Pyrrhonean Scepticism and the Self-Refutation Argument Author(s): Alan Bailey Reviewed work(s): Source: The Philosophical Quarterly,

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ThePhilosophical Vol.40 No. 158 Quarterly ISSN 0031-8094 $2.00

PYRRHONEAN SCEPTICISM AND THE SELF-REFUTATION ARGUMENT

BY ALANBAILEY

I
The globalsceptic The self-refutation takes theform ofa dilemma. argument is engagedin attacking viewthat aboutrational our customary justification somebeliefs and actions can be rationally Let us suppose, that then, justified. These thisattack is launched non-rational considerations. bywayofovertly to livea rational life. But wouldrightly be dismissed concerned byeveryone If theattempt to offer wouldappearto be completely reasons self-defeating. areindeedgoodreasons, then willmerely these reasons they putative provide an illustration of the thesisthatsome beliefscan be justified rationally. in thesame ifthey arenotgoodreasons, thenthey willbe dismissed Whereas Thus it non-rational considerations alreadydiscussed. way as the overtly must seemsto follow thattheargumentation bytheglobalsceptic employed forhis scepticism. be wholly any genuinesupport incapableof providing of global This argument a formidable criticism constitutes undoubtedly about rational Indeed its eleganceand simplicity scepticism justification. havelongmadeita favourite weaponofphilosophers opposedto scepticism. on several occasions Sextus discusses theself-refutation Empiricus argument (see PH2 130-3,PH3 19; MVII 440-4, MVIII 278-9, MIX 204-6) ; so it is obvious that the argument in the anti-sceptical figured prominently and Academic of Pyrrhonean the revival polemicsof his period.Similarly in the sixteenth led to a revivalof and seventeenth centuries scepticism in theself-refutation Hume offers someobservations on interest argument. in Book One of A Treatise the argument ofHumanNature;2and PierreAll references tothewritings refer toR.G. Bury's edition oftheGreek ofSextusEmpiricus text (Sextus Empiricus, ed. R.G. Bury, 4 vols., Loeb Classical Library 1933-49). The to 'Af refers to the 'Outlinesof Pyrrhonism'; and the abbreviation 'PH' refers abbreviation 'Adversus Mathematicos', with this being construedas embracingboth 'Against The Professors'and 'Against The Dogmatists'.The number immediately followingthese and thesecondnumber identifies therelevant is thebook number, abbreviations passage.All are takenfromthe facingEnglishtranslation translations by Bury. provided ofSextus' are availablein theTeubneredition Wordand nameindicesto SextusEmpiricus works.See SextiEmpirici ed. J. Mau (Indices,K. Mathematicos, Opera: Vol. III: Adversus Janacek)(Teubner, 1954). 2 David Hume, A Treatise Book One, ed. D.G.C. Macnabb (Fontana, ofHuman Nature, 1962), pp. 237-8.

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Daniel Huet's extraordinary handbookOf The Weakness Pyrrhonean of Human Understanding the on a list of seven misguided places argument to scepticism.3 Moreoverthe self-refutation is still objections argument no other immensely populartoday:4 argument againstglobal scepticism seemsto have the same air of brutalfinality. I wishto arguein thispaperthatthePyrrhonean Nevertheless scepticism Sextus about expoundedby Empiricusis one formof global scepticism rational that does have the internal resources to disarm the selfjustification refutation Thus the next two sections will to endeavour show that argument. Sextus'useofthefive ascribed to does commit tropes conventionally Agrippa Sextusto the conclusion thatno claim is everrationally to its preferable And the remaining of the is devoted to contradictory. portion paper for Sextus' whyit is nevertheless explaining impossible dogmatic opponents to dismissthe tropesas self-refuting. II Sextushimself is prepared to sayno morethanthat thefive Curiously tropes werehandeddownby 'the latersceptics'. it becomesclear from However, thatthesesceptics wereAgrippa DiogenesLaertius'accountofPyrrhonism and his immediate successors.5 Sextusoutlines the tropesas follows: thefirst basedon discrepancy, thesecondon regress ad infinitum, the third on relativity, the fourth on hypothesis, the fifth on circular (PHI 164) reasoning. are intended to set up theproblem. Tropes one and three Trope one is the one that'leads us to find thatwithregard to theobjectpresented therehas arisen both amongstordinary an people and amongstthe philosophers interminable conflict' us withthe problemof (PHI 165). This confronts whichof the competing the one settling opinionsis correct. Trope three, basedon relativity, is that theobject hassuchorsuchan appearance 'whereby inrelation tothesubject andtotheconcomitant judging (PHI 167). percepts' Here we are facedwiththeproblem ofdetermining whichof theseappearances represents the truenatureof the objectin question. It is the taskof four andfive toshow that there is nowayofsolving these two, tropes problems.
3 Pierre-Daniel Huet,Of TheWeakness (London,1725),pp. 184-5. ofHuman Understanding 4 See, for TheNature & Kegan Paul, 1973) example, Anthony Quinton, (Routledge ofThings 2nd edn (Duckworth, pp. 150-3); JohnPassmore, Philosophical Reasoning, 1970) pp. 72-4; 59 (1984), pp. 431-42 ;JohnF. Crosby, Hugo Meynell, Reconsidered', 'Scepticism Philosophy, of SkepticismAnd General Relativism',in Dietrich von Hildebrand (ed.) 'Refutation Der Philosophie Rehabilitierung Josef Habel, 1974), pp. 103-23. 5 ed. R.D. Hicks,2 vols. (Loeb Classical Diogenes Laertius,Lives ofEminent Philosophers, Library,1925), Book IX, sects 88-9.

