No Ratio: While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. MANUEL G. ALMELOR vs Leonida T. Almelor There is no evidence that Justos defects were present at the inception of the marriage. His defects surfaced only the latter years when these events took place; their two children die G.R. No.in 179620 August 26, 2008 explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage.

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Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that Facts: Manuel G. Almelor & Leonida Trinidad were married on 29Jan1989. Their serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket union bore 3 children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After 11 years of marriage, Leonida failed to prove. filed a petition to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and JAIME F. VILLALON VS MARIA CORAZON N. VILLALON father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005 as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Leonida Facts: On 12July1996, Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Ma. complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has Corazon N. Villalon. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his PI which he claimed existed even prior to for his mother. Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her his marriage. According to Jaime, the manifestations of his PI were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida. Further adding to her woes was and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; his concealment to her of his homosexuality. (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false Leonida filed a petition to declare their marriage void on the ground of assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Manuels PI. She alleged that his homosexuality rendered him psychologically Jaime thus prayed that his marriage to Maria Corazon be declared null and void ab initio. incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. The TC annulled the marriage under After going steady for about two years, Jaime and Maria Corazon were married on 22April1978. Jaime claimed that he married respondent because he believed that it was the right time Art. 45. to raise a family and that she would be a good mother to his children. In the middle of 1993, Jaime Issue: WON homosexuality is a basis to establish PI. decided to separate from respondent. According to him, their marriage reached a point where there was Ruling: No no longer any communication between them and their relationship became devoid of love, affection,
Ratio: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se. No sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage. Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The FC has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
support and respect due to his constant urge to see other women. Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning with main symptoms of grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality. A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another. Issue: WON a serial or habitual adultere is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. Ruling: No Ratio: Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners personal history. In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioners general claim that on certain occasions he had two girlfriends at the same time, no details

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or explanations were given of such circumstances that would demonstrate petitioners inability to be faithful to respondent either before or at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Jaime failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder as self-centered, characterized by grandiose ideation and lack of empathy in relating to others, and one with Casanova Complex as a serial adulterer, the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms. Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a serial or habitual adulterer, as he wants the court to believe. As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart could be deemed womanizing, especially considering that these instances involved the same woman. In fact, at the time of respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship has been going on for six years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from Casanova Complex who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from PI. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. The evidence on record fails to convince us that petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36 FC. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was living with respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.

Issue: WON the findings of the TC are binding although the prosecuting attorney did not participate. Ruling: Yes Ratio: ANNULMENT, DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND LEGAL SEPARATION; PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OR FISCAL MAY BE ORDERED BY THE COURT TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF THE STATE TO PREVENT COLLUSION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. NON-INTERFERENCE OF A PROSECUTING ATTORNEY IS NOT FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT IF PETITIONER VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED THE ANNULMENT OF THEIR MARRIAGE IN THE SAID COURT. - The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court. LENI O. CHOA vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002 Facts: Leni & Alfonso were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, 2 children were born. On 27Oct1993, Alfonso filed a Complaintfor the annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration 44

EMILIO TUASON vs. CA and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996 Facts: In 1989, Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, Maria Victoria alleged that she and Emilio were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot 2 children. At the time of the marriage, Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife. In one of their fights, Emilio inflicted physical injuries on Maria Victoria which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him. Emilio used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated. Emilio was a womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife. After Emilio left the conjugal dwelling, he gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children. The prosecuting attorney did not intervene in behalf of the state when Emilio failed to appear in the scheduled hearings.

