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ANewBeat:
Optionsformoreaccountable
policing
byRickMuirandGuyLodge
June2008
©ippr2008
InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
1 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
Contents
Contents
Aboutippr 2
Abouttheauthors 2
Acknowledgements 2
Executivesummary 3
1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle 6
2.Theproblem 8
3.Optionsforreform 15
4.Strategyforreform 23
5.Conclusion 24
References 25
2 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
Aboutippr
Aboutippr
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,
producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
sustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingin
theUK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasfor
changeandprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublic
policyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedas
possible.Ourinternationalandmigrationteams,andclimatechangeprogrammeextend
ourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputation
forhigh-qualityresearch.
ippr,30–32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA
Tel.:+44(0)2074706100E-mail:info@ippr.orgWebsite:www.ippr.org
RegisteredCharityNo.:800065
ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinJune2008.©ippr2008
Abouttheauthors
Abouttheauthors
RickMuirisSeniorResearchFellowintheDemocracyandPowerteamatippr.Hehasa
doctorateinPoliticsfromtheUniversityofOxford,whereheworkedasadepartmental
lecturerinLatinAmericanpolitics.Heworksacrossarangeofareasincludingidentity
andculture,democraticrenewal,communitycohesionandpublicservicereform.His
publicationsincludeThePowerofBelonging(withBenRogers),TheNewIdentity
Politicsand‘WhoRunsBritain?’(withEmilyThornberryandIanKearns)inPoliticsfora
NewGeneration:Theprogressivemoment(NickPearceandJuliaMargo[editors]).
GuyLodgeisHeadoftheDemocracyandPowerteamatippr.Hespecialisesin
governanceandconstitutionalreformandhaspublishedwidelyinthisarea.Heisalsoa
VisitingResearchFellowintheDepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,
UniversityofOxford.
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
WewouldliketothankTomGash,MikeKenny,AndyHull,CareyOppenheim,Georgina
Kyriacou,LiamO’Neill,CatherineBithellandHollyAndrewfortheiradviceandsupport.
WewouldalsoliketothankCableandWireless,LogicaandtheLocalGovernment
Associationfortheirgeneroussupportinfundingippr’sFutureofPolicingproject,
withoutwhichitwouldnothavebeenpossible.Thefindingsofourresearch,however,
areourownanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofourfundingpartners.
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Executivesummary
Executivesummary
Allpublicorganisationsneedtobeheldtoaccountforthewaysinwhichtheycarryout
theirdutiesonourbehalf.Robustaccountabilitymechanismsensurethatorganisations
performtoahighstandardandareresponsivetotheneedsofthepublictheyserve.
ThisreportarguesthatthepoliceserviceinEnglandandWalessuffersfroman
accountabilitydeficit.Atthenationallevelfragmentedgovernancemeansthatnoactor
inthesystemhasthepowertoeffectivelyincentiviseperformanceimprovementordrive
throughchangeandreform.RecentattemptsbytheGovernmenttoincreasecontrol
fromthecentrethroughtargetsettingandtop-downinitiativeshavehadlimited
successandhavemadepolicingevenlessresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.
Atthelocallevelthereisnorealdemocraticaccountability:policeauthoritiesareweak,
unaccountableandremote,whileelectedlocalgovernmenthasnoeffectivesayover
localpolicingpriorities.
Thisreportsetsouttheconsequencesofthislocalaccountabilitydeficitforpolice
performanceandidentifiessixoptionsforreform.
Ourargumentcomesinfourparts.
1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle
1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle
Policereformisnowamajorpriorityforallofthemainpoliticalparties.The
Governmentisduetopublishagreenpaperonpolicereformthissummerandhas
announcedthatitwilllookatoptionsforincreasinglocalaccountability.The
Governmenthasnowconcededtwoimportantprinciples:thatthereisanaccountability
deficitatthelocallevelandthatpeopleshouldhavemoredemocraticcontrolover
policingprioritiesintheirarea.Thedemocraticgeniehasbeenletoutofthebottlein
thepolicereformdebateanditwillbedifficultforanypartytoputitbackinagain.
2.Theproblem
2.Theproblem
Despitesignificantincreasesinfunding,policeperformanceonkeyindicatorshasnot
improved.Thereisalsoclearevidencethatthepublicbelievethatthepolicehave
becomeunresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Thereareanumberoffactors
thataccountfortheseproblemsbutonecauseofbothistheaccountabilitydeficitthat
existswithinpolicing.