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is that weassert that thething adduced of as a proof Tropetwo 'whereby thematter needs a further andthis andsoon proposed another, proof, again ad infinitum, so that the issuspension, as wepossess nostartingconsequence pointforour argument' (PHI 166).The idea hereis thata purported ofsomeproposition carries no weight until it hasbeenshown justification that ithastrue anda valid form. four inferential Andtropes and premisses five areintended torule outthe ofany from the threatened escape possibility The trope basedon hypothesis is invoked when 'theDogmatists, regress. forced to recede ad infinitum, takeas their being something starting-point which do notestablish butclaimto assume as granted they byargument andwithout demonstration' Thedecisive toany (PHI 168). simply objection suchmanoeuvre is thatif thedogmatist is to be considered of worthy he makes credence when an assumption, thesceptic willbe equally then ofcredence ifhemakes the the of worthy opposite assumption. Finally trope circular is relevant to those cases'when theproof itself which reasoning thematter toestablish ofinquiry confirmation derived from ought requires inthis that unable toassume either inorder toestablish matter; case, being the wesuspend about both' a other, (PHI 169).Thisisreally judgement just more caseofthetrope basedon hypothesis in a circular for, complicated theargument to establish thetruth intended ofthedogmatist's argument, claim itseffect theclaim for ontheassumption inquestion that can depends as true. be taken already areespecially Thesetropes inthat itis immediately noteworthy apparent that are notrestricted in their to judgements aboutany they application in theirscope. particular subject-matter: general theyare completely Moreover it is also clearthatthefive set outby Sextus call into tropes ourclaims to rationally belief as wellas ourclaims to question justified Ifa person then that does knowledge. thatp, merely hypothesizes assumption notgiveus anyreason it is truethat whatsoever to believe that p. Thus fourth cannot be circumvented tothe Agrippa's trope byretreating position that rather than certain. However fifth p isprobable is,as we Agrippa's trope have more than a complicated caseofthe out, already pointed nothing trope basedon hypothesis. It follows, that ifmere cannot therefore, assumption usany tobelieve reason neither circular that canany p,then give argument. theonly tojustify theclaimthat the wayleft Consequently p necessitates ofa series ina ofnon-circular that doesnotterminate provision arguments setofarbitrary would Yet thesecond that this assumptions. trope implies force us intoan infinite ofjustification, wish to andno onewould regress that a from the of suffers argue non-terminating regress justification merely limitation ofnotproviding us with an absolutely conclusive of justification theclaim An unfinished of purportedly being regress justification justified. does not even the itsconclusion as for provide slightest justification accepting

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true. It is tempting to conclude,therefore, that anyone who endorses five is committed to the radicalsceptical Agrippa's tropes unequivocally thesisthatno claim in any area of discourseever possessesany rational whatsoever. justification Such a conclusionwould,however, be premature as it overlooks the that someone the view that some claims are selftake might possibility A self-evidently true. true evenin claimcouldbe rationally evidently justified would not theabsenceofanyexternal as its on justification depend support the other be mere other claim On would not hand, being they justified. any assertionsas their self-evidence would itselfprovide all the arbitrary thatis necessary. such claimswouldnotonlybe justification Consequently immune to theregressive difficulties butthey byAgrippa's tropes, exploited wouldalso be capable of grounding thejustificatory chainsthatwouldbe in the case of less favoured essential claims. It appears, thatAgrippa's do notthemselves suffice to deliver then, tropes theconclusion thatno claimis everrationally all they showis that justified: mustbe eitherself-evidently trueor any claim thatis rationally justified derivable from truepremisses self-evidently by meansof inferential steps it is also clearthattheformer thatare self-evidently valid.Nevertheless and ifAgrippa's muchstronger conclusion couldbe wouldbe forthcoming tropes are no self-evident thatestablished thatthere byan argument supplemented will be and arguments of self-evident truths truths; againstthe existence in thenextsection ofthispaper.The restofthissection, however, presented willattempt is notin a position to countenance to showthatSextushimself of the thesuggestion thatself-evident truths exist.Irrespective oftheforce willbe brought in section that to forward III, Sextusis committed arguments the view thatAgrippa'stropesyieldthe conclusion thatno claim is ever And Sextus is committed to that view because any rationally justified. on his partto evade the forceof the tropesby appealingto the attempt of self-evident would be inconsistent withhis truths supposedexistence towards attitude the epistemological employed by the Stoics. categories Sextusrepeatedly asserts that thePyrrhonean is someone whodoes sceptic notassentto anything non-evident (see PHI 13,PH1 201, and PH1 225). the Pyrrhonist all Furthermore Sextusfrequently describes as eschewing As Sextusis at pains to stress thata personholdsa Soyluaonly 56y,uaaa. whenhe assents to something non-evident (see PHI 13,PHI 16,and PHI to the claim thatthe is straightforwardly 197), thatdescription equivalent However non-evident. Pyrrhonean sceptic does not assent to anything distinction it is clear thatthe appeal to the evident/non-evident although thePyrrhonist's to characterize special playsa vitalrolein Sextus'attempt stance,Sextus explainsthatdistinction only in termsof the philosophic thatwe are schemadevised therefore, bytheStoics.It follows, classificatory