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS of nullity of his marriage to Leni based on her alleged PI. Leni also filed charges Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that Jordan was afflicted with against Alfonso for perjury, falso testimony, concubinage, and deportation. Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, Issue: WON there is PI when Leni filed cases against Alfonso. delinquency and instability. Gates concluded that Jordans psychological maladies Ruling: No antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background. Gates added that Ratio: The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged PI with no indication of reformation, Jordans personality disorder appears to be grave of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated and incorrigible. to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, Issue: WON Borderline Personality Disorder constitutes PI. even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the Ruling: No filings are sufficient to establish her PI is not only totally erroneous, but also GAD bordering on Ratio: ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A PARTY TO BE absurdity. The testimony of Alfonso basically complains about 3 aspects of petitioners personality; DECLARED PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED SHOULD BE namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their childre n, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention PERSONALLY EXAMINED BY A PHYSICIAN OR A PSYCHOLOGIST, THERE of procreative sexuality. None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological IS NEVERTHELESS A NEED TO PROVE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL incapacity. Far from it. INCAPACITY THROUGH INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife PERSON ALLEGING SAID DISORDER. could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. CORRESPONDINGLY, THE PRESENTATION OF EXPERT PROOF Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological inc apacity was grave PRESUPPOSES A THOROUGH AND IN-DEPTH ASSESSMENT OF THE enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. PARTIES BY THE PSYCHOLOGIST OR EXPERT, FOR A CONCLUSIVE In Molina, we affirmed that mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional DIAGNOSIS OF A GRAVE, SEVERE AND INCURABLE PRESENCE OF emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral IN THIS CASE, THE COURT NOTES THAT THE REPORT AND element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and TESTIMONY OF GATES ON JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. [ WERE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON HER INTERVIEWS WITH JEANICE AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF JEANICES TESTIMONY JORDAN CHAN PAZ vs JEANICE PAVON PAZ BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. GATES ONLY DIAGNOSED JORDAN FROM G.R. No. 166579 18Feb2010 THE STATEMENTS OF JEANICE, WHOSE BIAS IN FAVOR OF HER CAUSE Facts: Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in Nov1996. Jeanice was only 19 years old CANNOT BE DOUBTED. GATES DID NOT ACTUALLY HEAR, SEE AND while Jordan was 27 years old. They got married on 3 July 1997. They have one EVALUATE JORDAN. son, Evan Gaubert,. After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 23Feb1999. JORDANS ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS NOT On 15Sept1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage SHOWN TO BE SO GRAVE AND SO PERMANENT AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically incapable of THE AWARENESS OF THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE assuming the essential obligations of marriage. According to Jeanice, Jordans MATRIMONIAL BOND. AT BEST, JEANICES ALLEGATIONS SHOWED psychological incapacity was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be selfTHAT JORDAN WAS IRRESPONSIBLE, INSENSITIVE, OR EMOTIONALLY preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and IMMATURE. THE INCIDENTS CITED BY JEANICE DO NOT SHOW THAT abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied. At one point, Jordan JORDAN SUFFERED FROM GRAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MALADIES THAT threatened to hurt her with a pair of scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22 February PARALYZED JORDAN FROM COMPLYING WITH THE ESSENTIAL 1999, Jordan subjected her to verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit her with OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. a golf club. 45

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Issue: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code Ruling: Yes Ratio: A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony. Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.[9] Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: 1. 2. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC; and Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES TO RENDER A MARRIAGE VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY, NOT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT OR DIFFICULTY, MUCH LESS ILL WILL.[ THE MERE SHOWING OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. AS ALL PEOPLE MAY HAVE CERTAIN QUIRKS AND IDIOSYNCRASIES, OR ISOLATED CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN PERSONALITY DISORDERS, THERE IS HARDLY A DOUBT THAT THE INTENDMENT OF THE LAW HAS BEEN TO CONFINE THE MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO MARRIAGE. Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior which showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how such a personality disorder made Jordan psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. LIKEWISE, JEANICE WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH CERTAINTY THAT JORDANS ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS MEDICALLY OR CLINICALLY PERMANENT OR INCURABLE. GATES TESTIMONY ON THE MATTER WAS VAGUE AND INCONCLUSIVE. Isidro Ablaza vs Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 158298 11Aug2010
Facts: On 17Oct2000, the Isidro filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on 26Dec1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. He alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on 9Jan1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when.Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,[ the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:

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having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos bro ther and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 FC expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Art40FC connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One

Eduardo Manuel vs People of the Philippines G.R. No. 165842 29Nov2005

Facts: On 28July1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa. He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City in January 1996. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. They were married on April 22, 1996. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single. In 1999, Eduardo started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. In August 2001, Tina made inquiries from the NSO where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Eduardo claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina, whom he met while she was working as a GRO, believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Issue: WON judicial declaration of presumptive death is needed before Eduardo can remarry. Ruling: Yes Ratio: It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 RPC, in relation to Article 41 FC. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence,

