87 Faa Interviews

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: Penny Anderson, FAA Civil Aviation Security official on 9-11
Type: Briefing
Team: 7
Special Access Issues: None
Date: December 18, 2003
Prepared by: John Raidt
Participants (non-Commission): Penny Anderson
Participants: John Raidt
Location: By phone at GSA office. Anderson at her current office at ICAO in Montreal,
Canada
Background
[U] Penny Anderson's position on 9-11 was ACO-I00. Specifically she served as a
division manager for the International Operations Division (a.k.a. Supervisory Civil
Aviation Security SpeCialist-GS-15). Today she serves as the Acting Chief of the
Aviation Security Audit Unit at the International Civil Aviation Organization (lCAO).
FAA Command Centers on 9-11 Commission
~ Anderson said that the FAA opened two command centers on 9-11: one on the
tenth floor and another on the third floor for the Civil Aviation Security unit. The third
floor room was opened during high threat situations. Anderson said she was told that the
third floor center was opened during the "Bin Laden threats" (which she thought might be
the 1993 WTC bombing but she wasn't sure). She remembers that it was opened during
TW A 800, times of tensions with Iraq and other times when FAA was on high alert
status.
~ Anderson described the third floor center (known as either the ACS command
center or the "working room") as a location for ACS to provide operational coordination
with its field units). She believes that the room number is 315, but she's unsure. It is
located across the hall from the medical clinic and a ladies' restroom.
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9-11 and the Gun memo
[U] Anderson wasn't sure at what time the command centers were made operational on 9-
11. However, sometime after the second plane struck the WTC she was made aware that
the ACS working room had been opened. Either Wi11y Gripper or Lee Longmire asked
her to go to the room to help out.
[U] Anderson remembers that the room had six or seven computers, and six or seven
phones. She said that the room was outfitted with Crisis Management software that
helped them log events and information. She said that logs from the working room were
prepared. She does not believe the phones in the room were recorded.
[U] Anderson stated that individuals in the room were in contact with the io" floor and
FAN ACS field units by phone. The room was also tied in to the Tactical Net (but they
weren't participating in the call). Though she can't be 100 percent certain, she believes
that the room was tied in- only to FAA personnel,
[U] As they received information from the io" floor and field units, they posted
information on butcher paper hung on the walls of the room. Anderson remembers
taking a call from a "male voice" who relayed a report about a shooting on board one of
the hijacked flights. She is not sure whether the voice was someone from the 1 floor or o"
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elsewhere. She is not sure whether this was the original reporting of the shooting to FAA
or whether it was a second-hand report to the working room. She remembers that some
thought this was "holy shit" news. She remembers not being surprised if the gun story
was true because there may have been a member of law enforcement on board.
.
[U] She recalls that at some point, perhaps later in the day, the 101hfloor wanted a
Q
y report on what information they had received. Anderson anq.' I
(Red Team ACS-50) were tasked to draft a "preliminary memo." Anderson
s y u's.ed information received from the io" floor and from the butcher paper in the
working room to produce the memo. She said tha~ ~id the tyPing., (Ander§r had
a TSA phonebookand gave usl I
phone number as follows:.:{571) or
(202)1 1.... i'/ / ..,/
[UJ Anderson andJ I look the prelimin~ memo t~ Le~Lqngmire who saw the
gun reference and asked If they could verify this information. Anderson said they asked
either Mike weiche~orJ . . lift~ey knew ~nytbi:" ~~\It the gun report .. Whoever
they asked that questron said "1:10." ~.Anderson/and _ __Ireported to Longmire that
they couldn't confirm t'ne gun story, Anderson stated thatLongmire said something to
the effect of: "Let's take-it out untillwe have/something one way or another." She stated
that she was not tasked td:::Rerfo~ a:n~:furt~e~./foll~,W.~,upon the story .:
: ,':
[U] Anderson heard nothing-more about the.gun.story, She said that she would notify the
Commission if she remembered a~y::o~hef' facts:'9h this or any other 9-11 related issues
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that could be helpful. .... '.:: : :::' .: ..
... :','
i .... :: ."" .. "
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9/11 Working-level Employee

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Event: Monte Belger, former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation

Administration
Type of event: Interview
Date: November 24,2003; 9:00 a.m.
. Team Number: 7
Location: GSA Commission Office
Participants - Non-Commission: Monte Belger
Participants - Commission: Bill J olmstone and J olm Raidt
Background
[U] On September 11, 2001 Belger was serving as the acting Deputy Administrator of the
FAA.
1972 -- Started with FAA as a security inspector in Tampa, FL.

1975-1978 - Security staff in FAA Washington HQ
1979 -- New England Region Division Manager (Security) in Boston.
1980 -- Great Lakes Region Division Manager (Security)
1983-84 -- Airports Manager in Chicago
1986 -- Deputy Director for Great Lakes
1988 -- Associate Administrator for Aviation Standards (including Security)
1997-2002 - Acting Deputy Administrator of FAA
2002 - Short tenure as Acting Administrator of FAA
2002 - Sept. 13-Retired
Currently working for Lockheed Martin
AVSEC Leading up to 9-11
[U] Belger stated that there were no significant domestic security events for 8-10 years
prior to 9-11 and no international event affecting U.S. Carriers. It appeared thing were
working ok. FAA was profiling passengers to counter the explosives threat. Leading up
to 9-11 the primary concern of the public, Congress and the FAA was its focus on
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congestion, capacity and customer service. FAA had a good security team headed by
Admiral Flynn, and FAA leadership had much confidence in them.
[U] Weaknesses of the system included performance/detection problems at screening

checkpoints-"the inability to detect everything all the time." In retrospect since 9-11,
inadequate sharing of intelligence was also a problem.
FAA Security Briefings
[U] FAA ACI produced a daily intelligence briefing (classified). The briefing would be
read by Shirley Miller (Belger's assistant). Anything necessary would be called to
Belger's attention by Miller. Belger would then pass anything he thought necessary up to
the administrator.
[U] In addition, Belger and Garvey had an open door policy. Flynn, and his successor as
Associate Director for Civil Aviation Security, Gen. Mike Canavan, could see the
Administrator and/or deputy anytime they thought they needed to. He stressed that if
there was anything that required action, he would have learned about it.
Prevailing Threat 9-11
[U] Belger said that the FAA saw aviation threats overseas and the use of explosives as
the biggest problem facing AVSEC. He was not aware of any increased threat in the
summer of2001.
[U] Belger didn't recall seeing the threat assessments from the FAA discussing the
increased domestic threat (2001 rulemaking discussing a domestic Bojinka event) and the
potential for suicide hijacking (CD-Rom presentation by ACI Pat McDonnell) He did
mention that intelligence people tend to try to cover all the bases "as they are apt to do."
In telligen ce/Liaisons
[U] Belger said he was unaware of any problems regarding the FAA's liaisons to the
Intelligence Community (IC) with respect to their access to intelligence or ability to focus
on FAA issues.
[U] Belger stressed that FAA was dependent on the Intelligence Agencies and the FAA
was always worried about whether it was getting the intelligence they needed. He said
there was no doubt they had more intelligence on foreign rather than domestic threats. He
was not aware of Usarna Bin Laden prior to 9-11.
CAPPS I
[U] Belger stated that the intent of CAPPS was to zero in more precisely on the threat
posed by bombers. He indicated that a passenger selected by the CAPPS pre screening
system would have to have their bags cleared for explosives. Belger did not seem to be
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aware that the profiling system prior to CAPPS required that selectees undergo increased
checkpoint scrutiny of their person and carry-on belongings. He said that if these indeed
were the case it simply reflected a change in the perceived threat. (He cited James Padgett
as the expert on the architecture of CAPPS I).
Checkpoint Screening
[U] Belger said the challenge of checkpoint screening was the constant effort to keep
folks alert and give them the best tools/technology to do their job. He stated that getting
100 percent detection would bring the nation's aviation system to a halt. He said the
need was to find the "right balance" between detection and keeping the schedule. He said
that the civil aviation system is fundamentally built around schedule.
[SS1] Belger stated his impression was that the system was slightly improving leading up
to 9/11. While FAA data on screening showed some improvement the performance
problems were unacceptable. The emphasis was on improving the equipment and
training people better. As an example of that emphasis, Belger identified an FAA
proposed rule pending in 2001 to certify screeners and increase training requirements.
He said that Admiral Flynn pulled back the final rule because he perceived an inability to
quantitatively test the system and performance. He wanted to put in place the TIP
(Threat Imaging Projection system) first. Belger stressed that better trained, more
dedicated individuals would be more likely to detect weapons, but, the U.S. domestic
system wasn't designed to detect weapons which were not prohibited.
[SS1] He agreed that the system was designed to stop crazies and criminals, but not the
dedicated terrorist.
Resource Allocation
[U] Belger stated that resource allocation decisions for security were driven by Admiral
FIynn, and these decisions factored in data from improved intelligence in the 1990' sand
the findings of vulnerability assessments. Belger wasn't aware of the application of any
risk management tools in determining resource allocation, but again this was Flynn's
responsibility.
Fines/penalties on Carriers for screening failures
[U] Belger cited his previous work experience in the FAA security program, including on
the issue of fines. He stated that the purpose of fines is compliance and enforcement.
Compliance is the overriding goal. Fines are a good way to get the regulated party's
attention. He cited the use of fines as an effective attention getting tool dealing with
issues of pilot performance. The fines got their attention. Belger noted that as a security
specialist he followed the fines that he assessed through to the final determination, which
was useful in understanding how and what happened. H~ said he didn't have the sense
that other FAA security enforcement personnel engaged in that same practice. Belger
said that the final settlements which were often lower than the original fine did not
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concern him. He found publicity about compliance failures to be more effective than
financial penalties.
[0] Belger could not recall an instance in which the FAA threatened to de-certify an air
carrier because of security violations. He did, however, recall that the FAA had closed
certain poorly-performing screening checkpoints.
Common Strategy
[U] Belger stated that while the common strategy against hijacking had been updated a
couple of times, it was not designed to counter a 9111 scenario. He didn't recall how the
scenarios to which the common strategy was to respond were planned or developed.
Obviously post 9-11 it had to be re-thought and replaced. He perceives that we still have
the need to make sure that all parties are aware of what they are supposed to do in the
event of an emergency.
FAM
[U] Belger stated that the FAM program was allowed to wither because it was a lower
priority in an environment where resources were constrained. He stated that at the time,
people didn't think there was a serious domestic threat, citing the absence of a serious
domestic aviation security event in the 10 years leading up to 9-11. He saw some of the
language citing a domestic threat in AC1 as "throw ins."
Cockpit Doors
[SS1] Belger said doors were supposed to be locked in flight. He was not aware of any
serious look at issues regarding the cockpit door from a security perspective. It was a
flight safety standards issue. An impregnable door can be a safety concern in the event of
decompression. He said that the safety issues regarding the engineering of the door are
startlingly complex, and that the FAR certification folks did a marvelous job of
minimizing the safety implications and the increased safety risk of secure cockpit doors.
Belger stated that before 9-11, the system wouldn't have made the trade-off of increasing
"security" by hardening cockpit door for minimized "safety." In the post 9-11
environment, it made more sense to make this trade-off. On that point, Belger iterated
that FAA decision-making is always about the trade-offs among safety, security and
efficiency.
Safety vs. Security
[U] Belger stated that security didn't' come to FAA until 1971 and the promulgation of
the first security regulations. Congress made the FAA the lead agency for security
because of the "safety" implications of responding to in-flight emergencies and
contingencies.
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[U] Belger disputed the accuracy of the National Research Council assertion that the
FAA didn't take the same approach to security as it did safety. He said that safety
standards are more precise and quantifiable. He regarded it as impossible to apply to the
same measures to security as FAA does to safety because of the human factors involved
in security. In safety you weren't trying to detect an enemy. Security was more
"subjective." He said that in general industry paid more attention to safety than security
concerns because the former was much more prevalent.
Cockpit Keys
[SSI] Belger agreed that it wasn't a good idea to have one key fits all, but it wasn't seen
as a significant risk pre 9-11. He wasn't sure ifhe was aware that one key fit all cockpits
prior to 9-11.
The Day of 9-11
[U] Belger was attending a meeting in Air Traffic Control on the morning of 9/11. When
he returned to his office, his assistant Shirley Miller told him that a plane had crashed
into the W orld Trade Center and she took him to the operations center (prior to the
second strike).
[U] He spent a few minutes trying to figure out who knew what, and started to set up the
security phone net with the ATC folks. His initial belief was that the plane was a general
aviation aircraft, not a commercial plane. He said the atmosphere in the building was
"chaotic but organized."
[U] At some point he was told that ATC had picked-up threatening transmissions from a
commercial flight, but wasn't sure whether he learned that before or after the second
plane hit the WTC.
[U] He remembers talking to Jane Garvey on the phone who was on her way from
Secretary Mineta's office to the FAA operations center. He was on the phone with
Mineta's Chief of Staff John Flaherty when the second plane hit the WTC. He returned to
the Operations Center to take Charge.
[U] Belger recalled that the Boston and New York Air Traffic Control Centers started
imposing ground stops on commercial aircraft. He said this was a very good decision,
though the scenario had never been practiced and some would say they didn't have the
authority to make such a decision unilaterally. In that regard, Belger said he is glad FAA
personnel didn't follow all the rules/regulations and protocols in place on 9/11 and were
more entrepreneurial (such as contacting NORAD).
[U] With regard to phone communications from the FAA's Operations Center, Belger
said there were two levels. (He did not know if either was recorded). The first was the
Primary Net that involved all the key players (FAA, FBI, ATe, DoD etc.) in an open net
to talk strategically.
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[U] The second was the tactical net which was at a lower level and used for tasking and
implementation within FAA.
[U] Around 9:20 A.M. EDT he remembers discussion about a national ground stop (i.e.
no take-offs )-Herndon was making the same decisions about this independently.
Meanwhile the FAA was still trying to figure out which aircraft hit the WTC. While he
hadn't talked with the carriers by that time, he believes Garvey had been in touch with
them.
[U] Between 9:20-9:45 there were many confusing reports about various aircraft being
unaccounted for. He heard of a crash on the Indiana/Kentucky border that was thought to
be AAL 77. By this point he believes he talked with Bob Baker and Russ Chew at AAL.
Jane Garvey talked to Don Carty.
[U] Belger doesn't recall any discussion that morning about the need to contact aircraft in
the air about securing their cockpits, even though they were considering an order to land
all planes.
[U] With regard to the Primary Net, Belger said he believes that Lee Longmire was in
charge. He had the impression that the military was on the line at some point and had
assumed that the proper contacts had been made. He had no knowledge about the
problem that Lee Longmire shared with the Commission that the NMCC was supposed to
be on the Net but was in fact absent for some undetermined length of time. Belger wasn't
aware of the NORAD response until after AAL 77 crashed (he subsequently learried that
Boston and New York Centers had called NORAD earlier)
[U] Belger was told about UAL 93 after it crashed. He stressed that everyone was very
confused about which aircraft hit the Pentagon. UAL and AAL weren't sure what planes
hit where. He said that the carriers were searching for information from the FAA not
providing it. It took a long time to confirm what aircraft hit the Pentagon.
[U] Belger believes that the "hijack coordinator" would have been the senior security
person present who was Lee Longmire. (SEE FAA PROTOCOL ON "Hijack
Coordinator).
[U] Belger learned of the crash into the Pentagon shortly after it happened. He and
Garvey got on the phone with Norm Mineta who decided to bring everything down
(around 9:45) which was implemented. Belger continued to monitor the system as it
executed this order. All aircraft were down and the system grounded by 12:15 P.M.
Weapons and Tactics
[U] Belger said it was his understanding that box cutters were the weapons used by the
hij ackers and that they "stormed" the cockpits. He doesn't remember anything about
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"knives." He said that his understanding was derived from news accounts, but that he's
still not sure what weapons were used.
[U] Belger said that he did not remember seeing any executive summaries about the
events of the day, and did not recall any discussion about the possible use of "guns." He
does remember some discussion about VAL 93 and the presence of a bomb as per ATC.
[V] Belger does remember speculation that the weapons must have been planted for the
hijackers, because the security folks didn't believe that the hijackers could have
succeeded in getting through four different checkpoint operations with weapons. Belger
stated that he was not aware of any evidence to give credence to the notion that weapons
were planted or that an "insider" participated.
Post Closure of the National Air Space
[U] Belger stated that once the NAS was closed and all planes had been grounded, there
was no standard operating procedure to guide the response. He turned his attention to
coordinating with the air carriers where everyone's aircraft was located-including the
numerous aircraft in Canada. He had many discussions with Canadian authorities
regarding how to handle people/customs. He recalls trying to figure out what decisions
needed to be made to re-start the system.
[U] Belger does not recall any discussion of screening the aircraft, passenger manifests,
or passengers coming off the grounded flights to determine if there were other plots.
[V] With regard to notifying flights in the air about what was happening at the WTC,
Belger said they were worried about panic among passengers. He was not concerned that
pilots or ATC would panic about what was going on. Belger thinks that the air carriers
did put out a warning to their aircraft. In retrospect, he believes it would not have been a
bad thing for FAA to make sure that all aircraft knew what was going on so that they
could secure their cockpits.
Centers of Activity at the FAA on 9-11
[SSI] Belger agreed that there were five centers of activity at the FAA on 9-11.
1) Washington Operations Center (WOC) - lOth floor. (Dave Canoles would know if
the phones in the center were recorded.)
2) Office of the Administrator/Deputy Administrator (Garvey & Belger) (He knows

the phones weren't recorded).
3) ACI watch - 3rd floor (Claudio Manno would know if the phones were recorded).
4) ATe communications hub - 10th floor (Bill Peacock and Jeff Griffiths).
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5) ACS Security Operations - 3rd floor.
[U] Belger stated that if anyone was in contact with the military it would have been ATC
or the WOC.
Radar Tracking
[U] Belger confirmed that the FAA didn't have primary radar in certain sectors - after 9-
11 he became aware of the impact of this on tracking AAL 77.
Garvey Role
[U] Belger said he spent almost the entire day with Garvey, except when she went down
to console people in the lobby later in the day-which he saw as an appropriate thing to
do. Belger said that his leadership role on 9-11 evolved and was a reaction rather than a
pre-planned procedure. He stressed that Garvey was making decisions along with him.
And that it is his nature to take charge. He has no reservations about her role on that day,
and never heard anything negative. Belger said he thinks "we did a pretty good job" of
keeping things in the office under control. He said that Garvey spent more time talking
with the airlines than he did.
After Action Report
[U] Belger stated that there was no formal, consolidated after action report on 9-11, and
in retrospect this could have been done better. H~ was never asked to write a statement
about what happened on 9/11 from his perspective. He remembers continuous
discussions with ATC about specific measures such as better coordination with DoD
which was done within days. He said that FAA knew that the FBI was investigating and
that leadership instructed everyone to give the FBI everything. This was followed by the
Joint Intelligence Committee investigation.
Table Top Exercises
[U] Belger remembers that FAA did conduct various table-top exercises over the years to
practice emergency response-mostly via telephone. He said that some of the scenarios
involved security issues (not just safety), and the system would do communications
checks to ensure that communications could be established quickly and effectively in the
emergency response mode. While Belger recalls that a hij ack scenario was practiced, he
doesn't remember a scenario involving the use of aircraft as a weapon.
Pre 9-11 Context
[U] Belger stated that from the spring of2000 through the summer of2001, the focus of
the civil aviation system was on capacity, congestion, and delays. He cited news reports,
hearings and White House interest. In the spring of 2000 the FAA was engaged in an
effort to be more collaborative with the airlines on issues such as weather, system
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operations etc. During this period there was significant attention being paid to the
Passenger Bill of Rights as well.
[U] Belger indicated that the DOT has a consumer hotline (under the auspices of the
counsel's office). The system tracks delays, customer complaints, etc. It should give a
good indication about what the general public was concerned about with respect to
aviation.
[U] Belger stated that "not a day went by" that delays weren't priorities for Belger and
Garvey. Domestic security seemed in-hand. Flynn was very well-respected. While
Canavan had a great reputation, he wasn't' as knowledgeable as Flynn. He didn't have a
grasp of the FAA system. Belger said he didn't recall Canavan expressing any discomfort
with the manner in which the aviation security system was functioning. Canavan's
priorities were the same as everyone else's: international threat; 107/108 rulemaking,
bombings.
Recommendations
[U] The Common Strategy, for better or worse,was well understood before 9111. Belger
believes there were clear roles and no confusion as to roles. He doesn't believe that is the
case today. TSA, FAA, DoD et. al. need to put together protocols and practice scenarios,
to be sure everyone knows what they are supposed to do and to drill on their respective
roles. TSA should retain the lead role for in-air hijackings (FAA and TSA did an
exercise in November 2002 on hijack coordination).
[U] CAPPS II or some type of capability to further identify the bad guys is absolutely
needed. We will never get 100% detection so we are better off knowing who the people
are (threats). "The good guy with a knife is not a threat. The bad guy with bare hands is
a threat."
[U] Intelligence sharing-We need a better idea of those who are entering the country.
The fact that so many hij ackers were here so long is "astounding." We need a common
database from which to work.
[U] Statements made by Monte Belger in his 9/25/03 hearing before the Governmental
Affairs Committee that were read to him during the interview: "We ordered the
evacuation of every airport terminal for the airports to be inspected. Every aircraft was
fully inspected before any passenger was allowed to board .. .It is very possible that those
items (i.e. hijacker weapons) did not go through the screening checkpoint. . .1 think there
was a newspaper report that after they did a thorough overhaul of one of the canceled
flights, they found one of the box cutters or paper cutters in one of the seat cushion of the
planes, and there is no telling whether a passenger brought it on board it was planted at
this point. .. One of the problems we had in getting (the Screener Certification) rule out
sooner was that there was no real objective way to test the screeners other than to test
objects that our inspectors use, which really is not a good real-world way to test."
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HrJ\10 ~ ~'7?\9~
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD f) ?uF70 <;;1
Event: Leo Boivin
Date: September 17, 2003
Prepared by: Bill Johnstone
Team Number: 7
Location: Commission Offices; GSA Building
Participants - Non-Commission: Leo Boivin
Participants - Commission: Sam Brinkley; Bill Johnstone; Lisa Sullivan
[Unc] Mr. Boivin served in the Air Force for 22 years (mainly in counter-intelligence), retiring in
1986. He went on to work in the just-established, small (approximately 6 people) intelligence
office within FAA which sought to make the intelligence community aware of FAA's
intelligence needs, to establish FAA's intelligence collection requirements, and to do threat
assessments. After the downing of Pan Am 103 (1988), Boivin served as the FAA intelligence
liaison with the White House Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Pan Am
. 103/Lockerbie Commission). He served as the head of the FAA's Special Assessments unit
from October 1990 until September 1, 2001, but returned briefly to the agency in the aftermath
of the hijackings to aid in the response. He is currently an independent aviation consultant
affiliated with the Aviation Institute in Ashburn, VA.
[Unc] The reorganization of FAA security instigated by the Pan Am 103/Lockerbie Commission,
and subsequently enacted by the Congress, lead to the creation of the Special Assessments unit
on October 1, 1990, which Mr. Boivin was chosen to head. The designation of the unit sought to
avoid the term "Inspection" so as to make clear that it had no regulatory mission, as well as the
term "Red Team" because of certain unfavorable connotations of that phrase in military circles.
The Special Assessment unit was to operate outside normal FAA testing. However, the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, and the subsequent U.S. deployments under Desert Shield and Desert Storm
lead to Mr. Boivin being temporarily (until 3/91) reassigned to Brussels, and to a.delay in the
operationalization of the Special Assessments unit.
[Unc] The genesis of the Special Assessments unit was the realization, during the FAA's review
of Pan Am 103 and the work of the Pan Am 103/Lockerbie Commission, that it had no testing
capability overseas and the big issue was how to "internationalize" the testing process, but in a
less formal way so as to avoid legal and sovereignty issues. After the completion of the work of
the Commission, Boivin was asked to help implement this process via heading up the new
Special Assessments unit. He reported to the head of Aviation Security Intelligence (first Jack
Gregory and then Pat McDonnell).
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[Unc J Boivin came to the job of Special Assessments head with some definite ideas. He saw the
mission as a controlled counter intelligence operation and sought to hire intelligence operations
people from outside the FAA, largely from military backgrounds. The unit worked out of leased
space at Dulles Airport, and started small (4 or 5), with hiring begun in the spring of 1991. The
first task was to teach the staff about FAA procedures and how the civil aviation industry
worked.
~ The first project assigned to the Special Assessments unit (by FAA civil aviation security
head "Ort" Steele) was in the latter half of 1991, and involved testing the screening capabilities
at the 17 largest (Category X) airports in order to establish a baseline of comparison with regular
FAA tests prior to the unit turning its attention to its main assignment of international testing.
NOTE: In the period leading up to 9/11101, this 1991 project was the first, and only,
comprehensive assessment of screening capability at domestic airports by the Special
Assessments unit.
[S81] Boivin wanted the 1991 domestic screening project to "stress test" the system, and didn't
want the checkpoints to know that they had been tested in order to allow multiple tests which
provided a more reliable database of results. Consequently, the checkpoints couldn't be notified
if they had passed or failed. For purposes of training his team for their international mission, the
tests worked well: For each test, the unit started with surveillance of the checkpoint (to observe
its tendencies and weaknesses), followed by the development of a test plan which was then
carried out. The test results were "disastrous," with only small erformance variations among
the various check oints .
• ~ The report on domestic screening was produced at the end of 1991, and the airlines were
briefed in early 1992. Mr. Boivin requires that the airlines were anxious to insure thaVthe results
didn't "get out."J
(S.8'fj In 1992 the Special Assessments unit began its main mission of testing the 88 overse~s'"
airports visited by U.S. carriers, or which had U.S. destinations.
~ After the initial interest generated by the response to Pan Am' 103, the"biidge~.f6~'Special
Assessments began to suffer, largely through OMB action. At a-time wheri Boivin to increase
his division (to 18 people), the unit received a no-growth (ftatjbudget.in 1993', and in 1994 was
moved back to FAA HQ and had to begin making cuts. At the stal1'o(1995, the unit had 8
people, but the two most junior had to be laid off because 9fth~"b~d-get cuts. According to Mr.
Boivin, "nobody on the Hill wanted to talk to the FAA" at this.time (mid 1990s) about boosting
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its security budget. , :""<"'"
9/11 Closed by statute
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~ After the destruction of TWA 800 (1996), the attention and money for security "came back
again, as usually happened after such a disaster. In late 1996, Special Assessments was directed
to shift its focus to the testing of Explosive Detective Systems (EDS) because of a statutory
mandate to the FAA to certify that such systems met prescribed standards and could function in
an airport environment.l
9/11 Closed by Statute
..... ~ ~/(Boivin had acquired responsibility for the Explosives Unit in

1993, and for a short time, also had responsibility for the Air Marshals.)
~ According to Mr. Boivin, the testing was constrained because: a) the airlines had initially
resisted deploying EDS so there "was not a lot to test" in 1997-98; b) the capability was not
mandated at that point and thus "not enforceable," and c) there was a legitimate worry that under
such circumstances testing might actually discourage further deployment.
.LSB1J In the aftermath of the Gore Commission, FAA got a total of approximately 300 positions
to do more "realistic" testing of the system, but Special Assessments got only 3 or 4 of these (the
rest going to field units under the Civil Aviations Operations (ACO) office. As a result, ACO
started to do focused, more realistic testing (called Special Emphasis Assessments or SEAs) at
domestic checkpoints in the period 1997-99, The Special Assessments unit was asked to help
develop the SEA test plans, but found the test results to be of variable quality.
~ Because of questions about the SEA results, S ecial Assessments was asked to re
•
the SEA tests, and did so in the period 1997-2000. 9/11 Closed by Statute
screening .
[.S811 In terms of assessing the security system just prior to 9/11, Mr. Boivin expressed the
opinion that over the years, the airlines had shown improvement overseas (through profiling and
bag passenger match), but domestically the main change had been the deployment of new
detection technology. He believes there are three elements to checkpoint security: 1)
Effectiveness (which is what his Special Assessment Unit sough to test); 2) Efficiency (which is
what the airlines are most interested inl; and 3) Deterrence (which one can't measure but one
"can see it." I
~ Mr. Boivin believes that "rulemaking was the bane of security." While Special
Assessments could provide a snapshot in time of weaknesses, permanent improvement in
security requires the rulemaking process, As one illustration, the FAA has wanted to do more
realistic testing (more test objects, more realistic test scenarios) backed up by better enforcement,
all of these changes required changes in rules. FAA security officials would have to go through
a lengthy process including prioritization of desired rules plus a detailed cost-benefit analysis to
justify each proposal. The Baseline Working Group (1996) did have some success in getting
security rule changes implemented, but this involved their usage of closed briefings on Capitol
'.
Hill to make their case.
-. COMMISS]ON SENSITIVE
•
~With respect to the use of knives in the 9/11 hijackings, Mr. Boivin indicated that
regardless of what was said about the legal status of knives, implementation of any effort to keep
them out of the cabin was "not doable." He referred to looking at this as a source of the 9/] 1
failure was a "fool's chase." In 1993 "Ortn Steele had wanted to ban knives, but Boivin told
him he could try
e. The
~ With respect to cockpit door hardening, this effort began with a 1998 or 1999 request by
the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee request in order to try to implement an leAO
pronouncement "urging," but not requiring, such action. According to Mr. Boivin, the airlines
were adamant that it couldn't be done in a cost-effective manner. The ensuing rulernaking,
which was completed in 2001, proposed changes for new aircraft only; both the airlines and
aircraft manufacturers cited difficulties with retrofitting. There was also concern about the
•
impact of any hardening of the cockpit door on crew safety (because of impeding crew egress).
Mr. Boivin indicated that while hardened cockpit doors will stop knife-wielding hijackers, "you
can't stop a determined hijacker" once on board a plane because of technological limitations.
[Unc] In terms of recommendations for further improving aviation security, Mr. Boivin pointed
to the need to make sure any new security measure can be shown to the public to be valuable.
He also called for greater consistency in application of security measures (while preserving
random or unpredictable elements). More specifically, he thought that placing the x-ray operator
in a remote location (to avoid being influenced by the appearance of the passenger) would be
worthwhile.
fJ1 P(L() 30/ otIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD ~
Event: Bruce Butterworth, former Director for Policy and Planning (ACS-1) at the FAA
Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan
Team Number: 7
Participants - Non-Commission: Bruce Butterworth
Participants - Commission: John Raidt, Bill Johnstone, and Lisa Sullivan
Background
(Unc) From 1975-1980, Bruce Butterworth worked for the House Committee on
Government Operations, Majority Staff (Congressman Burton). He moved to the
Department of Transportation where, following the crash of Pan Am 103 in December of
1988, he acted as a liaison to the FAA for the Office of the Secretary (Secretary Jim
Burnley). In 1991 he became Director for Security Policy and Planning (ACP-l) at the
FAA. In July 1995, he was promoted to Director of Security Operations (ACO-l). He
remained in that post until September 2000. At that time, he left the FAA and took a job
as the head of security for the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC. He was in this
role on 9111/01. This past year he moved to the NASA Goddard Flight Center as the
Deputy Director for Planning and Development and Applied Engineering and the
Technology Directorate.
(Unc) The only contact he had with aviation security after leaving the FAA was in
obtaining assistance on the updating of security checkpoints for the Holocaust Museum.
Butterworth obtained from the FAA TIP-ready x-ray machines built for airport
checkpoints which were then deployed at the Museum. The FAA had extra machines on
hand because, according to Butterworth, airports were unwilling to install them. A
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated September 11,2001 signed by Mike
Canavan of the FAA and Butterworth formalized the transaction of the machines.
Job Description
(Unc) As Director of FAA Security Policy and Planning, Butterworth outlined four 'main
job functions:
1. Formal and informal rulemaking: This encompassed implementation of the Pan
Am 103 Commission recommendations (p.L. 101-604). Butterworth thought the
more significant of the two functions was the informal rulemaking under the Air
Carrier and Airport Standard Security Programs because it did not take as long
and the rules were narrower in focus. Changes to the air carrier standards
program were easier to implement than changes in formal security rules.
Because the air carrier standards program was sensitive security information and
stayed within FAA, the rulemaking moved faster because DOT and OMB were
not "rattling around in the process."
2. Oversight of Research and Development (R and D): He targeted funding each
year. Rand D generally received an allocation of $36 million a year.
3. Physical security of FAA assets.
4. Contingency planning: ACP's fourth function was to devise plans in response to
credible and specific intelligence is received regarding a threat to an airport, for
instance. This included the issuance of Aviation Security (AVSEC) alert levels.
(Unc) Butterworth also acted as the informal liaison to Capitol Hill, given his prior work
experience on the House side. '
(Unc) The Policy office, which decided what policies should be pursued, had 32-42 staff,
while the Operations office, which implemented policy, had approximately 1,000 staff,
mostly field agents.
Security Directives - Rulemaking
(Unc) ACS-l would sign off on Security Directives once the three divisions (Intelligence,
Policy, and Operations) conferred on the content that went out to the air carriers and
airports. The FAA Administrator was kept informed, but generally did not participate in
the issuance of the directives. It was Paul Busick's responsibility to keep the Office of
the Secretary informed of FAA policy changes. Butterworth said that Busick took a
strong position on enforcement of security regulations for the civil aviation system.
Butterworth reported that he "almost lost his job" because of it.
(Unc) Carriers always wanted to see intelligence reports for themselves; to determine if
they were real. Butterworth said that changes to aviation security policies under normal
conditions (rather than in response to a crisis) face rulemaking difficulties, usually as a
result of cost-benefit analysis. Other constraints on the process he attributed to
interactions between "senior level people," who wanted to "make sure the rule is good,
and at the same time protects the industry'S interests. For example, it took the FAA four
years (approximately 1993-1996) to pass a rule protecting SSI from public disclosure.
This is one instance in which cost-benefit analysis was not a factor.
Butterworth recognized the need for the FBI and the CTS to beef-up their assessments of
the threat in order to move the industry.
• FAA Leadership
(Unc) Butterworth characterized the position of ACS-l as, the "president in charge of
going to jail," implying FAA leadership intuited that a mistake or an accident was bound
to occur, and the position that would take the blame for it between the FAA and the DOT
would be ACS-I.
(Unc) As for FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, Butterworth described her as "a distance
person," as though she "didn't want her fingerprints on anything that was going on at
FAA" with respect to security. Butterworth stated that watching her testimony at the 9-
11 Commission hearing in May 2003 angered him.
(Unc) In contrast, he said that her predecessor Administrator Hinson (early 1990s) was a
good decision-maker is crises, but Butterworth considered him "very skeptical" about
increasing security measures. Industry applied pressure on the FAA directly through the
Administrator's office. He never saw the calls happen. Butterworth fought hard to
improve cargo screening measures; to prevent them from being rolled back. Butterworth
said that Administrator Hinson was not one-hundred percent in favor of enforcing cargo
security measures because he was not fully convinced about the information used to
support the new measures. He loosened restraints.
• (Unc) In response to crises, Butterworth said "ACS is a completely different

organization." They act as a team, working al1 hours of the night. ACS was the primary
link between with the National Security Council's NSG (he listed these names as people
ACS liaised with during crisis-mode: Dick Clarke, Dan Benjamin, Steve Simon, and then .
later Roger Pressy. "Actionable intelligence" initiated such an emergency response.
Bojinka Plot
''{sS.D The classic example he used was the Manila Plot ("Bojinka"). Inthat instance,
Butterworth thought that Civil Aviation Security "did a really good job." He referred to
United Airlines as "the best of the carriers" with respect to security and reported that
"Greenwald from United said at the time, "if they are lying to us," (meaning FAA) "then
we'll get them," implying that Greenwald was going to trust the FAA's reports this time.
•
• 9/11 Closed by Statute
'tSSI) Butterworth called security procedures at the airports "messy." He thought that
was because airline Security Directors were "isolated" and did not know how to interact
with the airlines, or their vulnerabilities. Butterworth thought that primarily, "Airlines
hired security directors to deal with internal theft, such as ticket fraud and stealing."
Congressional Oversight
(Unc) According to Butterworth, only two Members of Congress, Congressman Oberstar

and Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), took "the right" position on aviation security one-
hundred percent of the time. Congressman Mica fought the "vehicle bomb measure" at
Orlando airport. Former Congressman Duncan, as Chairman of the Aviation
Subcommittee, is reported to have told the air carriersl industry stakeholders, "You all let
me know what you want to have rolled back," in terms of regulation.
(Unc) The industry would exercise its influence by getting Members of Congress to
submit "veiled" questions to the FAA on security measures. There was no congressional
pressure put on the stakeholders to increase security. It is Butterworth's opinion that
•
Congress pressured the FAA (in the form of inquiry) to "roll back" the regulations. He
said that the occasional question from a Hill staffer was often "veiled," They were not
going to come out and say they were opposed to increasing safety of civil aviation, but it
was clear they opposed increased spending on the measures.
(Unc) When asked to elaborate, he said that there was no Member of Congress on the
"far right" of the regulatory issue. As a FAA policy-maker, he said, "You were the right.
You had to create it." Even the victims' groups were largely ineffective such as from Pan
Am 103. As for the effectiveness of interested union representation, he said that the Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) was the most active on security issues. The Flight
Attendants Association was not very effective.
New Special Assessments Testing (the "Red Team")
(Unc) Butterworth instituted a program in 1995 of realistic testing of security measures.

The 1996 FAA Reauthorization Act, included language for realistic testing of the system;
Flynn and Butterworth got Sam Whitehorn (a staff member on the Senate Commerce
Committee) to put the language in the legislation. Butterworth requested the Special
Assessments Division (often referred to as the "Red Team") to mirror current threats with
calibration of the x-ray machines in mind. Prior to the program he instituted the test
methods used to assess the securit s stems "were ridiculous.'
,--~_~ ~ __ ~ ........ ....I The tests"
•
conducted were poor assessments of how well the system would perform shouldanactual
terrorist attempt to get an lED aboard a flight. Administrative law judg~.had·-said that
COMMIS S ION
.l:::·
..» §BNS:ITT\iE- 4
COMMISSION SENS,ITIVE
• ~------------------------------------------------------~
ruling dated back to 1990-91 and heavily influenced FA..(\'s regular testing Butterworth
indicated that, because of the ALJ ruling, it would be difficult for the FAA to seek a civil
fine if the test that the screener failed was not clear-cut. ...
This
teS) He said he had to fight very hard to sustain what he called a "robust" testing
program. He noted that Flynn, whom "he respected enormously," hap concerns about the
program Butterworth was trying to sustain. According to Butterworth, one could never
tell with Flynn whether it was him or his sup.eriors who were putting limits on him. AT A
rigorously fought it. Butterworth said he had to "walk it up slowly." Butterworth felt
•
that the regular testing/enforcement system "embraced" the partnership ~oncept between
the FAA and industry, but that it didn't do well enough in distinguishing "partnership from
co-optation. ",
~S) Failure to meet the FAA standards should not necessitate firing personnel. Small
fines did not effectively address the failures, either. For this reason, Butterworth devised
a Performance Based Enforcement (1995-2000) policy. It was based on tW9 premises:
the need to have testing results reflective across thy system, and that the air carriers face
the same testing protocols. The enforcement policy hinged on FAA's actions toward the
worst performers because many others in the system would base their compliance on
what happened to this group. He said that they openly considered closing checkpoints
that performed poorly and showed no improvement. Butterworth thought this wa'~ a good
approach (Ort Steele agreed), but it was never implemented. "
(eS) At one point, FAA leadership under Acting-Administrator Linda Daschle senta
letter to the industry on selectee-onl ba match testin results inson refused to send
the letter under his Administration).
The letter from the FAA basically sa..l.....,.to-,,-e-c-a-rr-}-er-s-:
!'P'w--e-a-re-c-o-n-s"'1
,..e-r
..m-g-a--nu-m-yoo-er
....of
options including revocation of your operating certificate as an air carrier." In
Butterworth's view, she was the only Administrator he served under who threatened to
get "tough" with the industry, and this particular letter represented the only occasion he
was aware of where FAA leadership threatened de-certification as a result of security
•
failings .
• tss) The response from the air carriers was mixed. Crandall's (American Airlines)
response was "acerbic." United was particularly embarrassed by their results. The FAA
had no "will" left to follow through on the threat to pull certificates. There was no fall
out.
FAA receptivity to Red Team findings:
(e"S) Butterworth revealed that he had personal conflicts with Ken Mead, Inspector
General of DOT. However, Butterworth thought that his testimony on Red Team
assessments at the Commission's May 2003 hearing was good. He indicated that the
charge that leadership "covered-up" the Red Team results was ludicrous. The Red Team
results were provided to the industry. Irish Flynn and Ort Steele deserve credit for the
continuous flow of information about performance to the industry; far more than the
administration before them. The Red Teams customarily briefed the field agents
following a test on their performance so that the x-ray machines could be recalibrated and
their weaknesses addressed. Butterworth implied that it was the air carriers and other
stakeholders that reluctantly accepted the information provided by the testing. They did
not want to know.
• ECS) Because the performance problems were so fundamental to the system, Butterworth
felt that the issuance of a rule or any other "dramatic" action on the part of FAA would
not remedy the problems. There was no dramatic action that could be taken, not with the
limited power that the FAA had at its disposal.
~S) Butterworth viewed potential threats to CAS in several groups: The first group
refers to the professional terrorist with financial backing, possibly state-sponsored. In
Butterworth's words, "All civil aviation security can do is to get this hijacker to pause for
a minute. It is impossible to design against these people. One can't shake down
everyone at the airports. It's not workable." This also applies to suicide hijackers, which
the system pre-9-11 certainly was not prepared to handle. In Butterworth's former
position, all one can do is, "Pray to God that your intelligence services are going to pick
them up."
(&S) He characterized the second group as the "deadly and dumb people," whose intent is
not suicide and who want to remain anonymous as they attempt to beat the system.
Operating under the presumption of non-suicide, the system attempted to deal with this
group by closing off all avenues for the criminal to maintain anonymity.
'(6S) The third group were "the nutcases;" individuals that try to walk onto a plane with a
38-caliber gun or a ticking briefcase, for instance. He indicated that the security system
•
had better be able to stop this group .
• cBs) Why was the FAA so close-minded to the thought of suicide hijackers? Butterworth
had no answer to that. He said that the entire security system was based on non-suicide.
Industry Influence - Dual Mandate
(e'S) In terms of industry influence, there was no question in Butterworth's mind that the
stakeholders could get rid of anyone they wanted at FAA at anytime. Butterworth told
the Commission that the FAA went "after him" for coming down too hard on the
stakeholders. In the spring of 1998, he almost lost his job over it. Congressman Oberstar
wrote a Jetter on Butterworth's behalf to ensure that he keep his job at the FAA.
Butterworth believed that he was targeted because his policy directives were costing the
industry too much money. For example, the industry fought his testing program "tooth
and nail."
(C§) Butterworth sought to move up to become Deputy Associate Administrator at FAA.

Jane Garvey put a security director from Northwest Airlines on the search panel for the
position. Busick and Klickenburg were also on the panel. According to Butterworth,
Garvey "went to the industry and asked who they couldn't get along with."
(SS) At the time, Northwest owed $2 million in fines to the FAA. Butterworth saw this
as a clear conflict of interest. Because of thatl 9/11 Personal Privacy land
•
"performance gaps" in the system, he withdrew filS name tor conslderatlOn tor promotion
at that time. In Butterworth's opinion, "it was a story worthy of the Washington Post
front page." This was a clear example of the contradictory, counterproductive nature of
the "Dual Mandate". Oberstar was horrified that a strong director of operations was
being targeted and industry was having a side. Flynn's strong support and Oberstar's
intervention let him keep his job.
(Unc) In summarizing his evaluation of the civil aviation security system during the time
he served, Butterworth indicated that he didn't think a 'jury of his peers" would believe
they had done everything it would have been prudent and responsible to do.
Public Disclosure of Air Carrier Test Results
(BS) He also shared with the Commission an instance in which the regulated industry
exerted undue influence over the FAA. There was a presumption that after a certain
period of time was given to an air carrier to fix security failures the information would be
made public. He was working on a settlement agreement with Continental Airlines on
fines for security failures. FAA had to have a press release with Continental announcing
that it had agreed to pay x number of dollars for security violations. The negotiations on
that deal went all the way to the Administrator, and he is not sure if it was ever resolved.
Questions from the 9/11 families:
•
t€S) Butterworth was asked the 9/11 family question with respect to the lowering of
fines. Butterworth said they were lowered as a result of the negotiation settlement
between FAA and the air carrier. The two lawyers would hash it out, and ultimately fines
were lowered. Fines were lowered' as a result of the negotiation settlement. Two things
the carriers care about: Where the airline was in relation to the rest of the pack (United
was always way ahead), and deflecting negative publicity. The longer it took to resolve
the issue the colder the trail got on the evidence of the carrier/screener malfeasance which
made throwing the book at them difficult. As far as publicity in terms of security
performance, policy on Public Disclosure is in the SSI rule. After a certain number of
years, it is no longer security information. Butterworth indicated that he had wanted to
create "mega-fines" for poor performers, but this was never done.
(6S) Butterworth did not recall the 1992 special analysis prepared by the FAA stating
that small knives are the most frequently used weapon in hijackings, nor did he know the
origin of the 4-inch blade rule. '
Intelligence
{S-SI) Butterworth indicated that aviation looked "juicy" to the attackers because of the
reported low level of security performance. Butterworth was "blown away" after 9-11 to
learn of the high level of activity and the sheer number of terrorist groups operating
inside the United States prior to 9-11. Such revelations called into question, in his mind,
the United States' commitment to identifying and tracking such groups domestically. He
said that while at the FAA, he operated under the assumption that the Bureau would "pick
them up; that they had enough tracks out there."
~I) Butterworth recalled taking several steps to get the Administration to focus on
tracking terrorists and improving intelligence gathering. In 1996, the Baseline Security
Working Group was established in response to a NIE statement that listed group
identities and locations of terrorists, and that specified a terrorist threat to civil aviation.
(Butterworth recalled that initially the Administration wouldn't agree to set up a BWG,
but that Butterworth contacted Rep. Oberstar, who wrote to Leon Panetta, and this led to
the removal of Administration objections.) There was an obvious need to improve
intelligence reporting to the FAA. Butterworth cited the same examples mentioned by
Flynn in his interview with the Commission, including the briefing of the staff of the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee on threats to aviation security.
~S) Butterworth recalled that FAA Administrator Hinson went to'CIA Director John
Deutch to express concern about intelligence and the growing threat and that his concerns
were dismissed by Deutch. He also recalled FBI agent John O'Neill's testimony to the
Senate Intelligence Committee wherein he was unwilling to corroborate FAA claims
about credible threats to civil aviation.
168) Butterworth was asked how the FAA was able to assess whether the FBI had done a
thorough job of following up on aviation related cases, and that the agency was 'being
duly diligent. It was Butterworth's opinion that "if you screw with the Bureau they won't
tell you anything;" that individuals suspected of terrorist activity were turned over to the
FBI; and that it was not the FAA's place to follow up with the Bureau in such cases.
• These presumptions directly affected the quality of the FAA's working relationship with
the FBI, and how it processed "intelligence" received from the FBI. The attitude, was,
"take what you can get," from the Bureau. FAA did ask FBI to beef up its assessments in
order to make security presentations to industry more credible.
"?f;S) In Butterworth'sview, part of the intelligence flow problem was on the FAA side,
which didn't necessarily wish to receive information that would cause problems for the
industry. FAA Security was often concerned about preventing roll-backs of existing
security measures, and perhaps hoped that the information on increasing threats was not
"real. "
1CS) Butterworth admitted that more could have been done on the part of FAA as a
regulator of the industry to "beef up" civil aviation security. In hindsight, he thinks they
could have pushed for more intelligence, come down harder on checkpoints and enforced
searches of selectee-only carry-on baggage. The rule only required that a selectee's
checked bags were screened.
• CAPPS
(Unc) Butterworth had the impression that it was a good security measure. Many steps
were taken to pass the political, civil liberties test. Airlines were in favor of CAPPS at
that time.
Miscellaneous
'tss.D Butterworth said that there were three incidents of people with terrorist affiliations
working at airports. The information was given to the FBI but he doesn't know how it '
was pursued. He indicated that Claudio Manno would know what happened in these
cases.
Recommendations
(Unc) Butterworth said there is no clear set of solutions to the problems plaguing the
system. More specifically:
• To address the vulnerabilities associated with the passengers, their checked bags,
and their carry-ons, Butterworth suggested setting up two processes: one for high
risk and one for low risk passengers. Trying to treat every passenger with the
same diligence overburdens the system, and inevitably, the system will prove
ineffective in stopping the people it is designed to stop. The system needs to
"have a selectee-base and screen the hell out of them."
.($.1) Butterworth supports more aggressive performance testing of the system.
He believes TSA is not doing as good a job as FAA did or assessing its own
11 Closed by Statute
• •
•
performance .
deterrence v~iue
He supports more applied R&D for detection equipment.

Butterworth recommended that cargo should go on all-cargo flights. Take it off
the passenger airlines, and subsidize the industry.
• He believes TSA needs to show a willingness to take a strong position on
certification issues. A lack of willingness to do so undercuts the system, giving
poor-performing stakeholders an advantage.
• He supports maintain the original quality of the Federal Air Marshal force at the
higher current deployment level.
• In Butterworth's view, the flow of performance information should include staff
of congressional offices, as well as the insurers of the airlines. If they are made
'privy to such information, the regulators won't need to threaten public disclosure.
Insurance premiums will go up if they are aware that the carrier has low
performance results, and thus economic factors can be brought to bear on
improving security.
• Butterworth said the fundamental problems within the civil aviation system are
rooted in the lack of intelligence. He also thought that the FAA officials were too
beholden to the industry. There should be a prohibition on seeking a job with an
•
air carrier for 4-5 years after leaving FAA.
(Unc) In conclusion, Butterworth indicated his belief that the current system is "corrupt."
To achieve aviation security, one does need a "working coalition" with industry, but the
federal regulators "need to remember who you are, and FAA forgot." Butterworth
worries that TSA could fall into the same trap. Also, Congress needs to be told about
security problems, and listen more attentively to the problems in aviation security. He
believes that the 2001 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) made an
important contribution by removing the primacy of cost-benefit analysis in aviation
security rule-making .
• COMMISSION SENSITIVE 10
• MEMORANDUM
Event: Unsolicited phone call froml...

Type of event: Unrecorded Telephone Interview
FOR THE RECORD
1 former controller Boston Center
Date: Wednesday, October 22, 2003
Prepared by: Miles Kara

....
Team Number: 8
ilJ"
Location: Commission Office, GSA
Participants - Non-Commission: None
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kafa
•
Background
.I ~~lled the Commissio~ Front Office today, October 22, 2003 and
. explained to Karen Heitkotter that he had information concerning the control of military
. aircraft on 9-11. Karen cal1ed Miles Kara and passed along the unsolicited phone call.
John Azzarello was in., the GSA office sp~ce and he and Miles jointly called) I
This memorandum is th.e record of that conversation.
He was not on
~"'u-ty-on.....r
...
- ......-p.P."t"'"o-u-g.....,~I-S
"'kn"';;'ow"'."e""':dr-g-e-o~ev-e-n~ts~th-a~t
'"':"da!-~
y-:-is-s-e-co-n-d~h:-~"'i":n~d,
he had ../
considerable knowledge of how the Center operated. the personaliti~,s involved/and the
relationship with the military. By hi-s..,0wnwordsl lis a "C6Dfi. on:d
I_-_-_ ......
- ..
_--- .....
i
whistleblower, as he is doing today, and proud ofit." ...

I L>\. .i //
I Flied specifically be~a.u~~qf~~~eported lapse rryObili~~iigtheAir~orce I? on
that day and because of the publicity attendant.to the Commission's.subpoena action
against FAA. He concluded the interview by stating that he "washappyto get out"
because of the FAA penchantforhiding records. '''Mehad t;ol¢ h~l wifethat [FAA]
"answers to nobody, makes its ownrules, and initsown mindt'safety is never
compromised." "", .. i./ .'"""."
•
j;
"'" ,. ::,',','
""::~i::':'
9/11 Personal Privacy
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

...... "]9/11 Personal Privacy
•
"'---"'ISM~jor Point/FOR OFFICIAL USE ON!-
Y
Other Points Dis"~uss~'d

. .
Otis Training: ./bti~"'Air Force/base fighter aircraft exercise regularly, at 0900 and 1300
hours, local, IT).Qstdays. Typically, the aircraft lift off the Cape on a southerly heading,
about 190 degrees/and ~ain in Warning Area 105. Cape TRACON hands the fighters off
'.
to Boston Center/Cape/Sector, R 18, at 10K feet. Cape Sector, in turns hands the fighters
off to Giant KiUer, possiblyat Atlantic City. Boston Center does not control the aircraft
,i:n the :farnidg area.
while th Y are.... ...
7
r---t'~idtl:i~tAre~l D ha.d hot lines to HUNTRESS (90 line) and to Giant Killer. There
~isto~y of je~s spilling out of WI 05 into the international traffic lanes and the
Sector would "hit ...
the line" and "virtually yell" to get the fighters back in to the warning
area. Herecalledone serious incident in either WI05 or WI07 off of Atlantic "~ity "a
couple jf
years/~go" that got into the press. . .."
1I'~ecalle~'/~hat there was once a procedure i~ place for .supersonic fl.ight for P'\106
iliciift, but ?,e does j'ot
recall the F ISs ever training or flying supersonic.
w \.
!lijac~ing~fr---teca.lIed one spec~fic incident seve~al ~ears ago, p~rhaps 10

Involving~' ~sa fli ht that was mterce ted b OtIs aIr defense aIrcraft.
----
I tknew that the only armed defense aircraft in the New England area capable of
responding on 9-11 were at Otis. At one time there might have been a capability at
Burlington, VT and does not recall there being such a capability at Atlantic City. Further
•
south, He thought that Langley had fighters that may have also been armed .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2

I \"""\ ' '
Staff aSk~' what positio~1 lli~ld and what his role would have been
on 9- I 1. as the military halson officer, 'tr~ry coordinator, but was not
• on the floor t at morning, he was up in his office. 1I1L-.Js opinion he had no reason to
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3

"S\ ;, -- .... ..
,
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
get in~~I~~d.r-i~~~ll~dtfiild later told a classroom full of people

(controllers an~rvisors) that [FAA] notified Otis in time. The purpose of that
meeting was to go over AFIO (Authorization for Intercept Order) procedures. He
characterized the meeting as "lots of arguments," and "not much learned."
New York Center ODAPS (Ocean Area Control)
'I Is primarycomplaint about New York Center ODAPS is that it had a long history
of only wanting to take commercial aircraft. He specifically recalled the mobilization for
the Gulf War and working 35-40 aircraft in the Nantucket area, and having great
difficulty getting ODAPS to either be aware of the need for military clearance or the
necessity to help. He said ODAPS had a reputation of being "difficult to work with."
They track differently, they have a whole set of rules, it is a non-radar environment.
They do ocean control using AIRINC and HF radio. They do have a radar capability in
the Bermuda area; the feed is remoted to New York. Their only over ocean capability in
the New England area is the Riverhead, New York radar which only goof for 200 or so
nautical miles.
Addendum
'I ~alled back later in the day and stated that the Lufthansa hijacking was in 1993 and
•
that the hijacker threat was to crash the plane into Wall Street.
• FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4

-ssi-
Event: LtGeneral Mike Canavan, former FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation
Security (ACS-1)
Date: November 4, 2003
Team Number: 7
Participants - Non-Commission: Gen. Mike Canavan
Participants - Commission: Sam Brinkley and John Raidt
Background
[U] On 9-11 Canavan served as the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security
(ACS1). He came to the FAA in December of2000 and left in October of2001.
Canavan stated that he served as Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (the
General's title was actually Associate Administrator of Civil Aviation Security). He took
the position with the FAA after a long and distinguished career in the U.S. Army.
Security Exercises
[U] Canavan was asked ifhe recalled a Table Top exercise conducted by the FAA when
he first arrived at the FAA in 2000 involving a Fed Ex plane being commandeered by a
suicide hijacker. Canavan did not recall such an exercise and shared that it must have
been at a pretty low level since he didn't recall.
Canavan said he never participated in Table Top exercises. He said he wanted to because
he had done them in other jobs. He recalls having talked to John Flaherty about doing
Table Tops.
Intelligence Briefings and Sharing
lS81T Canavan said that he recalls that FAA had its own intelligence unit of about 40
people, and that the FAA had liaisons with the FBI and CIA. He said that anything that
the IC agencies received that had an aviation element was supposed to come to the FAA
55I
.~
either through the liaisons or through STU's or computers. During his daily meeting if
there were anything of interest in the intelligence arena, his intelligence person would tell
him. If it was anything urgent he would get it either to the administrator or the assistant
administrator. Canavan said he did not receive a pouch briefing every day.
[U] Canavan said he never really understood what the role was of S-60 (Adm. Jim,
Underwood in the Department of Transportation Office of Intelligence) but that he would
try to keep him in the loop on issues. Canavan said that Underwood spent most of his
time trying to get money out of Canavan for his (Underwood's) pet projects. They got
along and he knew Underwood was over there, but that was about it.
[U] Canavan said he would ask Underwood for help in getting the department to help
push forward the pending rulemaking on screener certification and baggage screening
which was "on the two yard line." He and Underwood would try to meet two or three
times a month.
[U] Canavan said that he would talk security with Monte Belger, the Deputy
Administrator, but that he didn't talk to Garvey about it. She was very busy. Ifhe had an
issue he would talk to Monte. There were other things that were more pressing that
Garvey was working on such as getting people on airplanes. It was a tough summer for
efficiency. They were getting pressure from the Hill about what they were doing to fix
problems in efficiency.
[U] Canavan said that when he came to the FAA Garvey wanted him to work closer and
be more "user friendly" with the airlines, which he understood, because there was a lot of
complaining. Canavan defined "user friendly" as providing the screeners and air carriers
with solutions and educating them, not simply finding fault and writing them up for
everything. Canavan said he told his agents to reach out more to the airlines to try to help
them comply, not merely hammer them. He saw this approach as more conducive to
improved security.
[U] He said that some of his agents were frustrated that their fines would be reduced
down to very little in the negotiating process. Canavan told them not to be worried about
it, because that was out of their control.
[U] Canavan said that he would meet with his FSM's. He could tell who was hands-on
and who was hands-off. He told them to push the stature of the screeners to give them
more pride and to reward them. He referred to a program at Miami where they brought
the screeners to Washington DC to receive recognition they deserved.
Vectors of Security
Prescreening:
,.f.&SftCanavan thought that CAPPS I gave FAA a pretty good idea of who might be a risk
to the aircraft based on the profile that had been built over the years. Canavan said that
.,S8f-
•
~
CAPPS I was going after explosives because it was among the top two or three threats .
The history of bombings was that they would put the explosives in their luggage.
~ Canavan said one of the problems with CAPPS was that if an explosive screener
.opened the bag he or she was supposed to go find the owner, which was di fficult and time
consuming. He be1ieves there was pressure not to be scrupulous, because having to go
find the passenger in order to conduct a proper baggage search was onerous and time
consuming and would stop the system. Anything that slowed the system would get
pushback from the airlines.
Screening checkpoint:
[U] Canavan said that he would saw results from Red Teams after he had been there for a
few months. He stated that he had the Red Teams brief the Security Directors of the air
carriers to point out what they were finding in their assessments and that he would share
some ideas of how to fix the system. He would also share best practices on all aspects of
security with the field.
[U] Canavan said that the x-ray detection function was aboud bn a
good day. He stressed that he would tell the air carriers that' the better they paid their
people and the more incentives they provided to screeners.jhe better that checkpoint
•
screening performance would be. He found that in cases where screeners received better
pay and incentives for their work, they were over 90 percent effective which was good .
He pointed out that you can never get to 100 percent detection but that anything over 90
percent was pretty good.
[U] Canavan said that improved screeners pay would reduce turnover so you didn't have
.some "newby" conducting the screening. He stressed that in the final analysis the only
answer to the screening effectiveness issue is technology because "there aren't too many"
people who can do this day-in and day-out. Canavan said that he manned an x-ray screen
one time and he got bored, because it Was like running laps.
[U] Canavan said that the FAA's lab in Atlantic City was working on developing the
checkpoint technology of the future. He stressed that they were working to make the
CTX machines smaller and more effective. He used to tell his people that one day when
you walked up to the counter you would walk through two poles that would x-ray and
sniff you without you even knowing. Techn~.10gy would reduce the human factors which
are error-prone.
[U] He said that the benefit of rule making ~o impose screening company certification
pending prior to 9/11 is that it would have/allowed the FAA to fire the screening
company (because of the certification) .
• COM~ISSION
9/11
SSI
Closed
SENSITIVE
by Statute
3
•
~
Common Strategy:
4l' Canavan agreed that pre 9-11 we didn't have hardened cockpit doors or a domestic
air marshal program, which required that we relied on the common strategy to protect the
aircraft.
~ Canavan stated that a terrorist didn't need a box cutter to hijack a plane. You could
hold a ball point pen to a flight attendant's throat and tell the pilot to open the door and
they would open it because that was the strategy-to get the plane on the ground
somewhere and negotiate it out. The idea was to cooperate, get the plane on the ground
and go from there and hopefully it will tum out all right.
.f8'S1f Canavan remembered that there had been an effort to seek hardening of cockpit
doors but that the air carriers did not want this change because itadded weight and cost
money. He said that the security benefit he envisioned by the change would be to keep
someone from shooting through the door and to keep people out of the cockpit. He
indicated that rules required the pilot to keep the cockpit door closed and locked. By
hardening it you could protect it better (even though it went against the common
strategy). Canavan said that even though he and his people talked about reinforcing
cockpit doors, the issue was already decided by the time he got there and that the air
carriers just weren't going to accept it.
• Strategic Plan:
[U] Canavan said that when he took over as ACS 1 in December, in January he and his
top people got together and wrote a five-year strategic plan for aviation security. He said
that to his knowledge it was the first one that had ever been written. It included
objectives and tasks. Canavan said that when he went on the road, which he did a lot, he
would give two briefings. The first was on the strategic plan. The second was on
leadership. During the big weekly meeting he had, everyone would have to say where he
or she stood on the tasks associated with the strategic plan.
Aircraft as Weapons:
[U] Canavan does not remember talking a lot about aircraft as weapons. He said that,
historically, hijacking did not involve using aircraft as weapons. He said that he didn't
feel like we had won the hijacking battle. His biggest fear wasthatl
•
[U] To pull off 9-11 Canavan said that, the terrorists had to train as pilots, maintain
operational security, commandeer large aircraft, and coordinate all the flights to happen
in close proximity. He doesn't believe the terrorists would try to bring prohibited items
-sBT-
-sse-
through the checkpoint because it would jeopardize the entire plot unnecessarily. He
doesn't consider the plot a screening failure. He's not sure the FBI sufficiently examined
the people working at the airport who could have planted weapons. Canavan said that
they didn't discuss the need for a great domestic air marshal pro gram because the threat
was overseas. He cited the fact that there had been no hijackings in quite some time and
those that had occurred happened overseas.
Rulemaking
[U] Canavan was asked to address the high domestic threat level noted in the screener
certification rulemaking. He said that a draconian scenario was not necessary to get the
rule through. He wasn't sure if the threat level was actually what the FAA said it was but
that it didn't matter because his focus was on getting the rule through. The details of how
to do it didn't concern him. He wanted to lower the boom on the screening companies
because of their poor performance that was why they were pursuing the rulemaking. He
said that he wanted the ability to fire the screening companies because the air carriers
hired the lowest bidder.
[U] Canavan said that the security people at FAA were frustrated at how slow the
rulemaking process was and that the measures they advocated were killed by lobbyists.
He said that he doesn't remember Secretary Mineta ever telling him not to move forward
wi th something Canavan thought needed to be done.
[U] Canavan expressed frustration with an effort by L-3 Corporation to get the
government to buy poor-performing explosive detection systems. He said this effort was
aided by staffers who wrote into law a requirement that for every single Invision
purchased, the government would have to purchase an L-3 device which was "criminal."
[U] He said that in terms of hardened cockpit doors, hardened containers and the
screening rules, the air carriers would either delay or kill the reform.
Ie Liaisons
[U] Canavan doesn't remember hearing any problems about the ability of FAA's liaisons
with the IC to obtain the access and information they needed. He said he talked
personally to Cofer Black and Dale Watson and told them just to give FAA everything
that had anything to do with aviation. They agreed to do so. Canavan said he took it on
"good faith" that this was what was happening. He said he told his liaisons to be
aggressive, walk the halls and find out what they could. He said he didn't feel like he had
any blind spots domestically compared to internationally. He stressed that he knew the
IC leadership from his years as an Army General.
Canavan mentioned the ACS "road show" that the FAA gave to air carriers detailing the
heightened threat in the summer of 2001, which he said, was well received.
..,s-st-
. . .
•
~jI
TSA
L£8l1 Canavan said he wonders that now that the federal government has taken over the
screening function "who is regulating the regulators." He agrees with arming of pilots
because it is the last final measure to rotect the aircraft, if eople crash through the
General Aviation
[,SB1] He said that that while it's not a huge threat, it's out there and we should impose
prudent security measures at small GA airports, particularly in the area of credentialing to
be sure that people getting on the airplane are who they say they are.
Mission of the A VSEC system
[U] Canavan agreed with Irish Flynn that the system was built for the crazies and
criminals, but not really terrorists who could always find a way to defeat the system if
they real1y wanted to.
•
Veil of Mystery
[U] Canavan believes that we need to keep secret just how good screening technology is
to keep terrorists guessing. He agreed that we should make it tougher for terrorists to
observe checkpoint operations in order to learn how it functions, including its
vulnerabilities, and that "randomness" should be built into the system.
[U] Canavan noted that most terrorists are young, and that not too many older people get
involved in these activities.
Recommendations
[U] Canavan suggested that any operational changes (like the addition of flights) require
an analysis of the impact on security (security impact statement).
[U] Canavan said that the airline CEO's were elated when Mineta told them that the
federal government would be taking over screening.
[U] Canavan said there should be one person in charge of security at airports. He
suggested that it ought to be the airport manager, as is the case in Europe.
[U] He said the important aspect with checkpoints is to make sure screeners, whether
•
TSA or not, have a career track. Training should be flexible to ensure that people can be
trained to address emerging new threats. We should get the best technology possible.
-ssr-
[U] Canavan said that with respect to personnel, accountability is very important. He
supports Red Teams because they give the system an honest look.
~He said we need a good study on which to base the number of federal air marshals
we really need. He likes computer-based training, which he found to be effective. He
supports increasing the number of bomb-sniffing dogs.
[U] Canavan liked the idea of requiring air carrier's corporate boards to have a security
committee, like they have audit committees and compensation committees etc.
[SSI] He also believes the flight attendants should be trained in defensive tactics.
[U] He said we should be careful of how FAM's respond to drunks so they do not expose
themselves prematurely to the real terrorists on board.
[U] Canavan stressed that we need to focus on immigration and customs which is part of
the problem as well.
~S8l-
UNCLASSIFIED
Commission Sensitive
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Eastern Region

Type of event: Interview with Ron Ruggeri
Date: Wednesday, December 17, 2003
Special Access Issues: ID Check
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: 1 Aviation Plaza, Jamaica,NY 11434
Participants - Non-Commission: Mary McCarthy (Office of Regional Counsel, Eastern
Region, FAA - One Aviation Plaza, RM 561, Jamaica, NY 11434: P 718-553-3259, F
718-995-5699)
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Farmer, John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown
Note: Please refer to the interview recording for further details.
Background:
Ruggeri started with the FAA in December of 1975.
He first became a regional representative in June of 1989. He was a Quality Assurance

Staff Manager on September 11, 2001 (9/11). In February of2003 he became Division
Branch Manager for Air Traffic Operations.
The Quality Assurance (QA) staff manager reviews all accidents, incidents, operational
errors (deviations, loss of separation), Freedom of Information Requests (FOIRs), and all
review of air traffic services. The regional QA office supports the field work of different
facilities' QA offices, just as the Regional Office supports the air traffic centers and
facilities.
Ruggeri had only three specialists (one of which was Larry Cunningham) in QA
underneath his authority on 9/11. Their role was to support his work, but they did not
work with the field offices to compile materials for the 9/11 accident packages.
The 8020 11 FAA manual details what is required of QA representatives in their

investigations of air traffic incidents.
Accident Package:
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
•
The last facility that-spoke with an aircraft is responsible for compiling the accident
package. That package is held and reviewed at the region. The originals are kept at the
locations that bandIed the aircraft. The final accident package is sent to Headquarters.
The 9111 packages were handled slightly differently. The packages were split between
the Great Lakes, Eastern and New England regions due to the level of work involved in
the task.
9111 :
Ruggeri's pager read "AA 11 hijacked, and coming your way." He saw that and
forwarded the page to the managers of New York Air Route Control Center (ZNY) and
New York TRCON (N90). Both those facilities had received the information already. He
received that page from his counterpart in New England, Tom Benson. Ruggeri was in
his office and sent the information to Frank Hatfield and Rich Ducharme.
He received a call from a general aviation pilot who was a construction worker in lower
Manhattan through a female worker at the Automated Flight Service Station in Islip. The
pilot had called an 800 number that connected him to an information line for pilots to
receive weather updates through the FAA. The caller informed Ruggeri that a 767 had
'.
struck the WTC.
Ruggeri informed Ducharme of this information. Ruggeri went to the ROC (Regional
Operations Center) and Ducharme went to check the television. Ruggeri worked to set up
the Crisis Command Center, and could see smoke from the windows of the conference
room he was in. Ruggeri began calling various facilities to construct a working picture of
what was ongoing,
Ruggeri called the watch desk at ZNY, and was informed from Bruce Barrett that the
impact was a terrorist event. Barrett checked a Situational Display per Ruggeri's request
.to locate AA 11, and it showed AA 11 in Whiskey 105 but on a coast track (since the
computer was searching for the target, and projecting its flight path).
Within minutes of these events there were FBI Agents assigned to Kennedy Airport,
specificall~ I at the Region's office. Flight standards, flight surgeon, air
traffic, a~r'ways facIlItIes, security and legal were all present at the Crisis Center.
After.the impact of United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175), the number of possible
hijacked airplanes within the system grew to include upto twelve suspected hijacked
aircraft.
"During this time period the Crisis Center was receiving ongoing reports on aircraft that
were suspected of being hijacked, He spoke with John Hendershot at Dulles Tower, and
Ruggeri could hear in the background a voice saying the White House should be
e/ i
evacuated; he continued listening to the background of the phone-line with Hendershot
UNCLASSIFIED
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
UNCLASSIFIED
and heard that the aircraft struck the Pentagon. Hendershot had a line open to Washington
National Airport and to the Secret Service.
AAT20 (investigations and allegations), Doug Gould, Tony Ferrany, and Tony Mello
were all involved in receiving information and radar/voice data from Ruggeri on 9/11.
In order to get this information to the higher FAA ranks Ruggeri trusted that those people
at headquarters he was passing information to would pass the information on to a higher
level.
Flow of information:
Ruggeri noted that the information he received was verified through his own channels
before he passed it along to headquarters. He also noted that there were FBI agents at the
headquarters who, when they received information, would call back to the Region to
verify that information. So to his understanding there were dual channels to filter the
accuracy of information that was being produced.
Ruggeri noted that the Region does ideally act as a funnel for information between the
facilities and headquarters, but at times depending on the situation headquarters may
bypass the region for expediency.
Identity of aircraft:
Regarding the first impact, Ruggeri received information from the construction worker
whose phone call he received. Boston Air Route Control Center (ZBW) informed him
that they had lost contact with two of their air carriers. Ruggeri initially thought it must
have been a small plane that struck the north tower. Ruggeri noted that this belief
changed when he saw the damage from outside the office window and he could see the
smoke coming from the tower, he knew that the aircraft that caused that damage could
not have been a small general aviation aircraft.
Regarding AA 77 and UAL 93, Ruggeri commented that they did not have an immediate
knowledge of the flights' identities.
Ruggeri did not recall any knowledge of Tom White's efforts on 9/11 to build radar data
from New York TRACON (N90) on the aircraft that hit the World Trade Center (WTC).
Nor did he have any knowledge of a Sikorski helicopter striking the WTC. Nor did he
have any knowledge ofELTs on 9/11. Ruggeri noted that they did receive requests from
the New York Police Department (NYPD) to analyze radar data and located one of their
helicopters in the vicinity of the WTC the morning of 9/1 1.
After further questioning Ruggeri rioted there was what he remembers to be an IBM
helicopter that dropped off passengers .and returned north on the morning of 9/11. There
was a thought that that helicopter might have hit the WTC, or that the helicopter was
monitoring what occurred with malicious intent. And that is why the Region was asked
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
by the FBI to analyze the data surrounding this helicopter. His recollection is that this
matter was quickly dismissed, and did not contribute to a rumor that three aircraft struck
the WTC;
Ruggeri recalled no information that would have led the Region to believe that AA 11
"was still airborne after 8:46 AM.
Commission staff presented Ruggeri with a time line document to review that is labeled
"AAL I11N334AA" on the upper right comer. Ruggeri noted that the "1200" code is
general aviation that is not being controlled by air traffic. His opinion was that the
time line display attempts to recreate the radar picture on the morning of 9/11 to account
for any transponder changes that may have occurred aboard AA 11 and VAL 175.
Telephone conferences:
The Regional Telecom was staffed by Rich Ducharme, and served the purpose of
gathering information from the facilities, and communicating back to the facilities the
need to remain calm. All facilities were on monitoring this line.
The telecoms were on open speaker phones, but could be picked up for security reasons.
Aftermath:
Ruggeri noted that now there are satellite phones at all the major FAA facilities. There is
a function on some of these phones to allow immediate access to certain phone bridges.
Ruggeri also noted that the Crisis Command Center should be fully ready to use at all
times since it took more than two hours to fully create the Crisis Center on 9/11. Ruggeri
noted that the backup site for the Region is at ZNY.
Ruggeri commented that there are not practice runs conducted to train for setting up the
Crisis Center.
Record of events:
Ruggeri commented that immediately on 9/11 FAA Headquarters began" asking for
voicetapes. ZBW digitized the voicetapes from the flights, and then transferred the
digitized recordings directly to Ruggeri. Ruggeri passed this information to FAA
Headquarters. This recording is compiled from the real to real tapes, and then transferred
to a digital audio recording. Ruggeri heard the threatening voices from this recording, and
gave that information to the FBI. Ruggeri commented that he received the digital
recordings from ZBW later in the day of 9/11.
Each division had a log of what was ongoing. He noted to Commission staff that in the
Crisis Command Center there was most likely someone taking notes on what was going"
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
•
on. Ruggeri noted that the security log in particular was detailed. Ruggeri has never seen
any of these logs after 911l.
McCarthy noted that until recently there was an FAA Historian that operated out of
Washington Headquarters.
Ruggeri noted that Sue Zurilo kept a record from the Crisis Center on 9/11.
Military notification:
Ruggeri commented that he has never notified the military personally, but that all the
facilities now have direct lines to the military. He also noted that he believed there were
"push-button" lines that linked to the air defense operations from the facilities when he
was a controller.
Lufthansa:
Ruggeri was the assistant air traffic manager at Kennedy Airport, and was on the air
traffic telecom. His supervisor, Jimmy Jackson, received a page that they had a hijacked
aircraft. Ruggeri brought the FBI officers who arrived to the Tower to the operations
desk. Ruggeri patched the FBI into a call to the Luftahansa hijacker. They established
communications and the FBI agents spoke with the hijacker for the rest of the event.
• Recommendations:
Ruggeri noted that he believes aircraft should not be allowed to fly along the Hudson
channel. He noted that for upcoming events there should be better security. Secret
Service makes a request to the military SpecialOperations and the FAA, and works to
accommodate both their customers and the need for security.
Ruggeri noted the importance of communications for both the upper levels of authority
and for public notice. The FAA discovered later on that certain equipment (Nextel phones
and satellite phones) are necessary in the case of an emergency.
Ruggeri also noted that there currently is no method to insure their employees can travel
to their FAA facilities for continuity of air space traffic flow in the case of an emergency.
Ruggeri further noted a high concern of the lack of security over general aviation flights.
He thinks the airspace restrictions and expanded radar coverage should be examined to
account for this, especially over threatened sites. In this context, Ruggeri noted that there
are over 250 aircraft ports within the immediate airspace vicinity of New York City.
Threatened points:
• 9/11 Closed by Statute
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
•
I 9/11 Closed by Statute
Hypothesis on UAL 93:
Ruggeri noted that he holds the belief that the hijackers ofUAL 93 overheard a FAA
controller mentioning there was "something" approaching VAL 93's location "moving
quickly", and that the hijackers thought this was a military response. Thus the hijackers
crashed the aircraft .
• Commission Sensitive
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Type of event: Interview with Richard J. Ducharme
Date: Wednesday, December 17,2003
Team Number: 8
Location: 1 Aviation Plaza, Jamaica, NY 11434
Participants - Non-Commission: Mary McCartney. McCarthy (Office of Regional
Counsel, Eastern Region, FAA - One Aviation Plaza, RM 561, Jamaica, NY 11434: P
718-553-3259, F 718-995-5699)
Note: The majority of this interview was not recorded, per the request of the interviewee.
Background:
Ducharme started with the FAA in 1982 at Logan International Airport. In 1991 he came
to the Eastern Region. In 1993 he went to Dulles Airport as the Assistant Air Traffic
Manager. In 1995 he went to Philadelphia as the Air Traffic Manager. In 1999 he
returned to the Region as Chief of Staff. In 2001 he became Assistant Division Manager,
and in 2003 was promoted to Division Manager.
Ducharme is currently Manager (AEA-500) of FAA Eastern Region Air Traffic Division.
On September 11,2001 (9/11) he was Assistant Air Traffic Division Manager.
Pre 9/11:
Ducharme noted that losing a transponder signal or having a NORDO flight was not
completely uncommon prior to 9111; thus it was not the first time the military authorities
had been notified of these factors.
9/11 :
Ducharme was in charge of the division since Frank Hatfield wasQHe received a
page informing him ofa potential hijack out of Logan Airport. Ro~~i informed
him that a twin-engine aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. He called McCormack at
ZNY for information on the hijack of AA 11, and McCormack informed him that AA 11
lJNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
was on a coast track over the Atlantic. Ducharme realized AA 11 had struck the WTC,
and he acted to form the Crisis Command Center.
Ducharme paged Hatfield, who arrived within twenty-five minutes and took control of
the "bridge". Ducharme asked Sue Zurlo to record the actions that took place from the
CCC. He also set up John McCartney on a field telecom, to help facilitate the shut down
of airspace. McCartney checked on all the towers, and wanted an information bridge to
the facilities. Louis Ramirez from ZDC called to inform him that their airspace was
shutting down. Ducharme noted this was well before the Pentagon was struck.
Ducharme first thought that it was an event like the Egyptian Airlines hijacking. After
roughly twenty five minutes Ducharme asked the regional administrator to remove
anyone from the room who did not have top secret clearance.
Most of the telecom interaction over the course of the next twenty-four hours dealt
directly with denying aircraft flight privileges.
Ducharme noted that there were many requests from different offices to fly helicopters
and they denied those requests.
FBI, NYPD, PAPD, FAA Security were all at the Region on 9/11 and during the days
following. Most of these agencies Ducharme could only brief when he had the time to,
but were not the most helpful. The FBI was looking for the SATORI recording and the
voice tapes, but he did not have the authority to release it. When it was cleared as a
criminal event, he was able to release the information they requested.
Ducharme also noted that the threatening communication from AA 1 was posted onthe
FAA intranet after 1 PM the afternoon of the attacks. .
United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175):
A call had been received by "someone from the back" that there was a possible second
hij acking. He remembered the wording "We have another one coming down the river" -
referring to VAL 175 traveling low over the Hudson River.
Ducharme was on the telecom, and saw VAL 175 strike the south tower. Itwas at this
point that Ducharme knew definitively that it was not an accident. Some in the room
thought it was a reply of the first impact, but Ducharme recognized it had different colors
than an American Airlines flight.
AA 77:
Ducharme remembered receiving a call that informed him that John Hendershot, the
supervisor at Dulles Approach, had a flight on scope moving towards Washington, D.C.
He was advised shortly thereafter that the Pentagon had been hit.
COMMISSION SENSrlTVE
UN·CLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Ducharme recalled there was confusion over the location of AA 77, and that it
contributed to part of the frustration identifying the flight.
Iden tifying aircraft:
Ducharme noted that estimating speed and size on a primary target is possible if watching
Terminal radar (which monitors airspace differently than radar used for Center airspace).
The Terminal radar is designed for lower altitude whereas the Center radar is designed
for higher altitudes.
Ducharme also noted that at higher altitudes the controller expects to monitor high
performance aircraft.
Ducharme noted that they had received a report that a general aviation twin-engine
aircraft had struck the WTC, but in regard to the report of a Sikorski helicopter that
struck the north tower, Ducharme commented that he is confidant there was no Sikorski
reported from Eastern Region Air Traffic the afternoon of 9/11.
Threatening communication:
Ducharme noted that the threatening communication from AA 11 heard by ZBW would
be difficult for a controller to discern immediately, and gave credit to Pete Zalewski for
doing so.
National ATC Zero:
Ducharme noted that it is easier to land all aircraft once departures are stopped. He also
noted that redirecting flights to available airports assisted -this process.
Conference calls:
The FAA Headquarters telecom had Dave Spreg, Bill Peacock, Bill Buck, David
Cannoles, and every Center and TRACON was monitoring that call. He also noted that
Colonel Sharon Atkins, the FAA liaison, may have been on this call. Ducharme noted
that Cleveland Center and Kansas City joined the conference call, and he was told that
Pittsburg Tower was evacuated though this line.
Ducharme commented that Marcus Aurora, who worked on coordinating security matters
for the Region on 9/11, built a separate conference call from a separate conference room.
Ducharme noted that one of the difficulties they had on 9/11 was thaton the Air Traffic
side under his authority' his staff spoke in air traffic language, including speaking in Zulu
timeframes. Ducharme further noted that there were parties who were involved who were
not from the air traffic community that did not understand the language and reported
inaccurately to their superiors.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Ducharme noted that the Air Traffic role on 9111 was to shut the air traffic system down.
But on the FAA Tactical Net requests were coming through for flights to be cleared for
passage. They made the decision to leave one person monitoring that line (Marcus
Aurora), but for the most part ignored it so they could concentrate on refining accurate
information.
Ducharme explained that there is protocol in place for the air traffic side to specifically
speak with operational air traffic controllers. On 9111 Headquarters created one Air
Traffic Control telecom with all the regions. This bridge was the one monitored by
Ducharme and Hatfield. Ducharme would get approvals directly from Dave .Spreg for
flights in the days following 9/11. They had Peacock, AT1, on the line. John White, Jack
Keys or Linda Shusler were all on this line at one point or another.
He also noted that the confusion that is recorded in thetranscripts reviewed by