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to concludethattheprinciples forced theStoicschemaare ones underlying thatalso commandSextus'confidence. In theStoicschemaall possible ofinquiry matters are classified as falling of the pre-evident, intoone of the fourmutually exclusive the categories thenaturally and thealtogether nonnon-evident, non-evident, occasionally Butitis plainthat is self-evidently true cannot be a claim evident. a claimthat matter ofinquiry. For thetruth thatare abouta non-evident aboutmatters non-evident is notapprehended at all,and thetruth aboutmatters altogether can be apprehended thatareoccasionally or naturally non-evident onlywith from some form assistance of sign. a Now thepre-evident they[theStoics]say,do notrequire objects, do thealtogether sinceofcourse non-evident, sign... And neither at all. But such objectsas are theyare not even apprehended or naturally non-evident are apprehended occasionally bymeansof butby"suggestive" signsin signs- notofcoursebythesamesigns, andby"indicative" thecase oftheoccasionally non-evident signsin non-evident. the case of the naturally (PH2 99) Thus it follows that if Sextus does thinkof some claims as being selfthenhe mustholdthattheseclaimsare claimsaboutmatters true, evidently Yet Sextusdoes not drawany distinctions within the thatare pre-evident. somepreofpre-evident matters ofinquiry: he never that suggests category are more securelyapprehended than otherpre-evident evidentmatters matters. we areforced totheconclusion that Sextuscanbe in a Consequently to regard claimsas self-evidently trueonlyifhe supposesthatthe position matters of inquiry is selfor falsity of any claim about pre-evident truth evident. And it seemsobviousthatSextuscannotlegitimately supposeany such thing. The problemhere stemsfromSextus' willingness to attackthe claims evenwhenthedogmatists themselves are convinced madebythedogmatists are merely thetruth aboutpre-evident matters ofinquiry. thatthey stating of Sextus a lengthy discussion ofthecriterion AtPH2 95,for brings example, truth to a close withthiscomment: tobe unattainable, itis Andsincethecriterion oftruth hasappeared eitherabout those no longerpossibleto make positiveassertions of the things which (if we may depend on the statements seem to be evidentor about those whichare nonDogmatists) thelatter for sincetheDogmatists evident; supposethey apprehend about from thethings ifwe areforced tosuspend evident, judgement the about how shall we dare to make theevident, pronouncements non-evident?

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the Stoics' favourite Furthermore exampleof a claim about a pre-evident ofinquiry matter is theclaim'It is day'whenthisis asserted who bysomeone is locatedoutdoors and has thefulluse ofhiseyes(see PH2 97, MVIII 144 andMVIII 317). That claim,however, is a claimabouta matter ofobjective ten tropes,whichfeature fact; and Aenesidemus' prominently alongside are definitely Agrippa'sfive tropes in Sextus' account of Pyrrhonism, intended to call intoquestioneven the mostbanal of our ordinary beliefs abouttheobjective world. AtPHI 99 we find theassertion 'But ifthesenses do not apprehendexternalobjects (ra EKTr6s),neithercan the mind that there may be some nonapprehendthem.' Thus the suggestion of claims about the objective perceptual,purely a priorijustification ofrealobjects is explicitly Moreover theoverall thrust of properties rejected. Aenesidemus' is that cannot be usedtojustify claims tropes sense-perception of objective about matters factbecause sense-impressions conflict and we have no criterion whichimpressions are veridical capable of determining PHI 59-61, and PHI 112-17). But ifwe cannotjustify (see, forexample, claimsaboutmatters of objective factby appealingto sense-perception or purely a priorireasoning,then we cannot justifysuch claims at all. anyonewho endorsesAenesidemus' Consequently tropeswould have to that theclaim'It is day'is never conclude itsstatus rationally justified despite as a paradigm of the typeof claim whichthe Stoicswishto treatas preevident. at thefollowing Ifwe are to accommodate We arrive, situation. therefore, thenotion ofself-evident within theevident/non-evident truth classificatory then we have to suppose that all true claims about pre-evident system, matters of inquiry are self-evidently trueand all falseclaims about preevident matters ofinquiry wearenowaware areself-evidently false. However that Sextusholdsthat oftheclaimsthedogmatists makeaboutmatters many that them as pre-evident strike lackanyrational Thus a desire to justification. makeroomforthenotionof self-evident truth woulddriveus to conclude thatSextusis, in fact,committed to the view thatclaimsthatare totally as devoidof any rational nevertheless strike some dogmatists justification true.But it would be absurdto allege thata claim thatis self-evidently truecan lack any rational Hence it genuinely self-evidently justification. follows thatwe have to assumethatSextusholdsthatthe dogmatists are in theirbeliefthatthe claimsin questionare self-evidently true. mistaken that a person can take a claim to be selfHowever,the supposition threatens trueevenwhenit is notself-evidently trueobviously to evidently a uselessas a wayofproviding maketheappeal to self-evident truth utterly terminus. of justification witha satisfactory For we are now being regress truth ofself-evident and askedto acceptthata personcan havetheconcept and mere betweengenuine self-evidence yet be unable to distinguish

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wearefaced this is a possibility, Butonceweaccept that bythe speciosity. which is a decision about of some of property problem finding way grounding that the Thus no has been made: original problem, actually progress present. has simply between thetruth and theapparent of distinguishing truth, wecan And time in our this round at a different reasoning. point reappeared of whether to self-evidence as a means something determining hardly appeal self-evident. or merely is genuinely self-evident appears doestake that Sextus toaccept, We arecompelled therefore, up a stance the selfview him the that from that taking putative legitimately prevents that itisclear Sextus ofa claim canjustify that claim. evidence Consequently that as leading tothe conclusion cannot avoid atleast seeing tropes Agrippa's is everrationally no claimabout anysubject-matter justified. III endorsement oftheStoics' section weargued that Sextus' In thepreceding andhisattitude towards matters ofinquiry schema for classifying possible it impossible for make matters that areallegedly claims about pre-evident selfthe ofbeing that claim have toaccept cangenuinely Sextus property any doesnot who Itisnow toaskwhether someone true. however, time, evidently tomaintain that selfbe entitled those would share particular assumptions is of great the answer to thisquestion truths exist. evident Moreover, Ifself-evident toreject radical who wishes toanyone scepticism. importance in wearewrong unless noclaim do notexist, then couldbejustified truths of andunfinished that mere circular regresses reasoning thinking hypothesis, for a claim. Yettheview a rational cannot provide justification justification is ofrational arewholly that such sources justification unacceptable supposed For most be willing to abandon. notonethat would many people, people of means truths is theonly an appealtotheexistence ofself-evident then, isundoubtedly exist claim that self-evident truths Thefirst obstacle tothe with true claims that self-evident truths the fact itisnot toidentify necessary that in order matters ofinquiry to be persuaded about people pre-evident ofwhat isandwhat is not as infallible cannot beviewed self-evidently judges instance of someone true. Thus we find, forexample, thata spectacular claim a mistake self-evidence ofa particular aboutthesupposed making In 'Meditation in Descartes' 'Meditations On First occurs III' Philosophy'. as must that there be atleast 'itis perfectly evident Descartes states, calmly weunpack this when in thecauseas in theeffect'.6 much However, reality
6 Rene Works in ThePhilosophical On FirstPhilosophy', 'Meditations ofDescartes, Descartes, ES. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, (Cambridge Vol. 1, ed. and trans. Press,1911), p. University 169.