47

Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to Ratio: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a discharge his burden. logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible. action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense Dean Ernesto L. Pineda says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal authorized for purposes of remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of essential elements are: procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The the criminal action; and judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may reappearance of the said absentee. proceed. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy. accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in some cases sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a his estate. Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the bigamous even if done in good faith. Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) NCC, which, however, the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 FC, which requires a summary hearing for the Article 40 FC, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry. requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may Under Article 238 FC, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, absent spouse under Article 41 FC may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 FC. to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. WON the first marriage was void for lack of a ML is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000 successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous Facts: On 21Oct1985, Isagani contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce B. Javier. marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, Isagani contracted a existence at the material time of the first marriage. second marriage with Imelda Marbella-Bobis on 25Jan1996 and allegedly a third marriage Parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on Imeldas complaint-affidavit, an information marriage , for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only for bigamy was filed against Isagani on 25Feb1998. Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how obvious, that it was celebrated without a ML. Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage resorted to. That is why Article 40 FC requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the Issue: Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the Ruling: No pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held Hannah Cris A. 48

Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never a marriage. married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the Hannah Cris A. LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004 Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for 4years. In 1984, Lucio received a card from Lucia from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. They were married on 30Aug1990. On 8Sept1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving Lucio behind. On 19Aug1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio which was granted by the court on 17Jan1992 and to take effect on 17Feb1992. On 4Oct1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago. On 21Sept1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. The complaint sought among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On 19Oct1993, Lucio was charged with Bigamy. Issue: WON Lucio & Lucia were validly married. Ruling: No Ratio: The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3and 4 FC. This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared voidab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIAS ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004 Facts: On 18Sept1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo. In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home. Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989,Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Bias. On 19Jan1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on 24Dec1955 before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has 4 children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on 10Jan1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military. 49

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Facts: On 18Aug1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Issue: WON an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage is a prejudicial Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September question to bigamy. 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and Ruling: No wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; and Ratio: Salvador claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or marriage was a PQ, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. He, in fact, eventually others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on 29Oct1999. the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.[ Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. During the pendency of the proceedings, Carmen died. Eufemio argued in court that the action should be dismissed because the death of Carmen abated the action for LS. On 26 June 1969, counsel for Carmen moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion. Issue: When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings? Ruling:

Ratio: The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition. Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come

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Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be Hannah Cris A.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 NCC could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, NCC, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL G.R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941 Facts: On March 16, 1926, Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married Elena Ramirez Cartagena. After 7 years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately. On June 15, 1935, Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his coaccused, Julia Medel, and since then they lived together as husband and wife. Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, Elena instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the other concubinage. Issue: WON there was consent on the part of Elena so as to preclude her from charging her husband with bigamy and concubinage. Ruling: Yes Ratio: Rodolfo should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other. As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, 51

ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962 Facts: On 24March1939, Elisea married Enrique R. Santamaria. On 18Jan1958, the court granted Enriques petition for LS. On 10May1960, Elisea filed a petition with the court to allow her to resume using her maiden name Elisea Laperal because of the legal separation and because of the fact that they have ceased to live together for many years. Issue: WON a wife who has been legally separated from her husband can use her maiden name. Ruling: No Ratio: Article 372 of the New Civil Code which reads: ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding. consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. In this arriving at this conclusion we do not with to be misconstrued as AGUEDA BENEDICTO vs. ESTEBAN DE LA RAMA legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be G.R. No. L-1056 December 8, 1903 Facts: This is an action for divorce. The complaint alleged, as the grounds therefor, taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties abandonment and adultery. The answer charged the plaintiff with adultery, denied the herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the adultery imputed to the defendant, and asked for a divorce. Judgment was rendered on July 5, offended party from prosecuting the offense. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933 Facts: Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for 3 years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. When she met Marcelo Ramos, he took her and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo for adultery and both were convicted. After completing her sentence, Ursula left her paramour. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife it he would take care her back. He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went back to Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for Hawaii where she remained for 7 years completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the second charge of adultery. Issue: WON there was consent by the husband. Ruling: Yes Ratio: Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he