Commission staff does not reflect the conversations and passage of information that
occurred on the Headquarters Air Traffic telecom.
Other aircraft:
Ducharme noted that after the National Airspace was shut down, the Region had to
handle denying overseas requests for transit. After 48 hours most of the requests he
received was for wavers.
Record:
Ducharme noted that the timeline labeled "Chronology of Events" provided to

Commission staff by the FAA was compiled through the Region.
Ducharme noted that the lines from the Crisis Command Center were not recorded on
9111.
Miltaryl FAA
Ducharme noted that there is greater mutual respect between the military and FAA post
9111. Ducharme further stated that he would like to have qualified military operation
specialists budgeted for. He stated that those positions were cut due to funding constraints
on September 2, 1998. Ducharme commented that the MOS went from an important
position to non-existent. He further commented that not every facility needs them, but
oceanic operations definitely do.
Recommendation:
Ducharme commented that the parochialism between the agencies needs to be bridged.
He, further commented that many of the agency representatives do not understand air
traffic terminology, but do not trust the air traffic staff to inform them of necessary
COMMISSION SENSrrrVE
UNCLASSIFIED
UN CLAS SIFIED
information. Thus Ducharme suggested all the intelligence agencies have a dedicated
aviation team.
Ducharme has created two "Go teams": each has five on it, and they will operate in
rotation. He has cut out all the non-essentials from these teams.
COTvIMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLl\SSIFED

Type of event: Interview with John McCartney
Date: Wednesday, December 17,2003
Team Number: 8
Location: 1 Aviation Plaza, Jamaica, NY 11434
Participants - Non-Commission: Mary McCartney. McCarthy (Office of Regional
Counsel, Eastern Region, FAA - One Aviation Plaza, RM 561, Jamaica, NY 11434: P
718-553-3259, F 718-995-5699)
Background:
McCartney started with the FAA in December of 1981 with Los Angeles TRACON. In
1987he became a supervisor at Coast TRACON. He was there until 1991. He worked as
a project manager consolidating southern Californian TRACONs after that. In 1995 he
became Assistant Air Traffic Manager at John Wayne Tower. In September of 1998 he
-became Operations Branch Manager Eastern Region for the Air Traffic Division. He is
currently Assistant Air Traffic Manager for the Eastern Region.
The operations branch of the Eastern Region FAA handles procedures between different
facilities. They coordinate the sequencing and flow of air traffic. They also deal with
military operations coordination. Further, the operations branch is responsible for
coordination between facilities and branches. In this capacity, they focus on applying new
procedures and changes to the use of air traffic flows to accommodate new priorities.
Chain of Command on 9/11:
McCartney reported to Rick DuCharme and, above DuCharme, Frank Hatfield. On 9/11
Hatfield was the Air Traffic Division Manager. The Centers were under DuCharme's
responsibility, as well as Kennedy and LaGuardia Towers. Hatfield's direct report would
have been to AA T2 (Deputy Director of Air Traffic Services), who may have been Jeff
Griffith, according to McCartney. The AAT (Director of Air Traffic Services) on 9111
may have been Ron Morgan or Bill Peacock, according to McCartney. They would report
up to ATS 1 and ATS2, and they would report to the Administrator of the FAA.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFED
The Eastern Region security representative may have been Marcus Aurora, Division
Manager for Security or Dominic Festa, who reported to Aurora.
Umbrella of the Eastern Region: Eastern Region includes New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and West Virginia. This also includes
Washington, D.C. The airspace itself overlays state boundaries, dictated by radar
coverage.
Procedures in the case of an air event:
The Regional office's main conference room becomes a Crisis Command Center in the
case of an air emergency. There are communication lines and television feeds in this
room.
McCartney would be notified through the operations center. They have an on call air
traffic Quality Assurance (QA) specialist at all times. That person starts a chain of
contacts. Certain incidents require a fact finding process beforehand, but in the case of a
hijack the chain would begin immediately.
There is an Operations Center within the Eastern Region offices that is notified through
the QA officer at the facilities.
Operationally, in the case of 9111, the operations center notifies their in-building
management chain. That management chain notifies the Operations Center of the Eastern
Region, and then the Operations Center notifies the appropriate people in the Region
offices. The Operations Center is basically a notification center.
Pre 9/11 procedure for requesting military assistance:
McCartney noted he was not very familiar with the proper procedures to request military
assistance in the case of a hij ack. His role as a branch manager would be to locate
interpretations of the handbook's set procedures.
This would be handled real time on the tactical side of the FAA operations floors.
McCartney described his role in this process as "support to the field".
9/11:
McCartney was preparing for a staff meeting, and took a phone call from Mike
McCormack. McCartney's first reaction was puzzled as to how an aircraft on a clear day
could hit the World Trade Center (WTC). He immediately was told there were other
possible in air hijacks from the phone call from McCormack. McCormack gave
McCartney follow up information that the first aircraft may not have beenAA 11 because
they were tracking another hij acked aircraft. McCormack was attempting to confirm
which aircraft had initially struck the WTC. The sequence of understanding that
COMMISSION SENSrITVE .
UN-CLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFED
McCartney had was initially a General Aviation (GA) aircraft, then realized that the
events were caused by two commercial airliners. McCartney recalled sharing all the
information he was given by McCormack to Hatfield, and that this passing of information
happened sometime between AA 11 and UAL 175's collisions into the WTC.
Rick DtrCharme, according to McCartney, brought the Regional Administrator, Arlene

Feldman, into the Crisis Center, which, as noted before, is mobilized in the case of an air
emergency.
Air traffic, flight standards, airways facilities, flight surgeons and the security division
were all present. When it was determined that someone had no role to play, that person
was asked to leave. There was no military liaison out of the Regional Offices. McCartney
noted to Commission staff that he does not know if a log exists of who was present in this
Crisis Room. He did note that there was a running log for the air traffic division, which
he believed was already provided to the Commission.
McCartney had the responsibility for bringing appropriate parties into the Crisis Room to
help facilitate DuCharme and Hatfield's efforts.
Sikorski helicopter:
McCartney "noted that he originally believed that it might have been a GA small aircraft
that struck the north tower, but that the understanding that it was a commercial airliner,
probably a 767, developed before UAL 175 impacted the Trade Center. McCartney noted
that McCormack's call helped validate this, despite the initial uncertainty.
Phantom AA 11:
McCartney noted to Commission staff that he never heard that AA 11 was still airborne
after 8:46 AM on 9/11, and that he only heard confirmation that it was AA 11 that struck
the north tower.
Tactical net and primary net:
McCartney noted that the telecom in the Crisis Center he participated in was an air traffic
telecom with headquarters and the command center at Herndon; Frank Hatfield and Rick
DuCharme participated in this call. McCartney noted that they also took questions from
other telecoms and attempted to inform those questions from the information being
passed through the air traffic telecom. As the hij acking unfolded, this telecom was
established to maintain focus. New England Region would be on this telecom.
McCartney noted that he believes Herndon was on this line as well. McCartney noted as
well that he believes the Crisis Center Headquarters telecom that Hatfield and DuCharme
were manning might have had David Cannoles on it.
McCartney commented that it was unclear to him if this conference call was referred to
as the FAA Tactical Net. After reviewing the Position 14 Transcript presented to him by
lJNCLASSTFTED
UNCLASSIFED
Commission staff, McCartney noted that since the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
is noted on that Net, it was most likely not the Headquarters telecom established in the
Eastern Region Crisis Center. McCartney also noted that the Tactical Net may have been
dialed into from the Crisis Center.
Afterthat telecom was established there was an Eastern Region conference telecom set
up in a separate conference room that established an air traffic bridge for all the facilities.
This bridge was used to give clear directions during the shut down of the air traffic
system (ATC Zero, the national ground stop). Information on individual flight status was
passed on this call. McCartney noted that this was the route for real time information. He
noted this was established after the Pentagon was struck. New York Center was on this
call, and was also on the telecom in the crisis room.
McCartney noted that there were telecoms for security and airways facilities. All the
telecoms were eventually narrowed down to two or three, according to McCartney.
McCartney noted at some point in this sequence Pittsburg Tower was evacuated.
McCartney noted that after the second night they cut the telecoms down to two lines in
the same room.
Recorded lines:
McCartney noted that Tom Trebiano, the Operations Center Manager, may be able to tell
Commission staff which lines were recorded on 9/11.
After-action report:
A continuity of operations lessons-learned assessment was done by the Crisis Center

operators post the 9/11 attacks. This focused on an assessment of communications, and
an evaluation of how the actual equipment functioned.
McCartney noted to Commission staff that the investment in the DEN line most likely
came from FAA lessons-learned conversations; though he did not believe that these
discussions were held at the Regional level; and commented that they were probably
decisions made at Headquarters.
The need to have certain frequencies and communications established to the military was
recognized after 9/11. This led to establishing lines like the direct lines at the centers to
Northeastern Aerospace Defense Sector (NEADS).
Radar at region:
The Region has a Traffic Situational Display with an update rate of once "every two or
three" minutes. This is used as a traffic flow tool, not as a real time tool. It is fed·
information from Herndon Command Center.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFED
Advisories:
McCartney has responsibility for security briefings. McCartney also noted that he
remembered being at New York Center on the midnight shift at the Millennium. He
described this experience as more focused on the security aspects of and preparation for
possible computer failures as opposed to terrorist threats. He did not recall any briefings
out of the ordinary that urged more awareness regarding terrorism in the months
preceding the 9/11 attacks.
Aftermath:
McCartney noted that involvement with the military operations and special operations
has developed a more active, cooperative and better relationship. McCartney also noted
that there is a greater understanding on the FAA side of the importance of the military
mission domestically.
McCartney commented that in bargaining over airspace, there is now much more
cooperation to allow a solution that accommodates the Department of Defense (DoD).
McCartney noted that they have had briefings on the development of the F-22, so the
FAA can anticipate accommodating the need for airspace testing this aircraft involves.
McCartney noted there are also declassified briefings on the air defense missions of
NORAD.
Assessments are made after exercises and training missions on both the FAA and the
military side. These efforts are meant to continually refine their relationship and their
ability to communicate.
He also noted as an example that there is a relationship now with the NYPD to help
secure the airspace over the United Nations.
McCartney noted that the relationship between the Region and the Centers is roughly the
same as it Was prior to 9111. He commented that there is an increased awareness of their
mission to be more cooperative over airspace.
Regarding hijack response, McCartney noted that at the controller level there has been a
refinement of what the level of suspicion is, as well as a more clear set of notifications
established to the proper authorities.
COMMISSION SENSI'TIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
Event: Follow up visit to FAA
Type of event: Site visit to listen to audio tapes.
Date: June 12, 2003
Special Access Issues: We cannot have the tapes unless the communications with pilots (i. e. air-
ground, ground-air) are somehow removed.
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Building, L'Enfant Plaza
Participants - Non-Commission: Doug Gould, Lab Technician; Anthony Ferrante; and Shirley
Miller
Participants - Commission: Miles Kara
(FOUO) This was a planned visit to listen to background conversations previously heard on
FAA tapes of controller activities on 9111/0 1. FAA advised that it could make available, without
recourse to either DoJ or FBI, transcripts of what it terms "interphone" conversations, that is
conversations that do not involve communication with airplane crews.
(FOUO) Explanatory Information. FAA made available the conversations of three positions
concerning American Airlines Flight 11. Those three entities are: 1) the Military Operations
Specialist position; 2) the Radar Associate position; and 3)the Supervisory Traffic Management
Coordinator position. The radar associate sits in tandem with the radar controller in order to
handle activities that might otherwise distract the controller from his primary duty.
(FOUO) Following in chronological order is a summary of conversations made available on tape

by FAA. Each of the three tapes listened to contained an oral certification by the Boston Center
that the tapes were a true and complete transcription of recorded conversations. (Times noted
below are approximate within 5 seconds and are all EDT.)
At 8:27 :48 the Supervisory Traffic Management Coordinator (STMC) initiated a call to the
ATCSCC at Herndon, Virginia and reported a developing situation with American Air 11.
Boston Center believed the situation to be a possible hijacking, and had heard threatening
language in the background.
At 8:29 :00, as part of the same conversation, Herndon "sees him" on its scope and advises that a
heads up needs to be given to New York and Cleveland.
•
At 8 :29:35 the STMC initiated a call to Cleveland Center and informed it that American Air 11
was not transponding and they did not know where it was going .
At 8 :30:40, as part of the same conversation, Cleveland was told that it could "tag" AA 11 on its
Traffic Situation Display (TSD) as primary only.
At 8:32:57 the Radar Associate told Sector 47 (adjacent sector) that there was no contact with
AA 11 and that they believed there was some one in the cockpit, but did not have anymore
information.
At 8:34:31 the STMC called Cape TRACON and asked if it was able to talk to Otis, that there
was a situation with AA 11 and that there was a need to scramble some fighters. The wor) hijack
was not used.
At 8:34:55 the Radar Associate told Sector 47 that there was no verification of AA 11's altitude.
At 8:35: 13 the STMC called Cape Approach and informed it of a possible hijacking and was told
that Cape Approach would talk to Otis, "will talk to the guys here." Cape Approach asked for
clarification if AA 11 was on the ground in Albany and was told "no."
At 8:35 :44 the Radar Associate told Kennedy that AA 11 was over Kingston, that there was some
possible problem, and that AA 11 was not talking to anyone.
••
At 8:36:47 the Radar Associate told Kennedy that no one had talked to AA] 1 in the last 20
minutes
At 8:37:26 the Radar Associate told Kennedy that they had heard threatening transmissions and
to keep other aircraft away from AA 11, that something was going on.
At 8:37:53 the Military Operations Specialist initiated a conversation with the Northeast Air
Defense Sector (NEAD), the same conversation transcribed by the Weapons Section, NEAD and
that involved Major Dawn Deskins. The FAA time stamp is within a few seconds of the NEAD
time stamp, an approximate 15 second variation.
Note: the NEAD tape beginning at 8:39:45 was lost in transcription on 9/21101. The existence of
this FAA tape makes up for that loss for the period 8:39:45 - 8:41 :42. That period accounts for
Major Deskins trying to establish a location for AA 11 and confirms that she is talking to Joe
Coope1 I.
At 8:,48:06 and continuing until 8:51: 14 the Military Operations Specialist is working to get a
warning order issued for all military traffic in the NE sector. [Presumably this is precursor work
to clearing air space for the Otis fighters. The taped conversations were cryptic and hard to
understand.]
...At 8:52:04 the Military Operations Specialist again talks to the Weapons Section, NEAD, and is
/: told that Otis fighters were scrambled at 8:46 and that they will be under FAA control.
Follow-up. FAA has notified Boston Center to prepare a transcript of the above "interphone"
conimunications and is anticipating a document request something like the following:
"Transcript of all interphone communications at all FAA locations involved in the control of
American Air 11, United Air 175, American Air 77, and United Air 93." FAA understands that
the inclusion of American Air 77, for which there are no such conversations, is for the purpose of
obtaining a statement in writing that such was the case.
For Official Use Only
UNCLASSIFIED
Event: FAA Operations Center Visit
Type of event: Site Visit
Date: 6/4/2003
Team Number: 7
Location: FAA HQs
Participants - Non-Commission: (SEE ATTACHED PARTICIPANT ROSTER)
Participants - Commission: John Raidt

Meeting began approx. 1:00 pm
--FAA now doing a chronology of events/actions for Mineta's CoS: Flaherty
--No tape or video in Ops Center on 9-11.
--No butcher block paper in the FAA Ops Center for note taking as previously thought.
Butcher block paper was in an ad hoc workplace called the Security Directive Working
Room in the FAA bldg. third floor. Chuck Burke was in charge of that Room on 9/11.
(NOTE: FAA will provide list of people in both the FAA Ops Center and the Sec. Dir.
Working Room).
--Ops Center (a.k.a.) Washington Operations Complex (WOC) is linked to the nine
regional operations centers.
--The ACC (aviation control center)-used solely for aviation hijackings.
--FAA is now tied 24 hours a day by telephone to local law enforcement.
--Shirley Miller and Belger were in the VlOe the entire time.
on the 10th Floor, either in their office or in the WOC, throughout the day.
~-Garvey wasn't in the building when the events first started to unfold but once she
arrived she too spent her time either in her to" Floor office or in the WOC.
--Various centers activated on 9-11 Commission

*FAA Ops Center
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
*The ACC (Aviation Control Center)

*Security Directive Working Room
*9 Regional Office Ops Centers
*Command Center in Herndon facility
*Do T Crisis Management Center
FAA PARTICIPANTS: CURRENT JOB 9111 JOB

NAME
Lindy Knapp Dep. Gen. Counsel and
F AAlDo T liaison to
Commission
Mike Morse Special Assist ot ACS

operations
Shirley Miller Assistant to Belger
Lynne Osmus
Linda Schuessler Herndon Center
Anthony Ferrante ATC investigator
J. David Canoles ATC investigator
Mae Avery Manager of Ops. Center Manager of Ops. Center
Peter Lynch
Doug Gould FAA Lab/Radar
interpretation technician
--Process for alerting system to trouble: ATC notifies SUPERVISOR; SUPERVISOR

notifies REGIONAL OPS CENTER; REGIONAL OPS CENTER notifies FAA
WASHINGTON OPERATIONS COMPLEX and Herndon Command Center. The
airlines were notified by their representatives at Herndon, but they were also in contact
with FAA Civil Aviation Security officials. .
--The 9-11 "Phone Bridge" was set up by FAA. Lee Longmire, now at TSA, was in
charge of 9/11 phone bridge.
--There were two phone "NETS:" Primary Net: Linked everyone that was vital.
Secondary N et: FAA Internal phone link.
--F AA reports that most of the information about what happened that day was transferred
to TSA, to NTSB or to the FBI.
--FAA reports that there was NO recording of the Phone Bridge.

(NOTE: Ken Mead says he heard in a meeting with the Sec/CoS Flaherty/Staff that there
was a recording and that it was sent to DoJ).
--On 9/11 only the WOC was permanently staffed and only by two "Full-Performance
Level" (FPL) officers per shift. Now both WOC and ACC are staffed 24 hours a day.
UNCLASSIFIED
9(1,1 Working-level Employee
•
UNCLASSIFIED
--New)~ngland1E~,~tern/Great Lakes: Regional offices that joined in the 9-11 Net.
--Air Forcd ·····'l¥ilta liaisr to the FAA on 9-11 and currently

~~TE: Put on Interview list)- rrived about an hour after FAA stood up for the
CrISIS.
--Herndon Center manages the overall NAS-National Air Space; Linda Schuessler or
John White was on the phone with "Doug" from NORAD on the morning of9/11.
=Two FAA centers thought they might be targeted and sought to evacuate, including
Boston and Pittsburgh. The evacuation order was countermanded by AT Control
headquarters at the FAA.
--Shirley Miller was with Monte Belger and Jane Garvey all day on 9-11.
=Bcston Center is located in Nashua, NH
--ATC radio contacts: There is no way to know if a transmission is coming from a

particular aircraft, unless the individual transmitting declares who they are.
•
--FAA said that Boston Center declared a hijacking in progress at 8:25 am at which time
FAA headquarters is notified.
--Someone in the meeting mentioned a "Domestic Event Network which grew out of the
experience of 9/11 and includes TSA, ATC and regional operations centers
--Prior to 9-11 there were no procedures for contacting NORAD even if a hijacking is
declared; no transponder; no radio contact; course deviation. .
--First call to NORAD was from Boston Center to OTIS AFB between 8:30-8:34 a.m.
The supervisor was being "entrepreneurial."
--It was the National Military Command Center's (NMCC) responsibility to contact
NORAD to provide surveillance NOT INTERDICTION.
(NOTE: Did NMCC contact NORAD? How and when?)
--Controller in NY Center received a message for UAL 175 saying they heard a
suspicious transmission from AA11. FAA says the controller notified the supervisor
(NOTE: Get the time of this exchange and confirm the timelactions of the controller and
supervisor).
--Air Transport Association (AT A) has people permanently stationed at the various
•
Operations Centers and at Herndon.
(NOTE: Get all communications between these individuals and AT A re: 9-11).
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
FLIGHT 77
--8 :51 a.m. still normal communications between ATC andAA 77.
--There are two discrete communication systems on board commercial flights

1) Radio contact between Airplanes and FAA (as well as other aircraft), and 2) Text
message system (ACARS) between the Airline's Flight Ops Center and the aircraft.
(NOTE: Get all communications between the AIRLINE and the AIRCRAFT for 9-11)
--There are two ATC radar signatures for a contact: Primary: (which was just a
blip/unidentified) and Secondary: (picks up alpha-numeric info from the transponder on
the aircraft providing ill/Flight direction! Altitude/Airspeed.
--8:56 am FAA loses primary and secondary track from Flight ,AA77; Indianapolis Center
tracking the flight: Indianapolis notifies Great Lakes (Chicago) of a possible accident of
AA 77; Great Lakes sends out a message to local law enforcement and others to look for a
downed plane; the message goes to, among others, the Sheriff s office in Ashland, KY.
--FAA was told by a sheriff in Ashland, KY that 77 had crashed in Kentucky which was
why they weren't looking for the flight. (The sheriffwas responding based on request
from ATC system for information on potential downed flight in that area and thus the
FAA itself was the original source for the sheriff s report.)
-- FAA stops looking for Flight AA77 because they think it's down in Kentucky.
--There was NO DISCUSSION on 9-11 of contacting all Aircraft and telling them to
secure their cockpit doors, even after we knew of cockpit intrusions, that the old
hij acking paradigm was invalid, and we were in a panic of what other attacks were
underway. FAA and the Airlines had the capability of providing this notice but didn
NOT. (NOTE: This deserves more .analysis and attention).
-- Meanwhile, between 9:24 and 9:30 am controllers at Dulles observe fast moving
primary targets.
-- At 9:33 am an ATC supervisor at Dulles calls the US Secret Service AND National
Airport and informs them of fast moving target; Dave at Air Traffic opens a phone bridge
(??)
-- At 9:36 am DCA ATC asks C-130 to go look for flight 77; it does.
FLIGHT 93
--On flight 93 one of the radio transmission caught the terrorists telling the passengers:
"They have our demands!" He was playing up to the old hijacking paradigm of expected
"negotiations" to keep the passengers/system/situation under control.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
MISCELLANEOUS
There is an AT A representative at Herndon
.SPACE COMMAND is on the "hijack3" form for courier puposes only, no other reason.
FBI reviewed all FAA tapes on 9/12/01 by going to the the source so that they could
record everything digitally.
FAAI ATC operations clocks and radar tracking clocks are synchronized, but command
center clocks are not (thus the more reliable timing indicators come from the first two
sources).
NOTES FROM LAB PRESENTATION
--Controller must rely on his/her memory of a flight once a contact drops from secondary
to primary coverage on radar.
--122525: (8 :25 am) First transmission received of Arabic voice uttering threatening
words
--123445 (8:34 am) Controller overheard about calling OTIS to "scramble fighters"
--1238 (8:38 am) ATC asks 175 to look for flight AA11.
--1240 (8:40 am) You can hear supervisor talking to OTIS, on three different occasions
beginning at about 8:34:45, FAA radar clock time.
--Cleveland Center was following VAL 93.
--1325 (9:25 am) -Flight 93 checks in - OK.

--1329 (9:29 am) -ATC tries to verify altitude-No response.
--1332 (9:32am)-Radio picks up threats from Arabic voice.
The FAA reconstruction tool is a UNIX-based system called SATORI. It is a legacy

system that is being phased out in favor of a system called RAPTOR.
UNCLASSIFIED
Event: FAA Operations Center follow-up visit
Type: Site visit I Meeting
Date: 2/6120~
Teams: 7 and 8
Prepared by: Miles Kara and John Raidt
Participants (non-Commission): Tony Ferrante, FAA
Participants (Commission): Miles Kara and John Raidt
Location: FAA HQ
--FAA will provide filtered ATC audio tapes so that we can hear the background phone
conversations between Boston Center and other authorities more clearly.
--With respect to the background conversations, FAA (Tony Ferrante) told us that
Bradley TRACON and Cape TRACON are one in the same. That is not the case.
Bradley Iriternational is the Hartford CT airport, Cape TRACON is at
Falmouth MA near Otis AFB. It remains unclear who actually made the request to
notify Otis.
ZULU T.i~es/events indicated by radar tapes reviewed at FAA lab wi Doug Gould on
v
2/6/2003 . .
1
12:13:31 ATC requests AAll to make 20 degree tum to the right

12:13:32 AAll responds affirmatively.
12:13:49 ATC makes next effort to raise AAll-unsuccessful.
12:14:50 AAll still turning/climbing as requested by ATC (even though

NARDO).
12:16:05 AAII has completed turn/climb requested by ATC
1221 :09 AA 11 secondary signature dropped from radar.
12:22:50 AAII signature tag falls off radar.
12:24:40 First threatening message overheard by ATC-Boston Center

presumably from AA 11.
12:25:40 Second threatening message overheard by ATC-Boston

Center, presumably from AAll.
12:27:43 ATC-Boston Center calls EITHER Bradley TRACON in

Harford, CT or CAPE TRACON in Falmouth, MA (collocated
with OTIS AFB)** to report AAII problem.'
12:28:00 ATC- Boston Center calls Herndon ATC command center. 2
12:29:00 Overhear Boston Center to NY?? Conversation.
12:34:39 ATC-Boston Center conversation with Bradley TRACON??

stating the "need to scramble" jets .... to "tail" thenr'.
12:40:00 ATC-Boston Center call to Herndon ATC Command Center

Overhear "confirmed hijack" and "Tony.,,4
12:41:?? ATC-Boston Center call to Bradley TRACON.5
--The radar unit capturing image of AAII was the FPS 678radar at West
Covington, CT.
--The AIRLINE'S flight operations centers have radio contact with their aircraft as
well as text messaging.
--When asked why, after the WTC had been hit, and we were fearful of other such
attacks, all airplanes in the air were not told to secure their cockpits, the FAA people
present had no answer. Belatedly, they said they didn't want to cause "panic."
--FAAI ATC rounds-up the time captured by their computer to the next minute (for take-
offs only).
--Each sweep of the radar takes 4.5 seconds.
1Call is overheard in background on tape of Air Traffic Controller

2Call is overheard in background on tape of Air Traffic Controller.
** Tony Ferrante indicated that Bradley and CAPE tracons are one in the same. That is not the case. We
need to clarify which calls were to which facility.
3 Call is overheard in background on tape of Air Traffic Controller.

S Call is overheard in background on tape of Air Traffic Controller.
Event: FAA Operations Center follow-up visit
Type: Site visit I Meeting
Date: 2/6/20~
Teams: 7 and 8
Prepared by: Miles Kara and John Raidt
Participants (non-Commission): Tony Ferrante, FAA
Participants (Commission): Miles Kara and John Raidt
Location: FAA HQ
--FAA will provide filtered ATC audio tapes so that we can hear the background phone
conversations between Boston Center and other authorities more clearly.
--With respect to the background conversations, FAA (Tony Ferrante) told us that
Bradley TRACON and Cape TRACON are one in the same. That is not the case.
Bradley International is the Hartford CT airport, Cape TRACON is at .
FalmouthMA near Otis AFB. It remains unclear who actually made the request to
notify Otis.
ZULU Ti:tes/events indicated by radar tapes rev,iewed at FAA lab wi Doug Gould on
2/6/20ot~l· ..
12:13:31 ATC requests AA11 to make 20 degree tum to the right

12:13:32 AA11 responds affirmatively.
12:13:49 ATC makes next effort to raise AA11-unsuccessful.
12:14:50 AAII still turning/climbing as requested by ATC (even though

NARDO).,
12:16:05 AAI1 has completed turn/climb requested by ATC
1221:09 AA11 secondary signature dropped from radar.
12:22:50 AA11 signature tag falls off radar.
12:24:40 First threatening message overheard by ATC-Boston Center

presumably from AA 11.
12:25:40 Second threatening message overheard by ATC-Bo'ston

Center, presumably from AAll.
12:27:43 ATC-Boston Center calls EITHER Bradley TRACON in

Harford, CT or CAPE TRACON in Falmouth, MA (collocated
with OTIS AFB)** to report AA11 problem.'
12:28:00 ATC- Boston Center calls Herndon ATC command center. 2
12:29:00 Overhear Boston Center to NY?? Conversation.
12:34:39 ATC-Boston Center conversation with Bradley TRACON??

stating the "need to scramble" jets .... to "tail" them:' ..
12:40:00 ATC-Boston Center call to Herndon ATC Command Center

Overhear "confirmed hijack" and "Tony.,,4
12:41 :?? ATC-Boston Center call 'to Bradley TRACON.5
--The radar unit capturing image of AA11 was the FPS 678 radar at West
Covington, CT. .
--The AlRLINE' S flight operations centers have radio contact with their aircraft as
well as text messaging.
--When asked why, after the WTC had been hit, and we were fearful of other such
attacks, all airplanes in the air were not told to secure their cockpits, the FAA people
present had no answer. Belatedly, they said they didn't want to cause "panic."
--FAA/ATC rounds-up the time captured by their computer to the next minute (for take-
offs only).
--Each sweep of the radar takes 4.5 seconds.
1Call is overheard in background on tape of Air Traffic Controller

2Call is overheard in background on tape of Air Traffic Controller.
** Tony Ferrante indicated that Bradley and CAPE tracons are one in the same. That is not the case. We
need to clarify which calls were to which facility.

J:=:,4A-
UNCLASSIFIED
Mf1Z O~o113 ~~
Event: Visit to Reagan National Airport Control Tower in Alexandria, VA and Andrews
Air Force Base Control Tower
Type: Site Visit
Date: July 28, 2003
Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan and reviewed and edited by all Commission participants.
Team number: 8
Location: National Airport, Alexandria, VA; Andrews AFB, Morningside, MD
Participants (non-Commission): Shirley Miller, FAA; Linda Schuessler, FAA; Peter

Lynch, FAA Counsel; Donny Simons, Washington National Airport Operations
Manager; and Bob Lazar, Acting-Operations Manager on 9/11
Participants {non-Commission): Shirley Miller, FAA; Linda Schuessler, FAA; Peter

Lynch, FAA Counsel; Chauncey (?); Steve Marra, FAA Air Traffic Controller -
supervisor; and James Ampey, Air Traffic Controller (in the Tower on 9/11)
Participants - Commission (both locations): Dana Hyde, Miles Kara, John Azzarello,
and Lisa Sullivan
I. Reagan National Airport
Background
Shirley Miller arranged this briefing for Commission participants. Linda Schuessler, the
manager of the Command Center on 9/11, accompanied us on the visit as did Peter
Lynch of the FAA Counsel's Office. Donny Simons, the Tower manager, guided
Commission staff on a tour of the control Tower and administrative wing of the airport.
On 9/11, Simons was airport manager at Baltimore-Washington International Airport
(BWI). Simons led the group through a security point at which staff was signed in and
received visitor passes. The security guard was from a private company, rather than a
federal employee. Unlike the trip to Dulles, Commission staff members were not required
to walk through metal detectors to gain entrance to the Tower, as is required of all air
passengers.
Many employees who were working at the NATIONAL facility on 9/11 have since
moved to the new TRACON facility in Potomac, MD. (The TRACON at National has
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
been shut down.) Prior to the move, National employed 67 controllers in total; 18 of
which were on during a given shift; with 10-11 in the TRACON and 7-8 in the Tower.
There was one supervisor in the radar room, and a controller in charge of the Tower Cap
at all times. Prior to 9111, the U.S. Secret Service operated a desk in the TRACON during
occasions of significant events, such as the President's State of the Union Address.
The Tower is supervised 24 hours a day. Planes depart up and down the river, which
controllers referred to as a "north/south configuration." There are four controller
positions in the Tower: local, ground, assistant local, and helicopter. The local and
ground positions are manned by one person who physically moves from one side of the
Tower to the other depending on a north or south direction. This is manageable for one
controller because National operates on a "one in, one out" system.
The perimeter of National is restricted. The Department of Transportation controls slots

for departures and arrivals. The longest of the three runways is 6,800 feet long and
accommodates all of the jumbo jets. Because the airspace is tight over National due to the
proximity of BWI and Dulles Airports, the controllers at all three locations are
accustomed to working with each other to track planes and direct pilots. Prior to 9/11, an
average of 1,100-1,200 planes including general aviation planes flew in and out of
National each day. Since 9/11, the volume has dropped to 750 commercial flights daily
and general aviation aircraft are banned from National.
National Airport operates in Class B Airspace, which is the second most restrictive. The
bottom tier of the airspace is seven miles in width, and extends vertically upward for
1500 feet. Because it is three-tiered (like an inverted wedding cake), it used to be that
airplanes could fly under class B airspace beyond a certain distance from the Capitol.
Since 9111, aircraft are no longer permitted to fly under National's restricted airspace. All
aircraft are required to have an operable transponder and two-way radio communications
to fly in Class B airspace. Because National's airspace centers over the Capitol, and
conjoins two circles to the north and south (over BWI and Dulles), the airspace resembles
"mickey mouse ears" in shape.
Simons commented that National deals with a incredibly high volume of helicopter traffic
from the President, Vice President, military VIPs, news helicopters, and sightseers (less
so, post-9111), among other things. In response to this statement, Miles Kara asked
Simons to comment on the airport's relationship with the Pentagon's helicopter pad.
Simons said there is an air traffic control Tower at the Pentagon manned by military
personnel (not FAA). The National controller coordinates take-offs and landings with the
Pentagon controller. If a helicopter took off from the Pentagon pad before Flight 77 hit
the Pentagon, then it would be noted in National's log from 9111 since a National
controller assigns routes.
National Tower has direct phone lines to the Tower at Andrews Air Force Base. Andrews
is located within the "hub" of Washington National's airspace (described by Simon as an
inverted wedding cake). Therefore, National works all of the arrivals and departures for
Andrews. Typically, a controller at Andrews would notify by phone the flight data
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
controller at National Tower thirty minutes in advance of takeoff. National would then
confirm the aircraft, and a "flight progress strip" would then be issued for the plane at
National. The same flight data controller would work all Andrews' traffic on a given
shift. This person sat directly behind the-seat in the TRACON designated for the Secret
Service officer. National should have a record of all flights that took off and landed at
Andrews on 9111.
Events of 9/11
Simons introduced Commission staff to Bob Lazar, who was the most senior manager on
duty at National the morning of 9111. His title was "support manager." At the time the
first plane hit the World Trade Center in New York, Lazar was in his office in the
administrative wing of the airport, down the hall from the TRACON and the stairs that
climb to the Tower. Upon hearing the news, he went to the break room located in
between his office and the TRACON to watch the television. Due to his background in
Navy Special Operations, terrorism immediately sprung to mind before it was reported by
the newscasters. Lazar's response was to call special operations people at FAA
Headquarters, but he received no answer. At about that time, the second Tower was hit.
Immediately thereafter, a controller in the TRACON told him that Dulles had just
notified them ofa "fast-mover" heading towards Washington (Dulles' radar is seventeen
miles west of National).
National forced a track on the unknown target. Lazar was not sure at what exact time
National forced the track. Victor Pagent was the controller in the TRACON that first
tracked the unknown. When primary radar locks in on a target, it tracks the target with a
symbol. The TRACON would have been able to see it on radar, and the controllers in the
Tower would also have been able to track it on their screens. Someone in the TRACON
called Secret Service on the phone to inform them of the unknown target heading toward
Washington. (National TRACON had direct telephone lines to Dulles and BWI
TRACONs, as well as the U.S. Capitol and Secret Service.)
There was also a supervisor stationed in the TRACON, Bert Simpson, and a controller-
in-charge in the Tower (Carl something).
When Lazar was in the TRACON, Flight 77 was ten miles outside of Washington and
moving at 400 mph. Lazar started up to the Tower just as the plane hit the Pentagon.
When asked about the C.:.130by Miles Kara, Lazar described it "as the one that chased
Flight 77 around that day." Lazar confirmed that the C-130 had departed from Andrews
before National had received word of the unknown target heading toward Washington.
Once the target was known, the air traffic controllers at National asked the C-130 to tum
and follow the plane as it headed toward what turned out to be the Pentagon. Lazar
believed the C-130 was flying at 3,000 feet and reported that AA Flight 77 was flying
below him.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Controllers in the National Tower watched Flight 77 make a sweeping tum to hit the
Pentagon. He reported that the turn was at treetop level, made for alignment purposes
rather than an altitude change. [Note: NTSB has provided a simulation of the path of
Flight 77. On viewing the simulation, Kevin Shaeffer made the same observation,
namely, the path taken by AA 77 was for alignment purposes.]
Lazar told Miles Kara that he cannot remember whether they were running a north or
south configuration that morning. It varies depending on the direction of the wind.
In response to Miles' question, Lazar told him he did not remember any aircraft with the
call sign "Bobcat" that hung out over the national airspace that day. However, he did
remember two fighters inbound from Langley that morning, and two more coming from
the north but he did not think that they entered National's airspace. Simons stressed that
he did not remember the bobcats specifically. Simons conjectured, from the excerpt of
the log, that controllers from BWI were working the two "Bobcats" and needed vectors
from National controllers. It appeared from the logs that the Bobcats departed in front of
Flight 77, and Simons suggested that they could have been out of Air National Guard at
Martin in Pennsylvania). He remembered that A-I Os operated out of that location. [Note:
flight strips and other information indicate that Bobcat 14 and Bobcat 17 originated out of
Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. JSS radar data shows that they flew in trail at 21,000,
feet and were overhead during the last few minutes of the flight of American Air 77. It is
possible, but not confirmed, that they were Air Force corporate passenger jets.]
Lazar reported that word of the ground-stop ordered by Command Center was received at
National from Diane Creen at BWI.
None of the FAA representatives at National ,were aware of any precautions taken by the
airlines when they let passengers disembark the planes once FAA ordered all planes to
land.
Changes Introduced Since 9/11
(l) No General Aviation: 'Signature used to fly out of National. Waivers for prohibited
aircrafts are issued by TSA on a case-by-case basis (such as for cabinet members,
Members of Congress).
(2) Creation of an internal domestic ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone). [Note:
ADIZ are primarily border protection zones. See various wall maps in the cubicle next to
the water cooler for a trace of the CONUS ADIZ]
(3) Certain procedures are specific to arrivals and departures for National, such as the use
of a code word for landings.
(4) TSA restriction that air passengers cannot stand within thirty minutes of
arrival/departing National.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
• (5) The DEN (Domestic Events Network) is monitored at all times.
(6) Controllers have taken on additional role of security officers (more vigilance on the
job).
(7) ATC has new and enhanced relationships with organizations such as U.S. Customs,
Secret Service, the military, and FAA Headquarters.
For several days after 9111, National's TRACON operators controlled fighter jets on
combat air patrol (CAP). Shortly after National re-opened for commercial aviation,
Washington Center at Leesburg, VA assumed control of the CAP. Since 9/11, any
suspicious activity heard over the DEN causes fighters to be sent over the area.
Lazar and Simons believe that changes to the system since 9/11 have been
compartmentalized in response to perceived threats; and in so doing have not improved
the intelligence communication flow between the different segments of the system. They
acknowledged that there is a definite increase in available information on threats .
attributed to the increased number of operations and level of scrutiny in each case.
L- ..",They recommend that policy makers and
•
/ military personnel work to have a better understanding of the ATe system before
./ implementing ineffective (and in the case of codeword departures - detrimental) security
/ measures. According to Lazar,1
Simons recommended that every aircraft undergo screening on the ground, specifically
cargo. Much can be done to improve pre-flight screening.
When asked if he knew who to call in the event of a hijacking - if he had sufficient
training in advance of 9/11 - Lazar repJied that yes, he knew who to call at the time, but
all hijack training before 9/11 characterized the act as a tool used by terrorists to
negotiate with the target country. Passengers and airlines were fairly confident they
would eventually land safely. Post-9/ll, Lazar is not sure if hijack training adequately
prepares personnel for the new terrorist threat.
Since 9111, air traffic controllers have been made to take on the additional security
responsibilities in the system, whereas their main job function continues to be servicing
'.
the customer, separating the air traffic and ensuring all flights land safely. He believes it
is not the role of A TC to provide security for the system; he believes it is the military'S
responsi bility. .
UNCLASSIFIED
• ',I'"
•
UNCLASSIFIED
Simons reported that U.S. Customs keeps a small number of Blackhawk helicopters at
National. They have surveillance and identity responsibilities. U.S. Customs officials do
not .have shoot-down or interdiction authority. Simons and Lazar stated they believed
DOD had that authority. Simons and Lazar did not know who specifically had the
authority to make that decision should the question arise. Lazar suggested that some
friction existed between U.S. Customs and DOD officials because of the different roles
.......they p·erform with respect to investigations of suspicious aircraft. Lazar also noted that
1 I
Interestingly, NTSB and FBI did not conduct any interviews of the staff in the National
Airport A TC. Bob Lazar thought staff from the Congressional Joint Inquiry may have
interviewed personnel. [Note: Miles Kara, who worked on the Joint Inquiry, does not
recall any such interviews.]
II. Andrews Air Force Base
The Base has been active since 1958. Many Heads of State fly in and out of Andrews, as
does the President's plane, Air Force One. It is eight nautical miles from National Airport.
Two other small airports are located nearby: Hyde Washington Executive Airport (one
mile from Andrews), and one in College Park, MD. Steve Marra and James Ampey are
•
FAA A TC who have been stationed at Andrews Tower for many years. Both were on
duty the morning of 9/11 .
Before the move to Potomac, MD, the Andrews TRACON only had three screens. Eleven
people moved from Andrews to Potomac when the TRACON was relocated. The
TRACON controlled 2,000 feet of airspace. National controlled the rest. Currently,
Andrews Tower employs 14 controllers, 3 supervisors, and 2 administrators.
~~.,
.--j
....
The 113'h Air National Guard Wing is housed across the airfield from the Tower. Since
'
9/11, it has built an alert facility. To equip a plane with weapons, the missiles are brought
by truck from the weapons facility to the plane on the ramp. Steve Marra, who was a
weapons mechanic before he became an A TC, said that it takes 4.5 - 8 minutes for a
plane to take off once it is armed. Before 9/11, sidewinder missiles were not armed on
launch.
On 9111, Steve Marra was in the radar room when he heard on the radio that the World
Trade Center was hit. He thought it may have been a Cessna. He left the radar room and
turned on the TV, and then returned to the radar room in time to hear about the second
hit. Following the attack on the Pentagon, he was rushed to a security briefing and the
base began closing down.
Ampey stated he was on break when WTC 1 was hit. Ampey reported he witnessed the
•
WTC 2 crash on television. Ampey further reported that after the two trade centers were
hit, he went up to the Tower (this is while Marra was at the security briefing). He recalled
looking through manuals to determine the SOP in the event of a hijacking, while the
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
military personnel on hand were looking into SCAT ANA. He reported that it was a very
confusing time, it wasn't something practiced, and no one knew who to call. Therewere
an unusually high number of aircraft taking-off and landing at Andrews that morning
because previously scheduled military exercises were underway. The radar screens were
showing "emergencies all over the place, so they started to take their own action (Ampey
didn't specify what he meant by that). The controllers worked until 12:00 a.m. that
night.
Chauncey had been attending a conference at Washington Center in Leesburg, VA that

morning, and was in his car returning to the Base when he heard on the radio about the
attacks.
Karen Pontius from FAA Headquarters called Steve and told him to launch F-16s to
cap the airspace over Washington. He relayed that message by phone to the 113th fighter
wing. He didn't recall who the officer was at the 113 th that he spoke to that day. The
fighters were armed and sent up. Langley fighters were already up, but they were
unarmed and came down quickly because they ran out of fuel. [Note: This is an unclear
recall by Steve. Langley fighters never came down-they were serviced by tankers out of
McGuire AFB. Also, Langley fighters were NORAD alert fighters and should have been
armed.]
Many planes were scrambled out of Andrews. Controllers received word that the
President was expected to come in on Air Force One.
In looking through the flight strips from that day, Steve Marra found a ticket for a C-130,
a Gopher 6 that took off from Andrews at 9:33 a.m.
Secret Service did not have a phone line to the Andrews Tower that day. Now there is a
direct line from the Tower to the Secret Service, and Secret Service has a seat in the
Tower.
The battle staff at the base handles physical security of the Tower. It passes out threat
information daily.
The rumor that circulated that day, that "DC airspace is weapons free zone closed by
Andrews" was dispelled by Andrews ATC staff. Andrews does not have the authority to
close the airspace over Washington. It is possible for Washington National to close the
airspace - they have the power to do so. According to Marra, the airspace was not closed
that day by Andrews AFB personnel.
The three "Bullys" that appeared in the logs from 9/11 were identified by Marra as F-16s
from the flight strips. They took off from Andrews at 8:36 a.m. and flew to 53-14 which
is a restricted area over North Carolina. Two of them returned at 2:35 p.m. and the third
one came in 12 minutes later. According to the flight strips, the first Andrews-based
fighters scrambled and launched in response to the hijackings was at 11: 12 a.m. AAFB
had no contact with NORAD on9-li.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
"Muscle" is the name of the 1st helicopter squadron at Andrews, many of which flew that
day. Miles' "mystery flight" that hovered over Washington that morning could have been
a state police helicopter, a stealth flight, or a helicopter from the 1st Muscle squad out of
Andrews. Andrews' staff was unable to verify the identity of the aircraft. [Late analysis
indicates the early morning flight referenced was a helicopter, most likely the morning
traffic observation flight.]
National would have a record of what planes were over Washington that day.
The first time Andrews ATC heard from NORAD was the day after the attacks, on 9/12.
Since 9/11, the Andrews staff reported that there are fewer airplanes and tighter security.
Scrambles out of Andrews are regimented and regular: (1) suit up; (2) battle stations
(fighters get in the planes); and (3) running alert (which means they are ready for final
word to take off.)
Marra reported that scrambles are faster and more efficient than anytime in the past. In
the event that a plane enters the Washington Class B airspace, NEADS broadcasts the
event over the DEN. The controller that picks up the target on radar will contact the
owner of the airspace, who will in tum try and make contact with the pilot. More often
than not, the pilot is not listening to the channel and cannot hear the controller telling him
to leave the restricted airspace. Sometimes the pilot is talking on another channel.
Meanwhile, fighters are scrambled, suit up, take battle stations, and wait on alert while
thecontroller tries to make contact with the pilot. FAA usually manages to make contact
with the pilot in a matter of minutes.
Situations like this arise on average twice daily. Indeed, while Commission staff
members were present, the direct phone from NEADS rang and alerted the Tower to a
scramble. Marra listened to the line and called out the status of the scramble to the other
controllers (i.e., "battle stations") Shortly thereafter, the scramble was aborted.
Today, the Tower is in communication with, among others, National Airport, NORAD,
the 113th National Air Guard, Secret Service, and NEADS. They are required to monitor
the DEN at all times (although it was not on initially when Commission staff toured the
Tower). The Secret Service has a seat in the Tower now, and is on constant alert - they
are only present in the Tower when the President is landing, or as requested by a foreign
head of state.
On the day Commission staff toured the Tower, the President of Israel, Arial Sharon,
came on base and departed on his presidential jet from Andrews. The Base was closed
down and all persons and military and civilians were forced indoors, in advance of his
arrival. As soon as the motorcade entered the base, aircraftwere prohibited to travel
within five miles of the runway. This event is called "sterilizing the runway."
Two Secret Service snipers manned the perimeter of the Tower, overlooking Sharon's
plane. A Secret Service agent with headphones in the Tower reported on Sharon's
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
progress toward Andrews and oversaw the departure from the Tower. Marra reported that
the sequence of events and security measures were very. similar to when Air Force One
takes off. Typically, the president arrives by helicopter (Marine One) and lands within
feet of Air Force One on the ramp under the Tower.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Event: Visit to the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center ("ATCSCC" or
"Command Center") in Herndon, VA and Dulles Airport Control Tower
Type of event: Site Visit and Briefing
Date: July 22, 2003
Team Number: 7 and 8
Location: Herndon ATCSCC and Dulles Airport
Participants (Non-Commission) ATCSCC: Shirley Miller; Linda Schuessler, Air Traffic

Tactical Operations - Manager Tactical Operations Division (on 9-11); Peter Lynch, FAA·
Counsel; John White, Air Traffic Tactical Operations - Manager System Efficiency
Division; Jack Kies, Air Traffic Tactical Operations - Manager Tactical Operations
Division
Participants (Non-Commission) Dulles: Shirley Miller; Linda Schuessler; ADD

LAWYER; Charlotte Happle, Dulles Air Traffic Control Tower Assistant Manager;
Michael Hawrysko, Dulles Air Traffic Control Operations Manager
Participants - Commission (both facilities): John Farmer, John Azzarello, Dana Hyde,
Miles Kara, John Raidt, Bill Johnstone and Lisa Sullivan
ATCSCC - Overview
[U] Shirley Miller arranged this briefing for Commission participants. Linda Schuessler,
the manager of the Command Center on 9/11, accompanied us on the visit as did Peter
Lynch of the FAA Counsel's Office. Once at the Command Center Jack Kies led us on a
tour of the facility. Participants first observed a Strategic Planning Teleconference (see
below) and then toured the various areas of the main operations room. Participants then
convened in a conference room to discuss the actual events of 9/11:, directing questions
primarily at Linda Schuessler and John White. Total time of visit was approximately two
hours.
[U] The Command Center in Herndon became fully operational in 1996 [CORRECT? I
thought it opened in 1997 but didn't become fully operational until a year or so later.].
Its primary purpose is to monitor the flow of air traffic from a system-wide perspective,
combine data from the individual FAA centers, and adjust the flow of air traffic based on
weather forecasts and to make decisions regarding capacity and demand of the national
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
air space. According to Jack Kies, on average, there are 6,000 -7,500 aircraft in the
national airspace at any given time; a third of which the FAA does not track.
[U] The floor of the Command Center is divided into four tiers. The first tier is made up
of the weather monitoring group; the second tier is the Air Traffic Control area (divided
into sections that handle the 21 ATC en-route facilities by section of the country); the
third tier is the Command Center management; the fourth tier is the liaison desks for
customers, including the military. Controllers at Central Command are assigned to an
area/region of the country and he/she communicates between those facilities and the
Command Center. These controllers report to the National Operations Managers (NAMs)
on duty that have the authority to make decisions and hand down directives.
[U] As a means of enhancing communication with the Command Center and providing
effective service to the airlines, other major organizations are represented at the
Command Center such as the Air Transport Association (which represents the air
carriers); the National Business Association; the Airways Facility; flight inspection
officials; and a Central Alternate Reservations Facility (CARP) operated by FAA
officials with security clearances to conduct military aircraft exercises. The military also
maintains a cell at the Command Center.
[U] Every two hours, the Command Center hosts a Strategic Planning Teleconference
(SPT) that includes all customers and users of the National Air Space system, including
participants from the various flight control centers around the nation. They discuss
weather fronts, projected delays, and essentially lay-out the day's plan for the nation's air
travel. The teleconferences represent one dimension of the multilayered system of
communication engaged in by the Command Center, en-route Centers, and some of the
larger Traffic Control Centers (TRACON).
[U] In the event that the ATCSCC became inoperable, Mr. Kies stated that there are
several back-up centers.
[U] Kies indicated that all operations phones are recorded. With respect to administrative
phones, hesaid some are recorded and some aren't.
Traffic Situation Display (TSD)
[U] The computer program used at the Command Center to monitor the flow of air traffic
is called Traffic Situation Display ("TSD"). TSD receives radar data from field facilities
by satellite communication and displays such data at the Command Center. The
computer displays at the Command Center are not in "real-time"; the information is
delayed approximately 1 - 5 minutes. In terms of technical capability, the Command
Center can isolate one radar track of a plane, but it cannot "see" the radar information
that an air traffic controller tracking the plane can view on his or her radar screen. TSD
does not transmit transponder information (i.e., altitude, speed, etc.,) to the Command
Center [CORRECT?]. The Command Center does not talk directly to pilots, and it does
not transmit text messages to pilots in the cockpits. However, the Command Center talks
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
to the airline dispatch centers that then can forward text messages to pilots through the
"ACARS" system.
[U] Air carriers, businesses and individuals may access TSD data by purchasing software
from the FAA or through the internet via a subscription service such as www.trip.com.
Trip.com users can access the speed and altitude of commercial aircraft that have
activated their transponders. Commission staff questioned the FAA participants about
safety concerns related to TSD, given that it is readily accessible through the internet.
Mr. Kies stated that the FAA "combs" the feed sent to subscribers and excludes
information and data related to the movement of Air Force One, military aircraft, U.S.
Customs aircraft and other government aircraft. Similarly, the National Business
Aviation Association has filtered certain information from the TSD related to the
movement of corporate jets. Both the FAA and the TSA have evaluated the data
distributed over the TSD system and determined that the information provided to
consumers through the sale ofTSD does not present a threat to national security.
The National Airspace System (NAS)
[U] The National Air Space is divided between ATC towers, TRACON Centers, and en-
route Centers. Airport Ground Control puts pilots in the "system" once they are cleared
for departure. The ATC tower gets the plane in position for take-off and tracks the plane
within the tower's air space after take-off. The TRACON picks up the track of the plane
once it leaves the tower's airspace. The en-route Center, which has more air space than
the tower and TRACON center, works the plane through the air space system. There are
21 en-route Centers located domestically, with a higher percentage of them concentrated
. in the Boston, Chicago, and Miami "triangle." Some FAA Centers do not have primary
radar capability. In recent years, the FAA has consolidated TRACON facilities at
individual airports in areas of high volume air traffic to one TRACON that tracks flights
from 3-5 airports or bases. This has already taken effect in areas around cities such as
New York, Miami, and Washington-Baltimore.
On September 11 t\ 2001
[U] Jack Kies said that the ATCSCC was the eyes and ears for information gathering on
9-11. They possessed all the coordinated information for the system on that day. Linda
indicated that while there was a military liaison presence at the command center (attached
to the Air Traffic Services Cell), it was greater than usual on 9-11 because of previously
scheduled activity.
[U] Linda Schuessler was the ATCSCC operations manager on duty that morning. She
was in a staff meeting in the conference room adjacent to the Command Center floor
(now the national Capitol Region Council Command Center) when she received word of
CNN's report that a general aviation flight had hit the World Trade Center North Tower.
Controllers were engaged in a standard SPT at the time. John White, who was on the
Command Center floor, interrupted Schuessler from her meeting a second time to inform
her that a second plane, clearly a commercial jet, had hit the other tower. The meeting
UNCLASSIFIED
•
UNCLASSIFIED
adjourned and all the participants including Schuessler joined White on the Command
Center floor to watch CNN on the big screen.
(U] Schuessler asked controllers at each regional desk to call their field facilities and ask
them to report any unusual occurrences, such as loss of radar. A total of 11 unusual
instances were reported. One man kept track of the reports on a white board on the
Command Center floor. Another individual called out to field facilities to follow up on
the reports. John White said that he heard a controller in "strategic planning" calling the
airlines to tell them what was going on. White said that ATCSCC (unsure if it was the
controller in strategic planning or someone else) contacted the airlines' dispatchers about
notifying their aircraft to beware of cockpit intrusion. White said that while it was up to
the airlines to make the effort, "the expectation was that they would have contacted their
aircraft." No indication was give about what time these notifications to the airlines were
made. Every three minutes Schuessler and the two national operations managers
(NAMs) on duty that morning (one of whom was Ben Sliney) would huddle in the center
of the room and share information. The threat was determined to be .terrorism after the
second plane hit the WTC. "After the second plane hit the WTC and prior to the plane
hitting the Pentagon, we made the conscious decision to ground all flights," reported
Schuessler. In the strategic planning area on the floor, the controllers began calling all the
air carriers to report that "FAA Command Center was notifying all the ATCs, and
advis[ing] the Airlines to alert their crews" that the Command Center was grounding all
•
flights. [CORRECT? Please fill in the context here if you have notes on it]
(U] Meanwhile, John White was talking to the FAA Operations Center about the
information the Command Center was receiving. Mr. White was speakjng to, among
others, Jeff Griffith (Special Assistant to Air Traffic Services),[ ~n~.. ___
[QUESTION: ADD reference to David Canoles (who now heads the Washington
Operations Center) on the teleconference with the Air TrafficInvestigation Office from
the Command Center conference room - what is this about???] .
;' .'
[U] In addition, Mr. White stated that he and others at the Command Center were calling
various military bases on 9-11 in search of military assets.rsuch as fighter aircraft, to
defend the surrounding air space. Mr. White stated that "we [the FAA Command Center]
became the Department of Defense" on 9111. ' :
, .
. [U] When asked about the military presence at the Command Center, FAA staff
confirmed that because the CARF team had a scheduled military' movement exercise that
day, military personnel were on hand to help man the phones in the conference room. It
was not clear, however, who these military personnel.communicated with or what exact
role they played. . .
. .'
[U] When asked about hijacking protocols and procedures, John White stated that he
believed that Claudio Manno, the hijack coordinator forthe FAA, reported directly to the
•
Aviation Control Center ("ACC") on 9-11 sometime after the first plane hit the WTC. In
a separate exchange with Mr. Kies, he stated that.thestandard operating procedure in a
hijack situation is for a controller to cal1 the supervisor and "notify the military." John .
COMMISSION/SENSITIVE 4
UNC LAS,'S IF lED
UNCLASSIFIED
[U] White said that the command center was "calling all over the military bases to find
assets. It was very difficult to get anyone." He mentioned who they were looking for jets,
air carriers -- anything to respond. (The sense given to commission staffwas that the
search for military assets was ad hoc).
[U] FAA staff repeatedly emphasized that the Command Center was in constant
communication with approximately 11-13 FAA facilities on September 11, 2001
[QUESTION: where does this number come from? There are more than that, correct?].
John White stated that the Command Center had significant information on all hijacked
airplanes except for American flight 77. White said that AA 77 was the only flight about
which they were "disappointed" because they didn't have information. White or Kies
indicated that AA 77 got all the way to Virginia before they picked up the primary target
on radar. John indicated that there's a gap in radar coverage at certain altitudes which
can contribute to the problem. White further reported the Command Center had "great
information" on United Airlines flight 93. According to White, FAA Cleveland Center
tracked AA 77 until sometime after 9:00 a.m. when it disappeared from radar. The
Command Center thought AA 77 had crashed shortly after it disappeared from radar.
FAA lost primary radar on AA 77 on the morning of 9~11. Since there is a gap in
primary radar coverage somewhere over Ohio, White theorized that AA 77 may have
been lost in Cleveland Center because it traveled through the zone that lacked primary
radar capabilities.
[U] John White spoke often with FAA Headquarters on 9-11. According to White and
Schuessler the command center had a lot of reports of strange acting aircraft that day.
They added a lot of "inaccurate reports" flowed into the Command Center on 9-11. With
respect to AA 11, White speculated that a "tag jump" may have generated reports that
AA 11 was airborne after it crashed into WTC One. A "tag jump" could have occurred
because when a plane turns its transponder off, it is referred to as "coasting." The plane
does not "disappear" from the screen when this happens; the controller is simply unable
to find any specific information on the plane. The host computer will continue to look for
the plane in the system after it loses the transponder signal. Specifically, the host
computer will attempt to locate the plane through tracking its primary radar return. It is
possible that the host computer could identify the wrong target in such a search.
[U] White indicated he may have talked to the military on 9-11. If he called the military
(i.e., NORAD) on 9-11, White believes he would have called CONUS at Cheyenne
Mountain in Colorado. The Command Center was cognizant that the military lacked the
radar capability to look inside the U.S. airspace on 9-11.
[U] Schuessler ordered all non-essential persons on the physical plant of the Command
Center to leave the premises. The nation-wide ground stop was verbally communicated to
controllers in the field and planes were actually brought down after the Pentagon was hit.
The Command Center made the decision to bring down all air traffic after the Pentagon
was hit. Ms. Schuessler indicated that that option was considered before the Pentagon
was hit - when the Command Center made the decision to ground stop all aircraft'~ but
that course was not chosen. After the Pentagon was hit, the Command Center decided to
UNCLASSIFIED
•
UNCLASSIFIED
bring down all air traffic and started communicating that order to the field. Subsequently
the Command Center sought and received approval for this decision from DOT Secretary
Mineta.
[UJ In response to Miles Kara's question whether or not SCAT ANA (security control of
air traffic and navigation aids) was declared by the military, Schuessler explained that
declaring SCAT ANA would necessitate not only bringing down all aircraft, but also
force the FAA to turn off all navigational equipment and relinquish control of the NAS to
the military. According to Schuessler, SCAT ANA was never called for reasons related to
the FAA's need to maintain control over navigational equipment'. Therefore, the airspace
was not transferred from the FAA to the military on 9-1l. In the briefing, none of the
FAA staff had recollection of a special ops flight out of BWI to Pope AFB that day; nor
did they recol1ect the C-130 that passed over the Pennsylvania crash site that morning.
[U] According to Mr. Kies, "The only shot controllers at Boston Center and Rome, NY
had of finding the planes was to stay on the phone with each other." Without a
transponder signal, the controllers resorted to primary radar to locate and manually track
flights AAll and UA175. He explained that primary radar relies on the controller's
observation. The controller must contend with a Jot of c1utter on the screen. The
assurance of a positive identification of a target increases only with time. Long-range,
secondary radar tracks traffic at higher altitudes and identifies flights with absolute
•
certainty. Turning off the transponder in the plane disables secondary radar. The FAA is
looking into installing permanent transponders in aircraft) making it impossible for pilots
to tum the device off.
Potential Additional Disasters Averted on 9-11:
[U] Jack Kies states that he is absolutely certain that the grounding order that was
affected by ATCSCC (not Sec. Minetal stoard other terrorist plots from occurring. Jack
referred to an individual namedl ho works for NavCanada who told him that
Air Canada had a plane scheduled to depart Toronto Canada and arrive at JFK
International Airport in New York on 9-11. According to.1 I
that plane never got
off the ground and authorities found box cutters secreted ...in the luggage compartments in
the first class section of the aircraft and two people who/fit a terrorist profile on board.
Jack Kies also mentioned the St. Louis incident in which two passengers on a flight that
landed after the grounding order, fled the plane and hopped a train.
ATCSCC in Emergency Situations

.,
,
.
.,
[U] Jack Kies indicated that decision-making for the/National Air Space system,
including in times of emergency) rests with the ATCSCC. He seemed to indicate that
decision-making generated from the command center was even above the WOC. Kies
stated, "The buck stops here." ':
•
[U] Either John or Jack said the procedure caiIs for getting the military up to follow a
hij acked aircraft. ' ,
, .
COMMISSION/SENSITIVE 6
UNCLAS:SIFIED
•
UNCLASSIFIED
Miscellaneous
[U] Shirley Miller was queried on whether there were any "lessons learned" on how the
system worked on 9-1l. She indicated she was unaware of any.
Second Site Visit to Dulles Air Traffic Control
[U] The Dulles A TC tower is operated by 10-11 controllers and is approximately 40

years old. Dulles operates 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. On 9-11-01, Dulles had its
own TRACON, which was moved to Potomac, Maryland on December 17, 2002, where a
large TRACON facility was built to service Dulles, Washington Reagan, BWI, Andrews
AFB, and Richmond. On 9-11, the Dul1es TRACON was located on the 1 floor of the z"
tower. The facility has a direct line to the White House (U.S. Secret Service) which they
test on a weekly basis, according toJ I A white telephone marked "WH" is
located on the wall of the rz"
floor in the old TRACON area. The Dulles facility is run
by Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority. Personnel did confirm there was a direct
1ink to the White House from the TRACON on 9-11 (CAN SOMEONE ELSE
CONFIRM WHAT I BELIE~]~ THEY TOLD US).
[U] Dulles ATC owns and controls a 7.5 mile radius of airspace up to an altitude 0[2,000
feet. The Dulles local controllers pass flights to the TRACON facility which, in tum,
•
passes flightsto FAA "en-route" centers. The ramp tower, which is operated by the
airlines or private entities, controls ramps and gates at the airport .
[U] The Dunes A T~/rower generally has 2 ground controllers, 2 local controllers who
dear planes for departure and 1 supervisor. The tower also has a flight data controlIer
who records basic.flight information (e.g., destination, flight altitudes, etc.). The tower
has an AMASS:~ystem designed to prevent runway .incursions.
Dulles ATe ?t1 September 11 th
r[U) . fhe supervisor of Dulles Tower and TRACON, arrived for work
at ~':OO a.m. on Septem er 11,2001. AA 77 took off frornrunwa 3 and tracked the path
ofHighway 29 (also referred to as the "Dulles corridor"). first heard of the
World trade Center attack in the break room (on thy,,121h oor) e ow the tower.
I Isaw CNN's footage of AA 11 and UA'175 striking the WTC towers. The
/;;'persqrmel we met with said they received theirinformation from CNN. The Washington
;';' en-route Center notified Dulles' TRACOr-i facility of the World Trade Center crashes.
,/,/ Washington Center advised Dulles,.TRA.CON to look for any suspicious aircraft activity
and asked TRACON if it had anyinformation regarding AA 77. Specifically,
:; ....Washington Center talkedtothe Traffic Management Coordinator in Dulles TRACON
,// :/ regarding AA 77. Washington Center advised Dulles that AA 77 was "unaccounted for."
:: :' And to keep a look-out for)t.1 hold Air Traffic Management that AA
77 had indeed.departedfrom Dulles and gave them the exact time of take-off. He began
searching.for the.flight on Dulles TRACON's primary radar, which Dulles Tower always
••••••• displays:"A.-cc6'rdi~g,tol
......
Ithe supervisor of Dul1es TRACON called the White
......
UNCLASSfFIED
' .. 9/11 Working-level Employee
..
UNCLASSIFIED
[U] House on the direct telephone line and advised the U.S. Secret Service that AA 77
had just flown over Dulles at a high rate of speed and was headed towards Washington,
D.C. In addition.Dulles TRACON's supervisor notified National Airport via a direct
telephone line tha"t"A;\ 77 was quickly approaching the area. Dulles TRACON also called
Washington Center Traffic Management and Herndon Command Center to warn them
about the plane that sped ove{.Dulles and was speeding towards the Washington, D.C.
Capital region. During that timeJ ~aid that he was also looking for another
\"United Airlines jet that was reported missing. It was not until after the plane hit the
"'Pentagon that they realized it was AA 77. Personnel we met with said there was not
discussion of notifying the Capito\.
[U],... [noted that Dulles initially heard that AA 77 had struck the WTC's North
"\Tower.
tU] Dulles Tower received word from Traffic Management at Washington Center to
"sterilize airspace." Command Center had initiated this order to ground all flights. This
occurred after the Pentagon was struck by AA 77.
[U]'I ~as not aware that a C-130 military aircraft was in the airspace and
had attempted to identify AA 77. While protocol existed on 9-11 for Dulles TRACON to
notify Washington Center Traffic Management, Herndon Command Center and the FAA
•
Regional Operations Centers, no such protocol existed to notify the military .
[UJ The personnel we talked with were unaware of any actions taken to check the
grounded airplanes for terrorists once they were grounded by the order to clear the skies.
Changes Implemented after September 11th:
[U] Subsequent to the events of September n", the FAA developed a "more robust"
communications system.· Washington Operations Center Headquarters' Air Traffic
Management has a moderator on an open telephone line that connects all major
TRACONs, traffic management centers and "tower caps" in the United States.
Procedures for flight crew in the event of a hijacking or in response to suspicious activity
are broadcast over the Domestic Event Network (DEN) which includes the military, the
Herndon Command Center, larger TRACONs and en-route Centers. The DEN is run by
the Washington Operations Center 24/7.1
...... .......1 The creation and implementation of DEN is a significant change in

the system since September 11tho .
•
[UJ The FAA has initiated crisis management drills with Department of Homeland
Security focused on, "what if?" scenarios.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
[U] Of the hundreds of radar facilities Iocated throughout the country, the military only
attached itself to coastal locations before 9-11-01 because it positioned itself to detect a
threat coming from abroad, rather than within the 1).S. borders. Now, the military has
access to all domestic radar.
Miscellaneous
[U] --Dulles is the diversion airport for airplanes going into National that show some kind
of problem or suspicious activity, including NORDO, transponder off, airspace violation,
course deviation, etc.
[U] --TSA is doing a MANP AD assessment at airports. One of the Dulles personnel we
talked to thought it was a matter of when, not if, an airplane is attacked by a MANP AD.
[U] --When asked about the subject, one of the personnel indicated that he was concerned
the heightened profile and awareness for security issues can take the controllers eye off of
managing aircraft and airspace.
Follow Up
[U] Shirley Miller said she would try to obtain for the Commission copies of the recorded
phone conversations from Command Center on September 11th. She reiterated that calls
on administrative lines were not all recorded. Miller could not say with certainty if there
was an "after-action" report done by the FAA following the attacks. She responded that
routinely voice/data information is collected and given to the Air Traffic Investigation
Office. David Knowles synthesized that information into a book organized by flight after
September 11tho That information was delivered to the National Transportation Safety
Board, which ultimately turned it over to the FBI for the criminal investigation. The
NTSB, for its part in the investigation, corroborated the FBI's findings that the attacks
were not attributed to a mishap on the part of the FAA, but rather, to the deliberate steps
taken by the terrorists. Again, Miller promised to advise the Commission whether a
narrative and/or after-action report was written after the attacks.
UNCLASSIFIED
Event: FAA (Flight Standards) & NTSB (Dave Tew)
Type: Briefing
Team: 7
Date: FAA meeting January 13,2004; NTSB Phone Briefing January 25,2004
Participants (non-Commission): Meeting: phyllis Duncan (Fligth Standards); Peggy

Gilligan (Regulation-Certification); Nick Sabatini (Regulation-Certification); John Allen
(Flight Standards); Michael Morse (Security); Shirley Miller (FAA); Phone Briefing:
Dave Tew (NTSB) .
Participants: John Raidt, Sam Brinkley
Location: FAA Headquarters, Washington DC
The briefing was to discuss the FAA certification and pilot training of the 9/11 hijackers.
The FAA handed out a presentation "9/11 Commission Briefing-Flight Training-
January 12, 2004-John Allen, Deputy Director, Flight Standards Service."
This document contains the summary of information on the hijackers FAA flight
certification. The document is attached.
" Flight Standards Service
9/11 Commission Briefing

Flight Training
January 13,2004
John Allen
Deputy Director, Flight Standards Service
-
"" Background and Analysis
+ Types of Flight Schools
- Part 61school
• Typically a fixed base operator offering fuel, aircraft rental,
hangar storage, flight training
• Typically use standard but not FAA-approved curricula
~ Applicants have to meet knowledge and skills standards of part
61 and practical. test standards
- Part 141 certificate
• FAA approves curricula
• Approved curricula allow for certification at fewer hours than
stated in regulations
• Applicants have to meet same standards
• If lose 141 certificate, can operate as a part 61 school
- Part 142 training center
• Approved curricula for specific aircraft or systems
• Applicants have to meet same standards
2
Background and Analysis
+ Immediately after 9/11, from a list of the 19 hijackers
supplied by the FBI, we searched our FAA airmen
records.
+ Six of the terrorists on board the hijacked aircraft had
FAA certificates: (Note that subsequent research revealed that two
names previously given us by the FBI were cleared as not being hijackers.)
ranging from private pilot to commercial pilot
all had instrument ratings
none had type ratings (for aircraft larger than 12,500
pounds)
all except one had multiengine ratings
one was a flight instructor
none were flight engineers
3
-
•
+ Combination of certificates and ratings might have been
selected to provide minimum exposure to complex
airplanes.
+ May also be normal signs of pilots attempting to qualify
for airline careers.
- Pilots who might 'need financial help usually obtain single-
engine commercial certificates (before a multiengine rating)
and flight instructor certificates to build time and earn
money as a pilot.
- Foreign pilots taking training paid for by their government,
military, or an airline wouldn't necessarily obtain the single-
engine commercial or the flight instructor certificate
4
Background and Analysis.
+ Five of the six trained mainly in Florida, from local fixed
base operators to FlightSafety International to Embry
Riddle Aeronautical University.
+ One of the six trained mainly in Arizona, at various fixed
based operators and at Pan Am Flight Academy.
+ The oldest was 33 (Atta), the others ranged in age from 23
to 29.
+ Flight experience ranged from a low of 100 hours to
between 300 and 400 hours.'
1 This is based on total flight time entered ontheir last airmen certificate applications on file.
5
+ History of Foreign Pilot Training in U.S.
- U.S. has the most extensive flight training infrastructure in the
world
- More cost effective to foreign airlines and military who do not
have a built-in training structure for small numbers of pilots
- Tens of thousands of foreign pilots have trained in universities,
training centers, and flight schools (certificated and non-
certificated)
- Our participation in ICAD requires reciprocity in availability of
training facilities
- Before 9/11 FAA supplied, at the request of the U.S. State
Department, names of foreiqn pilots from Communist and former
Communist countries only who had been certificated in the U.S.
6
+ FAA aviation safety inspector responsibilities
With our system of designees, inspectors review certification
documents submitted by designees--
• Application filled out correctly.
• Applicant properly identified.
• All necessary paperwork attached.
• Designee conducted certification according to standards and
regulations.
Inspectors may re-examine any applicant for safety reasons.
Inspectors have safety oversight over flight schools and training
centers.
- Inspectors report possible criminal conduct or activity (usually
related to drug interdiction).
- Inspectors respond to law enforcement inquiries.
Inspectors investigate accidents, incidents, or safety-related
events.
7
+ In June 2002 preparation for Congressional 9/11 Hearings,
Flight Standards polled its aviation safety inspectors to
determine what if any pre-9/11 contact they had with the known
terrorists and terrorism suspects.
- Memorandum sent to all regions (9) to be forwarded to all field
offices (100)
- Attached list of 19 known hijackers, high level al-Qaeda leaders,
and terror suspects Zacarias Moussaoui
- Replies forwarded to a single focal point who investigated
incidents of any inspector interaction 'with any of the individuals on
the list
+ Two inspector replies received involving--
- Known hijacker Hani Hanjoor
- Terror suspect Zacarias Moussaoui
8
-
-
+ Incident #1: Jet Tech Training Center, Phoenix, AZ
Inspector with safety oversight responsibility for Jet Tech was in a
737 ground school class with Hani Hanjoor in January 20012
• Inspector had previously worked for Saudi Airlines in the 1970's
• Inspector had served in Air America during Vietnam
• Employees of Jet Tech indicated to the inspector they didn't think
Hanjoor met requirement to "read, speak, and understand" English
(Hanjoor had attended at least two English language classes in Arizona
and California.)
• Engaged Hanjoor in conversation about where he was from and why he
was in the class
• .Nothing about Hanjoor's behavior or interaction with the inspector
aroused any suspicions or led him to question Hanjoor's English
qualification .
Inspector had no further contact with Hanjoor
2Hanjoor was re-taking the ground school because he had failed the oral test after his first ground
school in December 2000.
9
+ Incident #1 Con'd
March 2001 Jet Tech contacted inspector after Hanjoor failed the
oral test a second time
• Inspector re-checked Hanjoor's airman file and found nothing out of
order
• Inspector reviewed the history of the designee who had certificated
Hanjoor and found nothing out of order
• Inspector reported this to Jet Tech, who transferred Hanjoor's student.
records- to their main office in Miami, FL and referred Hanjoor to the
main office
Inspector was extensively debriefed by the FBI and OST OIG after
9/11
Jet Tech ceased operations rather than pay fines exacted for two
enforcement actions brought by this same inspector .
3These records were subsequently seized by the FBI after 9/11.
10
+.Incident #2, Pan Am Flight lntematlonal", Minneapolis, MN
- In August 2001 inspector with safety oversight of Pan Am was
conducting a records review in a conference room
- An instructor asked her what she thought of a student paying
cash for simulator time for a B~747 who only wanted to learn how
to fly en-route, not takeoff and land
- Inspector indicated the regulations do not preclude this and that
wealthy owners of private, transport aircraft often do this
- The instructor did not provide a name or nationality
- Several days after this inquiry, the ins-pector was contacted at her
office by the FBI with a request to run a name through FAA
databases to determine if the person had a pilot's certificate
4Not affiliated with Pan Am Airlines
11
..
.,
+ Incident #2 con'd
The name provided by the FBI agent was Zacarias Moussaoui
• Inspector reported that Moussaoui had a student pilot's certificate
• Inspector had no suspicions because the office had worked with law
enforcement before
-' After 9/11 inspector recognized Moussaoui's name from new
reports and connected him with the instructor's remarks (Note:
Inspector did NOT know Moussaoui was arrested before 9/11.)
- Inspector had no direct contact with Moussaoui
- As of July 2002 inspector was not debriefed or contacted by the
FBI beyond the pre-9/11 inquiry on Moussaoui
- All information on this incident was provided to the
Congressional 9/11 committee
Moussaoui also took some flight training at Airman Flight School
in Norman, Oklahoma
12
•
.

+ Incident #3, Miami International Airport
- December 2000, known hijackers Mohamed Atta
and Marwan al-Shehhi left a C-172 on an apron
leading to a taxiway near the general aviation side
of Miami International Airport
• Atta and al-Shehhi had rented the airplane from Huffman
Aviation in Florida
• While waiting for clearance to depart Miami International
Airport, the C-172 engine began to "miss" and Atta and
al-Shehhi shut the aircraft down and went into the FBO to
contact Huffman Aviation
• Huffman Aviation could not retrieve until a later date and
Atta and al-Shehhideparted the airport by rental car
13
•
.
.