facieplausibility. nullifying Agrippa's tropesthatpossessesevenprima

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thatDescartes is claiming, we discover opaquepronouncement, amongst it that the of an havethe other that is self-evident cause ideamust things, ofthat idea.7 Andthat claimis unlikely to sameperfections as theobject indeed we far more to strike of us as true: are likely regard any self-evidently In his story 'The Horla',Maupassant described an it as obviously false. was moreperfect thanthatof any invisible creature whose constitution had we would human saythat naturally being.8 Consequently Maupassant than human Yetwewould formed anideaofa being more any being. perfect himself had superhuman the conclusion resist thatMaupassant rightly powers. in notorious instance ofthis occurred another Furthermore, phenomenon ofarithmetic the axioms from the course ofFrege's toderive purely attempt there that itis self-evident that laws. took theview is, logical initially Frege over sets ofquantification ofobjects, for every bymeans predicate expressible thatsatisfy thepredicate concerned. a set containing justthoseobjects us in an embroils thisso-called axiomof comprehension Unfortunately arenot thesetofall setsthat when wecometoconsider alarming paradox setis nota member of Ifwe hypothesize that this ofthemselves. members ofitself. Butif tobea member then the itdoeshave itself, property qualifying then itfails toqualify ofitself, itisa member weswitch tothe that assumption setsthat arenotmembers ofthemselves ofitself because as a member only this toFrege's Andwhen Russell attention, Frege brought paradox qualify. that abouttheselfrecalled he hadalways beenin somedoubt suddenly evidence oftheaxiom responsible.9 ablethinkers, Thusitseems clear that even intently concentrating highly can mistakenly takea claimto be selfmatter ofinquiry, on a particular cancleave totheview when itis not. a person true evidently Consequently him with an epistemological that self-evidence guarantee apparent provides donot ifheisprepared the heroic line that hisintellectual totake powers only of the the lesserintellects whichafflict suffer fromthe limitations named above. philosophers onhisown that tosuppose itis plausible Moreover, anyperson reflecting he now which willrecallthatthere are someclaims intellectual history And self-evident truth. intheir confidence as false hisformer regards despite is the realmof fruitful sourceof such renunciations one particularly thesuggestion thattwo encounter Whenwe first reasoning. geometrical
7 See BernardWilliams, Descartes: TheProject (Pelican Books, 1978), pp. ofPureEnquiry, 135-41. 8 Guy de trans. Selected Short Stories, RogerColet,(PenguinBooks,1971), pp. Maupassant, 313-45. 9 See M. Black and P.T. Geach (eds), Translations thePhilosophical from ofGottlob Writings Frege(Blackwell,1952), p. 234.

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lines for oftheir be parallel andyetsubsequently straight may part length without to be straight we takethefalsity of this lines, converge ceasing tobeself-evident. Nordoesthis sense ofself-evident differ suggestion falsity from the senseof self-evident the claimthat thataccompanies falsity colourthanwhite. 7+ 5 = 11 and the claim thatblack is a lighter theGeneral Nevertheless ofRelativity claims that ifwe wishto Theory to think continue ofa straight lineas theshortest distance between two then wehave toaccept that the situation described above isnot a only points, state ofaffairs butalsoa frequently state ofaffairs.10 possible occurring our intuitive ofthe ofthe Mobius isusually Similarly grasp properties strip A Mobius canreadily a strip be formed of extremely poor. strip bygiving a half twist andsticking theendstogether. Forourpresent paper purposes, thenature ofitsphysical is irrelevant: embodiment weneedonly however, ourselves with concern itspurely thestrip geometric properties. Suppose were tobe divided line. What orfigures itscentre along geometrical figure from that who would result ?Almost toreason his anyone operation attempts willconclude itis self-evident is two that that theresult waytoan answer twisted Theanalogy with anuntwisted seems circular, absolutely strips. strip of decisive. those ofus whohaveexperimented on actual However, strips insist would that this self-evident conclusion is false. The paper apparently evidence indicates that theresult ofdividing a experimental convincingly in thewayspecified is a single with Mobius a full twist. strip strip It follows, in distinguishing selfthatdifficulties accordingly, genuine evidence from self-evidence cannot be dismissed as confined to apparent other willinevitably whosearches hardenough uncover Anyone people. ofoccasions when he himself hasfailed toarrive at a satisfactory examples inretrospect, Yetifthese decision. casescanbe discerned only problematic thenit seemsobvious thatan appealto thesupposed self-evidence of a claim candonothing istrue. that the claim inquestion toestablish particular thelastofthepresent to theattempt to use selfHowever, objections as a of to an end evidence way bringing justificatory regresses goeseven the It is to that it is than criticisms outlined above. difficult deny deeper to go wrong without the for anypsychological logically possible operation thatit has gonewrong. Anyone agentinvolved having any realization todispute consider theconsequences ofAlzheimer's inclined this needonly cannot disease ortraumatic brain a claim's self-evidence Moreover, damage. is in that claim that he unless someone justified thinking recognizes justify is a the claimas self-evidently true.But thisprocessof recognition is for someone to it operation. possible psychological Consequently, logically
10See Papers: Hilary Putnam,'The Logic of QuantumMechanics',in his Philosophical Volume Press, 1979), pp. 174-7. One,2nd edn (CambridgeUniversity

