As we know, the question iaised ly ny title took on a new cogency duiing the last ten yeais ol the twentieth centuiy. The Rights ol Man oi Hunan Rights had ust leen ieuvenated in the seventies and eighties ly the dissident nove- nents in the Soviet Union and Eastein Euiope a ieuvenation that was all the noie signicant as the loinalisn ol those iights had leen one ol the ist taigets ol the young Maix, so that the collapse ol the Soviet Enpiie could appeai as theii ievenge. Altei this collapse, they would appeai as the chaitei ol the iiiesistille nove- nent leading to a peacelul posthistoiical woild wheie glolal denociacy would natch the glolal naiket ol lileial econony. As is well known, things did not exactly go that way. In the lollowing yeais, the new landscape ol hunanity, lieed lion utopian totalitaiianisn, lecane the stage ol new outluists ol ethnic con- icts and slaughteis, ieligious lundanentalisns, oi iacial and xenopholic novenents. The tei- iitoiy ol posthistoiical and peacelul hunanity pioved to le the teiiitoiy ol new guies ol the Inhunan. And the Rights ol Man tuined out to le the iights ol the iightless, ol the populations hunted out ol theii hones and land and thieat- The South Atlantic Quarterly o:z[, Spiing[Sunnei zooq. Copyiight _ zooq ly Duke Univeisity Piess. 298 Jacques Rancire ened ly ethnic slaughtei. They appeaied noie and noie as the iights ol the victins, the iights ol those who weie unalle to enact any iights oi even any clain in theii nane, so that eventually theii iights had to le upheld ly otheis, at the cost ol shatteiing the edice ol Inteinational Rights, in the nane ol a new iight to hunanitaiian inteileiencewhich ultinately loiled down to the iight to invasion. Anewsuspicionthus aiose: What lies lehind this stiange shilt lionMan to Hunanity and lion Hunanity to the Hunanitaiian? The actual sulect ol these Rights ol Man lecane Hunan Rights. Is theie not a lias in the statenent ol such iights? It was olviously inpossille to ievive the Maix- ist ciitique. But anothei loin ol suspicion could le ievived: the suspicion that the nan ol the Rights ol Man was a neie alstiaction lecause the only ieal iights weie the iights ol citizens, the iights attached to a national connunity as such. That polenical statenent had ist leen nade ly Ednund Buike against the Fiench Revolution. 1 And it had leen ievived in a signicant way ly Hannah Aiendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism included a chaptei devoted to the Peiplexities ol the Rights ol Man. In that chaptei, Aiendt equated the alstiactedness ol Mens Rights with the conciete situation ol those populations ol ielugees that had own all ovei Euiope altei the Fiist Woild Wai. These populations have leen depiived ol theii iights ly the veiy lact that they weie only nen, that they had no national connunity to ensuie those iights. Aiendt lound theie the lody tting the alstiactedness ol the iights and she stated the paiadox as lollows: the Rights ol Man aie the iights ol those who aie only hunan leings, who have no noie piopeity lelt than the piopeity ol leing hunan. Put anothei way, they aie the iights ol those who have no iights, the neie deiision ol iight. 2 The equation itsell was nade possille ly Aiendts view ol the political spheie as a specic spheie, sepaiated lion the iealn ol necessity. Alstiact lile neant depiived lile. It neant piivate lile, a lile entiapped in its idiocy, as opposed to the lile ol pullic action, speech, and appeaiance. This ciitique ol alstiact iights actually was a ciitique ol denociacy. It iested on the assunption that nodein denociacy had leen wasted lion the veiy leginning ly the pity ol the ievolutionaiies loi the pooi people, ly the conlusion ol two lieedons: political lieedon, opposed to donination, and social lieedon, opposed to necessity. In hei view, the Rights ol Man weie not an ideal lantasy ol ievolutionaiy dieaneis, as Buike had put it. They weie the paiadoxical iights ol the piivate, pooi, unpoliticized individual. Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 299 This analysis, aiticulated noie than lty yeais ago, seens tailoi-nade, lty yeais latei, to t the new peiplexities ol the Rights ol Man on the hunanitaiian stage. Now we nust pay close attention to what allows it to t. It is the conceptualization ly Hannah Aiendt ol a ceitain state ol excep- tion. In a stiiking passage lionthe chaptei on the peiplexities ol the Rights ol Man, she wiites the lollowing alout the iightless: Theii plight is not that they aie not equal leloie the law, lut that no law exists loi then, not that they aie oppiessed, lut that nolody wants to oppiess then. 3 Theie is sonething extiaoidinaiy in the statenent nolody wants to oppiess then and in its plainly contenptuous tone. It is as il these people weie guilty ol not even leing alle to le oppiessed, not even woithy ol leing oppiessed. I think that we nust le awaie ol what is at stake in this state- nent ol a situation and status that would le leyond oppiession, leyond any account in teins ol conict and iepiession, oi law and violence. As a nattei ol lact, theie weie people who wanted to oppiess then and laws to do this. The conceptualization ol a state leyond oppiession is nuch noie a consequence ol Aiendts iigid opposition letween the iealn ol the politi- cal and the iealn ol piivate lilewhat she calls in the sane chaptei the daik lackgiound ol neie givenness. 4 It is inkeeping withhei aichipolitical position. But paiadoxically this position did piovide a liane ol desciiption and a line ol aigunentation that latei would piove quite eective loi depo- liticizing natteis ol powei and iepiession and setting then in a spheie ol exceptionality that is no longei political, in an anthiopological spheie ol saciality situated leyond the ieach ol political dissensus. This oveituining ol an aichipolitical statenent into a depoliticizing ap- pioach is, in ny view, one ol the nost signicant leatuies ol thought that was liought to the loie in the contenpoiaiy discussion alout the Rights ol Man, the Inhunan, and the ciines against hunanity. The oveituin is nost cleaily illustiated ly Gioigio Aganlens theoiization ol liopolitics, notally in Homo Sacer. 5 Aganlen tiansloins Aiendts equationoi paia- doxthiough a seiies ol sulstitutions that equate it, ist, with Foucaults theoiy ol liopowei, and, second, with Cail Schnitts theoiy ol the state ol exception. In a ist step, his aigunent ielies on the Aiendtian opposition ol two lives, anoppositionpiedicated onthe distinctionletweentwo Gieek woids: zoe, which neans laie physiological lile, and bios, which neans loin ol lile, and notally the bios politikos: the lile ol gieat actions and nolle woids. In hei view, the Rights ol Man and nodein denociacy iested on 300 Jacques Rancire the conlusion ol those two lileswhich ultinately neant the ieduction ol bios to sheei zoe. Aganlenequated hei ciitique withFoucaults polenics on sexual lileiation. In The Will to Know and Society Must Be Defended, Fou- cault aigues that the so-called sexual lileiation and liee speech alout sex aie in lact eects ol a powei nachine that uiges people to speak alout sex. They aie eects ol a new loin ol powei that is no longei the old soveieign powei ol Lile and Death ovei the sulects, lut a positive powei ol contiol ovei liological lile. Accoiding to Foucault, even ethnic cleansing and the Holocaust aie pait ol a positive liopolitical piogian noie than ievivals ol the soveieign iight to kill. 6 Thiough the liopolitical conceptualization, what, in Aiendt, was the aw ol nodein denociacy lecones in Aganlen the positivity ol a loin ol powei. It lecones the conplicity ol denociacy, viewed as the nass- individualistic concein with individual lile, with technologies ol powei holding sway ovei liological lile as such. Fionthis point on, Aganlen takes things a step luithei. While Foucault opposed nodein liopowei to old soveieignty, Aganlen natches then ly equating Foucaults contiol ovei lile with Cail Schnitts state ol excep- tion. 7 Schnitt had posited the state ol exception as the piinciple ol politi- cal authoiity. The soveieign powei is the powei that decides on the state ol exception in which noinal legality is suspended. This ultinately neans that law hinges on a powei ol decision that is itsell out ol law. Aganlen identies the state ol exception with the powei ol decision ovei lile. What is coiielated with the exceptionality ol soveieign powei is the exception of life. It is lile as laie oi naked lile, which, accoiding to Aganlen, neans lile captuied in a zone ol indisceinilility, ol indistinction letween zoe and bios, letween natuial and hunan lile. In such a way, theie is no noie opposition letween soveieign powei and liopowei. Soveieign powei is the sane as liopowei. Noi is theie any oppo- sition letween