+ Incident #3 Con'd
This did not qualify as an accident or an incident and no
Miami traffic was impeded so no investigation.
FAA inspectors not asked to investigate until October 2001
when a NY Times article characterized the incident as
having "blocked a runway"
• The aircraft did not block a runway or impede any air carrier
traffic
• Air traffic did not report the event to Flight Standards as an
incident nor did they have a record of the event
• Inspectors concluded that no regulations or procedures were
violated
14
• Terrorists Who Had FAA Certificates
'
+ Mohamed NMN5 Atta (Citizenship: Egyptian)

- DOB: 09/01/1968 '
- Approximately 250 total flight hours (based on entries on last
airman application dated 12/21/2000)
-, Commercial Pilot, Airplane Multiengine Land, Instrument
Airplane; Private pilot privileqes in airplane single engine land
- First certificate issued: 9/1·8/2000 (Private, issued in Florida at
Huffman Aviation)
- Last certificate issued: 12/21/2000 (Commercial, issued in
Florida at Huffman Aviation)
- Various permanent addresses given for Florida
- Took flying lessons at Airman Flight School, Norman Oklahoma;
Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida; Jones Aviation in Sarasota,
Florida; obtained Boeing flight simulator training .at Sim Center
and Pan Am International in Opalocka, Florida
5stands for "no middle name"
15
•
c
Terrorists Who Had FAA Certificates

+Marwan Yousef Alshehhi (Citizenship: DAE)
- OOB: 05/09/1978
- Commercial Pilot, Airplane Multiengine Land, Instrument
Airplane, Private Pilot privileges in airplane single engine land
- First Certificate issued: 09/09/2000 (Private, issued in Florida at
Huffman Aviation)
- Last Certificate issued: 12/21/2000 (Commercial, issued in
Florida at Huffman)
- Various permanent addresses in Florida; same as Mohamed Atta
- Took flying lessons at Airman Flight School, Norman Oklahoma;
Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida; Jones Aviation in Sarasota,
Florida; obtained Boeing flight simulator training at Sim Center
and Pan Am International in Opalocka, Florida
16
..
'"
+ Waleed Ahmed AI-Shehri (Citizenship: Saudi
Arabia)
- DOB: 01/01/1976
. airman application dated 0.2/24/1996)
- Commercial Pilot - Airplane Single and Multiengine Land
- InstrumentAirplane
- Flight Instructor - Airplane Single Engine, Instrument Airplane
- First Certificate Issued: 03/01/1995 (Private, Embry Riddle
Aeronautical University-ERAU)
- Flight Instructor Certificate Issued: 12/10/1997 (ERAU)6
- Last Rating Issued to Commercial certificate: 3/19/1996
(Addition of multiengine rating, ERAU)
6No indication that CFI was renewed; should have been renewed 12/99 and 12/01
(Note: This individual was subsequently cleared of being a hijacker by the FBI.)
17
• Terrorists Who Had FAA Certificates
+ Ziad NMN7 Jarrah (Citizenship: Lebanon)
- DOB: 05/11/1975
Private Pilot, Airplane Single Engine Land, Instrument Airplane
First Certificate Issued: 08/05/2000 (Private, issued in Florida at
Florida Flight Training Center)
Last Certificate Issued: 11/15/2000 (Addition of instrument rating
to private certificate, issued in Florida at Florida Flight Training
Center)
- Permanent address given as Hamburg, Germany
- All primary flight training taken at Florida Flight Training Center;
took Boeing flight simulator training at Aeroservice Aviation
,Center, Virginia Gardens, Florida
7stands for "no middle name"
Note: Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah were considered by authorities to be the ringleaders; the other 13
hijackers were considered the "muscle" 18
•
+ Hani Saleh Hanjoor (Citizenship: Saudi Arabia)
- DOB: 08/30/1972
airman application dated 4/1311999)
Airplane, Private Pilot privileges airplane single engine land
- First Certificate Issued: 04/23/1998 (Private, after one failure on
04/16/19988, issued in Arizona)
- Last Certificate Issued: 04/15/1999 (Addition of multiengine
rating to Commercial certificate, issued in Arizona)
- Permanent address given as Mesa, Arizona
8Reasons for failure: VOR interception of radials, coordinated turns to headings
19
•
.

+ Ali Ayedh Al-Ghamdi (Citizenship: Saudi Arabia)
- DOB: 06/28/1976
Airplane, Private Pilot privileges airplane single engine land
- First Certificate Issued: 06/11/1996 (Private, issued in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia'')
- Last Certificate Issued: 10/13/1998 (Addition of multiengine
rating to Commercial certificate, Flight Safety, Vero Beach, FL)
"Saudi Airlines employee identification used as required picture ID
(Note: This individual was subsequently cleared of being a hijacker by the FBI.)
20
+ Hijacked flights and hijackers with U.S. certificatesl''
Flight De12arted Probable Hijacker Target

AA Flight 11 BOS Atta WTC
UA Flight 175 BOS Marwan al-Shehhi WTC
AA Flight 77 lAD Hanjoor Pentagon
UA Flight 93 EWR Jarrah Unknown!'
"Based on information from FBI

1 1 crashed in PA
21
" Private Pilot - Aeronautical Knowledge
Applicable FAA regulations

. How to report accidents, what constitute an
accident
How to use of the aeronautical publications .
How to navigate using charts, landmarks, and
instruments in visual conditions
Radio communication procedures
Recognition of critical weather situations
Safe and efficient operation of aircraft,
including collision avoidance and recognition
and avoidance of wake turbulence
22
(I)
, ~
."' .
Private Pilot - Aeronautical Knowledge
- Effects of atmospheric conditions on

aircraft performance
- How to compute weight and balance
- Basic aerodynamics and basic knowledge
of engines aircraft systems
- Stall awareness, spin entry, spins, and spin
recovery techniques
- Aeronautical decision making and
judgement.
- Preflight preparations-obtaining
necessary information for the flight and
planning for alternatives
23
• Private Pilot - Flight Skills
+ Airplane single-engine land:

- Preflight preparation
- Preflight procedures
- Airport and seaplane base operations
- Takeoffs, landings, and go-arounds
- Performance maneuvers
- Ground reference maneuvers
- Navigation
- Slow flight and stalls
- Basic instrument maneuvers
- Emergency operations
- Night operations
- Postflight procedures
24
• Private Pilot - Aeronautical Experience
+ Airplane single-engine rating (minimum):

40 hours of flight time
• Includes at least 20 hours from an
authorized instructor
• Includes at least 10 hours of solo flight
training
3 hours of cross-country flight training
3 hours of night flight training that includes:
• One cross-country flight of over 100 miles
• 10 takeoffs and landings to a full stop
25
(It Private Pilot - Aeronautical Experience
+Airplane single-engine rating (minimum):

- 3 hours of instrument flying
- 3 hours of flight training to prepare for.
practical test
- 10 hours of solo time, consisting of at least:
-5 hours solo cross-country
- One solo cross-country flight of at least 150
miles
- Three takeoffs and three landings to airport
with an operating control tower
26
Instrument Rating Requirements
+ Prerequisite - hold a Private Pilot Certificate

+ Aeronautical knowledge:
FAA Regulations that apply to flying in instrument conditions
Aeronautical publications pertaining to flying instrument
"conditions
Air traffic control procedures while flying in instrument conditions
Navigating and approaching to land solely by use of flight
instruments
Us"inginstrument navigation and approach procedure charts
Procurement and use of aviation weather reports and forecasts
Safe and efficient operation of aircraft under instrument flight
rules and conditions
Recognition of critical weather situations and windshear
avoidance
Aeronautical decision making and judgement
Crew resource management, including crew communication and
coordination
27
I
·----.._0_
" "0'
Instrument "......_.
Rating - Aeronautical Experience ~_
'* Airplane single-engine rating:
At least 50 hours of cross-country flight time as pilot in
command, of which at least 10 hours must be in airplanes
A total of 40 hours of actual or simulated instrument time
• At least 15 hours of instrument training from an authorized
instructor
• At least 3test
practical hours of instrument training in preparation for the
• At least oneof:
consisting cross-country flight under instrument flight rules
- "At least 250 miles along airways or ATe-direct routing

- An instrument approach at each airport
- Three different kinds of approaches
30 hours may be in a flight Simulator or flight training

device if the training is in accordance with a training school
program (under part 142) - 20 hours if not.
28
Instrument Rating - Flight Skills
- Flight skills related to all other certificates and

ratings
- Preflight preparation
- Preflight procedures
- Air traffic control clearances and procedures
- Flight by reference to instruments
- Navigation systems
- Instrument approach procedures
- Emergency operations
- Postflight procedures
29
• Commercial Pilot Requirements
+ Prerequisite - hold a Private Pilot Certificate

+ Aeronautical knowledge areas include everything for private
pilot certificate plus:
, Meteorology to include recognition of critical weather
situations, windshear recognition and avoidance, and the
use of aeronautical weather reports and forecasts
Use of performance charts
Significance and effects of exceeding. aircraft performance
limitations
Use of air navigation facilities
Maneuvers, procedures, and emergency operations .
appropriate to the aircraft
Night and high-altitude operations
Procedures for operating within the National Airspace
System
30
.• Commercial Pilot - Flight Skills
+ For airplane multiengine:

Preflight preparation
. Prefl ight proced ures
Airport and seaplane base operations
Takeoffs, landings, and go-arounds
Performance maneuvers
Navigation
Emergency operations
Multiengine operations
High-altitude operations
Postflight procedures
31
• Commercial Pilot - Aeronautical Experienc
-------- . ",,,,,,,,,,=~. -~,1'_~"'_"~'~~"'=bU'.4~·~"",,,,a·."""_""","~"'7C""'-~'~~==-~"'''''''''.,.=,<>.".''''=='''"'''''''=,.,==''''.;''''''''' ... '''~
+ Airplane single-engine rating:

250 hours of flight time
• 100 hours in powered aircraft, 50 in
airplanes
• 100 hours of pilot-in-command flight
time consisting of:
- 50 hours in airplanes
- 50 hours in cross-country flight with
at least 10 hours in airplanes
32
• Commercial Pilot - Aeronautical Experienc.
• 20 hours of training relating to areas

of operation, consisting of:
- 10 hours of instrument training of which at least
5 hours must be in a multiengine airplane
- 10 hours of training in a multiengine airplane that
has retractable landing gear
- One cross-country flight of at least 2 hours in a
multiengine airplane in day VFR conditions with a
distance of more that 100 miles from point of
origin
- One cross-country flight of at least 2 hours in a
multiengine airplane in NIGHT VFR conditions
with a distance of more that 100 miles from point
of origin
- 3 hours in a multiengine in' preparation for the
practical test,
33
.. • Commercial Pilot - Aeronautical Experienc .
• 1o hours of solo flight time or as

pilot-in-command with an instructor
-One cross country flight of not
less than 300 miles
-5 hours in night VFR conditions
with 10 takeoffs and 10 landings
34
_oSSible Scenarios- Based on Hijackers' Traini
~~~...l!:~~~&tG.\tIll.~(§iI.':;;!\!a.~ta.:J.~~I,o\."':=~l';Y~"A'\!;.~'"&.,.l.":l'i'lt·r:r,b~,;;\~.ilii.I:k""-'!o;~""",,«,,,_:r.;'!;l,"::':·':-"..,..~.;:t'):"),\"~",~"~':~~~/.'~iI!,·H"';"';;:_·'::.I.fJ;;:!l1ll:;;';'~~:O:~""':J""' .. ,IRA(r!"J'~fu~.('l,.'.li:::;;ax\'Z:~~':''';,N.7.:;j.;;I",I'l\<.'::i.:N.'IIi"':'M"!"":;I."~,jilJ)l;."';:Tr;l.":..~m;:jto>t:;t;';:;"i<"1'oOl'Mi:'.'~'ml~""];lj"
+ Scenario #1: Commandeer a large aircraft already airborne and in

VFR conditions:
Needs only rudimentary "maneuvering flight" skills
Depending on the category, class, and type of aircraft, a .person can
develop sufficient skills to safely act as PIC in about 15 hours in a non-
complex aircraft, and proportionately-more for more complex aircraft
If a device that can simulate the flight deck and flight environment is
used, the learning and training experience can be enhanced greatly
Bottom line: Private Pilot ASEL with flight training device augmentation
(Microsoft Simulator) would suffice
+ Scenario #2: Commandeer a large aircraft already airborne and in
IFR conditions:
Need maneuvering flight and instrument flight skills
Private Pilot ASEL, instrument rating with flight training device
augmentation
+ Scenario #3: Commandeer a transport aircraft (large, multiengine)
on the ground
Need maneuvering, instrument, and large multi-engine aircraft pilot
experience
Private Pilot ASEL, instrument rating, Commercial Pilot AMEL
35
UNCLASSIFIED
~FiZ OfO!73J3
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Potomac TRACON

Type of event: Interview with John ,Hendershot, Operations Supervisor, Dulles ATCT on
September 11, 2001
Prepared by: Miles Kara and Kevin Shaeffer
Team Number: 8
Location: Potomac TRACON, Warrenton, VA
Participants - Non-Commission: David Weigand,F AA Counsel
Participants - Commission: Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer
NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the tape recording of the interview for a complete
account.
----------------------------------------------------------------------~------------------------~------
Background
Hendershot has been with FAA for 20 years starting with a traffic management assignment at Norfolk
ACTC in 1983. His experience is primarily supervisory and his Washington DC area experience began in
1990 when he was the area supervisor at Dulles Tower.
Command and Control in FAA
Hendershot had no specific knowledge of FAA command and control for emergency situations. His
references were to standing daily telecoms. He believed that during emergencies all calls to facilities
would be handled by the Command Center at Herndon.
Hendershot reported to Jaime Llana, the Operations Manager, who reported to Sherelle Caper, the Asst Air
Traffic Manager, who reported to Stan McLain, the Air Traffic Manager (A TM). Caper may have been the
acting ATM. Henderson was in the TRACON portion of the Dulles Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT)
and was not in the Tower. He recalled that Terry Brown was the Tower Supervisor. The two supervisory
positions were interchangeable and on any given day Hendershot could be the Tower Supervisor or the
TRACON Supervisor.
Crisis Management
Henderson thought that most such communications would have gone through the Traffic Management
Coordinator, Mark Masaitas. Masaitas reported to the OM, Jaime Llana, not to Hendershot. Masaitas was
responsible for implementing and coordinating traffic management initiatives [Note: Masaitas currently
works at Potomac TRACON, but had departed for the day.] Hendershot's duties focused on air traffic
management and he would sometimes talk to other facility supervisors in that capacity. When asked about
the Washington Operations Center (WOC) net Hendershot said he was on a telecom on 9-11 but was not
sure if it was the WOC net, or not.
UNCLASSIFIED
He was asked about his FAA statement concerning the events of 9-11. In that statement he specifically
mentioned the Critical Event Eastern Regions Hotline. He did not recall the particulars of that hotline and
said that he wasn't on it that long, maybe 10 minutes, max. The Operations Manager (OM) Jaime Llana
would typically on the net, but Hendershot had time critical information to pass and the OM was off the
floor.
Hendershot had no specific information about either the WOC primary or tactical nets and does not recall
talking on or to the WOe.
He was aware of other hijackings in the system (UA93) from the Command Center, he thought, through
Mark Masaitas. He recalled directing everyone to be aware of any suspicious aircraft. Both he and Mark
were on scopes, but he doesn't recall giving any specific guidance to look for primary-only targets. At the
end of the interview he volunteered that upon hearing that ZID lost secondary and primary on a commercial
airliner to advised his air traffic controllers to be more alert.
Danielle 0 'Brien notified him of a suspicious primary. He immediately picked up the White House hot
line. Hendershot was questioned extensively about this line, but did not know any particulars at the
receiving end. He said, "I guess the operator picked it up," and assumed the information he passed on th
them would be relayed to the right people in the White House. He recalled that there might have been
periodic phone/line checks prior to 9-11, but showed no familiarity with the line. He didn't recall other
times the hotline (a dedicated line) would be used other than phone checks and coordination of Marine One
going to/from Camp David.
Hendershot was shot the FAA-provided transcript, most of which didn't ring a bell. He did state that no
one from Dulles Tower was talking to the White House during the minute-minute countdown concerning
the unknown primary approaching from the west.
As far as he could recall there were only two hotlines at Dulles, one to the White House and one to airport
operations at Dulles. The OM and the TMC would be the primary users of the ICSS phone. Supervisors
could also use the system.
He has no specific knowledge of the taping of any hotlines or the ICSS other than to assume they were.
2
..
UNCLASSIFED
• MEMORANDUM
Event: Federal Aviation Administration
Type of event: Interview with Robert Birch
Date: Tuesday, December 16, 2003
FOR THE RECORD
(FAA) New York TRACON (N90) ®
Team Number: 8
Location: N90, 1515 Stewart Ave., Westbury, NY 11590
Participants - Non-Commission: Mary M. McCarthy (Office of Regional Counsel,
Eastern Region, FAA - One Aviation Plaza, RM 561, Jamaica, NY 11434: P 718-553-
3259, F 718-995-5699)
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown
• Prior to recording:
Birch noted his disappointment that Commission staff was the first group to question him
about the events of September 11,200.1 (9/11), and that this interview occurred over two
years from the day of the attacks.
Birch noted also that most hijacks in the past were thought to be taken to a place of safety
for the hijackers, not as a weapon against infrastructure.
Background:
Birch started with the FAA on June 12,1977. He was assigned to Newark Tower and was
certified there as an FPL full erformance level controller. He transferred to N90 in
1980., eturning to N90 in 1984. He was
certi.fle or ewar area, an In t e mi eig ues transferred to traffic management unit
(Tfv1"U).He transferred to LaGuardia area, became a first line supervisor, and then at the
TfV10 became a supervisor. He has been an Operations Manager for roughly three years.
/9/11 :
Birch was the Operations Manager in Charge COMIC) on 9/11. Mike Lofaso was one of
•
the TMU supervisors, as well as Karl Jiricek. Jeffrey Clarke, the acting Air Traffic
Manager currently, was Birch's supervisor on 9111.
CONIMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFED
American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11):
Birch had a potable phone on him, and his deputy chief, Jeffrey Clarke called him and
relayed the information that N90 had received a call from Boston Center informing him
that AA 11 was hijacked. The information given was that it was primary only and
traveling down the Hudson River north of the metropolitan area.
Birch noted that they were observing the target, and they watched the primary target
identified with AA 11 disappear along the Hudson River. N90 staffwas watching
television in the break room, and Birch noted that these staff members informed the
Watch Desk that the World Trade Center (WTC) had been hit by a light aircraft. Birch
noted that they did not associate the WTC impact with the loss of the primary on AA II.
This was since lighter aircraft pilots are less experienced than an airliner pilot, and he
personally was not thinking this was a purposeful action .
.United-Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175):
Birch noted that the Watch Desk received information on UAL 175 from New York
Center (ZNY). Birch does not have any knowledge about the changing beacon code of
UAL 175. They were monitoring an assigned data block for the flight. Newark Tower
called and informed them that there was a second aircraft into the WTC.
Birch immediately told Newark Tower to stop all air traffic. Ron Regan went around the
operations floor and told all the supervisors and controllers to stop all air traffic in their
sectors.
Birch noted that he believes there was a call from ZNY, possibly by Mike McCormack,
informing him that there might have been more ongoing events. Birch noted that he does
not believe this call came until after they had started halting their air traffic.
Aftermath:
Birch orchestrated a complete stop to the air traffic that was controlled by N90
immediately after the first-two attacks on 9/11. Birch participated in numerous telephone
conferences while doing so. He spoke with his counterpart at Herndon Command, but
does not know who that would have been. Birch noted that he most likely spoke with
someone at the FAA Eastern Regional Office as well.
Birch noted that there was one call that was with the Local Eastern Region and another
conference call that was at the national level. Both these were established at some point
after UAL 175 struck the WTC. Birch recalls that one of these conference calls had
military participation. Birch believed that the national level telecom and the regional
level telecom were held on recorded lines. Birch also noted that these telecoms were open
listening lines. N90 monitored the national telecom lirie for several days at least,
according to Birch.
COMMISSION SENSI'llVE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFED
Birch had no knowledge of AA 11 being airborne after 8:46 AM, or of there being two
aircraft that hit the north tower, or of there being a Sikorski helicopter involved in the
events of the day.
Commission staff reviewed a transcript provided by the FAA to the Commission labeled
Position 14, Parts 1-4, page 73 with Birch.
Birch noted to Commission staff that Tommy White, at that time a Traffic Management
Unit supervisor, went "downstairs" right away to review an instant radar replay. This
replay is normally used to investigate possible operational error.
AA 77 and VAL 93:
Birch did not recall ifhe heard of flights AA 77 or UAL 93 from the break room or from
one of the conference calls. He noted that they heard of other crashes that did not actually
happen. That is why at N90 they feared that there were massive attacks occurring
concurrently across the country.
Military assistance:
Birch did not recall on 9/11 making a request from N90 for military assistance, but
believed that request was made by Boston Center. Birch noted that his step to request
military assistance would be to notify the En Route Center, the Regional Office, the
Command Center, and the National Headquarters. Birch would also notify his superior at
N90.
Now N90 has a hotline that connects directly to NEADS. This would be his first
notification procedure. There is also a DEN line that is monitored by a number of
agencies. N90 does not normally monitor it unless a flight is coming inbound. The DEN
line is not monitored by N90 at all times. Birch was not familiar with the National
Military Command Center, or the FAA Hijack Coordinator at FAA Headquarters.
Recommendations:
Birch noted that the first line of communication should be to an asset capable of making a
difference in the air event.
Birch noted that there should be air defense fighters at Flyod Bennet Field outside of
Manhattan. But he also noted that security should begin on the ground, and that hij ackers
should be prevented from accessing planes before they even board .
.COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFED
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York TRACON (N90)

Type of event: Interview with Jimmy Coschignano
Team Number: 8
3259, F 718-995-5699)
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown
Background:
Coschignano started with the FAA in 1978.
September 11,2001 (9/11):
Coschignano started at New York Center on 9/11, and was working at an Air Space
Detail. Three days a week he was at ZNY on a detail. Mike McCormack, the Air Traffic
Manager for ZNY, asked anyone who was not essential to leave. He drove directly to
N90, andreported for duty. The drive took approximately thirty minutes. He was
traveling westbound on the expressway and saw smoke from the direction of Manhattan.
He is also a volunteer firefighter, and called his firehouse. The firehouse told him they
thought it was a small aviation aircraft.
He reported to the TMU at approximately 9:30 AM. He had just been promoted on the 9th
to an Operational Manager position. He stayed at N90 for the next forty-eight hours.
Coschignano noted that most of the coordination he was involved with was with news
'helicopters.
Communications:
Coschignano noted that there were two or three constant telecoms ongoing on 9/11. Ron
Regan and Bob Birch were also monitoring and participating in the telecoms.
COMMISSION SENSI'lTVE
lJNCLASSIFIED
lJNCLASSIFED
Regarding the Herndon Command Center line, Coschignano assumed there were
representatives from NORAD and FAA headquarters on that line at some point in the
forty-eight hour period following the attacks. Coschignano noted that his recollection of
who he spoke with is very vague, but he suggested Commission staff review those
recorded lines for clarification.
Coschignano noted to Commission staff that these lines were recorded.
Identity of aircraft:
Coschignano recalled there was hearsay from controllers that returned to the operations
floor from the break room that passed information on the possible identity of the aircraft
involved in the attacks. By the time he arrived at the TMU though, Coschignano recalled
that it was accepted that the aircraft were commercial airlines.
Coschignano recalled that in the background at some point in the course of the day there
was one aircraft that was unaccounted for. The discussion was that the aircraft passed
through Cleveland Center headed to Chicago. Coschignano noted it might have been a
Delta flight.
Coschignano recalled that Tom White was replaying radar data for the suspected. aircraft
the morning of 9/11. Coschignano believed White was working to recreate the flight path
of the aircraft.
Coschignano had very little experience with American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11).
Coschignano recalled no knowledge of the false information that AA 11 was still
airborne after 8:46 AM. He had no knowledge of circumstance involving a Sikorski
helicopter out of Poughkeepsie.
Commission staff presented C with a transcript provided to Commission staffby the FAA
labeled Position 14, Parts 1-4. After review of a passage of the transcript, C explained
that the mention of a Sikorski helicopter in the transcript is not him. He noted to
Commission staff the belief that "Jimmy Johnson" and "Tommy White" may be the two
parties in the passage in question that discusses the Sikorski helicopter.
Military notification:
Coschignano's understanding of his responsibility in the case of an air event would have
been to contact New York Center on 9/11, but now he immediately contacts NEADS
through the DEN hotline.
Recommendation:
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFED
Coschignano noted that there is now a worry for general aviation contact. He noted the
belief that there should be Night Hawk helicopters on immediate alert' near targets of
specific interest.
COrvIMISSION SENSrrrVE
UN-CLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Type of event: Interview with Steven R. Fanno
Date: Tuesday, December 16,2003
Team Number: 8
Location: N90, 1515 Stewart Ave.; Westbury, NY 11590
3259, F 718-995-5699), Bill D' Alo (NATCA representative, N90)
Background:
Fanno has been a controller for over thirteen years. He was a PatCo controller and
worked at Charleston, West Virginia and at LaGuardia Tower for three and a half years,
all before the strike in 1981. He was then hired at N90 in 1996.
September 11, 2001 (9/11):
He was at LaGuardia Sector position 104 from about 8:30 AM on which is the final
vector coordinator. It controls 20 to 30 miles southwest of LaGuardia. Traffic is fed from
the Harp control and the Empire control. Fanno noted that John McKay worked the
Empire sector, and possibly John Smith worked the Harp sector on.9/11.
There was a report at about 8:45 AM that an aircraft had hit one of the World Trade
Center (WTC) towers. Charles Hannon, Fanno's supervisor, asked if there were any
missing aircraft, and was told there were not. Fanno noted that within two or three
minutes there were reports to the supervision ofN90 of a general aviation aircraft that hit
the WTC. Fanno's supervisor also called the towers to attempt to gather more
information.
United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175):
The Liberty South position had taken a point out from Washington Center or from N90's
TMU of a primary only aircraft. Liberty South put a tag, the "8" symbol (Liberty South's
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
tag - each scope has its own tag) on the primary target. This target was approaching from
the northeast and descending. He noted that at first they thought it was a military aircraft.
He noted it also had a full data tag, which included the altitude reading. The data block
did not indicate it was UAL 175.
Fanno noted that they did not know what had happened to the target until a report came
30 seconds or so later that another aircraft had hit the WTC. Fanno believed that this
report came from an Eagle flight. Fanno noted that after this event N90 worked to remove
all aircraft from the N90 airspace.
Fanno does not remember who the supervisors were on 9111.
Aftermath:
Fanno began switching all approaches to LaGuardia Airport in order to allow as many as
possible to land. Fanno was specifically moving aircraft northeast of Laguardia in a
position to land at a specific Laguardia runway. Fanno's supervisor also directed him to
keep the LaGuardia aircraft on hold.
Fanno noted that approximately five to eight minutes after VAL 175's impact he was
given a break, and another controller took over his sector. .
Fanno noted that approximately ten minutes after he was put on break the discussion as to
which aircraft hit which tower began in conjunction with the media reports.
Fanno has no knowledge of the Sikorski helicopter, or ofELTs on 9111.
Hijack training prior to 9/11:
Fanno had both classroom and computer refresher training to practice various air traffic
scenarios. He commented that this is their basis for handling any in air emergencies.
Fanno noted that he does not recall any hijacking practice that would involve the aircraft
not informing the controller of the hijack by covert communication.
Fanno noted that his section of the exercise is complete once he notifies his supervisor of
the hijacking and monitors the aircraft as it passes through his sector.
Fanno noted that the training for hijacks has not changed, but the awareness of the
controllers has. .
Procedural changes:
Fanno noted that the he now has his filter limits on his scopes set higher than he used to.
He now looks five thousand feet higher than what is required. He noted that N90 is on
guard for unusual aircraft circumstance.
lJN·CLASSIFIED
lJNCLASSIFIED
Recommendations:
Fanno noted the general consensus from the group of controllers he was with on 9/11 that
they had no information, and it seemed as if there was information to be had. He does not
know where the flow of information came from and led, but he would recommend that in
the future the information that is necessary to help keep aircraft safe flow to those people
in charge of maintaining the safety of the air traffic system, namely the controllers.
For instance, if Fanno had known that AA 11 had struck the WTC, he would have
vectored all his aircraft away from the city immediately. This would have been a safer
approach to air traffic than waiting the time period it took to redirect aircraft after the
second flight hit the WTC.
lJNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Type of event: Interview with Karl Jiricek
Team Number: 8
3259, F 718-995-5699), Tom Zaccheo (NATCA Vice President, N90), Bill D' Alo
Background:
Jiricek noted that operationally working as an air traffic controller for the civilian air
traffic system immediately from his career as a military controller was not a too difficult
transition. He noted that only a handful of the military controllers that came on board to
fulfill the need during the 1981 strike actually worked radar scopes.
Jiricek noted that there is not much involvement with the military at N90, and there is no
real interaction with the air defense missions.
Jiricek noted to Commission staff that there
Poughkeepsie Sikorski:
Jiricek had a vague recollection of a missing helicopter on 9111. He noted that Liberty
Sector controls the Poughkeepsie space, so if the aircraft was from that point a Liberty
controller may have mentioned it. But Jiricek noted that he thought the report of a
missing helicopter came from somewhere "further north".
Hijack protocol:
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Jiricek noted that the responsibility of the controller is to inform their First Line
Supervisor, and the Supervisor takes steps from there. Jiricek also noted that ifhe had to
initiate contact with the military himself he would do so through Herndon Command
Center.
Jiricek noted that the procedure post 9/11 for reacting to a hijack is still the same. Jiricek
noted that post 9/11 the DEN hotline connected the TMU to a military coordinator.
1991-1993
Jiricek worked in this time period at the National Air Traffic control in Washington, D.C.
Recommendations:
Jiricek noted that from the controller's point of view the information they receive needs
to be gained and passed in a timely fashion. From his perspective there must have been
on 9/11 a chain of events prior to him getting a point out of an aircraft 30 miles from
Kennedy. He believed that chain of events should have included informing the air traffic
system quicker. He noted they had no altitude on the first airplane, did not have any real
notice on the second, and so he believed they did the best they could have. If he had
better information on what was ongoing on 9/11, he still does not know what could have
been done from his position. Jiricek noted that given the limited mileage coverage of the
N90 airspace they do not have much time to interpret possible circumstance involving an
aircraft.
COMMISSION SENSITIVI~
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UNCLASSIFIED

Type of event: Interview with Steve Saul
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown"
Team Number: 8
Location: N90, 1~15 Stewart Ave., Westbury, NY 11590
3259, F 718-995-5699)
Background:
Saul was a pilot and flew commuter airplanes prior to becoming an air traffic controller
(ATe). In 1982 after the air traffic control strike he was hired as a controller in the Islip
area and as a training specialist. He worked as a procedure specialist, a controller in the
LaGuardia sector, and then went to Islip Tower for two years as a supervisor. He returned
to N90 as a specialist at the Traffic Management Unit (TMU), and then became a
supervisor for Liberty sector. He has been a supervisor at Liberty sector for 13 years.
September 11, 2001 (9/11):
Around 7:51 AM on 9111 Saul began a shift as supervisor for Liberty Sector. Around
8:40 AM Saul was training a controller, and there was a Controler in Charge (CIC) for
the sector. The eIC called him over and pointed out American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11)
which they believed was a hijack. Saul had just recently heard that a hijacker from an
event-from over twenty years ago had just been caught, so it did not surprise him that
"someone" had "gotten the idea" to hijack another flight.
Since the flight did not originate in New York Center airspace, he could not pull up any
information on the flight. This was normal, since the flight originated in Boston Center
airspace. Saul was told that the last known altitude for the flight was 29000.
UNCLASSIFIED
'- ,...
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• Based on his experience, Saul guessed the flight had a speed of approximately 300 or 400
knots. Below 10000 feet, aircraft are only allowed to have a flight speed of 250 knots,
and thus this was alarming. Saul advised the floor that there was a NORDO flight, and
did not spread news of it being a hijack so as to not alarm the whole floor.
Saul watched the radar at the "main bang" - the four mile gap directly above the point of
a radar - for AA 11 to reappear on the radar. Saul expected to see the aircraft fifteen or
twenty miles west of New York considering the speed at which the aircraft was traveling.
Saul heard a report that the World Trade Center (WTC) was on fire, and realized that AA
11 had hit the WTC. Saul thought initially that a disgruntled company pilot had done this
intentionally, but not as an act of terrorism. He had not heard of the threatening cockpit
communications. From the time he heard of the hijacking to the point of impact was
approximately three minutes at the most, according to Saul.
Saul recalls that the pilots on the frequencies were conferring through the control1ers and
they had started to put together that it might have been a commercial airliner. But Saul
had begun to think it was most likely a private jet sized aircraft. But the pilots were
telling the controllers that it could not have been a small aircraft considering the leve1 of
damage to the WTC.
•
United Airlines Fligbt 175 (UAL 175):
I . t.ook over for Steve Vollaro? and received a" oint out" of an aircraft.
That alrcraft was 'descend in int~ . 1s airspace,,~_~~.,.,.. .. ,
Saul walked up t s radar, pomtea at the target, an
consider it a "terrons atrcra ~",Saul remembers that the aircraft w,a·s
16000 feet and was {raveling at:approximateiy 400 knots. .:
, . , , .
.... ..I~almed down. and continued to monitor/he aircrafi
Saul went to the TMU desk, and\told Ron Regan, B'ob Birch's superior, that there was
another flight incoming, alfd requested for their to.be military assistance. Saul noted that
his comment was 'out of frustration because he knew that-there wereno fighters close
enough to respond. \.. ...', : ...
Saul noted that he was .alarmed because he. held' the opinion that if the aircraft was
landing at one of those airports.it would ry'ot have been descending at such a quick rate.
Saul watched the altitude descend. unti I the t~rget/disappeared from the scope.
Aftermath:
, ,
•
Within a few minutes all departures-out ofthe New York area controlled by N90 were
stopped per the direction of Ron Regan\Vi
9/11 Working-~evel Employee
COMMISSION SENSITTVE
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Saul noted that some of the controllers were upset by the events of 9/11, and clearing the
airspace was difficult.
AA 77 and VAL 93:
He found out about the AA 77 and the Pentagon attack while speaking with his wife. He
believes he was still in the facility when VAL 93 went down.
Bill Allen took over from Saul around 9: 17 AM. Saul came back on duty approximately
45 minutes from then .
.Other aircraft:
Saul noted that there are general aviation aircraft that are allowed to fly the passage up
the Hudson River, and that some controllers thought it might have been a small aircraft,
but most of the pilots were certain it was a commercial airliner. Saul told the controllers
that it was a commercial airliner. Saul noted that there was less certainty over the second
aircraft that hit the WTC (UAL 175).
The Hudson River corridor is a passage through which flights can travel without
restrictions as long as they keep their aircraft below 1000 feet.
Saul has no knowledge of the Sikorski helicopter or ofELTs on 9/11.
Communication:
Saul did not speak with anyone from the Eastern Region FAA office on 9/11. Nor did he
speak with Washington Headquarters. Nor did he speak with anyone from Herndon
Command Center. Saul noted that the Watch Desk at N90 holds the responsibility for
communicating with these entities.
Record:
Saul noted to Commission staff that there is a Facility Log and a Traffic Management
log, both of which report on air events that take place within N90 airspace.
Kennedy:
Saul had heard that there was a flight that had been grounded out of Kennedy Airport that
had passengers on board that were extremely suspicious. He is thankful that the flights
were grounded quickly for fear that there were other hijacks planned.
Observations:
Saul noted that the airspace routes are so congested that it was extremely difficult to
monitor the path of one flight that was off course.
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Saul noted that the aircraft carriers at times allow the passengers to monitor the frequency
and communications between the controllers and the pilots. This is done at the discretion
of the pilot.
Based upon his experience as a pilot and a flight trainer, Saul believes that aircraft
cockpits need to be extremely secure.
Saul noted that there needs to be better security at the smaller airports as well, since
general aviation aircraft would be very difficult to stop.
Saul noted that there are times that on the midnight shift he is in charge of the facility. He
noted that he feels adequately prepared for that responsibility, and for the methods
necessary to notify the military in case of another terrorist event.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE.
UNCLAS SIFlED
UNCLASSIFIED

r~)
..'.-....-..'.-.-.. ..'-J'.-:"
I
Event: Cape TRACON Interviews: Tim Spence, Cape TRACON Operational Supervisor

Date: Tuesday, September 30, 2003
Team Number: 8
Location: Otis Air Force Base, FAA Cape TRACON building
Participants - Non-Commission: Steve Walsh
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown
Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.
Background:
Spence is identified as K90 on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) transcripts provided to
Commission staff.
Spence began his employment with the FAA as an Air Traffic Control Specialist in 1984. He
began in Messa, Arizona. From there he worked in Oakland, CA and after that in Las Vegas, Nevada.
From Nevada he went to New York at Kennedy Tower and was assigned to equipment evaluations. Since
1999 he has been an Operational Supervisor at Cape TRACON. In November of2003, Spence transfers to
an FAA facility in Northern California as an Operations Supervisor. .
As an operations supervisor Spence has responsibilities for labor management, and he maintains
shift rotation.
Cape TRACON controls airspace up to 10,000 feet. This airspace is between Providence, Boston
and "the Islands" (Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard).
K90 as a position is recorded on site in digital voice recording format. There may be recordings at
the military areas, but since Spence made many of his calls 0 9/11 from a commercial phone those
communications were not recorded.
Cape TRACON is located roughly 150 to 200 meters from Otis Air Force Base (Otis AFB).
September 11, 2001 (9/11):

According to Spence, on 9/11 the Traffic Management Unit from Boston Air Route Traffic
Center (ZBW) contacted Spence and asked him to scramble air defense fighters to respond to a probable
hijack. Spence commented to Commission staff that this is not the typical responsibility of an Operations
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Supervisor with the FAA. He immediately called the Air Traffic Tower at Otis AFB to inform them of the
situation.
Commission staff questioned Spence in conjunction with a transcript from his position provided
by the FAA. Spence explained that during the five minute lapse in his recorded communications in the
FAA transcript he "made as many calls as possible". Spence started his calls with Otis Tower, for "if
nothing else" to give them a "heads up" and to receive information on who to call next to help facilitate
ZBW's request. The telephone number Otis Tower gave Spence was for either the Otis AFB Base. ,
Operations or for the "SoF (Supervisor of Flying) Desk" at the Base Operations desk. Spence explained
that the SoF is the aviation section of the Operations Desk. Spence called the Base Operations and
acknowledged he had no authority to authorize a fighter scramble, but advised Otis AFB to prepare to
receive an order since it was "probably on its way." He received the number for NEADS from the Otis
AFB, "from either Base Operations or from the SoF desk". Spence does not remember who gave him the
number. By the time he got in touch with NEADS they had already been contacted by ZBW. Spence
wanted to get the order officially sent as soon as possible.
Spence does not remember the exact details of who he spoke with on 9111. He stated he may have
been given a second number from the Tower but does not recall directly. He does not remember who he
talked to at the Otis AFB Operations Desk. Spence had been to Otis AFB before 9/11, so he knew as long
as he got a hold of one of personnel at the base the urgency of his message would be passed to the right
personnel. The general discussion he had with them was an introduction of his position, the relay of the
information of a hijack from ZBW, and a request for information on how to get a fighter scramble.
Spence postulated to Commission staff that Otis AFB may have just received a call themselves regarding
the situation; but he is not sure. They may have given him their supervisor, but he does not remember for
certain. Then he finally spoke with NEADS. These calls were made between 8:36 and 8:40/41 that
mornmg.
Since 8 :41 is the end of his discussion with NEADS, he believes the fighters were scrambled at
that point. He spoke with a male military personnel at NEADS who gave his position and name. Almost
immediately thereafter, within a minute, he received information that the scramble at Otis AFB was
ordered. The 8:41 call alerted TRACON that Otis had received its orders. The call was out of Giant
Killer. According to Spence, this is often called an "active scramble", but on 9111 they used the term
"battle stations" so the FAA knew of the seriousness of the event. All parties acknowledged with their
initials. Spence does not know who Giant Killer is, despite controlling the warning areas off the coast.
Spence does not distinguish Giant Killer from Huntress.
Spence commented that there was confusion, especially since the Base Operations standard
operating procedure was to contact the Centers with information. It was unusual for the Centers to contact
TRACON for information. Normally the FAA receives the call from the military for a scramble, but this
time it went the other way around, and then the official order came back down from the military.
According to Spence, most of the time the military does not differentiate that a scramble is or is
not for exercise when informing Cape TRACON. On 9/11, Spence called Dan Bueno at TMU ZBW to let
him know of the F 15 flight with the callsign PANT A.
Spence noted that information from the Tower went to PANT A that Huntress would control the
flights, and the flights were assigned a flight heading of 280. This information was shared by Huntress
and with Cape TRACON, so Cape TRACON knew to clear the flight path.
Spence offered that the Panta pilot may have been at the SoF desk when Spence made the call to
Otis AFB; this may account for why thepilot had some degree of warning.
UNCLASSIFIED
UN CLAS SIFIED
Spence is certain that the fighters were airborne when he received word that the WTC had been
hit. He also commented that there were numerous scrambles from Otis AFB after the time period covered
by the transcripts used in the interview. At that point Spence was highly involved in clearing the airspace
covered by Cape TRACON in accordance with the National Air Traffic Zero that was declared.
Notification to close airspace came to Cape TRACON via ZBW. Spence noted to Commission staff that
instrument aircraft were requesting clearance to arrive and to depart. He was able to facilitate the air space
orders that restricted these flights once the first message informed him that no one was allowed to transfer
through New York Airspace; after that the national system was shut down. Spence commented that part .
of his job as a supervisor was to tactfully tell pilots that under national security interest they had to land
their aircraft. Some of the controllers and the pilots questioned the order and were reluctant to believe
what was happening.
The evening of9/ll Spence and Steven Walsh, another Cape TRACON employee, spent several
hours creating transcripts of the recorded conversations from the morning. He immediately sent that
rough draft "up the chain". Spence also wrote an email of the account to Quality Assurance (QA) at the
Eastern ROC on the "Friday or the Saturday after the 11th".
Procedure prior to 9/11:
Spence informed Commission staff that he had never been involved in a hijacking response prior
to 9111. For anything on the terminal environment level that would need some response - that would need
"system involvement" - he would immediately call the ZBW Watch Desk. The Center then disseminates
the information. His next procedural step would be to inform the FAA Eastern Regional Operations
Center (ROC). As far as Washington Operations Center (WOC) and Herndon Command are concerned
regarding the flow of information, he would expect the WOC to disseminate the information nationally.
Spence noted that he would want to alert the local authorities first in the case of a local event.
In terms of requesting and receiving military assistance, Spence's first point of contact would be
ZBW's military operations specialist (MOS).
On 9111 Spence was unaware of other military bases with air defense capabilities besides Otis
AFB.
Post 9/11:
The QA person at Cape TRACON is now Dawn Wright. On 9111 the position was held by Dawn
Field. Spence does not believe information was collected by the QA office at Cape TRACON regarding
their response to the attacks.
Spence commented that most of the post-91l1 new procedures at Cape TRACON only reiterate
the same information flow that existed prior to 9111. Spence would call ZBW first, and then cover his
local information flow responsibilities. Spence qualified this by stating that he would prioritize by the
dictates of the individual situation. He noted that he might call NEADS directly on the number that is kept
in the Operations Supervisor rolodex.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE·
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Type of event: Interview with Steve Vollaro
Team Number: 8
Location: Ronkonkoma, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Mary M. McCarthy (Office of Regional Counsel, Eastern
Region, FAA - One Aviation Plaza, RM 561, Jamaica, NY 11434: P 718-553-3259, F 718-995-
5699), Tom Zaccheo (NATCA Vice President, N90)
Background:
Vollaro started at N90 in 1990, and has always been on rotation in the Liberty Section. Liberty
takes the aircraft from the departures and sets them on route, and also takes some of the arrivals
for Stewart and some of the other smaller airports.
9/11 :
Vollaro was assigned to the seven to three shift on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Vollaro noted that
a primary target was pointed out to him in Liberty South. He was told to watch out for the
aircraft, but there was a lot of clutter on his scope. Steve Saul, his supervisor, pointed out the
aircraft. Saul just pointed to a general area and informed that it was only a primary aircraft. Saul
did not give any other information.
Vollaro's radar screen is set to display all primary targets. In hindsight, Vollaro noted that the
aircraft Saul spoke of was most likely American Airlines 11 (AA 11).
Vollaro was in the break room and learned of the crash from a media report.
Vollaro was not in position when United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175) entered N90 radar
range.
Vollaro did not recall any discussion except for the media broadcast over what type of aircraft hit
the W orId Trade Center (WTC) towers.
UNCLASSIFIED
lJNCLA.SSIFIED
COtv1MISSION SENSITIVE
Vollaro did not take part in the grounding of aircraft on 9/11. By the time he returned from
break, the events of the morning had already taken place.
Recommendations:
Vollaro noted that the process for notifying the appropriate military authorities should be
streamlined, though he does not have much role in the process except to notify his supervisor of
any possible complications with aircraft.
COMMISSION SENSI'rrVE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Event: Cape TRACON Interviews: Steven Walsh, Cape TRACON Air Traffic Controller
Team Number: 8
Location: Otis Air Force Base, FAA Cape TRACON building
Participants - Non-Commission: Steve Walsh
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown
Background information preliminary to recorded interview:
Walsh noted to Commission staff that his primary role on September 11,2001
(9/11) was to clear airspace for the scrambledPANTA F1S flight that departed from Otis
Air Force Base (Otis AFB). Walsh believes CapeTRACON. understood that it was critical for
the fighters to "clear" (be free of air traffic) at a 5 mile radius as quickly as possible. Walsh
commented that he was familiar with the steps necessary to quickly clear airspace since Otis AFB
has procedure in place to serve as the back-up landing facility for the NASA space shuttle, and
Cape TRACON has responsibility to partake in this function.
Walsh noted that there are two operations that involve rapid coordination of Otis AFB
asset immediate take-off: "scramble" and "flush". He explained that in a flush there is no Air
Traffic Control (ATC) communication and all the aircraft at the base take-off. A flush would be
used if there was an imminent threat to the base. With a scramble the military flights do
communicate with the ATCs.
Commission staff presented a transcript provided to the Commission by the FAA to

Walsh for explanation. Walsh informed Commission staff that the term "off 5" indicates a flight
departed from Runway 5, which is directly off the main hanger at Otis AFB. Also, practice
scrambles occurred "all the time", so Steven Walsh, at Cape TRACON High Arrival Position,
coordinating with Tim Spence at K90, was not aware that the scramble of the PANT A flights on
9/11 was in response to the hijacking of AA 11. A call was received at Cape TRACON's ATC
Supervisor's desk from Daniel Bueno at Boston Air Route Center (ZBW).
Walsh communicated with PANTA 45, and PANTA 46 was its shadow. It is Walsh's
understanding that whenever he gives instruction to a flight lead, the lead passes the information
to its wing.
On 9/11 Tim Spence, the Supervisor at the desk for Cape TRACON, coordinated with the
Command Center, with the Otis AFB tower, and with Walsh's position on the radar.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Recorded Interview
Background:
Walsh began his career with the FAA in October of 1987. Prior to that he was employed
at both the Department of Defense (DoD) and at the United States Army as an Air Traffic
Controller (ATC). He has been a Full Performance Level flight controller at Cape Approach
(Cape TRACON) since May 1988. In 1989 he transferred to Boston TRACON, and after a short
time there returned to Cape Approach. Since 1990 Walsh has been at Cape Approach. In his
career he has been involved in OJTI Training, Aircraft Investigation for the ATC Union, and has
been a Facility Representative for National Air Traffic Controller Association (NATCA).
September 11, 2001 (9/11):
On the morning of 9//11 Walsh was assigned to the ASR 8' Otis High Position Combined,
which consist of four air traffic control positions combined into one. The decision to combine
these positions and their corresponding airspace depends on how many flights are scheduled to
travel through the airspace. The positions are often .combined for periods after the Labor Day
holiday, which corresponds in tum with the end of the summer vacationing season that accounts
for much of Cape TRACON's yearly air traffic.
Walsh was monitoring the radar and heard in the background of the operations area his
supervisor talking to ZBW about a fighter scramble from Otis AFB. At the same time he heard
the flight data specialist say he was attempting to get on the phone with the Command Center at
the Otis Air National Guard building, approximately half a mile from Cape TRACON. Next, the
Otis AFB Tower called to inform his position ofa F15 scramble with the call-sign PANTA.
Walsh controlled these fighters as a normal scramble flight, and transferred control to ZBW.
Shortly after transferring control to ZBW, Walsh was told from ZBW that the World
Trade Center (WTC) head been hit by an aircraft. Walsh had thought the Fl5s had been
scrambled in response to a hijacking, and when he heard the information concerning the WTC
from ZBW he assumed it was the aircraft the fighters had been scrambled to intercept. He asked
ZBW if the F15s were returning to Otis AFB, and was informed that they were staying in New
York Air Route Center (ZNY) airspace, and that the fighters were holding over New York City
(NYC).
When the PANT A flight scrambled the lead fighter radioed Walsh with their altitude
orders. Wash, in conjunction with Otis AFB Tower, cleared the flight to assume Flight Level 290
(FL 290, or 29,000 feet) at a course heading of 280. Walsh noted to Commission staff that the
fighters would not have passed Warning Area 105 (Whiskey 105) on this heading. He further
noted that flight time from Otis AFB to NYC is approximately 12 minutes for an F15.
Walsh believes Tim Spence, the Cape TRACON Operational Supervisor, was primarily
responsible for Cape TRACON actions on 9111, and reported directly to Buddy McDonald, the
Operations Manager of Cape TRACON; but Walsh noted that responsibility for the Air Traffic
Control might have been with Bob BussBurg, the Facility Manager at Cape TRACON. Walsh
noted that Bussberg may currently be a contract controller.
On 9/11, Walsh handled two other flights ofF15s as well as the initial PANTA scramble.
Those subsequent flights departing Otis were call-signed JEEP and SLAM. They departed as
tJNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
normal flights on the same 280 degree heading given to the PANTA flight. Walsh noted that
Active Scramble air defense fighters are fully loaded with armaments, but that the subsequent two
flights may not have been, unless the crew chiefs had the time arm them.
Walsh believes that the PANT A flight must have returned to Otis AFB approximately
two hours after their initial scramble. This is based primarily on his understanding of their fuel
capacity. (Note: Walsh would not be aware of the Russian Bear exercise, and that PANTA flights
were equipped with three tanks on 9111). Walsh also noted that the fighters from Otis AFB were
on missions throughout the night.
Walsh is not aware of any training exercises on the morning of 9111.
Military / FAA
Walsh noted to Commission staff that he controls practice scrambles from Otis AFB
"once or twice a month". There is usually no coordination between the military and Cape
TRACON in preparation for training missions; although if there is a large drill Cape TRACON
may receive notice. Walsh further noted that the 102nd Air National Guard Wing at Otis AFB is
graded on their performance in these exercises.
When there are training exercises Cape TRACON handles the flights after take-off, and
then guides the flight into ZBW airspace. Walsh believes ZBW hands control of the flight to
Giant Killer or Huntress as the flight enters the Whiskey 105 area. Walsh believes Giant Killer
and Huntress control practices and combat intercepts with the fighters. He is aware that
Huntress/Giant Killer are associated "somehow" to NEADS and NORAD.
General information on operations at CAPE Tracon:
Walsh informed Commission staff that radar responsibilities at Cape TRACON normally
close at 6:00pm in the summer months, and that "someone else" takes over their airspace daily at
10:00pm. 9111 was the first midnight shift Walsh had ever worked in his time at Cape TRACON.
Most of Cape TRACON's air traffic is air taxi (50 passengers or less) carriers to Boston
or to Providence. Thus Walsh is primarily familiar with General Aviation, Military and AT (Air
Taxi) flights; but not with major airline carrier flights.
Walsh noted to Commission staff the Otis AFB Tower is a contract tower, and is not
staffed by military personnel. He believes it has weather contractors as well.
Recommendations:
Walsh informed Commission staff he does not believe that the random inspections of
passengers, luggage, and cargo at airports are effective. He believes airport security should profile
passengers.
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®
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York TRACON (N90) .

Type of event: Interview with George Willey
Team Number: 8
Participants -Non-Commission: Mary M. McCarthy (Office of Regional Counsel,
3259, F 718-995-5699), Tom Zaccheo (NATCA Vice President, N90)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Background:
Willey has been with the FAA for 22 years and has worked at LaGuardia Tower and at
N90. He has been at N90 as of january of 1990. He has been working the LaGuardia
position, NOBB 108. He controlled the arrivals and departures out of White Plains, NY.
September 11, 2001 (9/11):
Willey began his shift at seven AM that morning. From the NOBB position there were
some pilots that remarked that there were plumes of smoke from the World Trade Center
(WTC). He did not hear any reports that were related to the hijackings until the initial
reports from pilots of the smoke from Manhattan. This was before he heard of any of the
circumstances with the hijacked aircraft.
Willey's statement reflected that he saw an aircraft on the HARP scope, but when
questioned he noted to Commission staff that he still does not know which aircraft that
may have been. '
Willey noted that the reports of the smoke came to him before he noticed the target on the
HARP scope. The target Willey observed on the HARP scope disappeared. He
"wondered what happened to it ., that was it". He did not know if that target was a
commercial airline or not. Willey commented that sometimes they could discern some
details on the size and power of an aircraft by watching the radar feed and estimating the
aircraft's speed.
COMMISSION SENSrlTVE
lJNCLASSTFIED.
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Willey remembered that within minutes of seeing the target disappear from the HARP
scope he heard from other controllers that the World Trade Center had been hit by an
aircraft.
Willey participated in grounding all aircraft once the decision to go to ATC Zero (Air
Traffic Control Zero) was made.
lJNCLASSIFTED
.. ,,-
•
Event: Interview of Gene L. McClelland, Jr.
'Date: July 31, 2003
Special Access Issues: none
Team Number: 6
Location: FBI Washington Field Office, Washington, DC
Participants-Commission: Barbara Grewe, Quinn John Tamm, Jr.
FBI Representative: Robert Stuart Sinton
Gene L. McClelland Jr .
..... ... SSA McClelland has a Bachelor of Science degree.

He entered on duty with the FBI on 08/06/1979. SSA McClelland was a commissioned
•
officer in the U.S. Army before joining the FBI. SSA McClelland has been assigned to
the WFO his entire career. SSA McClelland investi ative assi rinci all in
fureigncounrerinklligence~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
targets. SSA McClelland has su rvise
9/11 Classified Information
SA are require
The basic trainin for the osition lasts six weeks.
• ·-S~CRET
I •• ••
SECRET
• 9/11 Classified
9/11 Law Enforcement

Information
Sensitive
~Counter terrorism surveillances receive the highest priority, followed by

counter intelligence, The request form also reports whether the case is an intelligence
case. If an intelligence case, the case agent also notes whether the case is a preliminary
investigation or a full field investigation. In the past, physical surveillance could not be
employed on preliminary investigations. Since the Patriot Act was passed, this
prohibition has been removed. However, knowing that status assists in scheduling the
•
surveillances.
(i)Because of limited resources, the Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASAC)

uentl must decide which surveillances will be approved. Surveillance is conducted
9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive and that type of surveillance frequently
• 2 -sECRET
.. ..
, ... ~
....._---_ .....1SSA McClelland provided no additional information at this time .
• 3
COMMISSION SENSITIVE H Ff\ /dfuo qq g1
~ 5/JO 7!J~;::-
Event: Interview with Rear Admiral Cathal "Irish" Flynn, USN (ret) j51
Type of Event: Interview
Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan and reviewed by Commission participants
Team Number: 7
Location: 9-11 Commission Office, GSA building
Participants - Non-Commission: Rear Admiral Cathal "Irish" Flynn, USN (ret), former
Civil Aviation Security for the Federal Aviation Administration
Participants - Commission: Sam Brinkley, Bill Johnstone, John Raidt, and Lisa Sullivan
Background
(Unc) Admiral Flynn served in the United States Navy for 30 years. Following his
retirement from the Navy in 1990, Adm. Flynn joined Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC). From 1993 through 2000 he served as Associate Administrator of
Civil Aviation Security (ACS 1). Admiral Flynn spoke to the state of the civil aviation
system as it was on September 11,2001, and how security and intelligence were
integrated over the course of his tenure at FAA. He testified that FAA Administrator
Hinson shared his view that aviation security was "crucial" to the FAA's mission.
ACS and NSC
(Unc) To start, Flynn asserted that the Commission should not underestimate the
influence and impact the National Security Council staff (particularly the National
Security Council's former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke) had on Flynn's work in
aviation security at FAA. Flynn immediately went on to substantiate his assertion in
citing a 1995 meeting at which Richard Clarke was present when Flynn urged the
intelligence community to provide FAA with more intelligence affecting civil aviation in
order to step-up security at airports.
(Unc) Additionally, Flynn represented the FAA at meetings of the National Security
Council's Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) that pertained to civil aviation
security. FAA did not attend CSG meetings regularly.
ACS and Central Intelligence

,/
~-frTo this point, Flynn discussed two meetings he held with FAA Administrator David
Hinson and two Directors of Central Intelligence circa 1995. Flynn reported that a
meeting was less than satisfactory, with one of the Directors displaying a
"condescending" view toward civil aviation security needs. One of the DCI's is reported
to have said, "You have those machines (EDS machines), why don't you put them in
places like Miami and you are done." Flynn told them of his concern that threats to civil
aviation were not being adequately communicated. More specifically, he named Newark,
New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan as places where he had received indications of
possible problems with Middle Eastern populations in those areas. Flynn thought more
resources were needed to fund aviation security measures and to direct intelligence. FAA
Administrator Hinson and Flynn sought permission from DCI to go to the Hill with their
concerns and to ask for more money for civil aviation security intelligence. S-60 was
supportive of Flynn's efforts but the DCI was not supportive of going to the Hill,
indicating that that they had "plenty" of such intelligence .
.1SSlj'His assessment of the CIA at the working level was "excellent". He reported that
the agency was consistently helpful, provided a lot of "grainy" information, and helped to
sanitize the intelligence reports for the industry. This was mostly a CTC function, and
Flynn believed eTC was "smart and had a pretty good, grainy appreciation" of civil
aviation intelligence needs. Information provided b CIA roduced results and led the
FAA to in Fl nn's words
~ Given the generally high quality of the CIA's work product for the FAA, Flynn
reportedly had a much better appreciation of what was going on in Beirut than in Detroit,
even through there were a "hell of a lot more flights out of a Detroit," and (as he said
before) there were significant Muslim populations located there. He said the threat at
home was perceived as present but low while overseas the threat was present and high.
Gore Commission
(Une) Flynn then discussed the Gore Commission. He deemed their treatment of threats
to civil aviation to be "cursory" and their treatment of terrorism to be "lackadaisical."
The members failed to realize their priority in threat analysis should be Middle Eastern
terrorists. Flynn indicated the Commission dwelled on fallout from the Oklahoma City
bombing. Flynn believed that incident did not demonstrate a threat to aviation, or private
industry for that matter.
ACS and FBI
(Une) In another instance, Flynn reported that staff of the Senate Select Intelligence
e
i Committee asked the FAA, the DCI and the FBI for a briefing on threat indications
regarding civil aviation. Despite the few indications the FBI had received (of an
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individual who tried to get a job with airport access at LAX, for instance), the answer
they supplied the congressional staff with was no; they were not aware of any significant
terrorist threats to the aviation industry. O'Neil was the head terrorism guy at FBI.
Blitzer was his Deputy at the FBI. Based on his interaction with the two DCIs and Louis
. Freeh, Flynn characterized their attitude toward the FAA as "condescending." They were
not receptive to the idea that more needed to be done in the area.of intelligence for civil
aviation security.
ACS and FAA leadership
(Unc) The FAA Administrator at the time, David Hinson, recognized the difference
between safety and security and agreed intelligence was "crucial" to security.
Domestically and internationally, U.S. carriers were everywhere. Flynn felt that his
position required that he have. a firm grasp of what was going on everywhere in the
world. Underscoring this statement, he asserted that "if a high quality terrorist got to the
airport, it was going to be very difficult to stop him or her."
(Unc) When asked about his relationship with Administrator Jane Garvey, Flynn said that
she would ask how he was doing, for his input, from time to time. He believed that she
was "engaged" in security issues. Whenever a security directive or important Emergency
Amendment was issued, he would brief the Administrator.
ACS and Congress
(Unc) When asked about congressional interest, Flynn noted that Representative Jim
Oberstar from Minnesota was particularly active on the issue, and promoted enhanced
aviation security measures given the terrorist threat in a 1995 letter he wrote to the
President and Vice President. Flynn did not recall that Oberstar ever received a response
from the White House. With Oberstar's assistance, Flynn attempted to increase the
baseline budget for the FAA and step-up efforts undertaken by Security Directors. The
cumbersome and lengthy FAA rulemaking process led them to attempt to reconstitute the
Pan Am 103 Commission in non-crisis mode. Furthermore, he said he wanted "to avoid
having to chisel out improvements in the "unyielding granite" of the regulatoryprocess,
Domestic Threats
(.S5f)in turning to the domestic side, Flynn said Blitzer and the FBI would not give
regular reports and would only inform the FAA when it had specific information.
According to Flynn, Blitzer told others he had asked for "raw" intelligence. Flynn denied
this, and indicated to the Commission that he had asked for basic information of potential
threats from groups in the United States, where they were located, what their basic level
of sophistication was, what was going on, how they were organized. At this point, Flynn
alluded to the distinction between CIA and FBI attributed to the differences between
criminal investigations and intelligence gathering,with "intelligence jammed
uncomfortably into" the operations of the FBI. He reiterated that those covering the
domestic side had "precious little to say" to the FAA. When the FAA sent over a liaison
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to the FBI after the TWA 800, there was little improvement in the flow of useful
information.
(Unc) Flynn testified that at that time (late 1995) there was a belief within FAA that
domestic security needed to be "stepped up." The necessary improvements would be
expensive, and in addition to the aforementioned problems with the rulemaking process, .
there was a feeling that Congress would resist (for example; via restrictive appropriations
riders).
(Unc) At that point, the FAA determined to form a Baseline Working Group (BWG). It
was formally convened on the day of the TWA 800 incident and was therefore almost
immediately caught up in the "crisis mode" response to that event. Though the BWG
recommended more funding, some of the Commissioners from the Gore Commission
"pushed back" to keep the level at $100 million after it was discovered that TWA 800
had not been the result of terrorist action. By the following year (1998) neither OMB nor
the Congress supported any further increases in funding.
(Unc) With a budget of $1 00 million, there were only so many EDS machines FAA could
purchase at $1million a piece. The additional costs of installing and finding suitable
locations for them were obstacles for the program. Flynn said that an effective domestic
program for checked bags would require 2,000 machines.
ACS Rulemaking
(Unc) Flynn used the Emergency Authority of the Federal Aviation Administration Act to
push through security directives that circumvented the rulemaking process which could
take years topass a rule. The problem with this solutionwas that security directives were
temporary. Only rules carried the force of permanency, and the airlines were able to wait
out the rulemaking process, usually to their advantage.
ACS/ ACI Intelligence
£.S81} Flynn received a daily intelligence brief produced by Pat McDonnell's office
(ACI). There was a "SCIF" on site where he would go to read the most sensitive
intelligence reports. He periodically met with the intelligence analysts to discuss
intelligence flow. ACI kept files on threats around the world, also on individuals and their
histories. As part of his job, he briefed the FAA Administrator on the current threat
levels. He did not have much interaction with the Secretary of Transportation or other
senior members of the Administration. FAA was a consumer, a customer of the
intelligence community. It never had a "collection" mission. It assessed the intelligence
it was provided, but did not gather such information. The intelligence the agency
received in the 1990s was tailored to situations in which U.S. civil airplanes might fly
over areas of conflict.
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Hijacking and Knives
(SSI) Hijackings weren't a priority during his tenure as ACI because there were very few
of them. The protocol in the case of a hijacking was to appease the hijacker and divert
the plane. They didn't consider suicide hijacking a credible threat. The possible use of
knives in a hij acking raises the question of how one would prevent such an event from
happening, given the inability of the security equipment to detect such weapons.
Furthermore, pre-September 11, 2001 it was believed to be implausible hijackers
(unlikely to be suicidal) would use knives given the technology available at that time. It
was impossible to prevent someone from getting a knife on the plane. The prohibited
items list for airliners reflected items that were deemed "menacing" (presenting a clear
and obvious threat). That distinction represents the difference between a box cutter a
small knife (a tool) and a switchblade (menacing).
Dual Mandate
(Unc) Flynn indicated that he thought the so-called "dual mandate" did not affect him in
his role as head of civil aviation security. 'The first he heard of it was in 1996, and he was
not hampered by service or customer satisfaction issues: However, he was aware that his
"job was to secure aviation while it was operating."
(Unc) Flynn did not know what sort of relationship the airlines had with Congress. In
terms of getting FAA security directives implemented and adhered to at the airports, his
job required working relationships with the security directors (SDs) at each airport. They
often had backgrounds in the military, FBI, or other law enforcement, and had their own
information networks outside of the FAA's control. The SDs were often skeptical of the .
FAA's role, and the sources of its information. In particular, their discussions with FBI
sources often left them "less than convinced" of the FAA's threat claims. Many of the
Security Directors came from the law enforcement community. They would check on the
threat claims by the FAA and their former colleague's would discount the threat which
hurt the FAA's credibility. The CEOs of the airlines did not take increased security
seriously, and resisted expensive implementations. His office's relations with the airlines
was "hard all the time." Possibly because of the sanitized nature of the threat information
they were given, the airlines did not appreciate the need to increase security. Flynn said
the airlines considered civil penalties for infraction/violations of FAA directives as "a
cost of doing business." Going public would have been one way for the FAA to get the
airlines to sit up and take notice of its security regulations, but doing so would have, in
some respects, been drawing a roadmap for the terrorist.
(Unc) Flynn said many of the CEO's treated security as ajoke. Flynn recounted a 1994
meeting with CEO Crandall of American Airlines in which Crandall discounted the
domestic threat because there had been no domestic hijackings since the system was
improved in the early 1990s: "Give us a reason to do it (increase security) and we will."
Flynn believed that in response to specific events like the Bojinka plot, the airlines did so
and "were terrific." In general, according to Flynn, there was always a difference in the
airlines reactions to the requested security actions internationally versus domestically,

with greater receptivity to the former.
(Unc) Flynn indicated thatthe airlines approach to security varied widely. He cited
Tower Airlines, which ultimately went broke, as a carrier which approached security very
seriously and used that as a selling point to customers. He also singled out United
Airlines under Soliday for its conscientious approach to security.
(Unc) Flynn discussed the tension between the FAA's oversight role and its need to
imbue the security structure with the appropriate degree of randomness and mystery.
(Unc) Flynn described the FAA rulemaking process as "hideous and deliberately slow."
He pointed out that at least going back to .1990, aviation security laws specified that FAA
actions were to be done through the rulemaking process. In some of those statutes, like
the one concerning EDS deployment, there was language to keep the FAA from taking
security-related actions. OMB also would push back on cost-effectiveness grounds, with
its resistance to checked baggage screening requirements given as the example.
ACS Defense vectors
Intelligence
~Flynn said that the granular nature and frequency of the intell...i""-"_ ..... -.
. received from CIA on overseas threats was an asset to the s stem.
spite of Flynn's repeated requests for more information from the Bureau and other law
enforcement agencies. Flynn characterized the information on domestic threats as
"wooly."
Prescreening
Checkpoint Screening
•
I (§$;J5 Flynn believes that whi1e the quality of the x-ray machines has improved,
affordable, effective technology is not there. Flynn also raised the issue of screener
\i complacency (the human factor). He conceded that identifying IEDs is hard, no matter
how alert or trained the screener. As for needed improvements, he cited full deployment
of TIP, improved training of the screeners and supervisors, and a career track that aims at
, , ,
having individuals do screening for two to three years only (comparable to the Israelis"
system of airport security for Tel Aviv).
Airport Access
":
\
I ITo combat all of theseI
areas of vulnerability, Flynn said that state and local authorities need to get involved.
Cargo
e sal It wou require researc an eve opment grants to In an e ectrve screening

device. In the mean time, providing the airlines subsidies to not carry questionable cargo
is the best alternative.
Red Teams
Flynn said that red team testing was made "easy" because it would help the FAA to
obtain a civil penalty against the airline if the failure were obvious and glaring. Flynn
stressed the usefulness of civil penalties as an enforcement hammer.
With respect to the reduction of civil penalties against air carriers, Flynn said those
negotiations were conducted counsel and counsel and that he had no role.
~ Flynn reported that he had to work to save the Federal Air Marshals Program in
1993-1994 over the opposition of the FBI and the DOD.
NORADruSAF
,~ He reported that there was no routinized practice with NORAD, nor was there an
•
I established line of communication with the military during his time at FAA. He did say
that the air traffic controllers, many of whom are from the air force, may have had
established relations with NORADI USAF .
. Observations and Recommendations
(Unc) Flynn believes that for civil aviation security to be effective there has to be a high
probability of detecting IEDs and potential terrorists within a system managing a high
volume of air traffic, people, interacting elements, and also the high visibility of the
system's operations. Without increased spending on operations, the aviation industry
would never get there. Today, investment is far below what is necessary. The United
States, which owns 40 percent of the world's aviation, spends $18 billion a year,
compared to the Israelis, who spend $10 billion a year at Tel Aviv alone.
(Unc) He questioned the government and the American public's commitment to sustain
spending for aviation security over "the long haul." That is the only way to break the
reactive pattern of the aviation security system. Flynn believes that more congressional
hearings on aviation security should be closed in order to be as forthright and direct as
possible on the realities of the system without revealing such to the public at large.
(Unc) With respect to September 11,2001, Flynn stated, "we're not going to be able to
stop the pros" (referring to terrorists). Rather, the civil aviation security system can make
them do "extraordinary things" to try to defeat the system, and such actions should be
visible to the intelligence community. He believes that the September u" hijackers did
in fact do "extraordinary things" which were seen by the intelligence community.
(Une) Flynn was asked for his recommendations for improving the current civil aviation
security system and he responded with the following:
1) "Throw money" at technology and research and development. He reported that Rand
o investmentin aviation security has actually gone down since September 11 th and is
"way below where it needs to be."
I
4) "Do something about airport lobbies."
e i/
~
·/a.....-
5) Address, through a national plan, the threat of shoulder-fired
-"'I
missilesJ
I
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6) Address the chemical threat (biological threat not as likely for civil aviation because of
time factor).
(Unc) Flynn urged the Commission to avoid retroactivity/ perfect hindsight in its
conclusions. He added "we are not telling people it is dangerous to fly." He stated that
the Commission's willingness to say so would be a test of its integrity. He believes such
failures have vitiated previous efforts to enhance security. He believes the public needs to
be told how to protect itself (for example; that no checked bags would be permitted when
at the orange alert level).
Flynn agreed that it would be important for Congress to hold more closed hearings so
they could fully understand the threat, and that the Commission could give impetus to
this effort.
"-sst-'
Event: Interview of Willie Gripper
Type: Interview
Date: May 5, 2004
Team: 7
Participants (non-Commission): Willie Gripper, Civil Aviation Security Division

Manager at the FAA Northeast Regional Office up until just before 9/11; David Weigand
(FAA General Counsel' s office).
Participants (Commission): John Raidt and Bill Johnstone
Location: 9/11 Commission's GSA office
Background
[U] Mr. Gripper began working for the FAA in November 1985 as a Civil Aviation
Security specialist/Federal Air Marshal stationed at Dallas-Ft: Worth. In 1988, he
became a Federal Air Marshal coordinator at the FAA's Southwest Regional Office. In
1989 he was promoted to Supervisor at the Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO)
in Eustis, Texas. In 1991, he was promoted to Federal Security Manager at Dallas-Ft.
Worth Airport. In 1993, he was promoted to Civil Aviation Security manager at FAA's
Chicago CASFO. In 1997, he was promoted to Civil Aviation Security Division
Manager at FAA's Northeast Regional Office. He served in this capacity until May 2001
when he was promoted to Deputy Director of Civil Aviation Security Operations at FAA
Headquarters. He did not arrive at FAA HQ to take the position of Deputy Director until
August of2001.
[U] On 9/11 Mr. Gripper served as Deputy Director of Civil Aviation Security Operations
at FAA Headquarters. In February 2002 he took a corresponding position with the
Transportation Security Administration when civil aviation security was transferred to
TSA. In September 2002, Mr. Gripper returned to the FAA as Deputy Director of
Security and Investigations. Since October 2003 he has served as Deputy Director of
Field Operations for FAA security.
Note: On 9/11 the acting Manager of the Civil Aviation Security Division at FAA's
Northwest Regional Office who replaced Mr. Gripper was Richard Batts. On 9/11 Mr.
Batts was about to be replaced by Rich Stevens.
-S£I-
--s-st-
Security at Boston Logan Airport
[U] Security at Boston Logan was under Mr. Gripper's jurisdiction when he served as
Division Manager at the FAA's regional office. Mr. Gripper stated that when he arrived
in Boston he felt that the security at Logan was not as strong as at other airports,
particularly in the area of access control. He said that checkpoint-screening operations
were similar in quality to other airports. Mr. Gripper said that there was a particular
emphasis on improving x-ray screening at the checkpoints.
[U] Mr. Gripper stated that he learned that Fox 25 News in Boston had undertaken its
own testing of the checkpoints at Logan after the reporter contacted the Public Affairs
office at FAA Headquarters. He then met with the reporter and FAA's public affairs
officer to review FOX 25's findings. Mr. Gripper stated that he was particularly
interested in learning the nature of the tests that the news team had undertaken so he
could assess the shortcomings that they found. He said that the team identified the failure
of screeners to check bags that contained film shield bags (opaques) that could hide
prohibited weapons. The news team also was able to sneak weapons in using a
wheelchair, which was not searched properly.
[U] Gripper believed that the screeners should have been able to detect the test objects.
In the case of the film shield, the x-ray operator should have required a thorough
examination by hand of the opaque object. The wheelchair should not have been
exempted from regular screening scrutiny.
[U] Mr. Gripper said that he asked the television station not to air the program because he
had concerns that it would identify vulnerabilities to terrorists. (The station did air the
program.) Mr. Gripper did not point out to the news crew that the knife they snuck past
the checkpoint was technically legal because he did not want to point out that particular
systemic vulnerability to terrorists or criminals. He stated that after the report came to his
attention but prior to its airing he met with the air carriers and the airport and told them
that they had to clean up their act and do what they were supposed to do. In addition, he
had the field office inspectors go to Logan every day to test the system throughout the
entire month of JUly. He accomplished this through a regional Special Emphasis
Assessment for the entire region, which entailed continuous monitoring. He told the
agents to make it well known they were testing continuously because this would keep
people on their toes, as well as help respond to likely FOX 25 follow-ups.
Intelligence
[U] Mr. Gripper stated that he received an intelligence briefing in late June. The airport
and air carriers in Boston also received the briefing from FAA's Office of Civil Aviation
Security Intelligence. It was a CD-ROM presentation provided by Pat McDonnell.
Based on the information that Gripper received he was told that the system needed to be
on-guard against a possible hijack attempt that summer. Mr. Gripper said that FAA put
~S5I-
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the airports/air carriers on notice through the issuance of Information Circulars describing
the threat.
[U] Mr. Gripper stated that the CASFO and Federal Security Manager (FSM) handled
most of the day-to-day communications with the airports and air carriers. He directed
them to make sure that the FAA's Security Directives and Information Circulars were
received and understood by regulated parties. He said that the FSM at Logan, Steve
Luongo would hand-deliver the SD's and IC's to the airport and air carriers to make sure
they got the message.
[U] Mr. Gripper stated that he was aware of al Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden prior to 9/11.
He also knew that there were terrorist cells operating in the Boston area and the region at
large. He learned this mainly from monthly meetings of the Law Enforcement Group.
These meetings, hosted by the FBI, were attended by various federal law enforcement
agencies including the FBI, DEA, INS, Customs, etc. Mr. Gripper said that there was not
a lot of detail about terrorist activity provided at the meetings. He indicated that he and
the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Boston Field Office had a good relationship and
he was confident that if there were any security threats or problems specific to the airport
or aviation he would have been informed about them. From these meetings he did learn
that Hezbollah was the primary terrorist group present in the Boston area.
August 6th Presidential Daily Brief (PDB)
[U] Mr. Gripper was not aware that "training consistent with hijacking" as reported in the
President's Daily Brief had been taking place. Mr. Gripper said upon learning reports of
the PDB he did wonder why authorities on the front lines of civil aviation security such
as himself weren't getting this relevant information. Mr. Gripper said that he wasn't
even made aware by the FBI that Resam' s target in the millennium plot was an airport
until April of 2001 when he attended a conference in Seattle. He was deeply perturbed
that FAA hadn't been informed of this fact. His expectation was that the FAA's
intelligence division would receive such reports and would then pass them on to the
regional and local security offices.
Suspicious Activities
[U] Mr. Gripper stated that the Massachusetts State Police (MSP) detail assigned to
Logan would receive any reports of suspicious activities and incidents. He said that the
FAA maintained a good relationship with MSP and expected to hear from them regarding
any security issues. Mr. Gripper also said that in 2000 FAA established a security
summary database to record and track security incidents. Mr. Gripper did not recall any
suspicious incidents at Logan pre 9/11 that indicated terrorist interest or surveillance.
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS)
r~I] Mr. Gripper said that when the CAPPS was automated it removed the customer
service representative from the process of determining who would be selected for
--B5+-'
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additional security screening. He said that even as of 9/11 selectees were supposed to
have their carry-on bags, and checked luggage undergo secondary screening as per the
Air Carrier Standard Security Program and relevant Security Directives. He said that
carry-on bags were supposed to be trace detected for explosives and hand searched for
prohibited items.
Random and Continuous searches of carry-on bags
!,S811 Mr.Gripper stated that air carriers were required to continuously hand search carry-
on bags at the checkpoints, regardless of whether they were owned by a selectee or not.
He stated that this requirement was very difficult to enforce because it slowed getting
passengers to their aircraft. He further stated that air carriers attempted to subvert the
requirement by only checking bags that were easy to search such as computer cases.
Joint Vulnerability Assessments
[U] Mr. Gripper agreed with the view that the Joint Vulnerability Assessments were
simply a checklist of items, without any regulatory teeth. He concurred that if a security
measure or infrastructure were important enough to appear on a security checklist, it
should be required under the airport standard security program. He also stated that
localized threat assessments were supposed to be a part of the JVA's but they weren't
done.
Closed Circuit Television
[S-S1] Mr. Gripper stated that Closed Circuit television coverage at checkpoints was
helpful in reconstructing what happened at checkpoints. Most of the systems were covert,
and he never heard an argument that they were a helpful means of scaring off terrorists or
had a deterrent value. He said most of the systems were installed in lieu of having to have
a police presence at the checkpoints-a requirement that carriers didn't like. (Gripper
was personally involved in the deployment of such equipment at the Dallas-Ft. Worth
Airport, which served as one of the pioneers in this field.)
Choice of Logan for 9/11 hijackings
[U]Mr. Gripper believes that the hijackers chose Logan because it was in close proximity
to New York.
Boston CASFO
[U] Mr. Gripper responded to concerns expressed to the commission about the Boston
CASFO as follows:
1) [U] Concerns about the hiring of Mary Carol Turano as CASFO manager because
she allegedly lacked the necessary experience: Mr. Gripper indicated that Ms.
Turano did have some aviation security experience, but that he hired her to be a
$-1-.
~
manager, not a special agent or inspections officer. He also stated that FAA HQ
concurred in the decision. FAA HQ set no requirement or guidance requiring that
the candidate have a particular level of experience. He did not see her hiring as
unusual.
2) [U] Concerns about morale problems at the Boston CASFO: Mr. Gripper said
that he believes morale problems existed at the facility before either he or Mary
Carol Turano were hired. He believes that he was perceived as a "hard butt"
because the Boston CASFO wasn't doing what it was supposed to be doing and
he was brought in to help fix the problems.
3) [U] Concerns about serious backlog of enforcement actions: Mr. Gripper said
that such backlogs were a system-wide problem. There were huge backlogs when
he got to Boston and he worked to get them down.
[U] He stated that in 2000 he worked to get an assessment of all New England Airports in
order to get a picture of where everyone stood in regard to security. He said that in the
past such assessments took too long and delayed the ability of FAA to take remedial
action. He wanted a snap shot to be conducted early in the year so that they could get
about the business of fixing the problems. He said that the Boston CASFO did not
believe the project could be done in the time allotted and there was some controversy
about the initiative. Mr. Gripper stated that the assessments for Logan and Portland
airports were well done. He said that he wanted to get the assessments done
expeditiously and thoroughly in order to start fixing problems, not just "get them over
with."
Enforcement at Logan
[U] Gripper stated that it was a constant effort to explain to people that the air carriers,
not the airports, were responsible for the security checkpoints. He said that both the air
carrier and airport were assessed fines for their security violations. He believes that
Logan was average in meeting its security requirements. He stated that FAA's
Enforcement Information System has all the data on fines.
[U] He indicated that the FAA did suggest joint testing of security at Logan including
checkpoints but that Logan did not want to do it. He remembers that the Security Director
at Logan wanted to test checkpoints independently. He knew that the air carriers would
object. He stated that FAA Headquarters objected to allowing Logan to conduct such
testing ..
tssIJ Mr. Gripper knew that as of September 11, metal detectors weren't set-up to detect
knives.
After Action Report
[U] Mr. Gripper wanted to conduct an after-action report to see what happened on 9/11,
how and why it happened and how the system responded, in order to help determine what
immediate changes were needed. He did not receive the necessary cooperation to
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SSI
undertake the study, perhaps because there was so much else going on. Specifically, he
requested that an evaluation staffbe created to do the after action analysis. This request
was denied, perhaps because of resource constraints.
Follow-up
[,S8IJ'Mr. Gripper said that he would get back to the commission to confirm information
he provided on the following issues.
1) CAPPS consequences as of 9/11, including whether selectees were subject to

secondary searches of their person and carry-on bags.
2) Whether manual profiling prior to 9/11 included hand-searches of carry-on
baggage
3) Whether random/continuous security examination of carry-on bags involved hand
searches looking for prohibited items or explosive trace detection.
SSI
• Question:
September
Information for the 9-11 Commission
What were the procedures for persons designated as a selectee prior to
11, 2001? Specifically, did their carry-on items receive additional inspection?
Only checked baggage of the selectee was given additional inspection prior to
September 11, 2001. Checked baggage was submitted for EDS or ETD inspection, physical1y
searched or positi ve passenger bag match. Carry-on baggage went through the normal passenger
screening process.
Question: What were the procedures for persons designated as a selectee after
September II, 2001? Specifically, did their carry-on items receive additional inspection?
Question: What were the Security Directive requirements for continuous search of
•
passengers? If trace was present could the hand search be omitted?
Irecall the security directive (SD).requiring a continuous search of carry-on at the passenger
screening checkpoint. I cannot locate that directive or any information that indicates ETD could
-have been used in lieu of the continuous search requirement.
hJJLd~rt-
Willie 1. dhJper Jr.
%8
Federal Aviation Administration
Office of Security and Hazardous Materials
•
~
MEMORAN~UMFORTHERECORD
Event: Theresa Adams, Area 7 Air Traffic Controller
Date: Thursday, September 25, 2003
Prepared by: Cate Taylor
Team Number: 8
Location: Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center
Participants - Non-Commission: Theresa Adams, Area 7 Air Traffic Controller; Eileen
Participants - Commission: John Farmer, Dana Hyde, Cate Taylor
Background
Adams began with the FAA in 1989 and has been an air traffic controller at Indi for the
past ten years. She had never before been involved in a hijack situation. Her
understanding of hijack procedures pre 9/11 was to notify the area supervisor, confirm
hijack with the pilot, and comply with requests.
Adams has to deal with a NORDO situation a few times per week. In this situation,
Adams calls the airline company to reestablish communication with the aircraft. She has
had to deal with the loss of transponder communication about every few months. In this
situation, she asks the pilot to restart the transponder.
Experience on 9/11
Adams was training someone on the d-side of a position in area 7 on 9/11. The radar
controller in the position she was working at had already noticed that AA77 had
disappeared when she looked up at the screen and saw AA 77 in coast mode. The
transponder was not functioning at this point. Adams called the sector in front of AA 77' s
path to clear the predicted path. The radar controller at Adams' position in Area 7 was
getting ready to take the hand off of AA 77 from the Henderson sector in area 3.
Adams received a call from the Henderson sector controller who said that AA was
looking for a plane. She also learned that AA11 had crashed into the WTC but she didn't
know why this was important at the time.
Adams was not told to look for primary targets and did not do so. She still expected that
AA77 was flying without a transponder. Henderson called to report that AA77 was
NORDO and Adams thought a crash was possible but not probable.
1
UNCLASSIFIED
Next, Dave Critter, the Area 7 supervisor, came into the area and gave the order to
ground all flights. Adams did not understand the correlation until after all planes were
down. During the grounding, Adams was telling the pilots that there was a "national
emergency" and they were to "get everybody on the ground now." It took about 30
minutes to ground all aircraft in Area 7. After all flights were grounded, Adams went on
break.
Adams did hear rumors about a Cleveland controller saying there was a crash but doesn't
remember anything about Ashland, KY.
Post 9/11
When faced with a NORDO situation now, procedure is to notify the supervisor, call the
airline company, and call out to the aircraft several times. Pilot's awareness and
responsiveness is not a problem.
Adams did not have any recommendations for the Commission staff.
2
COMMISSION SENSITNE
UN..fLASSIFIED
MEMORAND~~ THE RECORD
Event: Dave Boone, Air Traffic Manager of Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Dave Boone, Air Traffic Manager; Eileen
Objectives of interview:
Boone's experience on 9-11
Opinions on radar gap
After action steps taken, presentation substance
Background:
Dave Boone became a controller in 1981 and held the positions of Traffic Manager
Specialist and Supervisor. In 1995, Boone went to the regional office in great lakes for a
special projects position for 3 Yz years. Then he returned to the Indi center as Assistant
Traffic Manager and became Air Traffic Manager in 1998.
Boone's experience on 9-11:

Several people were in Boone's office on the morning of September 11, 2001 for a
meeting when John Thomas, Operations Manager, called from the platform and reported
2 things; the WTC had been hit and Indi was missing an aircraft, AA77. Boone
immediately went to the control room where John Thomas gave a further update about
AA 77. He observed the primary target scan on the radar screen and could not see a
primary target for AA 77. Boone was aware of the southwesterly tum. that AA 77 made
before radio and transponder were lost by looking at the radar screen.
At this time, Boone received a report of something burning on the ground in Charleston,
WV. This report came from an Indi employee, whom Boone cannot remember, that was
on the phone with the state police. Boone recalled that it did not occur to him to keep
searching for primary targets. His focus was more on the local report of a crash on the
ground. Boone assumed the jobs of keeping people calm and keeping communication
flowing.
1
UNCLASSIFIED
Boone was on the phone with the regional office at least once with Craig Burna during
the morning of 9/11. Burna was the first to tell Boone that the Washington center put
together that AA 77 had flown over Dulles (Dulles reported a fast moving flight
overhead).
A suggestion from the traffic manager in the command center was to divert flights away
from the path of AA 77. This was shortly followed by the decision to ground all flights.
Boone did not pass on word to supervisors to ground flights. This was done by ...
There was no communication between NORAD and the Indi center on 9/11. Even if
Boone were thinking that AA 77 was in a hijack situation, he would not have called
NORDO.
Opinions on radar gap:

Boone was aware of a gap in the radar but was never worried about not being able to see
primary targets. The main concern for this area was not being able to see weather that
could affect aircraft flying through that area.
In the week following 9/11, Boone asked the automation specialists to look at the 4 radar
returns that cover the blank spot. It was found that the 4th priority radar was able to track
the flight path of AA 77 during its entire flight through the blank spot in the Bedford
.sector. In the filtering process, the computer chooses the 2 radar returns with the best
conditions and sends these two together as a composite to the ATC's screen.
After action steps taken, presentation substance:

In the week following 9/11, Boone delivered a Power Point presentation to the staff of the
Indianapolis center in order to provide his staff with information on about Indi's
involvement on 9/11. Substance of this presentation included-calls made and received,
instructions given, the distraction of a reported crash in the area, and the satori findings.
The satori is the system that an air traffic control center can use to recreate and view the
records of what an ATC actually saw on their radar screen on the day of the event. Had
the ATC' s kept their primary radar's on, the satori shows that they would have seen the
reemergence of AA 77 out of the blank spot as a primary target. However, there was no
command given ATC's to keep primary radar on.
On 9/11, there was no policy in place to keep primary radar on when an aircraft had lost
both radar and transponder. Since 9/11, the Indi center has made it their policy to keep
primary radar on in the event that an aircraft looses both radar and transponder.
2
Event: Richard Byard, Area 3 Air Traffic Controller

Date: Wednesday, September 24, 2003
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Richard Byard, Area 3 Air Traffic Controller; Eileen
Participants - Commission: John Fanner, Dana Hyde, Cate Taylor
Background:
Richard Byard has been an Air Traffic Controller at the Indianapolis Air Traffic Control
Center for 17 years. Prior to 9/11, Byard had been enrolled in the Controller in Charge
program and was the Controller in Charge on 9/11. He had participated in annual review
of training for hijack situations, conducted in a training simulator. In these training
exercises, Byard was never confronted with a suicide hijacker.
Experience on 9/11:
Byard arrived at 5:30am for his 6:00am-2:00pm shift and began working as the
Controller in Charge for Area 3. From hearing that there was a problem with AA77 from
Chuck Thomas, Byard went to look at the scope where he saw the coast track of AA 77.
He saw that the aircraft had made a slight tum to the left before it lost communication
and told Thomas to hit the all primary button and did not see anything that could have
been AA77. He thought this was very unusual. Byard was looking for AA77 in a 20 mile
arch to the west.
Byard then told the person on the d-side position, Anthony Schifano to call American
Airlines to alert the company of the problem. This is the time when Linda Povinelli came
to Area 3 and called the maintenance hub. A few minutes later, he gave the order to call
back American Airlines since there had been communication with AA 77.
Byard also gave the order to call approach control in the Lexington, Huntington, and
Cincinnati sectors to alert them of a potential problem. The primary was always kept on
in the Huntington sector. Byard was not aware of any report of a crash in the area and had
no involvement in calling the search and rescue. At no point did Byard have access to the
television for news.
I
He recalls that Chuck Thomas was focused on getting all flights grounded and Linda
Povinelli did not instruct the controllers to keep the all primary on. Byard was in position
to ground a few flights.
By the time the Pentagon was hit, Byard and others at the Center were suspicious that it
was AA77.
Looking back, Byard doesn't think that putting together the events of the morning of9/11
was too difficult and someone should have recognized what was happening.
Blank spot:
About 1-2 weeks after 9/11, Byard attended a briefing given by Dave Boone and learned
that there was a blank spot in the Bedford radar site, a part of Area 3. Byard learned that
there was a radar site that could have tracked AA 77 the whole time on the morning of
9/11 but this site was blocked from the Air Traffic Controllers' computers.
Upon hearing about the blank spot, Byard was angry that he was not informed of this
earlier. He learned that few knew about the blank spot. The airways facility makes the
assignments as to which data goes to the ATC computers. Byard suggested that someone
at the e-desk should have access to all radar data, including data received from the blank
spot.
Byard does not recall if Boone presented the reappearance of AA 77 in the briefing.
NORAD:
If he were in this situation again, Byard would not deal with NORAD. He would follow
procedures that may lead to someone at the e-desk contacting NORAD.
Changes in Job since 9/11:

When an aircraft goes NORDO, air traffic controllers take the situation much more
seriously. There was a military presence at the Indi center after 9/11 for a short time, but
the military still has access to the data at the center.
2
CLASSIFIED
Event: Rudolph Gayde, Area 3 ATC

Date: Thursday September 25, 2003

Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Rudolph Gayde, Area 3 ATC; Eileen
Background
Gayde began with the FAA in 1970, was laid off in 1981, and hired back in 1996 to the
same area and sector at the Indi Center. In either 1974 or 1975, Gayde worked a
hijacking. The emphasis at that time was not to interfere in any way. Chase planes were
involved with this hijack and Gayde's responsibility was focused on talking to the
hij acked plane and the chase planes on different frequencies while they were in the
airspace Gayde was covering.
Much has changed in the FAA since Gayde started in 1970. All tracking of aircraft was
done manually. Changes came in the mid 70's with radar data processing. Gayde believes
that European technology is far better than the FAA, but staffing in not much different.
While visiting a German air traffic control center, Gayde saw that the resolution was
better the scope and the lights were kept on since that did not create a glare.
Gayde had never thought a suicide hijack was a possibility and had never been presented
with this situation in a training exercise.
While Gayde had experienced NORDO and no transponder separately, he had never seen
this scenario together. In either event, Gayde would immediately call his supervisor.
Experience on 9/11
Gayde was scheduled to work the 7:00am-300pm shift in the Henderson sector of area 3.
He took a break just before AA 77 lost communication with Indi. While on break, a friend
told him about a plane hitting the WTC and Gayde did not believe this so he went into the
cafeteria to watch the television.
1
UNCLASSIFIED
Gayde returned to Area 3 after the both WTC towers were hit and grounded flights. He
noticed that the primary was on but Gayde reports that it was not working in high
altitude. The primary radar was kept on for a few days after 9/11.
After Action
Gayde believes that Boston's decision to involve NORAD was due to their location.
Boston deals with international flights where Indi only deals with domestic flights.
Gayde was aware that the radar was not working in the Lynchburg sector, where the
blank spot is.
When he wrote his statement, Gayde went back to the recorded tapes for accuracy. Gayde
was required to amend his report by adding the phrase that Jeff Meyers of the FAA
litigation department came up with.
Since Gayde started in the early 1970's, the manuals for air traffic controllers have gotten
larger from the addition of legal language.
Recommendation
Gayde believes the new policy to report every deviation of an aircraft to a supervisor is
an overreaction.
2
CLASSIFIED
Event: Randy Kath, Quality Assurance

Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Randy Kath, Quality Assurance; Eileen
Background
Kath was hired in 1979 at the Minneapolis Center, laid off in 1989, and rehired in 1992 at
the Indi Center and has worked in Area 1 since. Since he started, the volume and
complexity of air traffic has escalated exponentially and technology has not kept up with
this change.
Protocol for a hijack had not changed prior to 9/11. Once a hijack was confirmed, the
controller would clear the airspace in front of the aircraft's path. Kath had to take a
refresher course once a year for hijack procedures.
When transponder communication was lost, protocol was to select the primary, look on
the scope, and try to talk to the pilot. Kath would only have expected this in the event of
an electrical failure.
Kath had dealt with two hijacked planes, one in either 1984 or 1985, and the other in the
late 1980's. For both of these instances, the pilot squawked the hijack code and Kath
followed protocol. To his knowledge, NORAD was not contacted in either situation.
9/11 Experience
Kath was working the 7:00am-3:00pm shift in the Impel (high altitude) sector of Area 1.
He received a call from Jeffery Philips reporting that AA77 had been lost. He
immediately told his supervisor, sterilized his airspace and called the sectors in front of
AA 77' spath. Kath then pushed the all primary without an order to do so and saw
nothing.
Kath then took about a 7 minute break, did not sign in when he returned to the floor, and
began to assist in grounding flights. Kath estimates that he grounded dozens of flights
1
UNCLASSIFIED
with in about 30 minutes. Some of the pilots were asking what was happening. After all
planes were grounded, Kath learned that AA 77 had hit the Pentagon.
Since 9/11, NORDO has become a more serious situation. If there is loss of
communication with an aircraft, someone is assigned to look for that aircraft.
Quality Assurance and After Action

The duties of quality assurance staff are to conduct accident investigations, write reports
based on data, tapes, taps and c-comp generated reports, and do the satori recreations. An
accident package is created from this data and the package is kept at the center where the
crash occurred.
Other than the accident package, the only other after action report was done by Dave
Boone in a power point presentation. There was no write up because the transcripts will
tell the story of what happened at Indi on 9/11.
Recommendations
Kath would like to see long-range radar become more reliable but not with GPS; this
system would create holes. Kath informed Commission staff that Dick Sitzman, not with
the FAA, was able to track AA 77 from two different radar systems.
Kath believes that there needs to be more staff on hand during the day for emergencies.
On 9/11, Kath believes that Indi was just understaffed for this crisis.
2
CLASSIFIED
MEMORA
Event: Steve Lutomski, Traffic Management Unit Supervisor

Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Steve Lutomski, Traffic Management Unit Supervisor;
Eileen, FAA Counsel
Background:
Lutomski attended the FAA academy in Oklahoma City then started at Indi in 1986 as a
Controller in Area 3. Since then, Lutomski has been a Supervisor and Traffic Manager in
Area's 2 and 3.
Current Duties:
Staff of the Traffic Management Unit are responsible for managing the flow of air traffic
through the Indi airspace. They provide release times for aircraft to the first tier facilities
based on traffic volume and weather. Traffic Managers have direct contact with the
control towers and the military for scheduling. There are about 4 to 5 people on the day
and night shifts. Every two hours, there are national conference calls with TMU staff
from all other Control Centers.
Military:
The TMU has little contact with NORAD on a daily basis. There may be communication
for special interest flights but Lutomski cannot recall.
Lutomski has never been part of a SCAT ANA exercise.
Post 9/11:
Lutomski believes that there have been three main changes since 9/11.
First, Workload and paperwork have increased for _VIPflights. With only one day's
notice of a high priority flight through Indi' s airspace, Traffic Managers must research
the traffic impact.
Second, all flights must be monitored before they enter Indi's airspace.
1
UNCLASSIFIED
Third, recognition of the importance of military flights has increased.
Day of9/11:
Lutomski had the day off on 9/11 but had to come in for a meeting to discuss traffic
patterns with other TMU's around the country. He learned about the first WTC crash
from CNN and then went to talk with Doug Mollen about the meeting. Mollen told him
about the second WTC crash and he went down to the Traffic Management Unit to see
how they were handling the situation.
On the floor, Lutomski heard about some controllers looking for AA77. Lutomski
assumed the Military Operation Specialist position for the day and was on the phone with
the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center as they were calling for information on AA 77.
Lutomski received a call on the military phone advising that there was a beacon code on a
hijacked aircraft heading towards Indi. He entered this code on the screen and saw the
beacon ofUAL93. He was able to watch UAL93 slowly descend and circle for about one
hour.
During this time, he received a phone call from the command center giving the order to
ground all flights. Lutomski then walked around and told each area supervisor to tell the
controllers to ground all flights.
Indi had still not found AA 77 and Lutomski was getting reports of a crash in the Ashland,
KY area. Lutomski called American Airlines and was able to receive confirmationthat
AA 77 had crashed in the Pentagon.
ALNOT:
Lutomski informed Commission staff about ALNOT, the Alert Notice. This is a notice
put out by the flight data specialist at the control centers to alert other centers of
em~rgencles .
. Recommendations:
Control centers should have a military person on staff to assist in military situations. The
MOS staff stationed at Indi post 9/11 were a good resource for Lutomski.
Lutomski thought the military was slow to accept responsibility of the airspace on 9/11.
With all of their resources and ability, he believes that the military could have sterilized
air space sooner.
2
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMO~ERECORD
Event: Bill Orr, Quality Assurance Manager of Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Bill Orr, Quality Assurance Manager; Eileen
The purpose of this interview is to understand measures taken by the Indianapolis

ARTCC after 9/11. Bill Orr is the Quality Assurance Manager of the Indianapolis Air
Traffic Control Center and has provided the commission staff present with a brief
account of his day on 9/11 and steps taken following 9/11 to file an accident package and
any other after action reports.
Background:
In his 22 year career with the FAA, Orr has been an Air Traffic Controller in the Los
Angeles Center and Boston Center, FAA Academy Instructor, Facilities Manager, and
Quality Assurance Trainer. He has been at the Indianapolis Center for just over 10 years
as an Air Traffic Controller, Local Union Vice President, First Line Supervisor, and a
Training Manager. For the past four years, Orr has held the position of Quality Assurance
Manager.
Orr's Experience on 9/11:

On the morning of September 11,2001, Bill Orr was paged to come down to the
controller floor and he went directly to the e-desk. Here he learned that the Indianapolis
Center had lost contact with AA 77. Orr remembers hearing reports of a crash in Ashland,
KY and concern for the Sears Tower in Chicago, IL. Most of Orr's time that morning was
spent gathering data so he is unsure of exact times when thing occurred. He recalls that
Sally Weed, John Thomas, and Katherine were on the Telecom. During the course of the
morning, Orr was never in contact with the FAA.
Orr does not recall an instruction from the Air Traffic Managers to the Controllers to
keep their primary radar's on. Also, he doesn't think that the primary radar's were kept
on by the ATC's. Orr recalls that it was obvious to him that AA77 was the plane that
crashed into the Pentagon.
1
UNCLASSIFIED
Orr is unaware of any Facility Accident Notification Record generated but thinks John
Thomas or Sally Weed would fill this form out and it would be available at the watch
desk.
After Action:
Package
As Quality Assurance Manager on 9/11, Orr managed the investigation and was
responsible in providing the FAA HQ in Washington with the Accident Package.
An accident package was created within one week of 9/11. In this package were
personnel statements from Indi staff involved with AA 77. Since there were leaks of
information from other Air Traffic Control Centers, access to the contents of the Accident
package were limited to Bill Orr, Arnie Miller, the package specialist and a few others.
Bob Matt, a retired employee of the Indi Center, assisted in putting together the packet
and Dave Boone was needed to sign off on certain documents. Renee?? (secretary) also
had access to this information in order to respond to document requests. Orr has kept a
log of who accessed the package. After the package was prepared, the Indi center did no
further assessment. The only follow up of the events of 9/11 was a PowerPoint
presentation prepared and delivered by Dave Boone to the staff of the Indi center.
Tapes
It is standard operating procedure to gather all recorded tapes shortly after an event such
as 9/11. Orr did this for all recorded lines including the phones at the management desk
and all Voice Switching Communication System (VSCS) lines. However, the phone lines
at the e-desk and the Domestic Events Network (DEN) are not recorded on the
Indianapolis Center end. The FBI contacted Orr on the afternoon of September 11 and
requested that the Indi tapes be played over the phone. Orr sent a digital voice file of
these tapes to the FBI per their additional request.
Quality Assurance Alert

A Quality Assurance alert was issued by Orr shortly after 9/11, stating that the rules
would change for response to NORDO and loss of transponder based on a report that Orr
was filing. Analysis for this report focused on the blank spot in the radar, sort boxes,
primary and secondary radar, and the satori, a computer generated recreation of the scope
and primary targets. Orr reports that AA 77 reappears in Area 3 and lower sectors in this
area should have seen AA77 based on the satori report. Thus, Orr included in the Quality
Assurance Alert that ATC's are required to maximize the histories in the event of
NORDO and loss of transponder.
2
CLASSIFIED
Event: Jeffery Philips, Area 7 ATC

Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Jeffery Philips, Area 7 ATC; Eileen
Background
Philips started with the FAA in June of 1986 and came to Indi in October of 1986. In
May of 1989, Philips was a fully trained controller and has been in three areas. He
currently works in Area 7.
Procedures for a hij acking prior to 9/11 were to verify the hij ack squawk code, notify the
supervisor and handle requests from the cockpit. Training for hijack situations was done
in the simulator and Philips followed set procedures.
Philips knew that NORAD tracked flights and were in charge of air defense and
scrambles. He had not heard of SCATANA before 9/11 and is not sure of what they do
now .
.Philips is not aware of any manuals or documents to look at in a crisis but he would know
what to do. He has dealt with both NORDO and no transponder together but these aircraft
were approved for this situation.
9/11 Experience
Philips was at a radar position in area 7 when coworkers came back from break and
informed him about the WTC. He was then told by his supervisor to begin looking for
AA 77. Philips then began to clear the predicted path of AA 77. He thought AA 77 had an
electrical failure; even though this is not common in a 757, it could have happened.
When Philips heard about the Pentagon crash, he still thought AA 77 was airborne but he
quickly drew the parallel and thought it was a hijack situation.
1
UNCLASSIFIED
Philips had heard something about a SW tum just before it lost communication but his
focus was on other flights.
Changes since 9/11

Situational awareness on the job has increased since 9/11 for both controllers and pilots
in a crisis situation. Controllers are more cautious when an aircraft deviates from its path.
Philips is aware of the gap in radar coverage as a mosaic radar expert. He thinks that all
controllers should know about this problem. Philips thinks that the FAA is a much more
efficient system that Europe because we are a larger regulatory body. Europe has more
structure but Philips believes this is why their equipment is inferior to the US.
Recommendations
Philips thinks it would be more efficient to make information available on the controllers
screen and not stuck in binders.
Jovial is the language that software for the FAA is written in and is very difficult for
hackers to break. With this system, it takes 30 months to do a software change. To make
technology more efficient, Philips suggests that software be written in C++.
Philips believes that the hijackers of AA 77 knew where to avoid being detected by radar
due to rough terrain, weather, and a busy time of day for air traffic.
2
Event: Linda Povinelli, Area 3 Air Traffic Control Supervisor
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Linda Povinelli, Area 3 Air Traffic Controller;
Background
Linda Povinelli started with the FAA as an Air Traffic Controller in 1985. Since then she
has held the positions of Quality Assurance and Supervisor. She is currently the Air
Traffic Controller supervisor of area 3. Povinelli shares an office with Indi's other
supervisors but is usually on the main floor during her shifts. She is responsible for
resource management, break rotation, and personally overseeing the Air Traffic
Controllers in Area 3
Povinelli had never before been involved in a hijack situation. She has participated in
refresher training in the DYSIM, dynamic simulator about every six months. Povinelli
had never been presented with a suicide hijack situation in this training.
It is very uncommon to loose transponder. Povinelli believes this happens only about
once per year but a NaRDO situation happens daily. When an aircraft deviates from it's
path, controllers communicate with the pilot over the radio to fix the deviation.
9/11 experience
Povinelli recalls that there were 15 people scheduled for the day shift and John Thomas
was her supervisor. While in the supervisor's office, Povinelli received a page form the
floor that read "think we lost an aircraft." She then ran down to Area 3 and started an
assessment of the situation. Povinelli called American Airlines to report the NaRDO and
loss of transponder and also called the other sectors in front of AA 77' s flight path.
On the scope, she saw a slight tum in the path of AA 77 before it lost communication but
assumed that the tum was an ordinary correction. Her first thought was a crash, so
Povinelli called the state police for a search and rescue of the area where AA 77
disappeared. .
1
UNCLASSIFIED
At this time, the controllers had already hit the all primary. Povinelli was not. aware that
AA77 had reappeared in' the Henderson sector ofIndi's airspace.
Povinelli's role in grounding flights was to inform the controllers to begin landing planes
and to keep frequencies clear.
After Action
The times in Povinelli' s written statement are accurate since she went back and listened
to the recorded calls of the morning of9/11.
In the briefing given shortly after 9/11, Povinelli recalls that the SW tum of AA 77 was
not a big issue. It was on the Satori, but not included in the briefing.
Post 9/11
Since 9/11, Povinelli is more alert and more through with possible emergency situations.
She does not let the pilots get careless about giving call signs promptly.
NORAD
Povinelli knew ofNORAD. In hindsight, she would have called NORAD on the morning
of 9/11 for a scramble. This would have been coordinated with the front desk. Povinelli
has covered the front desk on midnight shifts and could get a phone number for NORAD.
Contact with NORAD is beyond Povinelli' s rank, but she knows that communication is
possible between the Air Traffic Control Centers and the military.
2
UNACLSSIFIED
MEMORAN~~THERECORD
Event: Anthony Schifano, Area 3 Air Traffic Controller

Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Anthony Schifano, Area 3 Air Traffic Controller; Eileen
Background:
Anthony Schifano began his training in 2000. He worked as an Air Traffic Controller in
Oklahoma City beginning in May 2000 and then transferred to Indi's Area 3 in July 2000.
From his training, the procedures to follow in a hijack situation are to verify the code
given by the pilot of the aircraft, tum the aircraft over to the supervisor and continue
working the other aircraft in the Area.
Schifano had never been confronted with a NORDO and no transponder situation.
Day of9/11:
Schifano was sitting on the d-side, a radio associate position, next to Rudolph Gayde.
Gayde took the handoff of AA77 from Washington and was handling AA77 before it lost
transponder and radio communication. Gayde took a break, Chuck took over, and AA 77
turned to a coast track on the scope just after a slight tum to the left.
Schifano told Richard Byard, the controller in charge of Area 3, that AA 77 had lost
communication. Byard ordered Schifano to call American Airlines. After the first call to
American Airlines, Dave Boone and Katherine arrived in Area 3. Schifano also made a
call to the next sector on AA 77' s flight path.
Initially, all ATC's were looking for primary tracks but this did not continue.
Schifano was relieved and went to the break room to watch the television. Here, he
learned that the Pentagon had been hit. Schifano was relieved before the grounding of all
flights began. When Schifano was in the break room, he heard about the reports of a
search and rescue.
Schifano suggested that another plane could have been asked to look for AA 77 in order
to provide the ATC's with a location.
1
UNACLSSIFIED
Post 9/11:
On Wednesday or Thursday after 9/11, the FBI interviewed Schifano over the phone.
Dave Boone and Chuck were also interviewed.
Today, if Schifano were confronted with a suspicious situation he would attempt to make
contact with the aircraft and follow procedure by passing off the responsibility to his
supervisor.
Recommendations:
Schifano believes that federalizing airport security and privatizing the airport industry
will not improve airline safety.
He also suggested that there should be a way to always keep a transponder on. If they are
so vital in communication between pilots and controllers, there should not be an off
switch on transponders.
2
CLASSIFIED
THE RECORD
Event: Kevin Schott, Area 1 Air Traffic Controller

Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Kevin Schott, Area 1 ATC; Eileen
Background
For seven and a half years, Schott was in the US Air Force. Schott worked as an MP for
four of these years where he cross-trained into an approach control position in the tower.
In 1989, he joined the FAA and went through full FAA ATC training at Indi. By 1992,
Schott was a fully trained ATC at Indi. He also spent about two and a half years in the
Traffic Management Unit.
The difference in his training between the military and the FAA was very different.
While the military is cut and dry, the FAA was more like learning a game and getting
evaluations.
Military protocol for a hijack uses the same handbook as the FAA: the 7110.65. The
standard operating procedures are the same now as they were when Schott was in the Air
Force.
FAA protocol for NORDO,.which happens daily, is to attempt to reach the pilot, notify
the supervisor, and go back to the previous sector to verify codes. For a no transponder
situation, the controller is instructed to try to contact and reestablish communication with
another transponder if possible.
Loss of transponder happens several times in the bad radar sections of Indi' s airspace.
Schott participated in refresher training sessions every year for NORDO, no transponder,
and hij acking individually.
Traffic Management Unit

The TMU oversees the entire airspace for the Indi center. The unit looks at the flow of air
traffic through major airports, route structures, and adjusts air traffic depending on any
1
UNCLASSIFIED
overload and communicates with towers, airlines and command centers. They look at
weather conditions and terrain. They pick up the slack of retired military positions.
9/11 Experience
Schott began working the early morning Air Traffic Management shift where he began to
analyze sectors and make calls to command centers. Steve Lutomski was his supervisor.
He came back from a break to learn that a plane had crashed into the WTC. Linda
Povinelli called Schott and told him that they had lost AA 77 and were looking for the
aircraft. She gave Schott the location of the last point of contact with AA 77. When they
could not find a beacon code, Povinelli asked Schott to call the Air Force Search and
Rescue but Schott doesn't recall hearing any reports of a crash site.
Schott was looking for a primary target but could not find AA 77. The primary radar was
not working well on 9/11. Schott heard that Atlanta has a better primary radar and was
able to track AA 77 the whole time.
When the second plane hit the WTC, Schott thought that AA 77 might be hijacked. After
this, Schott got the order to ground flights from Steve Harding in the command center.
Once all planes were grounded, Schott went on break and learned that a plane had hit the
Pentagon.
During the morning, primary targets were kept on but AA77 was never seen after it first
disappeared off radar. Schott did not know that the blank spot in the radar existed.
Recommendations
Schott believes that fixing the blank spot is a must. Primary radar is invaluable so it
should be kept but there should be some type of system to see all flights.
2
CLASSIFIED
MEMO
Event: Sally Weed, Support Manager for Operations of Indianapolis Air Traffic Control
Center
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Sally Weed, Support Manager for Operations; Eileen
The purpose of this interview is to learn about Sally Weed's experience on 9/11 as a
Support Manager for Indi, gain knowledge of Weed's brief position as liaison to NORAD
post 9111, and to hear any recommendations Weed has for the Commission.
Background
Sally Weed worked as an Air Traffic Controller in Albuquerque, NM until 1982 when
she relocated to the Indianapolis ARTCC. Here she was an Air Traffic Controller until
1987, when she became a supervisor. In 1997, Weed transferred to Memphis, TN and
then came back to Indi in 1999 as a Support Manager of Operations. During her career,
Weed has worked with the military, as a liaison between NORAD and the FAA, and has
designed FAA airspace.
Weed's experience on 9/11

Weed was in her office on the morning of 9111 when Doug Mullen came in and told her
that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. At some point after Indi had lost contact
with AA 77 and a second plane had hit the World Trade Center, Dave Boone asked that
Weed go to the e-desk and help receive phone calls, take messages and relay information.
Grounding of all flights had already begun. Weed had no role in this decision.
Weed does not specifically remember who she was talking to that morning. It is possible
that she could have taken calls from NORAD on a commercial line. Other incoming calls
included family members of Indi staff asking for information, notification of military
flights taking off, and calls asking about a flight in Chicago. Weed does not remember if
she had contact with Washington HQ, the command center, or the ROC.
At some point, Weed does remember hearing of a mining accident in Kentucky. Soon
after this, John Thomas briefed her on police reports of a crash site in the area. There was
1
UNCLASSIFIED
no talk of a hij ack situation at this point. As Weed was not familiar with the e-desk
books, she was unaware of any available POC or phone number to NORAD.
Liaison to NORAD post 9/11

Weed worked as a liaison for the FAA to NORAD from November 2001 to February
2002 in the Cheyenne Mountain Command Center. This position, created after 9/11, was
volunteer and on a temporary basis. The purpose of this position was to bridge the gap in
understanding between FAA air traffic controllers and military air traffic controllers.
There were no operational duties associated with this position. 21 FAA people
nationwide were involved with NORAD in a liaison position.
Weed noticed a vast difference in reaction to a NORDO situation. If the military were to
loose radio contact with an aircraft, they would be on high alert and get ready to
scramble. However, if the FAA were faced with a NORDO situation, which happens
regularly, they would not panic, and try to regain contact with the aircraft. From Weed's
experience, she believes the military did not expect a threat from within the country since
none of their large scale training drills took this scenario into account.
-Since her experience in Cheyenne Mt, Weed now thinks that the sense of urgency has
changed for both the military and the FAA. There is now a relationship between NORAD
and the FAA. Before 9/11, Weed would not have thought to call NORAD in the event of
a hijack; she would have notified her supervisor, John Thomas, who would have made
further notifications.
Weed noted that a major difference between the military and the FAA is the frequency of
training and drilling. The military drills all of the time, but the FAA drills only a few
times per year. It would be difficult to incorporate regular drills into daily FAA routine
for tow main reasons: the air traffic controllers do not have time to get away from work
and the scenarios would not be practical and thus not be taken seriously.
Upon returning to Indi in February 2002, Weed took about 1 month to retrain as an
Operations Manager. She noted that training now is no different than before 9/11.
Other talking points of interview:

Prior to 9/11, Weed knew of SCAT ANA. She participated in table top exercises to review
procedures about every two years. These drills involved little detail and few people.
Since 9111, every Air Traffic Control Center now has a DEN and a direct line to NEADS.
The FAA and military have worked on correcting the blank radar spot in Area 3.
Recommendations:
Weed stressed that the FAA needs to maintain the awareness level that they have now.
She is concerned that as we move farther away from 9/11, the FAA will become more
complacent. A military position at the center is a possible solution to keep the FAA more
alert and attentive to military operations and contacts. The liaison should have a specific
job description so not to have an ineffective position.
2
UNCLASSIFIED
Weed is concerned with loosing the DEN due to the cost of its operation.
Military training is not necessary for Air Traffic Controllers since the operations and
missions of the FAA and military are so different.
3
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Box: 00002 Folder: 0001 Document: 28
Series: Memorandums for the Record
Copies: 1 Pages: 11
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
Folder Title: Matt Kormann

Document Date: 02-13-2004
Document Type: Memo of Conversation
From:
To:
Subject: Interview of [TSA Analyst #1]
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.
NND: 161
Withdrawn: 03-19-2008 by: )ivJ
RETRIEVAL #: 161 00002 0001 28
_ (\ P-5~ ; ~ ( c:.:-t_ 0<-,

V''C Vie:. v'...J
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Box: 00002 Folder: 0001 Document: 29
Series: Memorandums for the Record
Copies: 1 Pages: 12
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
Folder Title: Patrick McDonnell

Document Date: 09-24-2003
Document Type: Memo of Conversation
From:
To:
Subject: Interview of Patrick McDonnell
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.
NND: 161
Withdrawn: 03-19-2008 by: ~v
RETRIEVAL #: 161 00002 0001 29

c:- SSI
Event: Robert C. McLaughlin, FAA HQ Security Operations on 9/11
Type: Interview
Date: June 3, 2004
Prepared by: Bill Johnstone
Team: 7
Participants (non-Commission): Robert McLaughlin and Christine Beyer, TSA General

Counsel
Participants (Commission): Bill Johnstone; and John Raidt
Location: GSA conference room, Washington, DC.
Background
[U] McLaughlin was in Army Intelligence 1984-88, specializing in terrorism analysis and
force protection issues.
[U] On September 12, 1988 he joined the FAA Civil Aviation Security Field Unit
(CASFU) at Baltimore Washington International (BWI) Airport. McLaughlin also
served as a Federal Air Marshal (FAM). In 1992, he became the BWI CASFU supervisor
and in 1995 he moved to the Washington, DC Civil Aviation Security Field Office
(CASFO), based at Dulles Airport.
[U] In 1997, McLaughlin came to FAA headquarters in Washington, DC as part of the

civil aviation security operations division (ACO; he was in ACO-600). Among his
responsibilities was to serve as a duty officer in the FAA Operations Watch. His areas of
particular responsibility included the canine unit, crisis management and standards and
evaluations. McLaughlin was serving in this capacity on 9/11101.
[U] He moved to TSA when it took over the functions of the FAA civil aviation security
office, and currently serves as the Assistant Director ofTSA's Assessments Division.
Day of September 11, 2001
[U] On 9/11101, Mike Weichert was the person in McLaughlin's unit who was the Duty
Officer. At around 8:30 a.m. Weichert and Bob Clark (who was also in the same unit)
"-&SI--
went out for coffee. At around 8:40 a.m. Laura Volaro came urgently looking for
Weichert and McLaughlin paged Weichert and offered to help out in his absence.
[U] McLaughlin reached the FAA security SCIF facility on the third floor of
headquarters by around 8:45 a.m. He found that everything there had become "elevated."
Pat Durgin informed him that FAA was aware that someone had been stabbed on board
American Airlines Flight #11, that contact had been lost with the aircraft, and that the
pilot may have been keying the mike so that the ground could hear sounds from the
cockpit. Furthermore, they were aware that the plane's altitude had been fluctuating.
[U] Durgin told McLaughlin that it was clear there had been a hijacking, but that only
someone from the Operations division could activate the Aviation Crisis Center (ACC)
on the 10th floor. Mike Weichert returned at just that moment, and he left to go to the io"
floor to activate the ACC. McLaughlin went to get Lee Longmire, head of Operations,
but discovered that he had already left to go to the ACC.
[U] McLaughlin indicated that his unit had helped put on two crisis exercises previously
that year (both based on traditional, non-suicide hijacking scenarios) so "everyone knew
what to do." McLaughlin's and Weichert's immediate supervisor on 9/11 was Carrie
Riley, but she was in Ireland that day.
[U] When McLaughlin went to the ACC (around 8:55 a.m. or 9:00 a.m.) the primary
communications net (for notification of other federal agencies and for convening
decision-makers) was in the process of being activated. He was tasked with getting the
FAA managers for the New England and Eastern regions plugged into the primary net.
At about that time, he saw, via CNN coverage, a picture of what appeared to him to be a
large passenger aircraft striking the World Trade Center (WTC). (This would have
actually been the second strike, ofUA #175, at9:02:40, but McLaughlin was not aware
of those facts at the time.) After getting her to come over and view a replay, McLaughlin
asked Fran Lozito ifit was Flight #11, but she indicated they didn't know.
[U] Carrier Riley who was in charge of emergency protocol was in Europe on 9/11.
[U] At this point in time (around 9:05 a.m.) the assumption in and around the ACC was
that there had been only one large aircraft crash into the WTC.
[U] McLaughlin served as a "runner" or back up in the ACC forthe next hour or so. By
10:00 a.m., another office was opened, on the third floor, and under the charge of Bob
Clark, with a mission of sorting out all of the information that was coming in about the
unfolding events. McLaughlin observed that an unintended consequence of the activation
of this third floor operation (which had not been provided for in emergency plans or
exercises) was to remove the individuals charged with obtaining the most accurate
information about what was going on from direct contact with the sources of that
information, which were still reporting in to the 10th floor.
-ssi.;
COMMISSION SENSITNE
551
•
[U] At some time after 10:00 a.m. McLaughlin was dispatched to Boeing to get airplane
schematics to be used by a planned "Go Team" that would be heading to New York.
When he returned to the FAA around 11 a.m., however, all of the focus had shifted to
getting all of the remaining airborne flights safely landed and plans for the Go Team trip
were cancelled.
[U] McLaugh1in recalled seeing Deputy Administrator Belger come in and out 0 f the
ACC a few times while he was present, but he did not recall seeing Administrator
Garvey.
Communications Nets
[U] McLaughlin indicated that there were actually three communications networks that
the FAA could activate in an emergency:
• The Primary Net, which was operated out of the Washington Operations Center
(WOC) adjacent to the ACC, and which could be activated by FAA Operations<
served as a means of bringing other federal agencies (on 9/11, including CIA,
FBI, White House, National Military Command Center, regional FAA division
managers, and the Secret Service) into the loop, and also as a way of assembling
decision-makers to allow for coordinated action.
•
• The Tactical (or Secondary) Net, which was an internal network for FAA
personnel. ,
• The Tertiary Net, which was apparently not used on 9/11, allowed for "side bar"
communications that may not have been appropriate for the Primary Net.
[U] McLaughlin did not recall an Air Traffic Control (ATC) presence in the ACC at the
outset, nor did he recall ever seeing Jeff Griffith and Doug Davis during the first hour he
was there. He was not aware that day of the ATC net established by Dave Canoles, and
McLaughlin believed that the ATe net wasn't established until two or three hours after
the activation of the Primary Net. (He reported. that ATC had not been involved in the
emergency exercises conducted by his office, and allowed that may have contributed to
what he perceived to be a lack of connectivity between ATC and FAA security on 9/11.
[U] McLaughlin was surprised when he was informed by Commission staff that FAA
logs indicated that the Tactical Net had been activated at 8:55 a.m., but the Primary Net
wasn't up and running until 9:20 a.m. As indicated above, his recollection was that the
latter had been activated by shortly after 9:00 a.m. In McLaughlin's view, the security
division had acted quickly in activating the communications nets as soon as possible on
9111. He pointed out that the time-consuming activation process required the individual
dialing up of 30 agencies.
•
8S1
~<~1 Working-level Employee
.' "COMMISSION SENSITIVE

\,....,\,'<:""""'~
•
[U) He stated that events in the WashingtorrOperations Center (WOC) were being
rec:orded by indi~iduals using "~vei'l! tra2kV' fe~,:"ith hard copies of data. from the
pnmary and tactical net. He said thai \. _ n~ ~erved as recorders that
day. """
Military liaison
(U] McLaughlin stated that there was supposed to be a"fD:iJjtary renresent1tive at FAA
Headquarters but that she was gone that day. Her name i~
.....---_ ..
The Airlines
[U] Mcl.aughlin indicated that communications with the airlines on 9111 was the
responsibility solely of the FAA's Principle Security Inspectors (PSI's) for the individual
airlines.
Warning Cockpits
[U] McLaughlin does not recall any discussion on 9/11 on the notification of cockpits
about the emerging situation. In his view, such action would have been the prerogative
of the ATC
•
Reverse Screen ing
[U] McLaughlin could recall no discussion of screening de-planing passengers from the
grounded aircraft on 9/11. He felt that all concerned did the best they could in coping
wi th an unprecedented emergency response.
After-action Reports
[U] McLaughlin was surprised that apparently the FAA never undertook an after-action
report on the events of9/11. He reported that such analysis was typically done in the
wake of major incidents.
FAA Intelligence and Operations
[U] McLaughlin indicated that the Operations Division had begun its own 24-hour watch
only as a result of 9/11. However, as a duty officer, he felt that he had a responsibility to
remain current on intelligence information, though this knowledge was not factored back
into the work of the operations division. McLaughlin reported that the Security Directive
(SD) working group was the one place where intelligence and operations were combined
pre-9/11.
[U] Pre-9/11, McLaughlin recalled having heard the name bin Ladin fairly frequently, but
never with specific threat information. Based on what he saw, he perceived that the
• threat to civil aviation had gone up "a little bit" in the months preceding 9111.
COMMISSION SENSITNE 4
''$I-
[U] Related to the question of information sharing among agencies, McLaughlin recalled
previously having seen a State Department cable with information on Pan Am 103
specifying that the information was not to be shared with the FAA.
Transportation Security Operations .Center
[U] McLaughlin said that the TSOC doesn't have an ATC representative assigned to it
which could be a serious problem in the event of an aviation emergency because
situational awareness is so critical.
..,...88I
~, (j~o/o,oJ
COMMISSION SENSITIVE fsl.
• Event: Interview
Type of Event:
with Mike Morse, FAA National
Interview
Security Coordination
~
Staffer
Date: September 15,2003
Team Number: 7
Location: FAA Headquarters, Washington, DC
Participants - Non-Commission: Mike Morse, FAA National Security Coordination

Staffer; and Susan Caron, FAA Office of the Chief Counsel
Participants - Commission: John Raidt, Bill Johnstone, and Lisa Sullivan
•
Background
(Unc) Prior to coming to the FAA in 1986, Morse was in the U.S. Air Force Office
of Special Investigations. He dealt with counterintelligence and counterterrorism
from 1966 to 1986. In 1986, he moved to the FAA where he assisted in the
establishment of an intelligence division for civil aviation security. He named
Richard Clarke, Oliver North, and] las three members of the
Administration who were instrumental in establishing an intelligence division for
FAA becauseof their perception that FAA needed help in its overseas intelligence.
Initially, FAA's connection to the intelligence community was ail online data system,
Flash board, hosted by the National Security Agency. A secure intelligence facility
(SCIF) was built at FAA Headquarters to accommodate the division. Between 1986
and 1994, Morse served as Deputy Director and then Acting Director of Civil
Aviation Security Intelligence. i
(Unc) Morse was made Deputy Director of Aviation Security Operations in 1994.
He held a variety of posts within security operations for FAA over the next 7 years,
including domestic operations division manager; standards and evaluation division
manager and speciaJ activities. IfIe was Special Assistant to the Director of Aviation
Security Operations from 1999 through 2001. At first, this was Bruce Butterworth,
but by 2001 (including 9/11), the Director was Lee Longmire.
(Unc) As of the end of October 2001, Morse was made responsible for setting up an
•
office (Litigation Support Staff) within FAA to coordinate and expedite FAA
responses to Congressional and Executive inquiries. He reported that FAA fielded
20-30 calls per day from Hill staffers and members alike. The 'Administration
wanted answers as well. There were 7-8 congressional hearings in a 3-4 week
period. His role helped to decrease the impact of the response process on regular
FAA operations as much as possible. As the name of Morse's new office suggests,
the FAA saw the potential for major litigation as a result of 9/11. Morse and his
staff acted as a central repository for all essential and relevant records related to the
attacks. Issue papers, records, including all of the email traffic, were saved. All of
these materials have been sent to TSA. Morse has most recently moved into the lead
role on the National Security Coordination Staff within the FAA. He was
instrumental in the set-up and design of this office. The staff is made up of himself
and two intelligence officers. National Security Coordination Staff is the entry point
for all outside requests to the FAA from the intelligence community on projects,
data, and people that might be needed to conduct clandestine projects at home and
abroad.
(U nc) On the ·split between FAA and TSA, Morse indicated that he was directly
involved in the development of the Memorandum of Understanding of February 28,
2003 which provided for transfer of functions and personnel to TSA. Morse further
stated that he was the "keeper" of the MOU for FAA. In order to maintain a single
source for aviation intelligence, Annex 5 of the MOU, TSA agreed to provide FAA
with intelligence information. With respect to security, FAA is still responsible for
security of its own facilities (including the Air Traffic Control System) and for
providing FAA support for clandestine government operations (especially military
and intelligence).
~) Morse depicted the FAA before 9/11 as strictly a regulatory agency. In that
capacity, the organization often "got its nose bloodied" in attempting to exert
influence over the industry stakeholders, and to do more than the system would
sustain. Civil Aviation Security officials wanted to do more, but absence of public
or Congressional support, the security system did "as good a job as it could." This
was the greatest weakness of the system, according to Morse. An exam pIe he used
to describe this point was an attempt by the FAA to institute background checks for
those who were given unescorted access to secure areas in airports in the late-1980s.
FAA proposals received severe pushback from Congress and the industry
stakeholders. The most unpopular ones such as this would often result in legislation
(appropriations riders) that would restrict FAA ability to enforce such unpopular
proposals. Morse said Karl Shrum (SP?) from FAA policy would remember the
specific details of the background investigation issue.
('6S) When asked how it was that the FAA arrived at the conclusion to propose
background checks for all employees with unescorted access to the airports, Morse
said that the movement followed the crash of flight TWA 800 and came at a time
when "the domestic threat level had significantly increased." In addition to TWA
800, he referred to the World Trade Center attack and the Bojinka plot as incidents
that combined to finally produce Congressional concern that enabled the FAA to try
to raise the security baseline. Morse indicated that some significant improvements
were made at this time.
~) Morse referred to the "tombstone mentality" of the system as a whole. The
industry stakeholders believed the justifications the FAA provided for tighter
security measures were not valid. Airlines wanted to see more specific indications of
threats. Morse claimed the FAA did a lot to communicate the threat to the industry.
Factors that inhibited this communication were the classified nature of the
intelligence reporting; the need for the intelligence community to conceal the
intelligence methods and sources; and the difficulty of sanitizing the intelligence for
the industry in a meaningful way. In addition, he believed that the airline security
directors were not highly placed within the companies, and were mainly retired law
enforcement officials with limited experience with terrorism and with limited access
to current intelligence. Morse cited Larry Wansley at American as an exception,
who was well-connected within his company.
(S3--I)
Sanitizing the intelligence for the industry stakeholders was done by the ACI
and the intelligence provider. Morse stressed that this was a difficult process.
~) Overall, Morse reported that it was slow and difficult to get the security
baseline raised. The Baseline Working Group met for the first time on the day
TW A 800 exploded, and some of its efforts were relatively quickly diverted into the
work of the subsequent Gore Commission.
'(€.S) Morse considered the FAA intelligence division to be a strength of the system
in that its function was to act as an advocate for the aviation community's
intelligence needs within the intelligence community. The intelligence reporting did
not, however, lend itself to long-term strategic planning for the system. Where the
intelligence division was effective was in disseminating immediate threats in real-
time to the right parties. He reported that the ACI had a direct line to the FAA
Administrator. Action taken in response to threat reports had a short turn-around
time. ACI had a "fair amount" of autonomy with respect to the issuance of Security
Directives and Information Circulars.
(eS) In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, (post-Pan Am 103 crash), Morse said the
FAA Administrator and the Secretary of Transportation were "hungry" for
intelligence on threats to civil aviation. What made things difficult for the
government was that the FAA had merely a regulatory role within the system.
Given the cumbersome rulemaking process, Security Directives and to a lesser
extent Information Circulars became chosen methods of tightening security
measures and increasing threat awareness to the airlines, airports, and all other
significant parties. As these instruments (particularly Security Directives) became
more common, they became less "popular" with industry, and this in turn led to a
slowing down of the process of issuing them. In this time period (late 1980s-early
1990s), Morse indicated that government leadership sometimes became frustrated
with the aviation security process because of the lack of threat specificity and the
accompanying difficulty of "selling" the remedies to industry, to Congress and to the
public.
(es) Security Directives were effective to a certain extent, but they were only
enacted on a temporary basis. Stakeholders saw the issuance of directives as the
federal authorities interfering, rather than advising, on airline and airport
operations. Inevitably, this strained the relationship. From the stakeholders'
COMMISSION, SENSITIVE
• perspective, the government would better serve the industry

information rather than loosely qualified Securtty Directives
grudgingly adhere to, lest they incur penalties.
(~Morse characterized
'
by providing relevant
that the industry
the regulatory process as.a weakness in the aviation

security system. He went on to say that financially, the airlines were in "dire
must
straits." This contri buted to their resistance to security regulations imposed by the
FAA. In addition to the rulemaking process, Morse identified deficiencies in the
num ber of inspectors and the lack of a streamlined enforcement mechanism as
sources of the FAA's regulatory weaknesses. Without theenforcement authority it
needed to ensure security directives were followed, there W'(lS little the FAA could do
to significantlyimprove civil aviation security, despite good 'intelligence the FAA
was receiving that it was imprudent not to do so. '
~S) Morse felt that fines and other enforcement mechanisms were not an effective
tool in producing better performance. The airlines and airports saw penalties as a
"cost of doing business," and Morse quoted one airline security director as
commenting that, "We plane for these violations like bad weather.vFrequent
reductions in the fines frustrated the security inspectors, lowering their morale.
~) On the topic of checkpoint screening, Morse dwelt on the human factor
•
inseparable from this layer of the security system at the airport. With screener
turnover as high as 400 percent in some places, there was no room for job-
performance improvement. Morse indicated that one factor contributing to',the
high turnov "failure meant fire" mentalit of the check oint'
A program must be evise to ac ieve ig er

performance levels from the screeners.
~) When asked what he thought the mission of civil aviation security was before
9/11701, Morse said it was "to keep bombs offofplanes ... Before Pan Am 103, all we
could talk about was hijackings." After Pan Am 103, FAA Security was concerned
most about the possibility of a sophisticated explosive device getting on a
commercial flight. He candidly admitted that screening at the checkpoint did not do
a good enough job to prevent it, observing that "screening is inherently tough." The
deployment ofEDS machines marked the FAA's best effort lo address the problem
that it saw as the biggest, most probable threat to the industry.
'(cs.) Neither the FAA nor the industry was prepared for the type of attack the
country faced on 9/1 110 l. None of the security measures in place could have
p reven ted it.
leS) Morse said that before 9111/01, it was not FAA's role to actively provide
protection for the aviation industry. Exceptions, where a direct federal security role
was in place, included putting K-9 teams at airports, maintaining the small Federal
'.
Air Marshal program, and conducting research and development.
(&S) Compliance with FAA regulations and procedures was what FAA was looking
for from the airports. Essentially, this is what the Special Assessment teams
covertly tested for at airports.
('SS) Morse was asked to discuss the "Common Strategy," the doctrine and training
materials developed by the FAA, in consultation with the FBI and ATA, and
provided to the industry on how to deal with hij ackings. The strategy, which he
indicated was "easily misunderstood," was many years old, dating back to around
1980, and was also the subject of an FAAIFBI MOU which had last been updated in
1997. Morse said the point of the strategy, which was incorporated into the training
video shown to pilots and flight crews during training, was to "optimize actions
taken by a crew to resolve hijackings peacefully." It was geared toward a systematic
delay through appeasement of the hij ackers. Appeasement was employed to prevent
the hij ackers from doing anything rash. Morse said that over time, history had
shown that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it was to have a peaceful
resolution. One reason for this might be that the hostages had time to develop
relationships with the hijackers.
(-e.g) The Common Strategy operated on the assumption that hijackers issue
demands, most often for asylum or the release of prisoners from jail. Morse
admitted the scenario which played out on 9/11101 was not imagined when designing
the strategy; they thought that "suicide wasn't the game plan" of hij ackers.
(&S) Prior to the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the FAA tried to update the "Common.
Strategy" video used by the airlines for training its flight crews because of changes
in aircraft and communications which had rendered the old version obsolete. Over
the years, some of the carriers, such as Continental and American, had developed
their own updated training materials to supplement the antiquated FAA video. The
training itself had always been the responsibility of the airlines. Morse would sit in
on training sessions from time to time. Morse indicated that the training materials
developed by American Airlines "mocked" the Common Strategy, apparently in an
. effort to use humor to get the point across. Commission staff has not viewed the
American Airlines training materials.
TS-S.I) As part of its efforts to update the Common Strategy, FAA gave the training
film to the FBI to review (1996-1997) because the content of the video was based on
a Memorandum of Understanding between the FAA and FBI on delegation of
responsibilities in the event of a domestic hijacking. The Bureau reported back that
it had "lost track" of the Common Strategy principles. Morse said that the FBI had
not been keeping track on incidents of hij ackings abroad or the changes in
technology that could be used in or would be relevant in a hijack situation.
tsSI) Morse reported that at that time, the FAA and the FBI "renegotiated" the
Memorandum of Understanding that had established the Common Strategy. The
FBI came back and said that the substantive content of the video was not, in fact,
irrelevant; it was pretty good. However, it agreed the tape could use updating for
the benefit of the viewers. The idea of suicide hijackers never entered their
discussions. Looking back, Morse realizes now that in their discussions, key factors
weren't considered such as the communications improvements over the years (air
phones, cell phones, ACARS messages, etc). It goes without saying that on 9/11101,
these communication tools were instrumental to our understanding of what
happened that day.
(C'S) Around 1999, some of the airlines, particularly US Air's Security Director
Laura Gimlet, were also concerned that the FAA training materials were
substantively irrelevant and used obsolete equipment. Since many of the airlines,
including US Air, were on the verge of bankruptcy, an effort was made on the part
of the airlines and FAA to work together to finance a new video.
ts-8I) In late 1999 or early 2000, the topic of updating the training materials for the
Common Strategy was raised at a meeting at AT A Morse attended with the airline
security directors. The FAA needed the air carriers to invest in the project. Morse
reported, "It did not go well;" no one wanted to help. For instance, no airline
wanted to loan a plane to the project for filming,' and there was little enthusiasm
from AT A. In spite of this reaction, FAA proceeded with plans to update the
Strategy, primarily through planning on use of current plane outfitted with current
communications devices (including ACARS and cell phones). In response to a
question, Morse indicated that at this time (2000 and early 2001) he was "not so
sure" the basic doctrine was still sound.
ts.sI) In 2000 and 2001, Morse held a number of meetings on updating the Common
Strategy with groups such as military counterterrorism forces and "U.S.
government specialists" on how to "absolve an aircraft" in the event of hij acking;
several with FBI; the State Department; and with representatives from the airline
carriers. He indicated that their existed a "disconnect" between the military and the
FBI on tactics in the event of a hijacking, but the hijacking model was the same (i.e.
non-suicide ).
(SSI) In May 2001, a meeting was held in Quantico to bring all interested parties
together to discuss updating the Common Strategy. It included three airline
captains with security clearances, ATC representatives, other FAA representatives,
but not NORAD. The suicide hijacking model was not formally discussed, but
discussions did take place on the imperative of keeping hijacked planes on the
ground, and they did seek to develop techniques for the crew to disable aircraft to
achieve this goal.
(l;S) Morse reported that AT A continued to "drag its feet" on revising the training
materials.
'(8S) In the summer of 2001, the joint project to update the Common Strategy was
underway and they began filming the new training video. A highjack exercise was
conducted in collaboration with the Miami FBI Field Office, Miami Dade County
Police Department, the SWAT team, and Varig Airlines, utilizing a 767. The
underlying doctrine was still under development at this time, and was not finalized
before 9/11101. The video and all of the materials have been turned over to TSA.
• c"ssI) When asked how he assessed the possibility of a suicide hijack mission, Morse
said that in the back of his mind, he was aware of the possibility of the event (based
on incidents in the 1970s and 1980s), but he stressed that he never saw any specific
intelligence on a suicide hijacking plot. Morse admitted that he feared hijacking
could become a popular tactic with terrorists again. When they looked at the Air
France hijacking, authorities suspected and feared that explosives rna have been
used in that attack. Other ossible terrorist tactics
~~~~ __ ....a commercia
viable threat to the industry.
(~J) Morse indicated that he intended to raise some concerns about the possibility
(albeit unlikely) of the suicide hijacking tactic in the Common Strategy update.
(~) The FAA and industry's treatment and attitude towards knives an~/'knife
detection has not changed significantly since before 9/11101. The 4-inch standard
was set in part because knives of shorter length were legal in all of the lis. (except
New York state which had a 3 inch threshold) and were thus not regulated.
Furthermore, they could not have prohibited anything smaller than a 4-inch blade
even if they wanted to because the machines are not sophisticated enough to detect
them. Finally, their thinking at the time was that, giving the experience with
hijacker motives and tactics up till that time, short ..bladed knives were not seen as a
•
menacing, credi ble means of controlling passengers or flight crews.' A question of,
"whe re do you put your energies?" had to be considered when deciding what went
on the prohibited items list. Bombs could easily be disguised as laptops and ball
point pens could be used as just as lethal a weapon as a small blade, whether
prohibited or not. ,/
(~J) The Checkpoint Operations Guide (COG) was developed ,:byAT A and RAA,
approved by FAA, and then sold by ATA and RAA back to their members. FAA
wanted to insure that the COG didn't fall below the minimum/standards called for
in the Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACCSP). Morse remembers that
A TAwas particularly focused on prohibiting or restricting items which looked
"menacing," I
~_~_~ ~ __ ~~~--,IBeyond these actions, given its role at."