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when even think that hehasrecognized a particular claim tobeself-evident, cananyone ever is notgenuinely theclaim self-evident. How,then, hopeto ?Yetif situation is his actual situation this not establish that logically possible inthinking that hecan that heisjustified itisimpossible for a person toshow the 'selftrue then existence ofsuch claims, reliably recognize self-evidently himto justify evenoneclaim. claims notenable true' would evidently of that thepotential Thusweareseemingly toconclude forced fallibility cannot that true' claims means all psychological 'self-evidently operations that conclusion with a reason tobelieve However, anyone anything. provide self-evident claimmustbe capableof is plainly absurd:a genuinely Thus tobelieve that itis a true claim. with someone furnishing goodreason is that theabove that from theconclusion should be drawn reasoning really then truths Andifself-evident cannot truths cannot exist. self-evident exist, tothe uswith a solution itisobvious that cannot epistemological they provide byAgrippa's tropes. generated problem IV views tohave that Sextus inthe weseem established Atthis discussion stage thatno claimis ever conclusion as yielding theradical Agrippa's tropes is right to that we havealso argued Sextus Moreover, rationally justified. ofallegedly self-evident tothe existence that anappeal the reject supposition ifitistrue that some claims even ustojustify truths would enable hypothesis, of sources arenot andunfinished ofjustification circular regresses reasoning, that it maintains the self-refutation However, argument justification. genuine is ever that noclaim is self-defeating toattempt toargue rationally justified. andis hisglobal is thestatus ofSextus' What, then, sceptical arguments, evennotionally coherent? aboutrational scepticism justification of assessment oftheforce at a correct When weareattempting toarrive the mature between itisessential todistinguish the self-refutation argument, and the characterization characterization of his arguments Pyrrhonist's ofthe the Until weappreciate offered significance byhisdogmatic opponent. to itis impossible different interaction between these twovery viewpoints, the with can genuinely how the mature understand argue Pyrrhonist constitutes a goodreason that without forward anything dogmatist bringing as true. Butifwedoavoid conclusions the for Pyrrhonist's accepting sceptical ofthe with the theviewpoint ofthemature Pyrrhonist viewpoint conflating mature see the to how itis surprisingly then easy dogmatist, unregenerate even can be of greatphilosophical significance Pyrrhonist's arguments are not arguments. rationally compelling though they fivetropes led us to the of the nature of Agrippa's Our discussion ofour serve as reminders to two are intended that ofthese conclusion tropes

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needto choose between claims while theother three frequent conflicting are intended to it show that is to make a has choice that tropes impossible any rational Forourpresent the however, justification. purposes, important point is that the tonote three that aresupposed toestablish that noclaim is tropes ever to its on of rationally preferable contradictory rely principles reasoning that areallextremely wish tomaintain that Almost noonewould plausible. unfinished ofjustification, circular ormere regresses arguments hypothesis a person canprovide with some reason tobelieve that claim is good particular true. itbecame inthe section that clear there arealso Furthermore, preceding forconceding Sextus'unargued but far-reaching grounds compelling that us toa claim's self-evidence cannot supposition appeals alleged provide witha rational forassenting to thatclaim.It seemsplain, justification that theindividual ofAgrippa's would strike therefore, components tropes most as relatively onthe uncontroversial constraints notion ofrational people justification. the Buthow would mature todescribe this onthe choose attack Pyrrhonist view that there that canbe rationally aresome claims dogmatist's justified? GiventhePyrrhonist's commitment to a global about implicit scepticism rational he willalmost notregard as offering himself justification, certainly reasons for infact, the Andwefind, that good rejecting dogmatist's position. with Sextus hispresentation ofAenesidemus' andAgrippa's prefaces tropes an explicit that he is notprepared to make assertion warning anypositive thenumber orvalidity itis possible that ofthese 'for regarding they tropes: than I shall beunsound orthere bemore ofthem enumerate' may (PHI may thePyrrhonist would wish to describe as himself 35). Instead presumably topersuade hisbelief the toabandon that there are seeking simply dogmatist suchthings as goodreasons for some claims andrejecting others. accepting Nowthis self-characterization hasthe virtue ofconsistency. The obviously isnolonger inthe ofbringing forward task Pyrrhonist engaged self-defeating reasons to showthatno claim is ever rationally Nor is he justified. toshow that thebelief that nobelief whatsoever canbe incoherently trying is in somesenseitself to therival rationally justified, rationally superior thatsome claimscan be rationally No philosophical justified. position canbe brought tobearagainst thesuggestion that itis perfectly objections that all conceivable someone should inpersuading someone elsethat succeed ourbeliefs areultimately based onanimal andthat none ofthem canbe faith, rationally justified. doesinitially What remain is why should unclear, however, philosophers inthe Ifthe interest themselves ofsuch has mechanics Pyrrhonist persuasion. noarguments butonly andan ability tomanipulate human rhetorical tricks howcan hisscepticism Such challenge? psychology, posea philosophical in the wouldseemto be of concern onlyto thoseinterested scepticism