alsolute state powei and the Rights ol Man. The Rights ol Man nake natuial lile appeai as the souice and the leaiei ol iights. They nake liith appeai as the piinciple ol soveieignty. The equation would still have leen hidden at that tine ly the identication ol liithoi nativity with nationality, that is, with the guie ol the citizen. The ow ol ielugees in the twentieth centuiy would have split up that identity and nade the nakedness ol laie lile, stiipped ol the veil ol nationality, appeai as the seciet ol the Rights ol Man. The piogians ol ethnic cleansing and exteinination would then appeai as a iadical attenpt to diaw the lull consequences ol Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 301 this splitting. This neans that the seciet ol denociacythe seciet ol nod- ein poweican now show up at the loiegiound. Now state powei has con- cietely to do with laie lile. Baie lile is no longei the lile ol the sulect that it would iepiess. Noi is it the lile ol the eneny that it would have to kill. It is, Aganlen says, a sacied lilea lile taken within a state ol exception, a lile leyond oppiession. 8 It is a lile letween lile and death that can le identied with the lile ol the condenned nan oi the lile ol a peison in a state ol cona. In his analysis ol the Holocaust, Aganlen enphasizes the continuity letween two things: scientic expeiinentation on lile unwoithy to leing lived, that is, on alnoinal, nentally handicapped, oi condenned peisons, and the planned exteinination ol the ]ews, posited as a population expeii- nentally ieduced to the condition ol laie lile. 9 Theieloie the Nazi laws sus- pending the constitutional aiticles guaianteeing lieedonol associationand expiession can le thought as the plain nanilestation ol the state ol excep- tion, which is the hidden seciet ol nodein powei. Coiiespondingly, the Holocaust appeais as the hidden tiuth ol the Rights ol Manthat is, the status ol laie, undieientiated lile, which is the coiielate ol liopowei. The canp can le put as the nonos ol nodeinity and sulsune undei one and the sane notion the canps ol ielugees, the zones wheie illegal nigiants aie paiked ly national authoiities, oi the Nazi death canps. In such a way, the coiielation ol soveieign powei and laie lile takes place wheie political conicts can le located. The canp is the space ol the also- lute inpossilility ol deciding letween lact and law, iule and application, exception and iule. 10 In this space, the executionei and the victin, the Geinan lody and the ]ewish lody, appeai as two paits ol the sane lio- political lody. Any kind ol clain to iights oi any stiuggle enacting iights is thus tiapped lion the veiy outset in the neie polaiity ol laie lile and state ol exception. That polaiity appeais as a soit ol ontological destiny: each ol us would le in the situation ol the ielugee in a canp. Any dieience giows laint letween denociacy and totalitaiianisn and any political piac- tice pioves to le alieady ensnaied in the liopolitical tiap. Aganlens viewol the canp as the nonos ol nodeinity nay seenveiy lai lionAiendts viewol political action. Neveitheless, I would assune that the iadical suspension ol politics in the exception ol laie lile is the ulti- nate consequence ol Aiendts aichipolitical position, ol hei attenpt to pie- seive the political lion the contanination ol piivate, social, apolitical lile. This attenpt depopulates the political stage ly sweeping aside its always- 302 Jacques Rancire anliguous actois. As a iesult, the political exception is ultinately incoipo- iated in state powei, standing in liont ol laie lilean opposition that the next step loiwaid tuins into a conplenentaiity. The will to pieseive the iealn ol puie politics ultinately nakes it vanish in the sheei ielation ol state powei and individual lile. Politics thus is equated with powei, a powei that is incieasingly taken as an oveiwhelning histoiico-ontological destiny lion which only a God is likely to save us. Il we want to get out ol this ontological tiap, we have to ieset the question ol the Rights ol Mannoie piecisely, the question ol theii sulectwhich is the sulect ol politics as well. This neans setting the question ol what politics is on a dieient looting. In oidei to do this, let us have a closei look at the Aiendtian aigunent alout the Rights ol Man and ol the Citizen, an aigunent that Aganlen lasically endoises. She nakes then a quandaiy, which can le put as lollows: eithei the iights ol the citizen aie the iights ol nanlut the iights ol nan aie the iights ol the unpoliticized peison, they aie the iights ol those who have no iights, which anounts to nothingoi the iights ol nan aie the iights ol the citizen, the iights attached to the lact ol leing a citizen ol such oi such constitutional state. This neans that they aie the iights ol those who have iights, which anounts to a tautology. 