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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 178628 PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case These consolidated petitions1 seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.2 The Facts The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).4 Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,5 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides: Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. xxxx Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the

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Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province. Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain. Later, three new municipalities6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006. On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201. In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,7 provides in pertinent parts: Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied) However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.8 On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."91avvphi1 In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution10 and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.11 Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.12 Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts. In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City." Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in

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Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.13 Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902. In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows: (1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas14stated that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment"; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) "affirms" the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces. (2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is "self-executing." Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and (3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the "province" contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives. On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. 15 In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.16 On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions: (1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region" and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.17 However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those mandated" in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. 18 Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria" under RA 7160.19

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(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6, 20 Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate law." The Issues The petitions raise the following issues: I. In G.R. No. 177597: (A) Preliminarily (1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and (2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597. (B) On the merits (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province. II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]"), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City). The Ruling of the Court

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The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid. On the Preliminary Matters The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of Election Laws, Rules and Regulations The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by "any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."21 On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act "which the law specifically enjoins as a duty."22True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.23Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.24 Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation Does Not Moot the Petition There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recen tly concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces. On the Main Issues Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,25 subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities. 261avvphi1

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Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.27 In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x." Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population reache s 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress Under the present Constitution, as well as in past28 Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. xxxx (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied) Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,29 we held that the "power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws," and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

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This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides: SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law.30 Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.31 It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a selfevident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x."

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The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that: Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied) However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional. Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states: Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied) serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment." The contention has no merit. First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative, thus: The Constitution ordains: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory." Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for "each province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress.

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Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment. There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements.32 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative districts "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by anational law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly. What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that "each province shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district. Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that "[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative." Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,33 Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.34 The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: (1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); (2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and (3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM. The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces: Justice Carpio:

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So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack Congress with their own representatives [?] Atty. Vistan II:35 Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that. Justice Carpio: So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?] Atty. Vistan II: Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances. Justice Carpio: Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying? Atty. Vistan II: Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying. xxxx Justice Carpio: So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct? Atty. Vistan II: Yes, Your Honor.36 (Emphasis supplied) Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy, 37 nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 21938 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces.

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It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x." The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established "within the framework of the Constitution." This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM "shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines ." The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case. In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID. Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,petitioners-in-intervention. x-----------------------------x G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,petitioners-in-intervention. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,petitioners-in-intervention.

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DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws. The Facts During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.6 After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature.11 The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.12Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. 13 The Issues The petitions raise the following fundamental issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. The Ruling of the Court

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We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. Preliminary Matters Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC, 14like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows. Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides: Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

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(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement. Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12thCongress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement ofP100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively. Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code . Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

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RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement fromP20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied) If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution. Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear, Plain and Unambiguous There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four corners. 19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20 Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from

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such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code. Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides: The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through a special law or charter. Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses. The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides: Sec. 123. x x x All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress , but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied) Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states: Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following: a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses. Applicability of Equal Protection Clause If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to theP100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

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Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted. Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11 th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement. To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled: The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24 There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11thCongress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11thCongress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million. The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held: We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to

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conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied) In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11thCongress - as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City EN BANC G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents, CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors. RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010 filed by MovantIntervenors1 dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution. To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief background of the relevant antecedents On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).2 On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC).3 The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.4 With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. 5 On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.6 The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.7 Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari8 seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz. Constitution, Article X Local Government Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. LGC, Title IV, Chapter I

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Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.) On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision9 granting the petition.10 The Decision declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law. 11 The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution12 dated May 12, 2010,13 the Court denied the said motions.14 Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their second motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually "noted without action" by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.15 Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790, relevant to this case, which provides RESOLUTION NO. 8790 WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were previously components of the First Legislative District of the Province of Surigao del Norte. In December 2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the Province of Dinagat Island[s] was created and its creation was ratified on 02 December 2006 in the Plebiscite for this purpose; WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one (1) seat for Vice Governor, one (1) for congressional seat, and ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats pursuant to Resolution No. 8670 dated 16 September 2009; WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled "Rodolfo Navarro, et al., vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the President of the Philippines, et al." rendered a Decision, dated 10 February 2010, declaring Republic Act No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution; WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above decision of the Supreme Court;

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WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of Representatives representing the lone congressional district of Dinagat Islands, (2) names of the candidates for the aforementioned position, (3) position for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the candidates for the said position, (5) position of the Vice Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for the said position, (7) positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and, [8] all the names of the candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, have already been configured into the system and can no longer be revised within the remaining period before the elections on May 10, 2010. NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that: a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system configuration is in line with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces; b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte. But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province of Dinagat Islands will, for the positions of Member, House of Representatives, Governor, Vice Governor and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, bear only the names of the candidates for the said positions. Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only candidates for the said position. Likewise, the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names of the candidates for the said position[s]. Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to vote for the candidates of Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and Member, House [of] Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile, voters of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the voters of the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for the Governor and Vice Governor, Dinagat Islands. Given this situation, the Commission will postpone the elections for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because the election will result in [a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates for Governor, Vice Governor, Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, and Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District (with Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del Norte. c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted. xxxx SO ORDERED. They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put, movantsintervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its prev ious status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of