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thathappento be of the propaganda efficiency techniques empirical both the we need to consider this To answer objection powerful employed. and mature offered the nature of the Pyrrhonist the by persuasion particular suchpersuasion. make to the is to of type response dogmatist compelled is quite of persuasion utilized The form Pyrrhonist by the mature thedogmatist tointimidate incharacter. He doesnotendeavour distinctive the from andendorsements theuseofforbidding scholastic jargon through of the day.Similarly, intellectual styleand intoxicating leading figures ofillicit theresources In short, absent. areconspicuously rhetorical subtlety does What the are eschewed. Pyrrhonist deliberately opinion-manipulation like much that lookvery ofthought chains areunadorned offer, however, rational arguments. but likegoodarguments, look chains ofthought notonly do these Indeed aregood them as though to treating is alsocommitted thedogmatist they to itis notrational ineffect, that second claims, arguments. Agrippa's trope to itis alsorational unless that believe proof, p on thebasisofa purported Nowthe inferential form. anda valid that the hastrue believe proof premisses as a meansof thisoracular offers mature pronouncement Pyrrhonist inaccordance isinterpreted when the However, pronouncement persuasion. transformed. isdramatically itsstatus rationalistic with the code, dogmatist's than to other hasno option, ifhe is notto actinsincerely, The dogmatist ofproofs as affording totake anunfinished that itis irrational regress accept for this a disputed claim. Onefactor for rational responsible any justification tofound claims himself the isthat lack offreedom attempts dogmatist rejects ofthe Forsomeone whopartakes ofa non-terminating onthebasis regress. a considerable this provides for consistency, enthusiasm dogmatist's that onany belief constraint as a proper for the second incentive trope taking thatleadsthe Andthesecond factor to be objectively justified. purports ifherejects that inquestion is that hisassent togive tothetrope dogmatist force him will inhisdecisions then hisdesire tobeconsistent trope, particular Butsuchan indisputes with other theuseofthat toabandon people. trope would be in sucha dispute mean theother would that abandonment party is no longer thatthedogmatist of a method able to establish, by means ofrational as worthy tocriticize, claim whatsoever acceptance. any prepared ofthe thevalidity to accept motivated is powerfully Hencethedogmatist as self-betrayal: itwould beviewed tocircumvent second Any attempt trope. I nolonger then second the ofthe 'Ifitisnot toaccept rational trope, validity and in mybeliefs actions.' tobe rational on what itmeans haveanygrasp critical two tothe other areapplicable similar considerations tropes. Very tosettle in a debate not hisopponent allow would Itisclear that the dogmatist ofa or bymeans in dispute, thepoint theissuesimply byhypothesizing refusal identical to an canhesincerely circular How,then, object argument.

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? Not thatitwouldimprove on thepartofthePyrrhonist matters evenifthe did decide to the mere or that the of dogmatist hypothesis p, accept provision as a circular a for it be reason to true that For this argument, good taking p. wouldmean thathe wouldbe committed to supposing thatall beliefs, no matter whattheir are rationally that the content, Onlyby holding justified. on one basis (namely, beliefthatp was rationally or justified hypothesis circularreasoning) whileprecisely the same basis was inadequateforthe thebelief itwasnotthecase rational ofthecompeting that belief, justification would in of a belief as that the be sort to evaluate any p, dogmatist position - surely moreor less rational thananother thewholepointofthepractice! And such a manoeuvre wouldinevitably itself to the dogmatist as present and paradigmatically irrational. arbitrary completely Thus thedogmatist is quiteunableto avoidaccepting theproffered tropes as constraints on rationaljustification. But once the tropes have been will rapidlydiscoverthat these tropes,takenin accepted,the dogmatist with theproblems with associated selfanyappealtosupposedly conjunction himfrom evident Indeed truths, satisfactorily prevent anybelief. justifying the tropes even preventhim from justifying the tropes themselves. the dogmatist is strongly Consequently temptedto abandon the tropes. he cannotformulate constraints thatpossessany However, any alternative Hence he is equallyfirmly committed toholding on tothe greater credibility. tropes. Now it is plausible to suggest that such unresolvedtension is unendurable. One solution is to turnone's attention away psychologically from the chainof speculative thatleads to thisconflict. This can thought in thepractical be achieved oneself activities ofdaily readily by immersing life.As Hume reports in the Treatise: I dine,I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with and whenafter three or four hours'amusement, I myfriends; wou'dreturn tothese they speculations, appearso cold,andstrain'd, I cannot in myheart and ridiculous, that find to enter intothem any 1 farther. this solutionsucceeds only if one is preparedto eschew Unfortunately character. Otherwise all reflection ofa distinctively completely philosophical on one's are bound to forcethemselves questions concerning justification and calamitous and theattempt themwilllead to a fresh to settle attention; withthe objections of the sceptic.Consequently anyonewho engagement to be pushedtowards finds is likely at all attractive philosophical speculation
1 Hume, A Treatise Book One, p. 318. ofHumanNature,

