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103586cv P.J.,etal.v.CTBoardofEd.,etal.

UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS FORTHESECONDCIRCUIT

SUMMARYORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARYORDERFILEDONORAFTERJANUARY1,2007,ISPERMITTEDANDISGOVERNEDBY FEDERALRULEOFAPPELLATEPROCEDURE32.1ANDTHISCOURTSLOCALRULE32.1.1.WHEN CITINGASUMMARYORDERINADOCUMENTFILEDWITHTHISCOURT,APARTYMUSTCITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION SUMMARYORDER).APARTYCITINGTOASUMMARYORDERMUSTSERVEACOPYOFITON ANYPARTYNOTREPRESENTEDBYCOUNSEL.

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AtastatedtermoftheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheSecondCircuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the CityofNewYork,onthe23rddayofDecember,twothousandthirteen. Present: DEBRAANNLIVINGSTON, RAYMONDJ.LOHIER,JR., SUSANL.CARNEY, CircuitJudges. _____________________________________ P.J., By & Through His Parents & Next FriendsMr.&Mrs.W.J.,etal., PlaintiffsAppellants, IANIANKATZ,byandthroughhisparentsand nextfriendsMr.andMrs.MarkKatz,etal., IntervenorsPlaintiffs Appellants, No.103586cv

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v. CT BOARD OF ED., EDUCATION, DEPT OF, TIROZZI,GERALD,COMM., DefendantsAppellees. _____________________________________ ForPlaintiffsAppellants: ForDefendantsAppellees: DAVIDC.SHAW,Bloomfield,CT. DARREN P. CUNNINGHAM,Assistant Attorney General, for George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut,Hartford,CT.

Appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Robert N. Chatigny, J.) denying Appellants motion to compel discoveryandmotionallegingsubstantialnoncompliance. UPONDUECONSIDERATION,ITISHEREBYORDERED,ADJUDGED, ANDDECREEDthattheordersofthedistrictcourtareAFFIRMED. In 2002, the parties to this action entered into a settlement agreement (the Agreement)concerningAppelleesallegednoncompliancewiththeIndividuals withDisabilitiesEducationAct(IDEA),20U.S.C.1400etseq.TheAgreement enumeratedfivegoalsintendedtoencourageAppelleescompliancewithIDEAas itconcernedstudentswithintellectualdisabilities.Thesegoalsweretoincrease

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...thepercentofstudentswithintellectualdisabilitiesplacedinregularclasses, reduc[e]thediscriminatoryidentificationofstudentswithintellectualdisabilities, increase . . . the mean and median percent of the school day students with intellectualdisabilitiesspentwithnondisabledstudents,increase...thepercent ofstudentswithintellectualdisabilitieswhoattendedtheschooltheywouldattend if not disabled, and increase . . . the percent of students with intellectual disabilities who participated in extracurricular activities with nondisabled students. The Agreement also contained a number of provisions to facilitate realizationoftheAgreementsgoals,includingmonitoringandparentaloutreach requirements, and a section concerning the establishment of an expert advisory panel. The Agreement finally provided that the district court would retain jurisdiction for enforcement of the Agreement for five years, but limited the courts jurisdiction to reviewing motions for substantial noncompliance in the subsequentthreeyears.Thecourtsjurisdictionwouldendaftereightyears,thatis, in2010. In2009,AppellantsfiledamotionassertingthatAppelleeswereinsubstantial noncompliance with the Agreement.1 Appellants also sought discovery to press
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Appellantsfiledtheirinitialmotionassertingsubstantialnoncompliancein2008,butthe motionwasdeniedforadministrativepurposeswithoutprejudicetorefiling.See,e.g., P.J.,etal.v.Education,etal.,No.91Civ.180(RNC)(D.Conn.),Doc.No.571. 3 3 of 11