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the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality. In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case. In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,16 the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case. On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings17 of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the sake of argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple resident of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second District of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte, and that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with legal interest in this controversy. On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above motion. At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original parties, and neither on Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion, which our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagats third motion for reconsideration. Inasmuch as the motions for leave to admit their respective motions for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and the aforesaid motions for reconsideration were already noted without action by the Court, there is no reason to treat Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion differently. In relation to this, the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors could not be considered as a second motion for reconsideration to warrant the application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.18 It should be noted that this motion prays for the recall of the entry of judgment and for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution which remained unresolved. The denial of their motion for leave to intervene and to admit motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, but only on the timeliness of the intended intervention. Their motion for reconsideration of this denial elaborated on movants-intervenors interest in this case which existed only after judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion for intervention and their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution merely stand as an initial reconsideration of the said resolution. With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support the claim that this was a ploy of respondents legal tactician to reopen the case despite an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually COMELEC Reso lution No. 8790 that set this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent portion of the Resolution reads: c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First

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Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of proper party interest for movants-intervenors only with the specter of the decision in the main case becoming final and executory. More importantly, if the intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy as regards to the impending nullification of their election to their respective positions. Thus, to the Courts mind, there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recal l Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors. It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it may be argued that their interest in this case should have commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary than real. This is because COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain finality prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of the local government officials stated therein would only have to be postponed. Given such a scenario, movants-intervenors would not have suffered any injury or adverse effect with respect to the reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since they would simply have remained candidates for the respective positions they have vied for and to which they have been elected. For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. 19 It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their unique circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because their interest in this case became manifest only after the case had already been decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely work to their disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are not only a court of law, but also of justice and equity, such that our position and the dire repercussions of this controversy should be weighed on the scales of justice, rather than dismissed on account of mootness. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.20 The second exception attends this case. This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,21 where technicalities of procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the constitutional issues raised were of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for intervention should be given due course since movants-intervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in the outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and because of the novelty, gravity, and weight of the issues involved. Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution of movantsintervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.22

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Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant extraordinary circumstances.23 The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final.24 In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In this manner, the thrust of the Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization and the attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized. On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court finds that the first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative consideration. It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from congressional debates are quoted hereunder HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we thought CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the economic viability of the new local government unit, the new province? xxxx HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the House version, because we also believe that economic viability is really a minimum. Land area and population are functions really of the viability of the area, because you have an income level which would be the trigger point for economic development, population will naturally increase because there will be an immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area from being converted into a province because of the population problems in the beginning, it will never be able to reach the point where it could become a province simply because it will never have the economic take off for it to trigger off that economic development. Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay for overhead and provide a minimum of basic services to the population. Over and above that, the provincial officials should be able to trigger off economic development which will attract immigration, which will attract new investments from the private sector. This is now the concern of the local officials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the proponents, simply by telling them, "Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand," you will never be able to become a province because nobody wants to go to your place. Why? Because you never have any reason for economic viability. xxxx CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area? HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers HON. ANGARA. Walang problema yon, in fact thats not very critical, yong land area because CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters, ah, square kilometers. HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative efficiency and delivery of basic services.

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CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right. HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted, there is only one central government and then everybody falls under that. But it was later on subdivided into provinces for purposes of administrative efficiency. CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay. HON. LAGUDA. Now, what were seeing now is that the administrative efficiency is no longer there precisely because the land areas that we are giving to our governors is so wide that no one man can possibly administer all of the complex machineries that are needed. Secondly, when you say "delivery of basic services," as pointed out by Cong. Alfelor, there are sections of the province which have never been visited by public officials, precisely because they dont have the time nor the energy anymore to do that because its so wide. Now, by compressing the land area and by reducing the population requirement, we are, in effect, trying to follow the basic policy of why we are creating provinces, which is to deliver basic services and to make it more efficient in administration. CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that the province is able to do it without being a burden to the national government. Thats the assumption. HON. LAGUDA. Thats why were going into the minimum income level. As we said, if we go on a minimum income level, then we say, "this is the trigger point at which this administration can take place."25 Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz. For a Barangay: LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed herein. To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan can be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned. LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the sangguniang bayan. (b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress, subject to the limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article. (c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the indigenous cultural communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural community is located.

