Please list Your Lastname Here

entcsmacro.sty, a macro le containing the denitions of some of the theoremlike environments and a few other tidbits. The formatting these style les impose should not be altered the reason for using them is to attain a uniform format for all papers in the Proceedings of which your paper is a part. Additional macro les can be added using \usepackage{...}. The le entcsmacro.sty must be included in the list, as is done at the start of the source le for this paper. A The ENTCS package requires a relatively up-to-date L TEX system in order to be successfully used. This is reected in two other packages that are called by entcs.cls, which must be available on your machine. These are:

The hyperref package. This package allows the use of hyperlinks in les A prepared using L TEX2e, one of the main features of Adobes Acrobat c Reader software. Be sure that you have at least version 6.69d of this package.

The ifpdf package. This is used by hyperref to dierentiate between the A A use of pdfL TEX and L TEX2e, followed by dvips and then ps2pdf. A The le instraut.dvi contains information about the use of L TEXto prepare les for online publication by Elsevier. This le refers to the older version A of L TEX that is no longer suppported, and that is inadequate for preparing .pdf les for online publication. Reading this le should answer most of the A basic questions about L TEX that might arise.

Frontmatter

A The biggest dierence between a usual L TEX style such as article.sty and the ENTCS package is that the ENTCS macro package requires the title, authors name or names, abstract, keywords and thanks all to be included within the frontmatter environment. At the beginning of the source le for this paper, youll notice this. Also, youll notice that the usual \maketitle is absent; it no longer is needed. The ENTCS style package automatically generates the title, authors name and address, and related material at the beginning of the paper. Note also that hyperref has been disabled in this part of the entcs.cls le, so references to footnotes arent linked to the appropriate A footenotes or addresses. This is an old problem with L TEX, involving the fact that the references within the frontmatter arent passed cleanly to the linking software. For those who have used the ENTCS package before, the one new thing to note is the inclusion of Keywords ; these are now required by Elsevier theyre also required by ACMs Computing Reviews which reviews ENTCS publications. The ENTCS macro package provides two alternatives to listing authors names and addresses. These are described in detail in the le instraut.dvi.

Please list Your Lastname Here

Basically, listing each author and his or her address in turn, is the simplest method. But, if there are several authors and two or more share the same address (but not all authors are at this address), then the method of listing authors rst, and then the addresses, and of referencing addresses to authors should be used. Also, notice that acknowledgment of support (the contents of \thanks) should be done by a separate listing of \thanks[NSF]{To the NSF} with the optional argument [NSF] being used for \thanksref which is attached to those authors acknowledging such support. It is important that the \thanks not be included within the scope of \author{} or of \title{}, but it must be within the scope of the environment frontmatter. More details about added terms such as \collab can be found in inst.dvi, if they are needed. Also, notice that the command \lastname{My Lastname} has been included before the frontmatter begins. This command should contain the last names of the authors of the paper. If there are no more than three authors, then they should be listed with the word and between the last two; if more than three authors collaborated on the paper, then the rst author only should be listed, together with \emph{et al}. This command creates the headline for each page after page 1. Finally, please be sure to include an abstract for your paper.

Sectioning and Environments

Since ENTCS is published through the auspices of Elsevier Science B. V., their style les have been used to create the ENTCS macro package. Heres a proof that this package is not much dierent than most of the ones one encounters: Denition 3.1 A le is derived from another if it is obtained with only a few modications from the original le. Theorem 3.2 The le entcs.cls is derived from elsart.sty. Proof. This is clear from the similarity of the output to the output from Elseviers style les. 2 If one wants to start a proof with a descriptive word, such as sketch, then one can use the \begin{proof*}...\end{proof*} environment, as in Proof (Sketch) This can be derived from simple observations. 2

The main dierences between the le entcs.cls and the elsartr.cls le used by Elsevier are the more precise format we use Elseviers generic les are meant for preliminary editing, and more precise formatting is imposed using a macro le designed for the specic Elsevier journal in which the paper will eventually appear. The entcs.cls and entcsmacro.sty les format papers 3