1902, in favor of the plaintiff, granting her divorce and 81,042.76 pesos as her share of the conjugal property. Esteban found out that Agueda had been having an affair with Zabal, the sergeant of the police. Agueda then confessed about the affair. Consequently, Esteban brought Agueda to her parents house and left her there. It was late established that Esteban also had illicit relations with Georgia. Issue: WON the divorce can be granted on the ground of adultery where both parties committed it. Ruling: No Ratio: It is said that if the plaintiff is guilty the defendant has condoned the offense. It is not necessary to determine upon this point where the truth lies for two reasons: (1) the court below made no finding of fact on the subject; (2) even if it had found that there was condonation this would not have entitled the plaintiff to a divorce.lawphil.net By Law 6, title 9, partida 4, the wife can defeat the husband's suit for divorce by proving that he has pardoned her. But we have found no laws in the partidas which say that the effect of that pardon would be so far-reaching as to entitle her to a divorce against him in a case like the present one. On the contrary it is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: For the sin of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other. Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce.

WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957 Facts: On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit obtain LS from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. While William was interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl. William learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment. Thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a 52

Hannah Cris A. Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the Facts: Alleging abandonment and concubinage, Socorro Matubis, filed on April 24, erring wife as her share. The wife defaulted. The fiscal intervened and established 1956, a complaint for legal Separation and changed of surname against her husband that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten defendant Zoilo Praxedes children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on Socorro and Zoilo were legally married on 10Jan1943. For failure to agree on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action. live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. Issue: WON LS can be granted where both spouses are guilty. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, the significant Ruling: No portions of which are hereunder reproduced. (a) That both of us relinquish our right Ratio: Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married persons in procuring over the other as legal husband and wife. (b) That both without any interference by a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce other crime or suit arising from our separation. proceedings", it was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default was calculated, or agreed upon, In Jan 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and on to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without 1Sept1955, said Asuncion gave birth to a child. It was shown also that Zoilo and regard to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is obviously the fact of Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it bars him from such in the community. After the trial, without the Zoilo adducing any evidence, the claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. court a quo rendered judgment holding that the acts of defendant constituted Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they concubinage, a ground for LS. may justifiably be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses. Issue: WON the petition for LS should be granted. Ruling: No It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Ratio: Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no appear upon the record. Hence, there being at least two well established statutory condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or grounds for denying the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy and prescription of the action). JOEL JIMENEZ vs. REMEDIOS CAIZARES Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant. G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960 SOCORRO MATUBIS vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960
Facts: Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950 upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation and for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.

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Echavez gorgeous hannah CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She Issue: Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the did not file an answer. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law. defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine Ruling: Yes her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, Ratio: The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of a medical certificate on the result thereof. Remedios continued to refuse to submit to a their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. In the physical examination. The TC granted the petition. This was opposed by the state because of case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property the lack of medical examination of the wife. and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they have Issue: Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone creditors who will be prejudiced by the said arrangements. testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. Ruling: No It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been separated in fact for at least Ratio: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at five years - the wife's residence being in Manila, and the husband's in the conjugal securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really home in Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch as a lengthy separation has supervened impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the between them, the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking manifest. part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression MANUEL J. C. REYES vs. HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, CA and CELIA of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, ILUSTRE-REYES bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979 competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this Facts: Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should attempted to kill plaintiff. Celia asked for support pendete lite. Manuel refused not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the because he claimed that Celia was an adulteress. ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. Issue: WON Celia is entitled to support. Hannah Cris A. ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-23482 August 30, 1968 CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON vs. ALFONSO LACSON G.R. No. L-23767 August 30, 1968 ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON G.R. No. L-24259 August 30, 1968 Facts: Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married on 14Feb1953. To them were born 4 children. On 9Jan1963, Carmen left the conjugal home. She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself. They made a compromise agreement regarding the custody of their children, support, and the properties. Ruling: Yes Ratio: It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the alleged adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action. In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite, the Manuel did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.

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Hannah Cris A. Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio: Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Echavez

gorgeous hannah

CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Facts: Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio: Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Facts: Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

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Hannah Cris A. Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio: Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Echavez

gorgeous hannah

CIVIL PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Facts: Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio: Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio:

Facts: Issue: Ruling: Ratio: Garcia v Recio G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001

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