Policeforcesareinsufficientlyaccountabletonationalpolicymakersbecauseof
fragmentedgovernance.EffortstoincreaseforceaccountabilitytotheHomeOffice
throughcentraltargetshavenotraisedperformanceinkeyareasandhaveskewedlocal
policingpriorities.Anevengreateraccountabilitydeficitexistsatthelocallevelwhere
policeauthoritiesareweakandremotefromthepublic,andwherethereisnoeffective
roleforlocalgovernmentinsettinglocalpolicingstrategy.Asaresultthereare
insufficientpressurestodrivechangethroughthesystemandpoliceforcesare
insufficientlyresponsivetolocalneeds.
3.
3.Optionsforreform
Optionsforreform
Weidentifytwoimportantwaysofimprovingresponsivenessandraisingperformance.
1.Citizenfocusedpolicing
1.Citizenfocusedpolicing
Therearemeasuresthatcanbetakentomakethestyleofpolicingmoreresponsiveand
citizen-focused.Theseincludethedevelopmentofacustomercarecultureinthepolice
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service,areductionintimespentonunnecessaryprocessesandpaperwork,embedding
neighbourhoodpolicingandprovidingresidentswithclearinformationaboutlocalcrime
patterns.
2.Increasedlocalaccountability
2.Increasedlocalaccountability
Whileitisnomagicbullet,makingdecision-makingmoreaccountabletocommunitiesis
crucialtodeliveringimprovedperformanceandmoreresponsivepolicing.Weidentify
sixmainoptionsforincreasinglocalaccountability.Itshouldbenotedthateachof
theseoptionswillonlybemeaningfuliftheycomewithsomepowersto:
• setlocalpolicingpriorities
• allocatefinancialresourcesforpolicing
• havearoleintheappointmentofseniorpoliceofficers.
Thesesixoptionsare:
Force--levelaccountability
Force levelaccountability
Option1.Adirectlyelectedpolicecommissioner.Thisprovidesaclearanddirectmeans
Option1.Adirectlyelectedpolicecommissioner
ofholdingchiefconstablestoaccount,whichshouldhelpdrivethroughchangeand
performanceimprovement.However,holdingthepolicetoaccountattheforcelevel
wouldstillleavedecision-makingatalevelremotefromlocalcircumstances.
Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.Thismodelpreventspowerfrombecoming
Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.
concentratedinthehandsofonepersonbutsuffersfromlessvisibilityandremains
remotefromlocalneeds.
Sub-
Sub-forcelevelaccountability
forcelevelaccountability
Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.Thismodelwouldsee
Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.
councilsperformtherolescurrentlycarriedoutbypoliceauthorities.Councilleaders
wouldsetbudgetsandprioritiesandappointlocalpolicecommanders.Thiswould
improvedemocraticaccountability,deliverlocalresponsivenessandenablepolicingand
communitysafetytobeeffectivelyjoined-up.Butitisaradicalstepthatwouldrequire
majororganisationalchangeandhavesignificantimplicationsfornationalpolice
structures.
Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.Councils
Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.
wouldapprovelocalpolicingstrategiesandretainthepolicepreceptelementofthe
counciltaxenablingthemtopurchaseservicesfromthelocalpolice.Councilscouldalso
beconsultedontheappointmentofpolicecommanders.Thiswoulddelivergreaterlocal
responsivenessandjoined-upservicesbutmayriskcreatingconfusedlinesof
accountabilitybetweentheforceandBasicCommandUnit.Thisoptioncouldbe
combinedwithreformingtherole,andimprovingtheeffectiveness,ofpolice
authorities.
Option5.Themayoralmodel.
Option5.Themayoralmodel.Governmentcouldcombinepolicereformwithamoveto
del.
rolloutdirectlyelectedmayorsacrossEngland.Mayorscouldbegivensimilarpowersto
thoseidentifiedinOptions3and4,butwouldprovideamuchclearerandmore
accountablelocalvoicetosetpolicepriorities.
Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.Thiswouldbuildonexistingcrimeanddisorderreduction
Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.
partnershipsbutbringaboutgreaterpublicinvolvementthroughdirectelections.
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However,itwouldseparatepolicingfromlocalgovernmentandwouldbetoothless
withoutitsownresources.
4.Strategyforreform
4.Strategyforreform
Thesedifferentoptionseachhavetheirownmeritsandbringtheirownchallenges.
Thereisnoperfectsystemofpoliceaccountability.Twoconsiderationsinformour
strategyfordeliveringchange.First,theevidencebaseontherelationshipbetweenthe
differentreformoptionsandperformanceisthin,principallybecausetheyhavenot
beentestedintherealworld.Ministersarethereforewaryofmajorreformwhensuch
changefeelslikealeapinthedark.Second,therearesignificantregionalvariations
whichmeanthataonesizefitsallmodelisinappropriate.Forthesereasonswe
recommendthattheGovernmentshouldfirstpilotbespokemodelsofpolice
accountabilityindifferentareas.