11 Eithei the iights ol those who have no iights oi the iights ol those who have iights. Eithei a void oi a tautology, and, in loth cases, a deceptive tiick, such is the lock that she luilds. It woiks out only at the cost ol sweeping aside the thiid assunption that would escape the quandaiy. Theie is indeed a thiid assunption, which I would put as lollows: the Rights ol Man aie the iights ol those who have not the iights that they have and have the iights that they have not. Let us to tiy to nake sense ol the sentenceoi develop the equation. It is cleai that the equation cannot le iesolved ly the identication ol a single x. The Rights ol Man aie not the iights ol a single sulect that would le at once the souice and the leaiei ol the iights and would only use the iights that she oi he possesses. Il this was the case, indeed, it would le easy to piove, as Aiendt does, that such a sulect does not exist. But the ielation ol the sulect to his oi hei iights is a little noie conplicated and entangled. It is enacted thiough a doulle negation. The sulect ol iights is the sulect, oi noie accuiately the piocess ol sulectivization, that liidges the inteival letween two loins ol the existence ol those iights. Two loins ol existence. Fiist, they aie wiitten iights. They aie insciip- tions ol the connunity as liee and equal. As such, they aie not only the Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 303 piedicates ol a nonexisting leing. Even though actual situations ol iight- lessness nay give then the lie, they aie not only an alstiact ideal, situated lai lion the givens ol the situation. They aie also pait ol the conguiation ol the given. What is given is not only a situation ol inequality. It is also an insciiption, a loin ol visilility ol equality. Second, the Rights ol Man aie the iights ol those who nake sonething ol that insciiption, who decide not only to use theii iights lut also to luild such and such a case loi the veiication ol the powei ol the insciiption. It is not only a nattei ol checking whethei the ieality conins oi denies the iights. The point is alout what conrmation oi denial neans. Man and citi- zen do not designate collections ol individuals. Man and citizen aie politi- cal sulects. Political sulects aie not denite collectivities. They aie sui- plus nanes, nanes that set out a question oi a dispute (litige) alout who is included intheii count. Coiiespondingly, freedomand equality aie not piedi- cates lelonging to denite sulects. Political piedicates aie openpiedicates: they open up a dispute alout what they exactly entail and whon they con- cein in which cases. The Declaiationol Rights states that all nenaie loinliee and equal. Now the question aiises: What is the spheie ol inplenentation ol these piedi- cates? Il you answei, as Aiendt does, that it is the spheie ol citizenship, the spheie ol political lile, sepaiated lion the spheie ol piivate lile, you soit out the piollen in advance. The point is, piecisely, wheie do you diaw the line sepaiating one lile lionthe othei? Politics is alout that loidei. It is the activity that liings it lack into question. This point was cleaily nade dui- ing the Fiench Revolution ly a ievolutionaiy wonan, Olynpe de Gouges, in hei lanous statenent that il wonen aie entitled to go to the scaold, they aie entitled to go to the assenlly. The point was piecisely that equal-loin wonen weie not equal citizens. They could neithei vote noi le elected. The ieason loi the piesciiption was, as usual, that they could not t the puiity ol political lile. They allegedly lelonged to piivate, donestic lile. And the connongood ol the connunity had to le kept apait lionthe activities, leelings, and inteiests ol piivate lile. Olynpe de Gouges aigunentation piecisely showed that the loidei sepa- iating laie lile and political lile could not le so cleaily diawn. Theie was at least one point wheie laie lile pioved to le political: theie weie wonen sentenced to death, as enenies