the time there was not much more the FAA could do with respect to knives, "
according to Morse. ,..:' ,,/
(881) The Inter-agency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) was sponsored
by the National Security Council. The FAA Intelligence division had a seat on the
Committee. The Committee discussed guidelines for the intelligence community as
a whole. It defined terms and priorities, functioned as a nexus point-for the
different agencies, and fostered analyst-to-analyst exchanges. It also did periodic
th reat assessments. "
•
" "
(s'SI) FAA intelligence thought the intelligence co~munitY'~eeded to be more

responsive to the aviation industry's need for intelligence on the domestic threat
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7
• . level. As a result, the DCI's (Director for Central Intelligence) staff provided a
report on threat estimates which the FAA used to establish evidence that the
baseline budget needed to be raised for security. This contributed to the overall
effort to raise the baseline for the FAA.
\6£) Morse was home sick on the morning of9/11101. At 8:30 a.m., his wife called
and told him about the first plane that crashed into the World Trade Center. He
immediately started in to FAA headquarters. It took him approximately one hour
to get there by car. Along the way, he heard al of the rumors and false alarms (he
mentioned the supposed car bomb at the State Department which was widely
reported that day). By 10:00 a.m., he was at headquarters and went to the
Command Center, where he stayed for the next 24 hours. The Command Center
was run by Lee Longmire that day. Initially, Peter Falcone may have been in
charge of the Center when Morse arrived. Morse spent the better part of the day
acting as a "dispatcher" of sorts for the primary net.
(-(;S) Longmire, Falcone, and Morse rotated in and out of positions on the dais,
facing the staff members answering calls. A "SCIF" adjacent to the Command
Center was where secure video and teleconference communications took place that
day, between national leadership, FAA, and the military. Fran Lozito, a FAA
representative to one of the air carriers, manned phones from the Command Center
that day; as did Janet Riffe, who was on (among other calls) the primary and
•
tactical nets that day. Riffe was the Primary Security Investigator for American at
the time .
t6S) The primary communications net was unclassified and was used by air carriers
and air traffic controllers involved in the incident. The tactical net was used for
discussions of deploying assets. Intelligence was another communications provider
in the sense that it linked people through the internet.
CQ) Because the crisis unfolded and ended relatively quickly, the Command
Center's function quickly changed to consequence management. They were worried
about deploying resources. Questions they needed answered pertained to what kind
of cargo the flights had on board, whether or not any law enforcement people were
on board, the physical lay-out of the planes, the amount of gas in the tanks.
""ECS) Before 9/11, it was the Command Center'sjob in acrisis to direct the activities
of law enforcement in response to a hijack. It was organized that way because FAA
provided the expertise to determine what could and could not feasibly be doneto
thwart a hijacking underway. Law enforcement does not have such expertise.
(Morse reported that the FBI was not necessarily pleased by this arrangement.) The
Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-l) was responsible for
coordinating FAA's response to a hijacking. On 9/11101, the lead FAA staff were
Lee Longmire, who served as Director, and Morse, who served as Information
Manager.
•
E-CS)Information gathered on 9/11 at the Command Center was compiled for the
Administrator. Most of the information was kept together in what is now room 312
A at FAA headquarters. Penny Anderson led the effort to sort through the
. , ~ ..
/9/11 Working-level Employee
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• inform ation on the four separate hij acks including all o,f the miscellaneous reports
(including many "red herrings," as Morse called them), It was in this room that the
"butcher paper" was hung on the walls to keep track of information as it came in.
Morse did not think the paper still exists. If it did, he thought he would know about
it. '
(tS) Morse recalled that Lee Longmire questioned Janet Riffe (sometime between
10 and 12) on her initial report of a gun being fired on one of the hijacked American
flights, based on reporting from American. Morse .informed Commission staff that
Riffe was talking to all of the air carriers that day,/not just American. Morse
recalled that Riffe, at the time, indicated to Longmire that, "I think I got" the
information on the gun, indicating some uncertainty on her part. In subsequent
discussion, American Airlines denied they were the source of the information.
I :
(t3S) Morse said, "It is almost impossible to overstate the chaos of that day." He
added that Janet Riffe may have been in one of/the most "stressful roles that day."
No one had ever anticipated the number of attacks at the same time.
\t)S) Morse was riot sure who typed up the information from the butcher paper (he
thought it might have beenl ' r
(sp?)) that day for the Administrator's
briefing book. The report of the gun was still in there for several hours, but was
•
subsequently destroyed when it was determined to have been erroneous.
Administrator Garvey informed Morse that she never saw the briefing book report
on gun usage. Morse speculated that someone within FAA "pulled it off the hard
drive and leaked it to the media."
~$) Morse indicated that they started getting more information during that day on
the weapons which may have been used in the hijackings (from media and other
accounts) and "it was clear we had short-bladed weapons involved."
~S) The GAO Office of Special Investigations did an investigation on the gun issue.
Morse recalled that the FAA had received a written response from them concluding
that a gun on board Flight 11 was highly unlikely, given the information their
investigators were able to uncover.
EC.S) Having brought down the flights, Morse conceded that there is no way to know
for sure if other aircraft were involved in the plot that day. Morse speculated that
the most senior level people in the secure video teleconference in the SCIF would
have discussed procedures for the planes to follow once they landed. Morse himself
could not say what steps had been taken by law enforcement or security at that
stage. Jane Garvey, Monte Belger, and Lynne Osmus would have been involved in
any such discussions, along with A TC officials and other senior DOT officials.
•
''(eS) Morse said that someone in the Command Center had spoken with AT A about
what they could or should tell their members. Morse's experience in the past had
been that AT A was helpful in disseminating information in emergencies, and that

they would willingly take on such responsibilities.
(C'S) No comprehensive After-Action Report was ever completed by the FAA.

Everyone was working day and night on emergency measures. The potential for
other attacks was real. Months later (March/April), an attempt was made to
complete a report, but the creation ofTSA was underway and it was increasingly
difficult to get all of the principles in one place to discuss what happened and
generate "lessons-learned." Morse reported that Larry Bruno, the security
regulatory manager, was initially tasked with writing the 9111101After Action
report. He found it impossible because people could not make time to cooperate.
Willie Gripper than tasked Morse with the assignment, at which point Morse
indicated that to accomplish the mission would require that higher level officials
made it a priority.
(5S) In separate areas of interest, intense studies were completed. And
operationally, these led to a great deal of change as a result of 9/11101. An example
of this is the DEN (Domestic Events Network), which was formed that day and has
remained operational 24-hours a day ever since.
(t3-S) In Morse's opinion, rapid congressional action quelled the FAA's internal
enthusiasm for identifying lessons-learned. After a drastic organizational overhaul,
lessons-learned by an out-moded bureaucracy quickly became irrelevant.
~) Today, FAA's security responsibility is limited to its own assets and personnel.
It still owns and operates the national air space, which in Morse's words, "remains
vital to. public safety." Airport towers, TRACONs, and circuits are also important
assets that are under the protection of FAA. In this regard, FAA has a role in
supporting national security activities (including military, law enforcement, and
intelligence). In addition, air traffic controllers have an added security component
to their jobs since 9/11(01 in implementing certain TSA functions, such as restricting
the use of national airspace.
(SSI) Morse feels that Osama Bin Laden's network of terrorists have a
preoccupation with aviation. The U.S. government needs to be familiar and well
trained on the workings of the aviation system in order to protect it; these training
operations need to go on outside of the public view.
'(t;S) Morse feels that it is better the country has taken security responsibilities away
from the air carriers because they were all unwilling to absorb the overhead in such
a highly competitive market and they were never very good at doing security.
"They were happy to contract out screening to the lowest bidder" and didn't like all
the data entry time and cost of working the CAPPS system. Furthermore, long-
term considerations seemed to not have much impact on the airlines' behavior with
respect to security.
('(SS) Morse does not see the evidence that the newly federalized aviation security
system is being tested and examined with the same rigor that it was before 9/11/01.
He said critically, "TSA is being expected to inspect itself;" implying that one agency
cannot be expected to perform both functions very well. In the old system, testing of
the security measures was done by multiple parties: the airlines themselves, the
private security companies involved, and FAA assessments. Airlines still have
obligation to check the security of the plane's cabin before and after takeoff, but for
the most part, they have been relieved of security responsibilities.
(CS) Morse described the old system as having been "junked" in the changeover to
the current system. He worries that the new structure has minimal knowledge of
aviation and little expertise in regulatory affairs. His initial impression is that TSA
is doing a worse job in regulation and inspection and "in many respects, security is
now worse." He believes that TSA's expedited rulemaking authority is a good thing,
but that the agency needs a better management focus to fix problems with
inspection, enforcement and compliance.
't&S) Morse recommended that a strong and independent testing mechanism be

established for the aviation security system. He said TSA has hired talented and
hardworking people with law enforcement backgrounds and no aviation or
regulatory expertise. The regulatory function of FAA did not survive the transfer to
TSA. Key people have left appointments since TSA's inception. Morse believes this
is due to the tendency to underestimate the complexity of the skill-set needed in
leadership roles for regulation of aviation in this country. He warned, "When all
you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." Morse concluded that law
enforcement is not a "cure-all" for the system of transportation security in this.
country.
UNCLASSIFIED

Event: Norfolk TRACON visit
Type of event: Recorded Interview and Orientation
Date: Monday, December 01, 2003
Team Number: 8
Participants (non-Commission): John Harter, Operations Supervisor
Participants (Commission): Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer
Location: Norfolk TRACON
Background:
Started in 1974 in the Air Force. Hired by the FAA in 1981 and his first facility
was Dulles Tower. He reported to Norfolk 1983 as a controller. In 1987 he became a
plans and procedures specialist for a year at which time he became a supervisor. He has
held several duties including representative to GIANT KILLER. He has been
Operational Supervisor continuously for the past 5 years and was performing those duties
on 9/11.
As a plans and procedures specialist he participated in writing letters of
agreement. His role at GIANT KILLER was as a safety supervisor and control tower
examiner. He also participated in writing letters of agreement at GIANT KILLER. He
does not recall contact with NEADS while at GIANT KILLER.
Scramble procedures in place have been that way since he can remember and date
at least to 1983.
He did listen to the audio tape of the East Feeder radar four or five days prior to
this interview. He has also talked to the legal counsel, Mr Weigand. Weigand was not
present in Norfolk that day but participated via phone conference.
9/11:
He was on the day shift and came in early. He was the supervisor in charge. First
recollection was when Newport News Tower called and said one of the World Trade
Center towers was on fire. His TRACON supports Newport News. He reported to either
Jerry Bourdeau or Mr. Chafin. They had no role in his actions that day. He was the focal
point for TRACON operations. His control room was configured and manned normally.
Peninsula and East Feeder positions are opened depending on Langley and Newport
News. He thought both were open that morning. If not opened they are combined into
the Arrival Radar position.
COIvlMTSSTON SENSITIVE
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lJNCLAS SIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Concerning the scramble he recalled that the "162" line, a ring-inlvoice-out circuit
rang. The ring will be heard throughout the floor; the voice will only be heard at the
position that answers. That caught his attention; that usually means something out of the
ordinary. The Peninsula Radar took the call, wrote down the details and briefed him.
Normally any position that took such a call would write down heading, DME and
frequency. He thought that scramble orders normally contained a DME. He recalled the
northbound aspect as unusual, normally scrambles proceed east. The northern aspect and
uniqueness of the order caused him to task the East Feeder Radar to call Navy Patuxent
Advisory to find out about shutting down their warning area. He knew the fighters would
proceed through that area if they followed the scramble order. He also noted that GIANT
KILLER would not get the initial flight strip but would get a departure strip which would
include the beacon code. That is done automatically through the Washington Center
computer.
The flight strip came in to flight data from where it was hand carried (short
distance) to the appropriate radar position. The flight strip showed 090 for 60. All they
could figure out was that someone through secure communications changed the scramble
order to which they were not privy. They do not have a secure line. He personally
understood that the flight plan was different from the scramble order but did not take
steps to change it. He has never done that.
They give active air scrambles priority. The pilots can go where they want, when
they want, how they want. If the pilot says he wants to go a certain direction they let him
go and do what they can to deal with traffic and with adjacent sectors. He validated that
normally Langley tower turns over radar control of the fighters as they are on the ground
rolling for takeoff. Air defense fighters do follow runway heading by letter of agreement
to 4000 feet at which time Peninsula Radar turns the plane over to East Feeder Radar.
Other than Patuxent Advisory, Harter called no other facilities other than those
who would normally be involved, in this case, GIANT KILLER. He doesn't recall if
Washington Center was involved. He had no contact with Washington Center, Herndon,
or FAA HQ concerning the Langley scramble.
Humans can change the flight plan, i.e. the 090 for 60, at Langley Tower or
Peninsula Radar. He recalled no reason that either had to change the flight plan as
entered by Langley Tower. The pilot will usually wait for ATC to receive subsequent
directions. Ifhe doesn't and just turns he will get all the priority he can be given. He
characterized the traffic at that time of day to normally be light to moderate.
. Given that the scramble order and the flight plan are different it is his position that
he will wait for the pilot to decide. That fact that East Feeder asked the pilot what
direction he wanted was initiative not standard procedure. If the pilot had gone north
East Feeder would have handed the plane off to Patuxent. If Patuxent was cold the hand
off would have gone to either Calvert or Cape Charles Sectors at Washington Center.
He does not recall HUNTRESS calling Norfolk asked where its planes were. He
recalls that the flight of three was unusual and that the third man has to squawk a specific
code which he did not. The trail was also well back from the flight lead.
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
He summarized his scramble handling procedure to be: come off of runway eight,
climb to altitude as quickly as can, put on heading as quickly as can, and hand off to the
next controlling entity as quickly as can.
He recalled no northbound scrambles prior to 9/11. All went to the east to go
after Russian Bears or for drug interdiction. He has not seen a scramble to the west and
hasn't seen one to the southwest in a long time.
He doesn't recall the absence of a target designation in the scramble order that
day. His priority that day was the second set of information he received, the flight plan.
AFIO. He didn't recall it as of 911l. There is something out now. Quad 7777s
means nothing to him.
He was not on a telecom with Eastern Region or any other FAA facility on 9/11.
He had an individual call from Washington Center asking how many airplanes he could
take on the ground.
Their TRACON altitude is max 23,000 east, 16,000 northwest, and roughly a 40
mile radius with allowance for Oceana on the south and east.
He was shown the 1994 LOA re scramble procedures. Concerning Norfolk, he
summarized that the first thing they do is give Langley Tower the release and take the
fighters to 4000 feet and then expedite their desired vector and then tum them over to the
next controlling entity. He will always default to the FIDO system because that is the
latest information. There can be an up to eight minute time period before the scramble
order and the flight plan. He' doesn't know what transpired in between. Unless someone
calls with an over ride or the pilot makes a request he will not change the flight plan. If
the pilot asked for a direction it would have taken 30 seconds to get the flight data system
changed. In practice, he would have let him go immediately and handed him off
manually. Manual handoffs are made a lot in the Norfolk area because of the abundance
of military facilities. Manual handoffs have been around as long as he has been in air
traffic. Anyone can do that.
Back to 090 for 60. If it were 070 for 60 the route would be into Washington
Center space. The 090 for 60 puts them past the 75 30 line, the edge of Norfolk airspace
and direct into GIANT KILLER space and not either Washington Center or Oceana. He
believes the 090 for 60 has been around for "years." It is an airspace convenience that
allows for a direct handoffto GIANT KILLER. A direct route flight strip would contain
the entry: LFI. .. Harkum, DCA ... LFI. The only near foolproof entry would have been a
"stereo" or canned entry.
Harter summed up: "along the way ... there was always someone there to break
the chain, the chain never got broken." Harter made that statement to staff having
relistened to the tapes prior to the staff visit. The history prior to 9111 was to the east or
to the southeast for drug interdiction or cold war issues.
He didn't think they could have done anything different, given the information
they had. If Langley had given Norfolk TRACON additional information, that is where
the chain could have been broken. That was Harter's answer to the question what could
have been done differently that day at his facility.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
He did not agree with the Langley position that it was more efficient to enter a
flight plan known to be acceptable to the system than to enter something different. That
is an operator issue. An operator knowing what he/she was doing would have been able
to correctly enter a unique flight plan. He believed that Giant Killer would have deferred
to what Norfolk had in the flight season over what was in the scramble order. Giant
Killer took the scramble flight because it was handed off by TRACON. He doesn't think
the scramble entered the equation. GIANT KILLER would have defaulted to the LOA
and would have worked to hand the flight off to HUNTRESS.
He did not recall any other call from HUNTRESS other than the scramble order
itself. He did not recall participated in any FAA national level conference calls; he does
not get involved in a lot of telcons at TRACON level.
There is no TMU position at Norfolk TRACON. Harter was the Operations