Please list Your Lastname Here

uniformly so that they all are easily recognizable as being from the series Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science. A All of the usual features of L TEX are available with these style les it is only the formatting that has been rigorously dened. Thus, one has available the sectioning commands \section,\subsection, \paragraph and \subparagraph. The numbering scheme used is one under which Theorem 1.2.3 is the third numbered item in second subsection of the rst section of the paper. In order to facilitate cross-references, all of the named environments given below are numbered, and all use the same number scheme. The le entcsmacro.sty contains additional information that is needed to typeset a paper. It also has the denitions of the AMS euler and blackboard bold fonts builtin. If you want to use symbols for the natural numbers, the reals, etc., then we prefer that you use the blackboard bold fonts, and not plain bold fonts. This is accomplished by using the \mathbb font, as in N or R. The names of theorem-like environments are provided in entcsmacro.sty. With the exception of the environment Algorithm, the names of all of these are full name, rather than a shortened version. The environments provided and their names are

\begin{theorem} ... \end{theorem} for Theorems, \begin{lemma} ... \end{lemma} for Lemmas, \begin{corollary} ... \end{corollary} for Corollaries, \begin{proposition} ... \end{proposition} for Propositions, \begin{criterion} ... \end{criterion} for Criteria, \begin{alg} ... \end{alg} for Algorithms, \begin{definition} ... \end{definition} for Denitions, \begin{conjecture} ... \end{conjecture} for Conjectures, \begin{example} ... \end{example} for Examples, \begin{problem} ... \end{problem} for Problems, \begin{remark} ... \end{remark} for Remarks, \begin{note} ... \end{note} for Notes, \begin{claim} ... \end{claim} for Claims, \begin{summary} ... \end{summary} for Summary, \begin{case} ... \end{case} for Cases, and \begin{ack} ... \end{ack} for Acknowledgements. For example,

Please list Your Lastname Here

Algorithm 1 Step 1: Write the paper Step 2: Format it with the ENTCS macro package Step 3: Ship the whole thing to the Guest Editors

References and Cross-references

A All the cross-referencing facilities of L TEX are supported, so one can use \ref{} and \cite{} for cross-references within the paper and for references to bibliographic items. As is done in this note, the References section 6 can be composed with \begin{thebibliography}...\end{thebibliography}. Alternatively, BibTEX can be used to compile the bibliography. Whichever one is used, the references are to be numbered consecutively, rather than by author-dened acronyms. Of course you can use your own acronyms for easy reference to each of the items in the bibliography, as has been done with the listing for this short note. However, note that the references should not be started with a new \section command. The package hyperref is automatically loaded by entcs.cls, and this makes all the cross-references within the document active when the pdf le of the paper is viewed with Adobes Acrobat c Reader. The format for including a link is simple: simply insert \href{URL} {text} where URL is the URL to which you want the link to point, and text is the text you want to be highlighted, which when clicked upon will bring up the desired web page.

4.1 Particulars about .pdf les We now require that .pdf les be provided for publication online. A .pdf le is viewable by Adobes Acrobat c viewer, which can be congured to load automatically within a browser. Viewing a properly formatted .pdf le with Acrobat c allows the cross-references and links to URLs to be active. In fact, Elsevier utilizes .pdf les in order to take better advantage of the webs capabilities. But one point we want to emphasize is that you should be sure to use Type A 1 fonts when you typeset your L TEX source le. These fonts are scalable, meaning that they carry information that allows the devise viewing the nal output to scale the fonts to suit the viewer being used from an onscreen viewer such as Adobes Acrobat c Reader, to printing the le on a printer. You can tell if you have used the right fonts by viewing the nal output on your machine. It the fonts look grainy, then you have not used Type 1 fonts. They can be located at the CTAN archive http://www.ctan.org they are public domain fonts, and dont cost anything to add them to your system. Assuming you have Type 1 fonts available, then there are there methods for producing .pdf les. 5

Please list Your Lastname Here

Using dvips and ps2pdf We list this option rst since it appears to be the most reliable and the easiest to use, especially if you include embedded PostScript graphics (.eps A les) in your source le. Simply run L TEX2e on your source le, then apply dvips to produce a PostScript le, and nally apply ps2pdf to obtain a .pdf le. The DVIPDFM utility Another easy method for producing acceptable .pdf les is via the utility dvipdfm. This utility is included in distributions of MikTEX, which runs on Windows machines, but it probably needs to be added to your teTEX A distribution, if you are running L TEX on a UNIX machine. The utility and precise information about installing it on your system can be found at the web page http://gaspra.kettering.edu/dvipdfm/ . In essence, this utility converts a .dvi le into a .pdf le. So, one can rst prepare the .dvi le A using L TEX, and then apply the utility dvipdfm to produce the needed .pdf 4 le. This utility makes inclusion of graphics particularly simple those that A are included in the L TEX source le are simply converted to the .pdf format. As we note below, things are not so simple with the second alternative, which A is to use pdfL TEX.
A pdfL TEX An alternative to the rst possibilities to produce .pdf les is to process A the source le with pdfL TEX. This format is available from the standard A CTAN sites http://www.ctan.org . It appears that pdfL TEX and hyperref A have some problems when used together. It is necessary to use pdfL TEX version 14d or later in order to minimize these issues. If your system has an earlier version (most teTEX distributions have version 13d), then you A can update your system by retrieving the latest version of pdfL TEX from ftp://ftp.cstug.cz/pub/tex/local/cstug/thanh/pdftex/ . Even if the A recent versions are used, pdfL TEX has the same dealing with references emA bedded with the frontmatter section described above for L TEX. A But there is one aspect of pdfL TEX that creates problems. Many authors include EPS 5 les within their papers. While this is fairly straightforward A with L TEX, there are a couple of points to note when attempting this with A pdfL TEX. A To include a PostScript image in a .pdf le produced with pdfL TEX, you rst have to convert the image to a .pdf le, and then it can be included using the same command sequence as above. The conversion can be