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their claim. The district court denied Appellants motion to compel discovery, findingthattheAgreementonlyrequiredAppelleestoprovideexistingdatainits finalthreeyears.SeeP.J.,etal.,No.91Civ.180(D.Conn.),Doc.No.593.Thedistrict courtlaterdeniedAppellantsmotionsassertingsubstantialnoncomplianceonthe groundthatAppellantsfailedtoestablishthatAppelleeshadfrustratedtheessential purposesoftheAgreement.Id.,Doc.Nos.686,706;seealsoJosephA.byWolfev.New MexicoDeptofHumanServs.,69F.3d1081,1086(10thCir.1995)([T]hetouchstone ofthesubstantialcomplianceinquiryiswhetherDefendantsfrustratedthepurpose oftheconsentdecreei.e.itsessentialrequirements.).Appellantsnowarguethat thedistrictcourterredindecliningtoorderdiscoveryandthatitincorrectlyapplied the standard announced in Joseph A. for finding substantial noncompliance. We assumethepartiesfamiliaritywiththeunderlyingfacts,theproceduralhistoryof thecase,andissuesonappeal. *** The Agreement operates as a consent decree given the district courts continuingjurisdictionoverit.SeePerezv.WestchesterCnty.DeptofCorr.,587F.3d 143,15152(2dCir.2009).Nevertheless,theordinaryrulesofcontractinterpretation apply.Thatis,whenthelanguageofadecreeisunambiguous,deferenceispaidto
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itsplainmeaning.Whenthelanguageisambiguous,however,acourtmayconsider extrinsicevidencetodeterminethepartiesintent.SeeBroad.Music,Inc.v.DMXInc., 683F.3d 32, 43 (2dCir.2012).Finally,therulesofcontractinterpretationdonot contemplateconsideringanyprovisionofthecontractinisolationbutinthelightof the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby. United States ex rel. AntiDiscrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 712 F.3d 761, 767 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). In considering a district courts interpretation of the terms of a consent decree, we reviewconclusionsoflawdenovoandfindingsoffactforclearerror.Broad.Music, Inc.,683F.3dat43. Following a review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that AppellantsfailedtoestablishthatAppelleeswereinsubstantialnoncompliancewith the Agreement for largely the reasons set forth by the district court. Contrary to Appellantsargument,itisplainthattheessentialpurposesoftheAgreementwere limited to the five goals set forth in Section II. As an initial matter, Section II is entitled Goals and Outcomes. To find that each section of the Agreement containedessentialpurposeswouldbetoignorethatterminology.Further,while theothersectionsoftheAgreementoutlinespecificstepsforAppelleestoundertake,
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eachofthosestepssupportstherealizationofthegoalsinSectionII;noneisanend in and of itself. For instance, Appellees failure to improve disabled students placementsinregularclasseswouldbeanobviousviolationoftheAgreement.By contrast,theirfailurefullytoinstituteacomplaintresolutionprocedurewhilestill recording progress toward achieving Section IIs goals could be a comparatively inconsequential breach. See Joseph A., 69 F.3d at 1086 (To the extent that any stipulatedcriteriahasnotbeenmet,thecourtmustdeterminewhetherthatfailure is immaterial to the overall objectives or, on the other hand, whether it had a materialadverseimpactupontheoverall[objectivesoftheDecree].).Finally,the Agreement makes clear that the goals in Section II are quantitative and not qualitative. Each of the five goals speaks to a numerical improvement in the integration and classification of students with intellectual disabilities. The goals nowheretouchuponthequalityofeducationprovided.WhileAppellantsrequest that we read such a requirement into the goals, we decline to do so where such a readingisnotsupportedbythelanguageoftheAgreement. Next,AppelleesmadesignificantprogresstowardaccomplishingSectionIIs goals,postinglargepercentagegainsontheintegrationofstudentswithintellectual disabilities pursuant to the first, third, fourth, and fifth goals, and markedly
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reducingdiscriminatoryidentificationofsuchstudentspursuanttothesecondgoal. WhilethisprogresswasnotcontinuousacrossthelifeoftheAgreement,blamefor thatshortcomingcannotbeplacedonAppelleesgiventheireffortstoimplementthe Agreementinitsfinalyears,evenafterAppelleesbelievedthattheywerenolonger boundbytheAgreementabeliefthedistrictcourtdeemedcredible.Inaddition, the district court credited testimony provided by Appellees that progress slowed becausetheeasygainsweremadeearlyinthelifeoftheAgreement,afindingwe will not disturb on appeal. While additional efforts by Appellees might have produced greater results, that alone is insufficient to support Appellants motion whereAppelleesmadegreatstridesinachievingtheAgreementsgoals.Because Appellants have thus failed to establish that Appellees frustrated the essential purposes of the Agreement, we conclude that the district court properly denied Appellantsmotionassertingsubstantialnoncompliance. Appellantsfinallyarguethattheyweredeniedtheabilitytofullyprosecute theirmotionwhenthedistrictcourtdeniedthemformaldiscovery.However,the AgreementclearlylimitedAppellantsdiscoveryrightstoexistingdatainthefinal three years of the Agreement. Further, the district court encouraged informal discoverybetweenthepartiesand,asaresult,Appellantswereabletodeposefive
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ofAppelleesemployees.Appellantswerealsoabletoengageinschoolvisitsprior totheevidentiaryhearingontheirmotion. WhileAppellantsmayhavepreferred greater access to Appellees records, they did not bargain for such access in the Agreement.Accordingly,thedistrictcourtproperlydeniedAppellantsmotionto compeldiscovery. WehaveconsideredAppellantsremainingargumentsandfindthemtobe without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district courts orders denying Appellants motion to compel discovery and motion alleging substantial noncompliance.

FORTHECOURT: CatherineOHaganWolfe,Clerk

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