Supervisor and the Traffic Management specialist on 9/11.
He recommended that all LOA be reviewed every two years. His other
recommendation would be education, for example on use of the FIDO (Flight Data
Input/Output terminal). You can always tell when new personnel come on at Langley
Tower, for example.
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UNCLASSIFIED
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M{fZ 0 +0 )1 ;og
@
Team Number: 8
Participants (non-Commission): Michael Strother, East Feeder Radar Controller on 9111;
Observer - Dave Weigand via telephone from Rockville, MD and Steve Wylinski,
NACDA representative
Background:
Controller for 16 years, started with the US Air Force. Worked at Newport News
Tower and has been at Norfolk TRACON/Tower since January 1998. His time is equally
divided among all positions in both TRACON and Tower. East Feeder air space extends
from the surface to flight level 230. Handoffs on eastbound aircraft are handed off by
Peninsula Radar. In his experience he handled perhaps a dozen scrambles, always to the
east.
9/11:
He had not personally observed events that occurred in New York prior to
handling the Langley scramble. He was aware that something unusual was happening
and that both WTC towers had been hit.
Langley Scramble:
Following is in reference to a copy of the transcript. He did not hear the actual
scramble order, but did hear the ring. He was aware that a scramble was in progress.
William Casson, the Peninsula Radar controller apparently handed him the flight strip
since only one strip was found and Casson's handwriting was on the strip.
He acknowledged that he asked what heading the pilot would like. He isn't sure
why he did that except to say that any time those guys come off, wherever they are going,
we need to have clean airspace. Whatever they want is what we give them. If the pilot
wanted to go somewhere else than as specified in the flight plan Strother had the
authority to grant that request. He doesn't think he would have entered a new flight plan
in the system he would have coordinated manually with whoever he needed to work with
to clear air space.
He made the handover to GIANT KILLER. They asked for radar and he switched
the flight over and called back later to make sure GIANT KILLER had HUNTRESS'
frequency. They did. It is an automated handoff. He entered a "V" on his console, hit
enter and it flashed to GIANT KILLER. The terminology on the screen is something that
GIANT KILLER would immediately recognize.
He did not recall anyone, anywhere, raising concern that the flight was headed
east despite what the scramble order said. He did not hear the scramble order and wasn't
aware of the north vector in that order.
He was the one that called Patuxent at John Harter's request to check on the status
of the restricted area. At East Feeder position he routinely talked to Cape Charles and
Norfolk High (Irons) sectors at Washington Center.
His personal position on scrambles was that they had priority and he would do
what was needed to facilitate their progress, to include authorizing the pilot to go where
he wanted to go.
~ ICR 0 +0 n '30 q
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD
@
Team Number: 8
Participants - William Casson, East Peninsula Radar Controller on 9111
Observer - Dave Weigand via telephone from Rockville, MD
Background:
Controller since May of 1982, and a couple years prior to that with the military ..
He has been at Norfolk TRACON/Tower since 1991. He was working the 9-5 shift that
day and was assigned to Peninsula position that morning. Norfolk handles the radar for
both Newport News and Langley Tower and releases IFR aircraft into the National
Airspace System. At TRACON he had the ability to detect primary targets, that switch is
always on.
9/11:
He was aware that there was a crash into a building in New York, what kind of
crash he did not know. He had not seen events on television. He took the call from
HUNTRESS on the scramble line. He recalled the order contained a heading, 010, and
altitude and a frequency. After that the flight strip came out with different information,
090 for 60. Langley tower called for release and he released the aircraft, gained comms
with the pilot and tried to release the flight to East Peninsula. There was some initial
confusion and the pilot came back to him on his frequency and he limited the flight to
23K feet, the limit for Norfolk TRACON.
He was given the opportunity to review the transcript of his conversations with
the Quit flight. He acknowledged that he and the pilot exchanged information about the
090 for 60 heading. He recalled no other conversation with the pilot about that heading.
He personally didn't question the situation. He had the flight strip and the pilot
statement. Had the pilot asked to go 010 he would have let him go immediately. He
would not have amended the flight plan; he would have accomplished manual
coordination.
Prior to 9/11 he had worked quit a few scrambles, more than he can remember,
perhaps monthly or quarterly, not something that happened every day. He could not
recall if the heading was always 090 for 60. He did know that they would come off on
runway heading, 080. He would take them on that heading to flight level 4000 and then
hand them off.
He confirmed that he was the only one who heard the verbal scramble on the 162
line. His normal procedure was to then notify his supervisor that there was a scramble.
He would also notify East Feeder position. The flight plan then follows. The post
scramble order call advising of a three-ship formation would have come to him. The
addition of a third plane did not make his job more difficult.
Hypothetically, if the pilot had turned on his own to the north he would have
worked to facilitate that action, not work to get the pilot back on flight plan path. He may
have called the supervisor to help call other facilities. He would have worked to hold the
pilot below flight lever 230 in Norfolk TRACON air space.
In his experience he was not aware that they ever had the target component of
scramble orders.
IYlP!.. o J%101
. f3J
Event: Interview with Lynne Osmus
Date: October 3, 2003
Team Number: 7
Location: FAA SCIF
Participants - Non Commission: Lynne Osmus
Participants -- Commission: Bill Johnstone and John Raidt
Career Background
(U) Lynne Osmus started with the FAA in 1979 as a federal police officer at Dulles when
the FAA owned the airports. Osmus had previously held a summer job as a screener.
1981-1986: held various positions with the FAA security field Office in Los Angeles,
including as a Federal Air Marshal. 1986-1987: GS-14 with the Domestic Security
Program. 1988: Branch manager in airport security; 1989: Division manager, and then
acting director of Policy for CAS. (Prior to 1988 operations and planning were rolled up
into one organization that was just a day-to-day operations program. The 1990 Aviation
Security Improvement Act changed the structure adding offices to look at long term
analysis including the Office of Policy which did more long-term planning and
rulemaking; and the Office of Operations which managed field operations, FAM, PSIs to
conduct inspections and ensure compliance with policy). 1990: Director of the Office of
Policy (ACP); 1990-1991 (6 months): Assistant to Administrator Busey; 1991-1995:
Director of Operations; May 1995-November 1998: Chief of Staff for FAA
Administrator Hinson and FAA Administrator Garvey; 1998-November 2000: Director
of FAA Brussels Office conducting airport assessments. Nov. 2000 - June 2001 .Acting
Asst. Administrator for Aviation Policy and International. June 200 I-February 2002:
Deputy Asst. Administrator for Security (ACS 2); Served as liaison with TSA to create
the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between FAA and TSA; Now serves as
Asst. Administrator for Security and Hazardous Materials.
Mission of CAS
(U) Protect aviation by making sure We had appropriate countermeasures for U.S. carriers
operating domestically and overseas (Part 108), and for foreign air carriers serving the
U.S. (Part 129). The requirements for assessing foreign airports bumped up against
sovereignty issues. We were enforcing the ICAO standards.
Threat
(Ssi) The focus was on passenger aircraft because history and the intelligence
assessments showed this was the target of opportunity and choice. The threat was
hijacking and then shifted to Improvised Explosive, Devices. Osmus said we had always
perceived the threat as overseas, but after the WTC bombing in 1993, the threat at home
was more evident.
Response
tsS) Osmus identified one of the strengths of the system as the emergence of automated
data systems, that did tasks such as organize inspection data and conduct trend analysis.
She cited the work of Mike McCormick to quantitatively assess threats and identify
weaknesses in order to aid in the development of countermeasures. '
(SSI) The weakness of the system is the "human factor" that with so many people
churning through the system, and so few incidents, complacency sets in. The problem
with complacency is why Claudio Manno's shop (ACI) kept trying to reach out to the Air
Carrier's security directors to let them know the threat to civil aviation was real so that
they would approve the necessary measures.
(~) Osmus did not see a laborious rulemaking process as a big problem because the
FAA had the authority to expeditiously issue Security Directives (SD's) if a counter
measure was required.
~J) Cost was a big issue to the air carriers, and given the absence of problems they
were reluctant to take costly action. In the case of a specific threat, such as Bojinka, the
air carriers were very responsive. They understood the threat overseas, but it was hard
for them to conceive of the domestic threat.
(~I') Another problem identified by Osmus was that the Security Directors for the air
carriers were former FBI and DIA folks who would call colleagues from their former
agencies. Often the information they received from their former colleagues would
undermine the FAA's assessments.
Roles and Responsibilities
~.I) Osmus said that she was not troubled by the division of roles and responsibilities.
Screening was an appropriate function for the air carriers because they had liability, the
aircraft and the schedule and the air carriers wanted to maintain control of the function.
(ss.I) Osmus said that there had been debate about whether the screening function should
be taken away from the air carriers. GAO and the IG looked into it, but they concluded
that changing the model was not advisable because the aircraft was the responsibility of
the air carriers.
2
'.
• ~I) According to Osmus the air carriers wanted the responsibility because screening
affected the timing of their operations, The possibility of having the airports conduct the
screening caused problems with consistency in the application of security from airport to
airport. There was no impetus to change the model. The cost of federalizing the function
was also a bi g issue.
Intelligence
-TssI) Strengths; FAA intelligence office was one of the best in government. It drew
experienced people but taught them to see things from an aviation standpoint.
(sSI) Weaknesses: While intelligence sharing had improved by 2001, the FBI and other
members of the IC did not fully recognize the need for FAA to have the information they
wanted. FBI was not as interested in developing intelligence as in investigating it.
Prescreening
(S-SI) CAPPS-The criteria (weights and factors) on which it was based was solid. FAA
did outreach to other agencies in developing CAPS' scoring criteria and in the mid-
L
1990'sI
I 9/11 Closed by Statute
•
j
(sSI) Osmus indicated that Jim Padgett could help explain what the criteria were and how
they factored in suicide hijacking, The problem with developing CAPPS was the limited
database of what attackers looked like, The operational problem was that the program
scooped up a Jot of people that weren't a threat. This shook public confidence in the
program, Osmus said that the CAPPS program was dev~~~wa·~~"",,,~~~.c- ..
baggage because that's where the threat was ercei d
..... ---~they needed a system to prioritize who posed the greatest

threat. Osmus said it was envisioned that CAPPS could playa larger role than just
baggage screening but that Admiral Flynn would have made a determination on this point
in the 1996~ 1997 time frame, Osmus did not recall an SD that was allowed to expire that
would have subjected selectees to greater checkpoint scrutiny.
~SI) Prior to CAPPS' the FAA utilized a manual pre-selection criteria program to
identify individuals who may pose a threat.
(sSI) No fly orders-These were issued in the form of SO's, Some of the carriers were
able to. load the list of names directly into their computer reserv)tions ~ystems, others had
to apply it manually. Post 9-11 the FBI developed a list of abou eople - this
became known as the watch list. Sometimes FBI would go directly to the air carrier to
•
help in a particular case. '
"'--~SSI 3
" ,. 9/11 Closed by Statute
• Checkpoint Screening
tsSI) Strengtht ...
Knives
~--- .....
(S-~I) Osmus said there were two factors leading to the 4" standard. 1) Traditional
hijackers used weapons such as guns, explosive and large knives, Small knives were not
part of the equation', 2) Sometime in the 1980's FAA conducted an informal survey of
state laws to determine what was and wasn't legal to carry. The 4" standard was.drawn
from that canvas.
Detection
WIt respect to the magnetometer's capabilities for

~d7e"":t-ec~t":"'"in-g~k:-n""":'i-v-es-4~':'l""
-or~e""'o-w""'-sm-'
..Jussuggested that we consult LYLE MALOTKY who
was FAA's scientific advisor, and who is now at TSA. He can tell us the metal content
that the magnetometers can detect. (COURTNEY TUCKER can tell us about the number
of knives confiscated by the system).
•
(ssI) Osmus said that she is not sure whether there was a concern that magnetometers
were unable to detect some items that were prohibited under Part 108 and the ACSSP,
She added however that terrorists were building high tech lED's so they were focused on
high tech threats, not low tech threats like small knives.
Access Control
(S-SI) The airport credentials all personnel with access to the ADA.The responsibility to
conduct background checks and, if necessary, the criminal check, for the purpose of
credentialing employees were as follows:
CSSI) The airport was responsible for doing a 1O-year employment check on its
employees, If any year could not be accounted for a criminal check was conducted. Air
carriers were responsible for doing the same check on its employees, and those of its
contractors, and then would pass the check onto the airport for credentialing. The FAA
was responsible for facilitating the criminal checks that required the assistance of the
federal government.
('8S1) Osmus said that access control continues to be one of her greatest concerns, though
there is no evidence this factor had an impact with respect to the 9/11 hijackings .
• 4
"
"'9/11 Closed by Statute

•
.sst
...'!,~
• I
Aircraft Protection
(SSI) Osmus statedJha:t't'he Common Strategy for air crew response to hijac~ing was in
the process of being updated again as of9/11. Flight attendants were taught tc1
~rid to understand the other resources that were brought to bear.
I
(Ss.J) The Federal Air Marshal program (FAM) was placed under the FAA by a
presidential directive. FAM training was adjusted to address the tactics that Hezbollah
was using. Training increased in the early 90's, as FAM wanted a permanent force with
high firing standards.
~.I) Osmus stated that an evaluation assessing the hijack threat concluded that a FAM
program should be continued. A written report was produced. By the mid1990's FAM
flights were all international based on the threat assessment. Osmus said that the FAA
didn't perceive a huge hijacking threat. She referred us to Greg McLaughlin who could
discuss with us the size adjustment decisions.
Safety vs. Security
(sg,I) Security didn't exist 30 years ago. While safety has always been part of the
equation, the goal of transportation is to move from point A to point B-and security is
•
perceived as getting in the way of efficiency. Whereas an air carrier could lose a
certification because of safety issues, security was not a certificate issue. She concurred
that the industry generaIly viewed security measures as "intrusive" to their operations.
,(SSJ) Osmus agreed that even though air carriers are no longer responsible for screening,
they are an integral part of security and must remain engaged. She said that since Pan
Am 102 se3curity had jointed safety and efficiency as the major focal points for the FAA
and even thought the head of FAA Security and much if it s personnel were drawn from
outside of the agency, she didn't believe this impeded the position and budget of the
security function.
Role of Air Carriers
t'SSI) Osmus pointed out that the carriers do still have security responsibilities and that
airline (and airport) employees, can and should be like a neighborhood watch. They can
best see changes in the norm which might be a security threat.
General Aviation (GA)
"('S-£) Osmus said that AOPA worked-up a GA security program and training materials.
She recommended we contact Andy Cebula at AOPA for details (phone number 30 I 695-
2203) .
• 5
The Day of 9-11
(S.ST) Osmus was at home sick. Canavan was out of town. Claudio Manno called her to .
sayan aircraft was off route and headed toward New York City. Osmus was in her
basement and didn't hear the call. Manno called back just after the first aircraft struck
the WTC. Osmus estimated that it was between 30-35 minutes between Manno's first
and second calls to her. Osmus went to the ACC at the Washington Operations Center
getting there sometime between 11:00 and noon. She went to the video-conferencing
room. She doesn't remember everyone who was there except that she knows
Administrative Garvey and Deputy Administrator Monte Belger were there. They were
on a broad administration phone bridge. Garvey and Belger were mainly listening in to
what was going on.
(SST) When asked who the FAA's hijack coordinator was, Osmusindicated that it was
Lee Longmire who was ACO 1, but that there was really nothing for him to do. Osmus
stated -that she does not remember any other plots that day that were confirmed.
TSS.I) Osmus stated that she does not recall any discussion of checking the grounded
aircraft for other hijackers, nor does she recall any discussion of contacting the cockpits
of aircraft still in the air and requiring them to secure them. Osmus said to check with
Jane Garvey and the ATC people about such orders.
(SS1) Osmus confirmed that the executive summary (which mentions the gun story) was
produced for Mike Canavan and the Administrator. She did not know who produced the
summary but indicated that it was drawn from the information put upon the butcher
paper in the ACS working room at FAA HQ. She thought that perhaps KA Y PAYNE-
Canavan's administrative assistant might know who produced the executive summary
given to Canavan.
(-SSJ) Osmus stated that Claudio Manno was in touch with the FBI throughout the day,
and that the FBI was at each of the airports.
(,S"SI)Osmus confirmed that there were three centers of activity at FAA HQ on

9111/2001 :
1) The Aviation Crisis Management Center which was in the Washington Operations
Center and which contained the videoconferencing center where Garvey, Belger, et. AI.
were on the phone bridge. uo" floor) (Lee Longmire in charge)
2) The ACS working room (3rd floor) (Chuck Burke in charge)
3) ACI watch office (3rd floor) (Claudio Manno in charge after 9/11)
(SSI) Osmus agreed that there was a great deal of confusion about the situation and said
that it all happened so fast that everybody in the system was doing their own thing as best
they could. She was not sure whether they had enough information in the early hours to
S'SI 6
\ ,
• conclude that the cockpit crew of other flights should have been warned. Garvey and
Belger were incontact with the airlineCEOs on 9/11.
(S'SI) Osmus mentioned CARRIE RILEY who has been the crisis management expert at
FAA for a long time. She can talk about the process of how the crisis management
system was supposed to work.
\&81) Osmus stated that within.48 hours they had to analyze what had happened to
determine the necessary counter-measures to get planes back-up. It was clear they had the
wrong hijack model with different weapons than the system had anticipate as the threat.
Post 9-11
~I) Osmus stated that she has some concerns about the nation's ability to respond to
aviation crisis under the current bureaucratic structure. Now that ATe is under FAA and
the security function is under TSA, she worries that there will be a lack of coordination.
(SSI) Osmus recommended that the commission talk to Lyle Molotky who was the
scientific advisor at FAA and who is now with TSA.
•
• 7
~
H~OL(orrn6
(J)
Event: James Padgett, former Manager of the Global Issues Division, Office of Civil
Aviation Security Intelligence at FAA (on 9-11)
Date: Part I: October 7, 2003; Part II: (DATE?)
Location: Commission office at GSA
Team: 7
Participants (non-Commission): James Padgett, TSA International Operations Liaison to

State Department; and Brandon Strauss, TSA Counsel
Participants (Commission): JohnRaidt, Sam Brinkley, and Lisa Sullivan
Background
[U} James Padgett had a background as an intelligence case officer for the Department of
Defense prior to coming to FAA in 1990 as the Acting Manager of the Strategy Division
until May 1991 (replaced by Stephanie Stouffer). After the Pan Am 103
recommendations were issued, the FAA proceeded with many organizational changes,
including reprogramming the intelligence office with 4 divisions. He served as Stouffer's
unofficial deputy in the intelligence division overseeing this process. From August of
1994 to December of 1999, Padgett was technical advisor/special assistant to the Director
of Intelligence, Pat McDonnell. He was reassigned to the Office of Global Issues within
Intelligence, where he took on supervisory responsibilities. He was-in that position
through the spring of2002 before being assigned by TSA to the Office of Foreign
Missions at the State Department (OFM) through the interagency liaison group.
FAA Intelligence Division
(U) In early 1990, the Intelligence division at FAA was just starting up. Each
Intelligence agency that the FAA relied on for information had different reporting
requirements.
(ssf) CIA received a "reading requirements" list of FAA intelligence needs, whereas
NSA, DOD, and FBI were given "statements of intelligence interests." The subjects
addressed were broad. FAA Intelligence continuously "banged the drum" for more
intelligence from the intelligence community. The assumption made on the part of the
--8Si-
•
~
intelligence community was that FAA was only interested in terrorists targeting planes or
specific mentions of aviation.
(~ Padgett said he was "always at pains to underscore the intentions of terrorist

group's" It is always possible that groups could ultimately turn attention to terrorist tactics
at a later point." By this, Padgett meant he wanted information on groups the agencies
were tracking in addition to the specific threat indications they were receiving. He
reported that he said at a briefing at NSA: "FAA wants to know what the groups are
doing regardless of whether information pertains strictly to aviation." He elaborated that
the FAA was looking for more enc clo edic, s ecific re orts on thin s such as
.....~ ...... r anything else that terrorists might want to

acquire.
fB'B'f) Intelligence requirements were updated periodically. It was an ongoing process.

When a report was received that was time sensitive, Padgett would issue a special
emphasis." He also participated in interagency seminars. For example, Padgett reported
to have attended a HUMINT (Human Intelligence) seminar, to tell the intelligence
community what the FAA had identified it was interested in reading about; and,
furthermore, to make sure that the subjects were accorded a priority (such as, for
example, information on terrorists gaining employment at airports) for the intelligence
collectors. The Executive Committee showed concern regarding Beirut.
• Intelligence Process and Intelligence Community Reporting
(U) The process for FAA intelligence included:
1) Making sure the national collection priorities included what FAA was interested
in, and
2) Making sure that the FAA reading requirements were on file with the collectors.
~ Padgett felt that the process worked extremely well for the CIA, and that NSA,
DOD and State were well aware on several occasions. However, FAA intelligence heads
were continually concerned about what they were and were not receiving from the FBI.
There was the issue of protecting aspects of ongoing criminal investigations that
prohibited the Bureau from sharing information with the FAA. "On a number of
occasions, the FAA found out information well after the fact involving a possible plot to
attack an airport or the surveillance of an airport," Padgett reported. When pressed
further, he said he could not be more specific on the information, other than that one may
have involved Los Angeles Airport (LAX) in the late 19908 (he was very vague on this
point). He said the indications arose during Pat McDonnell's tenure as director.
"Possibly," someone with affiliations to terrorists was surveiling, or wanted to talk to
someone working at LAX.
•
~ At another point (Padgett was vague on this recollectionjj Ifrom the
Bureau mentioned that "something had come to light,r~garding terrorism at LAX."
COMMISSION .SENSITIVE 2
"~

~
~cDonnell expressed that the FAA had not been made aware of the situation,
• 'L-..J response, according to Padgett, was to say "oh, we didn't tell you guys about
that at the time?"
(~) Interagency seminars were forums for discussion of intelligence collection

objectives. On forums that focused on activity in the United States, Padgett said that the
FBI did not want to take the lead in information collection in such cases. Normally, one
agency takes the lead on particular cases, and because the focus was domestic, Padgett
naturally assumed the FBI would have the lead. He expressed his concern at the time that
no other agency was ever given the official lead on collecting information on domestic
threats.
(U) Padgett also said that there was "always the problem of turnover" from person-to-
person with accounts. Someone sitting at a particular desk working a particular account
would have an enlightened or certainly broader understanding of what FAA needed.
When that person is replaced, the new officer may be a victim of "tunnel vision" on what
information should go to the FAA.
(U) The only continual problem he was aware of was the reporting from the FBI.
July 2001 Rulemaking
'. (U) At the end of his tenure before 9-11, they were getting ready to publish the Federal
Register Rule on certification of screening companies and the change of FAR 1071108.
At that time, the FAA described the domestic threat as the "Bojinka" scenario and
applied it to a domestic situation. Padgett indicated he was probably a part of that
rulemaking process.
(0) In thinking about the rule, Padgett recalled that the "economists" at FAA were
wondering how much mileage they could get out of the Pan Am 103 incident. He
. suggested that those attacks which the U.S. was spared (when Bojinkawas thwarted)
should be factored into the cost benefit analysis of future rulemaking. Should something
like Bojinka occur, the outcome would be devastating, Padgett observed.
(U) Padgett reported that there was a massive effort to get procedures in place here that
were already in effect abroad to guard against the possibility of a bomb in checked
baggage here. The FAA had begun "sounding the trumpet" for greater aviation security
after the "National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)" came out in 1995 (which the FAA
participated in). This estimate greatly strengthened the FAA's hand to institute such
changes. The airlines fought them every step of the way. Prior to the release of the
estimates, they had claimed the FAA was overstating the threat. The air carriers wanted
to know where the FAA could point to these "things" taking place in the domestic arena .
• COMMISSION
331
SENSITIVE 3
~.
TWA 800, the Gore Commission and CAPPS
(U) Padgett recalled that in 1996 initially it was thought that TWA 800 was a terrorist
attack. That perception gave rise to the White House Commission on Aviation Security
(also known as the Gore Commission). At that time, they were only just beginning
CAPPS. They had seen the possibility of the United States being in a state of war after
the Gulf W ar. FAA had identified the need for an automated passenger profiling system.
The FAA went about pursuing the program using the various air carrier reservation
systems utilizing a series of grants.
(U) By September1996, everything changed. The Commission came along and endorsed
the automated pre-screening concept in its final report in early 1997. This was supposed
to be done for all the airlines, simultaneously. The FAA had to write all the program
inputs and outputs to get CAPPS up and running that year. It was an extremely busy
time. Through it all, they were trying to brief on the Hill to line up support for a stronger
baseline security in this country even before they had instituted the CAPPS system. FAA
knew that FAA would be fought "tooth and nail" by the stakeholders once they incurred
the pre-screeninglbaseline expenses who would say that FAA was exaggerating the
threat.
(U) It was a matter of taking the baseline (which was fairly low at the time), combined
with several contingency measures that were enacted during the Gulf War (that had been
discontinued), and effectively "moving the baseline up" permanently.
The Hij acking Threat
(U) A big question was how the hijacking threat was viewed post-Pan Am 103, post-
TWA 800, in the absence of such events. Was hijacking still a viable threat? Where was
it in relationship to other threats? Padgett indicated there was a greater concern to prevent
bombs because a) they were believed to be more likely because it was a highly publicized
vulnerability, and b) there were more measures in effect to prevent hijackings than
bombings (so it was believed), specifically the screening checkpoint.
~) Checked bags were not screened and there was no passenger bag match. It was a
glaring vulnerability. Given the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the FAA
needed to sell this program to the lobbyists. Padgett stated that vulnerabilities are not the
same as threats. Risk is a product of threat and vulnerability. Vulnerability can exist
irrespective of a threat.
(SsI) According to Padgett, "Terrorists were more likely to exploit a well advertised
vulnerability." The threat that accompanied the 2001 rulemaking was done for cost-
benefit analysis. We knew terrorists were here. We knew about Bojinka.
(D) Padgett never thought that he and the FAA Intelligence Division were coming up
with something to satisfy some artificial need, such as congressional support for the
rulemaking process. ACI always resisted ,attempts to quantify the threat. "We recognize
·SSl
•
~
that the economists have to do it, but the intelIigence office was very, very concerned that
terrorists would attack within the United States." That said, he thought that the greatest
domestic threat would be a bomb in the checked bag or a carry-on. That was not
exaggerated on their part, according to Padgett.
(U) ACI was always given the opportunity to review language of the rulemaking process
before it went to the Federal Register and into the public domain.
Suicidal Terrorism
~ The FAA Intelligence Division had looked at the idea of ''suicide attackers."
Padgett set up a conference call with the analysts in his division to talk to a leading
authority on suicidal terrorism, Dr. Ariel Murari, sometime before September 11th. He
had given a talk on that subject at the international conference hosted by the Gore
Commission in late January of 1997. In the conference call, he said that throughout all of
his research, he had not found a single instance of a suicide attack carried out on aviation.
He thought it was unlikely for psychological reasons related to the extended time
between the "point of no return" and the execution. He certainly did not raise the
possibility of multiple hijackers willing to kill themselves.
CAPPS
• ~ Padgett indicated that some people knew we always wanted to get a good pre-
screening system for all passengers, and others say the idea of CAPPS was spawned in
recognition of the need for an intensive method of profiling which required interaction
between the profiler and the passenger. The latter was the "Rolls Royce version of this."
It is what the United States requires in locations where we have extraordinary security in
place.
(S81) Padgett further reported that since 1995, they have been telling the tr~ined agents
{ow 'to prioritize the signs, what to look for, etc. What the U.S. put in place overseas is
largely an outgrowth of the Israeli method. It was the air carriers that came to the FAA in
the late 1980s asking for permission to create a system that would generate far fewer
selectees than what FAA's system was eneratin at its international locations. He
described that s stem as fairl crude'
P-------------------------~
~ The airlines working with ICTS (WHAT IS THIS?), which consisted primarily of
former EI Al employees, came up with something. In 1995, FAA stepped in and
announced they would take the project over. FAA realized it was impossible to replicate
the system used internationally at home, given the high volume of passengers that passed
through domestic airports (he used O'Hare as an example) in comparison to the relatively
low volume of passengers to screen at terminals overseas. Intensive interaction between
the profiler and the passenger had to be ruled out, and the number of selectees had to be
minimized.
'""'SM-
•
~
9/11 Closed by Statute~_~",!",-_~ --'

L....__ --- __ ...... - .......--..--~ (At this point, Padgett reiterated that the
...... -..J
FAA was not looking for the suicidal hijacker.) The primary concern was the "witting
non-suicidal terrorist" because that was a threat vector that had been exploited in the past.
~CAPPS had started independently of the effort to deploy Explosive Detection

Systems (EDS). The original thought was that CAPPS would be applied to all
passengers, regardless of checked bags, and a selectee would have additional security
scrutiny of their person, of their carry-on, and if they had checked bags. However, the
greater concern was about the carry-on bomb that would be left behind at an intermediate
stop by a non-suicidal hijacker, and that had been successfully carriedout against U.S. air
carrier in the past.
~) ACI always believed that selectees' carry-ons and person should be subjected to
additional security measures. This was changed to checked baggage only. Padgett's
understanding of the reason behind ACI's position was that there needed to be a
"premium placed on improving performance at the screening checkpoint for an
passengers, not just selectees." Padgett said the ACI policy-makers thought that by
instituting a procedure whercctees got a thorough going-over, non-selectees would
be essentially ignored. Thus percent of all passengers would walk right on
•
through. That would introduce t e possibility of letting people that were not necessarily
terrorists but were nonetheless dangerous out of carelessness or ignorance (gun carriers)
get on board. Coupled with ongoing instances of air rage, a volatile situation could arise.
~ Padgett reported that there were operational concerns about how one conducts a
selectee search without a checked bag. If CAPPS is run at the gate and a passenger
comes up as a selectee, there was the \problem of taking additional security measures that
close to boarding the plane vs. escorting the passenger back to the screening checkpoint.
~ Padgett affirmed that the purpose of CAPPS was to identify a population of

passengers most likely to contain a terrorist. Although it was not intelligence's role to
determine what the countermeasure was, it was understood that the population would be
subjected ,to security measures over an? above the rest of the population.
~ Padgett indicated that the purpose of CAPPS obviously morphed. Sometime

between May of 1997 and the end of that summer (possibly July) the first addendum that
is contrary to the original CAPPS document came out that said CAPPS would only be
applied to checked bags. He does not recall that ACT was invited to argue againstthe
policy change. Interestingly, at overseas locations, where CAPPS was introduced (such
as at London Heathrow), there was still the requirement for the selectees to have
additional measures applied to their persons and carry-ons in addition to the checked
bags. :
•
¢I) Padgett developed the CAPPS product in response to Bruce Butterworth wanting to
get from intelligence the likeliest form of attack on aviation domestically. There was
~
..
•
"'S'Sl
limited enthusiasm for this on the part of the Director of Intelligence because it pushed
FAA towards quantifying threats.
~) Padgett and the Intelligence division offered scenarios that were the likeliest.
Butterworth wanted to determine where it would make most sense to do testing on the
system. He identified 26 different threat scenarios that were based on other methods used
in previous attacks, or on adaptations of other attack methods too obvious to ignore. This
. was a fairly easy list to generate.1
threats because a number of distortions
"'------------------- ....J r---------------------------~

Basically, the CAPPS assignments were
subjective from the start.
Issues Associated with Risk Management
(U) Padgett did not recall some earlier product that quanti fled or placed emphasis on
certain threats over others.
• (U) During the summer 0[2001, there was a focus on the increase in "chatter." He was
not involved in the Indications and Warnings side of things. He remembers that the
intelligence community was very concerned with the reports about Al Queda; they were
beyond the planning stages for a big event. He created a time line plotting the different
terrorist plots, showing them from initiation through all stages of maturity. There were
any number of plots at different stages of maturity at any given time.
They were overlapping considerably.
(U) Padgett reported that flight training was not a skill set for terrorists that was followed
by FAA InteJligence. .
(U) Padgett reported that there were reports pertaining to suicide missions: Algerians
over Paris; a report of crashing an airplane over CIA; and there might have been
something like Bojinka about exploding an aircraft over a populous us city. However, he
did not specifically recall anything other than suggestions.
(U) On September 11, 200 I, he was at FAA Headquarters. He was sitting in a staff
meeting at ACI. He stayed downstairs. He did not go to the Command Center or the
Watch .
• COMMISSION SENSITIVE
SSI
7
:9/11 Working-level Employee
..
COMMISSION SENSITIVE ~:
•
~ , ,
PART II: The Interview with James Padgett was continued at a later date. The session
was attended by John Raidt (9-11 Commission); James Padgett; and Brandon Straus
9-1 I-The Day and immediate aftermath
[U] Padgett was located on the 3rd floor of the FAA Headquarters building went the event
occurred. Everyone in the division was sent to the ACr watch to answer telephone calls.
Padgett remembers takin,g cflls from a couple ofpegple ,: ~ his division who witnessed
the attack on the Pentagori-] : , ,
[U] ACl drew up schedules to bolster personnel coverage of the watch. Padgett drew up
the rosters, but had to leave by 4: 15 pm to pick up his car which was getting repaired.
I
~ Padgett spent his time examining Passenger Name Recbrds, and making
adjustments'- 9/11 Closed by Statute ,
~] Padgett is not sure when it started but we were getting lots of tasking from the
NSC for information going.way back on pilot training. This tasking included checking
the CACTIS database inquiries as pe~ I
Padgett also drew up
•
information on the Method of Operation used by the hijackers for the federal air
marshals. Padgett noted that FAA asked DoD for manpower to help sustain the
inteI1igence effort. He said only the USMC came through with assistance.
CAPPS
~J Commission staff asked Padgett to provide additional information on the

development of the CAPPS program before 9-11. He said that there's no uestion that
the ori ina1 intentof the ro ram W~~ Closed
~~~":':';;;;"~--"""';';;"";';---"""''''''''--9/1l t() ;nF'ntifv tF'1T()r1stS.
by Statute
~I] Padgett said he was personally disappointed t~at CAPPS consequences were
narrowed in the guidance documents. He said that there was concern on the part of
policy makers that screeners would have to pay particular attention to selectees, which
they believed would mean giving non-selectees a pass.
~ Padgett said that there was no way to fold the "no fly" list into CAPPS. There
wasn't a field for such inputting. The Justice Department had done a civil rights review
of the program and FAA was not allowed to have fields outside of what was in the PNR.
Current Concerns
•
[U] Padgett is concerned what will happen ifhis unit has to start focusing on other modes
of transportation, because "we're still a small staff." He said that ACI felt that they
probably should not dedicate analysts only to pipelines, trucking, rail, and merchant
:'5:5 I
"SsI
marine because we didn't see that we'd be able to hire enough analysts to cover
everything, including domestic and transnational. He doesn't believe that the manpower
increase was commensurate with the expanded portfolio of ACI.
"'S---SL
COMMISSION SENSITIVE 11fi< 0 Y0746 3-
7c&1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD '--~--]
E vent: Pone
h ' h Janet Riiffre, FAA's Principa
ca 11WIt . . IS' ecunty Inspector assigne
. d to _£~
American Airlines on 9/11
Type of Event: Conference Call / Briefing
Team Number: 7
Location: Conference Call
Participants -- Non Commission: Janet Riffe, FAA Principal Security Inspector assigned
to American Airlines on 9/11, and Brandon Strauss, Counsel at TSA (monitoring).
Participants -- Commission: John Raidt and LisaSullivan
The purpose of the conference call was to trace the origin of the report that a gun was on
. board American Airlines flight 11. Specifically, to determine if Riffe had been told by an
employee at American Airlines Corporate Headquarters that a gun was on board
American Airlines flight 11; as reported in an FAA internal memorandum.
Janet Riffe was the FAA's Principal Security Inspector (PSI) assigned to American
Airlines on 9/11/01. She had been in that position for about a year to a year and a half.
Riffe is currently employed by the TSA as an Assistant Federal Security Director for
Operations at Greensboro, North Carolina.
Riffe is the PSI mentioned in an FAA internal memorandum that contained the.following
text:
"The American Airlines FAA Principal Security Inspector (PSI) was notified by
Suzanne Clark of American Airlines Corporate Headquarter that an on-board flight
attendant contacted American Airline Operations Center and informed that a passenger
located in seat lOB shot and killed a passenger in seat 9B at 9:20 a.m. The passenger
killed was Dan Lewin, shot by passenger Satam Al Suqami. One bullet was reported
to have been fired."
John Raidt read the passage to Riffe and asked her if the passage accurately depicted
what Suzanne Clark had told Riffe about a shooting. Riffe said the memo was a correct
depiction of what she'd been told.
Riffe said she was in the FAA HQ Command Center taking notes on her calls as more
information came in. She said she that Suzanne was not her normal point of contact at
Corporate Headquarters. Following the initial call from her in which she described the
shooting; Riffe did not speak to her again. The notes from the call with Clark were given
to her manager that day, Fran Lozito (#2 in the FAA command center). Lozito gave them
to Lee Longmire (#1 in the command center). The information was put into a log. The
executive summary was produced from the log. Riffe's view was that the executive
summary was being prepared for the Administrator.
According to Riffe, the next day someone in the Administrator's office said that her note
was the only gun reference found and to please clarify for accuracy.
Lee Longmire asked Riffe to contact American Airlines to confirm her report of the gun.
She talked to her normal point-of-contact, Chris Bidwell, the manager of corporate
security at American Airlines. Riffe said Bidwell told her the report was erroneous. Riffe
verbally passed the update to Lee Longmire.
Riffe didn't know anything about follow-on drafts of the executive summary that may
have deleted the passage.
Riffe indicated that the GAO did a comprehensive investigation into the gun issue.
Riffe expressed her view that Suzanne Clark, if asked, would deny telling Riffe anything
about a shooting; although Riffe is sure she did.
Riffe added that there was a lot going on in the command center and in the aviation
system. There was a lot of erroneous information floating around.
Corporate Headquarters. Following the initial call from her in which she described the
shooting; Riffe did not speak to her again. The notes from the call with Clark were given
to her manager that day, Fran Lozito (#2 in the FAA command center). Lozito gave them
to Lee Longmire (#1 in the command center). The information was put into a log. The
executive summary was produced from the log. Riffe's view was that the executive
summary was being prepared for the Administrator.
According to Riffe, the next day someone in the Administrator's office said that her note
was the only gun reference found and to please clarify for accuracy.
Lee Longmire asked Riffe to contact American Airlines to confirm her report of the gun.
She talked to her normal point-of-contact, Chris Bidwell, the manager of corporate
security at American Airlines. Riffe said Bidwell told her the report was erroneous. Riffe
verbally passed the update to Lee Longmire.
Riffe didn't know anything about follow-on drafts of the executive summary that may ,
have deleted the passage.
Riffe indicated that the GAO did a comprehensive investigation into the gun issue.
Riffe expressed her view that Suzanne Clark, if asked, would deny telling Riffe anything
about a shooting; although Riffe is sure she did.
Riffe added that there was a lot going on in the command center and in the aviation
system. There was a lot of erroneous information floating around.
Event: Janet Riffe, FAA Principal Security Inspector for American Airlines
Date: February 26, 2004
Location: GSA
Team: 7
Participants (non-Commission): Janet Riffe and Christine Beyer (TSA General

Counsel's office)
Participants (Commission): Sam Brinkley and John Raidt
Background
[U] In September 1990, Riffe was hired as a special agent and Federal Air Marshal by the
FAA in the Dallas Ft. Worth CASFO. In October of 1992, Riffe transferred to the Dulles
CASFU in the same position. In June 1995 Riffe was transferred to FAA Headquarters to
serve as the Principal 'Security Inspector (PSI) for U.S. Airways. In September 1996
Riffe was moved to Oklahoma City to serve as a manager in the training division. In
1998 Riffe became the PSI for Continental and TWA. In May 2000 she became the PSI
for American Airlines, and served in this position on September 11, 2001. In December
2002 Riffe was appointed as the Assistant Federal Security Director for Operations at the
airport in Greensboro, North Carolina.
American Airlines
[U] Riffe said that as PSI she spoke to someone in AAL's corporate security office every
day, sometimes as many as three times a day on issues regarding implementation of and
compliance with FAA security rules.
[U] Riffe stated that American Airlines, like other carriers, tended to question FAA
security rules and wanted to know what specific threats justified the particular measure
that FAA was requiring. She said they would question, but would ultimately comply as
required. Riffe said the biggest problem she had as PSI was with AAL's pilot group who
continually fought the requirement to conduct security training. For instance, the pilots
had seen the Common Strategy taped many times, and they didn't want to have to watch
it any more.
Special Emphasis Assessments
[U] Riffe said that the FAA's SEA results were given to the PSI's and that she in tum
would forward them to the carrier, often with a letter expressing concern about the
results. Riffe said she didn't have much latitude to tell them what to do in order to fix the
deficiency. She said that the PSI didn't have enforcement teeth and couldn't threaten to
take away flights etc. She didn't find the approach to be particularly effective.
[U] Riffe said she would get the results of the SEA's and of Red Team reports broken
down by airline. She said that the FAA didn't prepare a yearly report providing all the
results of the testing involving the airline. She said that the air carriers were well aware of
how poorly they performed in these SEA's.
[U] Overall, Riffe said that when it came to security American was a 5 on a 1-10 scale.
She cited US Airways as an example of a top performing company on security who she
would score as an 8.
Fines
[U] Riffe said that American was definitely concerned about fines. When she was
assigned to be the PSI for American, the carrier was involved in a global settlement of its
many fines. As part of the settlement, FAA wanted to put out a press release to announce
the agreement, but American was adamantly opposed to doing so because the comp~ny
feared the bad publicity.
[U] Riffe stated that FAA General Counsel's office would negotiate the fines in order to
avoid having to go to court with the airlines.
Detection vs. deterrence
[U] Riffe was asked about American Airlines' view that the role of checkpoints was to
"deter" m, while deemphasizing the requirement to "detect" at checkpoints. She
responded by saying that the airline had to know it was their responsibility to detect
because federal law required that the carrier not allow dangerous weapons in the sterile
area or onboard their aircraft.
Measuring performance of the air carrier
[U]Riffe agreed that the way to measure an .air carrier's performance in security was to
look at the following areas: corporate structure; security spending; manpower; SEA
results; FAA testing/checkpoint assessments; and EIS (enforcement) cases that were
opened against them.
[U] Riffe said that she didn't receive the self-assessments that the carriers were required
to conduct on their checkpoint operations.
American's security programs
[U] Riffe stated that American did have an exceptional International Security Program
but that it's domestic program was lacking. The carrier's creation of its Domestic
Security Program was the result of its being put on probation by EPA and FAA Hazmat
for improperly storing hazardous materials. This problem is why the carrier created the
position of Vice President for Safety, Security and Environmental (Tim Ahern).
[U] Riffe believed the reason that their domestic security program lagged was because
the carrier was influence by the absence of domestic incidents. She said that American
didn't believe the threat was domestic, and that it all came down to money. She said that
they didn't want to spend money when no security incidents had occurred. Riffe thought
it would be interesting to see the breakdown of how AAL security personnel were
assigned to domestic security as opposed to international security. She cited Jack Bullard
as someone who fought FAA security requirements while Larry Wansley was good and
took security seriously.
Intelligence
[U] She said that American would sometimes ask her about intelligence and threat
information. However, she did not get daily intelligence information. She said that once
every few months she would receive a presentation or get some particular piece of
information that wasn't in IC's or SD's. Even though she had a security clearance she
did not receive the Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS)
[U]Riffe stated that she knew ofUBL, al Qaeda and its interest in aviation prior to 9/11
but considered the threat they posed as an overseas threat. She said that her awareness of
the threat was not detailed. She wanted more data, but felt like ACI wasn't forthcoming
with information and further noted that she felt that PSI's were inconveniencing ACI if
they would venture into the SCIF.
CAPPS and Manual Prescreening
[U] Riffe said that when FAA went to computerized passenger pre-screening: Some of
the smaller airlines and airports continued to use Manual Prescreening. She stated that
while the consequences of selection by CAPPS was solely explosives screening of
checked baggage, selectees of the manual system continued to be subjected to a
secondary hand search of carry-on baggage. She said the PSI's wondered why the FAA
wanted two different standards for the consequences of selection. Riffe felt that CAPPS
was intended to get rid of the human element in prescreening to make it more consistent.
She believes that diminishing the consequences of selection for those carrier that went to
computer assisted prescreening was a decrease in security.
Continuous Search
[U] Riffe agreed that the ACSSP and Alert Level III required carriers to randomly
conduct hand searches of carry-on bags on a continuous basis and that this meant a hand
search was supposed to be going on at all times except for when the screener was
transporting the bag from the x-ray machine to the table for the hand search. Riffe said
that the random/continuous hand search was not practiced the way it should have been. In
fact she said when FAA tested this requirement, they found that the carriers/contractors
did it only about 50% of the time. She recounted an incident in which she observed
American checkpoints at Df'Wfailing to conduct the random/continuous hand searches
and called American's corporate office to complain. She also notified the CASFO.
GSC monitoring
[U] Riffe also stated that the ACSSP required the Ground Security Coordinator (GSC) to
frequently monitor checkpoint performance, but that this was not properly practiced.
After 9-11 a Security Directive was issued requiring air carrier supervisory staff to
monitor checkpoint operations at all times.
Cockpit keys
[SSI] Riffe was aware that American had one key that fit all cockpits and jet-bridges. She
thought that this was a questionable practice, but there was no regulation prohibiting it,
and any attempt to regulate it wouldn't meet the costlbenefit requirements of federal
regulatory law.
FAMs
a
[U] Riffe stated that FAMs cost lot of money and that given the absence of domestic
attacks they could not be justified on a costlbenefit basis to OMB.
9-11 The Day
[U] On the morning of9-11 Riffe was at work when sometime between 8:30 a.m. and
9:00 a.m. Bob McLaughlin came down and said that there was a hijack in progress on an
American flight and that she needed to come to the WOC (Wash. Operations Center).
She's not sure if Bob McLaughlin was the first at the FAA HQ to know about the
problems that day but indicated that he might know who was.
[U] She went upstairs to the WOC and called AAL and talked to Joe Bertapelle and
Suzanne Clark of AAL. She's not completely sure which call came first but she thinks it
was Bertapelle. Bertapelle told her that at 8:39 they had received a report that two flight
attendants had been stabbed, the plane was descending, and there was information that
the flight was flying erratic. At some point Bertapelle told her that CNN was reporting
that Flight 11 was a 767-200 with 81 passengers.
[U] At some point, Suzanne Clark told her that a hijacker (Saqami) shot and killed a
passenger (Lewin). She provided the seat numbers and passenger names, and said that the
aircraft was headed back to Kennedy Airport. She thinks she was told this information 15
to 20 minutes before the plane crashed into the WTC. Riffe stated that they had no reason
to believe it wasn't' going back to Kennedy. She put this and other information received
throughout the day on small pieces of paper that were given to Lee Longmire who was
running the WOC and also to the" events recorder."
[U] Though she can't be sure of times or sequence she remembers talking to Larry
Wansley, Dave Divan and Tim Ahem at various points throughout the day.
[U] She's not sure exactly when but 'at some point they received word that a UAL plane
was being hij acked, and then she heard that a plane had crashed into the Pentagon. She
said that the report of the Pentagon crash was the first they had heard of a problem on
Flight 77.
[U] Riffe said that her notes indicated that a report was received that flight 93 had
crashed in to Camp David. (NOTE: Riffe will send us a copy of her notes from the WOC
that day).
[U] She stated that they received a lot of information in the WOC on 9/11 including the
an aircraft crashed into the Lincoln Memorial.
[U] She said that within an hour of the crashes AAL faxed the five names of the hijackers
on both flight 77 and flight 11.
Flight 77
[U] Riffe' snotes indicate that at 10:05 she talked to Tim Ahem who confirmed that AAL
#11 and AAL#77 both crashed into the ATC. She said that American kept saying that 77
had gone into the WTC. There were several hours of confusion before they received
confirmation that 77 was the flight that crashed into the Pentagon.
ATe
[U] Riffe said that the primary net was on a speaker inside the WOC. She does not
believe that the ATC Command Center was on either the Primary or Tactical Net. She
believes that someone in the WOC was on the phone with ATC on a separate line,
•
Recording events in the WOC
[U] She doesn't remember if the information was posted on anoverhead projector but all
the data points received in the woe were entered into a computer by-an "events
recorder." She namedl . las people who
had performed that role. They took turns logging iiif{rmation in the computer. She said
that Longmire ran the woe most of the time but tha '_ ~nd Willie Gripper
ran it as well later in the day.
Cargo
C.:~·
r
f
[U] Riffe said that she pulled the cargo manifests for both American flights. AAL #11 r
had two ULD's of cargo, and one package of hazardous materia]: dry ice. AAL #77 had
only mail and baggage. (NOTE: We want the cargo manifests).
Notifying Cockpits/reverse screening
[U] She does not recalI any discussion of the need to contact pilots to secure their
cockpits, nor does she recall any discussion of screening planes/passengers once they
were grounded. ,
• Other Plots
[U] Riffe said she remembers hearing on 9-11 that some passengers were supposed to be
on a TWA flight in St. Louis, bolted and were apprehended. She believes that the CASFO
in S1. Louis or DFW made the report.
Checkpoints
[U] Ri ffe described the testing that FAA used to conduct on checkpoint operations.
Checkpoints were tested twice a month to see how well they were detecting test objects.
The checkpoint received one comprehensive assessment per year (looking at training,
equipment etc.) and three supplemental tests per year.
T~A Today
[U] TSA is no longer testing checkpoint operations because the agency is afraid to know
how we're doing. TSA regulatory resources have decreased since TSA took over. There
are no regulatory assessments of cargo, access control etc. There is only a small group of
people in internal affairs conducting tests. Given the many airports in the U.S. There's
no way they can do the job sufficiently. They are coming nowhere near the level of
testing that was conducted by the CASFO's under the old system. She said that she
•
couldn't tell how checkpoints are doing at Greensboro because they don't test. She was.
told by TSA headquarters that the FSD's may not conduct testing.
" . . .
• [U] Riffe also stated that there's a lot of confusion about roles and missions at TSA.
Operations doesn't talk to policy. There are too many layers of management. We don't
know who we are supposed to go to for answers. She believes that TSA is still caving in
to special interests. The regulated industry is still telling us what we can and can't do.
[U] TSA has hired a lot of former air carrier people with a mindset of customer service
rather than security.
Recommendations
[U] People who might be thrust into a position in an emergency operations center need
some training. "We didn't now who was responsible for what."
[U] Test the system.
Hnz~~.AtJo/~
®
UNCLASSIFIED ,
.

Event: Interview of Peter Schurott, Supervisor of the Newark CASFU (Civil Aviation
Security Field Unit) on 9111/2001
Type: Interview (conference call)
Date: March 3, 2004
Team: 7
Participants (non-Commission): Peter Schurott; Mary McCarthy (FAA General Counsel's

office).
Participants (Commission): John Raidt and Bill Johnstone
Location: Conference call held with Schurott from the GSA conference room.
Background
[U] Prior to 1998 Schurott had worked as a port security officer (private contractor) in
Brooklyn. He was hired in 1998 by the FAA as a Civil Aviation Security specialist at the
Newark CASFU. After one and one-half years in that position he volunteered to serve as
acting supervisor of the CASFU. In 2000 he was named as the Supervisor (which is the
top position in a CASFU). He served in this capacity until January of2003 when he
signed on with FAA's Hazardous Material division in Newark, which is where he
currently works.
Security at Newark
[U] Schurott indicated that the CASFU conducted Special Emphasis Assessments
(SEA's) to examine the compliance by air carriers and airports with federal aviation
security rules including Positive Passenger Bag Match; controlling access to Aviation
Operations Area; and checkpoint operations. In addition, the CASFU would conduct
monthly testing of the checkpoints at the airport.
[U] He said that the results of the SEA's and monthly checkpoint testing at Newark were
"not bad." He said.he couldn't really compare the results to other airports, but at Newark
they had "good days" and "bad days." He said that turnover in checkpoint screeners was
a big problem. He found the airlines at Newark to be attentive to security, and he had a
good relationship with them. He had no major complaints.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
• Federal Security Manager
[U] The FSM (Russell White) and the CASFU shared an office and they got along very
well. As the CASFU, Schurott reported to the CASFO (Civil Aviation Security Field
Office) Supervisor Nora Zaba. Zaba had jurisdiction over aviation security at Newark,
JFK and La Guardia.
[U] (Note: Mary McCarthy said that she will find out from Nora Zaba whether the
checkpoints at La Guardia enforced a prohibition on knives with 3 12inch blades rather
than the 4 inch standard because 3 12inches was the law in New York City).
United Checkpoint
[U] Schurott said that the United checkpoint through which the UAL 93 hijackers passed
on 9-11 had explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment that was used to randomly check
carry-on items. He said that checkpoints, which had such equipment, were required to
conduct "random and continuous" testing of carry-on items with it, in lieu of "random
and continuous" hand searches of carry-on bags as required by the Air Carrier Standard
Security Program. He agreed that the FAA would have had to issue a Security Directive
allowing the ETD testing to replace the hand searches. However, he couldn't identify
•
what Security Directive might have done this.
[U] He stated that it was very difficult to get the air carriers to comply with "random and
continuous" screening of carry-on bags-whether by hand searching or ETD. He said
that the carriers didn't want to slow the system down. Carriers were interested in getting
people through the checkpoint and on to the planes.
[U] He said that the reason explosive trace detection (ETD) was emphasized more than
hand searches for "deadly or dangerous" weapons in carry-ons, is that FAA thought that
an explosive could bring a plane down which was of higher consequence than a weapon
that might escape x-ray detection.
[U] He said that United used CTX machines to examine checked bags for explosives at
Newark, rather than PPBM.
X-ray
[UJ Schurott said tha~"""""'~~~....w..~~~i~sh~c~ertUiWai.....

n....:w~e~~iIiUiti~~~~~~w.:. ......
from common items. 9/11 Closed by Statute
UNCLASSIFIED
2
COMMISS'ION SENSITIVE
UNCLAS,~IFIED
• Suspicious activities
[U] Schurott said that there was no indication of terrorist surveillance at Newark.
Suspicious activities went to the Port Authority police.'. Other reports may have gone to
the FSM or the FBI, but he didn't receive them. '
[U] Schurott attended the monthly consortia meetings, as di~tI !who was the
FBI's liaison to the airport. Schurott said that he never received any information at the
consortia or anywhere else about the presence of terrorist groups in the area. He was not
aware that terrorists were present or active in the vicinity of Newark.
9-11 the Day
[U] Schurott said that a K-9 officer told him that he heard that either a Cessna or a '
helicopter hit the WTC. He and some of his colleagues turned on the television but the
TV went out before the second aircraft struck. He called Nora Zaba at the CASFO office
to see if she were aware of the situation. She told Schurott that she had heard reports
about hijackings. Schurott spent the day collecting information as directed by Zaba. He
obtained the manifest for VAL #93, checkpoint logs, and the list of CAPPS' selectees. In,
addition he conducted interviews with the fueling people, catering and others who
serviced UAL 93. He said that none of the information he received in the interviews
•
indicated anything abnormal or suspicious. He was not assigned to collect information on
any flights other than VAL 93, and he doesn't know of anyone else who was asked to
look at other flights.
[U] Schurott said that the VAL station manager was Terry Rizzuto. In retrospect he can't
think of anything that stood out about security at Newark that would encourage terrorists
to target the facility.
[U] He said that the only closed circuit television was in Terminal C of the airport
(Continental) which was new. The terminal from where VAL #93 departed did not have
CCTV.
Recommendations
[V] Schurott said that the notion of allowing passengers without carry-on bags to have an
express lane at the checkpoint would be difficult to implement because of space
restrictions at most airports.
[U] He believes that TSA should not only test checked baggage for explosives with CTX
machines, but should also exercise Positive Passenger Bag Match as a layered precaution.
[V] He thinks that eliminating carry-on baggage would be a significant aid to security .
UNCLASSIFIED
3
UNCLASSFIED
Event: Meeting with FAA Chief Counsel, Andrew Steinberg

Type of event: Meeting
Prepared by: Kevin Shaeffer
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Andrew Steinberg (FAA Chief Counsel), J.S. Dillman (FAA
Assistant Chief Counsel), David Wiegand (FAA AGC-41 0), Anthony Ferrante (FAA Air
Traffic), Shirley Miller (FAA Senior Advisor), Thomas Davidson (FAA Air Traffic)
Participants - Commission: Steve Dunne, John Farmer, Dana Hyde, Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer
Location: FAA HQ
Team 8 staff requested a meeting with FAA Chief Counsel Andrew Steinberg to discuss the
following issues:
1. NC Staff interviews at Washington Center (ZDC) December 3-4, 2003
2. Clarification of FAA facilities' tapes requested by the NC
3. Understanding of future interview guidelines
Mr. Steinberg opened the meeting by underscoring that the FAA has been fully cooperative
with the National Commission. He reported that he had received "feedback" of accusations
directed against his Counsel staff from the NC staff. He conceded that there may have been
misunderstandings and miscommunication within the FAA on the NC-Administration
interview guidelines. He stated that the FAA. resents inferences that they are not being
"above board" and that they understand the important mission of the NC. He further noted
that he didn't think the FAA subpoena was warranted, and stressed that he does not want to
be accused of not cooperating with the NC.
Mr. Steinberg mentioned that the NC staffhas turned down "many offers of FAA technical
assistance" and offers ofhelp to better understand FAA air traffic matters. This point was
addressed by Dana as not true, that she and Miles had indeed accepted several offers of FAA
assistance.
Mr. Steinberg brought up the fact that they had a "number of discussions" with the NC
regarding the acceptance of the FAA using some judgment on what materials they provide to
the NC (to help reduce the amount of irrelevant materials produced). He stated, "If you want
us to dump a truckload of documents onto you - you'll get them." As an example, he
presented four audio cassettes, "that are totally blank, yet you have demanded we provide
them."
John Farmer explained the NC's deadline concerns to Mr. Steinberg.
Dana then addressed Mr. Steinberg's points. A discussion proceeded on the interview
guidelines agreed upon with the Administration, and how the FAA seemed to take a different
stance towards the interviews conducted at ZDC. In sum, the issues at ZDC were 1) pre-
meetings with interviewees and FAA counsel; 2) the presence of a Union "minder" in
addition to the FAA Counsel minder; and 3) recording the interviews (just prior to the very
first interview at ZDC, FAA Counsel Mr. Wiegand told NC staff, in the presence of the
interviewee, that they did notwant the interview recorded). The general theme was that the
NC accepts document and interview guidelines, yet when the NC staff visits the Air Traffic
Control facilities we discover a different"story on the ground." Dana concluded with the
point that ZDC was the NC staffs fifth facility visit, the first visit post-subpoena, and that
"things were clearly different" at ZDC in comparison to the other sites.
Mr. Steinberg replied to Dana, "We're not in a new ballgame post-subpoena." ,
Dana addressed the specific issue over the tapes from the TMU and OMIC stations at ZDC.
She noted that the NC has received a letter from the FAA that the ZDC TMU admin phones
are not recorded. However, when walking the floor during the ZDC visit the QA
representative said "yes we do tape the TMU/OMIC lines, but we were told that you didn't
want them." (The QA rep mentioned Tony Ferrante's name as the individual who
communicated that to them). Dana stressed that we wanted to clarify these issues.
Specifically, that we want now (and have always wanted) "all" TMU/OMIC/MOS recordings
from ZDC between the hours of 8 am - 12 noon on 9/1110 1. FAA countered that most of
those lines are "blank" and Tom Davidson stated that he directed the facility to "not waste
the NC's time" by turning in mostly blank tapes. Mr. Davidson stated he directed the facility
to provide only "pertinent" information. Dana noted, however, that ZDC didn't produce any
of the recordings from those positions. Mr. Davidson stated, "we see it as assistance, not
resistance. We have a good story to tell. I directed them to provide any calls pertinent to the
hijackings and the attacks."
Dana pointed out that she distinctly recalled conversations with Mr. Davidson and Mrs.
Miller "about efforts to take judgment and discretion out of it, by limiting the request to
specific phones, positions, and times." Mrs. Miller acknowledged that there could have been
an intemal-F AA "miscommunication" regarding ZDC and their efforts to utilize judgment as
to what would be most helpful and responsive to the NC request. Mr. Davidson stated, "they
(TMU/OMIC) had communications with the Command Center, but since we thought you
already had those, the recorded lines from ZDC were not provided."
Mr. Steinberg noted that he saw a need to "document agreement on interview guidelines."
Steve noted that there are detailed interview guidelines that havebeen worked outbetween
the NC and DOl. We agreed to fax copies of the exchange of letters (a total of3) between
the NC and DOl.
Mr. Wiegand stated that he "was appointed to liaison with the NC post-subpoena." And, that
there was "increased sensitivity to the NC since the subpoena, that's why I was assigned."
As for the interview guidelines, he stated, "I had no knowledge of the pre-existing
agreements." "I was told that the NC was a fact-finding effort, and I met with each
interviewee for five minutes to explain what the purpose was." Mr. Wiegand then recounted
that when he saw that the interviews were going to be recorded, he asked the Union
representative at ZDC ifhe knew about the recordings - which he did not.
Mr. Wiegand stated that Dan Marcus told him that if the interviewee wanted the Union
representative present along with Mr. Wiegand, that was "ok."
Mr. Wiegand stated that "I at no point advised the interviewee to object to the recording of
the interview." "I got hot when you (Dana) implied that I was coaching the witnesses. I
apologize. You (Dana) said there was an agreement that there would be no pre-meetings. I
was unaware of it and wanted to see it. I called Dan Marcus and he said that if I wasn't
advising the witnesses, he'd "take my word."
Dana responded that she assumed that Mr. Wiegand had knowledge of the interview
guidelines that exist between the NC and the administration. She added that the ZDC visit
was the fifth site visit and this was the first instance of misunderstanding. Dana highlighted
the fact that most of the heated disagreement at ZDC came after Mr. Wiegand mentioned
there were "post-subpoena sensitivities."
Mr. Steinberg stated that he assumed that preparation for the interview is covered by the
written agreement between the NC and DOJ. Steve replied that while there are detailed
interview guidelines, not all were put to writing because the NC takes the view that this is not
an adversariallitigation-type of investigation. Mr. Steinberg replied, "you have to
understand that we don't know how the FAA will be handled in the NC's report. So we have
to, and should, approach this as more of a litigation matter." As such, he concluded "I'd
much rather have an explicit understanding of the agreement." The NC agreed to send Mr.
Steinberg a letter on some of the specific issues raised during this meeting.
UNCLASSIFIED
Event: Rich Stevens, FAA Security Division Manager for the NE Region post 9-11
Date: March 1,2004
Location: GSA (by conference call)
Team: 7
Participants (non-Commission): Rich Stevens and Christine Beyer (TSA General

Counsel' s office)
Participants (Commission): Sam Brinkley and John Raidt
Background
[U] From 1985-1988 Stevens served as a Federal Air Marshal (FAM). In 1988 he became
a supervisor at the Washington National CASFO. In 1990 he was a Division Manager for
ACS Operations at FAA Headquarters. In 1992, he moved to the FAA Southwest
Regional Office in Ft. Worth, Texas where he served as the interim Security Division
Manager and then became the Deputy Division Manager. On 9-11 he was in the process
of being assigned to be the Security Division Manager for the FAA's Northeast Regional
Office. He served as the Security Division Manager for the Northeast region from
October 2001 until early 2002 where he was detailed to Washington DC to help stand-up
TSA. In July of 2002, he was appointed to the Deputy Federal Security Director at the
Airport in Tampa, Florida.
FAA Northeast Region, Security Division
[U] This division oversaw security operations at Logan Airport in Boston. Willy Gripper
had been the Division Manager until a few months before 9-11 when he was reassigned
to Washington DC. The job was vacant and the post was covered by Bill Fogerty and
Dick Batts who served alternately in an "acting" capacity.
American Airlines
[U] As the Security Division Manager at the FAA's southeast region in Ft. Worth
Stevens had a lot of contact with American Airlines. He stated that American was about
average in their compliance with security rules, but had a lot of access control violations
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
for failure of personnel to wear ID. FAA was conducting a lot of tests on access control
pre 9-11.
[U] Stevens said that American Airlines was definitely a "bottom line" company. They
would comply but not step out front on security issues, and would cut a comer if they
could. As an example he cited an FAA requirement (through an SEA) that the air carrier
have a person present at their checkpoints during certain periods of the day to ensure that
operations were being conducted according to standard. He said that American wouldn't
really cooperate with that requirement.
[U] While Stevens believed that Larry Wansley (American's security director) was
committed to security, open to suggestions, and not contentious, Wansley's predecessor
Jack Bullard was a bulldog hired to argue with the FAA, particularly about security
violations and associated fines cited by the FAA. Bullard was very vocal, and in Steven's
opinion hired to pushback at FAA.
[U] Stevens said that Bullard wouldn't so much dispute that the violations occurred but
rather downplayed their importance because he said "there wasn't a threat." Stevens said
he found it ironic that AAL headquarters where the executive offices were located had
very tight security and one had to have an ID to get into and around the building, yet
Bullard would argue that ID rules weren't important when it came to the Air Operations
Area and SIDA areas because of the absence of a threat.
Violations
[U] Stevens said that security violations levied against American, like all other carriers,
were logged in the WEBAIRS database which has been archived. It could be searched to
list all the violations by carrier, and compared to other carriers. This database would
contain the carrier's full enforcement history.
[U] Stevens stated that American like to have penalties accumulate and then negotiate
them down in a global settlement. As part of this strategy American would delay the case
so it got old, making it harder for the FAA to make its case before an Administrative Law
Judge or in court because the trail was cold or the employee had moved on. He said that
American's primary concern was whether the violation would be made public. The
company feared bad publicity more than the cost of the fine, which he said they factored
into their cost of doing business. Stevens said he was never involved in a case in which
American did not push to make sure the violation wasn't publicized.
[U] In 1996, FAA changed the rule requiring that any fine or aggregation of fines over
$50,000 had to be reported publicly. Stevens said he remembers that in 1993 nearly 162
cases had been written against AAL totaling nearly $6 million in fines. AAL and the
FAA negotiated the fine down to $75,000 which FAA agreed to because many of the
cases were so old, and therefore difficult to prove.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
[U] Prior to 1994 all of a carrier's violations were sent to the regional office where the
airline's certificate was held. Stevens said this contributed to global settlements. After
1994 the violations were sent to the regional office in the jurisdiction where the violation
occurred which made it tougher for the air carriers to fight.
Exercises
[U] Stevens said that he engaged in many different emergency exercises, including
hij acking, over the years, but none of the exercises that he participated in or any that he
knows of ever contemplated the use of an aircraft as a weapon.
Suspicious Activities
[U] Stevens said there really wasn't a central repository where all suspicious activities
were logged and tracked. The airport LEO would write a report and pass is it on to the
FSM but there was no requirement for the FSM to report it elsewhere. The FSM did
produce weekly reports on the significant events that occurred at their airports. This
reporting was captured in the WEB AIRS program. In addition, FAAI ACO would create
an Operations Security Summary highlighting events.
PPBM
[U] Stevens said that the practice of PPBM pre 9-11 exemplified that fact that the FAA
didn't believe that suicide attacks were in the terrorist playbook for aviation.
FAM
[U] Stevens saw the FAM program as being extremely important because it was
classified and the bad guys did not know where and when we were flying. It was a good
deterrent.
9-11 The Day
[U] Stevens said that he was in Boston, house hunting for his move to the NE regional
office when he saw on the news what happened at the WTC. Right after the second
airplane struck he called the Regional Office and was told by Fogerty that two aircraft
had been reported hijacked out of Logan. Stevens got to the regional office sometime
between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. A command center was established and linked into
the primary net. He said the primary net was not recorded at that location but they had a
variety of individuals taking turns making notes on what was said.
[U] Stevens said that he dispatched agents to pull the checkpoint logs at Boston and
Portland to be sure that the checkpoint equipment had been turned on, tested and operated
in accordance with the rules. He said that the logs showed everything had been done
properly at the checkpoints at both airports. He also acquired the checkpoint videotape at
Portland.
UNCLASSIFIED
. COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
[U] Stevens said that he's not sure whether Atta was made a selectee in Portland, but ifhe
was selected, most likely he would have been subject to Positive Passenger Bag Match,
but Stevens said to be sure about the consequences of selection you would have to check
with the station manager. He agreed that if Atta and al Omari were selectees under the
manual selection program they would have undergone a hand search of their carry-on
luggage. Stevens said that from the video he saw of Atta and al Omari going through the
checkpoint at Portland, they did not have their carry-on hand searched.
Logan
[U] Stevens said that the LEO"s at Boston were very well trained and professional. He
said that because Logan paid overtime the job was coveted and everyone wanted to do a
good job so they didn't lose their position.
[U] Stevens also said that Joe Lawless was very professional. He said that politically
Logan may have needed to make a change after 9-11 by transferring Lawless but
operationally Lawless had not dropped the ball at all.
[U] Stevens said that the CASFO office was located at the airport. On 9-11 the CASFO
folks went to Logan's Command Center.
TSA today
{U] He said that TSA is headed in the right direction. He said that FAA was restructured
in 1990 following Pan Am 103 but we didn't do the job right. He said that the stand-up
of TSA is our last opportunity to do it right. He said that checkpoint screening has been
tested twice at his airport by TSA internal affairs, and that he (as an FSD) is just now
getting the capability to test checkpoints.
[U] He also expressed his strong support for the TIP program which he sees as an
important tool for training and to keep people on their toes.
[U] He said that TSA has a contract in which they pay a company to pick up all the items
they collect at checkpoints. GSA regulations prohibited them for donating or selling it.
UNCLASSIFIED
·'\J ...., ...
, ..
.
•• Event: Interview
MEMORANDUM
with Fonner
FOR THE RECORD
FAA Special Ageni... -'
Type of event: Briefing, Interview
Date: August 18, 2003
Team Number: 7
eJ)
rn
Location: Falmouth, MA :Z
~.--'i
:z
Participants - Non-Commission: Former FAA Special Agent~'-!' " rr;
:;2:
23 .
Participants - Commission: John Raidt -;;D
5~
-
'.
..:;
lerved as a Soecial Azent with the FAA in Bo~ton.l I
..... .....Isaid that problems at Logan and Boston were well known.
He indicated that-on April.2ih, 2001 Joe Lawless the Mas$p~~' Director of Public .S·~fety
wrote a memo to Massportabout terrorist organizations w,~h des to Logan, Airport.
~~~"",,!,,"- .... lq~1ieves\tQ.at th~\nemo included a recommendation that the airport assess
checkpoint security because ofthese terrorist links. ... .
I ~~dicate<l that there were two other documents; besides the Lawless memo
that the commission should obtain. "'Qne was a document produced by ACI discussing g
the existence of extremistIslamic organizations operating ;1n Boston. ,/,'
A second document dis~uss~ci"a,~n~'~n rerrorist who wqr~ed as a baggage handler at

Logan that the airport was unable-to fire because of civjlIiberty issues.] ..... .....
suggested that perhaps the indiv'iQ~~d"~,a~"CQ.~ducting SjUfveill!lCe,,~pe'rations .
...... .....Iindi<:.ated that Mr. Lawless'lIad'-'p'roposed Hoing-'~Dd~~cover work at Logan
•
particularly to assess·'the.c.l:l~.~~points.1 ~~ld ttJi,~,idea was "shot down" by
Jane Garvey and the FSD Steve-LUP~~?: \J
, ""'::,':,~~,::\ ,-::'> .:
. ::-:.\'
..y,'
COMNlISSION SENSITIVE
'~ ...
• l.said they were afraid that State Police testing would show terrible problems
at the checkpoints. Apparently, Ms. Garvey was interviewed on this issue on PBS .
..... .....k~'dicated that there were people in positions of authority at FAA security
who did not have the necessary experience and qualifications, and that because of this
many "cases" were dropped because they weren't acted upon in a timel fashion. He
indicated t a . .
_~~~_ .... '\i'~also believes that there is significant fiscal mismanagement at FAA
now TSA .
.....__ ~~hndicai~d that all the testing at Boston Logan was conducted in the first
quarter of the 'year to.get it out of the way. He agreed that the predictable tempo of the
testing led to complacency among screeners and managers for the remaining three-
quarters of the year. .,\".
"'\,
..... ~ugg'¢sted ih'~t the Commission review the Employee Attitude Survey at the
CASFO in Boston.and review the FOX 25 undercover report about Boston checkpoint
problems. .... \. \"\"
•
He also suggested""tha~"',,~et~,l~~ td ~t the Boston CASFO about
problems in that office .....
He suggests we ask her about the role of "customer service" in
regard to security op~raiipns .........
'~""'" :
, '
He indicated the Mary'Carol T~i'~no was unqualified for her job and that this lack of
qualification and trainin'~ hU,~ se¢,\rity. !
Other aviation security probl~msl ..., Icited include:
--TSA spokespeople say toomuch ~bout the d~tails of our securit s stem that tells
w to defeat the s stem
=Federal Air Marshals have a chat-room .... on the internet called a FAM BOARD. He says
the cite is publicly accessible and gi'ye's inforrnad:on about security that terrorists and
other criminals don't need to know. I t.vill provide the URL for us.
"
•
2) WILLY GRIPPER, Directo·tQ,fOperations·'··' ..... ,,<::::: ..
" ', ', ';
kWi)l1:Gri pper' saclministrat;~~ dfti cer

••••••••• , ••••••• , ••••••• v ,
COMMISSION"S't:NSIT1VE 2
"9/11 Personal Privacy
9/11
,........ Personal Privacy
•
COMMISSION SENS ITIVE
DOCUMENTS TO REVIEW
",
I
... ....
lsuggest we obtain the following documents:
1) Quarterly Review and Status Report for the Northeast Division, including the
employee attitude study.
2) Carter Commission report Documents to obtain
3) "COMPREHENSIVE'INSPECTION SURVEY FOR 1998 and 1999;
4) LA WLESS MEMO ON ISLAMIC TERRORISTS IN BOSTON
5) LA WLESS MEMO ON UNDERCOVER SYSTEM ASSESSMENT
6) LIST OF DROPPED CASES AT BOSTON THAT WERE NEVER LOOKED
: INTO.
7) An ACI document discussing extremist Islamic organizations operating in Boston.
~1..... ....Fd I discussed several ideas to improve aviation security including,
1) Independent Red Teams

2) Walk and talk teams (like they now have at Boston) who are trained in behaving
pattern assessment.
3) Congressional requirement that after every red team report TSA will describe
•
their remedial steps.
4) Measures to ensure that management doesn't "fear" red team reports as an
embarrassment, but rather as an important measurement tool.
5) Training and experience requirements for TSA managers (just like we have for
screen ers ).
UNCLASSIFIED
rl r~,?t4o/~ 7 9<l
I. l)
.l
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with Alan
Miller
Date: Monday, September 22, 2003
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238 7045]
NOTE: Please refer to the interview recording for a complete account.
Alan Miller has been with the FAA since 1989 as a certified professional controller and has spent
most of his career at Area C.
On 9111 Miller was assigned to Boston High Sector (above 24,000 ft.) as the RA position
(46RA). Prior to sitting down at 46R Miller noted that Pete Zilowski was by himself handling the
situation with AAll. He received a very short brief on the situation from Zilowski. The Area
Superviser, John Shippani, was away from the aisle briefing TMU on the situation. Miller heard
that it was a possible hijacking, and Zilowski explained the circumstances of the airplane
(NaRDO, no transponder beacon). He was told that there were unclear communications and that
the transponder was still emitting the primary code C when AA 11 stopped responding all
together north of Chester in Area B. In Area C airspace AAll received a flight data tag and was
under primary tracking. Zilowski continued to track AA 11 southbound after the threatening
transmissions were confirmed. Miller noted that other controllers, or the TMU alerted other
centers of the circumstance. Miller took over for Zilowski, and was at the main radar position for
Sector 46 at the first impact. Miller was told of the impact by John Shippani, and Miller
immediately thought it was AA 11. The Sector was closed to air traffic Miller moved traffic to
the low Sector 47, which is approximately 11,000 ft. and above to 15,000 ft. and above over
Boston. Miller left for break since his traffic was clear' and he saw the second hit on the WTC on
the break room television.
Miller stated that ATC FAA training had allowed the controllers at ZBW to successfully clear
the skies once the order was given. Post-9f11 Miller believes the FAA has a different role as a
coordinator with the military. He stated there should be more training for FAA ATCs to take part
in this responsibility.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
f( PK 0 ~!UII;J8~
®
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with
John Hartling
Type of event: Recorded Interview
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown and Miles Kara
Team Number: 8
Participants- Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045] .
NOTE: Please refer to the recorded interview for a complete account.
Hartling has been an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) with the FAA since 1981. Prior to that
he was an ATC with the Air Force.
On 9/11 Hartling first became aware of AAII when Athens Sector 38 forced AAII onto
his radar. It had last reported an altitude of FL 290, and hadn't reached Kingston Sector
yet. The data block for AAII had no altitude confirmed since FL 290, and AAII was
moving in excess of 500 knots. Hartling admits that he did not take AAII too seriously at
first, since his main concern was keeping aircraft out of the possible path depicted by the
primary-only return from AAII. He was handling departures out of Bradley (Hartford,
CN), and put a US Air flight above AA 11 in an attempt to get an altitude estimate. The
US Air flight was unable to get a visual and Hartling then asked UALI75, who was able
to get a visual and an estimate ofFL 270 to FL 290.
It was at this point that Hartling heard his supervisor in the background mention
threatening communications from the cockpit of AAll.
Hartling does not remember a single time in his years with the FAA, nor in his time with
the military, in which he controlled an aircraft with no radio communications, no
transponder and was seriously off course. He remembers the AA 11 sequence as "losing"
radio at 0814EDT, while in the control of radar position 47R, then being passed to radar
position 46R. AAII remained in Athens Sector for a "good amount of time", then passed
into Kingston Sector. He acknowledged that whenever there was a problem with a flight,
the first step a controller takes is to notify the supervisor for the area.
He turned UAL175 35 degrees right to put the flight back on course after deviating it to
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
check on AAl1. He notes that it was unnecessary to do this since UAL175 could have
been changed to a northern route to LAX, but he felt itbest to put the flight back on its
scheduled route. He kept UAL175 at FL 310, and was aware that this combination of a
tum and FL 310 would keep UAL175 safe considering AA11 's unpredictable altitude.
The floor for his sector is 16,800 feet, so if AA11 passed below this it would slide into
"Coast" mode. Since AA 11 was not below this level, Hartling could estimate a safe zone
to keep his planes in. Hartling kept his supervisor, Ron McQwin (?) for Area F, and
William (Bo) Dean, Hartling's RA, notified. Hartling does not remember when AA11
was officially termed a "hijack", but he knows the supervisors had constant information
as to the factors contributing to AA11 's situation from the ATe perspective.
Hartling did not personally become involved in the military notification of the hijack, and
believes it was the watch desk supervisors who were involved. He noted that calling Otis
Air Force Base was a logical step.
Regarding cross-country flight course, Hartling informed Commission staff that the
routes taken by AA11 and UA175 on 9/11 were in no way predictable. One was
scheduled to take a northern route, and the other a southern route. Even these routes can
be modified on any given day to allow for developing weather conditions. It is usually a
"company" (airline company) decision as to which route on of their flights may take, and
Hartling believes much of this decision is based on the amount of fuel a particular route
necessi tates.
Hartling does believe ZBW had good situational awareness that it was AAll that hit the
WTC, since when Steve Smalls came in from the break room to inform the center of the
hit, he said "THAT airplane" hit the WTC.
Hartling does not believe the response to the hijack could have been quick enough to
make a difference. He noted that the air space caps around nuclear facilities should be
monitored and addressed with more thought. Hartling does not believe a response to a
"cap break" around a nuclear site could be quick enough to make a difference. Hartling
noted that past ATC training scenarios for hijack situations did not take into account the
possibility of simultaneous multi-plane hijackings. Nor are has he been involved in a
training scenario that would include no "hint" from the pilot of the cockpit compromise.
Hartling further noted that the AA11 characteristic of descent and slowing from its rapid
pace are not real signals of a hijack.
Hartling's main point regarding the 9/11 attacks is that the attacks were out of the FAA
"box". His worry is that even thought the example of 9/11 is being used today to prepare
for future events, the next terrorist attack on US soil may again be "out the box" created
by the 9/11 attacks. He does note that the FAA is more aware of the threat now, and has
implemented new procedures. Unfortunately, for the ATC, Hartling notes that there is
very little that can be done except to track and attempt to communicate with the aircraft.
Regarding the military, Hartling has had contact with military flights on a regular basis at
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
the pilot to controller level, but has no knowledge of the relationship at the managerial
level. Before 9/11 Hartling did not have much knowledge though on the warning areas
and hot areas monitored by the military, and learned much later from 9/11 that Otis could
deploy defensive strike fighters. Prior to 9/11 Hartling has no "intercept" training with
the military, and was aware that NORAD controls much of the highest altitude airspace.
He has had even more contact with military aircraft post-9/11 since military fighters are
often running escort for VIP flights. Hartling does not think extensive FAA
controller/military training is necessary since he is confident an FAA controller is able to
vector an aircraft to a target, and can "break up" flights of between four to six aircraft.
Hartling does note that part of his comfortable mindset regarding working with military
flights does stem from his training as a controller in the Air Force.
Regarding what worked well on 9111, Hartling notes that the grounding of airborne
flights was a complex endeavor for the ATC system, and that the fact that there were no
accidents should not be overlooked. He also notes that it was a positive sign in the ATC
community that all ATC centers were able to take definitive control over the airborne
flights and over the flights waiting to depart. Hartling noted that without this
acknowledgement of FAA authority over the skyways, their may have been serious
incidents beyond those of the actual terrorist attacks on 9/11.
Hartling noted that the 9/11 hij ackers must have calculated the GPS coordinates of the
WTC, and this led them to know when to descend and how to guide the planes to their
targets.
UNCLASSIFIED
UN C LA SSIF rED
COMM.ISSION SENSITIVE