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(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present: (1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may be created by law, or in highlyurbanized cities where such territory shall have a population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The creation of a barangay shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/ (2) Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Municipality: LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income. (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities. LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality shall not be created unless the following requisites are present: (i) Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the provincial treasurer. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; (ii) Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and (iii) Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. City:

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LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisities: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or, (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present: (1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and (2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. Provinces: LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or, (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

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(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present: (1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and (2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.) It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of local autonomy. Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR26 and in the Whereas clauses of Administrative Order No. 270,27 which read

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WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments; WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals; WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President to convene an Oversight Committee for the purpose of formulating and issuing the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of all the provisions of the said Code; and WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and consideration of the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the Local Government Code of 1991, has completed the formulation of the implementing rules and regulations; x x x Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass. Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity. Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove enlightening: CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian,28 with respect to his CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay. HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the distinguished Senator about the action taken by the House, on House Bill No. 7166. This was passed about two years ago and has been pending in the Senate for consideration. This is a bill that I am not the only one involved, including our distinguished Chairman here. But then we did want to sponsor the bill, being the Chairman then of the Local Government. So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less interested in the creation of the new provinces, because of the vastness of the areas that were involved. At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection. And as I have said a while ago, that this has been pending in the Senate for the last two years. And Sen. Pimentel himself was just in South Cotabato and he delivered a speech that he will support this bill, and he says, that he will incorporate this in the Local Government Code, which I have in writing from him. I showed you the letter that he wrote, and naturally, we in the House got hold of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility for the whole Philippines to create a new province, and that is quite the concern of the respective Congressmen. Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop the mother province from voting against the bill, if a province is going to be created.

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So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not willing to create another province, when it can be justified. Even Speaker Mitra says, what will happen to Palawan? We wont have one million people there, and if you look at Palawan, there will be about three or four provinces that will comprise that island. So, the development will be hampered. Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated November 2, 1989. This was practically about a year after 7166 was approved by the House, House Bill 7166. On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me: "Dear Congressman Chiongbian: We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your House No. 7166 was incorporated in the proposed Local Government Code, Senate Bill No. 155, which is pending for second reading. Thank you and warm regards. Very truly yours," That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised that the Senate has adopted another position. So, we would like because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House, thats the only bill that is involving the present Local Government Code that we are practically considering; and this will be a slap on the House, if we do not approve it, as approved by the lower House. This can be [an] irritant in the approval of the Conference Committee Report. And I just want to manifest that insofar as the creation of the province, not only in my province, but the other provinces. That the mother province will participate in the plebiscite, they can defeat the province, lets say, on the basis o f the result, the province cannot be created if they lose in the plebiscite, and I dont see why, we should put this stringent conditions to the private people of the devolution that they are seeking. So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because, this is an approved version of the House, and I will not be the one to raise up and question the Conference Committee Report, but the rest of the House that are interested in this bill. And they have been approaching the Speaker about this. So, the Speaker reminded me to make sure that it takes the cudgel of the House approved version. So, thats all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I dont believe that it is not, because its the wish of the House, but because the mother province will participate anyhow, you vote them down; and that is provided for in the Constitution. As a matter of fact, I have seen the amendment with regards to the creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the plebiscite. And why should we not allow that to happen in the provinces! In other words, we dont want the people who wants to create a new province, as if they are left in the devolution of powers, when they feel that they are far away from civilization. Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of their situation. But the province of South Cotabato has a very unique geographical territorial conglomerations. One side is in the other side of the Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital town is in the North; while these other municipalities are in the East and in the West. And if they have to travel from the last town in the eastern part of the province, it is about one hundred forty kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the same distance. And from the North side, it is about one hundred kilometers. So that is the problem there. And besides, they have enough resources and I feel that, not because I am interested in the province, I am after their welfare in the future. Who am I to dictate on those people? I have no interest but then I am looking at the future development of these areas. As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, its incidental; I do not need to be there, but I can foresee what the creation of a new province will bring to these people. It will bring them prosperity; it will bring them more income, and it will encourage even foreign investors. Like the PAP now, they are concentrating in South Cotabato, especially in the City of General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and even the AID people are asking me, "What is holding the creation of a new province when practically you need it?" Its not 20 or 30 kilometers from the capital town; its about 140 kilometers. And imagine those people have to travel that far and our road is not like Metropolitan Manila.