6 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle
1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle
Thegenieisoutofthebottle
Policeaccountabilityisbackonthepoliticalagenda.InitsDraftLegislativeProgramme
theGovernmenthaspledgedtobringforwardanewPoliceReformBillthat,among
otherthings,willcreate‘aclearandpowerfulpublicvoicein[police]decision-making
throughdirectlyelectedrepresentatives’(OfficeoftheLeaderoftheHouseof
Commons2008:19).
ThisrepresentsasignificantchangeinGovernmentpolicytowardspolicegovernance.
UntilnowtheLabourGovernmenthasopposedplanstoallowdirectlyelected
representativestooverseelocalpolicing,arguingthattheyrisk‘politicising’policework
andcouldleadtopolicingbeinginfluencedbycrudepopulistcalculations.
WiththisnewpledgetheGovernmenthasconcededtwoimportantpoints:
• Thatthereisalocalaccountabilitydeficitinpolicing
• Thatlocalpeopleshouldhavemuchmoredirectdemocraticcontroloverthe
policyandprioritiesofthepoliceserviceintheirarea.
TheGovernment’spledgecouldbeinterpretedinanumberofdifferentwaysandwedo
notyetknowwhatproposalswillemergeintheforthcomingpolicingGreenPaper.
However,byfavouringdirectelection,theGovernmenthasletthedemocraticgenieout
ofthebottleanditwillbeveryhardforpoliticiansofanypartytoputitbackinagain.
Thisconcernwiththeaccountabilityofthepoliceservicehasemergedfromagrowing
concernthatpolicinginBritainhasbecomefartooremotefromtheneedsandpriorities
oflocalcommunities.BritishpoliticianshavelonglookedenviouslyacrosstheAtlantic
attheabilityofpowerfullocalmayors,likeNewYork’sRudyGuiliani,torespond
effectivelytopublicconcernaboutcrimeandbringaboutimpressivereductionsincrime
ratesthroughinnovativeactionatthelocallevel.
OneofDavidCameron’searliestinitiativesasConservativeleaderwastosetupa
taskforceonpolicereform,headedbytheConservativeMPNickHerbert.Amongother
things,thetaskforcereportcalledfortheintroductionofdirectlyelectedpolice
commissionerstooverseethestrategyoflocalpoliceforcesandmoreeffectivelyhold
chiefconstablestoaccount.
TheGovernmentitselfhasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedwiththequestionofpolice
reform.In2007,theformerHomeSecretary,JohnReid,commissionedHerMajesty’s
ChiefInspectorofConstabulary,SirRonnieFlanagan,toconductanindependentreview
ofpolicing.Oneoftheaimsofthereviewwastoexplorehowlocalaccountabilitycould
beenhanced.Flanaganreportedearlierthisyearand,withoutfavouringanyparticular
option,setoutanumberofpossiblereforms,rangingfromestablishingpolice
commissionersatforcelevelthroughtooptionsdesignedtogiveagreaterroletolocal
authorities.
Thispaperisintendedtocontributetothedebateleadinguptothepublicationofthe
Government’sgreenpaper.WhiletheGovernmenthasmadeitclearitintendstoconsult
ontheproposals,itappearsthatsomeformofdirectelectionatthepoliceforcelevelis
itsfavouredoption.Wearguethatwhiletherearebenefitstobegainedfromdirect
electionattheforcelevel,alternativeandadditionaloptionsmustbeconsideredtoo.
7 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
Mostimportantlytheroleoflocalgovernmentinholdingthepolicetoaccountshould
berevisited.
WewelcometheGovernment’sdecisiontopublishanearlydraftoftheQueen’sSpeech.
Wehopeitwillnowstickwiththespiritofthisprocessandgiveseriousconsiderationto
allofthedifferentoptionsavailableforimprovingpoliceaccountability.
Thispapercomesinthreeparts:
1. Itarguesthatthereisanaccountabilitydeficitinpolicing,especiallyatthe
locallevel,andshowsthatthisisanimportantfactorunderminingpolice
performanceandresponsiveness.
2. Itsetsouttwowaysofimprovingpoliceperformanceandresponsiveness.
First,therearechangesatthelevelofworkforcestructureand
organisationalculturetodelivermorecitizen-focusedpolicing.Second,
therearechangestopolicegovernanceatthelocalleveltodelivergreater
accountability.Thepaperidentifiessixoptionsforincreasinglocal
accountabilityandsetsoutthepotentialbenefitsanddrawbacksofeach.