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 with
Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center.
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA Boston Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Commission: Chris Perito, FAA General Consul
Daniel D. Bueno began with the FAA in March of 1982, and began his career at Boston
Center. He spent 6 to 7 years as an ATC (air traffic controller), then worked as a traffic
management specialist in the Traffic Management Unit (TMU), then as both an Area D
and Area C Supervisor, and finally in his current position, as Traffic Management
Supervisor. The TMU "umbrella" includes Eastern Region and Boston Center, Carmine
Gallo is its overall head.
Bueno first became aware of a possible hijacking from Area C Operation Supervisor
(OSIC), John Schippani. Area C covers airspace of Flight Level 240 (24,000 feet) to
FL600 at and to the west of Boston, Massachusetts. Bueno paged Terry Biggio, who has
Operations Manager in Charge (OMIC) at the time. The possible hijack was identified to
Bueno and Biggio as American Airlines 11 by Schippani, who was informed from the air
traffic controller (ATC) covering Sector 46 (R46), Peter A. Zalewski. Biggio brought
AAll up on his display module (MDM), and Bueno called the FAA's Herndon, Virginia
air traffic control headquarters to inform them that AA 11 was "no radio communication"
(NORAC), more commonly referred to as NORDO (no radio), and had turned off its
transponder, which transferred its radio signature to a primary target, which consisted of
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
corvrMlssION SENSITIVE
no altitude information. Bueno stated that Terry Biggio asked Robert Jones to pull the
"tape" from the recorder. Bueno identified the speaker at Herndon as "Tony". AA11 took
a sharp right tum at 1227 UTC, and headed south. When AA 11 started to slow down,
Bueno called New York TRACON to advise them ofa the situation. Bueno's experience
as an ATC led him to believe that AA 11's slow down was indicative of a drop in altitude,
and thus NY Center would need to clear all air traffic at all altitudes along the possible
path of AA11. Based on Bueno's memory of a previous hijack, Bueno called Cape
TRACON for an immediate fighter escort out of OTIS Air Force Base. He knew that the
call should have gone to North East Air Defense (NEADS), but due to the urgency of the
circumstance called directly to the FAA contact point for Otis.
Bueno explained that he understood normal procedure for a NORAC airplane was to
check the NAV 80, try to raise the aircraft by various means (check previous transponder
frequency, use AIR Inc., notify the aircraft's company, ask other aircrafts to try and raise
the NORDO airplane), but noted that although prior to 9111 it was usual for pilots to be
inattentive to ATCs at times, and that often there were 5 to 20 minute lapses in
communication, the combination of circumstance (NORAC, no transponder, serious
deviation off course) was infrequent. Despite this it was still unusual to call this to the
attention of the "aisle supervisor" (area supervisor).
Bueno stated that prior to 9/11, a hijack would be predicted as a flight to Cuba or a
ransom demand, but not as an act of terrorism. He also noted that with AA11, until the
threatening cockpit communication was confirmed, predominately the Boston Center
staff was concerned the place had experienced serious mechanical or electrical failure. He
noted that there was an occurrence of this sort involving a generator malfunction post-
9111, and it was addressed immediately.
According to Bueno, the key that alarmed Boston Center over AA 11 before the
threatening communication was the hard southern tum. The southbound course combined
with a dropping altitude had already been reason enough for Terry Biggio to call for an
immediate "ground stop" in the Sparta/Carmella traffic corridor. Once Bob Jones
communicated the tape's content to the TMU, Biggio informed ROC, WOC and New
York Center of the necessity of an immediate ground stop at Logan. Bueno believes New
York Center was working VAL 175 at this point.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
When asked about a timetable for-military involvement, Buneo stated he took an initial
role calling the hijacking to Collin Scoggins attention, who immediately called NEADS.
Buneo noted that Collin Scoggins was a military operations specialist (MOS) at Boston
Center, and is usually not on the ATC floor. The MOS is now part of the TMU. It became
Cape TRACON's responsibility to coordinate the fighter scramble, and Boston Center
took responsibility for clearing the skies, and that Huntress took did not take control of .
high altitude along the coast until later in the day.
The procedure for active fighter scrambles was coordinated in the "Otis Cape TRACON
Letter Agreement", and Bueno had experience in the early 1980s with a scramble to
escort an airplane out of Kennedy Airport. Bueno has not participated in any tabletop
scramble exercises. Regarding Operation Vigilant Guardian, a command post exercise
that was scheduled to take place on September 11th, Bueno believes the military operation
specialists may have been briefed, but that Boston Center was not involved beyond a
NOP AR (no pass through air defense) order for the airspace involved in the exercise.
Bueno stated that the system "worked absolutely" on 9111. Boston Center was able to
shut down the airspace on the east coast in a relatively timely manner, and were able to
reroute and land planes successfully. Bueno stated that the Dynamic Simulation Training
(DynSim) that ATCs are required to perform yearly serve their purpose, even though they
are only simulation. He noted that in the past one of his DynSims might have involved
vectoring an aircraft toward a hijack, but if so it is only a loose memory, but that he
definitely has not exercised a NORAC hijack with no transponder. Nor had their been a
hij ack simulation or exercise that included FAA and NORAD co-participation.
North Atlantic inbound flights on 9111 were passed through to Canada.
Prior to 9111, Bueno remembers numerous localized ground stops, but never a national
one.
After Cape TRACON was contacted by FAA personnel, Cape TRACON called Otis.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Bueno mentioned the possibility of scrambling fighters from Atlantic City to Collin
Scoggins. Bueno never thought that the scrambled fighters would receive an order to
shout down a commercial airliner.
Bueno recommended to heighten airline security passengers should no longer be allowed

carry-on luggage, and all cargo should be thoroughly screened. Bueno commented that
Boston Center staff now have a security and national defense role that has beenadded to
their pri~ary purpose of keeping aircraft separate from each other and from weather
threats. Bueno is concerned that just as hijacks in the past created a conceptual box from
which all planning and practice will be based on, the event of 9/11 was created another
conceptual box, and unless planning and practice is exercised beyond this box, the
country is still vulnerable.
Bueno stated that a benefit of the improved relationship between FAA and military
entities is that they now communicate daily over airspace caps and are linked through the
Defense Event Network (DEN).
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Hr-~D ~DI&lq)
®
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview. with
Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator.
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Cominission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045]
NOTE: Please refer to the interview recording for a complete account.
Joe Cooper has been with the FAA since 1991 at Area B, and has been with the TMU
since 1999. At TMU Cooper generally manages traffic flows and considers TMU to be
the "hub" of traffic for Boston Center. The ZBW TMU communicates with ZBW sectors
and coordinates what is ongoing in ZBW airspace with the TMUs of other national air
centers. Cooper identified TMU positions as departure spacing, en route spacing, arrival
flow, military coordinator, and severe weather management. The en route spacing
coordinator is responsible for the "metering" of air craft - at about 38 crossing into a new
air space per hour. The military coordinator is responsible for clearing airspace for
military training purposes. Al Trav is the term used when the military makes an "altitude
reservation" - they receive these reservations when they plan on using an air "track" for
mid- flight refueling. Reservations for this space can be done through Herndon Command
Center. Herndon also handles any national severe weather coordination. Cooper never
deals with the ROC or the WOC.
On 9111, Cooper first heard from Pete Pesquili in Area B that AA 11 had lost
communication capabilities and radar. The next step was for one of the TMU personnel
to contact company. Cooper remembers thinking it odd that an air carrier would loose
both at once. TMU pulled the call sign for AA11 to monitor the flight. Controllers were
alerted to move air craft away from the possible route of AA 11 since the altitude was
unknown, and the last registered altitude was FL 290. At that point Area C told TMU that
AA11 was a possible hijack. Terry Biggio told Bob Jones to "pull the tapes" (the record
of communication between the pilots and the ATC). AA 11 veered to the right. The
primary target had been tagged, so the data block of the last known information stayed
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with the primary. At first, with only three factors, NaRDO, no transponder and serious
course deviation Cooper thought AAll had experienced serious electrical damage. But
after the hard left tum and the confirmation of a hijack through the cockpit
communication, there was no doubt in Cooper's mind.
Dan Bueno asked Cooper to call for military assistance. Cooper began speaking with
Huntress at approximately 123754UTC. He asked Huntress to send Fl6s out of Otis Air
Force Base. Cooper did not know the physical location of Huntress (Rome, New York).
Cooper asked Bradley to stop departures headed towards New York when AAII was
roughly five miles south of Albany. When speaking with the military, Cooper believes he
spoke with Sergeant Powell. Cooper was unaware of any specific military exercises that
were taking place on 9111. Cooper believes there was a lack of understanding on the
military's part on the FAA definition of "primary target", but he was eventually able to
give the military a rough latitude and longitude coordinate. Cooper thought they might
vector an aircraft from the Falcon Axe area that is composed of airspace 7,000 ft to
49,000 ft. Cooper believes that Collin Scoggins asked the military about height finding
capability to be used on AAII.
Cooper stated that Terry Biggio was on a conference call that included New York Tracon
and ZNY. He does not believe those calls were recorded, but the hotline on the New York
side may have been recorded. They were still attempting to locate AAII when Terry
Biggio told the TMU they lost radar contact with AAII, and shortly after that one of the
facilities personnel told the TMU a plane hit the WTC. Cooper went to the TV at the
facilities and Cooper immediately knew it was AAII.
Cooper was caught in "disbelief', but he then immediately thought of the strain on his
controllers who were attempting to slow down traffic. ZNY then called and informed
ZBW of a possible second hijacking and that ZNY airspace was being shut down.
Cooper stopped all departures flight planned through ZNY. He then heard of the second
hit on the WTC. He immediately realized that control in order to keep the planes still in
the sky was all he could do. He told Dan Bueno that maybe they should call ATC Zero.
Bueno said to do it, and they sent out the GI message for a ZBW ATC Zero. They
reviewed more of the audiotape and Biggio relayed the "we have some planes" through
the conference call. The Pentagon then got hit and Herndon called for a National Ground
Zero.
Cooper discovered that UALl75 was also a Boeing 767 headed to LAX. The TMU
decided to check for planes in the air that were also flight planned from Logan to LAX.
They found Delta Flight 1989 and immediately informed Cleveland Center.
NEADS was called and the TMU asked what to do with military aircraft airbound and
not responding to the attacks. NEADS announced that all military aircraft not on mission
would return to base.
The facility manager then ordered everyone evacuate ZBW except for one supervisor per
area, one controller per area, and two TMU personnel.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Cooper is clear that any suspicion of another airborne threat the DEN line is the absolute
first place to report to. It is open at all times. Cooper is not aware of how he would get the
military involved except to use the DEN line.
NOTE: Cooper provided Commission staffwith a personnel account of the events of 9/11
through his perspective.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with ~
Richard Beringer . l7
Prepared by: 'Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
. Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238
7045]
NOTE:· Please refer to the recorded interview for a complete account.
Beringer started as an ATC in the Air Force in 1979 and with the FAA as an'ATC in
1983. From there he became an Area C Specialist.
Beringer informed Commission staff that prior to 9/11 NORDO aircraft were considered
to "eventually come back", and wouldn't be thought of as a hijack. Occasionally it would
occur with a commercial airliner, and then anATC would inform the supervisor, who
might then have called the airliner company. There were other techniques at the disposal
of an ATC in the pre-9/ll environment. An ATC might attempt to contact other aircraft
to check altitude, or to contact the aircraft incase there was something wrong with the
ATC equipment. If an aircraft took a serious deviation from course, then it would be
considered a higher priority. The priority of a NORDO differed on the type of aircraft.
Mostly ATC'sdid not pay as much attention to privately owned aircraft. When an aircraft
was NORDO it was highly uncommon even in the pre-9lll environment for the aircraft
to go more than a sector without some form of communication with the ATC. Beringer
noted that for the transponder to tum off and for there to beno radio contact was unusual
and would call for a supervisor's attention in pre-9/ll, but now is viewed with high
suspicion. With the third factor of a serious course deviation Beringer noted that itwould
be viewed even prior to 9/11 with extreme seriousness.
Beringer considers hijackings pre-91l1 as extremely out of the ordinary, even though they
are trained in the basic ATC response on a yearly basis. Beringer believes that multiple
situations are practiced in the DynSim and CBI training, and also believes that a situation
with the multiple factors that occurred on 9111 has been practiced.
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UNCLASSIFIED
On 9111 Beringer was at the BoSox Sector RA position. This position covers the airspace
above 10,000 ft including FL 230. He took AA11 and carried it through westbound after
the handoff from Boston Tracon position. Beringer would normally initiate a handoff to
the Boston High Sector from there. Beringer remembers a routine handoff from BoSox,
and climbed the aircraft towards Athens 38. He then was relieved and went on break.
When Beringer returned both AA11 and UAL175 had hit the WTC, and the air traffic
system was about to close.
He heard from his colleagues corroborating information on the flights.
Beringer noted that it was a widely held assumption in ZBW that UAL175 was the
second hit on WTC, since ithad been reported when it "left" the ATC system.
Pre-9f11 Beringer noted his understanding that it was the supervisor's responsibility to
contact the military. Beringer stated there is no need for FAA controllers to contact the
military. In the case of 9111, Beringer would not have known who to contact at the
military. He noted also that his ability to vector a fighter for intercept, if a case called for,
would be due to his military experience and not from his training with the FAA.
Regarding the fighters in Whiskey Warning Area 105, Beringer was responsible for
working them over to Kennedy. Beringer stated that typically ZNY would not work those
fighters. Beringer did bring the aircraft over from WI05 but did not bring their Otis
replacements over. His experience with the military is that they work closely together in
upstate New York, but that his experience is more extensive because of his training. He
acknowledged that there are sometimes difficulties in dealing with military pilots, but .
that because of the high performance level of their fighter aircraft they are often very
willing to follow a controller's guidance to rapidly change their position. Overall
Beringer believes the FAA and military coexist well in their shared airspace. Beringer
stated that he has handled fighter aircraft in FAA DynSim training.
Beringer noted that after ATe Zero was declared all aircraft was directed to the nearest
airport, and by the time the ZBW building was empty the only aircraft left in the sky were
military. .
In a 9111 type event Beringer reiterated that there is not much the ATC system can do
short of passing along timely information and vectoring a military aircraft to intercept. He
is skeptical though that flight time to an intercept will allow a fighter to make a
difference. Beringer stated that the only security would be to make cockpits completely
safe from intrusion. But he also noted the threat posed by private aircraft. He also noted
that a terrorist with thorough ATC knowledge could develop a much more sophisticated
plan.
Beringer was the last ZBW controller to leave the building because he was controlling
two military tankers and giving them instructions to get below his 18000 ft ceiling on
airspace, at that point they could fly by visuals. One tanker called 23k visual, the other
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UNCLASSIFIED
got below the 18000 mark.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Robert Jones, Quality Assurance Officer, ZBW.
Team Number: 8
7045]
Jones has been with the FAA for the last 14 years, 13 of which he has spent with ZBW.
He is a full performance level controller, and a TMU supervisor. On 9/11 Jones was a
Quality Assurance Specialist charged with processing the accident information for flight
UAL175. Jones identified the threatening communications from UAL175 on the flight
recording.
Jones explained to Commission staff the difference between an "accident package" and
an "accident file". The package is developed and published by the FAA and has a defined
scope and purpose. The file is all the information collected regarding an accident, and in
this case contains a timeline created by Jones and his colleague. The timeline, which will
be provided to the Commission through a request to FAA headquarters, was pieced
together through the call toll records.
Based off his notes, Jones stated that at 1224UTC Area C reported a possible hijack.
Jones went to 46R (Pete Zilowski). Jones then went to review the recording. He relayed
the recording information to the Watchdesk. He confirmed that an "Arab" voice stated
"we have some planes". Jones relayed this to Biggio immediately.
At 122456UTC Jones relayed another communication. At 1233359UTC Jones relayed

the final communication. Jones estimates all three communications were told to Biggio at
some point between 1233-1237 UTC. (CHECK TIMES).
At 122750UTC the supervisor at TMUY called Herndon to relay information on the
UNCLASSIFIED
~.'
/ ,
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• likely hijacking.
At 1240UTC Dan Bueno requests to be put on a conference call with Herndon, and relays
the information that AA 11 had dropped speed, which he guessed might be a descent into
NY Tracon airspace.
At 130355UTC Boston Center TMU tells internal facilities to ground stop all ZBW
traffic.
At 1311 02UTC an order was issued to increase cockpit security.
At 1342 UTC all aircraft were ordered to return to airports, and a national ground stop
was instituted. .
Jones noted that at the time of the 9/11 attacks ZBW used reel to reel tapes for recording.
Now they have digital audio. He noticed that there is a difference in terminology when
Boston ATCs tried to relay information to NEADS. He thinks this lack of common
terminology should be dealt with.
Jones explained that he understands Giant Killer as based out of Norfolk, Virginia and is
control of Navy training exercises, and all warning areas off the east coast.
• Jones stated that AAII first became a primary target at 1221 12UTC. He noted that
because they only had a primary Collin Scoggins attempted to contact NEADS to
coordinate with their height findin ca abilit check on that).
Jones also stated the pre 9/11 the WOC's prime role was to notify the other ArC centers
of the ongoing information and operations. .:
Jones took Commission staff on a tour through the reel system of Z~W', and Commission
staff has requested the complete accident file through FAA headquarters, It was during
this tour that Jones explained to Commission staff that the communication from AA 11
did not come from the American Airlines pilot keying the microphone covertly to inform
authorities of the hijack. After the 9111 attacks Jones assisted an FBI audio analyst in
copying the recordings. The FBI analyst informed Jonesthat in analysis of the recording
he could pick up spit in the speech patterns of the hijackers being recorded smacking the
microphone. It was the FBI analyst's definitive conclusion that the hijackers were in
position of the cockpit, and speaking directly ,into the microphone, at the time of the
recording. "
• 9/11 Law· Enforcement
UNCLASSIFIED
Sensitive
UNCLASSIFIED
tl ~t ()~L) Iv 79 if
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD @
Steven Roebuck, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C.
Date: Monday, September 22,2003
Team Number: 8
7045]
Roebuck has been with the FAA since 1982, and at Boston Center Area C for his entire
career. He has spent a detail with Quality Assurance and a detail with training. He was
involved in ZBW's GPS project, and with its single site adaptation project. Roebuck
noted that Area C itself has both high and low altitudes.
On 9/11 Roebuck was working BoSox 47R, then worked Hampton (where the F15s flew
through after the attacks). Roebuck stated that the handling of AA11 from takeoff gave
no indication of the impending hijack. He climbed AA11 beyond the noise abatement
altitude and up to 14000 ft. He was relieved to take break by Greg Tachini. At that time
AA 11 was still on frequency and was cleared to climb to FL 230.
He came back from break and was told of the hijack of MIL He took over Hampton
Sector (31 R) which covers south of CT down to Long Island, at mainly FL 230 and
above.
Prior to 9/11, Roebuck's experience with Warning Area 105 (Whiskey 105) was that it is
mostly reserved for military operations, and it was not unusual to work traffic in and out
of the area. Occasionally he would be notified that the area was conducting tests to the
national air defense systems. Roebuck noted that in the course of his career he has noted
a reduction in the use of Whiskey 105, but that when the military needs it, it is active.
Roebuck stated that the relationship between the FAA and the military over his career
indicates that years ago the military had "bad radios", which made it difficult for FAA
controllers to communicate with military flights. Especially when there were multiple
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branches of the anned services conducting exercises in the warning areas. Overall though
Roebuck views the relationship asa good one, and noted that the working relationship
between military crews and the controllers is "a good one", considering they operate very
busy airspace.
On 9111 Roebuck remembers the two responding F15s as "coming out" under one flight
call sign of Penta 45. Roebuck stated that this is not unusual, and usually the lead aircraft
has the call sign. If the fighters split, they are both identified by different call signs.
Roebuck noted he does not know if the fighters came out of Otis Air Force Base, and
does not know if they departed before or after the AAll impact. Further, Roebuck noted
that the original flight strip for the fighters gave a destination of Kennedy Airport.
Roebuck believes that the handoff for the fighters began at Cape Tracon, then went to
Cape Sector, then to him at Hampton. He received a call that the F15s received a call to
switch communications to Giant Killer. Roebuck's understanding of Giant Killer is that it
covers the shore defense for CT, NY, MA, NJ, and VA. The Cape Sector explained that
they had spoken to the pilots and told them of the attacks on the WTC. At this point Dean
noted the expectation was that the fighters would head directly to New York City
airspace. Shortly thereafter the flights were handed off to Hampton frequency and Dean
climbed them to FL 290. He asked the pilots if they knew their destination. They did not
and needed to delay at the western portion of Whiskey 105. If the pilots of the Penta
flight were based at Otis Roebuck had an expectation that they would be familier with the
Whiskey area. When they told Roebuck of the delay he wanted information on the
position the pilots would hold. They told him they could not give a specific position, but
for him to keep them at a "published hold" in the area. Roebuck asked if they wanted a
radial or latitude longitude hold, and the pilots replied that they would maintain
themselves. With this lack of information Roebuck was unsure of what the pilots were
going to do, and did not know how to clear airspace for their potential course. Roebuck
had initially held the expectation that the fighters would tail AAll, but since it had
already hit he couldn't predict their next course of action. So Roebuck asked the pilots if
they were in contact with "company" (military), and they said they were. Roebuck noted
that normally clearing area for fighters is very specific, so this unknown generic hold was
extremely unusual. The fighters had an altitude but did not issue an EFC (Expect Further
Clearance). Roebuck assumed the purpose of this hold was that if the fighters needed to
move rapidly they did not want to be encumbered by an air traffic technicality. When the
pilots arrived at Whiskey Roebuck pointed them out to ZNY twice. Roebuck also
contacted Giant Killer to ask if they needed communications with the fighters, which they
did not, so the pilots remained on Hampton frequency. Then there was the second impact
on the WTC. He tried to communicate the "second event" to the pilots calmly. He
informed the crews on the Hampton frequency to heighten cockpit security. This was all
probably within fifteen minutes. At some point-Roebuck asked Penta if it was a flight of
two fighters. The Penta leader said they were in communication with Huntress, and the
Giant Killer had requested communication. The pilot informed Roebuck their flight
needed to proceed "on course". Roebuck asked if they wanted a hold on Kennedy. The
Penta leader said he wanted a position directly over New York City. Roebuck worked the
fighters over to Calverton, NY, but then the pilots asked for a position overhead New
York City. Roebuck cleared them direct to Kennedy as a navigational aid. He checked
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LaGuardia's weather to make sure the pilots could spot Manhattan. Then he cleared them
direct to Manhattan. He requested them to take FL 210, which would put them in ZNY
airspace. Roebuck didn't know if ZNY Kennedy sector would know that they were
coming. Roebuck had both civilian aircraft and fighters to deal with, and Kennedy had
traffic at FL 230, so Roebuck climbed the fighters to FL 240. Roebuck received
communication from Giant Killer indicating the fighters needed to be worked by
Huntress control from that point, and that Huntress needed to communicate with ZNY.
When the F15s were east of Kennedy Roebuck was relieved by John Gingrich (?).
Roebuck's last communication with the fighters was to put them over to Kennedy's
frequency, at which point the fighters were speaking to Huntress.
Roebuck informed Commission staff that "cat tracking" is the term used now when the
ATC is informed of a "special interest" flight.
Roebuck noted that his only previous experience with a military scramble was before he
was a certified controller there was a scramble out of the Cape Sector when the Russians
flew a Bear aircraft along the coast.
Since 9/11 Roebuck noted that the military relationship with the FAA has changed.
Roebuck views the ATC responsibility for conducting intercepts to be a much greater
priority. This leaves a gray area in the knowledge base of an FAA certified controller.
Most FAA controllers are not experienced with the factors governing a fighter in
supersonic flight, and this knowledge gap could compromise a controller's ability to
successfully vector an intercept fighter to its target. Roebuck believes supersonic flight
changes the vertical separation requirement. He is aware that the FAA forbids supersonic
over the continental USA, but he is also aware that there are military priorities. Roebuck
also informed Commission staff that military flights have their own broadcast mode, and
that only the lead fighter will broadcast on the transponder mode C that FAA ATCs
monitor. Roebuck noted that the training for an FAA ATC is to keep aircraft separated,
whereas the mentality to conduct a successful intercept requires a controller to vector
aircraft together. Roebuck sees deliberately bringing airplanes together as a different skill
set. And he does not believe FAA Ares are adequately trained for this.
Roebuck recommends FAA ATCs be trained to conduct intercepts. He noted that control
over an intercept depending on time of day and density of air traffic is circumstantial. But
if the situation permitted, he stated it would be better for the military to control its own
flights. He also stated that FAA personnel should become acquainted with the military
lexicon.
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r1r-- K 0 1L PIt; 7~j
I
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD ~\

.~
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston CenterField Site Interview with
Toby Miller, First Line Supervisor Area C, Traffic Management Supervisor on 9/11
Team Number: 8
7045]
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Miller explained the TMU outlook as a "system" view for balancing air traffic. He
explained that some of the positions at the TMU at ZBW are: a military coordinator, an
en route specialist, a severe weather specialist, and an arrival sequencing specialist for
Boston Logan Airport.
On 9/11, TMU staffwas Dan Bueno as supervisor, Joe Cooper, Dennis Wishheart and
Steve Wills. When Miller arrived at 5:30am everything was as usual. He worked the
departure coordinator position until his break. Around 9: 15am Miller heard of the WTC
impacts, and went back to TMU. He was briefed by the supervisor of Area E. He
contacted ZNY and was told that New York would not take any aircraft through ZNY
airspace. He received word after this that there would be an impeding ATC Zero through
Herndon Command Center. At this point he informed all of the supervisors, and then
went back to his desk. By the time he was back at his desk the ATC Zero had been called,
and he went back down the aisles and informed the supervisors. He personally verified
with the northeast area towers that no aircraft was to take off.
Through his proximity with the Operations Desk he heard of the reported bomb threat
and also of possible inbound planes towards ZBW. It was at this point that the ZBW
building evacuation order was issued. Miller and Bueno remained at the TMU to handle
air traffic for an additional ten to fifteen minutes, and then the operations manager told
them to go. It was around one o'clock at this point, as far as Miller could remember.
Miller stated that it was Dan Bueno who contacted Otis for a fighter scramble. And that it
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was his understanding from conversation in the TMU that Bueno's attempt was
unsuccessful.
Regarding the AA11 anomalies, Miller noted that the DynSim and CBI training prepared
ATCs for hijack scenarios in which the pilot was communicating with the ATC. He
acknowledged that the uncontrolled flight of AA11, which refers to the airplane's serious
course deviation, was a factor that calls for a higher level of concern, but stated that
without the "tip off' from the pilot as per training, it would not be in an ATC's ability to
distinguish definitively that a plane had been hijacked.
Miller has daily contact with HUNTRESS regarding training in the military areas. Miller
informed Commission staff that "huntress" is NEADS call sign. Miller would get the
huntress training exercise in the evening and clear the appropriate space the next day.
Miller stated his belief that a military fighter could not have reached AA11 or UALI75.
Miller does not believe the ROC has a role to play in 9/11 type events.
Miller noted that the slowing airspeed of AAll indicates its descent. He had no
knowledge of reports of AA 11 airborne after the first tower impact.
Miller distinguished an ATC handoff as a transfer of transponder frequency and an ATC

point out as showing another airspace sector that a plane is passing through that sector's
airspace, but that the original radar controller is maintaining the plane on the original
radar sector frequency. It is called "clipping" when a plane travels through airspace but
does not switch it's communications over.
Miller stated that the DEN network now running is a useful tool, and that training since
9/11 has been adequate to address their work. He also stated that important training for
ATC personnel would be information on who to contact in different emergency
circumstance. Miller also noted that this type of training is more important on the
supervisor level than on the ATC level, since it is the supervisors who make decisions on
who to involve. \
Miller stated that the military and FAA have an excellent relationship.
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UNCLASSIFIED MrK04ul!rif7
@
Barry O'Connor, Regional Operations Officer for Communications Information Security
(COMSAT), FAA Regional Operations Center (ROC)
Team Number: 8
7045]
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O'Connor has been with the FAA since 1973, and has been with the Regional Operations
Center since 1987. He noted that the role of the Communications Information Security
division is to act as a conduit for information amongst the various ROC contains entities
such as flight standards (in spectators), air traffic, security, airways facilities, legal,
human "resources and civil rights. Within COMSAT for ROC are six operations officers
and one manager. They work twelve hour shifts, with one or two people on per shift.
COMSAT is similar to a dispatching service for the nine offices internally at the ROC,
but the differ in that they gather information that is at times passed through local state
agencies. COMSAT then notifies the proper entities. They would notify the WOC
(Washington Operations Center) dependent on the severity of the situation (a fatality), or
whether the incident was newsworthy. The entities they might contact include, but is not
limited to: state and local police, state aviation, air traffic control towers, Federal Bureau
of Investigations, or Coast Guard.
O'Connor noted that the Northeast Region Operations Control Manual does cover
hijacking protocol.
On 9/11 O'Connor received a call from Terry Biggio of Boston Center informing him the
possible hijacking of American Airlines 11 (AAll). Biggio told O'Connor Boston
Center was "working the aircraft", but had overheard threats. COMSAT arranged for the
ROC coordinated with the WOC and put Biggio on a conference line. WOC then
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contacted their security and ROC started notifying all internal teams. The Regional
Management Team was in a staff meeting, but were shortly notified by their own
channels. ROC notified air traffic division 505, and Tom Benson of quality assurance and
placed them in the conference call amongst numerous government entities.
O'Connor handled the requests of various FAA divisions to be placed in calls on 9111,
and these calls began prior to the AA11 hitting of the WTC. He does not remember if
Herndon was connected to these calls, and does not handle connecting FAA entities to
the military.
He noted that he has experienced similar "hectic" scenarios like 9/11, but that he has
never seen a hijacking in his career. There have been routine exercises with airports in
tune with the type of emergencies they might experience, and he remembers a coworker,
identified as Sherry Dottin, who partook in a hij acking drill four to five years ago. He
noted that to help prepare his office for these types of emergencies the handbook is
updated periodically, and identified this handbook as FAA NE Regional Order 1770.1.
COMSAT only keeps a chronological log of their day's activites during major events. He
constructed a timeline for 9/11, and was on duty until 9pm.
O'Connor noted that since 9/11 he feels callers to COMSAT should know the exact party
they wish to speak to, and that COMSAT should be aware of the correct POCs for
various FAA entities .
. He had no involvement in Cleveland Center on ZNY. He only handled calls that involved
AA11, but overheard conversation about UAL175 when FAA raised Security Conference
levels and he had to notify the various northeast region offices. He also had to notify the
offices when FAA declared a national air traffic control ground stop.
O'Connor noted that on 9/11 WOC and ZBW were connected real time, but that such
simultaneous connection is rare, and information would usually flow from ZBW to the
ROC, then to WOC. O'Connor noted that the COMSAT FAA Primary NET on 9/11 was
open to all agencies, and the Tactical NET was FAA only. O'Connor also noted the ROC
has an active duty military liaison, who is to be informed on military accidents. The
liaison is not 24 hour. O'Connor stated there is now an Air Traffic Crisis Center at the
ROC, and that this center receives active information for the strict purpose of handling air
traffic. This center deals internally with FAA air traffic matters. COMSAT does practice
relocation twice per year, and did so prior to 9111. Their back up facility is at ZBW.
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Collin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist.
Team Number: 8
7045]
Scoggins is currently a Military Operations Specialist with ZBW.
Scoggins has experience as an Airspace Procedure Specialist and as an ATC specialist in

Area D with the FAA, and was a F4 crew chief with the military between 1976 and 1980.
Scoggins noted that there are MOS positions only at a few facilities, and the position is
commonly referred to now as a "Mission Coordinator" at the TMU.
On 9/11 Scoggins was advised of the hijack at approximately 8:35 EDT. He first thought
of the Luftansa hijack, and did not want to "clutter" the situation being handled at the
center, but when he went to the floor was asked by Dan Bueno to check on "fighters".
Scoggins went to call NEADS to request a fighter scramble, but Joe Cooper was already
doing that. The procedures for this are in a Letter of Agreement at Otis Air Force Base,
noted Scoggins. According to the agreement between ZBW and NEADS, the military
would call ZBW and inform them of the scramble, so the reverse order of the set
procedure might have caused some confusion. Scoggins also noted that Burlington, VT
has lost its air defense requirement and capability.
At NEADS, Scoggins has experience dealing with Bill Airs, of the Department of
Defense (DoD). Scoggins is also aware of a new FAA representative at NEADS,
currently a position filled by Steve Colbertson. According to the 7610.3 regulation,
according to Scoggins, each air defense facility is required to have an FAA
representative, but only WADS had one. Now each does.
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If Scoggins had placed the call to NEADS on 9/11, he noted he would have called
Battlestaff at Huntress, not Bill Airs. Scoggins noted that Sargeant Powell was on the
phone, and that the Weapons Office at Battlestaff is next to the ID Controller. Scoggins
stated that the calls "went the way they should have", considering in the case of a hijack
the center is supposed to notify the ROC, but is not confident in the ROC's ability to .
facilitate military cooperation. Scoggins does not believe there was a necessity to call
Herndon or the woe before NEADS.
Scoggins noted that the agreement for escort procedures reached between First Air Force
Langley, 102nd Fighter Wing, and Otis Air Force Base, and ZBW does not cover internal
procedures.
Regarding the scramble, Scoggins followed Cooper's initial call with phone calls of his
own on the DSN phone that were not recorded. Scoggins stated he made 30 to 40 calls
trying to ID AA 11 as a primary target at position 20 degrees south of Albany. He
attempted to get NEADS to ID AA11 and to receive altitude information. He was told
later that the altitude estimate would have been only within 6,000 feet. He stated in.his
efforts to obtain this information he spoke with a Major Deskins and with Sergeant
Powell. The miscommunication between Scoggins and the military was in the military
request for a latitude and longitude read out, which to Scoggins indicated the military did
not understand the use of the term "primary target" within the FAA. To the FAA
"primary target" indicates a beacon code whereas to the military "primary target" is an
actual target.
When AA11 's speed decreased, an indication of a drop in altitude, both Scoggins and
Bueno became extremely concerned. Scoggins was able to convey to Sergeant two
approximate sets of latitude and longitude points, but the military was unable to identify
AA 11's primary. The TMU was notified of the first WTC impact three or four minutes
afterwards, and TMU started to realize that their dialogue with the military at that point
had not been productive.
Scoggins did not think the first WTC impact was AA 11. He stated that he "wouldn't have
believed it." He believed the reports that it was a small aircraft, and asked NEADS to
scramble fighters from Atlantic City.
AAll went off radar at ZBW after its impact, but ZBW personnel still tried to find it. A
minute or two later ZBW personnel conceded that it was AAIL TMU informed the
Te1con call, but got a call afterwards saying AA11 might still be airborne and headed
towards DC. As far as Scoggins knew the Te1con had a grouping of agencies on it. He
heard that an aircraft was headed towards the White House, turned, and hit the Pentagon.
Scoggins believes this call amongst others was recorded at NEADS. He never learned
who originally reported AAII heading towards DC.
Scoggins believes the fighters from Otis were off the ground in about twelve minutes, but
noted that that was still too late to intercept even UALI75. He does not believe the
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fighters would have gone supersonic. Scoggins noted that FAA Chapter 76.4 states that
the FAA control a scramble until the fighters were within range of the target, then would
keep fighters at a safe distance.
Scoggins noted that he remembers an exercise in 1995 or 1996 that involved a military
scramble to escort a hijacked aircraft, and the fighter was unable to intercept. He believes
this exercise was joint FAAlmilitary and Was done through ATB200.
Scoggins noted that in the event of a hijack TMU calls NEADS and the OMIC calls
Henrdon.
Scoggins noted that the DEN line makes escort notification procedures obsolete by
informing all the necessary parties at once. He would like to see more participation in
DHS by TSA.
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r:
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD L0

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Interview of Jennifer
Donahue, Regional Executive Manager (REM) for Communications Information Security
Team Number: 8
Participants -' Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown
Donahue's office at the FAA ROC in Burlington, Massachusetts is primarily a

communications hub responsible for communications security, conferencing, and
facilitating a steady flow of information amongst FAA entities in the Boston Center
region, between Boston Center and other FAA regional centers, and finally connecting
Boston Center administration with FAA administrative headquarters at the FAA
Washington Operations Center (WOC).
On the morning of September 11, 2001 at the ROC there was a regional team meeting, so
every administrative manager was already there. Approximately 0830 EDT Barry
O'Connor received a call from Boston Center (Nashua, NH) reporting the hijack of
American Airlines Flight 11 (AAll). Donahue's office immediately put the
administrative managers in contact with the WOC, and proceeded to set up numerous
conference calls between FAA entities. The ROC officially began handling the Boston
Center and New England region communication priorities after AA 11 impacted 1 World
Trade Center, but Barry O'Connor was probably informed of the hijack prior to impact.
During the immediate aftermath, and the days following 9/11 COMSAT staff had some
difficulty identifying which conference call, and which conference net, to place callers in.
The COMSAT has 120 lines, and these lines were fielded by four personnel, including
Donahue. Often the callers requested to be placed in a net, or conference call, different
than the one they intended to reach. For example, the FAA operated both a Tactical Net
and a Tertiary Net. The Tactical Net was for FAA only, and was not secure. The Tertiary
Net was not set up by the ROC, but the ROC could channel callers into it. This net
consisted of many different federal agencies. Donahue was not clear on which net would
be considered the "primary" net.
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The ROC handled events on 9111 by using their experience from major aircraft accidents.'
They had no instructions and/or responsibility to contact NEADS, NORAD or any other
military entity, and Donahue said that is the task of Boston Center's Traffic Management
Unit (TMU).
Overall, Donahue stated COMSAT was adequately prepared to handle its role in the 9/11
FAA response, and that despite the heavy load of calls COMSAT operations ran
correctly.
Prior to 9/11, the COMSAT's hijack procedure was to 1) contact the WOC; 2) contact the
ROC's security division; and 3) contact the ROC's own management team. COMSAT
had and has an Air Traffic Handbook (80-20) that considers a hijack a "security event",
and prior to 9/11 required the ROC to contact WOC, but post 9111 includes primary and
secondary notification protocols (primary - WOC, ROC security; secondary - Regional
Administrator, REM, Air Traffic, and Flight Standards). Since 9111, the COMSAT has
also installed a direct open line to the WOC.
Donahue stated she is concerned that post- 9/11 the COMSAT is not being adequately
informed of changes to priority and policy from WOC. According to Donahue, COMSAT
is part of Command, Control and Communication (C3) operations, and should be kept
aware of policy change and should receive intelligence on possible security incidents.
She stated COMSAT should be included in FAA emergency preparedness conferences.
Donahue stated this combination of factors is the only way COMSAT can effectively
keep information flowing internally among its counterpart among FAA's 9 regional
centers, as well as flowing "upwards" to the WOC.
COMSAT at the ROC has no direct responsibilities to airline carriers.
COMSAT has not partaken in any post-9/ll drills, but Donahue believes its participation
in preparing and passing information for Hurricane Isabel demonstrated the usefulness-of
their open line to the WOC. Donahue stated that the west coast regional operation centers
may have participated in a hijack drill, or in a hazardous materials drill post-9Ill.
COMSAT does now have a general threat item in its team meetings, that usually includes
information on any security threat level changes from the WOC.
Donahue has set up back-up capability at the Boston Center in Nashua, NH, and has
practiced evacuation and relocation with her team. But Donahue stated that her team still
should be directed by FAA on a clear and exact procedure of who to notify in another
large scale security event, and that practice runs for an understanding of the roles of
ROC personnel, as well as the line of succession within the ROC, would be useful.
Lastly, Donahue explained that the Air Traffic team at the ROC has a Crisis Management
Room, with it's own communication abilities, that is used for weather events, and would
be instrumental in coordinating FAA air traffic control (ATC) during other large scale
events.
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Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview with Jon
Schippani, Operational Supervisor in Charge, Boston Center.
Type of event:
Recorded Interview
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown and Miles kara
Team Number: 8
Schippani was supervisor for Area Con 9/11. He had 10 years prior experience as a
supervisor, and had 16 years experience as a controller prior to that. There are usually
two supervisors in an area, but he was the only one on that day.
He first became aware of AA11 when the 46R Controller, Pete Zalewski, said he had lost
contact with an aircraft; they followed up according to the usual handling of a "no radio"
(NORDO) aircraft. AA11 became a real concern for Schippani when the transponder
signal shut off. Schippani went to Area B,and confirmed that they too had no contact. It
. was at this point that Pete Zalewski heard what he referred to as '''threatening'' language
with an "Arabic accent" from the cockpit. John assigned Al Miller to sit with Zalewski.
They asked another plane in the sky, UAL175, for a visual on AA11, and UAL175
replied that AA11 had an approximate altitude of 28,000 feet.
Until the threatening communication was confirmed, Schippani believed AA11 had
experienced severe electrical or mechanical difficulty. Once the threatening conversation
had been confirmed, and AA 11 took a southbound course, Schippani believed AA 11 was
hijacked and headed for a landing at Kennedy or Cuba.
Schippani roughly recalled what occurred at the watchdesk. [Staff Note: The watch desk
is the hub of activity in the Center.] He remembers Dan Bueno attempted to contact Otis
AFB for support, but Schippani did not recall the procedure for request a fighter
scramble. He guessed that most likely pre-91l1 protocol for the request should have been
from Boston Center to the Regional Operation Command (ROC), and the ROC would
process the request. He confirmed that prior to 9/11 his understanding of
NORADINEADS role in a hijacking scenario was cloudy.
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To get the closest military asset, Schippani noted he would contact Giant Killer out of the
Virginia Capes. Giant Killer monitors low to mid altitudes along the east coast. He had an
understanding of how to contact them by phone. [Staff Note: Giant Killer performs the
Air Traffic Controller function in designated military warning areas over the ocean. It is
a Navy organization with its control center at Oceana, Virgina.] Schippani noted that
from his experience Otis Air Force Base was an unknown factor, and he would not know
how to contact NEADS (North Atlantic Air Defense). Prior to 9/11 Schippani noted that
Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) had no input in the coordination over airspace with the
military, unless there was an "aircraft transfer". Schippani was aware of the FAA
Command Center at Herndon as a resource, but was not sure of its possible function on
9/11, or in a 9/11 type event.
Schippani noted that Boston Center had "good situational awareness" and relayed its
information promptly to the ROC and FAA Washington Operations Center (WOC). The
lines of communication from the Controller through the Traffic Management Unit to the
Operations Manager In Charge (OMIC) were effective, but Schippani noted that all of
Boston Center's experience handling aircraft in crisis still did not prepare it for the shock
of the 9/11 attacks. Schippani felt that the Air Traffic system reacted as best as it could to
handle a complete change in, and then a shut down of the traffic pattern, especially after
the New York air space was completely closed and Boston Center was forced to handle
all of its users.
Schippani noted that it was a mistake within Boston Center to "key the overhead
microphone" so that the full sector could hear the AA11 communications. He believes
this contributed to the emotional stress of the Air Traffic Controllers. [Staff Note: Later,
Zalewski told staff he did that so that everyone else could experience what he was
experiencing and to generate a sense of urgency which he felt did not exist.]
Schippani is highly concerned over nuclear power plants, and their susceptibility to 9/11
attack scenarios.
Regarding the FAA and the military, Schippani stated the relationship was "like oil and
water". He expressed some frustration that communication over sharing airspace is often
difficult. For example, when thunderstorms threaten the airspace on the eastern coast, the
military does not coordinate well with clearing alternate routes for commercial aircraft if
they are using the space. Furthermore, even in the post-9/11 environment the
coordination necessary for VIP flight is difficult. Shipppani did acknowledge that the
FAA could do a better job itself. He explained that the military needs large tracks of
airspace for mid flight refueling, and that the FAA is reluctant to cooperate.
Regarding coordinating an intercept, Schippani would like to see more drills. He had
experienced one scenario when a plane veered too close to a presidential airspace cap in
Maine. He thought this scenario was a positive example of the improving FAAlmilitary
relationship. .
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Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C.
Team Number: 8
7045]
Zilowski has been with the FAA since 1982. He has been with ZBW for his entire career,
but spent a short period of time with Area E.
On 9/11 Zilowski took a position at Hampton 31 at about seven o'clock, he then went
over to R46 Boston High Sector (24k ft. and above). AAII was handed off to him, and he
climbed the flight first to FL 280, then to FL 290 for normal spacing procedures. He
turned AAII twenty degrees right to expedite the climb, and AAII responded. Fairly
soon thereafter he climbed them to FL 350, but AAII did not respond. He tried calling
AA 11 again, since he wanted to tum AA 11 back on course. AA 11 started to move into
the arrival route for Logan, and Zilowski became concerned. Zilowski changed his
transmitters and receivers to check his own equipment, and when everything checked out
he attempted to reach AAII on the 121.5 guard code. He checked previous sector
frequency, and tried to contact the flight's company to establish communication .
. Zilowski became even more concerned as AA 11 started to approach another sector's
airspace.
As these factors persisted and Zilowski still did not hear from the pilot of AA 11, he noted
that the situation was highly unusual. When the transponder had first shut off, Zilowski
had told his supervisor, John Shippani, quietly. He then explained toShippani what he
had done to attempt to communicate with AAII. At this point hijacking had not occurred
to Zilowski. He kept track of AAll 's primary, and still had no reading on its altitude. As
AA 11 starts to tum Zilowski heard a strange voice over the frequency. He noted that
since he had experience at air route with heavy international traffic, an Arabic pilot's
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•
voice wasn't unusual to him. But in this sector, Zilowski noted that most pilots are
American, so he thought the Arabic voice was out of place. Zilowski could not
distinguish the message in the first transmission. It was the second transmission that he
heard clearly. He "screamed" to his supervisor, and told him of the hijack. He put AAII
on the loudspeaker for the section. He had no RA to assist, and asked for an immediate
"D" side. He concentrated on listening for communication from AAII and, once Greg
Tichini became his RA, gave Tichini all the planes in his sector. Zilowski firmly believes
that the communication from the hijacker was meant for the passengers to hear, and is
adamant that it did not come from the American Airlines pilot keying the microphone.
Zilowski also stated that UAL175 heard the transmission from AAII since they were on
the same frequency. After the second communication Zilowski thought AA 11 was
headed back to Logan Airport, and was worried that it would turn back into the
departures. He wanted to get another supervisor since he did not think Shippani was
taking the situation seriously, and stated that he requested Bob Jones pull tapes to check
the transmission.
When AAII continued on a southbound heading Zilowski thought it was headed to

Kennedy. He gave the handoff to Athens Area B put Athens hadn't cleared the airspace
yet. Athens picked up Zilowski's point out, but Zilowski kept monitoring the frequency
in case of a further transmission.
•
Zilowski handed control of his airspace over to Tichini once Athens took over tracking
the flight. Zilowski then left the building for a break. Zilowski was informed of the first
WTC hit from his parents, and stated he immediately knew it was AA 11. Tichini told
Zilowskiofthe second WTC hit ofUALI75.
Zilowski explained to Commission staff that "Nordo" indicates no radio, whereas

"Norac" indicates no radio communication. So AA 11 was officially Norac. Zilowski also
explained that when a transponder goes off the computer will automatically attribute a
data tag with a call sign to the primary.
Post 9/11 Zilowski believes the air travel is safer, and believes supervisors and the FAA
take security much more seriously. He noted that pilots should be more involved in
staying aware of the need for continued vigilance, and is worried the "system" may
. become complacent as time distances memory from the attacks. He noted that the rapport
between pilots and ATCs is going away, and believes there should be more interaction
between the two groups to better secure air traffic.
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H~ R 04 0 I& ~c J--
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD @

Richard Dion, Regional Operations Officer for Communications Information Security
Team Number: 8
Dion has been an FAA employee since 1989. Previous to working at the Regional
Operation Center (ROC), Dion was an air traffic controller (ATe) at Boston Center and
Delomes. On September 11, 2001 Dion had been in his current position, a regional
operations officer for communications at the ROC, for four years. Dion reports to
Jennifer Donoghue.
Dion explained that there are five permanent full time employees who work at COMSAT,
and that on 9111 he worked the night shift, from 1800 EDT to 0700 EDT on September
12, 2001.
According to Dion, COMSAT's primary function is to set up telephone conferences.

They often connect the personnel of the ROC's different divisions: security, air traffic,
and flight standards are examples. He estimated half a dozen open line 24 hour
conferences were ongoing on 9/11 and thereafter for "a few days". This was unusual for
COMSAT.
Dion thought COMSAT's hijack procedures were not very different from the role they
play in any other major aircraft event. He noted that the "'situation" dictated who to
contact and connect. He is unaware of any prioritized list of essential contacts, but knows
to call the three main divisions at the ROC: security, flight standards and air traffic. His
secondary contact group would be other regional entities. He acknowledged that
contacting the Washington Operations Center (WaC) would be a priority. COMSA T
does not make notice outside of the FAA unless it is directed to do so by the wac. The
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only exception to this is to contact the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
COMSAT at ROC is not capable of setting up secure conference calls. That responsibility
is the wac's, and any conference that necessitates a secure line would be set up through
, the wac. The ROC does have one secure line though, that can be used for individual
callers. The ROC does not routinely record calls, but can do so if notified in advance.
Even though he was not present during the day on 9/11, Dion had some observations
regarding the ROC COMSAT from when he arrived at work that evening. He found that
the COMSAT response was not very efficient, and that part of its disjointed response was
due to a lack of organization (where to find orders/equipment). He believes this capability
gap has been bridged in the time since. He is still concerned, however, that COMSAT
operates without enough staff. There were four people when Dion came in, at which point
he began reviewing the day's notes and got a briefing from his manager.
Dion noted that some of the security and some of the flight standards personnel were
given so much do accomplish that they connected into multiple conference lines, and this
caused confusion.
Dion noted that the ROC has military liaisons from the Air Force, Navy and Army. These
liaisons operate as the military's voice to the FAA. Dion was not clear on how they
would involve themselves in a 9/11 type situation, and was not clear on who their FAA
counterparts were.
Dion does not believe COMSAT has a line to the Defense Event Network ("DEN").
Dion is concerned that COMSAT does not get all the equipment necessary to perform its
function. He attributes this to a "line of business" attitude in the FAA with its budget.
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Shirley Kula, Operations Supervisor, Boston Center.
Team Number: 8
Kula has been an Air Traffic Controller (AT C) since 1982, and was an ATC supervisor
for three years prior to 9/11. On 9/11 she was fulfilling a supervisor requirement to spend
8 hours per month at a radar scope, and was working the Athens Sector 38 Radar
Associate (RA) position.
On 9/11 Kula was notified from 46R that AA11 took a 20 degree tum but did not change
elevation to the instructed Flight Level 350 (35,000 feet). 46R had called Sector 47
(Boston Approach) to see if AA11 had stayed on radio frequency 112.7. After that proved
unsuccessful, Kula instructed a call be placed through Aeronautical Radio Incorporated
(AKA Air Inc) to attempt to call AA 11 through their system, and Kula instructed AA 11
be contacted on "guard" (an open frequency used for the entire Boston Center airspace).
Kula found out from John Schippani that there was suspicious communication in the
cockpit. Kula instructed Ron Smith to call all vertical airspace under Sector 22 for AA11,
and once AA 11 took the hard southern tum Kula input the change in route to inform
other ATCs there was an airplane that may cross the paths of their air traffic.
Kula noted that it was at this point at which she became extremely concerned for AAll.
She noted that though it was usual to have a NORAC (no radio communication) airplane
in that sector, the serious course deviation and unsure altitude were dangerous factors for
the other air traffic traveling through Boston Center.
In efforts to determine AAll 's altitude, Kula asked a Delta flight to visually check
AA 11' s altitude. The Delta flight reported approximately FL 290.
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Kula was no longer directly supervising AAll after the handoff of the flight to Sector 20.
It was definitive in Kula's mind after she heard of an impact at the World Trade Center
that it was AAll.
Military:
Kula was unaware that military radar could find altitude, and she was not involved with
the fighter scramble from Otis Air Force Base. Kula did vaguely recall a scramble in the
"early 80s" off the eastern coast, but "certainly nothing since 1985."
Kula noted the Dynamic Simulation (DynSim) training programs usually have a hijack
scenario every year, but those scenarios in her experience have never consisted of
multiple hijacks, or in her experience of a single hijack that necessitates a vectored
military fighter.
Kula noted that the Boston Center Watchdesk open line with Giant Killer (military
airspace coverage of low to mid range altitudes along eastern coast), which rings once a
shift for a line check, as well as the open line with DENS are both positive steps for more
rapid communication.
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Mr~ (NDI &<lL
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Interview with Terry
®
Biggio, Deputy of Facility, Boston Center.
. Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown and Miles Kara
Team Number: 8
Background
On 9/11 Biggio was Operations Manager Areas A and D for one and half years with
duties as OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge) in conjunction with the Traffic
Management Unit (TMU). Biggio reported to Glen Michaels, assistant deputy for Boston
Center who was away on 9/11, and has since retired, and Heather Ackerman, an
administrative manager who was away at a joint managers meeting on 9/11. Biggio was
the manager overall responsible for Boston Center on 9/11. Prior to being OMIC, Biggio
worked with Boston Center as a Quality Assurance officer, an Air Traffic Control (ATe)
teacher, an ATC supervisor, an Operations manager, a support manager, and as acting
deputy.
Events of 9-11
On 9/11, Daniel Bueno paged Biggio, who came to the TMU and was briefed by Jon
Schippani and Bueno. They showed Biggio AA lIon the 46R radar display, which was
being worked by Peter Zalewski at the time. Bob Jones, Quality Assurance, was asked to
review the tape recording for AA11 for possible unusual communications. Jones told
Biggio immediately of the threatening communication, and that the speaker clearly had a
middle eastern accent, and had said something like "we have some planes" and "don't do
anything stupid". Biggio immediately relayed that information to the Regional
Operations Command (ROC).
According to Biggio, prior to 9/11, an airplane that had gone NORDO (no radio
communication) was a frequent occurence. An airplane that lost transponder was
relatively infrequent, but not unheard of. An airplane that had seriously deviated from its
course was indicative of a serious mechanical problem. Biggio and never experienced
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such a serious deviation before as was the case with American Air 11. The combination
of the three factors-NaRDO, no transponder, course deviation--when applied to AA 11,
were enough for Biggio to deem it necessary to contact ROC. But, without the
threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts AA 11 would have been
recognized or labeled a hijack.
Specifically, Air Traffic Controllers are taught that a hijack would include a covert sign
from the cockpit, either use of the transponder code 7500, which flashes "HIJACK" on
the data block for the flight on the TMU (traffic monitoring unit), or the pilot would have
used covert language (the word "trip" to describe the airplane's course) to signal the
ATC. In simulated hijack exercises the pilot would be in contact with the ATC, and they
would be able to verbally confirm "7500" for a hijack, "7600" for a malfunctioning
transponder, and "7700" for an emergency.
Biggio noted that though he did not call the Washington Operations Center (WaC)
directly to inform FAA of the hijacking, he was placed in a conference call through the
ROC that was being actively monitored, as far as he knows, by the wac.
Biggio noted that though there was no drilled simulated scenario, or previous real-life
scenario that mirrored the events of 9/11, Boston Center was able to respond effectively
through the benefit of numerous air traffic threats during the summer storm season and
the combined extensive experience of the ATC staff. [Staff Note: We found no young
controllers involved on that day. The Radar Associate positions were manned by
experience personnel sitting in to maintain their qualifications.]
Biggio noted that part of Boston Center's success can be attributed to their authority over
air traffic. Biggio was able to stop air traffic through the Sparta/Carmel cooridor and was
able to ground stop Logan Airport directly.
Biggio noted three main points about the collective knowledge brought to bear on 9/11 by
Boston Center 1) Coordination and communication were key since 9/11 's situation itself
had not been planned for, but the instinct and capability to deal with crisis scenarios had
been firmly developed; 2) quality personnel enabled solid communication in Boston
Center, but Biggio had serious concerns after the impact at the Pentagon that his Center's
urgency and information was not being translated to FAA operations nationally; and 3)
the responsiveness of Boston Center allowed for the Sparta/Carmel corridor and all west
bound traffic to be shut down, which saved valuable airspace for the coordination of the
complete clearing of the skies to commercial air traffic.
Regarding Boston Center, FAA and the Military
Pre-9111 protocol for communicating a hijack threat to the military had been practiced
but as far as Biggio knew they had never practiced intercept procedures. In such exercises
all communication was handled through the ROC.
Once the first WTC collision was reported, Biggio clearly believed it to be AAl1, and
communicated that belief on the open line with ROC. It is for this reason that Biggio was
surprised to hear that controllers for the New York region were still looking for AA 11
after impact. [Staff Note: Biggio's surprise was in response to a question as to what he
knew about the post-impact search for American Air 11.]
Biggio noted that there is tension with the military at times over the use of airspace,
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
specifically regarding use of the Whiskey 105 and 106 military controlled airspace off the
coast, but that this tension is normally negligible.
Regarding crisis management preparation and response post-9/tt
ATC procedure has shifted from a service focus to a homeland security focus, and that
some of this change in concentration is due to the critical incident stress debriefing for
the Air Traffic Controllers, post-9/11. Biggio believes both sides, FAA and military, need
education on each-others procedures and capabilities. The Dynamic Simulation exercises
required for ATCs pre-9/11 did not stress combined FAA/military scenarios, and Biggio
is concerned his ATCs would not have been successful in coordinating an intercept with
United Airlines 175.
He is extremely concerned with the air vulnerability of the nation's nuclear power plants.
Since 9/11 he has experienced a scenario in which a fighter scramble had not reached a
nuclear plant cap in time to escort an aircraft out. This incident had no adverse result, but
served as an example to Biggio of the need for quicker communication and response
time, despite changes like the 24 hour DEN (Defense Event Network), increased attention
to NORAC communication, and 360 degree""confidence turns" (an ATC supervisor can
request a pilot perform a complete 360 degree circle if there is cause for suspicion of the
aircraft). Permanent airspace caps over these high risk sites may be necessary.
Final Thoughts (in response to questions about recommendations)
Communication and information is key. Given a urgent situation, it is vitally necessary
to be confidant that Boston Center knows it is speaking with the right person to have the
correct information, or request for information, immediately addressed. Biggio believes
that ATC supervisors now will recognize the unusual signs in their airspace that will
indicate a possible terrorist event using aircraft, and that those supervisors will
communicate immediately with TMU and Boston Center management. Biggio is
extremely concerned though that this process, as well as it may work within Boston
Center, will not translate into the rapid and effective national response needed to deal
with a crisis akin to the 9/11 attacks.
UNCLASSIFIED
Event: Staff visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA
Type of Event: Briefing and Scheduled Interviews
Date: September 22-24, 2003
Special Access Issues: NATCA (National Air Traffic Control Association)

representatives sat in on some interviews. A FAA legal representative from the New
England Region attended all staff contacts with FAA personnel
Team Number: 8
Location: Nashua, NH (Boston Center) and Burlington, MA (New England Region)
Participants - Non-Commission: See individual interview reports
Participants - Commission: Miles Kara, John Azzarello, Geoff Brown
Background Summary
Commission staff were able to efficiently and effectively formally interview 18
people, tour facilities at both the Boston Center and the New England Region, and
accomplish discovery of four additional relevant document sources, thanks to a
forthcoming, responsive reception by the Operations-Manager-in-Charge, Terry Biggio.
Mr. Biggio fine-tuned the visit schedule on-site to ensure that we talked to the people that
would do Staff the most good in the time allotted. That required dropping some potential
interviewees and adding others and making several schedule changes that impacted the
FAA work force. The work force accommodated those changes and the representatives
of FAA Counsel appointed to attend Staffs presence pitched in and helped out. NATCA
representatives, when requested by interviewees to be present were also helpful in the
overall process. The Staff left with the impression that Boston Center, Mr. Biggio in
particular, wanted us to gain a complete and accurate view of their collective work under
near-unprecedented pressure on September 11, 2001. The Regional Administrator took a
brief exit brief from the team at which time she was advised of the support provided by
Mr Biggio and staff and of the document discoveries made by the Commission staff.
Major Points
Discovery. Staff learned of additional responsive information that had not been
provided through the document request process.
AccidentFile. Staff learned from Mr. Bob Jones, Quality Assurance
Office, of the existence of an accident file, different from the "accident package"
provided by FAA to both the FBI and NTSB, and subsequently provided to the
Commission in response to a document request to DoT. Among other items in the
package is a reconstructed time-line based on telephone company records. Mr

Jones, locally considered a hero because of his quick work in replaying the tapes
of cockpit conversations that day was insistently steered our way by Mr. Biggio.
After Action Review. Staff learned that the New England Region
convened a round table two weeks afterSeptember l l" to conduct a detailed
review of events of the day. Staff is not aware of any formal product that ensured,
but asked that associated files and records of that event be made available to the
Commission. A member of the Region's 24-hour operations center, during
interview, produced a region log, a document previously not provided staff, but
one that staff was certain must exist since a similar document was produced by
the Eastern Region in New York. Staffhas a copy of that log.
Additional Transcripts. During one interview Staff became aware of a
radar controller position that controlled the scrambled Otis fighters. Staff asked
for information from that position. It is Staff s understanding that the only
information that went into the "accident package" was data pertaining to FAA's
actually contact with or handling of the four hijacked aircraft, possibly because
that was the FBIINTSB focus. That excluded any accident file information that
pertained strictly to the Otis fighters themselves. The FAA legal representative
said he would make sure we got the information we needed. Separately, and
previously, Staff had brought to Headquarters FAA attention the lack of
transcripts pertaining to the Otis fighters, aircraft that we know from other sources
had been controlled by FAA, at least in part. FAA provided the tapes of Boston
Center radar control positions 17R and 18R to Staff on September 25, 2003.
Personal Notes. Two persons interviewed brought with them personal
notes at least one set of which had been constructed a few days after 9/11. Staff
asked for and voluntarily got both sets of notes. Those notes are important
because both individuals worked in the Traffic Management Unit that day, the
focal point for decisions made by and information flowing to the OMIC, Mr.
Biggio.
Boston Center Performance. To a person, Boston Center is proud of its
performance that day and the Center has internalized that it did all that it could do, given
the events of the day. The Senior Traffic Management Controller, Mr. Bueno, carefully
and repetitively described to Staff "the box," his description of how the Center perceived
that hijackings would proceed. No one seriously considered any outcome other than an
airplane proceeding to an airport somewhere and landing, perhaps Cuba. The view
prevailed even after the content of the cockpit communications was learned. Therefore,
Boston Center controllers proceeded to do what they were trained to do; they notified
supervisors as events proceeded, and then continued to try and ensure safety in the sky by
keeping planes separated, from each other and from AAll, and notifying adjoining
sectors within the Center and other Centers, as necessary.
Determining a hijack. No one factor or combination of factors that day, other
than the cockpit communications, definitely led Center personnel to a hijacking
awareness. There are three such factors.
Loss of Radio Contact. This phenomenon was common, to the point of

being notorious. Pilots and crews were simply lax in maintaining contact. One
interviewee made sure we understood the commonly misunderstood acronym
"NORDO." That means "no radio" in the literal sense that the aircraft's radio(s)
are not working. It is in that sense that controller 38R is captured on tape early in
the AAll story designating AAll "nordo," implying that the pilot is in control
and unable to communicate. That is different from an aircraft with a working
radio, but deliberately not communicating. The term for that, Staffwas told, is
"NORAK," (Ph)
Loss of Transponder. This phenomenon is much rarer, but not in-and-of-
itself, alarming. Controllers routinely ask the affected plane to "recycle your
transponder." [That is the protocol used with UA175 by New York Center
controllers.] Controllers generally agreed that transponder loss would be reported
to the supervisor. The combination of "nordo" and transponder loss is highly
unusual and many controllers had never experienced that combination.
According to Mr. Biggio that combination is a sign of major equipment
malfunction and at that point in the flight of AAll would not have triggered any
notion of a hijack.
Course Deviation. One controller, a supervisor on duty that day as a radar
associate to complete monthly qualification requirements, citied minor course
deviation-AAII failure to climb to 35000 feet-as an additional warning sign.
There was no consensus on that point, but all controllers agreed that the
combination of "nordo," transponder loss, and significant course deviation-the
AAll tum to the south-was serious. However, Mr. Biggio on that point said
that given a major equipment malfunction what might be happening was a pilot
turning to land at a "heavy" capable airport. One controller supported that thesis,
describing a "heavy" pilot as one who would try to land at Kennedy, vice
elsewhere. A "heavy" aircraft is a term used by FAA controllers to describe a
large aircraft such as a 747/757/767. Centerpersonnel who observed the tum
south also observed a unusually rapid rate of progress, indicatively of a pilot who
wanted to get somewhere in a hurry.
The Intervening Variable, Unusual Cockpit Communications. After AAII
lost its transponder and just before it made a significant course deviation to the south,
unusual communications of unknown source were heard on the AAll assigned frequency
of controller 46R. It was quite clear to the controller that he had a problem and he
immediately and loudly made that fact known. In a rapid sequence of events a quality
assurance staff member, Bob Jones, personally went to the basement and reran the tapes
and made the call that the voice said "we have some planes." Mr. Jones' accident file
timeline will provide the exact time he communicated that fact to the watch desk and to
Mr. Biggio. The OMIC log shows that Biggio declared a hijack, based on cockpit
communications at 0825 EDT. That time appears to staff to be the time of the original
communication itself and not the time that Biggio was notified by Jones. The accident
file log will be determining factor.
First Aircraft Impact into WTC and AAl1. The Boston Center learned of
developing problems in New York one of two ways. First, a CNN feed is maintained in a
office contiguous to the watch desk in the center proper. Second, controllers on break
typically went to the cafeteria where a CNN feed was also available. Intuitively and
instinctively, Center personnel who were aware of and followed AAII on its flight south
knew that it was AAII that impacted the north tower, irrespectively of differing
information available from CNN. At least at the supervisory level, if not at the individual
controller level, Boston Center personnel also understood AAII to be slowing and
descending. Staff tentatively concludes that Boston Center itselfwas not the initial
source of confusion about AAII after the impact of the first plane into the WTC.
Nevertheless, Center personnel aware of the altitude search for AAll, southbound, were
also aware of two other factors. First the last know accurate altitude for AA 11 was
29,000 feet. Second, UA175, under direct query by a Boston Center controller sited
AAll at about 0837 EDT and established its altitude to be 27-29,000 feet.
The Altitude Problem. FAA controllers cannot determine altitude on a non-
transponding, primary-only, aircraft. Center personnel confirmed that to Staff several
times over. On the other hand, air defense scope operators at the Northeast Air Defense
Sector (NEADS) can determine altitude in that circumstance. According to the Deputy
Commander at the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, FAA did not purchase that altitude-
determining capability and, further, was considering the elimination of all primary radar
returns from its en-route radar system. Most Center personnel were not aware that the
Sector Area Operations Center (SAOC) at NEADS could read altitude and that might
have been a reason to contact NEADS. One key person did, Colin Scoggins, a member
of the TMU and the person most often in contact with NEADS. He arrived at the Sector
about 0825 EDT and immediately became aware of a developing situation. His initial
instinct was to stay out of the road-too many onlookers impeded the task at hand. As he
became aware of a primary-only possible hijacked aircraft his immediate response was
that NEADS needed to be notified so they could get altitude on the airplane. He headed
for the TMU and by the time he arrived Joe Cooper was in contact with NEADS. Mr.
Scoggins spend the majority of his time thereafter in intermittent direct phone contact
with NEADS, primarily Major Deskins, trying to assist NEADS in gaining scope contact
with AAll. His calls, however, were not on a taped line. He believes those calls were
taped at NEADS. The difficulty was that NEADS wanted "lats and longs" and he was
trying to give them position from a known VOR, e. g. "x" miles south of Albany. He
recalled that he passed two distinct sets of lat-long coordinates to NEADS.
Military Notification. No person Staff interviewed seriously considered
contacting NEADS through the process on paper-FAA~NMCC-NORAD, if they were
even aware of it. Dan Bueno gets high marks from Center personnel for instinctively
calling FAA traffic approach personnel at the location where he knew the fighters to be-
Otis AFB. Bueno called Otis because he knew "from the eighties" that is where military
assistance caine from. He also considered BurlingtonVT and Atlantic City NJ for the
same reason. Even Mr. Scoggins, who knew that the call had to go to NEADS, did not
fault Bueno for trying to call the AF Wing directly through other FAA personnel. The
response to Bueno's call was that Otis needed NEADS authorization. According to
available transcripts the Cooper call directly to NEADS and the Otis tower call to
NEADS based on Bueno's call reached NEADS at nearly the same time, approximately
0838 EDT.
." COMMISSION SENSITIVE
• The Scramble. Staff learned from the controller who was on position 18R that
he vectored the fighters to a holding position in area Whiskey 105, a military controlled
area south of Long Island. From his perspective that was the result of several factors.
There was no defined mission. There was uncertainty about the continuing threat-the
first impact was an event of the past. There were also multiple controllers involved. An
entity known as Giant Killer at Oceana, V A controls military traffic in the training areas,
but they only control to a certain altitude. High altitude is controlled by Huntress-
NEADS. The Center controller's situational awareness was that the military wanted to
be positioned to vector in any direction as required and that overhead New York City did
not provide that. He also ruled out supersonic flight because it, in-and-of-itself,
introduced complicating air traffic control factors. Moreover, without a defined mission
the usefulness of such flight was problematic. The controller had experience working
Concorde flights and was used to the complicating nature of such flight.
Military/FAA Relationships. There is a natural tension between the two entities
because both desire the use of the same airspace for different reasons. When both entities
want the same space at the same time coordination issues need to be worked out and, as
in the paragraph above, multiple controllers get in the act. Staff observes, based on this
single visit, that those relationships could have been smoother on 9/11, especially in the
realm of information sharing. One person interviewed put it succinctly. Paraphrased, he
said the role of the FAA is to keep planes separated in the air, the role of the military is to
•
bring planes together. Those are mutually exclusive goals. Mr. Scoggins efforts in trying
to translate sufficient information to allow NEADS to acquire AA 11 are indicative of the
need for better information sharing. As a result of the inherent tension and differing
protocols and languages, military cells have been established in FAA to work day-day air
space management issues. The New England Region has one such cell, a cell that also
provides support to the Eastern Region in New York. Staffheld a short discussion with
the senior Navy officer in the cell. The cell has 2-3 person contingents from each of the
three services and each reports separately to a different boss. The Army and Navy
representatives report to their General Staffs at Headquarters US Army and US Navy,
respectively. The Air Force Cell reports to the Air Force Liaison Officer at FAA
Headquarters. All of the assigned ,military personnel are either flight or controller-trained
and each cell exits to handle administrative matters only. There is no reason that they
could have or should have been contacted or interjected themselves in the process on
9/11. The senior Navy officer put in succinctly from a military perspective. There are
defined lines of communication and procedures to handle events like that and ifhe or his
other service counterparts had gotten involved they would have just confounded the
situation.
Additional Items of Interest
Effect of Events of 9111.J
.......... - ....1 All

Staff members as well as the FAA legal representative encouraged him
to allow the Commission to have a copy of valuable contemporaneous records. He had
incorporated personal thoughts and notes and Staff encouraged him to provide just the
factual content.' He said he would consult with his family and consider our request over
COMMIssrON SENSITIVE 5
..,.
"
.. .
• night. He returned the next day and handed staff a CD containing whatever portion of his
notes he judged of value to the Commission. The second individual was the one who
experienced discovery of the hijacking-nordo, no transponder, cockpit communications,
is
and turn to the south. He was also interviewed by Tom Brokaw. He upset that what is
in the public domain is distorted and not what factually happened that day. Staff told him
that was the reason we had come to interview him. His primary concerns are three-fold:
'He is upset about the AA 11 pilot getting a hero's credit for "keying the
mike." He knows from first hand listening that the hijacker was
speaking directly into the microphone. That understanding is supported
by Bob Jones who listened to the tapes and then re-listened to them again
in the presence of an FBI agent. According to Jones, the Agent
described a man talking, even spitting, directly into the microphone.
Staffwill ask for the 302 report concerning that event and has, but has
not listened to the tape.
,-. He is also not happy with Brokaw's portrayal of what the controller was
hearing and feeling that day
The Region's Role. The New England Region's role appears to be primarily
administrative. However, Staff reserves judgment on this point until the Region's after
action review is analyzed. The so-called "ROC," Regional Operations Center, functions
essentially as a switchboard to facilitate tele-conferences, various ROC line-of-business
(i. e. security) requirements to be on or enter Headquarters FAA tele-nets and to
essentially act as a clearing house for Regional management. Fortuitously, according to
Region personnel, an RMT (Regional Management Team) meeting was in session that
morning and all Region entities were notified simultaneously of the developing situation .
UNCLASSIFIED
Brazilino Martens, Certified Professional Controller
.Date: Monday, September 22, 2003
Team Number: 8
7045]
Martens was working Athens Sector 38 on 9/11, and took the AAll handofffrom 46R,
with information on AAll 's status. It was NORDO, and not responding to the
instructions from 46R to take a 20 degree right heading. Martens fully expected to hear
from AAII shortly, but became alarmed when AAII dropped to primary. He started the
, procedure for tracking, and thought the flight had an electrical problem. He used other
aircraft to check on AA 11's frequency, and updated AA 11's flight track to reflect its
change in course. When AAll started its sharp left tum, Martens hoped it was just
getting back on course. Martens coordinated with other flights to account for AAII 's
behavior, and was highly concerned because of his memory of Paine Weber's Lear jet
incident. Sector 46R called and informed Martens of the threatening communications
from AA 11's cockpit. AA 11 got the handoff to Kingston, and continued southbound. The
controllers had no altitude, and no information on AAll 's probable course. Martens
knew that AA 11 should have been back on its scheduled course to head towards LAX far
before its left tum.
Martens acknowledged that NORDO aircraft were extremely common prior to 9/11, and
mostly when a plane is on the wrong transponder frequency the pilot would come back to
the correct frequency within a few minutes. Martens noted that most major air carriers
make sure their aircraft have two transponders, and so a plane that loses all transponder
broadcast without pilot communication is a situation that warrants concern within
approximately thirty seconds. Martens believed AA 11 was experiencing serious
mechanical and/or electrical failure.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Martens explained that air traffic controllers only monitor transponders for aircraft at
higher altitudes, and had to switch their computers to display primary targets as well in
the case of AA 11. Martens also explained that in usual circumstance when an ATC has to
identify a primary target on screen but has communication with the pilot the ATC will
instruct the pilot to perform a 30 degree tum to the right or left, and can then tag the
primary by identifying that tum. Martens also explained that the controller will broadcast
a message on the "guard" frequency that is maintained on a backup transponder
frequency amongst every aircraft in a sector (?).
Shirley Kula was Martens Radar Associate position on 9fll.
Martens stated that the dynamic simulations he has been involved in do run non-routine
situations, but the hijack related scenarios are relatively simple.
Martens statedthat shortly after he was off the scope and became aware of the first WTC
hit he concluded that it was AAll. He was not involved with UAL175 or with Delta
1989.
Martens was not involved with the military scramble.
Martens used latitude and longitude to identify AA 11 to other sectors so those sectors
could clear aircraft in AA 11's possible paths.
Marten stated that training and preparation for the Air Traffic Control role on 9/11 was
adequate, since once the flights were airborne, and notification on the hijacking had been
by the ATCs to their supervisors it was mostly the controllers job to maintain separation
from AAll, which they were able to do. Martens also noted that a hijacking could have
entered the ATC mindset after the serious course deviation, but that more than likely in
the pre-9fl1 world the best analysis would state it was a serious electrical/mechanical
malfunction.
Martens would like to see a streamline for communications between FAA and military as
preparation for another hijacking, and informed Commission staff that an FAA controller
cannot "post" a flight onto a military scope, but can give the military operator latitude
and longitude as an initial step to identifying an aircraft of common interest. Martens
believes FAA ATCs have efficient equipment to do their jobs, but would like to have
better radar than the ones they currently use (which sweep every 12 seconds).
UNCLASSIFIED
COM~s~7~~~~~~~TIVE HFR O~U(& w
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center (ZNY)
Type of event: Follow-up Interview with Mike McCormick
Date: Monday, December 15,2003
Team Number: 8
3259, F 718-995-5699)
Background:
McCormick is now Chief of Staff Eastern Region Air Traffic Division. He was
promoted to that position on October 21 S\ 2003.
On September 11,2001 (9/11) McCormick was the Facility Manager for New
York Center (ZNY).
Lines of Communication on 9/11:
McCormick noted regarding the Air Traffic Telecon that it was the same telecom
as the Dave Cannoles telecom, which is the FAA Headquarters Telecom. McCormick
noted that only himself and Dave Cannoles stayed on that telecom for the initial period.
Others joined that line periodically as the day progressed. McCormick does not
remember that ZBW or N90was on that conference call. He does not believe Bob Birch
from N90 was on that call either.
Regarding the information flow to Herndon Command Center, McCormick

believes Supervisor Traffic Management Coordinators (STMCs) on duty (Mulligan and
Rosenberg), Traffic Management Coordinator (TMC) Jim Kurz, TMC Pete McCloskey,
and Operations Manager in Charge COMIC) Bruce Barrett were all giving information to
Herndon Command Center. McCormick recalled there was another TMC on duty, but
does not remember who that was.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
McCormick noted that in the case of a large scale air event there was no specific
protocol as to which person was in charge of communicating information since the
protocol was for the OMIC to dictate those responsibilities. McCormick does not believe
anyone gave information to Washington Air Traffic Headquarters before he was speaking
to Dave Cannoles. McCormick noted that he had an adjunct form of communication that
informed his superiors at the region.
1) ZNY to Herndon. Herndon to FAA Headquarters;

2) Any field facility to Regional Operations Center to Washington Operations Center
to all eastern region facilities and offices;
3) McCormick to his superiors at Air Traffic in the Region;
4) McCormick to Cannoles later in the day. [Commission staff is investigating the
time frame and nature of this Cannoles conference call, and how it differed from
the Eastern Region's Air Traffic Telecom.]
One communication would be specifically through the Air Traffic line of business
and the other would be through the regional offices which expand the information to all
necessary parties.
At the Region, McCormick spoke with Ed McKenna, the manager of Syracuse

Tower, who was in the regional offices for a meeting that McCormick was supposed to
attend later in the day. McCormick noted that his conversation with McKenna evolved
after several frustrated calls to the Air Traffic Division to inform them of the situation
regarding AA 11'and VAL 175.
This took place after 9:03 AM. He was on the conference call with Cannoles around
9:15AM. It was during this interim period that McCormick spoke with McKenna.
McKenna was delegated the responsibility to call McCormick back. McCormick had
been attempting to contact Franklin Hatfield, Regional Air Traffic Manager, the highest
ranking eastern region air traffic representative, or Rick DuCharme, the Assistant
Regional Air Traffic Manager, or any of the various branch managers with authority
below that. Some of those would be John McCartney, Operations Branch Manager, Dave
Siewert, the Resource Management Branch Manager, Mike Sammartino, the Air Space
Branch Manager, Mike Catrozulo, the Requirements Branch Manager, Ron Ruggeri, the
Manager of Quality Assurance Staff, and Mary Ellen Grant, the Information Resource
Management Branch Manager. It was Ron Ruggeri who sent McCormick the text page
regarding the hij acking situation.
McCormick initially called Cannoles from his portable phone,' and when he realized the
nature of the telecom, he dialed it from the speaker phone on an unrecorded line in the
Air Traffic Manager's conference room.
McCormick has no knowledge of the differences between the conference call he was on
with Cannoles and the FAA Tactical Net, the FAA Primary Net, or other FAA nets.
McCormick's telecom with Cannoles lasted for many weeks as an open line, and
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
at certain points there were other agencies on the line. He does not know if these other
agencies were on the line on 9/11 or on another day. He does recall there being Air
Traffic, Airways Facilities, and other FAA entities participating in the call.
McCormick noted that others at the region most likely participated in some
telecoms. He referred to Marcus Aurora, who works for TSA now, and who was Division
Manager for Security in the Eastern Region on 9/11, according to McCormick. Frank
Shurott was an agent who works for Aurora. He retired two months ago. He worked in
employee investigations and security clearances. Joy Criem was working in security as
well. .
Initially McCormick became aware that there was a problem with United Airlines Flight
175 (UAL 175) when he was speaking to Bob Birch regarding AA 11. McCormick does
. not know who notified Herndon regarding UAL 175. McCormick did speak to a number
of people at the Region regarding both AA 11 and VAL 175. McCormick stated that
Bruce Barrett was communicating the situation along the appropriate air traffic channels.
McCormick noted that he delegated a presence at the telecom throughout the period of its
duration. Dave LaCates, Laurie Weber, Paul Fairley, and Kevin Delaney all held this
responsibility. The same group was responsible for monitoring the Eastern Region
Telecom. .
McCormick received information regarding the Sikorski Helicopter through a ZNY staff
member, who heard this information through N90.
Phantom AA 11: McCormick did not know where any information regarding AA 11
being airborne after 8:46 AM may have originated. Either Dulles or Washington National
reported that quick moving plane headed towards the White House. He had already
assumed that the target for AA 77 was Washington, DC. He mentioned that to Cannoles
on the telecom. When they reported the fast moving VFR target, that flowed into his
suspicions on AA 77. No one said this on the line though. There were reports that
indicated they thought AA 77 was headed east from Indy Center. McCormick asked
Cannoles ifhe was going to "be okay", and Cannoles made ajoke "Don't worry, we have
the blinds down." McCormick guesses that the report of AA 77 heading east came out of
Indy Center, but is not sure. McCormick noted that if the Command Center speaks with
Dulles it would be to a TMC at Dulles.
Commission staff presented McCormick with a timeline that was produced through ZNY.
Kevin Delaney was this timeline's primary compiler and editor. McCormick believes
STMCs and OMICs contributed to the timeline. McCormick noted that they attempted to
validate the information presented in the timeline with the time stamps and information
from the tapes at ZNY. .
Commission staff gave McCormick some hand written notes to identify the authors of,
and he noted that some of the notes reflect the days and weeks after 9/11, not just the day
of 9/11. McCormick noted that one of the documents ,Commission staff showed him
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related to an expired ID Card of a former contractor for a FAA ZNY employee that was
discovered in an apartment raid in New York City.
McConnick noted that there were two reports out of Poughkeepsie. They received initial
reports from the New York Tracon that either a twin engine aircraft or Sikorski helicopter
was lost. This was happening when AA 11 hit and UAL 175 was being hijacked. This all
happened simultaneously. This reinforced initial reports that there was an ELT before AA
11 struck the WTC. Initially when McConnick was on the telecom it was unknown if
there were other aircraft that struck the WTC. McConnick believes he had a conversation
with Cannoles on the telecom relating UAL 175 as being one of the aircraft that may
have hit the WTC. They had some conversations regarding the known and unknowns.
They knew that UAL 175, a Boeing 767, had hit the south tower definitively. The initial
news reports for the North Tower were that a small aircraft had hit it. Up until VAL 175
hit the south Tower McConnick had thought it would hit the North Tower. McConnick
was sure that AA 11 had hit the north tower, but was not sure if it was the only aircraft to
have hit the north tower. He learned about AA 77 from another region that had gotten on
the telecom. It was most likely Cleveland Center, Indianapolis Center, Great Lakes
Region, Eastern Region Air Traffic, Washington Tower, or Washington Headquarters
.speaking about a lost aircraft. They reported that they had lost all information, but gave a
last known position and altitude. "Somebody", possibly Dulles Tower, got on the telecom
and said they had a fast moving VFR that was headed towards the White House. Shortly
thereafter he was told the Pentagon had been hit. McConnick had the impression that
most of the parties on the telecom were operational and not managerial level.
McConnick recalls that someone did report information regarding VAL 93 on the
telecom. He noted that there was no sign in or roll call operating on the telecom.
McConnick clarified transcripts by noting that Tom White, Jim Coshiganoand Jim Barth
were both employees at N90 on 9/11. White was an Operations Manager, Coshigano was
an STMC and Barth was an Operations Manager at the time. McConnick noted though
that he does not recall White being at the Tracon on 9/11. He noted there is also a Tom
Pasione at the Command Center.
McCormick noted that he does not recall being involved with the Herndon Telecoms.
McCormick noted at one point there was 1) the Cannoles Telecom; 2) the Eastern Region
Telecom; and 3) the Command Center Telecom. The Command Center Telecom
subsequently became the DEN line.
McCormick does not believe that anyone at ZNY had operational knowledge that
NEADS had radar feeds that gave altitudes.
McCormick does not recall any discussions over AA 11 not ever passing through ZNY
airspace. McCormick noted that they were looking for position reports from other aircraft
regarding AA 11. McCormick does recall receiving information when he went to the
watch desk to speak with Bruce Barrett to let him know that the hij ack was confirmed,
Marty Rosenberg said he spoke to American Airlines who informed him that one flight
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attendant was dead and the hijackers had "knives and bombs". He also relayed that
American Airlines had spoken to a flight attendant.
ELT: McCormick's best recollection is that it occurred moments before the impact of AA
11. His best hypothesis is that it was unrelated to the event.
McCormick noted that he was fairly certain that there was a command center
representative on the command center line. The only question from ZNY on 9/11 was
whether or not there was more than one aircraft that hit the north tower. He did hear some
speculation, not on the telecom, that perhaps it was not AA 11 that struck the tower. But
he did not communicate this. McCormick noted that most at ZNY believed.AA 11 had hit
the North Tower. He also noted that if one of his employees had heard over the telecom
false reports regarding AA 11 they would have voiced their awareness and clarified the
point.
McCormick does not remember Terry Biggio or Collin Scoggins being on the Cannoles
telecom on 9111. At that time he does not think he would have recognized their voices.
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Type of event: Interview with Jack Jackson, via conference call
Team Number: 8
3259, F 718-995-6699), Mark Depalma (NATCA representative)
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Background:
Jackson was working as the Operations Supervisor in Charge of Area E. He gave general
supervision to the ATCs. Area E is one of the Oceanic Sectors. On 9/11 it covered, non-
radar, the western Carribean down to the San Juan Boundary. It also includes one radar
domestic sector between Atlantic City and 30 miles southeast of Kennedy. This was
sector 66, the Manta Sector. Manta sectors up to FL 230 and a base, depending on
approach control, of 5-7 thousand feet. The position is all out over the water.
ODAPS 87 was within Area E, and was being worked at the time of events on 9/11 by
Sharon Majeski.
9/11:
Jackson noted to Commission staff that he was at the watch desk when he overheard an
incoming phone call from Boston Center advising that AA 11 had turned of course and
shut off its transponder. They were tracking him as a primary. Jackson does not
remember if it was still in ZBW airspace or had already passed towards ZNY. He recalled
they also told ZNY watch desk that the flight was presumed a hij ack.
Jackson returned to Area E and was informed from the 0 87 position that there was a call
from air defense looking for information on AA 11. Majeski did not have information
since the flight was not in her zone. Jackson knew because of the conversation at ZNY's
watch desk what the air defense call was about.
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The ODAPS 87 position has assumed the task of providing information to air defense on
special interest flights coming into the continental United States. The ODAPS position is
a supplemental position that simulates where flights may be in conjunction with their
situational reports. D 87 and 0 87 are two different positions. 0 87 is equipped with
additional tracking capabilities based on computer based simulations that are built off of
the progress reports of flights over the ocean. 0 87 bases its simulation from pilot reports
that are based on estimates of route, altitude and speed.
The D 87 is the manual control position for Sector 87. The D 87 controller is responsible
for the aircraft separation. D 87 achieves manual separation standards based from the
visual reference provided by 0 87 to D 87. These positions are co-located.
There are four D positions and four 0 positions that are compiled in different ways, and
Jackson does not recall exactly how they were compiled on 9/11.
From Sector 66, a controller has the ability to quickly look at any other radar sector.
Sector 66 has both a radar (R) and a radar associate position (RA).
Jackson remembered that when Majeski received the phonecall from NEADS it was
broadcast over a speaker. Maj eski engaged NEADS in conversation, and Jackson could
tell there was some confusion.
Commission staff uses an FAA transcript in conjunction with questioning:
Huntress received a relatively quick Latitude/Longitude reading for AA 11 from Majeski.