Beware ! The utility dvipdf does not produce acceptable .pdf les, and should not be used. Only dvipdfm should be used to produce .pdf les. 5 EPS stands for embedded PostScript, which aords a mechanism for including preA prepared PostScript les within a L TEX document.

Please list Your Lastname Here

accomplished most easily using Ghostscript; you can simply view the le in Ghostview and then print the image to a .pdf le using the pdfwriter option within Ghostview. The result for a standard chess board that is part of the Ghostview distribution is the following image:

A Here as well is a copy of a color image. While pdfL TEX can handle image les A in other formats, L TEX can only handle .eps images reliably.

It also should be noted that we have included two separate source les for A A this example le one for L TEX and one for pdfL TEX because we want 7

This PDF file was created using CutePDF. www.cutepdf.com

BACKGROUNDER
No. 2824 | JULY 11, 2013

James Jay Carafano, PhD, and James Phillips

Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back

gypts army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi, just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011, to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down. By taking steps to preserve public order, the military could help to salvage Egypts chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. Clearly, Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsis increasingly authoritarian rule. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible, attach tighter strings to U.S. aid, and recalibrate the U.S. aid program to focus on ghting terrorism and preventing food shortagesthe chief threats to Egypts future. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. He ruled in a secretive, authoritarian, and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypts democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians, even some of his former supporters. During his year in office, he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypts worsening economic, social, and political problems. When challenged, he arrogantly ignored, marginalized, and demonized

Key Points

Egypts army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi, whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war. The army, however, is sitting on a volcano and knows it. The U.S. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. Washington should attach tighter strings to U.S. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortagesthe chief threats to Egypts future. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypts deep economic problems, but the U.S. can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy.

Morsis Threat to Democracy

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

BACKGROUNDER
No. 2821 | JULY 11, 2013

Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge

Dean Cheng
Abstract

Beijing hopes to win future conicts without ring a shot. How? By using psychological warfare to manipulate both a nations leaders and its populaceaffecting the thought processes and cognitive frameworks of allies and opponents alike. Indeed, the PRCs psychological warfare operations are already underway despite the fact that there is no active conict. It is therefore essential that the United States counter such psychological operations now while preparing to use its own arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conict ever arise.

Key Points

Over the past decade, the Peoples Republic of China has exhibited growing interest in waging asymmetrical warfare. To this end, the PRC released political work regulations for the Peoples Liberation Army addressing the importance of waging the three warfares: public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. The three warfares represent the PRCs commitment to expanding potential areas of conflict from the purely military (i.e., involving the direct or indirect use of military forces) to the more political. Such expansion will be supported by manipulation of an enemys leadership, including through intimidation and coercion, alienation, and deception. To avoid being psychologically outmaneuvered by a PRC intent on winning without firing a shot, the U.S. must strengthen its own psychological warfare capabilities, including strategic communications, public diplomacy, and media outreach capabilities, as well as dedicated psychological operations units.

ne of the elements distinguishing the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) from many of its counterparts is its continued role as a Party army. The PLA is, rst and foremost, the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This distinction both obligates the PLA to help maintain the CCPs grip on power and gives it an additional set of tools with which to defend the CCP and the Chinese state. At the moment, the PLA is not only planning for operations on the physical battleeld; it is also preparing to conduct political warfare, including what is termed the three warfares: public opinion warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. Psychological warfare is in some ways the most far-reaching of the three warfares. It involves the application of specialized information and media in accordance with a strategic goal and in support of political and military objectives.1 Such efforts are aimed at a variety of potential audiences and usually involve operational missions against an opponents psychology and cognitive capacities.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2821 Produced by the Asian Studies Center The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