3. Itbrieflysetsoutastrategyforachievingreforminthisareaand
recommendsthattheGovernmentfirstpilotsbespokemodelsofpolice
accountabilityindifferentpartsofthecountry,ratherthanproceedingwith
asinglenation-wideapproach.
Thispaperisthesecondoutputfromtheippr’swiderprojectontheFutureofPolicing.
ThefirstpaperfromthisprojectwaspublishedinFebruary2008andlookedatthe
modernisationofthepoliceworkforce(seeTheNewBillbyTomGash).Thefinalreport
fromtheprojectwillbepublishedlaterthisyearandwilladdressthewiderchallengeof
howtodeliverpolicereform.
8 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
2.Theproblem
Theaccountabilitydeficit
Theaccountabilitydeficit
Allpublicorganisationsneedtobeheldtoaccountforthewaysinwhichtheycarryout
theirdutiesonourbehalf.Accountabilityensuresthatorganisationsperformtoahigh
standardandareresponsivetotheneedsofthepublictheyserve.Thepoliceservicein
EnglandandWalessuffersfromanaccountabilitydeficit.Atthenationallevel
fragmentedgovernancemeansthatnoactorinthesystemhasthepowertoeffectively
incentiviseperformanceimprovementordrivethroughchangeandreform.Recent
attemptsbytheGovernmenttoincreasecontrolfromthecentrethroughtargetsetting
andtop-downinitiativeshavehadlimitedsuccessandhavemadepolicingevenless
responsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Atthelocallevelthereisnoreal
democraticaccountability:policeauthoritiesareweak,unaccountableandremote,while
electedlocalgovernmenthasnoeffectivesayoverlocalpolicingpriorities.
Inthissectionwearguethat:
• thepoliceservicefacestwoimportantchallenges:thechallengeofimprovingits
performanceinreducingcrimeandthechallengeofbecomingmoreresponsive
totheordinarycitizen
• thereareanumberoffactorsbehindpoorperformanceandalackof
responsiveness,includingissuesaroundworkforcemodernisationand
organisationalculture,butthelocalaccountabilitydeficitinpolicingplaysan
importantroleinbothandthereforeneedstobeaddressed.
Theperformancechallenge
Theperformancechallenge
Atfirstglance,itmightbereasonabletoaskwhypolicereformisrequiredatall.Overall
crime,asmeasuredbytheBritishCrimeSurvey,hasfallenby42percentsince1997and
fearofcrimehasfallensignificantlyoverthesameperiod(Gash2008).
However,mostoftherecentfallincrimecannotbeattributedtochangesinpolicing.
MostcriminologistsandtheGovernment’sownStrategyUnitbelievethatthebulkof
thefallinso-calledvolumecrimes(burglary,theftandnon-seriousviolentcrime)has
beenduetoBritain’sbuoyanteconomyinrecentyears,ratherthantheimpactofpolice
work(Solomonetal2007,Pearce2007).Thatisnottosuggestthatthepolicedonot
haveanimpactoncrimelevels,buttopointoutthatweneedtogobeyondheadline
crimefigurestoassesspoliceperformance.
So,howwellarethepoliceperforming?Itisdifficulttofindholisticmeasuresofpolice
performance,simplybecauseofthediverserangeoffunctionsthepoliceareexpected
toperform.However,keycrimereductionindicatorsappeartoindicatethat
performancehaseitherremainedflatordecreasedinrecentyears.
Detectionrates,forexample,fellbetween1998and2002andareonlyrecently
approaching1998levels,witharound24percentofrecordedcrimesbeingclearedup
in2007comparedto29percentin1998/99(Walkeretal2006).Performanceonthis
indicatorisalsopatchyacrossthecountry,withdetectionratesvaryingtoahighdegree
betweendifferentpoliceforces.Forinstance,detectionratesforviolenceagainstthe
personvaryfromjust26percentinonepoliceforceto59percentinanother(ibid).
Detectionsperofficerarethesametodayastheywerein2001/02,buteachpolice
detectionin2007costthepublicpursemoreinrealtermsthanitdidin2000(Walkeret
9 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
al2007).Oneexplanationforthisriseindetectioncostsmaybethatmuchofthe
increasedinvestmentinrecentyearshasgoneintoreassurancepolicing(the
neighbourhoodpolicingprogramme),whichsomewithinthepoliceservicearguehas
moreimpactonthefearofcrimethanitdoesoncatchingcriminals.