Jackson stated that the 0 87 position can pull up data. They put in the call sign AA 11
into her computer, and a data block on AA 11 was established. As far as Jackson knows,
this capability is present at all positions. By this point, according to Jackson, the flight
was already in R42 airspace. Once a track is established the system correlates that data
block throughout the Center's computer system,
When a data blockthat is associated to a target is brought up there is usually consistant.

In this case, the data block moved along with the target. There is an option on the
computer to request the latitude and longitude of any particular point and this option was
used by Majeski to pinpoint AA 11, and is the basis for the information she gives to
NEADS.
According to Commission staff, at roughly 8:53 AM, Jackson passes the information to
NEADS of the first impact at the World Trade Center. They had been tracking a primary'
target associated with a data block. There were a good number of targets in the air at that
time. Jackson could not pick out one target amidst the many that were on the screen.
a
Jackson told Commission staff that even though Majeski is not at radar position at 0
87, she has a radar screen to use. Jackson noted that either himself or Majeski gave the
number to NEADS for the Watch Desk. Majeski was not a CPCon 9/11, though she
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definitely is now. She completed her training on 2-8-02. Jackson noted that she was
"certainly" qualified for the position she was at though.
At approximately 8:54 AM after Jackson was off the line with NEADS, we went back to
the Watch Desk to let them know what had transpired. Martin Rosenberg was walking
from the watch desk and told Jackson what had happened. Jackson does not recall going
back to the Watch Desk with Rosenberg.
Jackson stated that he does not remember how he knew that AA 11 struck the WTC.
Majeski explained to Huntress that the flight went into a 'coast" mode. Majeski and
Huntress ID get their terminology over the "coast" node
Jackson attempted to explain that he could not be certain that the flight that was AA 11
was in fact AA 11, since there were several primary targets on screen.
Jackson noted that the speaker at Huntress could speak with the Watch Desk for updates.
Thy asked if their was anyone at the military desk number.
Jackson noted that they never had the altitude, but could get the latitude and longitude.
Further, Majeski 0 87 she could not get radar altitude.
Sector 86 was in Area F on 9/11. From the 0 87 position Majeski, Sector 81 in Area F
did a flight plan read out on AA 11. They receive calls through Huntress nad make phone
calls to specific sectors weathers.
Jackson explained that more than likely when Majeski was originally on the phone with
NEADS she probably turned and asked him for information. He told her it was primary
only, and then she was able to pass a latitude longitude point within 30 seconds.
George Leonard noted that Dave Bottiglia began the AA 11 ALPHA track at 8:38:38.
VAL 175:
Jackson does not recall any conversation about VAL 175 with Huntress ID.
Phantom AA 11:
Jackson does not recall any reports of AA 11 being in the air after 8:46 AM.
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Type of event: Introduction to interviews
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred Johnson, ·FAA General Consul
Basic introduction to the air traffic system as controlled by ZNY:
Mike McCormick, the Air Traffic Manager of the facility, greeted Conunission staff and offered an
overview of the operation at ZNY, and a tour of the facility.
According to McCormack ZNY is both a domestic and oceanic operation. He noted that these two task sets
are related but distinct - related in that they share resources, but distinct in that they have separate physical
layouts and their approaches to air traffic control rely on different modes of communicating with aircraft.
ZNY is the third busiest air route center in the United States but it covers the smallest domestic airspace.
ZNY is highly condensed, and many of its sectors control aircraft in the climbing or descending periods of
flight. This factor makes ZNY different then typical cruise level flight controls.
McCormack explained 6 systems of distribution at ZNY: Sections A-F.
A through D are domestic. This space covers New York New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. New York Tracon
handles Newark Airport, and is generally capped between 17k and 19k ft.
Sections E and F are oceanic, andcover a quarter of the northern Atlantic airspace. The oceanic sections
also work often with the Portuguese Islands, Canada and the United Kingdom. Section E handles the
Caribbean, and Section F handles the North Atlantic. The Oceanic areas all have warning areas and thus
coordinate often with the military.
American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11) was never intended to pass through ZNY airspace. United Airlines
Flight 175 (UAL 175) was. Airplanes can file and fly whatever is most advantageous to their travel on any
given day.
Individual variables are used to choose an aircraft's route, and often the winds make the highest difference
to what route is taken. This is especially the case early on in the day. The Air Traffic Controllers (ATCs)
know what the preferential routes are. Wind and weather are the only real variables, and there is some level
of predictability.
Sectors have the responsibility to hand off (a complete transfer of communication, transponder frequency
and air traffic control) an aircraft to the sector it is traveling into, or to point out (a verbal communication of
an aircrafts position) an aircraft to a sector that an aircraft may be traveling through for a short period en
route (clipping). Air traffic controllers are responsible for all aircraft in their sector whether they emit
primary beacon code or are emitting a transponder code. A handoff and a point out are terms used for radar
operators. In the oceanic sectors airspace control is performed by verbal communication to the pilots, and
there are no hand offs or point outs. A controller will normally do an automated handoff. A point out is
generally only used if the controlled aircraft is going to clip someone else's airspace for a short period of
time, and thus it is not necessary to transfer communication. There are such things as automated point outs
but generally not used here. .
Kennedy Sector at ZNY is both a high and low position, and covers airspace from surface to unlimited. It is
unique to NY sector. For the most part, only sectors to the west own all airspace to the grown. In the east
Tracons usually cover lower altitudes.
ATCs at ZNY mostly stay in the same areas, but can bid to be moved to new areas. Generally an ATC will
begin and end their career as ZNY employees.
ZNY does not have super high or ultra high areas since most aircraft that travel through ZNY are usually
climbing or descending. All the domestic airspace covered by ZNY could fit in one of Salt Lake City's
super-high areas.
Within one facility untracked data blocks can be "forced" to different sectors, but they cannot be
transferred, forced, to another facility. Full data blocks can be forced but for primary targets the
information needs to be keyed first. On the receiving end the controller must key for the proper display for
that information. .
ZNY holds that it did not receive very much help from Boston regarding AA 11 and UAL 175 on 9/11.
ZNY looked in through their own sector areas to locate the primary. ZNY vectored an aircraft to pass over
the target and that is where ZNY received their information. The position was not a transfer from Boston.
There was a temporary wall on 9/11 that blocked access from the control center to the cafeteria. Area F
now has new sectors, and can watch what is being handled by Area E. The flight data unit is has not
changed. Areas A through to the TMU are all about the same, but since 9/11 additional land lines with
direct coordination to NEADS and CONNOR have been added as well as: Telcon hotline with dens,
CONNOR phone patched into VICs, and added recordings to the MOS desk. All TMU lines were taped on
9111, as well as the TMCs, STMCs, and OMIC lines. The only phones that were not taped and still are not
taped are phones on the area supervisor desks. Since 9/11 internet access is now available at the watch desk
of the OMIC. Headline news is broadcast from the NOMINAS area.
ZNY now has the ability to coordinate with NEADS, especially over use of airspace with Giant Killer in
the Whiskey areas.
Regarding the Otis Air Force Base scramble ofFl5s, McCormack noted that they "Just came into our
airspace. Were aware of them, and knew more military aircraft came in over the course of several days."
Under other official circumstance ZNY would have both accident packages for AA 11 and for UAL 175,
since both accidents occurred in ZNY airspace. Cleveland Center has the package for United Airlines
Flight 93 (UAL 93).
At one point all three flights, AA 11, UAL 175, and UAL 93 were in ZNY airspace.
UNCLASSIFIED
Type of event: Interview of Anthony Palmieri
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred R. Johnson, Jr., FAA Deputy Regional Consul,
Eastern Region
Background:
Palmieri has been employed by the FAA at ZNY since 1982. During his career he has served as a
staff specialist, a temporary supervisor, a traffic management unit (TMU) coordinator, and as an air traffic
controller (ATC) in ZNY Area B. During the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 Palmieri was at the
RA43, or Radar Associate for Area B'Radar 42 position. David Bottigia was the R42, radar 42, position.
UAL 175:
According to Palmieri, United Airlines Flight 175 (VAL 175) was somewhere between Allentown
and Stillwater when took the RA42 position.
Palmieri noted to Commission staff that Michael McCormick, the Air Traffic Manager for the
facility, was atArea B. Palmieri noted this was the first indication he noticed that there was "something
going on". Ivonna Dowis was the Controller in Charge (CIC) for Area B at that point, and she was assigned
Palmieri to the RA42 position. Palmieri remembers that he asked Bottiglia more than once for an update on
the ongoing situation, but that Bottiglia was-too occupied at the radar to take the time to brief Palmieri.
Palmieri went through the flight data strips and noticed VAL 175 was no only broadcasting the wrong
, code, but was also on a "coast" track. In the air traffic system, a coast track is the term to describe the
computer projection of the course of an aircraft that the radar is no longer taeIfttfying iIilfs-raaarsWeeps.---------------
After Palmieri noticed this coast track, Bottiglia informed him that the flight might be an ongoing hijack.
From the data Bottiglia assumed that it was VAL 175. Bottiglia also remembered that one of the other ZNY
personnel had informed him ZNY was tracking a probable ongoing hijacking that might have been airborne
in Kennedy Sector (part of the ZNY airspace).
Palmieri noted to Commission staff that even though he knew there was an ongoing air event, he
had very little situational awareness. Further, when he was assigned to the RA42 position he was not aware
of the first attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) (American Airlines Flight 11 at roughly 8:46 am strike
of the WTC north tower). He further noted that when he was assigned to RA42 VAL 175 .had already
turned southbound, and was in a position northeast of the Philadelphia area. He was aware of a hijack
involving another aircraft, and thus assumed VAL 175 was experiencing a mechanical emergency. Palmieri
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made this assumption since he believed it highly improbable that there were two concurrent hijackings.
Palmieri did not equate specifically AA 11 with the attack on the WTC; but he also did not doubt
that the plane that he and Bottiglia were monitoring and that was squawking code "3321" was VAL 175.
VAL 175 Route:
Regarding the route of VAL 175, Palmieri explained to Commission staff his recollection as
follows:
Regarding the Coast data block of VAL 175, Palmieri explained that the data block is associated
to a target, but "floats" on the radar screen roughly an "inch or two" away from the target. Bottiglia and
Palmieri were looking at two data feeds: one with the 3321 transponder code, and another with the coast
data block. Both feeds were associated with the one airplane VAL 175. Palmieri noted the reason he was
confidant the 3321 transponder was VAL 175 was from reviewing air traffic strips he knew there were 0
other like aircraft in the airspace.
Palmieri further explained that in Yardly Sector VAL 175 changed altitudes from 14,000 feet to
20,000 feet. The data block in that sector indicated an "intruder alert" (a limited data block that shows the
intruding target, a four digit code and an "I" for "intruder) - this indicates an aircraft has entered airspace
and has not received acknowledgement for its travel from the controller of the airspace). Palmieri contacted
sector 56 and the sector 56 controller acknowledged he was aware of the passage of the aircraft, and was
planning the routes of the airtraffic through sector 56 accordingly. Palmieri then called Liberty South
Tracon to inform them, and they acknowledged they were aware of the aircraft associated with code 3321.
Tracon informed Palmieri they would coordinate accordingly within their facility. Palmieri did not call the
area airport air traffic control towers. He spoke to Kingston sector of Boston Center (ZBW) and asked them
to remain monitoring and attempting to contact the aircraft with code 3321, but ZBW informed him they
were already in the process of shutting down ZBW airspace.
At this point Palmieri recalls VAL 175 climbed "a few hundred feet". Since there was a Delta
flight traveling in that airspace, Palmieri believes the pilot knew to beware of the collision avoidance
system.
Palmieri noted again that he was reluctant to believe VAL 175 was a hijacking, and was looking
for an indication that the flight was experiencing an emergency instead. He explained further that he did not
realize that VAL 175 was hijacked until after it dropped below the R42 radar and he heard "another" plane
had hit the WTC.
Paul Thumser asked Palmieri to call ZNY employees who were not at a position at that time
(primarily those people who were on break) to provide additional staffing to positions that were
experiencingdifficulty, Palmieri noted that Dowis took control ofR56, and then after she was called to
perform another duty he took over R56. This all occurred during ZNY's shut down of there airspace.
Shortly thereafter Palmieri recalls the ZNY TMV informed the operations floor that the nation was
assuming a National Ground Control Zero (no non-military flights over national airspace).
Training:
Palmieri explained that pre-9/11 an air traffic controller was trained to identify and respond to
hijack scenarios in very specific ways. This training included identifying the hijack Code 7500, or using a
covert verbal confirmation of the hijack from pilot. He noted that all these indications are from the flight
crew itself; the indications are not from observations made by the controllers based on the path or status of
a flight. Palmieri noted that a plane with unusual characteristics does imply to an observant controller that
there is a problem with the pilot or the airplane, or that there is an emergency situation with passenger; but
not that there is an ongoing hijack. In the case ofa hijack, Palmieri, as an ATC, is responsible for informing
his supervisor. From that point Palmieri believes the supervisor informs the Operations Manager in Charge
(OMIC). Palmieri further believes that the OMIC is responsible for informing the military that there is a
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need for a fighter scramble to escort the hijacked aircraft. Palmieri is trained once a year in a Dynamic
Simulation (SynSim) machine with hijack simulations.
Pamiera noted that on 9/11 he believed VAL 175 was in an emergency situation. In the case of an
emergency he was trained not to bother the flight crew, and to wait for indication of what is happening
from pilot.
Military
Palieri commented that the military needs to provide an escort for a hijacked aircraft. He believes prior to
9/11 the military would scramble fighters to monitor a hijacked aircraft; but would not have orders in place
to shoot it down. He noted that post 9/11 all ZNY air traffic personnel know that the military has authority
to shoot down a hijacked aircraft. The FAA has informed the air traffic personnel to "do whatever" the
military tells them to do in that circumstance. Palmieri understands he would be required to control the
airspace for a military aircraft if that aircraft entered his airspace in a hijacking scenario. Palmieri
postulated that the military action would include an engage and terminate order. Palmieri does believe his
training is enough to vector a military aircraft to the hijacked aircraft target.
Lessons learned:
Palmieri noted that he is now confident in the FAA's ability to land large amounts of aircraft in a short
period of time. Further, he learned that military coordination needs to be timely in air space emergencies.
Palmieri noted most controllers now assume the worst and then "back off form there". Procedurally he
learned to notify the supervisor immediately. Palmieri knows his supervisor notifies the OMIC, the OMIC
notifies the military, the military notifies NORAD, and NORAD assesses the situation, and a possible
response.
Area B conference the morning of 9/11 :
Palmieri noted that after the sector was closed down, the Area B personnel went to complete written and
oral statements on their recollection of the attacks. Palmieri believes the purpose of meeting was to record
information on the facts of the event, and to allow people to "vent". Palmieri assumed the meeting was at
the request of the facility manager. According to Palmieri, Martin Fournier was responsible for the
recordings.
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Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center
Type of event: Interview with Charles Alfaro
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Charles Alfaro and Alfred R. Johnson, Jr., FAA Deputy
Regional Counsel, Eastern Region
Background:
Alfaro started in January of 1977 as an Assistant Controller. He worked in that
position until 1981 when he was dismissed for three years. At the end of that period"he
was retrained on the sectors he had been qualified for, and became an Operational
Supervisor for the area in October of2000. He worked in Area C ofZNY for his entire
career, until a year and a half ago when he switched to Area F, Oceanic. [Staff Note:
Alfaro is one of only a few of the Controllers fired by President Reagan who was
reinstated and continued a career in the FAA.]
His responsibilities as an Operations Supervisor are to run the shifts and manage
the area Air Traffic Controllers (ATC). He does not man a radar scope, but is required to
sit one 8-hr shift at a scope per month to maintain currency. In a typical day his duties
include oceanic planning, sector splits, shift start, and the monitoring of air space
restriction enforcement in his area. He reports to the Operations Manager in Charge
(OMIC).
Events of9-11:
On the morning of September 11,2001, Alfaro's shift started at 0630. The
Operations Supervisor in Charge (OSIC) position was initially assigned to Andy Epstein.
At roughly 0730 Epstein had paperwork to do, and Alfaro was assigned as OSIC. Bruce
Barrett was the OMIC on 9-11.
AAll:
Around 0830 a call came in from the Boston Center supervisor of Rockdale sector
that passed information on a primary target. The information Alfaro was given for the
primary target Boston Center was tracking was a best known position of 20 miles
southwest of Albany, and a reported last altitude of Flight Level (FL) 290 with
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instructions to climb to FL 350. ZNY was told the aircraft was not communicating with
the controller. Alfaro noted to Commission staff that the first phone call from Boston was
not recorded and he was not informed of any "threatening" communications from the
cockpit.
Alfaro informed Barrett, the OMIC, about the call from Boston Center and the
information on the primary target. He did not know if Barrett had already been informed
from another source. Alfaro commented that usually in a circumstance involving an
aircraft that is not communicating with the controllers a call is made from the ATC
Center to AirInc. AirInc is a service provided to major airline carriers that has its own
dedicated communications link with an aircraft, and serves the primary purpose of
providing a backup method of communicating with an aircraft. After Alfaro informed the
OMIC, Tim Stephany, the Sector R34 controller, told Alfaro of a deviation on the
primary target that ZBW had identified as AA 11. Alfaro called Boston Rockdale from
the R49 radar desk, which is an adjacent position to R34.
Alfaro noted to Commission staff that the area was looking for AA 11 at altitudes
below 29K feet. Sector 42 controls aircraft at 24K ft. and above, Sector 35 controls those
at 23K ft. and below. To compensate for the uncertainty of AA 11'saltitude, the
controllers for these areas were told to keep all their air traffic five miles away from the
primary target identified as AA 11. As long as a controller can see a primary target a
controller can "block" (protect airspace) from the ground up. Alfaro commented that this
was a standard procedure in the case of primary only aircraft in question.
Alfaro related to Commission staff that a second phone call from Boston Center
confirmed that the primary target being tracked was in fact AA 11, and told ZNY that
Boston Center was "treating him like a hijack". Alfaro then went to see Bruce Barrett
for the second time. He recalled it could have been five or so minutes between the two
phone calls. He told Barrett AA 11 was headed southbound. Barrett said he was aware
and was already talking to the American Airlines dispatch office.
Pre 9-11 concerning anomalies:
Alfaro explained to Commission staff that aircraft routinely are NORDO (no
communications with controllers), and that there are various methods to get in touch with
the aircraft. Further; Alfaro explained that it was not unusual for an aircraft to be out of
communications for five or six minutes before a controller regained contact. However,
controllers would inform supervisors immediately aboutthe situation. Alfaro's estimates
and comments were based on 23 years experience.
Alfaro commented that a lost transponder incident averaged in frequency at about
once a month. He considered it routine to lose a transponder and noted that it was not
something to be alarmed about. The protocol was for a controller to ask the pilot to
recycle the transponder. According to Alfaro, when the pilot recycled the transponder, in
most circumstance the transponder signal would be restored.
The combination of a ~ORDO condition and a lost transponder was infrequent;
according to Alfaro this occurred more than once a year but was still extremely
infrequent. The combination ofNORDO, a lost transponder and a serious course
deviation was very rare.
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Further on AA 11:
When Alfaro was told Boston Center was considering AA 11 a hijack he had
already assumed AA 11 was an ongoing hij ack and told the OMIC right away. He still
believed it was a possibility that AA 11 was experiencing a serious mechanical
malfunction, and had still heard nothing of the threatening communications heard from
the cockpit. If it was a cockpit emergency his thought was the plane would head for either
Kennedy or Newark since both airports had extended runways.
According to Alfaro, the OMIC at ZNY did not give any direct order to the
controllers to treat AA 11 as a hijack. Tom Kelly from Sector 35 went back to Barrett for
information. Barrett did not inform Alfaro of the possibility of threatening
communications. However, once Barrett did inform him Alfaro was sure of the gravity
of the situation. He went back to the area and told Sector 35 that it was not an emergency
landing; that it was a hijack.
He does not know of any efforts made in Area C to verify altitude since they did
not need that information to keep other aircraft away. He assumed that the identification
of the primary was positive, and his area did not doubt Boston.
He watched AA 11 head towards Kennedy Airport until it disappeared from the
scope. He thought that it was malfunctioning radar when the target did not come back on
screen. There was no information from any other source that AA 11 struck the WTC, and
Alfaro thought AA 11 might have landed at Kennedy.
Alfaro changed that opinion when ZNY received a phone call asking if they had
lost an airplane. Carl Schmalz, a controller who was at home at the time, called the center
and informed them of the crash at the World Trade Center. Schmalz said he thought it
was a small aircraft. Alfaro was hoping that it was not AA 11, but gradually changed that
position to acknowledge it was probably AA 11.
Alfaro then went to the TMU desk and spoke with LeCates, Thumser and
McCormick. He referred to AA 11 as probably hitting the WTC and was told "we already
know". He went back to his area thinking that AA 11 had impacted the WTC.
He was not involved with the UAL 175 incident and noted to Commission staff
that he could only comment on AA 11. He saw the second impact on CNN and knew it
was a commercial airplane when the impact was replayed, but did not know what plane
struck the tower.
Training:
Alfaro commented that his hijack procedure prior to the events of9/11 was to
verify the hijack with the pilot via the hijack code, "7500", and to notify his supervisor
that a hijack was in progress. The standard procedure was not to make inquiries with the
pilot in the cockpit to avoid escalating events. Any request for military assistance would
be handled at the OMIC level.
The training he received was computer refresher training and dynamic simulation
exercises. He does not recall any multiple hijacking exercises. Further, Alfaro noted that
all his training dealt with single-event scenarios.
Other Information:
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Alfaro recalled media reports of an aircraft striking the WTC but did not hear any
reports that 1) it was AA 11; or 2) air traffic controllers continued to look for AA 11.
Alfaro expressed his feeling regarding the identity of the airplane involved in the WTC
crash did point towards AAl1, but on 9111 he was never sure.
The second time Alfaro went to Sector 35 he advised the controller to call NY
Tracon. Alfaro noted to Commission staff that no controller indicated that AA 11 was
slowing down or descending: The controllers were only tracking a primary target and
ZNY could not tell the airspeed of the plane. Alfaro commented that they assumed the
airspeed was "fast".
Alfaro assumed that any contact with the ATCSCC at Herndon would have been
by the OMIC, Bruce Barrett. Alfaro did not know what role the Washington Operations
Center in the events of the day.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
H(JZ Dt{Oi hV ~
Type of event: Interview with David LaCates, ZNY Deputy Operations Manager
®
Date: October 2, 2003
Team Number: 8
Eastern Region
NOTE: Please refer to the recorded interview file for a complete account.
Background:
LaCates was hired in 1983 as an air traffic controller (ATC) in the Michigan area. Prior to joining
the FAA LaCates served a direct posting as an air traffic controller for the United States military for two
and a half of three years in service at Hill Air Force Base (AFB), Utah. He was transferred to New York
TRACON (N90) in 1984. At N90, LaCates served as an ATC for approximately "eight or nine" years, and
then as a training specialist for approximately eighteen months. He transferred from N90 to Islip Tower as
a manager. At Islip Tower he spent some time in Resources, but then transferred back to N90 as an
Operational Manager. From that point he worked at the Traffic Management Unit (TMU), then as the TMU
assistant manager. He left N90 for a detail at New York Center (ZNY), and spent four years at ZNY as a
deputy. His deputy now is Assistant Air Traffic Manager Slag.
LaCates' official work day is from 0800 to 1630. He noted that he arrives at ZNY at 0730 for the
Eastern Region Teleconference that is started by Ray Holland. LaCates further noted that during the course
of the day he is not usually on the controller floor but instead is working from his office.
September 11, 2001 (9/11): AA 11
On the morning of9/11, LaCates was in Traffic Management Officer Charley BaIley's office.
LaCates wears both a portable phone and a pager, and received a call from Mike McCormack, the facility's
air traffic manager, asking LaCates to report to the operations floor immediately. When LaCates arrived,
McCormack told him there was a 'confirmed airborne hijack in progress. He continued his recollection by
relating to Comn:i.ission staff that he received a page from Ron Rugerri of the Regional Air Traffic
Management office that confirmed the hijack. Both LaCates and McCormack went to Area B (which was
handling the hijacked aircraft, AA 11) to monitor the progress of the flight. Shortly thereafter LaCates
recalls receiving reports from ZNY personnel of "smoke coming from Manhattan", and of a fire at the
World Trade Center (WTC). After these initial reports LaCates was directed by McCormack to watch the
CNN coverage of the event, and Lacates did so from the ZNY cafeteria. LaCates could only see smoke and
black areas on the CNN coverage, and could not be positive the aircraft that struck the north tower was AA
11. He informed McCormack of this, and returned to Area B to check for the missing primary.
David Bottiglia, R42, the air traffic controller who monitored AA 11's travel through ZNY airspace into
UNCLASSIFIED
N90 airspace, told LaCates that VAL 175 reported a suspicion transmission from AA 11.
LaCates commented to Commission staff that he discovered later that day that the initial
confirmation of a hijack he received from Ruggeri at.the Regional Air Traffic Management office was
actually information that had been passed from Boston Center (ZBW). While he looked at the air traffic
radar scopes at Area B on 9/11 LaCates believed that AA 11 was still fairly close to Manhattan. He
commented that the search for the correct altitude on AA 11 was ongoing when LaCates arrived in Area B.
He further commented that his experience of the search for AA 11 only began two or three minutes before
its primary was lost. LaCates informed Commission staff that based on his experience working at N90
altitude readings on primary targets can be fairly "easy to loose track of'. He continued to comment that the
range of possible explanations for AA 11's disappearance from radar was varied before it was confirmed to
have struck the tower. LaCates does not immediately assume a crash when a flight loses its primary, and
the notion that the plane would be used as a weapon had not occurred to him. He believed AA 11 might
have landed somewhere.
Kevin Delaney, a Quality Assurance officer at ZNY, was also asked to monitor the CNN
broadcast. LaCates notes that when he heard of the CNN report we immediately assumed it was hijacked
flight AA 11. He acknowledged that he did hear rumors that the aircraft that struck the WTC was in fact a
small airplane from Poughkeepsie. LaCates reiterated that he did not continue to monitor CNN for long,
and instead returned to the operations floor to search for AA 11. LaCates clarified that he believes he did
see a target on Dave Bottiglia's radar screen that was AA 11. LaCates believes the order of the factors that
led to his situational awareness regarding AA 11 was reports of 1) smoke, and 2) a WTC fire.
September 11,2001 (9/11): UAL 175
When the transponder code of VAL 175 changed, LaCates immediately reported the information
to McCormack. VAL 175 made a slight turn and climbed altitude to avoid air traffic. Laf'ates continued to
monitor the flight, and then it descended below the area's radar coverage (below 2200 feet). At this change
LaCates updated McCormack. LaCates noted to Commission staff that he was mainly in Area B during the
events of the morning of9/11, and walked to the watch desk at times to pass new information to
McCormack. LaCates described the leadership of ZNY on 9/11 as a division of labor between McCormack
and himself. 'Mcf.ormack was coordinating the center's response and reports to the FAA through
conference calls. LaCates was feeding McCormack information from Area B.
Bottiglia told McCormack that the pilot of VAL 175 waited to get on the ZNY radio frequency
before reporting that he overheard strange transmission from AA 11 while in ZBW airspace. LaCates does
not remember where Paul Thumser was at this time, but does remember that McCormack and Bruce Barrett
were at the watch desk. LaCates believed at this point that the information on VAL 175 led to the
conclusion that it was experiencing a form of equipment malfunction or failure. He did not think at this
point that VAL 175 was an ongoing hijack, but did know that "something was dreadfully wrong". LaCates
noted to Commission staff that he never experienced a hijack in his career with the FAA prior to 9/11.
LaCates noted to Commission staff that he had "no doubt" that the aircraft with the transponder
coded 3321 was in fact VAL 175, and that he had some situational awareness that led to this conclusion
because of AA 11. LaCates also noted that by the time VAL 175 took a northeastern turn he told
McCormack that the flight was most likely headed towards Manhattan.
Situational Awareness on September 11, 2001 (9/11)
LaCates noted to Commission staff that after the two impacts of the WTC towers he was fully
aware that "something was amiss" with air traffic. It was at this point that McCormack ordered ZNY
airspace closed.
LaCates noted that he only heard rumors of a threatening flight from Poughkeepsie, and that he
had no awareness of questions involving Delta flight 1989. Further, LaCates noted to Commission staff that
on 9/11 he was not aware of any events from Cleveland Center or from Indianapolis Center until "well
UNCLASSIFIED
after" the second strike on the WTC. LaCates noted that Bob Ocon, a support specialist, informed him of
the events in Indianapolis and Cleveland Centers. LaCates told Commission staff he has no knowledge of
reports of AA 11 being still airborne after 0846 (the time of impact).
LaCates believes the rumor of a small twin engine aircraft from Poughkeepsie heading towards
Washington, DC got translated to be the first aircraft to hit the WTC, and also believes this rumor persisted
for over an hour. LaCates notes that McCormack was aware of this rumor; but he has no knowledge of how
it began.
LaCates believes that the Pentagon was monitoring the operational floor at ZNY and McCormack
was on a Teleconference in his conference room. LaCates noted to Commission staff that he had no
knowledge or idea of the identity of the aircraft that struck the Pentagon after he first heard of the strike. He
also had no knowledge of any controller, including David Bottiglia, R42, who might have thought AA 11
struck the Pentagon.
Area B Conference post attacks:
LaCates informed Commission staff that McCormack had asked a tape be made of the Area B
personnel so there was certainty that all statements were recorded. McCormack also noted that gathering
information after an air traffic event was routine. He noted that the usual procedure would be to watch the
SATORl (a computerized recreation of the air traffic radar picture during an event compiled by the radar
files) while listening to an audio tape of the air traffic controller position, and then compile a written
statement. Since this was an unusual situation LaCates believes McCormack wanted an immediate and
accurate record of what had happened. LaCates believed Bob Ott gathered this information. Lacates
himself submitted a written statement but not a verbal one. LaCates further explained to Conunission staff
his understanding that Kevin Delaney, the Quality Assurance officer in charge of the ZNY record of VAL
175 on 9/11, destroyed the tape. This information came to LaCates information after Kevin Delaney'S
interview with Commission staff. Delaney had spoken to McCormack and McCormack told LaCates.
LaCates explained to Commission staff that an official FAA tape needs to be designated so on the actual
recording. It is his understanding that this Area B tape did not have this official designation, and thus was
not an official FAA tape. But LaCates also noted that it is his understanding that the tape still existed, until
his conversation with McCormack noted above.
LaCates noted that it is the official FAA policy that in the case of an accident written statements
are produced by the personnel involved. LaCates postulated that McCormack may have been worried that
they employees would not return to ZNY, and then were would be no record from the ZNY employees for
review until they returned. He further stated that a further purpose of the recording was probably to have an
accurate portrayal to be used by the 'controllers to compile complete written statements. Furthermore,
LaCates noted that it is within Delaney's authority, as a Quality Assurance manager, to make the decision
on what to retain and what not to retain as a record of an air traffic event.
LaCates informed Commission staff that he believes personnel at ZNY attempted to locate the
tape in preparation for their interviews with Commission staff. LaCates did not himself attempt to locate
the tape, but he believes "someone" asked George Leonard to look for them, since Leonard was responsible
for compiling the document package in response to the Commission document discovery request. Lacates
himself was not part of this process.
FAAfMilitary:
LaCates offered Commission staff the opinion that there are no relationship difficulties between the FAA
and the military over the use of airspace. He noted that occasionally the military does not want to allow
civilian use of airspace they control, but the procedures for the FAA to mitigate such a situation are
"adequate".
LaCates was not aware of any further steps to be taken by the center beyong contacting the military that the
FAA is responsible for regarding a fighter scramble. LaCates further commented that at his level of
UNCLASSIFIED
authority he has no ability to contact specific military air defense assets. He believes that the OMIC
(Operations Manager in Charge) has the responsibility and operational knowledge to contact the military.
LaCates commented that ATCs from McGuire AFB were at ZNY during the time period in which ZNY
assumed their airspace. He noted that McGuire AFB's air traffic capability is primarily approach control. It
was not until after 9/11 that LaCates became aware that NEADS and Customs could ascertain altitude on a
primary only aircraft.
Documents:
Commission staff presented LaCates with copies of FAA documents that pertain to "air piracy" incidents.
LaCates noted that after 9/11 he reviewed Chapter 7 of the FAA Crisis Management Handbook that details
escort procedures in the case of a hijack. LaCates again reviewed them within "the last three to six months"
in preparation for his interview with Commission staff.
LaCates was not familiar with Chapter 40 of the FAA Crisis Management Handbook. Chapter 40 addresses
procedure for a National Air System shut down.
Recommendations:
LaCates noted to Commission staff that the FAA never operated an aircraft accident/crisis drill. He noted
that on the contrary workplace evacuations that include drilling shutting down a center's airspace is drilled.
He noted to Commission staff the importance of drilling for all types of possible scenarios.
LeCates noted his opinion that each FAA air traffic control area needs a dedicated military specialist. He
further noted that these position is "on the books", but is often not filled. According to LaCates, ZNY has
only three military specialists; two of which are traffic management coordinators with some military
familiarization. LaCates does not believe this is sufficient to address the current air threat probabilities.
LaCates noted the importance of the DEN hotline and ZNY's dedicated CONAR line.
Other information:
LaCates noted to Commission staff that he was told three suspicious individuals "jumped off a plane at
Kennedy" on 9/11.
UNCLASSIFIED
·MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview
with George Leonard, Acting Quality Assurance support manager.
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred Johnson, FAA General Consul
NOTE: Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.
Background
Leonard has been in his current position since the third week of January 2002; prior to
that he was the Operational Supervisor in Area C. He has also served tours as a Quality
Assurance Specialist and as an .Air Traffic Controler (ATC) in Area B. He has been at
ZNY since October 1987.
Events of9-11
Leonard was the Operations Supervisor, Area C, on 9/11, but was not in the facility that
day. He was attending an Operations Supervisor Course at Pocono PA. He teaches
operational supervisors and Pocono is a central location in the Eastern Region for such
training. He is also a certified accident investigator and has been certified to teach
accident investigation since 9/11.
Events unfolded early in morning, they had just began class. A supervisor from a NY
tower interrupted telling him what he could see ongoing. Class was suspended and they
went to learn the news. Leonard called the Eastern Region to let them know there were
33 supervisors at Pocono. They were advised to remain where they were, but several
made the personal decision to return to their duty locations. He personally came back to
New York later that day. From his perspective supervisors all made decision to return to
their facilities immediately. Everyone was on the road when the towers collapsed.
Other Points
After 9-11'he took the place of Marty Fournier (stricken with appendicitis) and his role
was to put together the transcripts and compile a list of aircraft position reports from
SATORI (FAA system to exploit and display raw radar and computer information) to
plot on maps and get recreate routes for analysis. He did not get involved with specific
UNCLASSIFIED
handling of tapes and other mechanics of the process
He did not get involved with establishing situational awareness of which aircraft
impacted which tower. He did not encounter any information on AAII as a reborn
target, southbound.
Leonard viewed CNN as it carried information on the two impacts at the World Trade
Center and called the facility and spoke with Charlie Alfaro. Leonard could tell after
second impact that it was a significant sized aircraft. He thought it was a B767. He knew
that events could not be an aircraft or pilot mistake after the second impact.
Nine different radar sites support ZNY. The sites feed a host computer and the computer
produces a mosaic display that it determines best meets the needs of the controller to
maintain traffic separation.
Hijacking Scenarios and Training
He had never contemplated a scenario such as 9-11. All employees undergo annual
refresher training internal to FAA that included a hijack scenario at least once per year.
The Dynamic Simulation lab where scenarios are created was intended for controllers.?
He had no recall of unusual scenarios; most training scenarios were standard hijackings.
Absent the overheard communications there appeared to be no direct indication from the
AAII sequence of events that there was a hijack. Loss of communications, including
transponder, would lead a controller to believe there was a catastrophic mechanical
malfunction. In a pre 9-11 world the controller would be alarmed about the actions of .
AA 11, but not think hij ack.
Post 9-11 hijacking training scenarios require loss of communications and/or loss of
transponder to be brought immediately to supervisor attention and reported up the
command line. The Pre-9-11 procedure, once aware of cockpit compromise, was for the
controller to look for verification covertly form pilot to confirm, and tell super.
The Accident File
The ZNY accident file was put together by Marty Fournier and Kevin Delaney. The file
itself is separate from the accident package that must be forwarded, and includes
supporting documentation for the package.
Comments and Recommendations
Since 9-11, not just FAA but the aviation industry has learned to look scrupulously at
people.
Need to continue to explore how aircraft could be used differently by terrorists.
Never would have though military aircraft would be used for engagement order. But now
people would expect nothing less.
Need to keep trying to make things safer with both FAA, the Airlines, DoT, and DoD.
UNCLASSIFIED M frz OLfo/~1d
®
Type of event: Interview with Kevin Delaney
Prepared by: John Azzarello and Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Ronkonkoma, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred Johnson, FAA Counsel
NOTE: Please refer to the recording of the interview for a complete account.
Background Information
Kevin Delaney worked in Area A at ZNY for approximately twenty-one and a

half years until December 2000 when he became the Supervisor of the ZNY Quality
Assurance Office.
Events of 9-11
Delaney was working at ZNY on the morning of 9/11. He was assigned to the
Quality Assurance Office. According to Delaney, Bruce Barrett supervised the watch
area, Pete Mulligan was the Supervisory Traffic Management Coordinator, Bob Felser
was the Military Operations Specialist (MOS), and Evanna Dowis was the Controller-in-
Charge (CIC) in Area B. Paul Thumserwas the Operations Supervisor in Area B.
However, in accordance with FAA procedures, Thumser left AreaB and "went to pull a
tape" when the "alert machine" indicated a controller from Area B may have committed
an error related to the rules governing separation of aircraft. The potential controller
error was unrelated to the events involving AA 11 and VAL 175. When Thumser left the
Area, he appointed Dowis the Controller-in-Charge of Area B.
Sometime shortly after the North Tower of the WTC was struck, Mike
McCormick, ZNY ATM (New York Center Air Traffic Manager), asked Delaney to go to
the cafeteria and monitor CNN on television to obtain information about the incident.
While monitoring CNN, Delaney watched UAL 175 as it crashed into the South Tower of
the WTC ("WTC 2"). He stated he knew upon watching CNN's slow motion replay that
a "jumbo jet", but not necessarily a 767, impacted WTC 2. Delaney went right to the
"watch desk" and then to "Area B" and reported his observations to McCormick.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
According to Delaney, Dowis was doing an excellent job and was keeping a log of events
at the time.
Delaney did not quite remember when any detailed information regarding AA 11
was disseminated. After WTC 2 was struck, Delaney said "they" were not sure what
struck WTC 1 and were not sure whether it was AA 11. Delaney said there were still
reports that a twin engine jet was missing after WTC 2 was struck. In Delaney's view,
there was a good amount of confusion on which aircraft hit which building. He advised
McCormick the second WTC crash was not a mistake, Delaney stated it became more of
a "military type situation" than an FAA situation after WTC 2 was struck.
At some point in time, ZNY started to get information from FAA Boston Center
regarding the identities of aircraft they were missing and what communications were
heard from AA 11 on the Boston frequency. He stated he did not talk to New York
Tracon on 9-11.
Delaney said they were just starting to form the "te1con" shortly after he advised
McCormick about the second crash. He did not think the people on the teleconference at
ZNY concluded AA 11 crashed into WTC 1. He believes there was no "consensus" on
the teleconference at ZNY regarding what type of aircraft had struck WTC 1. He does .
not recall anyone on the teleconference reporting a helicopter struck WTC 1. Delaney
said it was not until sometime after the teleconference started that AAl1 was recognized
as the aircraft that struck WTC 1.
Delaney said a controller is unable to obtain an aircraft's altitude reading when

the plane is on primary radar only. He said ZNY usually "filters out" primary radar
returns so controllers could 'perform their jobs. Delaney said it is very hard for a pilot of
one aircraft to gauge another aircraft's altitude through visual observation. If an aircraft's
transponder failed prior to 9-11, a controller would simply vector another aircraft in the
area towards the non-transponding aircraft to identify it. Although Delaney worked the
MOS position at ZNY during Desert Storm (1990-91), he was not aware that certain
military radar facilities could read altitude on a primary target.
Delaney stated, prior to 9-11, nobody would have anticipated someone hijacking
an aircraft and crashing it into a building. Prior to 9-11 the mindset of the FAA and
passengers was to "cooperate" with hijackers because the plane would eventually land
safely somewhere. Today, Delaney believes everyone would react differently.
Prior to 9-11, air traffic controllers usually detected hijacked aircraft because the
pilot would squawk code 7500 (the "hijack code") on his transponder. Controllers and
supervisors were trained to verify the hijack code with the pilot. Today, the information
regarding hijack codes is not well protected.
Prior to 9-11, Delaney would have associated an electrical or mechanical failure

with an aircraft that had deviated significantly from its intended course, lost its
transponder signal and radio communications. In his opinion, a drastic deviation in an
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
aircraft's course does not necessarily translate in the mind of a controller to the
possibility of a hijack because a pilot without a functioning transponder may not know
exactly what direction his plane is headed in. Delaney said the thought of a "hijack"
would eventually "creep" back into the controller's thought process. Delaney opined that
knowledge of the threatening cockpit communications overheard by the Boston ATC and
the UAL 175 pilot would certainly lead one to conclude that AA 11 had been hij acked.
However, Delaney stated the information ZNY received from ZBW was "sketchy"
regarding the content of the hijacker's statements in the cockpit of AA 11.
Delaney was not sure if Boston Center spoke initially to someone in Area C or
Area B regarding AA 11. Boston Center told ZNY they were treating AA 11 as a hijack
and reported its last known altitude was 29,000 feet. According to Delaney, that is when
the Sector 56 controller vectored another aircraft towards AA 11 in an attempt to
determine its altitude. The aircraft was unable to locate AA 11 and discern its altitude.
Delaney stated that Dave Bottiglia was fairly certain that UAL 175 was the
aircraft that struck WTC 2. In Delaney's opinion, even if the fighter pilots had reached
UAL 175 before the impact, the military would not have given them an order to shoot
down the aircraft over New York City because too many people on the ground would
have perished.
However Delaney did state that he believed the US government shot down VAL
93. Delaney's belief was based solely on the fact that people told him the debris from the
impact ofUAL 93 was spread over an eight mile area.
Delaney noted that after 9/11 the FAA received a large number of false bomb
reports at flight service stations.
Delaney advised Commission staff that he had an argument with FAA

headquarters regarding whether the events of 9111 should be declared an aircraft accident
or an incident. If it was deemed an accident, Delaney stated that he was supposed to
provide the names of everyone involved in the accident including those that perished at
the WTC. Delaney further noted that in an accident package he is required to provide
transcripts and other pertinent information that relates the status of the aircraft in
question. This information is not included in an incident package. He noted to
Commission staff that the attacks of September 11th were acts of war, and that as such he
did not personally feel it was appropriate to put those names in the compilation of
materials to be submitted. He noted as well thatthere is no category in the tools available
to him as an FAA Quality Assurance officer to account for aircraft involvement in acts of
war. Delaney noted that Paul Falley and Mike Pomfrey were asked to assist him in
creating the transcripts, since Marty Fournier, another ZNY Quality Assurance officer
was on emergency sick leave due to appendicitis. Delaney noted the urgency of the task
since it was his understanding that the FBI sought information immediately.
After questioned by Commission staff Delaney continued to explain the

difference between an "FAA Accident Package" and an "Incident Review". Essentially,
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
an accident package includes transcripts related to the event while an incident review
requires less information be included. Delaney stated that he, Falley, and Pomfrey
transcribed audio tapes related to the events of 9/11 for seven straight days after the
attacks. Moreover, at the direction of Ron Ruggeri, Delaney prepared a ZNY timeline of
events, and gave it to Ruggeri. Ruggeri was the Quality Assurance manager of the New
York Region (AEA). Delaney estimated it took him approximately 90 days to complete
the accident package and file.
In the first few days following the attacks and at the direction of Delaney's
supervisors at AEA, Delaney forwarded information to AEA via an unsecured website.
Delaney opined that some of the information reported by the media (e.g., the New York
Times article that quoted Dave Bottiglia's conversations on 9/11) was obtained from this
website.
Every piece of paper related to the accident was stored in a safe at ZNY. Delaney
stated that items had to be signed out before anyone removed items from the safe. He
noted that there were approximately three boxes of materials in the safe.
Delaney stated that the National Transportation Safety Bureau was not involved
with the investigation at same level as was the FBI.
- According to Delaney, on the morning of 9/11 Bob Ott and Marty Fournier
gathered ZNY Area B employees in a conference room to tape their perspectives on what
occurred that morning. Delaney chose not to include that tape in the accident package.
Delaney noted that the tape was originally placed in the EAP (Employee Assistant
Package), and that in his opinion the tape was not a fact gathering exercise. Delaney
stated that he is not sure if "anyone" at ZNY listened to the tape for "hard facts". Delaney
further noted that everyone involved in the tape record was asked to do an official FAA
statement. [NOTE: In subsequent interviews with ZNY employees Commission staff
gathered information that contradicts Delaney'S statements. Please see Commission
MFRs for Michael McCormack and David LaCates for further information].
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Delaney expressed the opinion that the air space caps currently operated are
effective.
Delaney also expressed that aviation industry employees are too willing to verify
a situation as an emergency before conducting a more thorough inquiry. This situation
leads to many false alarms.
Delaney stated ZNY should be equipped with technology to determine altitudes

on primary targets and other information similar to the technology used by NEADS and
US Customs.
Delaney stated that if the FAA asked ZNY to take over the air traffic control of an
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
adj acent FAA center, ZNY could not execute the order because they lack the necessary
equipment and training.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Type of event: Interview with Mark Merced
Team Number: 8
Eastern Region
Please refer to the interview recording for a complete account.
Merced noted to Commission staff that he was very hesitant to participate in an interview.
Commission staff received his personal statement through a request. Commission staff did not receive the
statement originally because he was directly involved with AA 11, and New York Center only provided us
with documents involving VAL 175. Merced did not have the time prior to the interview to review his
statement.
Merced began his career 1991 at ZNY. He trained and became a certified air traffic controller
(ATC). He has been an ATC with Area B for his full career.
AAll:
Merced was "working" sector 56, Kennedy Sector, on the morning of September 11,2001. His
shift started at 6:30 am, and he was R 56 (radar for sector 56) without an RA (radar associate). Boston
Center's (ZBW) Kingston Sector notified him of a specific primary target. The controller told Merced that
ZBW was tracing a primary target at Flight Level 290 (FL 290, or 29,000 feet), that the flight was a
possible hijack, and this it was likely AA 11. Merced physically pointed out that target to Dave Bottiglia,
and Bottiglia started to follow the track. Merced does not remember if the track was actually "marked" with
a data tag [please see David Bottiglia MFR for further details]. Merced recalls an "Eagle" flight headed
towards Boston. He descended that flight 31, 000 feet, and asked for it to look for AA 11. The "Eagle"
flight was unable to confirm a visual recognition of AA 11, so Merced directed that flight to continue on
course. He attempted to do the same with a Federal Express flight out of Bradley that was at Flight Level
270.
Merced noted that after his second attempt to receive a visual on AA 11 by directing flights near
the primary target the target itself "disappeared". He was "watching it the whole time", and the controllers
were using all the methods they could to locate the target. Merced told Ivonna, who was the Controller in
Charge (CIC) of Area B, to call New York Tracon in an attempt for altitude information on the primary
target. Merced was working with Bottiglia, but does not remember Bottiglia setting an "AA 11a" data tag
UNCLASSIFIED
on the primary. Merced noted that Bottiglia received an "H" position once he was no longer tracking AA
11. Merced noted that Chris Tucker was assigned to the departures radar, and set that radar scope to receive
information from the floor to the ceiling to check for AA 11. Merced Wormed Commission staff that this
operation was very infrequently done in the past, "especially for commercial aircraft". .
Once AA 11 disappeared, "someone" called Washington Center (ZDC) and informed them of the
situation with AA 11. Merced assumed that AA 11 had continued southbound, but was flying at an altitude
below the radar sweeps. Merced noted that the controllers could tell the primary target's approximate speed
by monitoring the distance between the lines that indicate a "hit" on the radar sweep, and that the aircraft
performed a slight turn to the southwest. Merced noted that this is all the information he received on the
target.
VAL 175:
Merced first heard of the WTC impacts after VAL 175 hit the south tower. He was actively aware
of what Bottiglia was monitoring and doing. Bottiglia noted that when he was informed of the impact of the
south tower, he had "no real doubt" that it was VAL 175. Bottiglia had told him a plane informed him that
the WTC was on fire, but he had did not know or think that the fire was caused by the impact of AA 11. He
did not which aircraft struck the different sites until after he went home around 5 o'clock that evening.
Merced noted that when he was informed that the WTC was hit he left ZNY to attempt to contact a friend
who was in the WTC.
Merced noted that Area B personnel were "sequestered" in a conference room after the events. At
this meeting, he gave a written and a taped statement.
Prior to 9/11:
Merced informed Commission staff that prior to 9/11 he would have expected the pilot ofa hijacked
aircraft to covertly communicate the situation by using a hijack transponder code (7500) or through a
verbal code.
Merced noted that prior to 9/11 it was often that an aircraft would not be in constant contact with the air
traffic controller, and that this was no reason to assume the aircraft was undergoing a hijack. He further
noted that a lost transponder signal does happen, but prior to 9/11 an air traffic controller would have
approached the problem thinking that there was something electrical wrong with the aircraft. Once the
aircraft deviates from course, Merced would have thought that there was an emergency and the pilot was
headed for the nearest airport.
Merced informed Commission staff that Bottiglia was told by the pilot of VAL 175 that he overheard
threatening communications in a communication from AA 11. Merced that since ZBW had said that AA 11
was possibly a hijacked aircraft he took VAL 175's news seriously. Merced had never handled a hijack in
his career.
Merced noted that anF AA ATC has no authority to notify the military or Herndon. He notes that that is the
responsibility of the supervisor for the area.
Prior to 9/11 Merced had no experience with a military scramble exercise, but had worked on military
exercises in the past through a small piece of airspace at 14,000 feet and below. Merced experienced no
difficulty coordinating the use of this airspace for military purposes, besides a few instances in which the
military aircraft "spill out" of the airspace assigned to them. He had no practice with the military on
hijacking procedures, but felt prepared to vector a military aircraft to a target.
Merced's hijacking training was mostly annual refresher training that included hijack scenarios on a
Dynamic Simulation, called DynSim, which simulates air traffic. These exercises, as noted, involved one
aircraft, and a pilot as the participant in communication through code use. Even post 9/11 Merced has only
exercised scenarios involving single aircraft.
UNCLASSIFIED .
Merced noted that an emphasis has been placed on the importance of maintaining contact with an aircraft,
post 9/11 when the controllers experience a NORDO aircraft they do whatever can be done to communicate
with that aircraft. Prior to 9/11, Merced noted there was no standard on how or when to attempt to
communicate with a NORDO aircraft.
UNCLASSIFIED
r1 HZ 0 lfO {~~ ~ 0
®
Date: Tuesday, October 1,2003
Team Number: 8
->
Eastern Region
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Background:
Rosenberg began working with the FAA in 1969, after working as an air traffic controller (ATC)
in the US Air Force. He started at LaGuardia Tower, and then went to the New York Common Air Control
arm at Kennedy Airport. He was qualified in all positions of operations inthat facility. From there,
Rosenberg went to the regional office for New York as a staff specialist, and thereafter carne to ZNY as a
controller.
Rosenberg was involved in the air traffic controller strike in 1981. Afterwards he was able to
return to the FAA due to a legal issue, and became an air traffic supervisor at LaGuardia Tower. In 1985
Rosenberg started working at New York Center (ZNY) as an operational supervisor. After that, he became"
a traffic management unit (TMU) supervisor. Rosenberg noted to Comrnissionstaffthat he spent time at
the regional office to receive 75 points towards his career.
Rosenberg described the role of a TMU supervisor as a buffer between the outside world and the
ATCs in the center: They are responsible to regulate the amount of traffic going through a sector. They use
miles and trails restrictions, and reroute airplanes in order to do this. Rosenberg noted that a TMU
supervisor also has greater situational awareness on the national airspace picture than an area supervisor or
air traffic controller. The TMU supervisor also is involved in higher levels and frequency of
communication with the other centers and with Herndon Command Center. Rosenberg noted that an
operational supervisor is concerned with one portion of a whole air space picture, whereas the TMU
supervisor is concerned with the whole.
Rosenberg has no oceanic operational experience.
9/11:
On 9/11, Rosenberg, Peter Mulligan and Bruce Barrett all were assigned as TMU supervisors.
Both the OMIC and the STMC directly coordinate with TMU. A controller told Rosenberg there was a
"serious problem" with the aircraft AA 11 from Boston Center. Rosenberg dialed on a "hotline phone"
UNCLASSIFIED
American Airlines' dispatch for information on AA 11. ZBW was still on the line, and they were both told
on a recorded line that American Airlines believed the "number one" stewardess had been stabbed and that
hijackers had taken control of the airplane cabin. There was no mention from American Airlines' dispatch
that indicated the hijackers possessed a firearm. After the conversation with American Airlines' dispatch,
Rosenberg called into a hotline with ZBW that connected them to ZNY, Herndon Command Center, and
the Great Lakes Regional Director. Rosenberg explained to Commission staff that the ZBW manager
informed the parties on the hotline that ZBW was attempting to have the military scramble fighters but was
unsuccessful. Rosenberg commented that he is not sure who else, or what other organizations, may have
been on that conference call. Rosenberg questioned the Command Center for further information regarding
military involvement.
Rosenberg noted for Commission staff that his conversation with American dispatch was to
receive information on whether or not AA 11 was an ongoing emergency or hijack. Rosenberg's career
experience led him to believe that AA 11, as a hijacked aircraft, would probably land in Cuba. He noted to
Commission staff that he told one of the TMU staff to call the air traffic arrival and departure towers for
information regarding AA 11. He also noted that he thought Kennedy or Newark airports would be the only
airports of use for the airplanes if in fact they were experiencing some form of emergency.
Rosenberg recollected that Pete Mulligan was speaking on one conference call regarding AA 11,
and that Bruce Barrett was listening to the same hotline as Rosenberg.
Rosenberg noted to Commission staff that the ATCs lost the primary target that was associated
with AA 11 at approximately a position 15 miles west of Kennedy airport, and there was a report of an ELT
(Emergency Locator Transmitter) signal. Rosenberg next remembers a female voice on the phone call he
was monitoring that informed him CNN reported an aircraft struck the WTC. Rosenberg commented that
even at this point it was "unfathomable" to thinkthe plane had hit the WTC. He thought Newark Tower
delivered the first news of the event. Rosenberg noted to Commission staff that after he heard of the first
incident on 9/11 he gave his phone and responsibilities to Ricky Bell, and left the building. Rosenberg
explains to staff that he has a son who is a pilot, and was too emotional to continue in his position that
morning.
Rosenberg recalls from the time he spent at TMU on the morning of9/11 that the controllers were
looking for a primary target, presumably AA 11, at 29,000 feet. Rosenberg explained that a controller can
estimate the airspeed of a primary target by judging the distance a target skips between radar sweeps. He
disagreed with the notion that the descent of the aircraft would indicate a drop in airspeed. Rosenberg
commented that the aircraft would maintain its set speed since usually planes speed up when they descend.
He also noted that ZNY radar does not read altitude, and is not equipped to tell the correct flight
information on an aircraft without the mode C.
Rosenberg commented that requiring all planes to immediately land the morning of9/11 probably
saved many lives. He noted as well that the successful process of landing the planes quickly and safely
saved lives.
Rosenberg told Commission staff he can not comment on UAL 175 since he had left the center by
the time UAL 175 struck the south tower. .
Military and the FAA:
Rosenberg noted to Commission staff that even prior to 9/11, the FAA had telephone lines to
Northeast Air Defense Sector (aka HUNTRESS), and Giant Killer [Commission staff believes Giant Killer
is a Navy operation that controls the east coast low altitude airspace]. Rosenberg does not know who
answered those lines prior to 9/11, nor does he know if those entities could authorize a fighter scramble.
Rosenberg continued by commenting that prior to 9/11 the FAA centers had very little awareness on how to'
communicate with the military. His only approach would have been to call the command center at
Herndon, Virginia. He also noted that his knowledge of the location of air defense capabilities was limited
to Otis AFB, Langley AFB and Atlantic City [Commission staff is aware that Atlantic City was not an
UNCLASSIFIED
active air defense base on 9/11]. Rosenberg further commented regarding military notification that he is
not sure who had the direct responsibility for seeking military assistance, but he does not believe it is the
responsibility of the center's military operations specialist (MOS).
Post 9/11 Rosenberg explained the procedure for handling events that indicate a hijack or other
type of in-air security situation is to give information into the DEN line (Defense Events Network), and he
is also aware that the military party that monitors the DEN line is responsible for the decision making from
that point. Rosenberg noted he only has the authority and responsibility to inform the DEN line. Rosenberg
noted his hope that the entity "on the other side" of the DEN line has more awareness and intelligence then
the TMU at ZNY.
Procedures prior to 9/11:
Prior to 9/11, if a hijacked flight is on the ground the pilot signals that the flight in an ongoing
hijack by putting the aircraft's flaps down. If the pilot is speaking on frequency the pilot can use the term
"trip" to signal the hijack to the controller. If the flight is in the air the pilot may also squawk the hijack
notification frequency of "7500".
Prior to 9/11, if the flight was not communicating (Nordo) and had its transponder off Rosenberg
would still not refer to the flight as a hijack. If the flight had a significant deviation from course Rosenberg
would consider it an emergency condition. Rosenberg believes ZBW did not know if AA 11 was
experiencing a mechanical emergency or a hijack, and Rosenberg passed this information to McCormack.
Concluding Remarks:
Rosenberg noted to Commission staff the need to inform passengers of ongoing air traffic events,
so they can best handled the circumstance. He believes that no matter where an event is taking place, all the
"appropriate" people should be immediately informed so they are able to increase their vigilance.
Rosenberg noted that ACAR is a silent communication system that covertly signals a flight cockpit with
information from the airline company.
Rosenberg also noted that now that it is known an attack can happen from within national borders
the communications with the appropriate decision making parties are viewed as essential and quick. He
noted that there is now an immediate military response, and in his opinion none of the parties involved are
complacent again.
1111Z0£fIOI~~/
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD
@
with Paul Thumser
Date: Tuesday, October 1, 2003
Team Number: 8
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Background
Thumser has extensive experience as a pilot and as an operations supervisor. He was
chief pilot for a light commuter airlines and in October 1981 for a variety of reasons he
left the flying world and was hired in October, 1981 as an air traffic assistant. He started
at NY TRACON and moved to New York Center in 1989. He ultimately became an
operations supervisor in Area B and was supervising that area on 9-11. He reported
through the operations supervisor to the Operations Manager in Charge (OMIC), Bruce
Barrett who ultimately reported to Mike McCormack. On 9111 McCormack would have
reported to the acting AEA501 at Eastern Region, Rick duCharme.
Observations based on pilot experience
EL T. An Emergency Locator Transmission (EL T) cannot be triggered by a pilot in a
B767. ELTs are tested at 00-05 of each hour. On a B767 impact would be the only way
to trigger one. The ELT heard on 9-11 could have come from anywhere--121.5 civilian
243.0 military. A lot of times when an ELT is received outside the testing time a pilot
will report that they set it off.
RCC (Rescue Coordination Center). The RCC is operated by the Air Force and they are
the contact for credible ELTs ..[Staff Note:. We visited the RCC and they receive all
ELTs; so many in fact that they are a nuisance and they have special procedures and
software to manage that.]
Parameters for an ELT for that type of airplane (767) to be set off due to a hard tum or a
hard landing aren't credible. The sensitivity setting on those ELTs is not low. For
example, on the Egyptian air crash into the ocean there was no ELT set off. Thumser was
the midnight supervisor, and therefore the OMIC that night. He vectored an airplane to
investigate, and that plane did not pick up an ELT. Based on that example and others he·
judged it would have to be a serious impact to set the ELT off.
Supervisory Responsibility Prior to Hijackings
There is detection equipment when airplanes are within 5 miles horizontally or 1000 to
2000 feet vertically of each other. An alann goes off and a print out comes through at the
watch desk area. One went off that morning prior to the unfolding events of the day.
When such an alarm goes of the controller of record has to be relieved from that position
and an NTap - a computer printout with targets, altitudes and times - is retrieved in order
to match the times and altitudes to check if a controller has made an error. If it is
concluded that there was less than required separation, then the voice tapes are checked
to see what the controller and the pilot said. Airways facilities checks the voice tape.
Because of an occurrence that morning Thumser put Ivonna Dowis in charge of Area B
and Thumser began the investigation of operational error. The Error that Sector R39had
that morning did not have anything to do with the events of 9-11.
At about 0835 EDT Bruce Barrett informed Thumser of possible hijack and Thumser
went back to Area B.
AAll
Mark Merced Sector R56 controller and Ivonna briefed Thumser on what was happening.
And Thumser retook charge of the area. Merced started tracking AAll while having
conversations with Boston Center. Thumser could only hear one side of the
conversation.
The last known altitude for AAll was flight level 290. Everyone is aware of that and
Thumser finds out about it. Protecting flight level 290 then becomes the controller
objective, not allowing anyone within 2000 ft, vertically of that altitude keeping in mind
there had been no radio contact with AAll for 15 or 20 minutes. It was a primary target
only with a major course deviation.
AA 11 was not supposed to come through the New York area. Although Thumser did not
know it was destined to LAX, the AAII flight plan was not through ZNY airspace. The
people (other sectors, other centers) who needed to know did and New York Center was
.tracking the primary. R42 controller, Dave Battiglia, started a track on AAl1.
In order to partially validate that track Thumser asked Merced to take Eagle936 to Flight
Level 310. Vectored with a slight adjustment, the Eagle went just to the left of the
American probable track 10 to 15 miles northwest of LaGuardia. The Eagle did not spot
AA 11. It was maj or trouble that the Eagle flight did not see AA 11. They had high
confidence if AAll was at flight level 290 the Eagle would have spotted it.
Thumser became extremely concerned because of the high volume of traffic at all
altitudes in the ZNY New York City airspace. His sense of urgency translated to all in the
area, according to his recall.
When Thumser first got to the area had only heard of a possible hijacking-NORDO
aircraft, shut off transponder, and off course. At that time he had received no information
of the threatening communications.
He told the Sector 68 controller, controlling departures coming down out of LaGuardia
and Kennedy, that AAII may enter his airspace. He also told other sectors in his area.
He then went back to Merced and learned that the primary target was lost over
Manhattan. Radar coverage is overlapping in ZNY so he thought the plane has gone very
low. He told the whole area that the primary target was lost and that they didn't know
lat/long/altitude or anything else.
UA175
At that exact point Dave Battiglia informed Thumser of the lost UALI75. The data block
was there but it was no longer tracking altitude. The block went into coast after 4 radar
returns (48 seconds) .. The first four hits after a loss, based on history, are projected by the
computer. Thumser noticed the UAL175 data block going to coast track.
Dave Battiglia called a few seconds later and informed he is not communicating with
UALI75. They then notice on Battiglia's screen the limited data block on a different
code. Battiglia says it is UALI75, but it has changed altitudes.
Mike McCormick is in the area now. UAL175 [as a limited data block] starts to descend.
They tell Sector 39 that UALI75's limited data block may be entering its space. That was
1Oor 13 miles before UAL 175 turns to the southeast east. They had a good fix on
altitude, unlike AA 11. The Mode C transponder was still on.
At that point the area was informed that a "small airplane" had hit the World Trade
Center. The information Thumser had at that time was - had a hijacked airplane (AA11)
that lost primary directly over Manhattan so he immediately equated that it was AAII
that hit the WTC.
But now he was dealing with UALI75. Safety and control in Area B is compromised, so
Thumser tells everyoneto stop all traffic in Area B. UAL175 is turning at this time and
there is chaos in the Area related to the attempt to clear all traffic in UALI75's path. At
the point that UAL175 is 20 miles southeast of Allentown, [Note: Thumser had access to
detailed charts depicting the flight paths ofUA175 and AAll that were posted on the
wall] turning southeast and descending. That was an extremely abnormal situation.
His awareness of the UAL !75 hijack began at the beginning of the tum to the Southeast
and told Dave LeCates to scramble McGuire. [His recall] He didn't recall saying "I
think this is a hijack." McGuire doesn't have fighters, but was thinking something was
going to happen, and he was reaching for any possibility to get military assistance. After
Thumser'r original statement was consulted Thumser says he told LaCates to scramble
McGuire after the northeast bound tum ofUALI75. While handling the descent of
UALI75, he said "tell them [tower] he's coming." He wanted to help stop the plane,
somehow. He even had a thought of running another airplane into it at that time. It was a
bizarre enough situation to tell someone to scramble.
LeCates never acknowledged or responded. He recalled conversing quietly to LeCates, he
didn't say loudly as he didn't want to disturb area. Thumser also told staff, "If I had
authority ... knowing what I know ... with the background I have .. J would have shot that
plane down."
When working at Kennedy he had worked hijacks and had used procedures in place to
provide fighter escort. The Paine Stewart Lear jet incident is another example. Had been
done in past. When asked if part of the procedures was the ability to shoot down aircraft,
Thumser thought it would have to be directed by the White House. [Staff Note: Staffhas
since learned that the only possible hijack Thumser could have worked was a February
1993 Lufthansa incident. He cited the Stewart incident only as an example, not as an
incident that he worked.
If there hadn't been the preceding AAII event, Thumser would not have thought
UALl75 was a hijack. He would have thought it had a serious equipment problem and
would land at Kennedy. Kennedy has a large maintenance base. In the old days would
have treated it like an emergency and would have told Kennedy, possibly Newark to get
ready. [Staff Note: That statement is belied by what he next said.]
About 20 miles Northeast of Potsdam, UAL175 made its tum to the North and Thumser
was now thinking it was headed towards theWTC. He then qualified that it was not at
tum towards northeast, but at the point of the tum to the southeast that he understood
UAL175 was headed towards the WTC. [This may be reconstructive on his part, in
hindsight. ]
As Thumser looked at the transcript it was 0853 EDT when he stated American 75 hijack.
AT that time he had information that a small airplane had hit the WTC, but didn't have
verification that it was AAll. UALl75 was in a high rate of descent, was traveling 350
or 400 knots and headed towards the ground. They lost target soon thereafter and nearly
instantaneous heard of the second WTC hit.
Area B Controller Meeting
Thumser recalled that after it the immediate situation was over they shut down traffic and
combined sectors on the Center floor. Other people were tasked to watch Area B' s
scopes and Robert Ott, one of the office managers, was tasked to guide Area B
controllers through a recall process. It is not abnormal procedure to give statements iri
such situations. Ott gave Thumser and Area B controllers direction not to call home or
friends. Ott sequestered everyone in a conference room.
They went to an old operations room and Marty Fournier, with Bob Ott, recorded
statements by controllers--Mark Merced, Dave Battiglia, Chris Tucker, Tony Palmieri
and Thumser. For whatever reason they wanted the statements recorded That is rarely
done. Thumser gave a verbal recorded statement. He recalled that he did not want to say
everything because of what else was in room. [check tape] Thumser posed no obj ection
to Staff listening to his statement.
Other Comments
Thumser had never heard of the possibility of a terrorist using a plane for a suicide
mISSIon.
Assumed the chief and the deputy were on the phones relaying all the information.
Looking at the [post-facto] hijackprofile and what they did, it seemed simple [in
hindsight] to project where the hijacked airplanes were going. He reiterated he thought
UAL175 was going to hit WTC about seven minutes before impact.
It was like [watching someone Jdriving the wrong way down the street.
"What I thought it was going to do was conjecture, not fact."
Hij ackings in General

Pre 9-11 controllers would receive communication from the pilot about the hijack--code
words or a specific transponder code. Neither of those things happened on 9-11. Other
ways to detect or suspect a hijack--not talking to ATC and/or extremeiy off course.
Without communications nothing could be confirmed, however.
Pre 9-11 the controller would receive the communication - pilot reports hijack - get the
information and report to the area supervisor. The area supervisor would report to the
watch desk and the OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge) would follow up. He doesn't
believe anyone below the OMIC would do the follow up.
Prior to and on 9-11, concerning NORAD and NEADS, Thumser had reasonable
awareness and thought it would take 5 or 6 phone calls to get there and they probably
would have called an air force base.
He was not familiar with Dynamic Simulation training concerning hijackings and had no
computer or other training for hijacking. Operations supervisors do not go through the
same training as controllers. Controller were only to a) get information and pass it and b)
do what thepilots ask to do.
There were very few hijacks pre-9-11 for a controller to respond to in the real world. He
recalled no exercises or drills-there was very little emphasis and drills. He had no
knowledge of any exercises or drills sponsored by the FAA or the military and certainly
none with multiple hijacking events.
Post 9-11 he hasn't personally gone through any such training, and does not believe
controllers have gone through any either. The only review they've gotten is what to do in
case of a known hijacking. He emphasized that on 9-11 they were only told of a
"suspected hij acking".
Nevertheless, Area B was treating both UAL175 and AAII as a hijacking, though not
confirmed. No one said to Thumser don't say it's a hijack until it-is confirmed a hijack.
AAII Rebirth
He never heard any rumors of that sort concerning AAll, but did hear within New York
Center that it might not have been AAll that hit the WTC. Personally, he made the
logical assumption that it was AAII. You wouldn't see a fire from the WTC if a small
aircraft hit it. He didn't hear anyone say anything about it not being AAII hitting the
center and doesn't recall anything from outside the path of the AAll track still being
airborne. He heard nothing heard about a plane from Poughkeepsie being lost ..
Does not believe he wrote an AAll statement for the accident package. Usually facility
that has control of the airspace or the airplane that is involved in the accident does the
incident. AA 11 originated in Boston; he is a little surprised that they didn't ask him for a
statement.
The last known AAll Mode C (transponder) altitude was flight level 290. It is possible to
transit from Boston Center air space into NY TRACON air space without passing
through N ew York Center air space.
Recommendations and other Comments
Security at gates, security at airports (ramps, cleaners, maintenance, fuelers) is
pmportant- that's where access to planes is. Clamp down on security in ramp area. The
Air Traffic Control perspective is that very little that can be done except cooperate with
the hijacker. If a situation similar occurred-within minutes to New York-it would be
very difficult without already airborne combat pilots with authority to shoot down.
Cooperation is better now with the military, with the NEADSINORAD direct line. There
could be additional hotlines distributed throughout, but Thumser is not confident that
every operational supervisor should be given that responsibility.
Pre-9-11 military communications were very difficult. The relationship only dealt with
aircraft in and out of warning areas.
Thumser believes UAL175 might have had an updated transponder that could not be
turned off. Here his reference is to the original UAL175 code 1470 that became 3020,
then a minute later 3321. He posed the rhetorical question, "why tum 4 knobs when you
could tum it offwith one switch?" And then continued, "does that seem an attempt by
United Airlines pilot to signal, hijackers to shut off, or c hijackers change code for
confusion?" The transponder is right to the side of the pilot and in Thumser's flying
experience the first digit would have been changed first.. Even switching one digit would
have caused a limited data block to display on controller scopes Transponders and codes
are taught early in flight school. The hijackers would have known the mechanics.
MrKt)~'OI&¥J~
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD