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That is as far as from here to Tarlac. And there are municipalities there that are just one municipality is bigger than the province of La Union. They have the income. Of course, they dont have the population because thats a part of the land of promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday because they feel that there are more opportunities here. So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will enhance the development of the Philippines, not because I am interested in my province. Well, as far as I am concerned, you know, I am in the twilight years of my life to serve and I would like to serve my people well. No personal or political interest here. I hope the distinguished Chairman of the Committee will appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has already approved because we dont want them to throw the Conference Committee Report after we have worked that the house Bill has been, you know, drawn over board and not even considered by the Senate. And on top of that, we are considering a bill that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take that into account. Thank you for giving me this time to explain. CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the legislative history of the Senate version on this matter of creation of provinces. I am sure there was an amendment. As I said, Ill look into it. Maybe the House version was incorporated in toto, but maybe during the discussion, their amendments were introduced and, therefore, Senator Pimentel could not hold on to the original version and as a result new criteria were introduced. But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when we reach a book, Title IV, on the matter of provinces, we will look at it sympathetically from your end so that the objective that you want [to] achieve can be realized. So we will look at it with sympathy. We will review our position on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate version and we will adopt an open mind definitely when we come into it. CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Kanino yan? CHAIRMAN LINA. Book III. CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Title? CHAIRMAN LINA. Title IV. CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. I have been pondering on the case of James, especially on economic stimulation of a certain area. Like our case, because I put myself on our province, our province is quite very big. Its composed of four (4) congressional districts and I feel it should be five now. But during the Batasan time, four of us talked and conversed proposing to divide the province into two. There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever tread on those areas. That is, maybe youre acquainted with the Bondoc Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that is Ragay Gulf. From Ragay there is a long stretch of coastal area. From Albay going to Ragay, very few governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That area now is infested with NPA. That is the area of Congressman Andaya. Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be extended to these areas. With a big or a large area of a province, a certain administrator or provincial governor definitely will have no sufficient time. For me, if we really would like to stimulate growth, I believe that an area where there is physical or geographical impossibilities, where administrators can penetrate, I think we have to create certain provisions in the law where maybe we can treat it with special considerations. Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philipppine Local Government Data as far as provinces are concerned. It is very surprising that there are provinces here which only composed of six municipalities, eight municipalities, seven municipalities. Like in Cagayan, Tuguegarao, there are six municipalities. Ah, excuse me, Batanes. CHAIRMAN LINA. Will you look at the case of --- how many municipalities are there in Batanes province? CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Batanes is only six.

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CHAIRMAN LINA. Six town. Siquijor? CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Siquijor. It is region? CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven. CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim. CHAIRMAN LINA. Six also. CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Six also. CHAIRMAN LINA. It seems with a minimum number of towns? CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one congressional district. But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga ako ngayon. CHAIRMAN LINA. Camiguin, Camiguin. CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with a population of 63 thousand. But we do not hold it against the province because maybe thats one stimulant where growth can grow, can start. The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code? Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas. So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a generalization. CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province because of some geographical id[i]osyncracies, as you called it, stimulate the economic growth in the area or will substantial aid coming from the national government to a particular area, say, to a municipality, achieve the same purpose? CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually, tinitingnan lang yun, provision eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You are entitled to, say, 20% of the area. Theres a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of Camiguin and Siquijor, but Camiguin is composed only of five municipalities; in Siquijor, its composed of six, but the share of Siquijor is the same share with that of the province of Camarines Sur, having a bigger area, very much bigger. That is the budget in process. CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even with sympathy because of the explanation given and we will study this very carefully.29 The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest intention of Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them to directly share in the allocation of funds under the national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections 284 and 285 of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area, population, and local revenue. 30 Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law,31 or may consider the

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implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC. It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 53332 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied.) These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR. With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated.33 Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court,34 but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee. With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat. Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355. What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income ofP82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections35

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Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators. So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each others acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to: 1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010; 2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010; 3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and 4. The petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999 JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents, GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

PUNO, J.: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a component city. On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1 On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city, viz.: AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Sec. 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words "an independent" thereon so that said Section will read as follows: Sec. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago. Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the following: Sec. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective Provincial Position for the Province of Isabela. The voters of the City of Santiago shall be qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other elective

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provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a candidate for such provincial positions and any elective provincial office. Sec. 3. Repealing Clause. All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Sec. 4. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. 2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City. In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, 3 a member of the provincial board of Isabela. 4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi. Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification. We find merit in the petition. First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 5Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city council of Santiago. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.1wphi1.nt Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco, 6 we held: xxx xxx xxx

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The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers "to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In Casibang v. Aquino, 7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows: A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation. Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress. 8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in Congress. 9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units. The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be

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diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz.: 10 Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had "merely re-classified" Santiago City from an independent component city into a component city, the effect when challenged ( sic) the Act were operational would be, actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there would besubstantial changes in the political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to the Province of Isabela, geographically, politically, and administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area and population of local government units, provinces included. The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and which taxes shall accrue solely to the City Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province such as taxes on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because of reduced shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of R.A. No. 7160. The City Government's share in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No. 7160). The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160). The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great change in the state of the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is the Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution). The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468, (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the decisions in administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter (Section 67 R.A. No. 7160). It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that: (f) Plebiscite (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

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xxx xxx xxx The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people. A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the amendment merely caused a transitionin the status of Santiago as a city. Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people. On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that " only if the classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ." With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. 11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory. 12 It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed by the political representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by one commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are ". . . basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. . . . By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local government units." 13 The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant

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change in its socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing for it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or be voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted to be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee announced the withdrawal of the amendment "after a very enlightening conversion with the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz.: 14 BILL ON SECOND READING H.B. No. 8729 City of Santiago Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as reported out under Committee Report No. 971. The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion is approved. Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof. The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled: AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729 Insert Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Local Government be recognized. The President. Senator Sotto is recognized. SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its principal author, is a simple measure which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of the Province of Isabela. The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of the Province of Isabela. As an independent component city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the said province as a local political unit. To use the language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an "island in the provincial milieu.