Whiletherehasbeenanincreaseinthenumberofoffencesbroughttojustice(‘OBTJ’),
thishasnotbeenduetomorecrimesbeing‘clearedup’andmoreoffendersbeing
broughtbeforethecourts.Rather,ithasbeenaconsequenceoftheintroductionof
newformsofdiscretionarypunishment,suchasPenaltyNoticesforDisorderandonthe
spotfines(Solomonetal2007,Gash2008).
Incomparativeterms,officerperformancelookspoor:whereaspoliceofficersinthe
USAmakeanaverageof21arrestsperyear,policeofficersinEnglandandWalesmake
justnine(LovedayandMcClory2007).
So,despiteheadlinefallsincrimelevels,keymeasuresofpoliceperformancehavenot
improvedoverthelastdecade.Thisisdespiterecordincreasesinpublicspendingonthe
policeandpoliceofficernumbersstandingatanalltimehigh:spendingonthepolice
hasincreasedby21percentinrealtermssince1997andmostofthismoneyhasbeen
spentonmorepoliceofficers(up11percentorby14,000officersbetween1997and
2007)(Solomonetal2007).Ifthepolicearetoreducecrimefurtherintheyearsahead
theywillhavetodosoinaclimateofmuchtighterpublicspendingandmakebetteruse
ofthesamepotofresources.Theywill,inshort,havetodothingsdifferently.
Theresponsivenesschallenge
Theresponsivenesschallenge
Opinionsurveysshowthatpublicsatisfactionwiththepoliceservicehasfallensincethe
1980s,linkedtoaperceptionthatthepolicehavebecomelessresponsivetotheviews
andprioritiesoflocalcommunities.Weshouldnotethatthesefiguresprecedethe
recentrolloutofthenewneighbourhoodpolicingteams,whoaretaskedwith,among
otherthings,raisingpublicconfidence.
Theproportionofpeopleexpressingconfidenceinthepolice,althoughstillrelatively
high,fellfromover90percentin1982to75percentin2001/02(Rogers2004).The
proportionsayingthatthepolicedoa‘goodorexcellentjob’fellfrom64percentin
1996tojust48percentin2004/05(Allenetal2006).
Satisfactionwiththepoliceisalsonegativelyrelatedtopersonalexperience.In
2004/05,thosepeoplewhohadcontactwiththeirlocalpolicewithinthepreviousyear
ratedthemmorenegativelythanthosewhohadnothadcontact(51percentofthose
whohadnocontactratedthemtobegoodorexcellent,comparedtojust45percentof
thosewithrecentcontact).Thisisnotsimplybecauseoffendersratethepolice
negatively.Peoplewhohavebeenvictimsofcrimeinthelastyearratethepolicelower
thanthosewhohavenotbeenavictimofcrimeinthelastyear(41percentofvictims
ratedthemgoodorexcellentcomparedto52percentofnon-victims)(Herbert2007).
Thesefindingscontrastwiththosefromotherpublicservices:forexample,directusers
ofschoolsandhospitalstendtoratethoseserviceshigherthanthepublicasawhole.
Moreprolongedcontactwiththepoliceleadstomorenegativeattitudes:accordingto
one2005survey,while89percentofpeoplesaytheyaresatisfiedwithinitialcontact,
only58percentsaytheyaresatisfiedwithfollowupcontact(Herbert2007).
10 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
Decliningsatisfactionwiththepoliceisrelatedtoaperceiveddeclineintraditional
communitypolicingandthelossof‘bobbiesonthebeat’.Whenaskedwhatthepolice
shoulddomoreof,59percentsaymorefootpatrols,followedby36percentsaying
communitypolicing.Only26percentsaytheywantmorepatrolsbycarandjust19per
centsaymorecrimedetection(FitzGeraldetal2002).A2007ICMpollfoundthat73
percentofthepublicfeltthatthepolicedonotspendenoughtimeoutonthebeat
(Herbert2007).Relatedtothisisafallinsustainedcontactwithindividualofficers.The
samesurveyfoundthat73percentofthepublicdidnotknowanyofthepoliceofficers
intheirlocalareaandafurther13percentdidnotknowmany(ibid).
Raisingperformanceandincreasingresponsiveness
Raisingperformanceandincreasingresponsiveness
Wehavesetouttwosignificantchallengesforthepoliceservice:thechallengeof
raisingpoliceperformanceinreducingcrimeandthechallengeofbeingresponsiveto
theneedsofthecitizen.Inwhatfollowswearguethat,whileitisbynomeansa‘magic
bullet’,reducingthelocalaccountabilitydeficitiscriticaltotacklingbothofthese
challenges.
Performanceandaccountability
Performanceandaccountability
Thereareanumberofwaystoenhancepoliceperformanceandthesearethesubjectof
ippr’swiderreportonpolicereform,tobepublishedlaterintheyear.Thesemeasures
include:
• modernisingthepoliceworkforce
• improvinginformationsystemsandprocesses
• reformingorganisationalstructurestoenhancecapacityatdifferentlevels
• changingorganisationalculture.