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- theacceptance theothersolution of the sceptical claimthatnone of our beliefs can ever be justified. This immediately absolves one of the for criteria of Hence one'sinability tofind rationality. responsibility selecting is no candidates a source of concern. any satisfactory longer describethe situationbeforehis How, though,would the dogmatist dramatic conversion to globalscepticism? Within thedogmatist's rationalistic code the Pyrrhonist's chainsof reasoning have to be treatedas good If theyare dismissedas mere emotivepersuasion, then the arguments. will have abandoned what little he ever had on the dogmatist effectively grasp ofrational The mimic notion do not justification. Pyrrhonist's arguments just thearguments in his less reflective customarily by thedogmatist employed thefactthatthey moments do mimicthesearguments is itself (though very thepatterns ofargument alsorepresent thedogmatist finds significant); they leastimpugnable. Ifthose havetobe abandoned, thenthedogmatist patterns has no idea of whatmight have literally replacethem.No rivalprinciples eventhesame degreeofplausibility, As faras let alone greater plausibility. thedogmatist is concerned, thesceptical aretobe taken therefore, arguments as good arguments. But their is thatthereis no such thing as a conclusion If thedogmatist had anyplausiblealternative of good argument. principles In sucha reductio wouldbe occasionto adoptthesealternatives. rationality, therationalism ofthedogmatist their leavesthedogmatist absence, however, in theuntenable ofwanting to sayboththathe has goodreasons to position areno suchthings there as goodreasons, and,as thisconclusion supposethat is clearly thathe cannothavegood reasonsforsupposing that inconsistent, thereare no such thingsas good reasons.Consequently the dogmatist's a workable rationalistic no longerrepresents and language-game; practice the dogmatist abandonshis rationalism forscepticism. An illustration ofPaul Feyerabend drawnfrom thewritings mayhelp,at to bringmatters thispoint, intosharper focus. Indeed Feyerabend, despite to be an epistemological anarchist rather thana sceptic, is perhaps claiming thetwentieth-century whomost conforms totheroleand philosopher closely of Sextus' Pyrrhonist. In his book Against Method, strategy Feyerabend seeksto discredit of scienceby showing apparently Popperianphilosophy that its proposedmethodology would actuallyhave hinderedscientific At otherpointsin the book,however, Feyerabend progress.12 specifically deniesthathe knows whatconstitutes But ifhe is unableto 'real' progress. betweenprogress and mere change,thenhow can he be in a distinguish wouldhaveretarded to arguethatPopper'sproposed methodology position For it is natural to assumethatsuch a claimcannotbe scientific progress? is able to establish thatthere hasbeen some well-founded unlessFeyerabend
12

Paul Feyerabend, Method (Verso, 1978). Against

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be nothing to Otherwise there would for progress. methodology Popper's have orprevented. in hindered YetFeyerabend the admission that he glories lacks tosuppose hasbeenanyscientific since that there anyreason progress ofthePre-Socratics. thedays It hasseemed tomany that therefore, people, we can safely is selfconclude thatFeyerabend's position hopelessly Hisargument ofscience canbe contradictory. against philosophy Popperian a good if between his claim to lack for criteria, argument only distinguishing andchange, is false. progress hiscritics tothis istopoint outthat have Feyerabend's allegation response the The is not misunderstood function ofhis intended argument argument.13 for toprovide with a goodreason anyarbitrary rejecting person Popperian ofscience. of Rather itis intended toreduce thetypical adherent philosophy his such toconcluding for that hehasa goodreason abandoning philosophy In this an sort ofcontext it doesnotfollow, from thefact that allegiance. a certain the uses ofthe that the wielder argument argument accepts premiss, claims tohave orregards itas plausible. He may reasons for it, good premiss, it and, but stilluse it becausehis opponent denythe premiss accepts a desiredconcession. Thus into making it, can be driven accepting reaffirms topossess as that hedoesnotclaim Feyerabend knowledge special towhat constitutes that hesimply takes hiscuefrom andexplains progress, his opponents. 'THEY prefer THEY say thatthe Galileoto Aristotle. -. Galileo I only transition Aristotle intheright direction. addthat is a step this wasnot been with the butcould not have achieved achieved, stepnotonly therefore methods favoured Feyerabend's argument generates bythem.'14 forthePopperian it doesnotprovide difficulties ofscience: philosopher reasons for as true. this itsconclusion However, objective taking apparent is actually ofnosignificance. The only deficiency likely antecedently people totake itsconclusion tobefalse arethe arecompelled, andthey Popperians; ownrationalistic to holdthat the andfirmly-held beliefs, bytheir practice is coercive. willhaveto ifthey aretoactsincerely, Hence, argument they abandon their ofcourse, is just scientific Andthis, suggested methodology. theresult that intended. Feyerabend NowI take itthat most observers would that agree Feyerabend impartial has defended himself the mooted successfully against chargeof selfcontradiction. ButifFeyerabend's then so is the here is acceptable, position ofthePyrrhonist whoseeks theauthority toundermine ofreason. position ForFeyerabend andthePyrrhonist inthesameway. Neither believes argue thearguments that he happens are rationally to putforward compelling. Indeed themature no arguments us anyrational holds that Pyrrhonist give
13 Paul Feyerabend, 'Conversations with in hisScience ina FreeSociety Illiterates' (New Left Books, 1978), pp. 125-217. 14 Paul Feyerabend, in a FreeSociety Science (New Left Books, 1978), p. 142.

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whatsoever for their conclusions tobetrue. However, justification taking just in as Feyerabend that the sincere is offers arguments Popperian noposition toreject as irrational so thePyrrhonist offers that the arguments persuasion, The soledifference sincere is forced toregard as good dogmatist arguments. of with is that leavethePopperian thepossibility Feyerabend's arguments of ofmind as theresult hischange sincerely subsequently characterizing on the otherhand,renders the rational The Pyrrhonist, argument. totalk so unworkable that he is subsequently dogmatist's practice prepared interms isthe ofpersuasion rather than reasons. Atnopoint dogmatist only that can be rationally theoption ofretaining hisbelief someclaims given as and yetsincerely the Pyrrhonist's arguments justified characterizing
irrational.