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The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to run for any elective positions in the Province of Isabela. The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city and its officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of the President, which is very far away from Santiago City. Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected, one way or the other, by the happenings in the said province, and is benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela. Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august Body Committee Report No. 971 of the Committee on Local Government, recommending approval, with our proposed committee amendment, of House Bill No. 8729. Thank you, Mr. President. The President. The Majority Leader is recognized. Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of interpellations. The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of interpellations is closed. Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments. Senator Roco. Mr. President. The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco? Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to close the period of interpellations just to be able to ask a few questions? Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President. The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of the period of interpellations? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved. Senator Roco is recognized. Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentlemen yield for some questions? Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.

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Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government, we were with the sponsors when we approved this bill to make Santiago a City. That was about two and a half years ago. At that time, I remember it was the cry of the city that it be "independent." Now we are deleting that word "independent." Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want some explanation on what happened between then and now that has made us decided that the City of Santiago should cease to be independent and should now become a component city. Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public hearing that they are no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city. The power and authority is now being exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far from the City of Santiago. In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to participate in the provincial elections. Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on record, however. I think there was a majority of 14,000 who approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for that charter some degree of respect. But if there has been a change of political will, there has been a change of political will, then so be it. Thank you, Mr. President. Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very important point raised by Senator Roco, and I will have to place it on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are proposing a committee amendment is that, originally, there was an objection on the part of the local officials and those who oppose it by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That was the solution. Because there were some sectors in the City of Santiago who were opposing the reclassification or reconversion of the city into a component city. Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President because the two of us had special pictures (sic) in the city is that I thought it should be put on record that we have supported originally the proposal to make it an independent city. But now if it is their request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman, let it be so.

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Thank you. Senator Drilon. Mr. President. Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President. Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President. Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend, the Senator from Bicol, on the matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City, there is a resolution passed by the Sanggunian on January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of Santiago from an independent city. This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the law takes effect. The question I would like to raise and I would like to recall the statement of our Minority Leader is that, at this time we should not be passing it for a particular politician. In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the additional territory be added to the election of the provincial officials of the province of Isabela. Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President. Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President. Senator Alvarez. Mr. President. The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized. Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I share some information. Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger territory. As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why this amendment is being put forward. While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who signed the resolution were not the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district who represents a constituency, the voice of the district.

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I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if we have to fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given account, as we do give account to many of the legislations coming from the House on local issues. Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is that, as Senator Roco said, just two and-a-half years ago we passed a bill which indeed disenfranchized if we want to use that phrase the citizens of the City of Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-a-half years after, we are changing the rule. In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in order to approve the conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be proposed by the Committee Chairman as an amendment. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the change from an independent to a component city be subjected to a plebiscite. Secs. 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those enumerated. So the proposal coming from the House is in adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite. Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is "conversion". The word "conversion" appears in that provision wherein we must call a plebiscite. During the public hearing, the representative of Congressman Abaya was insisting that this is not a conversion; this is merely a reclassification. But it is clear in the bill. We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city. That is how the members of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we would like not only to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the leadership of the province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing it. To them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of Isabela deciding for them. Senator Tatad. Mr. President. The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

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Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the period of interpellations. The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved. Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr. President. The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none the motion is approved. Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows: Sec 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RETIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE. The President. Is there any objection? Senator Enrile. Mr. President. The President. Senator Enrile is recognized. Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President. SUSPENSION OF SESSION Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session. The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no objection. [There was none]. It was 7:54 p.m. RESUMPTION OF SESSION At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed. The President. The session is resumed. Senator Sotto is recognized.

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Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body, I withdraw my amendment. The President. The amendment is withdrawn. Senator Maceda. Mr. President. The President. Senator Maceda is recognized. Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the amendment. Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela I am no great fan of the Senator from Isabela but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his province but his own city where he is a resident and registered voter. So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance, senatorial courtesy demands that we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind them. Thank you anyway, Mr. President. Senator Alvarez. Mr. President. The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized. Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for the statement of the gentleman from Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have suddenly become his great fan for the evening. May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do not want it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of the province. The town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town from the province? But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the Committee. Senator Tatad. Mr. President. The President. The Majority Leader is recognized. Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the period of committee amendments be closed. The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word "independent" preceding "component city"?