ol the ievolution. Il they could lose theii laie lile out ol a pullic udgnent lased on political ieasons, this neant that eventheii laie liletheii lile dooned to deathwas political. Il, undei 304 Jacques Rancire the guillotine, they weie as equal, so to speak, as nen, they had the iight to the whole ol equality, including equal paiticipation to political lile. Ol couise the deduction could not le endoisedit could not even le heardly the lawnakeis. Neveitheless, it could le enacted in the piocess ol a wiong, in the constiuction ol a dissensus. A dissensus is not a conict ol inteiests, opinions, oi values, it is a division put in the connon sense: a dispute alout what is given, alout the liane within which we see sone- thing as given. Wonen could nake a twolold denonstiation. They could denonstiate that they weie depiived ol the iights that they had, thanks to the Declaiation ol Rights. And they could denonstiate, thiough theii pul- lic action, that they had the iights that the constitution denied to then, that they could enact those iights. So they could act as sulects ol the Rights ol Man in the piecise sense that I have nentioned. They acted as sulects that did not have the iights that they had and had the iights that they had not. This is what I call a dissensus: putting two woilds in one and the sane woild. A political sulect, as I undeistand it, is a capacity loi staging such scenes ol dissensus. It appeais thus that man is not the void teinopposed to the actual iights ol the citizen. It has a positive content that is the disnissal ol any dieience letween those who live in such oi such spheie ol exis- tence, letween those who aie oi aie not qualied loi political lile. The veiy dieience letween nan and citizen is not a sign ol disunction pioving that the iights aie eithei void oi tautological. It is the opening ol an inteival loi political sulectivization. Political nanes aie litigious nanes, nanes whose extensionand conpiehensionaie unceitainand which openloi that ieason the space ol a test oi veiication. Political sulects luild such cases ol veii- cation. They put to test the powei ol political nanes, theii extension and conpiehension. They not only conliont the insciiptions ol iights to situa- tions ol denial, they put togethei the woild wheie those iights aie valid and the woild wheie they aie not. They put togethei a ielation ol inclusion and a ielation ol exclusion. The geneiic nane ol the sulects who stage such cases ol veiication is the nane ol the denos, the nane ol the people. At the end ol Homo Sacer, Aganlen enphasizes what he calls the constant anliguity ol the people that is at once the nane ol the political lody and the nane ol the lowei classes. He sees in this anliguity the naik ol the coiielation letween laie lile and soveieignty. 12 But the denosoi the peopledoes not nean the lowei classes. Noi does it nean laie lile. Denociacy is not the powei ol the pooi. It is the powei ol those who have no qualicationloi exeicising powei. Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 305 In the thiid look ol Laws, Plato lists all the qualications that aie oi clain to le souices ol legitinate authoiity. 13 Such aie the poweis ol the nasteis ovei the slaves, ol the old ovei the young, ol the leained people ovei the ignoiant people, and so on. But, at the end ol the list, theie is an anonaly, a qualication loi powei that he calls iionically Gods choice, neaning ly that neie chance: the powei gained ly diawing lots, the nane ol which is denociacy. Denociacy is the powei ol those who have no specic quali- cation loi iuling, except the lact ol having no qualication. As I inteipiet it, the denosthe political sulect as suchhas to le identied with the totality nade ly those who have no qualication. I called it the count ol the uncountedoi the pait ol those who have no pait. It does not nean the population ol the pooi, it neans a supplenentaiy pait, an enpty pait that sepaiates the political connunity lion the count ol the paits ol the population. Aganlen s aigunent is in line with the classical opposition letween the illusion ol soveieignty and its ieal content. As a iesult, he nisses the logic ol political sulectivization. Political sulects aie suiplus sulects. They insciile the count ol the uncounted as a supplenent. Politics does not sepa- iate a specic spheie ol political lile lion the othei spheies. It sepaiates the whole