@
with Peter McCloskey
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Sandy Lane, FAA General Counsel, Mark DePalma,
NACT A Representative
Background
McCloskey reported to ZNY on November 2,1982, and was assigned to Area B. He
subsequently worked in the airspace and procedures office, for three and a half years as a
traffic management coordinator and is now an air traffic controller in Area D. On 9-11
he was working as a traffic management coordinator in the Traffic Management Unit
(TMU).
Events of9-11
That morning McCloskey was assigned as shift coordinator and arrival director and dealt
with flight restrictions and rerouting accomplished at the watch desk. He was at the
position throughout the morning .
His first notification of unusual air traffic was a phone call from Boston at 0829 EDT,
followed by a conference call with Cleveland Center and the FAA Command Center at
Herndon. The ZNY and ZBW participants were not actual air traffic control areas, it
was all within the traffic management units; it's a hotline that patches all facilities
together through the command center:
A target aircraft had shut off its transponder, made a hard left tum near Albany, and
wasn't being tracked by ZNY. It appeared that there was also criminal activity and the
aircraft was a possible hijacking. He immediately told his supervisor, Pete Mulligan.
Everyone at first thought he was kidding, but got serious very quickly. Mulligan called
Herndon for more information, McCloskey did not listen to that conversation.
When McCloskey first tried to pull up on the target on a scope he didn't see it; too many
primary targets. So had to hone in on a position north and listen for Area B to give more
precise information. He called Areas Band C to inform them of the hij ack, based on what
Boston said--hard left and due south, 180 heading. That path would have entered Sector
56, Area B, or could have entered Sector 34, Area C. The Controller-In-Charge Area B
confirmed that UAL175 reported that AAII passed below his position. That information
allowed McCloskey to then track AAII as a primary target. He didn't have the call sign
on his screen, but knew it was AAII based on the Boston information. Whe he acquired
the target it was probably 30 miles north of Kennedy.
Chaos started. McCloskey called Boson backand spoke to the shift coordinator position
in traffic management. Everything was handled through the command center. He learned
that the hij ack was confirmed, that Boston Center said they heard something that
confirmed a hijack. McCloskey notified Area B that an airplanewas headed their way.
He called Washington Center to inform them and called Tracon New York as well.
Determine speed on a primary by the way they track and the actual spacing between the
lines on the trail. Can leave up to 5 histories. Can adjust it to none, or anything that's 1-5.
Spacingbetween these histories gives an idea of where going. Radar updates every 12
seconds. 5 histories is a minutes worth of information.
He received a phone call from someone at watch desk about an ELT(Emergency Locator
Transmission) in the vicinity of lower Manhattan (NY Tracon). When that report came in
the target was gone. Then word came in that something hit the WTC, a small airplane.
McCloskey hoped that was true but didn't really have a chance to think. Area B
Controller-In-Charge (Ivonna Dowis) came around comer and told him about UAL175
lost.
United 175
McCloskey Immediately brought the airplane up on the radar screen. He found the non-
Coast data block based on what Dowis reported about a 3321 beacon code. He told Staff
his recall was that since AAII might have been plane that hit WTC, and that 3321
beacon was headed towards lower Manhattan, there was a major problem.
He called NY TRACON who looked for the 3321 target and picked it up. He told them
he thought it was UAL175 and gave a "heads up, here comes another one." Next he hears
was the plane crashed, he had no idea where. He immediately hung up since there wasn't
anything else to say.
He learned from people in cafeteria who were watching CNN live that another tower had
been hit and had no doubt which aircraft had hit which tower. He shared that opinion
with Pete Mulligan, "everybody" up front assumed the first one was AAl1, but there was
no confirmation. But when the United hit, "we didn't need confirmation." Bruce Barrett
was at the watch desk during the whole process. He did not know if Mike McCormack
was there or not when second plane hit.
Military Assistance
Boston Center did not mention that military assistance had been scrambled for AAII. H e
was not aware of the procedures to obtain military assistance for a hijack. Air traffic
procedures would be to render any assistance asked for by the pilot and notify supervisor.
He had no knowledge of what supervisors do in hijack situations. His knowledge is based
specifically on the role of the controller. There is no separate training to man a position at
the Traffic Management Unit (TMU). Everyone in TMU is a controller.
Additional Points
Pre-9/11 they had computer-based instruction and classroom instruction in air traffic
procedures, to include hijacking scenarios. Post 9/11: hijack procedures received no real
change instructions. Would still do whatever is necessary to accommodate aircraft, and
notify supervisor. Prior 9/11 - as ATC would detect a hijack by 7500, by verbal or by the
code word.
He thought all communications with the Command Center Herndon, ZBW and the
outside hard line to NY Tracon were recorded.
McCloskey was shown Chapter 7: 76.4 - never received training regarding contacting the
military by the book. He was not aware of any military assistance requested with either
AA11 or UAL175.
It is virtually impossible to detect a hijack without the pilot telling you since so many
other things are taking place. Personally, if they are going off course, he is "going to ask
" - "do you realize you are off course?" He has not received any training to be more
aware in a formal sense. FAA has provided mandatory briefing items to be read and
initialed. But as a controller there really isn't anything to be-done to make you more
aware. He was shown N7110.332. Didn't recall it.
McCloskey was not really familiar with the Northeast Air Defense Sector and what role it
played. Prior to 9/11 he had never participated in any joint FAAlmilitary exercise. Not
post either. No idea of military ROE on hijacks. Unaware of escort and engage order
officially, but assumes they have that authority now. FAA could have a role in vectoring
military aircraft to target. After 9/11 military and FAA had a lot of "knee jerk" reactions.
A lot of general aviation pilots strayed into prohibited areas post 9/11, and this involved
military scrambles, which went smoothly. After 9/11 there was a NEADS hotline in the
TMU. NEADS would ask "do you deem it necessary to scramble?"
He made the phone call that put NY at ATC zero. After UAL175 hitthe second tower,
they were stunned for a second. He spoke with Pete Mulligan urging him to stop traffic.
Pete gave the instruction to do so. He advised Wanda at the Command Center that ZNY
was going to ATC zero, immediately.
UAL175 and AAl1 were out of the normal equation--changes code, no radio, serious
course deviation. He could think of various problems that might be involved, but because
of the hard left tum would think something very serious going on. In the position AA11
made that hard tum he might think he had a problem and 'was turning to land in
Philadelphia. Pre9/11 McCloskey would not have thought hijack. He would have
thought some kind of mechanical electrical error since there was no notification, covert or
overt from pilot.
McCloskey didn't give any verbal statements that day. He had no knowledge of the
morning's meeting. There is an internal turf war; controllers don't like traffic
management since they perceived the position to be useless.
He made a statement for the UAL175 accident package, but was never asked for a
statement on AA 11.
Rebirth of AAll
He'had heard of that possibility. No one knew for sure, so they continued to try and track
where both AA 11 and UA 175 were. There was no confirmation that they were the ones
that had hit the towers. An effort was made at the watch desk to learn from NY towers
that had a view of the WTC. They kept looking for a fast moving primary in that
vicinity. Only way to get confirmation was a reliable visual report. ELT went off in lower
Manhattan. Don't know in hindsight if anyone saw AAII was first impact. Can look back
at the primary data to see when the plane actually stopped. From Herndon or FAA
headquarters all calls went to either Bruce Barrett and Pete Mulligan.
He did not hear any rumors of AAII hitting the Pentagon. When he heard about it he
thought the lost plane over Indy was the one that struck the Pentagon. McCloskey never
, thought AA 11 had gone that much further south.
Recommendations
He would disassemble the Command Center at Herndon. "They're useless." Controllers
cannot "control" hijacks. 9-11 was a nightmare for controllers, they can only watch.
Military options are limited. IF a hijacker was headed towards a nuclear plant, perhaps
better to shoot down? That was way outside the duty of the controllers .. FAA has to
coordinate with the fighter aircraft but Herndon should not be involved. Any decision
making should be made facility to facility. Such procedures worked much better before
there was a Command Center.
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center interview
with David Bottiglia
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: FAA General Counsel Representative Sandy Lane and
Julio Enriquez, NACDA Representative
the interviewee. Please refer to the recorded interview for a complete account.
Background:
Bottiglia started with the FAA on April 1, 1982 in Oklahoma to train and has been at
ZNY his entire career. He was originally assigned in Area G, which is now D, and first
worked the oceanic side of the operation. He is certified in all north Atlantic sectors ..
Bottiglia moved over to area B and has been a "Full Performance Level" controller in
that area for at least 10 years.
Events of9-11:
There are no specifically assigned sectors in Area B. ZNY controllers are assigned a
sector when they report to the radar area. He had just returned from a break, and took
over as controller at Sector 42. On any given shift controllers rotate areas with breaks
which are variable and occur every one-half to two hours depending on the work load.
His shift started around 0630-0700 and was scheduled until 1500.
Sometime after 0800 Bottiglia was sitting at R42 (East Texas) when Mark Merced, R56;
Kennedy High Sector - which is adjacent to R42 - asked Bottiglia to put on all limited
(all primaries). Since Positive Controlled Airspace (PCA), space above 18K feet altitude,
only monitors transponding aircraft, it takes a specific action to display primary-only
targets.
American Air Fligb t 11:
Mark pointed to a target on the scope and informed Bottiglia it was AAll. Merced also
told Bottiglia that Boston center thought it was a hijack. Bottiglia started a primary track
on the target, and named it "AA lla". The "a" distinguishes for the computer a track
different from the previously established track (AA 11). A controller starts a track on a
primary by going to the target on the screen and then typing in information at the
keyboard.
Since there was no altitude data associated with the AA lla track, Bottiglia asked other
airplanes to verify AA 11's altitude, He specifically questioned USAIR 583. Normally a
pilot would not have his TCAS (traffic collision avoidance system) display set for ten
miles out, but the VSAIR Pilot changed his TCAS range to check for the target. He did
not see AAll. [Staff Note: this is 1240:49Z based on the FAA R42 transcript.]
UAL 175 "checked in" on the same frequency asAA 11 "a bit" earlier than this point,
but did not mention anything at the time about hearing unusual transmissions. VAL 175
later informed Bottiglia of suspicious transmissions. A Supervisor had taken everyone but
VAL 175 off the Boston frequency that was isolated for AA 11, and UAL 175 did not
want to broadcast on the same frequency as AA 11 since then he would be heard by those
in control of AA 11, according to Bottiglia. His explanation of why UAL 175 delayed in
relaying the information he had heard from AAII was that once R42 was heard searching
for AA 11 the pilot ofUAL 175 would feel more comfortable broadcasting what he
heard.
Bottiglia immediately called Boston; he had not heard any of the suspicious broadcasts
from AAl1. He also told his supervisor, Evanna Dowis, what was transpiring. His main
conduits of information to others were Dowis and Merced.
At this time he recalled that two airplanes were broadcasting ELTs (Emergency Location
Transmissions). An ELT can be set off manually but usually happens in case of a crash. It
is always difficult to determine the origination of an ELT. The higher up the target the
further away it can be heard.
Bottiglia was trying to relay the ELT information to Dowis, but then AA 11 disappeared
altogether as a primary track. Bottiglia noted to Commission staff that it was his opinion
at the time that AA 11 was no longer at high altitude. He explained that once an airliner
goes too low en route controllers lose the track. So when AA 11 disappeared he did not
think anything about it hitting a building.
Bottiglia noted to Commission staff that Mike McCormack was standing nearby, and was
on the phone. Dowis was relaying information to McCormack. Thus Battaglia is sure
that McCormack had been informed of the hij acking.
After Bottiglia lost the radar feed on the primary track on AA 11, Bottiglia thought AA
II was flying at a low level, but had no real idea what it was doing. After this point he
started getting reports about a fire at the WTC. Even with this new information, his
thought process was still that AA 11 was hijacked and was flying low level. The last
confirmed altitude on AA 11 was Flight Level 290, and Bottiglia attempted to verify that
altitude. Merced had vectored an Eagle flight right over the AA 11 track to try and get an
altitude. Delta 2433 reported it could not see the airplane. Bottiglia believed D2433
passed overhead AA 11, and this served to support his thought that AA 11 was
proceeding south at low altitude. This information, the ELT signal, and the report of the
WTC fire were all suspicious; but Bottiglia notes he did not know or think that AA 11
had crashed. Bottiglia heard someone say that the WTC fire may have been caused by a
small commuter aircraft that struck the tower. So, even with all these factors plus the
"disappearance" of AA 11, he did not associate AA 11 with the impact at the WTC.
Battaglia explains this to Commission staff by noting that just prior to the impact he was
only relaying information out. He had no awareness of any information regarding
military notification, or of what Boston was doing, or of what was going on away from
his screen. Once he realized that there was no apparent traffic conflict with AA 11 he
dealt with other traffic that needed to be handled.
A few airplanes reported smoke from "good distance" away from the towers, and
Bottiglia overheard McCormack in a conversation saying a small twin engine aircraft had
hit the WTC. In Bottiglia's opinion, a person would have to be very familiar with
airplanes to tell exactly what caused the first impact.
United Airlines Flight 175:
According to Bottiglia, it was right around the time of the confusion about what first hit
the WTC that UAL 175 went into a "Coast" track. Bottiglia tried to raise UAL 175 on
the correct frequency. He also called Kingston Sector to see ifUAL 175 was on the
frequency there. Bottiglia noted· that despite the Coast track and lack of communication
he did not think anything was really going wrong with UAL 175. According to him,
sometimes pilots "just don't listen". The mind set at the time was controllers very rarely
considered a lack of a pilot immediately communicating back to them as a problem.
Normally a pilot is probably 'just doing something more important". Pre-91l1 the actions
ofUAL 175 were not unusual; and it was not unusual for transponders to change code
during a flight.
Bottiglia checked his frequency to see if it was still working - a lost transponder code
could also be a technical problem at the controller end. He also called Kingston Sector to
check ifUAL 175 was still on that frequency, it was not.
Bottiglia then saw a change of altitude with the frequency change on UAL 175, and he
talked to Sector 10 (the sector he would normally hand offUAL 175 to). He had been
"flashing" (a method of alerting controllers on other scopes) UAL 175 to Sector 10 to
inform the Sector 10 ATC that he believed flight UAL 175 was broadcasting a 3321
code.
Bottiglia became frightened when the code changed to 3321 and he saw the target
climbing. Bottiglia did not think at first that UAL 175 had been hijacked, but when the
code changed to 3321, and the flight started to shift its altitude without proper direction
from its controllers, he started to think UAL 175 might be another hijack. [Staff Note:
When UAL 175 went into "coast" track it was not squawking 3321. There was an
intervening code change that lasted about one minute before UAL 175 squawked its final
code of3321.] Other factors, such as the hijack of AA 11 and the WTC fire - though
Bottiglia stated he did not know it was AA 11 - caused him to be more concerned
regarding UAL 175 than he normally would have been.
Bottiglia told McCormack the uncertain status ofUAL 175. McCormack immediately
said into his phone "we might have multiple hijacks". Bottiglia does not know who
McConnack was speaking with.
On the radar scope at this point Bottiglia views only the information he has associated
with VAL 175 - the data block in the coast track. He explained that the coast track does
not immediately disassociate from the target. Even though a target switches to an
unknown squawk the coast will stay with it for a number of radar sweeps. But if another
plane squawks the same code, the information of a code that was associated with the
target in question drops off. On the radar screen the call sign VAL 175 stayed on the data
block of the track that was on the correct heading.
When Bottiglia "flashed" (gave notice of a target) VAL 175 to Sector 10 he did not feel
a need to speak with VAL 175 again, and was intent on looking for AA 11. There were
many imperative air tracks near Kennedy, so he was not necessarily' worried about the
western portion of the sector [where VA175 was].
Back to American Air 11 and questioning in conjunction with the transcript:
After 1250 there was no AAll primary, and Bottiglia had heard about the fire at the
WTC. He again stressed he was not thinking AA 11 was the plane that impacted the
tower. He had heard that it was a small aircraft and had heard of an aircraft in question
that departed from Poughkeepsie - both overheard from Mike McConnack. VS Air gave
a report that it might have been a commuter plane that impacted, which was based on a
radio report. So, again; at that point the information that was informing Bottiglia's
perspective on the air traffic situation at the time led him to continue thinking AA 11 was
a hijack and was south of the city at a low altitude.
Bottiglia noted to Commission staff that in his career he may have experienced one
hijack, and he believes that hijack landed in.Atlantic City. Despite this one memory of a
hijack, Bottiglia noted that, in his mind, hijackers always went south tothe Caribbean.
Eventually, as the events of the day progressed, he associated AA 11 with the plane that
struck the Pentagon. He did not know definitely until media reports confirmed AAll had
hit the WTC. He heard that information after it was confirmed that VAL 175 hit the
WTC. He did not change his mind about AA 11 hitting Pentagon until after the media
broadcast, and stated to Commission staff that at that point he might have been home
already. Bottiglia told Commission staff that the Management of ZNY removed the
controllers from Area B ten or fifteen minutes after the events of the morning of 9/11. On
that morning Bottiglia thought it unbelievable that a commercial airliner could have hit
theWTC.
Back to UAL17S and questioning in conjunction with a copy of the transcript:
Bottiglia recalled that around 1251z he asked VAL 175 to recycle its transponder; it did
not respond, or do so. He tried numerous ways to contact VAL 175 and thought there was
something seriously wrong after speaking to Sector 10. He was thinking VAL 175 was a
hijack in his 1253z comment (from the transcript of his position) and told the facility
chief he "lost" VAL 175.
At that time he did not equate the 3321 code with VAL 175.3321 was climbing
abnormally. He had an altitude from 3321 data block and it was climbing higher than the
assigned VAL 175 altitude. There was no call sign on 3321 and he saw the call sign for
UAL 175 on the screen as a coast track. The coast track data block showed UAL 175's
altitude, but coast altitude would not be the real altitude; he then flashed Sector 10 the
information,
Bottiglia did not know if the transponder code 3321 and UAL 175 were two separate
planes. "Sometimes" controllers lose targets on planes for periods of time; so Bottiglia
noted there could have been a radar technical error.
The factors that caused him to conclude that UAL 175 might be a hijack were: the AAII
hijack, WTC on fire (two separate events to him), and the "missing" transponder
information on UAL 175.
The Boston Center information that there was a communication from the cockpit of AA
11 that indicated the hijackers were controlling "more aircraft" was never passed to
Bottiglia. He did not know about that infonnation until Tom Brokaw brought it up in an
interview with Bottiglia recapping his participation in the tracking of the aircraft on 9/11.
When Battliglia first saw the 3321 code, he did not know what was happening, but
realization of the seriousness of the course deviation occurred when the target started
turning towards the city. He realized there would be a conflict with traffic and attempted
to separate traffic. Delta 2433 identified the code 3321 from a visual as a United B767.
Battliglia then was "95%" sure the aircraft transmitting a transponder code of 3321 was
in fact UAL 175. He relayed that information to McCormack.
Battliglia tried to clear other air traffic from the path ofUAL 175. He was supposed to
verbally communicate to the traffic but did not have the time to perform his usual air
traffic control functions, track UAL 175, and try and establish communication with UAL
175 all at the same time. Handling of all planes except for the function of tracking
transponder code 3321 was taken from Bottiglia and distributed to other controllers.
According to Bottiglia, it was either Laurie Barrett or Jimmy Kurz who called NY
TRACON and informed them of the situation.
According to Bottiglia, New York Center personnel were active in the area, and evolved
in the process of clearing air traffic in response to the deviation of AA 11 and UAL 175.
He noted to Commission staff that there was almost a collision with an aircraft in Sector
55. Bottiglia continued to watch the 3321 target tum north towards city. At one point the
target 3321 descended and then gained altitude. Bottiglia hoped this was a sign that the
pilot was attempting to control the flight of the aircraft. But then it descended ten
thousand feet in approximately one minute. Bottiglia monitored the descent of the aircraft
he believed to be UAL 175, but that was transponding 3321 until it dropped below the
radar field at approximately 2200 feet.
Bottiglia heard someone say "oh my God he's down on the next hit" - which means that
someone who monitored the rate of descent knew the flight would be at ground level by
the next radar sweep. Battliglia stated that he is "pretty sure" that "everyone" (the ZNY
staff) was watching UAL 175 when it hit the WTC. 'Bottiglia noted to Commission staff
that he believes he knew the aircraft was headed towards the WTC when it went off his
screen. He noted that "someone" came in who was in the cafeteria watching CNN and
said a second airplane hit WTC. He immediately equated that report to UAL 175.
Area B· stopped taking traffic after the second collision.
Military Procedures:
Battliglia was not aware of procedures to notify the military, or of procedures to ask for
military assistance in the case of a hijack. His only training was to tell his supervisor in
the case of a possible hijack. Bottiglia understood that the Traffic Management Unit
(TMU) had responsibility to make decisions regarding procedure and contacts in the case
of a hijack. At the working position his job was to relay information through command.
He is "pretty sure" that TMU was communicating to the military information and
awareness regarding UAL 175. Bottiglia postulated that after UAL 175 disappeared TMU
might have known AA 11 was the first collision at the WTC. Bottiglia noted that he was
not getting all the information that the TMU had, and still assumed it was a smaller
airplane. Dave LaCates was in Area B as a supervisor and Battliglia did not speak with
Bruce Barrett.
VAL 175 factors prior to crash:
Bottiglia noted to Commission staff all three factors that led to his concern over UAL
175: he was not speaking to the aircraft, and then he associated the new code 3321 with
UAL 175, and then noted it had significantly deviated from course. He reiterated to
Commission staff that he probably would not have said it was a hijack without awareness
of the other factors that day. He had previously worked an incident of an aircraft that lost
all power, and that experience influenced his thought process on the morning of 9/11:
When a B767 loses all power there is not much time to get the airplane on the ground.
The pilot would not speak with ground for fear that communication would take away
power. Therefore, in the case ofUAL 175, Bottiglia had previous experience that
informed his thought process that UAL 175 was experiencing some mechanical error. He
also thought the flight may have lost hydraulic fluid, so the heading towards the city
might be for an emergency landing at Kennedy.
Training:
Training on Dynamic Simulations involves airplanes that squawk hijack code 7500,
inferring that the airliner pilot is in control of the aircraft. Bottiglia continued his point
by noting that controllers were never presented with a scenario or practice exercise that
was more challenging than this. The procedure that he had learned was 1) to see the
"hijack" warning flash on the scope; 2) to verify with the pilot that he ist'squawking
7500"; and 3) then to tell the supervisor for the area.
Bottiglia noted to Commission staff that he has never been involved in a real life military
intercept on a hij ack and has never participated in a simulation that would vector a
military aircraft towards a target. He noted to Commission staff that he understands
usually HUNTRESS and/or GIANT KILLER are contacted by the FAA to coordinate air
traffic controls for the warning areas. He knew of the Northeast Air Defense Sector
(NEADS), but did not know that the call sign HUNTRESS was for NEADS. He was not
familiar with a number to call other than NEADS. He was not aware of how to contact
NORAD.
Bottiglia explained to Commission staff that his training was not to continue contacting a
hijacked aircraft, and that FAA ATCs were trained not to verify a hijack unless on a
signal from the pilot.
Other Comments
After the second impact his supervisor ordered a "shut down" of the air space and
instructed the controllers not to allow 'any aircraft to transfer into ZNY airspace. This is
referred to as being at "air traffic control zero".
After this point Bottiglia recalled meeting with Martin Fournier and other staff from Area
B. Bottiglia noted that "everyone" was "in shock" and management attepted to get
statements on the day while events were still "fresh in mind". All attendees made verbal
statements on tape as to what happened on their scopes. Bottiglia stated the he does not
have an issue with Commission Staff requesting and reviewing that tape.
When questioned regarding the UAL 175 tum to the right on its southwest leg, Bottiglia
answered that this tum was most likely the aircraft's auto-pilot returning the aircraft to a
heading in J80 (the air route "jetway" it would travel on) over the Sparta VOR. Once
"Sparta" is programmed into autopilot as a point en route the plane itself would self
correct in order to tum back to the correct route. Bottiglia commented to Commission
staff that he does not believe UAL'175 went offroute until it started to climb and tum
southeast; Bottiglia opinioned that the hijack pilot probably did not change the autopilot
until after the tum.
Recommendations
Bottiglia noted that it is his understanding that Boston Center has the capability to pull its
voice tapes (recordings) quickly, but that it takes time to do that at ZNY. He noted that he
did not hear a pilot ask ifUAL 175 was still flying until after reviewing the SATORI.
Bottiglia believes there should be a passive mechanism on aircraft that triggers a hijack
alarm at the appropriate agencies. He offered the suggestion that pilots could log on and
off of the flight controls when they leave the cockpit.
uNCLASSIFIED
Type of event: Interview with Evanna Dowis, CIC, Certified Professional Controller
Team Number: 8
Location: fAA New York Air Route Center, Ronkonkoma, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred Johnson, FAA Counsel, Mark A. DiPalma,
President, NATCA ZNY
NOTE: Please refer to the tape recording of the interview for a complete account.
Evanna Dowis was hired by the FAA in the fall of 1997. She trained for 2 112years and became a
certified professionalcontroller in 1999. Prior to 9/11, she was trained and certified as a controller-in-
charge. Prior to working at ZNY, Dowis worked for the U.S. Air Force and the Department of Defense as
an Air Traffic Controller ("ATC"). Specifically, she worked as an ATC at Edwin's Air Force Base,
California, from 1989 to 1994. Subsequently, Dowis worked at the air traffic control tower at Buckley
AFB.
Dowis explained the distinction between an FAA area supervisor and an FAA controller-in-charge
("CIC"). An area supervisor is a full-time position with administrative responsibilities. The area supervisor
must evaluate employees as well as oversee the entire operation in his or her assigned area. A controller-
in-charge's duties are solely operational.
On the morningof9/11, Dowis started as a CPC and later became the CIC of Area B when the
Area B supervisor left the area. She recalled that she first became aware of air traffic problems when
Boston Air Route Center (ZBW) notified Mark Merced, a ZNY CPC assigned to radar Sector 56 (Kennedy
VOR 18,000 feet and up), that an aircraft with the call sign "American Airlines 11" (AA 11) had been
hijacked. Boston Center reported AA 11 was NORDO (i.e., no radio communications) and had no
transponder broadcast (i.e., no "mode C" altitude information). Boston Center attempted to help the
controller at Sector 56 gain recognition of the primary target, but it was very difficult for the controller to
verify the correct primary target on his scope. Dowis noted that, without any information regarding the
altitude of AA 11, the primary target could be registering something at 1,000 feet or 30,000 feet - "it was
just a blip". Dowis immediately relayed the information she and Merced received from Boston Center to
Bruce Barrett and Pete Mulligan who were working in the OMIC area. They informed her that ZBW had
already called them and advised them about AA 11. .
Dowis then returned to Area B where she, Merced and Dave Bottiglia, the controller who
monitored Sector 42 (the airspace to the west ofR56), asked other aircraft to look in the area where AA 11
was believed to be in an effort to identify the altitude and location of AA 11. They were told at least one
UNCLASSIFIED
aircraft previously had advised the FAA that AA 11 had been spotted at approximately 29,000 feet. This
information may have come from a pilot's TCAS (traffic collision avoidance system). FAA controllers do
not have the TCAS system. Dowis advised controllers who worked sectors adjacent to the sector where
AA II was located that there was a possible hijack at approximately 29,000 feet, and to clear other aircraft
from its path. She continued to relay updated information about AA 11 to the TMU desk and the
Operations Manager-in-Charge ("OMIC").
United Airlines Flight 175 ("UAL 175") entered sector 42 of New York's airspace, and made
radio contact with radar controller Dave Bottiglia who worked the R42 position that day. When UAL 175
entered Bottiglia's sector, its operations were normal. After Bottiglia transmitted a second request over the
radio for information about the location of AA 11, the pilot ofUAL 175 advised ZNY he had heard
threatening communications on his frequency when UAL 175 departed from Boston. It was apparent to
Dowis that UAL 175 did not to relay this information until Bottiglia (R42) asked about AA 11. In
subsequent interviews at ZNY, commission staff was told that the pilot ofUAL 175 may have waited until
he arrived in New York's airspace and was confident the hijackers of AA 11 could not overhear his
communications before he advised ZNY about the hostile transmission. At that point Dowis stated the
controllers were intensely focused on AA 11 and where it might be headed.
Subsequently, Dowis says there were reports ofELT signals (i.e., emergencylocator
transmissions) in the area. Dowis explained that the CIC must report ELT signals to the OMIC with certain
exceptions. For example, it is not necessary to report an EL T signal when the pilot advises the FAA
controller that he accidentally emitted the ELT signal. Moreover, the FAA will designate certain time
periods on selected days wherein pilots are permitted to test the aircrafts' ELT signals. During these time
periods allotted for EL T testing, there is an understanding in the aviation industry that the FAA will not
report the EL T signals to the appropriate authorities.
Shortly after the initial reports of an EL T in the area, Dave Bottiglia at R42 noticed that UAL 175
went into a coast track (an aircraft goes into coast track when its assigned transponder code is changed by
the pilot independent of any action by FAA controllers). Bottiglia advised Dowis that UAL 175 went into a
coast track. He further advised Dowis that he had lost radio contact with the pilots ofUAL 175. Dowis
relayed this information to the OMIC. With regard to UAL 175, the aircraft was assigned transponder code
1443 upon departure. At some point while it was in the airspace designated Sector 42, Bottiglia noticed
that UAL 175 changed its transponder code to 3321. Dowis stated she was not certain the aircraft with
beacon code 3321 was UAL 175 because much of her attention was focused on the hijacking of AA 11.
Nonetheless, she assumed UAL 175 was associated with the beacon code 3321.
Bottiglia and Dowis then observed UAL 175, now in coast track and associated with transponder
code 3321, turn off course. Dowis then informed the OMIC that UAL 175 had deviated significantly from
its intended course. As UAL 175 turned eastbound towards New York City, Dowis recalled the OMIC said
that fighters had been scrambled. At that time, Dowis believed the fighters mentioned by the OMIC had
been scrambled for UAL 175. She continued to observe UAL 175 on the radar screen while other
controllers turned other aircraft from the path ofUAL 175 to avoid a mid-air collision. Dowis described
the atmosphere as quite hectic.
With regard to UAL 175, Dowis stated that "hijack" entered her mind when the aircraft lost radio
contact and deviated drastically from its intended course. Dowis commented to Commission staff that prior
to 9/11 controllers seemed to lose radio communication with aircraft on a regular basis. However, she
noted the loss of contact was usually only for a few seconds. Dowis also commented that occasionally
there is a loss of radio contact when the aircraft entered "blind spots" in certain geographic areas. With
regard to loss of radio contact, the controllers sometimes ask the pilots to go to backup frequency. Shortly
thereafter, the controller calls the aircraft and asks the pilot to "IDENT" - which means that the pilot can
hear the ATC, but the ATC can't hear the pilot. When the pilot sends an "IDENT" signal, three bars and a
line appear on the controller's scope. Other responses by a controller may include: asking other aircraft if
they can communicate with the aircraft in question, asking the OMIC to call the aircraft's company,
broadcasting on the guard frequency, and immediately notifying the CIC or area supervisor.
UNCLASSIFIED
Dowis explained that the radio frequency changes each time an aircraft enters a new sector. She
noted that, at .times, pilots get confused when they hear radio frequency changes intended for another plane.
Equipment failure (loss of transponder) is not frequent. According to Dowis, an aircraft's loss of
transponder rarely occurs. Dowis also commented that an aircraft's deviation from course is unusual and
infrequent.
Dowis stated that the loss of both radio communication and transponder in her view would
indicate equipment failure and an imminent aircraft crash. Even prior to 9/11, when an aircraft deviates
significantly from its course in addition to the loss of radio communication and transponder, Dowis said she
would immediately think a hijack had occurred.
With regard to VAL 175, there were two mode three code changes in a short period of time, and it
did not take long for her to conclude the plane was probably being hijacked. She recalls she told the OMIC
this. She showed him the new transponder code 3321. He had already heard from ZBW that AA 11 was
hijacked. Because of the infrequency of hijacks, Dowis commented it was surreal and unbelievable that
there could be a second hijack.
Dowis does not believe that ZNY had the situational awareness to definitively identify that the
first impact at the WTC was AA 11. She does not think it was confmned until after the news reported the
event correctly. Vnlike the uncertainty regarding AA 11, Dowis was confidant that VAL 175 was the
airplane that hit the WTC" As she tracked the aircraft she thought it was going to crash into New York
City. Her assumption that VAL 175 struck the WTC was not confirmed until approximately thirty tio sixty
minutes after she was relieved of her duty.
Dowis commented that based on past ATC experience it was an institutional assumption that
hijacked aircraft would land and make demands. Controllers, according to Dowis, are specifically taught to
look for the 7500 hijack code, and to inform their CIC or area supervisor. They are also taught to monitor
the hijacked aircraft and provide sufficient separation for other aircraft. The controller is also supposed to
be discreet with the pilot. According to Dowis, there was an assumption before 9/11 that the airline pilot
was flying the plane and not the terrorist. Dowis' experience with the FAA, military and DoD all included
some form of yearly hijack response training. Training would include computer based instruction and a
review of procedures and rules. All the training scenarios Dowis had experienced involved the hijack of
only one airplane.
Dowis described the procedure for FAA notification of a hijack to the military as follows. The
ATC should notify the CIC or area supervisor regarding a hijack. The CIC or area supervisor is responsible
for notifying the OMIC. The OMIC, in tum, notifies the military.
Dowis noted that there have already been changes at ZNY since 9/11. There are now military
blocks/caps over airspace. She also believes the OMIC has a direct line to the military. Memorandums
issued on a regular basis instruct controllers to be constantly aware of current procedures.
With regard to the relationship between the FAA and the military over the division of airspace,
Dowis stated that the military for the most part gets what it needs from the FAA. She acknowledged that
the military can make an ATC'sjob harder, but the military's requests are accommodated quickly in
today's world. '
With regard to AAll, Dowis is not aware of any reports within FAA or the military that AA 11
may have been airborne after 8:46 EDT. Dowis stated the controllers had accurate and timely situational
awareness that VAL 175 hit the WTC because the transponder code 3321 associated with VAL 175
allowed them to track altitude as the aircraft descended. The altitude information was not available for
AA 11. This factor contributed to the lack of situational awareness.
Dowis stated the Area B personnel probably would have concluded VAL 175 was hijacked absent
any awareness of that AA 11 had been hijacked. Dowis does not know if the ROC, the FAA headquarters
or if Herndon Command Center were notified as events surrounding UAL 175 developed.
UNCLASSIFIED
rfA<.o LW I~ q~{
@

Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Ronkonkoma, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred Johnson, FAA Counsel
NOTE: Please refer to the tape recording of the interview for a complete account.
Background FAA Experience
James Kurz was hired by the FAA in April 1983. After a brief assignment at
Washington Center (ZDC), Kurz came to ZNY. He has been a certified professional
controller (CPC) since 1985. Except for a two year military detail in 1992-93, Kurz has
worked at ZNY for approximately 20 years. Kurz has been assigned to the ZNY Traffic
Management Unit ("TMU") since the late 1990s. As a coordinator in the TMU, Kurz
manages the air traffic flow and coordinates ground stops, delays and various flight
activities with other FAA in route centers, tracons and towers. Kurz communicates with
Herndon ATCSCC on a daily basis.
The Eventsof9-11
On 9/11, Kurz was assigned to work the day shiftat the TMU. His shift started at
either 6:00 a.m. or 7:00 a.m. According to Kurz, it was a normal morning shift until
Evanna Dowis or someone else from Area B advised the TMU that a hij acked aircraft
with the call signAA 11 may be headed towards ZNY from Boston Center. TMU was
further advised that AA 11 was a primary target and NORDO (i.e., FAA had lost radio
contact with the aircraft).
Kurz noted that, unless another aircraft has visual contact with AA 11, you can not
ascertain the altitude of an aircraft that has lost its transponder and radio communications.
Kurz had no coordination responsibilitiesin particular with regard to AA 11 because he
was a departure coordinator. Kurz said he may have spoken with someone at New York
UNCLASSIFIED
Tracon regarding AA 11. He stated ZNY personnel at the Watch Desk tagged what they
assumed to be AA l l on its scope and tracked it as a primary target. Kurz did not know
whether New York Tracon or NEADS obtained a trackon AA 11 as a primary target
prior to impact.
According to Kurz, prior to 9-11, he would have concluded that an aircraft with
no transponder signal, no radio communications and traveling significantly off course had
been hijacked. Therefore, he would have assumed that AA 11 was hijacked without the
information he received from Boston Center. Kurz first thought AA 11 was headed over
the Atlantic Ocean towards South America. He believed it was a traditional hijacking
whereby the pilot would seek ransom or political asylum. Kurz stated he had no reason
to think otherwise since, prior to 9-11, he had never heard of a scenario whereby
terrorists would use aircraft as weapons of mass destruction.
Personnel from ZNY never communicated with anyone in the hijacked aircraft.
Moreover, no one told Kurz about the substance of the hijackers' threatening statements
that ZBW controllers overheard.
Kurz stated ZNY lost the airplane in the vicinity of New York City. He recalls
someone at the OMIC or STMU position said Northeast Air Defense Sector was tracking
AA 11. He could not identify the ZNY employee who was communicating with NEADS.
Kurz also did not remember what transpired at the Military Operations Specialist
("MOS") position. Kurz called the control towers at JFK and Newark Airports for
information. They reported there was a fire at the WTC. He became aware that
"something" hit the north tower of the WTC ("WTC 1") when he saw media reports on
television. Based on the information he received at ZNY, Kurz believed that AA 11 hit
WTC 1 before it was confirmed.
When Kurz worked the MOS position at ZNY, he did not frequently interact
directly with NEADS. He recalls that he coordinated events with the Central Altitude
Reservation Facility ("CARP") Unit when he was the MOS. Kurz was familiar with the
locations of the military warning areas in the National Airspace because he worked the
MOS position. Kurz also was aware that warning areas are reserved for military
exercises and training.
Kurz explained the FAA procedures in place prior to 9/11 for securing military
assistance during a hijack. Kurz understood that someone from ZNY would call NEADS
and ask for help. Neads in tum would scramble military aircraft to track the hijacked
aircraft until it landed safely. When Kurz worked the MOS position, he recalled he was
involved with military "practice scrambles" on a few occasions.
Prior to 9-11, Kurz had limited knowledge regarding the function of Otis AFB.
He was not aware of the locations of Air Force bases where alert aircraft were housed on
9-11.
Hijack of VAL 175

UNCLASSIFIED
Kurz became aware there was a problem with VAL175 when someone from Area
B advised him the aircraft was off course, "Nordo" and was emitting a transponder code
different from the one it was assigned. Someone at ZNY may also have stated that VAL
175 was in a descent. While Kurz had limited awareness of transponder code change, he
was aware that the FAA could track an aircraft's altitude as long as the aircraft was
squawking a transponder code.
Kurz was on the telephone with someone from the Newark Airportcontrol tower
when UAL 175 struck the south tower of the WTC ("WTC 2"). While it was not
confirmed until perhaps the following day, TMU personnel assumed VAL 175 crashed
into WTC 2. (Kurz changes this position when he is interviewed on October 1,2003 and
questioned about a transcript that depicts a conversation he had on 9-11 regarding the
events of that day).
Kurz stated he heard reports of possible additional hijacks over a "hotline"

telephone that was on loud speaker in the TMU-Watch Desk area. Specifically, after
WTC 2 was struck, he recalls hearing a report of a bomb on board an aircraft headed
westbound near Indianapolis Center. With regard to the crash at the Pentagon, Kurz
initially heard the explosion was caused by a small plane that was loaded with explosives.
He also heard the FAA had lost radar contact and radio communications with UAL 93.
Kurz had no recollection regarding a report that Delta flight 1989 was a hijacked aircraft.
Kurz advised commission staff that he, Bruce Barrett, Pete Mulligan and Marty
Rosenberg were at the TMU Watch Desk on 9-11.
Kurz stated that he probably participated in the ZNY ground stop and the national
ground stop. He said he would have advised the tracons of the order to ground stop and
the tracons in tum would have informed the area control towers. Kurz vaguely recalled
that he informed the "Philadelphia Towers" about the ground stop. He stated that the
national ground stop order would have come from Herndon Command Center. He
further stated the FAA would have informed all interested parties about the ground stop
through dissemination of a "General Information" or "GI" message.
While Kurz heard the term "SCAT ANA" prior to 9-11, he did not recall hearing
anything about the implementation of "SCAT ANA" on 9/11. (When SCAT ANA is
declared, the FAA sanitizes and cedes control of the national airspace to military
authorities).
Relationship Between FAA and Military
While Kurz acknowledged there was some competition between FAA and the
military for airspace, he maintained there was no real ongoing tension between the two
entities. He stated any tensions he had observed were limited to individual situations and
were based on personality clashes. Kurz further stated weather patterns sometimes
impact aircraft routes over coastal areas. When this occurs, it is necessary on occasion
for an aircraft to fly into warning areas.
UNCLASSIFIED
Lessons Learned From 9-11:
Kurz opined that the Domestic Events Network hotline (the "DEN" or the "DEN
line") is an effective means for coordinating a response to an air threat. Today, in the
post 9-11 environment, the FAA and military authorities have developed methods for
early detection of threats to aircraft so they can respond in a timely manner. They also
take any reports that may indicate threats to aircraft very seriously. lfthe events of9-11
were repeated today, Kurz believes the authorities would respond more quickly than they
did on 9-11. Moreover, Kurz said the FAA is trying to anticipate new methods of
airborne terrorism so they can respond appropriately. While a hijack was probably the
most severe event anticipated prior to 9-11, today the FAA thinks "outside the box".
Kurz next stated, after 9-11, the FAA micromanaged all events that remotely
resembled a threat to aircraft. The FAA does interact more frequently with the military
.today. Kurz believes FAA involvement in military training and exercises prepares the
FAA personnel to interact with the military in a real world event. After 9-11 , FAA
controllers regularly interacted with military personnel including fighter pilots during the
maintenance of fighter caps over major urban areas and critical infrastructure. These
efforts served to further improve and enhance the relationship between the FAA and the
military.
Interview of Kurz on October 1, 2003
When Kurz was interviewed by Commission staff on September 30, 2003, Kurz
was somewhat equivocal regarding his opinion of what caused the initial explosion at the
WTC. Commission staff conducted a follow up interview with Kurz on October 1,2003,
during which the participants reviewed a transcript of a conversation Kurz had on
September 11, 2001, from ZNY TMU regarding the cause of the initial WTC explosion.
After reviewing the transcript, Kurz acknowledged that he was confidant that AA 11 had
struck WTC 1 shortly after he received reports of the fire at WTC 1. He further stated his
firm belief that AA 11 struck WTC 1 was slightly undermined by reports at ZNY that
NEADS was still tracking AA 11 after reports of the explosion.
Kurz also acknowledged that the transcript confirmed he and others at ZNY
believed the explosions at the WTC were acts of terrorism before it was confirmed.
ttKOtfvl& 1~~
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD
@
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New YorkAir Route Center interview
with Lorraine Barrett
Team Number: 8
Participants - Non-Commission: Sandy Lane, FAA General Consul and Julio Enriquez,
NACT A representative
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
Barrett began here career in April 1982 at ZNY. In 1985 she moved to the flight service
station as a flight service specialist (deal with general aviation population) for four years.
She came back in 1989 and has been an air controller at ZNY since then. She was
originally assigned to Area C, but since 1992 has worked in Area B.
Barrett was assigned on 9-11 to Area B, Yardley Sector, Postion RA55 (H) handoff. [The
handoff position is the same as what Boston Center calls 'the Radar Associate position. It
is an "assistant" position used to take some of the duties away from the controller so
he/she can concentrate on managing traffic. The "handoff' or "associate" position
assignment does not mean that the controlleris less qualified. Often, managers sit those
positions to fill their monthly requirement for 8 hours on the scope. In this case, an
experienced controller, Barrett, happened to be assigned to a "handoff' position.]
Events of 9-11
Yardley Sector handled en route airspace Philadelphia to New York. The R55 controller
was Chris Tucker. Barrett was handling the transfer of aircraft from sector to sector.
Aircraft cannot enter a controller's space without a handoff or a point out. A point out,
itself, is not a transfer of control, just a notification that an aircraft is passing through
another sector's space.
She was working a 7-3 shift and she was involved with UAL 175. She called over to
Sector 42 to climb some planes to higher altitude. Dave Battiglia, the Sector 42 controller
said he couldn't give higher authority because, Barrett assumed of the AAll flight. She
started looking at her scope to find any target she could and saw one quick primary; then
it disappeared. Until Battiglia's communication of difficulty she had no awareness of a
hijack or a problem with AAll. Battiglia said that Boston Center was looking for a hijack
that it had lost.
Somewhere around 1247z UAL175 changed transponder code. She heard McCormick in
the background speaking on the telephone. At this point or a little later, UAL175 turned
off course, and descended towards her sector. Chris Tucker started "turning" planes.
When he turned to the transponder for UA175 it was on at a different code. You could
see exact track and altitude. He was squawking 3321 but that code was assigned to a
Delta plane. UA 175 now became an unknown target. She told a different Delta plane to
take any actions possible to evade the plane squawking 3321. Dave Battiglia told people
about no communications with the UALI75. See didn't see UAL175, but would have
recognized the coast track.
Going Thru the Transcript
Tucker was very busy watching airplanes and separating them. At some point UA175
turned off transponder code and started turning towards Tucker's air space. When he saw
3321 beacon code at approximately 0853 EDT Tucker told Sector 09 to watch for target
because it was headed their way. Tucker ID'd the aircraft as an unidentified flight, 3321
on the computer associated to a delta flight.
The sector had two planes vectoring towards the same space as 3321. They did not
connect 3321 as being UAL175 and didn't have real awareness of what was happening at
the WTC. They Just had heard a plane from Boston was lost, then began to wonder what
the result for the 3321 code would be. They were aware that the second plane that was
missing was a United plane. Three planes that crossed the 3321 code path didn't accurate
information so the target could be definitively identified. [Staff Note: Keep in mind, the
Controller pair Tucker/Barrett had made the association of the 3321 code to a Delta
flight.
After watching the SATORI replay [SATORI is an automated means of depicting
historical flight data to replicate the picture seen by the controller.] she did notice the
3321 code pull away from the UAL175 coast track. She also noticed they hadn't flashed
the coast target to Sector 10, a normal procedure.
The continued to direct planes away from the 3321 beacon code. It is fair to refer to as a
hijack, in retrospect. She doesn't even know at what point they confirmed the hit on the
WTC.
During their vectoring activities is when the hijack plane made a notable tum into the
city--short left, rapid descent. Tracon handles 17K feet and below and they called west
and south Tracon, Tucker and Barrett lost the aircraft at 2,000 feet and Tucker knew the
loss location was where the WTC was. At that point she switched over and took the
controller position.
Tucker knows some general aviation, a private pilot. Eight minutes after the target made
the Yardley tum to the north it was recognizable that it was UAL175.
First she heard it was a private aircraft out of Stewart, by Poughkeepsie. When that
information came to the room someone, possible Jimmy Bouliber, R68 controller had
said that it had struck WTC. She remembers people coming into the room from the
cafeteria with the information that the WTC had been hit for the second time. She
remembers that she heard that roughly five or ten minutes later and assumed it was the
target they had tracked; a commercial aircraft had hit WTC.
The 3321 track was moving very quickly, and the decent was so rapid. She remembers
hearing someone say a United hit the towers.
Regarding AAll, she only recalls someone saying it was a small pane. After the
Pentagon crash SHE assumed it was AA11 that had hit the pentagon.
After second aircraft hit the WTC, even the news broadcast was saying it was a small
plane that hit the first one. That view prevailed until it was confirmed. That AA 11 was
the first plane.
Area B meeting
She remembers that Marty Fournier and Bob Ott were to keep them concerned controllers
informed. They thought AAll had hit the trade center, and that a different American
Airlines flight hit the Pentagon.
The meeting was convened about 0916 EDT (check time on tape); she was told to go to
the briefing. She was on the H position until 0916,' and then the R position until 0930,
then went upstairs for conference. Written statements came thereafter. She doesn't
remember if a verbal statement was taken. She remembers Fournier and Ott were pushing
for a statement. She has no problem with Commission Staff reviewing any taped verbal
statement she made.
Training
Pre 9-11 there was hijacking content in exercises in the Dynamic Simulation lab, but they
were not extensive exercises. Training was vastly different than the actual hijacking of
airplanes on 9-11. In training scenarios the pilot was still in control of the airplane. All
exercises were based on that given. There were also scenarios when the pilot would use a
code word or the pilot would verbally explain if the situation allowed ..
She has participated as a controller with military aircraft out of McGuire Air Force Base
and Warren Grove (military airspace just above Atlantic City). She wouldn't have
known how to contact NEADS then, but they now have a direct line to Huntress Controll
(NEADS).
Pre 9-11 she had never heard of anything like what happened that day. Planes out of
communication, NORDO, happened all the time and still happens but a little less. In the
past two years the pilots have gotten better.
Loss of transponder would happen relatively often. Sometimes planes switch codes
relatively regularly. The procedure is to ask the pilot to recycle. This is a non-urgent
procedure if the controller is talking to airplane. Never in her career had both loss of
communications and loss of transponder happened at the same time. She had also
experienced course deviations, but never all three factors together
Recommendations
There weren't any air traffic problems on 9-11. Events of the day were a security issue.
H PRM!JIlft~1
Commission Sensitive ®
Type of event: Interview - Martin Fournier, Operations Supervisor Area C
Team Number: 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
Fournier began his career with the FAA on June 24, 1986. He originally worked at Oakland Center, then
transferred to ZNY. He specifically worked on the preparation of the accident package regarding AA 175.
He is currently the Operations Supervisor for Area C ZNY, and has been assigned there since November
2002, prior to that he was a Quality Assurance (QA) Support Specialist.
During his assignment as a QA Specialist, Fournier's main focus was to insure the quality of air traffic at'
the facility. He assured that the minimum requirements were maintained at the facility, and provided
briefings as to specific aircraft functions. Aircraft accidents, noted Fournier, are for the most part due to
pilot error. It is for these accidents that most incident and accident files and packages are prepared.
Events of 9-11
On 9-11 Fournier was serving as QA Support Specialist. His office was on the second floor at the training
wing at the east side of the building. The QA offices have no access to radar scopes. Fournier vividly
remembers being in the tape room investigating a pilot incident. While he was listening to voice tapes,
Terry Kirk (?), the office assistant, told him Kevin Delaney wanted him to go and watch CNN since an
aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. Fournier was under the impression it was a small aircraft. He
started watching CNN live in the cafeteria, which began filling with employees. As he watched CNN, he
saw a second aircraft go behind the towers. "It looked fake for some reason." The speed of the aircraft was
500 or 600 mph, and he noted that the reason it looked distorted may have been because aircraft "just don't
fly that fast under 10,000 ft." He had a hand held phone with him and was in communication with Delaney.
He called down to the conference room and realized there was a serious problem, but he stayed in the
cafeteria and reported to Delaney what was being covered on CNN. Until the second collision Fournier still
thought the first impact was a small airplane.
After the second impact Fournier went to the air traffic managers' conference room. He knew the first
move as QA Specialist in an accident response was to start pulling tapes. Controllers started being pulled
off position in Area B, so Fournier began trying to gather information as quickly as he could. Many of
those people just wanted to leave. He went down to the conference room and a Telcon was ongoing. There
was an open microphone with "maybe command center and maybe headquarters." He heard reports of
possible missing airplanes, but doesn't know where that information came from. Mike McCormack and
Kevin Delaney were definitely in the conference room at that point.
Session with Area B Personnel
Fournier told Staff that the Area B ZNY staff (the area with primary involvement with AA 11 and UAL
175) were "sequestered" in a conference room shortly after the first two impacts. The meeting may have
been to "figure out" some details of the attacks, but was very unclear on details regarding the meeting.
Commission stafflater learned more on this meeting (Refer to the MFRs for Kevin Delaney, Dave LeCates
and Mike McCormack for further details. In Mike McCormack's interview, Stafflearned that McCormack
specifically tasked Fournier to gather information from the Area B controllers, and to facilitate their
emotional needs). .
[Staff Note: Fournier was the first individual interviewed at New York Center. He was defensive and
somewhat confrontational in his approach. Wolfgang Lurch, the Union Representative present challenged
the Staff as to the lack of notification and preparation time. Staff got to the bottom of the meeting
referenced above by the time the suite of interviews at New York Center was completed and saw no
practical reason to reinterview Fourner at the time of the visit on his clearly established basis for direct
knowledge of the Area B session. He ran the session.]
Paul Thumser, a supervisor, was the Controller-In-Charge on duty in Area B at the time. Thumser was
concerned for the well being of the controllers. Fournier approached him to fmd out what happened. With
concurrence from the union president, Thumser got an operations managers' room to talk to Area B
personnel to find out what happened. Fournier noted that Bob Ott was possibly one of the support
managers, as well as possibly Mark DePalma. Also in the conference room, to Fournier's best recollection,
were George Tracy of Quality Assurance, Mark Merced, a controller for Area B, David Battiglia, another
Area B controller, Anthony Palmieri, Evanna Dowis, Christopher Tucker, and Lorraine Barrett. The
complete list of the people present is in the accident file.
Fournier tried to put them at ease as best as could. It was an extremely difficult situation. They were
repeating the event they had just witnessed. He advised that personal statements would be required. He
does not remember if everyone in that room did provide a statement. The statements that would have been
required by the accident package would be those people who talked to the aircraft or were operationally
involved in some way.
American Air 11 and United Air 175
Fournier was not sure who was first notified of the situation aboard AA 11 without looking at the accident
package. He does remember that there was some communication to HUNTRESS [Northeast Air Defense
Sector] from possibly the OMIC, though he does not know which sector called first. Fournier thought it
could have been Area B, though he does not know who picked up the call. He recalls a call from Boston
Center to Area B but is not sure if that was the first AA 11 notification without looking at the timeline.
Regarding identification of AA 11 being the impact, Fournier knows there was coordination from Boston to
New York. He noted that this coordination extended through/to HUNTRESS and the OMIC. He believes
Boston informed New York Center (ZNY) of a lost beacon and primary target only, and thought that relay
of information placed AA 11 at a last known altitude ofFL 290. The tape may indicate if ZNY wasn't exact
on the correct identification of the primary track for AA 11. He noted that Area Basked UAL 175 to
identify AA 11 for aircraft type and altitude, and that VAL 175 did not confmn whether or not it was an
American flight. Fournier does not believe that the identification of AA 11's primary track was 100%
certain when it crossed the boundary from Boston Center to New York Center.
After the second impact. and after he left the cafeteria, Fournier recalls no specific effort or discussion to
identify what type of aircraft, or which aircraft hit the WTC. Fournier stated that people recounted what
they saw on their scopes and naturally "filled in the holes." Fournier thinks he remembers Jim Bouliber say
that he observed UAL 175 and concluded that it was probably heading towards Manhattan. He does
remember that people identified UAL 175 as the second plane to impact, but does not recall the
dissemination of this information.
Fournier does not remember the Pentagon collision. Regarding VAL 93, he does not remember anything
specific, or that there were inquiries regarding a "missing" Delta flight. He does not remember any
uncertainty regarding which aircraft collided at which site, and only remembers information he came across
during the investigation.
Fournier remembers there was a Telcon ongoing with nationwide facilities to monitor and attempt to assure
that flights were remaining on course, but he does not recall anything specific in regard to AA 11 and VAL
175, and does not remember when it was specifically determined that those two flights had been lost.
Fournier recalls that VAL 175 had a code beacon change but was on course, and he recalls an extreme
amount of attention trying to locate and contact AA 11. Fournier noted that a loss of tracking an aircraft
drastically upsets the system, but that controllers do their best not to allow distractions as they work traffic.
Concerning the code change, when VAL 175 went to coast mode, Fournier recalled that Dave Battiglia
then realized the flight had taken a strange change in its course.
Fournier remembered that Boston did call and report to ZNY that AAll was primary target only and at a
last known altitude ofFL 290. He stated he does not know if it was an ATC or the OMIC who were
informed initially. Fournier then stated to Commission staff that it might have been an accepted assumption
at ZNY that the first lost flight was AA 11.
Other Information
Fournier does not remember communicating with either American orVnited Airlines. He does think there
was communication between these companies and ZNY.
When pressed on the effort to identify what struck the WTC Fournier stated that he "just doesn't know
what exact steps were taken". Further, Fournier does not recall ifthere was an effort to find out what
happened. Fournier was not sure whose responsibility it would be to gather accurate initial information
regarding AA 11. He does think that it was determinedlconfrrmed that company (American Airlines) was
missing an aircraft quickly; though he does not know what steps would be taken to verify this information.
Fournier remembers no specific efforts to determine what happened to VAL 175.
Fournier stated that there must have been coordination between TMU and at least Newark tower to
discover what had struck the WTC. He believes that there was some discussion of "aircraft and problems",
and that call signs might have been stated.
Fournier stated that after seeing the second aircraft live on CNN strike the WTC it was "probably not" safe
to assume it was a commercial aircraft. Fournier stated that it could only be considered "a large target". He
agrees that when the second plane struck you could identify it as a fast moving commercial jet, especially
once the news networks replayed the attack in slow motion.
Fournier stated that 100% of air traffic workers would have said [prior to 9-11]that a hijack was not a
terrorist suicide mission. He pointed out that with 8000 flights in the air "right now", controllers then and
now maintain a vigilant watch over their airspace.
Fournier stated that with the benefit of two years of hindsight part of the problem on 9-11 was that Boston
Center was not positive it had a hijack with AAll. He believes that since controllers are institutionally
taught to operate with surety, then having a possible situation planted seeds of doubt and hesitation across
the air traffic system, and may have delayed action.
Fournier noted that it is his understanding that VAL 175 heard questionable communications of "everyone
remain seated" from either the ground or from departure. He also noted that with hijacks you clear the
airspace and "let them do whatever they want - block his way from everyone else."
Fournier noted that he had received briefings and refresher training - requirements and procedures with
handling hij ack and what to do if they need to be intercepted. He stated that he did an intercept "out west
years ago" for a hijack.
Fournier does not think there is anything that can be done from an Air Traffic Control perspective to stop
an aircraft from hitting something. In his opinion, he does not think things could have been handled
differently even if the awareness was different. He notes that there exists a higher awareness today, but
does not know if anything could still be done.
Fournier would like to see the cockpit for aircrafts impenetrable. He stated to Commission staff that prior to
9/11 the "FAM trips" (familiarization trips) that used to be taken by FAA controllers in the cockpit of
airliners as a method for increasing the dialogue between the controllers and the pilots had been cancelled.
He stated that "99.9%" of pilots are territorial about cockpit, but that the thin door of the cockpit prior to
9111 was inadequate.
Fournier explained the difference between Controller-In-Charge and Area Supervisor. Both perform the
same operational function but the "Controller in Charge (CIC)" can not counsel employees. Other than tht
the two terms are interchangeable=the difference in the relationship to the employees is a labor relations
issue. Area supervisors are official supervisors and are excluded from the bargaining unit, Controllers-in-
charge are not.
The VA 175 Mode 3 Code Change
What the controllers sees on his scope depends on what type of filters the controller has selected. [Staff
Note: This explains why all statements by controllers contains a statement that they did not observe what
the exact settings were on that day.] When an aircraft is on the assigned beacon code the data tag display
seen will be correlated by the computer. When the code broadcast by the aircraft does not align with the
one assigned, the controller will be able to see on his radar screen that the data tag and the radar track are
not in sync. Tthe computer will "project" the most likely course of the aircraft based on the radar for a few
cycles and then the data tag will stop tracking with the radar track.
Controllers are trained to visually know when an aircraft is not on the right code and will pick up on this
quickly if there is a low level of traffic in the airspace. What is seen by on the scope is a code different than
the one assigne, but not a separate target.
When the code changes and the computer does not recognize the associated data tag with that change, the
data tag goes into (CST) "coast" mode and separates from the radar track. A limited data block remains
with the target but only displays the last certain information of the aircraft. In this circumstance steps
would be taken by the controller to reestablish and verify contact.
A full data block displays the aircraft call sign and altitude, and, in addition, varies in display between a
computer ID, an approximate airspeed, aircraft status (hand off or point out status). After the beacon
changes the tag freezes in the coast mode and when the radar loses the aircraft's Mode C transmission the
controller looses altitude information as well.
HrtZ 0401 b ~ :;< ~
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD ®

with Mike McCormick, Air Traffic Manager,
Team Number: 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
McCormick was hired by FAA in February 1982 as an air traffic controller at
Philadelphia tower and reached full performance level in May 1984. He proceeded
through a series of training, area supervisor and quality assurance assignments and most
recently was, in tum, the assistant air traffic manager, and promoted to his current
position in 1998.
Responsibilities
An Air Traffic Manager has responsibility for running all center operations and
exercising general supervision of 500 employees. Concerning air traffic management,
David LeCates is his Deputy. All operations managers and support managers report to
LeCates. From the controller up the chain-of-command is: Air Traffic Controller,
Operations Supervisor, Operations Manager, LeCates, McCormick. There are 5
Operations Managers, who rotate the duty of OMIC, Operations Manager In Charge. The
OMIC has specific responsibility for an entire shift; all the operational guidance and
supervision for that shift.
Events of 9-11
On 9-11 the OMIC position was manned by Bruce Barrett. He had overall operational
supervision for New York Center for the day shift Below Barrett are positions
interchangeably called Operations Supervisor In Charge (aSIC, or OS) and Controller-
In-Charge (CIC) An OSIC is a trained supervisor and has additional disciplinary
authorities than does a CIe who is a trained controller acting temporarily ina supervisory
in Area B where the OSIC, Paul Thumser was away [see Thumser interview] and Ivonna
Dowis was the CIC.] .
Estimated Chronology as recalled by McCormick
At about 0835 EDT he was in his office away from the Sector floor. He received a call
from Bruce Barrett, the OMIC, on a private line informing of a possible hijack in Boston
Center airspace--Boeing 767, Flight Level 290, Southbound. McCormick immediately
went to the operational floor and saw, based on projected path, the aircraft would enter
New York Center airspace in Area B. He called LeCates, also on a private line to inform
him of the possible hijack.
McCormick proceeded to Area B and observed Paul Thumser and Ivonna Dowis in the
middle of the area; both appear to be in charge and awareof AAll. He ascertained that
the Watch Desk also knew. He received a page on his text pager "confirmed hijack in
progress AALll, BOS-LAX, last known altitude Flight Level 290, transponder off, target
turned southbound after Albany. The Washington Operations Center (WOC).
He received a text message at 0845-0848 EDT from Ron Ruggeri at Eastern Region.
McCormick wrote that text down exactly and provided a copy of what he wrote down at
the time to Commission Staff. The message confirmed a hijacking
McCormick went to Thumser and Dowis and told them it was a confirmed hij ack. He
then went to the Watch Desk and spoke to Barrett and Peter Mulligan to give them the
same information. Bob Rosenberg, also at the Watch Desk said that he spoke to company
(American Airlines) and reported that people had been killed and the hijackers have
"knives and bombs". LeCates was not on the floor at the time, but McCormick relayed
the' information to him at some point.
McCormick did two things in Area B; he told Dowis and Thumser to make sure they
were communicating with watch desk and to make sure the watch desk knew to contact
the military. Back at the Watch Desk he also asked if the Command Center had been
contacted and was told it had. Peter Mulligan said he was in process of contacting the
military.
He then went back to Area B and by then LeCates was there. He informed him of the
confirmed hijack--knives and bombs, and reiterated to Thumser and Dowis the
seriousness of the situation. He also contacted his counterpart at Washington Center,
Louis Ramirez, and told him to beware.
McCormick then went to various positions in Area B, a track of AAll(alpha) had been
established and they tried to give approx altitudes between three or four radars as people
fed information. He called NY TRACON, Bob Birch, to notify him.
McCormick thought AAll was visually flying along the Hudson River and was
descending towards the New York area andthat it might attempt to land at Newark.
At that point NY tower, based on a phone call from NY TRACON, said something hit the
World Trade Center and relayed that to McCormick. By that time he heard controllers
talking loudly about UAL175. All of this was going on at the same time. He told Birch to
wait and informed him that there might be another one. At that point he got off the phone
and had received no specific information except "large aircraft" on what hit the WTC.
As he was talking with New York TRACON he was also getting reports of an ELT. Two
different Sectors told him that. His understanding of getting an ELT signal wass that they
happened accidentally or there was an accident-the vast majority are false alarms.
However they always reacted as if it was an emergency until known otherwise. The
reports he received were prior to the first impact of the WTC.
He informed Birch of the possibility of more hijacks and to not assume everything is
over. He thought that was a very good possibility from listening to background
conversation and knowing of the problem with UA175. He told Birch there may be
another crash into the WTC. That was based in part on the ELT hits before AA11 struck
WTC. After reviewing his statement he said the warning to Birch was based on
awareness of 175. His .estimates of times were based on statements arid notes taken that
day. The conversation with Bob Birch might have lasted a few minutes.
He thought was that AA11 was going to emergency land at New York. Perhaps bomb
went off so that's why it lost all electrical-radio and transponder. He thought inward
"airport." That's why he called TRACON. That's when he actually got a report of an .
aircraft impacting the World Trade Center. He thought 1) it was AAll and 2) didn't
discount the other possibilities. But his first instinct was it was the impact was a hijack
and somehow it was deliberately flown into WTC. He based that analysis on the Trade
Center bombing in 1993; there was a thought in his mind back to 1993 and that they
[terrorists] were trying to take the Trade Center down again. Thus, as Dave Battiglia tried
to contact UAL175 with no response he kept thinking it may be another one.
He did not speak externally to anyone other than Birch. He told LeCates to tum on CNN
and keep passing information.
He went to Battiglia to figure out the UAL175 issue. Battiglia and Thumser explained it
was descending and had begun turning in Eastern PA, the Allentown area. As it was
turning toward New Jersey he was thinking this was not good and, according to him was
thinking possibly Trade Center at that point. [Staff Note: As early as 0854-0855 EDT]
As it completed the second tum he was thinking Trade Center. It would be pointing
directly towards New York City, was assuming it was headed towards WTC and was
thinking it was headed to the same tower.
In his thinking he had a total of three hits, two on the first tower and one on the second.
He was thinking the two ELT reports were from 1) small aircraft reported hitting 2)
AA11 did hit and 3) 175 on its way to hit. He thought two had hit same tower and
thought 175 was going to hit the other tower.
In summation, based on ELT, reports in media, unverified unknown aircraft general
aviation aircraft from upstate New York headed to WTC-that from the controller
working New York TRACON, a report ofa helicopter lost over New York (later on
found inaccurate) he was thinking possibly a small aircraft, possibly another aircraft,
possibly yet another aircraft, possibly a 767 all into the towers. He thought it was a
coordinated attack.
Other managers reported to the floor. One of the first was Kevin Delaney from Quality
Assurance. He told Kevin to go watch CNN so LeCates could come back. Delaney had
his portable phone and McCormick told him to call on the phone, not just run back and
forth.
Attempts to Notify Eastern Region
He called his superiors at Eastern Region sometime between 0852 and 0856 EDT to
inform them of more than one hijack and another probably hijack (UAL175) headed in.
He doesn't remember which administrative people he gave this information to. He was
told that no manager was available. He iterated it was an urgent matter and said he
needed to speak with a manager immediately and asked not to be put on hold. He was
-again told no manager were available to talk to him.
Based on what administrative people was saying his was that managers were all busy
with AAll. The admin implication was that it was too busy to put his call through.
Eastern Region managers were too busy reporting upward regarding AA 11. The admin
.people couldn't break through that wall.
He was trying to reach either Frank Hatfield or Rick DuCharme and asked for them by
name. He did not get into specifics, simply saying there was more. He was emphatic that
there was more. He tried several times to get through. The call was never completed.
Easter Region managers didn't have a mobile phone number that is a cell extension from
desk. They don't have that s~e system McCormick had that allowed him to carry his
hard line on his person.
[Staff Note: We pushed McCormick at length on this issue. McCormick is a retired
Marine Officer and used to running things-being in command. He demonstrated to us
that he was, in fact, in command at New York Center, then and now. We found it odd
that McCormick could not find a way to get through and seemed to have given up to
administrative barriers. The issue is that he was trying to pass on valuable warning time
to Eastern Region which was in direct contact the Port Authority. He was not successful,
for whatever the reason.]
Back to the Narrative
It was relayed through LeCates to him that a second aircraft hit the Trade Center. He
went to the watch desk and Spoke to Bruce Barrett, Pete Mulligan, and Marty Fournier
again, asking about the status of the airports. Bruce said they may want to be ATC zero.
[Term for no departures or landings at a particular center or area.] McConnicksaid to do
it and let him know if there was any push back. At ZNY that decision is McCormick's if
he is there, otherwise the decision is up to the OMIC. At that point he was reasonably
sure in his mind that UAL175 hit the second WTC tower, in his mind that was the third
hit, because of the ELTs.
After declaring ATC zero they next needed to think about how to protect the ATC
system, the country, and the security of the facility itself. At that point he was thinking
there had been three coordinated attacks on a single target. He didn't know if that was an
isolated event or not. His ATC thought to get rid of air traffic, the potential weapons.
He had Barrett and LeCates get all supervisors and managers into a "round up" at the
watch desk to inform them ofinformation known so far. He made the decision to elevate
physical security at New York Center, to not let anyone in or out. All visitors were
escorted off the premises. And he started delegating-Barrett, air traffic; Bruce's
assistant, John Azzerone, physical security; Paul Ferril, in charge of personnel.
At 0904 EDT Bob Felser, Military Operations Specialist informed him the military had
scrambled and they wanted to know current location of their target. It seemed to
McCormick that they were asking about 175. Felser said something like ''''fighters in
air." McCormick told him it was too late.
At that time he received a phone call from Ed McCennan, (phonetic) Manager, Syracuse
Tower; a hub of responsibility for many areas. Somebody had told him to call
McCormick and he vented that he couldn't get through to Region He, M,cCennan, was
not hearing back from any appropriate person about what was going on and asked
McCormick to get on the National Telcon.
McCormick went to his conference room and dialed in on speaker. David Canoles was
there from headquarters, a high ranking administrative official within air traffic. The AT
01 on 9-11 was Bill Peacock, head of air traffic for the nation. He reported directly to the
administrator. [Staff Note: Bill Peacock was stuck in Texas that day and was not present
at Headquarters.]
McCormick reported to Canoles everything that had happened up to that point. That was
probably around 0915 or 0925, he recalled .. Probably 915. Told him of events as best
known as well as possibilities. Shortly after that people on Te1con started talking of
another missing aircraft. Look for primary. Said Dave, you know where that's headed
for? He said yeah. We've got the widows down we'll be safe. Heard fast moving primary
east bound to dc. Started counting down miles to white house. 5 4 3 2 1 and heard aircraft
turning away. Thought white house too small, and then thought it would hit capital, and .
shortly thereafter it hit pentagon. Didn't expect that. They may have given call sign or
company of aircraft on Telcon. No one on that Te1con thought it was AA11. They
thought it was a craft from out west they had lost track on . Right about same time of
pentagon hit Cleveland center got on telcon. Gave call sign and beacon code and last
known position and said it was heading eastbound. McCormack called out to the Barrett
and area c and gave beacon code and call sign and told them to look for it incase it was
incoming. Immediately said yeah track Pittsburgh headed eastbound. At that point shortly
thereafter they said had lost target.
During telcon no mention of shoot down. His assumption was that it was a controlled
flight into the ground deliberately crashed. Made assumption based on rapid loss of
altitude. Based thought on air 90.
Shown documents:
Had never seen the air piracy documents prior or post 9/11.
Had seen SSI document shown. There documents are not marked sensitive.****
Aware of a process in existence of coordinating with military in case of hijack. Knew
person would be out of Washington. The process followed at ZNY - events taking place
too quickly to go through the process that had been set up. Always good to have parallel
forms of communication going on at all times. Wanted to make sure everyone had same
or similar info to make decisions. Made attempt in interest of expediency to give them
information so they would be prepared to have orders. That way military would gain
situational awareness quicker. Does not know what the policy was intended to address.
Process would be time and resource intensive, and thus would have a natural delay.
Aware of one off the coast of Africa that was not deliberate and aware of Egyptian 990
that was deliberately flown into north Atlantic. Prior to 9/11 personal natural assumption
. would not be to 'think that a 9/11 event would happen.
Quicker get any assistance, military o~therwise, is better. In a situation where the
circumstance is for theiho be a landing in Cuba, etc intent, then time is critical, but might
be less critical then in 9/11 scenario.
Prior 9/11 had direct line capability to NEADS. When spoke of military priority to Paul
and ivonna, thought OMIC would make call on how to contact NEADS, direct or
commercial line. Was notaware that Boston had already called. AMIS - unknown.
Military radar has alt on primary? Knows they can do that, does not know where they can
do that. At one point during event Filsner said it was tough to get the number.
Procedures are much more defined now to contact military.
Thumser and scramble McGuire comment - took it as an emotional reaction to events.
Said to no one in particular. Knew there were no fighters or tactical capabilities. Were not
on hot pads or anything like that.
Was aware that on 9/11 ac did not have air defense capability for at least a year or two.
Bradley in ct capability for air defense? No. Knew they needed tactical air defense
fighters out of new England.
Spoke with region after and informed them that in between hijacking had knowledge that
WTC would be hit again. Understands that it was emotions that existed in those short
minutes. But also informed them that a better system needs to be in place. Now there is
one. Thought that perhaps someone could have been contacted through them to warn
people at WTC. But knows no warning would have changed events.
Shortly after phone with New York tracon and as walked to Dave's display to see track of
aircraft was when he realized the WTC was still threatened.
Pre 9/11 role of roc? They would then phone out information to the appropriate parties.
Assume WOC, appropriate air traffic division, flight standards, security things like that.
Official protocol to request military assistance? Center, roc, WOC, same time notifying
various eastern region elements, WOC would have own guide, hijack coordinator, then at
that level would start coordination with military: Then someone through Herndon would
call ZNY and the military cell in Herndon would coordinate.
Now, direct communication systems with eONOR, with NEADS, dens (which is
monitored), then based upon that info would develop coordination. Additionally have
combat air patrols and different times and direct coordination with those patrols. And
then air defense communication with a zone out of Washington center. Additionally have
hot phones to NEADS or CONNOR on separate phones. Or they can call ZNY directly.
Every year as part of refresher program have training on procedures for hij ack. Does not
know if there were every multiple hijack scenario testing. Prior 9111 no awareness of
faa/military/dod exercises here at ZNY. Thought believes there have been some at
Kennedy that were simulated as hijack on ground at airport. No knowledge of one with
an airborne aircraft.
No knowledge of a major power loss in an aircraft.

Herndon - prior 9/11 no knowledge of Herndon's role. Now they are plugged into
command center.
Produce log of9/11. Don't know who asked him to do that might have been Ron regerie
who drafted.
Shows chronology of events document:
Guess it would be developed in eastern region air traffic. Based on how the id facilities
and the short cuts they used. Unique to this time line at top "Richard Knowles" reference.
Data radar dump AAll McCormack confirmed hit. Maybe had already pulled NTap
(national track _ program) or SATOR!. Simultaneous loss of radio and radar considered
to be an aircraft accident (8020) unless otherwise confirmed. "Maybe not AA 11 into
WTC per McCormack" (935) - what was actually relayed "maybe not just AAll into
WTC"as said on telcon. Thought possible small aircraft, general aviation, and 175.
Guessing eastern region did notes. No knowledge of Richard Knowles or Richard Nolan.
Speculation on what's read on timeline.
For record of time line from ZNY and commission received final version of time line from
McCormack.
Area B controller sequester issue
There was too much for h im to handle alone. So he delegated to Bob Ott the
responsibility for looking after people involved with the hijacked aircraft, particularly the
personnel in Area B.
McCormick wanted them to be brought together to get an employee assistance program
counselor here, a nurse from medical. One controller offered the name of an Episcopal
priest and McCormick gave permission for him and for two psychologists or psychiatrists
to enter the facility.
McCormick told Kevin Delaney to get verbal statements, knowing that high level law
enforcement would be calling. They set up a tape recorder so that people could talk in the
open on what they saw and experienced .. In his mind that gave employees the chance to
support each other and to get a record if authorities came that night or within the hour.
No law authority ever came to New York Center. McCormick fully expected for some
authority to come quickly. He didn't reach out himself to the FBI and didn't tell
headquarters or region [that no .one had come].
The union did express some concern about the procedures but only if information had to
be given out that day. That would have been a non-standard procedure. It was Mark
Depalma, the union facility representative that expressed concern.
At a couple times that day McCormick went tothe room to check on staff. He has never
seen or listened to the tape. There was general controller concern about having to go
through the taping. They didn't want to put things in a formal way that would be used in
an investigation. There was also some worry about who would receive the tape. They
were reassured that the tape would not be used for disciplinary purposes. It was strictly to
be used for law enforcement personnel.
Some Specific Questions. Was it taped one at a time or in general groups? Probably
both. Were others present? FAA nurse, contract employee assistant counselor, two
psychologists, and Episcopal priest, a couple management officials, supervisors involved,
controllers involved.
Commission staff informed McConnack that we had asked his staff if they would obj ect
to our reviewing the tape, and that McConnack's staff for most part had no objection.
Only objection was from Kevin Delaney. Commission staffinfonned McConnick staff
that Delaney said that he destroyed the tape without ever reviewing it.
McConnick first discovered tape was no longer available when George Leonard couldn't
find it. Employees had asked about the tape in order to review it to prepare for the visit
by the Commission Staff. George Leonard asked the Quality Assurance manager, Marty
Fournier, and Quality Assurance specialist George Tracy to locate the tape.
Fournier did a complete search but did not find it. McConnick and Lecates checked the
safe, it wasn't there. Delaney told McConnick after Delaney's Commission interview
that he "destroyed" the tape.
[That could mean it was recycled. Commission Staff Did not follow up on what Delaney
meant by "destroyed"]. McConnick was glad to know that there was information on its
loss. He had not followed up on the search in detail. It was absolutely Kevin Delaney's
call on whether or not to destroy tape. It is encouraged for all that is extraneous to be
gotten rid of. As materiel is incorporated into personal statements it is destoyed.
McConnick thinks Delaney said and meant "destroy". If Delaney had destroyed the tape
it would have been over a year ago when an accident package was completed. The tape
would be destroyed. Items that are in the formal file or package there is a chain of
custody log.
McConnick believes that no copies of the tape were made and that the tape has been .
irrevocably lost.
Delaney was not in the building on the day of this interview to discuss the matter.
McConnack will follow up on it.

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Penny Anderson, FAA Civil Aviation Security official on 9-11

Special Access Issues: None

Date: December 18, 2003

Prepared by: John Raidt

Participants (non-Commission): Penny Anderson

Participants: John Raidt

FAA Command Centers on 9-11 Commission

9/11 Working-level Employee

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Monte Belger, former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation

Type of event: Interview

Date: November 24,2003; 9:00 a.m.

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: John Raidt

Location: GSA Commission Office

Participants - Non-Commission: Monte Belger

Participants - Commission: Bill J olmstone and J olm Raidt

1972 -- Started with FAA as a security inspector in Tampa, FL.

AVSEC Leading up to 9-11

[U] Weaknesses of the system included performance/detection problems at screening

FAA Security Briefings

Prevailing Threat 9-11

Fines/penalties on Carriers for screening failures

Safety vs. Security

The Day of 9-11

Weapons and Tactics

Post Closure of the National Air Space

Centers of Activity at the FAA on 9-11

2) Office of the Administrator/Deputy Administrator (Garvey & Belger) (He knows

After Action Report

Table Top Exercises

Pre 9-11 Context

9/11 Closed by statute

..... ~ ~/(Boivin had acquired responsibility for the Explosives Unit in

9/11 Closed by Statute

Type of event: Interview

Date: September 29, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan

Location: GSA Commission Office

Participants - Non-Commission: Bruce Butterworth

Participants - Commission: John Raidt, Bill Johnstone, and Lisa Sullivan

Security Directives - Rulemaking

• (Unc) In response to crises, Butterworth said "ACS is a completely different

9/11 Closed by Statute

• 9/11 Closed by Statute

(Unc) According to Butterworth, only two Members of Congress, Congressman Oberstar

New Special Assessments Testing (the "Red Team")

(Unc) Butterworth instituted a program in 1995 of realistic testing of security measures.

9/11 Closed by Statute

9/11 Closed by Statute

FAA receptivity to Red Team findings:

Industry Influence - Dual Mandate

(C§) Butterworth sought to move up to become Deputy Associate Administrator at FAA.

Public Disclosure of Air Carrier Test Results

Questions from the 9/11 families:

9/11 Closed by Statute

He supports more applied R&D for detection equipment.

Event: Unsolicited phone call froml...

1 former controller Boston Center

Date: Wednesday, October 22, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

get inId.r-i~~~ll~dtfiild later told a classroom full of people