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Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title of this House Bill No. 8729 is "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act 7720". The title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I do not think that we should amend that anymore. The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the motion? Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments. The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved. Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we close the period of individual amendments. The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of individual amendments is closed. APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729. The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall now vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729. As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye. Several Members. Aye. As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silences] House Bill No. 8279 is approved on Second Reading. The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite. In the case of Tan, et al. v. COMELEC, 15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its enactment, viz: The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to have the creation of the new Province a fait accompli by the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and other officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the election for President and Vice-President." Thus, the petitioners reported after the event: "With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was

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appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery was in place to deliver the "solid North" to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte during the elections the unashamed use of naked power and resources contributed in no small way to arousing "people's power" and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today. The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz., the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladoid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule. Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent component cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, 16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan 17 whose charters were amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained: 18 . . . Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power to vote in provincial elections, without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this reason that I vote in favor of this bill. It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill 19 allowing qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a component city. 20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous situation then obtaining ". . . where voters of one component city cannot vote simply because their charters so provide." 21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 133076 September 22, 1999 MOISES S. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.: On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the Court challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535. Petitioner also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation of R.A. 8535, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches, and the Department of Budget and Management from disbursing funds for said plebiscite. Lastly, he prays for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, through a motion we duly noted. Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds: a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income, population and land area; seat of government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City, respectively, and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay resolution; and b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution. 1 Petitioner asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to Congress during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. No. 8535. This, he argues, is clear from the minutes of the public hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government on the proposed charter of the City of Novaliches. Petitioner particularly cites its hearings held on October 3 and 27, 1997. He is silent, however, on the hearings held by the appropriate Committee in the House of Representatives. Likewise, petitioner points out that there is no certification attesting to the fact that the mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of income, population, and land area.1wphi1.nt In their Comment, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General, traversed all the allegations of petitioner. They claimed he failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof. In their memorandum, respondents argued that petitioner had the burden of proof to overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal requirements under the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A. 8535. Further, respondents stated that the petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document supporting petitioner's claim that R.A. 8535 is unconstitutional. Respondents pray that the present petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

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In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 2 we had occasion to stress that: All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 3 Every statute is presumed valid. 4 Every law is presumed to have passed through regular congressional processes. 5 A person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his allegations clearly and unmistakably. Having this in mind, we now proceed to examine whether or not petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity accorded R.A. No. 8535. The Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7: Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: (a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and (c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Corollarily, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in Article 11: Art. 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present: (1) Income an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and non recurring income; and (2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or

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more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners. Petitioner argues that no certifications attesting compliance with the foregoing requirements were submitted to Congress, citing in particular public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government. However, we note that the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of Representatives. Its principal sponsor is Cong. Dante Liban of Quezon City. Petitioner did not present any proof, but only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to the House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual practice in this regard. Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites therefor. Moreover, present during the public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government were resource persons from the different government offices like National Statistics Office, Bureau of Local Government Finance, Land Management Bureau, and Department of Budget, and Management, aside from officials of Quezon City itself. The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the combined average annual income of the 13 barangays 6 for the years 1995 and 1996 to be around P26,952,128.26. 7 Under the Local Government Code, a proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding two years. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310. 8 This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the Implementing Rules. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local Government Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and populationor land area. Other than the income requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly urbanized. Petitioner avers that the oral manifestation made by the representatives of government offices is not enough certification. But respondents reply that in the hearings, particularly by the Local Government Committee headed by Senator Sotto, on October 3 and 27, 1997, the DBM, DILG, and Finance Officials were present along with other officers armed with official statistics and reference materials. In their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on population, land area and income of the proposed city. Their official statements could serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open session of either the Senate or the House of Representatives give even greater solemnity than a certification submitted to either chamber routinely. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that, aside from the oral declarations during the public hearings, the representatives present did not also submit written certifications. Note that under the Implementing Rules, written certifications are required to be attached to the petition for the creation of a city, to be submitted by interested municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of a resolution. Petitioner, however, did not even bother to present a copy of said petition if only to prove that it was without the written certifications attached as required by law. We are thus constrained to presume, as respondents urge, that these requirements were met appropriately in the passage of the assailed legislative act. Petitioner then argues that R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as required under Section 11(a) of the Local Government Code: Sec. 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices, and Facilities. (a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units shall specify the seat of government from where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered. In selecting said site, factors relating to geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of transportation and communication facilities, drainage and sanitation, development and economic progress, and other relevant considerations shall be taken into account.