BACKGROUNDER
No. 2824 | JULY 11, 2013

James Jay Carafano, PhD, and James Phillips

Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back

gypts army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi, just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011, to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down. By taking steps to preserve public order, the military could help to salvage Egypts chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. Clearly, Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsis increasingly authoritarian rule. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible, attach tighter strings to U.S. aid, and recalibrate the U.S. aid program to focus on ghting terrorism and preventing food shortagesthe chief threats to Egypts future. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. He ruled in a secretive, authoritarian, and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypts democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians, even some of his former supporters. During his year in office, he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypts worsening economic, social, and political problems. When challenged, he arrogantly ignored, marginalized, and demonized

Key Points

Egypts army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi, whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war. The army, however, is sitting on a volcano and knows it. The U.S. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. Washington should attach tighter strings to U.S. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortagesthe chief threats to Egypts future. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypts deep economic problems, but the U.S. can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy.

Morsis Threat to Democracy

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2824 JULY 11, 2013

opposition political parties, which he linked to foreign conspiracies. Under these conditions, Egypts army justiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. On July 3, Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi, who had failed to meet the demands of the people, was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nassers coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak, this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders, political leaders, and youth activists, many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsis ouster in a televised statement.

During his year in office, Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypts worsening economic, social, and political problems.
The next day, the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour, chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court, had been sworn in as interim president. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. As a judge, he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. mr. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that we stop producing tyrants and said that new elections were the only way forward, although he gave no indication of when they would be held. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6, but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party, one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. Baradei, a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front, a coalition of
1.

leftist and liberal parties, frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators, but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a ght. Mohammed Badie, the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. Speaking at Cairos Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on Rejection Friday, Badie warned, We are all willing to sacrice our necks and our souls for him.1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsis ouster. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes, leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1,000 injured. On Monday, at least 51 of Morsis supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. Egypts mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections, more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai, a hotbed of Islamist extremism, launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish, the provincial capital. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law), a new Islamist group, announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypts new government. Similar organizations in Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaedalike terrorist organizations.

Matt Bradley, Tamer El-Ghobashy, and Reem Abdellatif, Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2013, http:/ / online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940.html (accessed July 8, 2013). 2

ISSUE BRIEF
Ambassador Terry Miller and Ryan Olson

No. 3985 | JULY 9, 2013

Punitive Trade Sanctions on Bangladesh Not the Way to Improve Labor Conditions

n response to poor labor conditions in Bangladesh, the Obama Administration has moved to unilaterally impose trade sanctions by removing the countrys privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). These actions follow two prominent workplace tragedies that have killed over 1,200 Bangladeshi workers in the past year. While these tragedies are horric, the Administrations policies will be ineffective in promoting improvements in working conditions. Instead, imposing trade sanctions will only hurt Bangladeshs poor and damage burgeoning trade relations. Generalized System of Punishments. The GSP is a World Trade Organization scheme that gives beneciary developing countries access to preferential tariffs rates outside the most-favorednation framework. The GSP was created to encourage export-driven growth in developing countries by increasing market access to developed economies through lower tariff rates. In the U.S. the GSP program provides duty-free access for 171 countries in 5,000 product categories. Under U.S. law, GSP participants duty-free access is contingent on country practices, including

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/ib3985 Produced by the Center for International Trade and Economics (CITE) The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

adherence to international standards for workers rights. Questions began to be raised about conditions in Bangladesh after two tragic accidents in the past year. First, a re broke out in the Tazreen Garment Factory in Dhaka, killing over 100 workers who were trapped inside. More recently, a second garment factory, the Rana Plaza, collapsed, killing over 1,000 workers. Subsequently, on June 28, the Obama Administration announced that it is removing Bangladesh privileges under the GSP regime. Unless Congress intervenes, the policy will take effect 60 days after the announcement. Wrong Move by the Administration. This move is punitive and off-target. In reality, the GSP covered only 118 products and $34.7 million in imports from Bangladesh in 2012.1 This is less than 1 percent of the $5 billion in total imports that Bangladesh ships to the U.S. each year.2 In particular, it will have little effect on the garment industry, which is largely exempt from GSP duty-free status. Instead of specically targeting the garment industry, removing GSP privileges arbitrarily punishes industries that are unrelated to the recent tragedies. Over 30 percent of covered products in 2012 are agricultural goods and inputs.3 Over 50 percent of those who live in rural areas are considered poor, and rural workers make only about half as much per year as their urban counterparts.4 Yet it is these workersnot the garment industrywho will bear the burden of new tariffs. These punitive actions will only hurt the poorest Bangladeshis and are bound to further depress employment in a country that is already suffering. Simply increasing regulations on the industry is not the solution. While there is a need to improve

ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3985 JULY 9, 2013

building safety, the real problem in Bangladesh is that there are too many burdensome regulations that discourage business owners from registering new construction projects and obtaining proper permits. According to the World Banks Doing Business report, Bangladesh ranks 83rd in the world for obtaining a construction permit. On average, it takes 100 days and costs $375 to obtain a building permit from the Business Development Authority.5 That is nearly three months income for the average Bangladeshi. Increased regulation may have contributed to the accident at Rana Plaza, whose collapse is connected to the construction of two illegal oors on top of a six-story building. Had regulations been more reasonable, perhaps the owner of the Rana Plaza would have registered the additions to the facility and obtained the proper permits, preventing violations to the building code that led to the collapse. The Obama Administrations actions will also not tackle the high levels of corruption that could have played a role as well. According to Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index, Bangladesh ranks as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.6 High levels of corruption undermine the existing regulatory framework meant to oversee workers rights, labor conditions, and construction, allowing businesses to skirt rules by paying off bureaucrats. Repeal Bangladesh Trade Sanctions Now. If the Obama Administration does not act to repeal these unilateral sanctions, Congress should act. The TAA Extension Act of 2011 renewed duty-free privileges under the GSP until July 31, 2013. In
1. 2. 3.

light of the GSPs upcoming expiration, Congress should:

Renew duty-free treatment under the GSP. Duty-free treatment for developing countries under the GSP promotes nearly $20 billion in trade with the U.S. and saves importers nearly $750 million in tariff duties. The GSP promotes growth and employment in developing countries and provides low-cost, duty-free goods for U.S. consumers.7 Reinstate Bangladeshs qualication for duty-free treatment in the GSP renewal. The Administrations punitive move is ineffective and cruel. Not only does is hurt the poor and do little for workers rights, but it also damages vital trade relations with a key ally and a large, friendly Muslim country. Expand the GSP product categories to cover textiles. If the Administration and Congress really want to help workers in Bangladesh, Congress should act to cut tariffs on textile imports into the U.S. In 2012, Bangladesh exported over $4 billion in textile and apparel products to the U.S., paying an average duty of nearly 16 percent on those products.8 Reducing or eliminating this duty would directly benet workers in Bangladesh by increasing employment and encouraging economic growth.

Punitive Sanctions Not Helpful. The recent workplace tragedies that have befallen Bangladesh

U.S. International Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, http:/ /dataweb.usitc.gov/ (accessed July 2, 2013). U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade Statistics, http:/ /censtats.census.gov/naic3_6/naics3_6.shtml (accessed July 2, 2013). U.S. International Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, All Import Commodities, Customs Value by Customs Value by GSP (excluding GSP for LDBC only) for Bangladesh, 2012, http:/ /dataweb.usitc.gov/ (accessed July 8, 2013); and U.S. International Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, All Import Commodities, Customs Value by Customs Value by GSP LDBC countries only for Bangladesh, 2012, http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ (accessed July 8, 2013). Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Detailed Tables of HIES 2010, http:/ /www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/userles/Image/HIES-10/ Final%20All%20table.pdf (accessed July 2, 2013). World Bank Group, Ease of Doing Business in Bangladesh, 2013, http:/ /www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/bangladesh/#dealingwith-construction-permits (accessed July 2, 2013). Transparency International, BangladeshCorruption, http:/ /www.transparency.org/country#BGD_DataResearch_SurveysIndices (accessed July 2, 2013). The Trade Partnership, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences Program, February 2013, http:/ /tradepartnership.com/pdf_les/GSP%20 Annual%20Report-February%202013.pdf (accessed July 2, 2013). U.S. International Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb. 2

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3985 JULY 9, 2013

are horric and highlight concerning workplace conditions. However, the Presidents move to punish Bangladesh by imposing trade sanctions is misplaced. Instead, if the President truly wants to improve the lives and well-being of workers, he should encourage free trade, work to lower barriers, and increase economic dialogue with Bangladeshi authorities.

Ambassador Terry Miller is Director of the Center for International Trade and Economics and Mark A. Kolokotrones Fellow in Economic Freedom and Ryan Olson is a Research Assistant in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation.