V ofhis In theprevious thinks section weargued that themature Pyrrhonist He does as having a purely function. arguments therapeutic epistemological them that hisarguments instead heregards not hold have rational force: any inother ofjudgement as instruments for about people. bringing suspension of view ofthefact the itis important tobeaware that However, Pyrrhonist's in thecourse ofhisphilosophical hisownarguments changes dramatically towards a When thePyrrhonist hisintellectual journey development. begins he is firmly committed tothe about rational global justification, scepticism thetropes of theprinciples of reasoning thatunderlie objective validity and Aenesidemus. devisedby Agrippa Indeed,it is only the future that initial inthe ofthese enables confidence Pyrrhonist's validity principles his subsequent ofjudgement on all nonevident us to explain suspension matters ofinquiry. ofhisinvestigations hasa great beliefs Atthestart thePyrrhonist many of inquiry. the mature aboutnon-evident matters However, Pyrrhonist even hedoesadmit to tohave nobeliefs about such matters though professes beliefs about ofinquiry: evident matters having nor It must in mind that as wesay, weneither alsobe borne what, posit what is nonis someoneofthedogmatic statements madeabout deny, whichmoveus forwe yieldto thosethings evident (r- r8qA,ov); 193)

to assent(UvyKaardOatv). and driveus compulsorily (PHI emotionally

of transformation is theresult Moreover thePyrrhonist assures us that this that have histrust hishaving been undermined tovarious arguments exposed intherationality ofhisformer beliefs (seePHI 31-5).Thusheis claiming

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that these him toalter hisbeliefs. Butitisobvious have arguments persuaded that a person who hasnoinclination tobelieve that a given hastrue argument a and valid inferential structure will not of be premisses persuaded anything the fact the beliefs alter as that bythat argument. Consequently Pyrrhonist's a result ofhisexposure likethose to arguments devised and by Agrippa Aenesidemus can be explained to suppose that the onlyifwe are willing as inclined to acceptsuch arguments was, at some point, Pyrrhonist rationally compelling. Oncethe hassuspended matters onallnon-evident Pyrrhonist judgement ofinquiry, is no needto suppose there thatthissuspension of however, is sustained inclination toaccept that judgement bya continuing Agrippa's orAenesidemus' aregood Theelimination arguments arguments arguments. ofexisting the claims beliefs onthe that Pyrrhonist being depends persuaded in question are lessjustified In contrast, thanhe formerly the supposed. ofnew who hasalready beliefs judgeacquisition bya Pyrrhonist suspended onallnon-evident would onhisbeing ment matters ofinquiry depend perclaims thanhe formerly suadedthatsomeparticular are better justified the renunciation ofthe Consequently supposed. Pyrrhonist's epistemological that doesnot have effect on hissceptical any arguments principles underpin ofhissuspension the is now ofjudgement. thePyrrhonist stability Although free toadopt a newsetofstandards, think ofanyepistemological hecannot that than those more hehasjust discarded. possess any principles plausibility Thushe is quite unable tocometoevena provisional conclusion about the merits ofputative ofcourse, rules outthepossibility Andthis, justifications. ofthePyrrhonist at thepositive conclusion that hedoes eventually arriving havegoodreason tobelieve claim is true. of that a specific Yetsuspension ona given is supposed tobe a product ofone'sinability to judgement topic reason discern for orrejecting claim about thetopic good any any accepting in question. It seems that thePyrrhonist's of clear, therefore, suspension will remainstableeven whenthe Pyrrhonist extends his judgement ofjudgement to cover thevery that drove suspension originally principles himtowards a widespread ofjudgement. suspension Thusitis nowpossible thesameargument canhaveentirely tosee that inthePyrrhonist's career. different functions atdifferent stages philosophic The Pyrrhonist starts outas a dogmatist whois implicitly committed tothe usedin thearguments principles putforward byAgrippa epistemological andAenesidemus. hehasnot realized the full Nevertheless, yet implications ofthose assent to thesceptical so he doesnotgivehisexplicit principles; In thecourse ofhissubsequent investigations, arguments justmentioned. aware ofthe fact that and hebecomes however, increasingly Agrippa's tropes ofprinciples aremerely outtheconsequences Aenesidemus' drawing tropes hecannot ofreasoning hissupport. think ofany that Moreover, enjoy already

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alternative he couldsincerely endorse. Hencehe embraces the principles of conclusions the and finds himself forced to sceptical judgetropes, suspend onanever-widening ment oftopics. Atthis the then, range Pyrrhonist stage, views and Aenesidemus' as rationally Agrippa's tropes tropes compelling that have enabled him to discover the limits ofhuman reason. arguments it occurs to the to his however, Eventually, Pyrrhonist subject basic to tests he onallother the same hasbeen epistemological principles imposing claims that to be And when he he is does this, purport rationally justified. forced totheconclusion that these fail to meet the standards that principles themselves down. Thus the on they lay Pyrrhonist judgement the suspends of those and he to as ceases thetropes objective cogency regard principles, At MVIII 481, forexample, we findthe following good arguments. comments about theuse ofAgrippean arguments: as itis not And man for the who hasascended again, just impossible toa high a ladder to overturn the with hisfoot after ladder by place hisascent, so also it is notunlikely that theSceptic after he has atthe arrived demonstration ofhisthesis ofthe bymeans argument the it non-existence of as were proving by a step-ladder, proof, then abolish this should very argument. As we havealready thisreassessment of the standard however, noted, does not disturb the Pyrrhonist's of arguments sceptical suspension of doesthePyrrhonist thefive Nor,indeed, judgement. stopusing tropes ten henolonger of andthe ofAenesidemus. thinks Although Agrippa tropes them as providing himwith forhisscepticism, he is ofthe goodreasons that these areaneffective means to ofpersuading other opinion tropes people Hencethetropes a central continue tooccupy judgement. suspend placein thePyrrhonist's ofhisscepticism. exposition Itfollows, that toregard wehave thePyrrhonist as successively therefore, two the views insection IV ofthis described as itis And embracing just paper. toavoid vital themature assessment ofthestandard conflating Pyrrhonist's with theassessment made so tooitis arguments bythedogmatist, sceptical vital to avoidconflating with themature assessment theone Pyrrhonist's forced The mature uponthedeveloping Pyrrhonist genuinely Pyrrhonist. seeshisnegative as nothing more than a form of epistemological arguments thedeveloping is in thesame However, Pyrrhonist psychological therapy. situation as anyone elsewhohasnot arrived ata global about yet scepticism rational to avoidseeing same he is wholly unable those justification: very as rationally arguments arguments. compelling Canada University, Guelph