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Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not provide for a seat of government. However, this omission, to our mind, is not as fatal to the validity of R.A. No. 8535 as petitioner makes it to be. We agree with respondents that under Section 12 of the Local Government Code, which applies to the proposed City of Novaliches by virtue of Section 54 of R.A. No. 8535, 9 the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of government after its creation. For said Code already provides as follows: Sec. 12. Government Centers. Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall endeavor to establish a government center where offices, agencies, or branches of the National Government, local government units, or government-owned or-controlled corporations may, as far as practicable, be located. In designating such a center, the local government unit concerned shall take into account the existing facilities of national and local agencies and offices which may serve as the government center as contemplated under this Section. The National Government, local government unit or government-owned or-controlled corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for the construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center. While Section 12 speaks of the site of government centers, such site can very well also be the seat of government, "from where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered." 10 With regard to the alleged adverse effect on Quezon City by the creation of the City of Novaliches, petitioner again failed to present any concrete evidence on this point. Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., was present during the deliberations of the Senate Committee on Local Government, and made no mention of anything concerning such adverse effects. As chief executive of Quezon City, Mayor Mathay would be the first person to protest any development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City. The fact that he did not raise any adverse issue during the public hearings on R.A. No. 8535, stressing instead his concern on the matter of inclusion of all Quezon City voters in the plebiscite that would decide the fate of the City of Novaliches, is indicative of the non-existence of such negative issues. Moreover, in the plebiscite as contemplated on R.A. 8535, all persons concerned will obviously have the opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on the principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches. That the Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches, if true, will also not render invalid R.A. No. 8535. The evident purpose of this requirement, found in the Implementing Rules, is to inform the City Council of the move to create another city and to enable it to formulate its comments and recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City Council members are obviously aware of the petition. The matter has been widely publicized in the mass media. Surely members of the Quezon City Council, including petitioner, could not now be heard to claim they have not known of the contents of the barangays' petition to create the City of Novaliches. The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited amendment of the Constitution, contrary to petitioner's contention. The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation. Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to convince the Court with substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us to grant the reliefs he seeks. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUFAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents. DECISION HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm. Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city. Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into Republic Act No. 7720: On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993. On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993. On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817. On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into consideration

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the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member of the Committee on Local Government. On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city. The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives. I The annual income of a local government unit includes the IRAs Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having computed Santiago's average annual income in the following manner: Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 Total income for 1991 and 1992 Minus: IRAs for 1991 and 1992 Total income for 1991 and 1992 Average Annual Income P 15,730,043.00 P 26,219,120.94 P 13,109,560.47 =============== P 20,379,057.07 P 21,570,106.87 P 41,949,163.94

By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiago's income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement. The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.

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Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system. A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets. The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions.7 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. 8 The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit. 10 The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income. Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".12 Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-9313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others" (Emphasis ours).14 Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws.15 II

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In the enactment of RA No. 7720, there was compliance with Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy. Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained: . . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. xxx xxx xxx

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. . . . 18 III

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Every law, including RA No. 7720, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.19Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.20 Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995 JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents. G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995 JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.: At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1 G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

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G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated. We find no merit in the petitions. I Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied) In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2 The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4 We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.: Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the area

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of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served. Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law. Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar. II Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal

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elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay. We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5 Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction. III Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides: Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied) They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14

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Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject." WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 146319 October 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 146342 October 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, respondents. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." 1 Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,2 the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification. On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed3 the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.4 Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds: A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite. Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that: 1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and

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2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.5 Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001 elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election of its officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806. We shall first delve on petitioner's constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806 in G.R No. 146342. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.6 This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.7 The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law.8 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.9 In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt,10 for to doubt is to sustain.11 Petitioner initially reject R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which provides,inter alia: "SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." (Emphasis ours) The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus: "SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." (Emphasis ours) Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done. This contention is devoid of merit.

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Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides: "SECTION 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. . . . ." (Emphasis ours) Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,12 this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,"13 and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. "14 Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: "SECTION 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." (Emphasis ours) Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence. It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.15 The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,16 and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.17 Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."18 Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

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We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City. Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within 120 days from the "approval" of said Act per express provision of its Section 54, viz: "SECTION 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act. x x x ." (Emphasis ours) The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after theapproval of the Act. This 120day period having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states: "SECTION 65. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation." The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,19 it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000. The COMELEC is correct. In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides: "SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date." (Emphasis ours) Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix "another date" for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of the law. Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we stated in Taada: "ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This

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clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication." (Emphasis supplied) To give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective even before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred in Taada. Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation. Consequently, we sustain the presumption20 that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite. WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents. DECISION PEREZ, J.: This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, 2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise: District 1st District Municipalities/Cities Del Gallego Ragay Lupi Sipocot Cabusao Libmanan Minalabac Pamplona Pasacao San Fernando Canaman Camaligan Magarao Bombon Calabanga Sangay San Jose Tigaon Tinamba Siruma Buhi Bula Nabua Population 417,304

2nd District Gainza Milaor Naga Pili Ocampo 3rd District Caramoan Garchitorena Goa Lagonoy Presentacion 4th District Iriga Baao Balatan Bato

474,899

372,548

429,070

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Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716: District 1st District Municipalities/Cities Del Gallego Ragay Lupi Sipocot Cabusao Libmanan Minalabac Pamplona Pasacao San Fernando Gainza Milaor Camaligan Magarao Bombon Calabanga Sangay San Jose Tigaon Tinamba Siruma Buhi Bula Nabua Population 176,383

2nd District

276,777

3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Pili Ocampo Canaman 4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan Garchitorena Goa Lagonoy Presentacion 5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga Baao Balatan Bato