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2824 JULY 11, 2013

embraced Morsis Muslim Brotherhooddominated government and was surprised that Egypts people so quickly became violently opposed to Islamist rule. The Administration gambled that the practical responsibilities of governing would dilute the hostile anti-Western ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet once in office, Morsi relentlessly expanded his own power in a winner-take-all manner while neglecting Egypts festering economic problems. The Obama Administrations enthusiasm for the Muslim Brotherhood led it to turn a blind eye to Morsis power grabs, the rising persecution of Egypts Coptic Christian minority, the crackdown on pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that the Mubarak regime formerly tolerated, and the restrictions that the Morsi government placed on freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. The Obama Administration failed to publicly criticize Morsis excesses, power grabs, and abuses. This led Egypts secular and liberal opposition to turn to Egypts army in despair, angry that the Obama Administration uncritically supported the Morsi regime. Many protesters demonstrating against Morsi before the coup also carried signs protesting President Obamas support for the Morsi regime. Morsi, for his part, felt no need to compromise with the opposition or temper his Islamist ambitions because the Administration was reluctant to use the leverage afforded by $1.5 billion in annual U.S. aid to Egypt. Secular, democratic, and liberal Egyptians opposed to an Islamist takeover should be natural allies of the U.S., not leading a backlash against American policy. The fact that Egyptians resent the Obama Administrations courting of the Muslim Brotherhood should be a wake-up call for the White House. It is a sad sign that U.S. policy toward Egypt has gone off the rails. Egyptian advocates of freedom should know that Americans support their efforts and do not side with an Islamist authoritarian leader who is hostile to American values and policies. The United States should support freedom in Egypt to advance its own interests as well as those of the Egyptian people. The interim government established by the army has a better chance of laying the groundwork for a democratic transition than did Morsis regime, which was headed for dictatorship.

Military coups have advanced the prospects for democracy at least two times in the past: Portugal in 1974, and Egypt in 2011. It remains to be seen whether Egypts latest coup will succeed in salvaging Egypts dim democratic prospects. However, General el-Sissi reportedly was a student at the U.S. Army War College in 2006, in which case he may have absorbed the professional standards and nonpartisan apolitical tradition of the U.S. Army. In any event, Egypts military leaders are much more likely than Morsis cronies to advance freedom in Egypt, support economic reforms to revive the economy, and play a stabilizing role in the volatile Middle East.

What the U.S. Should Do

In addressing Egypts deepening crisis, the United States should:

Press Egypts army to hold elections and step aside as soon as possible. General el-Sissis road map for a democratic transition included no dates. President Mansour has laid out a vague timetable for a constitutional referendum in four and a half months and parliamentary elections in six months. Washington should urge the interim government to adhere to this timetable. It should also nd an inclusive way of writing a new constitution to establish the rules of the political competition before elections. The lack of a shared understanding of the rules of the game enabled Morsi to stage a power grab. The Administration has called for a transparent and inclusive political transition process, but the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties should be allowed to participate only if they publicly choose a path of nonviolence. Attach tight strings to any U.S. aid. The Obama Administration has stopped short of calling the armys intervention a coup to avoid triggering an aid cutoff. Section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012, as contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, bars any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup dtat or decree or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup dtat or decree

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2821 JULY 11, 2013

very perceptions that inform decision making, from the context to the biases. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations, inuencing the course of the conict. To be effective, however, psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. Instead, peacetime psychological operations are necessary, both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations.

PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime, between military and civilian, and among strategy, operations, and tactics.
Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve inuencing and altering an opponents unconscious, implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. By employing various forms of strategic communications, including diplomatic efforts, one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for ones own policies and goals. At the same time, such techniques attempt to isolate opponents, undermining their positions, portraying them as fostering ill intentions, and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. In addition, employing all the tools of communications, including various forms of media, emphasizes ones own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. All the while, one must be working to counter opponents efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize ones populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. In wartime, psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specically military targets and goals. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion, doubt, anxiety, fear, terror,

regret, and exhaustion in an opponent, especially among senior military and civilian leaders. Ideally, such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels, thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. The ability to interfere with an opponents information systems, coupled with efforts to inuence decision makers, can create a strong psychological impact. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance, but once the conict is concluded, such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. When one defeats the enemy, it is not solely by killing the enemy, or winning a piece of ground, but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemys heart.6 In order to undermine the opponents morale, one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties, friendly elements in the opponents society, and similar outlets. Finally, offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures, since an opponent will also be trying to undermine ones own forces, population, and leaders. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conict, highlight ones successes and the enemys failures, and instill condence and support for the Party and the state. Such defensive measures require tight control of information ows in ones own society and the insulation of ones decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. This need for control explains Beijings efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population, including the Great Firewall of China.

Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks

For the PLA, psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD), working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy

6. Guo, Psychological Warfare Knowledge, p. 14. 3

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2821 JULY 11, 2013

very perceptions that inform decision making, from the context to the biases. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations, inuencing the course of the conict. To be effective, however, psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. Instead, peacetime psychological operations are necessary, both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations.

PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime, between military and civilian, and among strategy, operations, and tactics.
Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve inuencing and altering an opponents unconscious, implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. By employing various forms of strategic communications, including diplomatic efforts, one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for ones own policies and goals. At the same time, such techniques attempt to isolate opponents, undermining their positions, portraying them as fostering ill intentions, and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. In addition, employing all the tools of communications, including various forms of media, emphasizes ones own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. All the while, one must be working to counter opponents efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize ones populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. In wartime, psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specically military targets and goals. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion, doubt, anxiety, fear, terror,

regret, and exhaustion in an opponent, especially among senior military and civilian leaders. Ideally, such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels, thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. The ability to interfere with an opponents information systems, coupled with efforts to inuence decision makers, can create a strong psychological impact. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance, but once the conict is concluded, such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. When one defeats the enemy, it is not solely by killing the enemy, or winning a piece of ground, but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemys heart.6 In order to undermine the opponents morale, one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties, friendly elements in the opponents society, and similar outlets. Finally, offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures, since an opponent will also be trying to undermine ones own forces, population, and leaders. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conict, highlight ones successes and the enemys failures, and instill condence and support for the Party and the state. Such defensive measures require tight control of information ows in ones own society and the insulation of ones decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. This need for control explains Beijings efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population, including the Great Firewall of China.

Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks

For the PLA, psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD), working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy

6. Guo, Psychological Warfare Knowledge, p. 14. 3

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2824 JULY 11, 2013

Islamist militants will likely soon expand their attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army, police, and government facilities; anti-Morsi political groups; symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as Tahrir Square; and symbols of foreign conspiracies such as the U.S. embassy, American companies, and other Western companies. Egypts Coptic Christian minority, about 10 percent of Egypts more than 80 million people, will likely become even more of a lightning rod for terrorist attacks. Islamists charge that Egypts ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. There will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks, particularly in southern Egypt, a focal point for sectarian violence. The splintered Islamist movement is by no means unied in support of Morsi. The Nour Party, a Salast movement that favors the immediate imposition of Sharia law and resented Morsis high-handed efforts to monopolize political power, joined non-Islamist opposition parties in pushing for early elections. Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and ostracize the Nour leaders, who supported the military intervention. An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypts unnished revolution. Left unchecked, it could devolve into an even bloodier version of Algerias civil war, which has consumed more than 100,000 lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an Islamist election victory in 1991. Egypts army is sitting on a volcano and knows it. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits, and political stability will likely be elusive until the countrys worsening economic situation is reversed. Nearly one-quarter of Egypts workers are unemployed, and the gure is much higher for young men, who form the shock troops for street protests. Egypts economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the siren call of radical ideologies, particularly Islamist extremism. The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the past two years have severely hurt tourism, which formerly generated the bulk of Egypts foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of every seven workers. Morsi further sabotaged the tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor

Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997not exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists. Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once again to undermine the new government.

The army cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypts worsening economic problems, which will require considerable American and international support.
Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle fought amid economic collapse, social turmoil, surging crime rates, widespread unemployment, falling standards of living, and rising sectarian tensions. The imminent bankruptcy of Egypts state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic food shortages, bread riots, labor strikes, and growing political polarization. Foreign currency reserves are nearly exhausted, which will make it difficult to pay for wheat imports, which provide nearly half of Egypts food consumption. The army needs to put Egypts house in order quickly and then get out of the way. It inevitably will lose popular support the longer it rules, as it did between Mubaraks fall in February 2011 and Morsis purge of top army leaders in August 2012. The army can only do so much to repair Egypts dysfunctional political system. Moreover, it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypts worsening economic problems, which will require considerable American and international support.