However,inadditiontothesemeasures,raisingperformancewillrequiresignificant
changesinthewaythepoliceserviceisgoverned,andthewaysinwhichthepoliceare
heldtoaccount.Thisisbecauseeffectiveformsofaccountabilitycandriveup
performancebycreatingthenecessarypressurestoimprove.Undercurrent
arrangements,however,thepolicearenoteffectivelyheldtoaccountateitherthelocal
ornationallevel.
EnglandandWalescurrentlyhave43policeforces,eachheadedbyachiefconstable.
Theseniormanagementofeachpoliceforceismadeupofachiefconstableandachief
officerteamandisresponsiblefor:
• settingtheforcebudget
• drawingupandimplementingthelocalpolicingplan
• monitoringandensuringcompliancewithnationalperformancetargets.
Underwhatisknownasthe‘tripartitesystem’ofpolicegovernance,whichwas
introducedwiththe1964PoliceAct,achiefconstableisaccountablebothtolocal
policeauthoritiesandtheHomeSecretary.However,neitheroftheselinesof
accountabilityfunctionseffectively.Welookatbothinturn.
Nationalaccountabilityandperformance
OnthefaceofitthepoweroftheHomeSecretarytoholdthepolicetoaccounthas
increasedsignificantlyinrecentyears.Indeedmanycommentatorshaveexpressed
concernaboutthedegreetowhichtheHomeOfficehasbecomedirectlyinvolvedinthe
deliveryofpolicingatthelocallevel(Flanagan2008).However,whilethereisnodoubt
11 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
thatthepowerofthecentrehasgrowninrecentyears,itisfarfromclearthatthishas
deliveredthemosteffectiveformofaccountability.
TheHomeSecretaryhasthepowerto‘callon’apoliceauthoritytosuspendorretirea
chiefconstableifheorshebelievesthechiefconstableisnotperformingdutiestothe
requiredstandard,butthispowerhasrarelybeenused.Itwasusedtwicebytheformer
HomeSecretary,DavidBlunkett,inthecasesofPaulWhitehouseofSussexPoliceand
DavidWestwoodofHumbersidePolice,butonlyfollowinghigh-profileinvestigations
intospecificcrimesthatuncoveredseriouspolicingfailures.Moreover,theHome
Secretarystillhastogettheagreementofthepoliceauthoritytoact.IntheWestwood
case,HumbersidePoliceAuthorityinitiallyresistedtheHomeSecretary’scallforitto
suspendtheChiefConstable,sothematterendedupincourt(thejudgeultimately
sidedwithBlunkett).Itis,perhaps,forthisreasonthattheGovernmentisrumouredto
beexploringgivingtheHomeSecretarythepowertodirectlydischargechiefconstables
(TheTimes,25May2008).Reflectingonthetripartiterelationship,Blunkettquipped:
‘theChiefConstablegetsallthepower,thePoliceAuthoritygetsallthemoneyandthe
HomeSecretarygetsalltheblame’(BBCNewsOnline,2July2004).
Intheabsenceofsuch‘hard’levers,centralGovernment,andparticularlytheLabour
Governmentsince1997,hassoughttoexercisegreaternationalcontrolthrougha
performancemanagementsystembasedongovernmenttargets.Whilethereisno
doubtthattheuseoftargetshasimprovedpoliceperformanceinsomeareas,andthat
policeforceshavebecomemoreaccountabletoWhitehallasaresultoftheir
introduction,itisneverthelessincreasinglyclearthatthissystemprovidesacrudeand
increasinglyineffectivewayofmanagingpoliceperformance:
• Centrallyimposedperformancetargetsareinflexibletochangingdemandsand
needsatalocallevel.Inarecentsurvey,71percentofBasicCommandUnit
(BCU)commanderssaidthatnationalreportingrequirementswerehavinga
negativeimpactonthequalityofpolicingintheirarea(LovedayandMcClory
2007).Nationaltargetsthatchangeinresponsetopoliticalprioritiesin
Whitehallleavepoliceonthegroundunabletoremainfocusedonprioritiesset
atthelocallevel.Ahigh41percentofBCUcommandersdisagreedwiththe
statementthat‘stafffeelabletochallengethewaythingsaredone’,showing
howinflexiblethecurrentsystemisfelttobe(ibid:19).OneBCUcommander
toldipprhowthebiggestrecentpublicconcerninhisareawasthenumberof
youngchildrendrivingmopedsinarecklessandanti-socialmanner.Despite
this,hefacedcounter-veilingpressurefromforceheadquarterstofocuson
thosecrimesforwhichtherewerenationalperformancetargets.Thisisthe
familiarphenomenonof‘onlywhatgetsmeasuredgetsdone’.