439,043

372,548

429,070

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.4 Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.6 The provision reads: Article VI Section 5. (1) x x x x

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(2) x x x x (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied). The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement. In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats. Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment. Verbatim, the submission is that: 1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and 2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12 The provision subject of this case states: Article VI Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) x x x x (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

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On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds. On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716. On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law. We first pass upon the threshold issues. The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons: 1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1 2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act. 3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction. The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716. This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance. The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules, 14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society. 15 Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates: Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but

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to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied) Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23 Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. We deny the petition. We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality. 24Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25 There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26 Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27 In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:

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Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.28(Emphasis supplied) The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population. Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states: Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI. The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole,though it was among, several determinants. From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive

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ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution: Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied). Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned. Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates: INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO: Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting. Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous. Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente. xxxx Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District. Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33 "PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.

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In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes. Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan. There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body. APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34 The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts. Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates: At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City. REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149. Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there. Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body. Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions. On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet. Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body. Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone. There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I.35 Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.

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It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population."38 Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that: x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied). This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution. The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson. Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers. Translated in the terms of the present case: 1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786; 2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners. 3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were: (a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities; (b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities; (c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and (d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.41

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Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716. To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986 PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,respondents. Gamboa & Hofilea Law Office for petitioners.

ALAMPAY, J.: Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3, 1986. Said law provides: SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less. SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz. SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials of the province. SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds. SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-24) Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

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Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are: SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6) Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during which the Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court. The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Nrte, namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional issues which they have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution.'"At the same time, they asked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that petitioners have brought out. Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot the prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission on Elections to desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986. Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte to be not in accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate, at the same time making pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity; And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent Provincial Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release of any local funds to answer for expenses incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-10). Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the issuance of any official proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite. During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus curiae in this case (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on January 2, 1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said motion was granted in Our resolution of January 2, 1986. Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining order, the Court, on January 7, 1986 resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require respondents to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885,

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should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said law is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question. They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with. Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte. Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted: 1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression 'unit or units affected'. It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents do that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite. 2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. ... 3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice-their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari materia. Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force in the case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot and academic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative votes cast represented a majority of the total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del Norte province, the appointments of the officials of said province created were announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that this case should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the creation of the new province is now a "fait accompli."

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In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear to be agreed to by the parties herein or stand unchallenged. Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds in connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court to desist from ordering the release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should not longer deserve further consideration. Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the following: SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the South and the natural boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, containing an area of 285,656 hectares more or less. (Emphasis supplied). However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del Norte were defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as follows: SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into a new province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less. Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by Provincial Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows: xxx xxx xxx This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental have the land area as indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila. Land Area (Sq. Km.) 1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8 2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3 3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9 4. Manapla......................................................................112.9 5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5 6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6

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7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0 8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4 9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5 10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3 11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available) This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever purpose it may serve him. (SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90). Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the component units of the new province, was derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the total land area of the entire municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the portions derived from the land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This area of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers, representing the total land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and the Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers using as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90). No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of petitioners that the original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, reads: SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President shall appoint the first officials of the new province. However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant change in the above provision. The statute, as modified, provides that the requisite plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns which would comprise the new province that is assailed by the petitioners as violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit that Sec. 3, ART XI thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected by the creation of the new province as a result of the consequent division of and substantial alteration of the boundaries of the existing province. In this instance, the voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the questioned plebiscite. Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition

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fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli. In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the unusually rapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and discourage the commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done by whatever branch of our government. This Court gives notice that it will not look with favor upon those who may be hereafter inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if such acts would violate the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal be blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is already done is done. To such untenable argument the reply would be that, be this so, the Court, nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought to its attention. On the merits of the case. Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quote: SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein. We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of judicial inquiry. Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to say the least, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the unexplained changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news articles regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the decisive matters which should be reckoned in the resolution of this case.

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What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would constitute the new municipality. This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is, however, highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or units affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted. The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected." It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote: 2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision. This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the ruling which We now consider applicable to the case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein assailed as suffering from a constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in the instant case. Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the present Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly considered acceptable because of the views then taken that local autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer retains persuasive value. The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein. It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.

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We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected. In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving phrase that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners. Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary. As contended by petitioners, Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to each other. A Province maybe created where an existing province is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially altered. It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true. It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored. It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned. In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court make a pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.

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Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications currently attending to its creation. As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded as the defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in an amount claimed to be at least P10,000,000.00. The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code, as earlier discussed. It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into account government statistics relative to the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks of the territory of the province to be created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but also the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and fallacious. The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664). The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p. 909). It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but which has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned. Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was marred by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve "pure and simple gerrymandering; "that recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far from guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).

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It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this case can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of the questioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools of a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant people. Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued existence of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our people there would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein. WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void. SO ORDERED.

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