Sitting on a Volcano

Egypt, the largest Arab country, is a bellwether for the Arab Middle East. The United States has a national interest in stabilizing Egypt, preventing the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state, and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on the scale of Algerias in the heart of the Arab world. Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypts social fabric continues to unravel. The Obama Administration has been asleep at the switch for much of the past two years. It eagerly
3

U.S. Help Needed in the Struggle for Freedom

Please list Your Lastname Here

to illustrate how to insert graphics images into the le. If your paper does not include such images, then the same source le can be formatted by either A A L TEX orf by pdfL TEX. Using ENTCS Macros with Mac OS X Of course, if your le doesnt require .eps or other PostScript les, then you can create the required .pdf le using any of the standard TEX implementations for the Macintosh. If you need to include PostScript les, and if you are using TEXShop, then you can specify to use dvips and ghostview in processing your le, and then you can apply ps2pdf to create the needed .pdf le. Alternatibely, the Mac OS X operating system is based on UNIX, so it supports the use of teTEX as described above.

Summary

The ENTCS macro package is relatively easy to use and provides a uniform layout for all the papers that appear in ENTCS. Problem 5.1 Finish your paper and get it to your Program Chairman on time! When you have nished preparing your paper, send a copy of the source le, together with any macro les that are needed to your Program Chairman. If the les are extensive, you can place copies in the pub/incoming sub-directory of the ftp directory on the machine indicated by your Program Chairman using anonymous ftp. If you do this, please send me email to alert me that the le(s) are here. Assigning Volume / Issue Numbers One additional point worth mentioning is that ENTCS is moving to ScienceDirect, Elseviers main platform for publishing electronic series, Because ScienceDirect must publish entire volumes at the same time, we have changed the procedure for preparing nal versions so that volume numbers will not be assigned until the nal versions are ready. Guest Editors will now have to receive the nal version of all papers in their Proceedings before a volume and issue number will be assigned for the Proceedings. Even with the move to ScienceDirect, the reference scheme already used for publications in ENTCS http://www.elsevier/nl/locate/entcs/ NNnn.html remains the valid way to cite papers published in ENTCS, where NN denotes the number of the volume, and nn denotes the issue number. Publications consisting of an entire volume should use 1 as the issue number. Copyright Transfer Forms One result of the move to ScienceDirect is that the corresponding author of each paper published in ENTCS must submit a signed Copyright Transfer 8

Please list Your Lastname Here

Form to Elsevier in order for their paper to be published. A copy of this form will be sent to each author by the Guest Editors of each volume. Details about this agreement specifying the rights of the authors and the rights of Elsevier are available at Elseviers Author Gateway. Publication of Final Versions Because ScienceDirect cannot easily accommodate changes to published material, the Proceedings in its entirety must be ready before it can be published. This is one reason why the volume and issue number is not assigned until the nal versions of all papers have been sent to the Guest Editors for nal processing.

Bibliographical references

ENTCS employs the plain style of bibliographic references in which references are listed in alphabetical order, according the the rst authors last name, and are sequentially numbered. Please utilize this style. We have a BibTEX style le, for those who wish to use it. It is the le entcs.bst which is included in this package. The basic rules we have employed are the following:

Authors names should be listed in alphabetical order, with the rst authors last name being the rst listing, followed by the authors initials or rst name, and with the other authors names listed as rst name, last name. Titles of articles in journals should be in emphasized type. Titles of books, monographs, etc. should be in quotations. Journal names should be in plain roman type. Journal volume numbers should be in boldface type, with the year of publication immediately following in roman type, and enclosed in parentheses. References to URLs on the net should be active and the URL itself should be in typewriter font. Articles should include page numbers.

The criteria are illustrated in the following.

References
[1] Civin, P., and B. Yood, Involutions on Banach algebras, Pacic J. Math. 9 (1959), 415436. [2] Cliord, A. H., and G. B. Preston, The Algebraic Theory of Semigroups, Math. Surveys 7, Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, R.I., 1961. [3] Freyd, Peter, Peter OHearn, John Power, Robert Tennent and Makoto Takeyama, Bireectivity, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 1 (1995), URL: http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs/volume1.html.

Please list Your Lastname Here

[4] Easdown, D., and W. D. Munn, Trace functions on inverse semigroup algebras, U. of Glasgow, Dept. of Math., preprint 93/52. [5] Roscoe, A. W., The Theory and Practice of Concurrency, Prentice Hall Series in Computer Science, Prentice Hall Publishers, London, New York (1198), 565pp. With associated web site http://www.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/publications/books/concurrency/. [6] Shehadah, A. A., Embedding theorems for semigroups with involution, Ph.D. thesis, Purdue University, Indiana, 1982. [7] Weyl, H., The Classical Groups, 2nd Ed., Princeton U. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1946.

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