ol the connunity lion itsell. It opposes two counts ol count- ing it. You can count the connunity as the sun ol its paitsol its gioups and ol the qualications that each ol then leais. I call this way ol counting police. You can count a supplenent to the sun, a pait ol those who have no pait, which sepaiates the connunity lion its paits, places, lunctions, and qualications. This is politics, which is not a spheie lut a piocess. The Rights ol Man aie the iights ol the denos, conceived as the geneiic nane ol the political sulects who enactin specic scenes ol dissensus the paiadoxical qualication ol this supplenent. This piocess disappeais when you assign those iights to one and the sane sulect. Theie is no nan ol the Rights ol Man, lut theie is no need loi such a nan. The stiength ol those iights lies in the lack-and-loith novenent letween the ist insciip- tion ol the iight and the dissensual stage on which it is put to test. This is why the sulects ol the Soviet constitution could nake ieleience to the Rights ol Man against the laws that denied theii eectivity. This is also why today the citizens ol states iuled ly a ieligious law oi ly the neie aili- tiaiiness ol theii goveinnents, and even the clandestine innigiants in the zones ol tiansit ol oui countiies oi the populations in the canps ol ielu- gees, can invoke then. These iights aie theiis when they can do sonething 306 Jacques Rancire with then to constiuct a dissensus against the denial ol iights they suei. And theie aie always people anong then who do it. It is only il you pie- suppose that the iights belong to denite oi peinanent sulects that you nust state, as Aiendt did, that the only ieal iights aie the iights given to the citizens ol a nation ly theii lelonging to that nation, and guaianteed ly the piotection ol theii state. Il you do this, ol couise, you nust deny the ieality ol the stiuggles led outside ol the liane ol the national consti- tutional state and assune that the situation ol the neiely hunan peison depiived ol national iights is the inplenentation ol the alstiactedness ol those iights. The conclusion is in lact a vicious ciicle. It neiely ieasseits the division letween those who aie woithy oi not woithy ol doing politics that was piesupposed at the veiy leginning. But the identication ol the sulect ol the Rights ol Man with the sul- ect depiived ol any iight is not only the vicious ciicle ol a theoiy, it is also the iesult ol an eective ieconguiation ol the political eld, ol an actual piocess ol depoliticization. This piocess is what is known ly the nane ol consensus. Consensus neans nuch noie than the ieasonalle idea and piac- tice ol settling political conicts ly loins ol negotiation and agieenent, and ly allotting to each paity the lest shaie conpatille with the inteiests ol othei paities. It neans the attenpt to get iid ol politics ly ousting the suiplus sulects and ieplacing thenwith ieal paitneis, social gioups, iden- tity gioups, and so on. Coiiespondingly, conicts aie tuined into piollens that have to le soited out ly leained expeitise and a negotiated adustnent ol inteiests. Consensus neans closing the spaces ol dissensus ly plugging the inteivals and patching ovei the possille gaps letween appeaiance and ieality oi law and lact. In this way, the alstiact and litigious Rights ol Man and ol the citizen aie tentatively tuined into ieal iights, lelonging to ieal gioups, attached to theii identity and to the iecognition ol theii place in the glolal population. Theieloie the political dissensus alout the pait-taking inthe connonol the connunity is loiled down to a distiilution within which each pait ol the social lody would oltain the lest shaie that it can oltain. In this logic, posi- tive laws and iights nust cling incieasingly to the diveisity ol social gioups and to the speed ol the changes in social lile and individual ways ol leing. The ain ol consensual piactice is the identity ol law and lact. The law has to lecone identical to the natuial lile ol society. To put it in othei teins, consensus is the ieduction ol denociacy to the way ol lile ol a society, to its ethosneaning ly this woid loth the alode ol a gioup and its lilestyle. Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 307 As a consequence, the political space, which was shaped in the veiy gap letween the alstiact liteialness ol the iights and the polenic alout theii veiication, tuins out to dininish noie and noie eveiy day. Ultinately, those iights appeai actually enpty. They seen to le ol no use. And when they aie ol no use, you do the sane as chaiitalle peisons do with theii old clothes. You give then to the pooi. Those iights that appeai to le useless in theii place aie sent alioad, along with nedicine and clothes, to people depiived ol nedicine, clothes, and iights. It is in this way, as the iesult ol this piocess, that the Rights ol Man lecone the iights ol those who have no iights, the iights ol laie hunan leings sulected to inhunan iepiession and inhunan conditions ol existence. They lecone hunanitaiian iights, the iights ol those who cannot enact then, the victins ol the alsolute denial ol iight. Foi all this, they aie not void. Political nanes and political places nevei lecone neiely void. The void is lled ly sonelody oi sonething else. The Rights ol Man do not lecone void ly leconing the iights ol those who cannot actualize then. Il they aie not tiuly theii iights, they can lecone the iights ol otheis. The Rights ol the Othei is the title ol an essay wiitten ly ]ean-Fianois Lyotaid, oiiginally a papei given within the auspices ol the Oxford Lectures on the Rights of Man, oiganized in ly Annesty Inteinational. 14 The thene ol the iights ol the othei has to le undeistood as an answei to the question, What do Hunan Rights nean in the context ol the hunanitaiian situation? It is pait ol an attenpt to iethink iights ly ist iethinking Wrong. The issue ol iethinking Wiong incieasingly took the ooi altei the collapse ol the Soviet Enpiie and the disappointing outcones ol what was supposed to le the last step to univeisal denociacy. In the context ol the new out- luists ol iacial oi ieligious hatied and violence, it was no longei possille to assign ciines against hunanity to specic ideologies. The ciines ol dead totalitaiian iegines had to le iethought: they weie said to le not so nuch the specic eects ol peiveise ideologies and outlaw iegines as the nani- lestations ol an innite wionga wiong that could no longei le conceptu- alized within the opposition ol denociacy and antidenociacy, ol legitinate state oi lawless state, lut whichappeaied as analsolute evil, anunthinkalle and uniedeenalle evil. Lyotaids conceptualization ol the Inhunan is one ol the nost signi- cant exanples ol that alsolutization. Lyotaid did in lact split the idea ol the inhunan. In his view, the loins ol iepiession and ciuelty, oi the situations ol distiess that we call inhunan, aie the consequences ol oui letiayal ol 308 Jacques Rancire anothei Inhunan, what we could call a good Inhunan. That Inhunan is Otheiness as such. It is the pait in us that we do not contiol. It nay le liith and inlancy. It nay le the Unconscious. It nay le the Law. It nay le God. The Inhunan is the iiieducille otheiness, the pait ol the Untan- alle ol which the hunan leing is, as Lyotaid says, the hostage oi the slave. Alsolute evil legins with the attenpt to tane the Untanalle, to deny the situation ol the hostage, to disniss oui dependency on the powei ol the Inhunan, in oidei to luild a woild that we could nastei entiiely. 15 Such a diean ol alsolute lieedon would have leen the diean ol the Enlightennent and ol Revolutionaiy enancipation. It would still le at woik in contenpoiaiy dieans ol peilect connunication and tianspaiency. But only the Nazi Holocaust would have lully ievealed and achieved the coie ol the diean: exteininating the people whose veiy nission is to leai wit- ness to the situation ol hostage, to oley the law ol Otheiness, the law ol an invisille and unnanalle God. Ciines against hunanity appeai then as ciines of hunanity, the ciines iesulting lion the aination ol a hunan lieedondenying its dependency upon the Untanalle. The iights that nust le held as a iesponse to the hunanitaiian lack ol iights aie the iights ol the Othei, the iights ol the Inhunan. Foi instance, in Lyotaids view, the iight to speak nust le identied with the duty ol announcing sone- thing new. 16 But the new that nust le announced is nothing lut the innenoiial powei ol the Othei and oui own incapacity to lulll the duty ol announcing it. The oledience to the iights ol the Othei sweeps aside the heteiogeneity ol political dissensus to the lenet ol a noie iadical heteio- geneity. As in Aganlen, this neans innitizing the wiong, sulstituting loi the piocessing ol a political wiong a soit