• Assessingpoliceperformancebyaverynarrowlydefinedsetofcrimereduction
outputshascreatedperverseincentivesontheground.Forexample,whilethe
Governmenthasmetitstargettoincreasethenumberofoffencesbroughtto
justice,thishasbeenachievedlargelybyincreasingthenumberofpeoplethat
havebeencautionedforrelativelyminoroffencesandbecausethepolicehave
madeuseofnewsummarypowerstopunishpeopleonthespot,againfor
relativelyminormatters(Solomonetal2007).Ratherthanfocusingonthe
mostharmfulcrimes,thepolicehavetargetedyouthsforpettyoffencessimply
tomeettheirperformancetargets,effectivelypicking‘thelowhangingfruit’
insteadoftacklingthecrimesthatreallymattertopeople.
12 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
Noneofthismeansthatnationalaccountabilityinitselfisundesirable–onthecontrary,
insomeareasitiscrucial.Forinstance,therewillalwaysbetheneedforsomecentral
governmenttargetstoensurethatminimumfloorstandardsaremet.Beyondtargets
thereisaclearroleformuchgreaternationalcoordinationwhenitcomestotackling
seriousandorganisedcrimeandcounter-terrorism.Anotherexamplewouldbeinthe
areaofdevelopingstandardinformationsystemsandprocessesacrossthepolice
service.Currentlyforcestendtohavetheirowndatabasesanddeveloptheirown
technologicalsolutions,aproblemthatleadstopoorinformationsharingand
duplicationofresources.Workforcemodernisationisalsoanareathatwouldbenefit
frombeingdrivennationally.
Intheseimportantareasdevelopingnation-widesolutionsrequiresnationalleadership
and,therefore,greaternationalpoliticalaccountability.WheretheGovernmenthas
gonewrongisinseekingtoholdpoliceforcestoaccountnationallyforlocalcommunity
policingmatters,whichfromthepointofviewofresponsivenessarebetterdesigned
andheldaccountableatthelocallevel.
Localaccountabilityandperformance
Ifnationalaccountabilityisconfusedandineffective,localaccountabilityisalmostnon-
existent.Policeauthorities,madeupoflocalcouncillors,magistratesandother
appointedfigures,lackrealpoweroverpolicechiefs.Whiletheyhavethepowerto
appointanddischargeachiefconstable,theycanonlydosowiththeapprovalofthe
HomeSecretary.Inreality,veryfewchiefconstableshaveeverbeendischargedbytheir
policeauthoritiesforunsatisfactoryperformance.
Policeauthoritiesalsohaveverylittleimpactonpolicingprioritiesintheirarea.Under
theill-defineddoctrineof‘operationalindependence’(craftedpreciselytokeepthe
policefreefrompoliticalcontrol)policeauthoritiesmainlyleavestrategicpolicing
decisionsandthedevelopmentoflocalplansandbudgetstotheirchiefconstables.
Policeauthoritiesprovideforaveryweaklinkbetweenthepoliceandlocal
communities.Theyarenotdirectlyelected,sotheirabilitytoincreasepartofthelocal
counciltaxthroughthepolicingpreceptraisesseriouslegitimacyquestions.Moreover,
theindirectlyelectedmembersofpoliceauthoritiesareoftennotleadingmembersof
thelocalauthoritiesthatappointthemandtheycovergeographicallydispersedareas,
whichmeanstheyareremotefromtheviewsoflocalresidents(LovedayandMcClory
2007).Asfarasthepublicisconcernedtheyarebarelyvisible.Accordingtofocus
groupscarriedoutfortheHomeOfficein2003,hardlyanyparticipatingmembersof
thepublichadheardofpoliceauthoritiesorwereawareoftheroletheyplayedin
theoreticallyholdingthepolicetoaccount(Docking2003).
So,wehaveanaccountabilitydeficitatboththenationalandlocallevels,makingit
difficulttodrivechangeandincentiviseperformanceimprovementthroughthesystem.
Atthelocallevel,accountabilityisweakbecausepoliceauthoritiesareremoteandlack
legitimacy.Atthenationallevel,theHomeOfficehassoughttoincreaseaccountability
throughaperformancemanagementsystemthathasimpededeffectivepolicing.