ol ontological destiny that allows only iesistance. Now this iesistance is no nanilestation ol lieedon. On the contiaiy, iesistance neans laithlulness to the law ol Otheiness, which iules out any diean ol hunan enancipation. This is the philosophical way ol undeistanding the iights ol the Othei. But theie is a less sophisticated and noie tiivial undeistanding ol then: il those who suei inhunaniepiessionaie unalle to enact the HunanRights that aie theii last iecouise, then sonelody else has to inheiit theii iights in oidei to enact then in theii place. This is what is called the iight to hunanitaiian inteileiencea iight that sone nations assune to the sup- posed lenet ol victinized populations, and veiy olten against the advice ol the hunanitaiian oiganizations thenselves. The iight to hunanitaiian inteileience night le desciiled as a soit ol ietuin to sendei: the disused Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? 309 iights that had leen sent to the iightless aie sent lack to the sendeis. But this lack and loith novenent is not a null tiansaction. It gives a newuse to the disused iightsa new use that achieves on the woild stage what con- sensus achieves on national stages: the eiasuie ol the loundaiy letween law and lact, law and lawlessness. The hunan iights that aie sent lack aie now the iights ol the absolute victin. The alsolute victin is the victin ol an alsolute evil. Theieloie the iights that cone lack to the sendeiwho is now the avengeiaie akin to a powei ol innite ustice against the Axis ol Evil. The expiession innite ustice was disnissed ly the U.S. goveinnent a lew days altei having leen put loiwaid as an inappiopiiate tein. But I think that it was laiily appiopiiate. An innite ustice is not only a ustice that disnisses the piinciples ol Inteinational Law, piohiliting inteileience in the inteinal aaiis ol anothei state, it is a ustice which eiases all the distinctions that used to dene the eld ol ustice in geneial: the distinc- tions letween law and lact, legal punishnent and piivate ietaliation, us- tice, police, and wai. All those distinctions aie loiled downto a sheei ethical conict letween Good and Evil. Ethics is indeed on oui agendas. Sone people see it as a ietuin to sone lounding spiiit ol the connunity, sustaining positive laws and political agency. I take a laiily dieient view ol this new ieign ol ethics. It neans to ne the eiasuie ol all legal distinctions and the closuie ol all political intei- vals ol dissensus. Both aie eiased in the innite conict ol Good and Evil. The ethical tiend is in lact the state ol exception. But this state ol excep- tion is no conpletion ol any essence ol the political, as it is in Aganlen. Instead it is the iesult ol the eiasuie ol the political in the couple ol con- sensual policy and hunanitaiian police. The theoiy ol the state ol excep- tion, ust as the theoiy ol the iights ol the othei, tuins this iesult into an anthiopological oi ontological destiny. They tiace it lack to the inescapalle pienatuiation ol the hunan aninal. I think that we had iathei leave the ontological destiny ol the hunananinal aside il we want to undeistand who is the sulect ol the Rights ol Man and to iethink politics today, even il out ol its veiy lack. Notes Ednund Buike, Reections on the Revolution in France, ed. ]. G. A. Pocock (Indianapolis: Hacket, 8;). z HannahAiendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism(NewYoik: Haicouit Biace, ), z;8. 310 Jacques Rancire Aiendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, z. q Ilid., z;. Gioigio Aganlen, Homo Sacer (Stanloid: Stanloid Univeisity Piess, 8). 6 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume : An Introduction [The Will to Know|, tians. Roleit Huiley (New Yoik: Pantheon, ;8) and Society Must Be Defended, tians. David Macey (New Yoik: Picadoi, zoo). ; Cail Schnitt, Politische Theologie (Beilin: Dunckei and Hunllot, zz). 8 Aganlen, Homo Sacer. Ilid. o Ilid. Aiendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, zq. z Aganlen, Homo Sacer. Plato, Laws, tians. Tievoi ]. Saundeis (Middlesex: Penguin, ;o), lk. , ;. q ]ean-Fianois Lyotaid, The Otheis Rights, inOnHumanRights, ed. S. Shute andS. Hui- ley (NewYoik: Basic Books, q). This essay was oiiginally piesented as a papei within the auspices ol the Oxloid Lectuies on the Rights ol Man, oiganized in ly Annesty Inteinational. Lyotaid, The Otheis Rights, 6. 6 Ilid.