Worryingly,thereisaviciouscycleatplay.Intheabsenceofanyeffectivelocal
accountabilityitisHomeOfficeministerswhoareheldresponsibleforthequalityof
policingatboththenationalandlocallevel.Knowingtheywillbeblamedwhenthings
gowrong,ministersareencouragedtotrytoenhancepoliceperformanceusinglevers
liketarget-setting,whichaswehaveseenhavelimited,andevenperverse,impactson
13 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
policing.Butbyintervening,ministersreinforcetheviewthattheyare,indeed,
responsibleforallaspectsofpolicing,whichlocksthemintoaviciouscycleinwhich
theyhavetotrytomanagelocalpoliceperformancecentrally.Breakingthiscycleis
crucialtoimprovingpolicing,andstrengtheninglocalaccountabilityiscriticaltothat.
Responsivenessandaccountability
Responsivenessandaccountability
Thereareanumberoffactorslyingbehindthewidelysharedviewthatthepolicehave
becomelessresponsivetothecitizeninthewaytheygoabouttheirwork.
Changingpoliceroles
Therewereanumberofchangestopolicerolesandfunctionsinthesecondhalfofthe
20thcentury,eachofwhichreducedtheday-to-daycontactbetweenthepoliceand
thepublic:
• Therewasareducedemphasisoncrimepreventionbystreetpatrol(‘bobbies
onthebeat’)andagreateremphasisoncatchingcriminalsbyresponding
(usuallybycar)tocallsfromthepublic.In1967,policeforcesintroducedanew
systemofUnitBeatPolicing,whichessentiallytookofficersoffwalkingpatrols
andputthemintovehicles.Thesecoveredwiderareasandmeanttheycould
respondmorerapidlytourgentincidentsasandwhentheyoccurred.However,
thisnew‘firebrigade’servicemeantthatthepolicehadmuchlessday-to-day
contactwiththegeneralpublicandmeantthatthereassuringfigureofthe
Britishbobbyonregularfootpatrolwaslost.Weshouldnotethattherecent
introductionofneighbourhoodpolicingbytheGovernmentismeant
specificallytorestorethiskindof‘DixonofDockGreen’policing.
• Therewasagreaterandnecessaryemphasisondetectivework,which
reinforcedtheshiftawayfromdeterrence-orientatedfootpatrols.Agrowing
numberofofficerswentintoCriminalInvestigationDepartments(CID),
alongsideanumberofotherspecialistcrimedetectionunits,suchasserious
crimesquadsanddrugssquads(Maguire2003).
• Theprimaryobjectiveofpolicingshiftedtofightingcrime,whichreducedthe
amountoftimepolicededicatedtotheirbroaderservicefunction.Theswitch
fromfoottomotorisedpatrolswaspartlyresponsibleforthis–constableswere
nolongerfamiliarfigureswalkingthestreets,abletohelpcitizenswithgeneral
enquiries.
Risingpublicexpectations
Thepolicefacethechallengeofrisingpublicexpectations,asdoallpublicservices.
Deferencetoauthorityhasdeclinedandtrustinallpublicinstitutions,includingthe
police,hasfallen.Inaddition,weareamuchmoreaffluentsocietyinwhichcitizens
expecthighstandardsasconsumersofgoodsandservices,includingthoseprovidedby
thestate.Inordertomeetpublicexpectations,publicservicescannotstandstill:evenif
thequalityoftheservicesuppliedbythepolicehadremainedthesameoverthelast40
years,thepolicewouldhaveneededto‘uptheirgame’.
Lackofacustomercareculture
Publicsatisfactionwiththepoliceamongwitnessesandvictimsislowerthanamongthe
generalpublic,indicatingthatdirectcontactwiththepoliceleadstoincreasingly
negativeviewsoftheirperformance.Thisislikelytobeduetoalackofacustomercare
cultureinthepoliceforce,itselfrootedinalackofworkforcemodernisation(seeGash
14 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
2008).TheBritishCrimeSurveyhasfoundthatnearlyafifthofadultscouldrecallbeing
‘reallyannoyed’withapoliceofficerinthelastfiveyears,and43percentofthosesaid
thiswasduetotheofficer’smanner(Docking2003).Focusgroupsconductedforthe
HomeOfficehighlightedmanyinstancesofpoliceofficersbeingrudeorabruptor
askingwhatweredeemedtobeunnecessaryquestions(ibid).
Amorediversepopulation
Surveysandfocusgroupscontinuetoshowthatpeoplefromminorityethnic
communitiesbelievethatthepolicediscriminateagainstandstereotypepeoplefrom
blackandminorityethnic(BME)groups.Anumberofindependentinquirieshaveraised
seriousconcernsaboutthetreatmentofminoritycommunitiesbythepolice.Themost
prominentrecentinquirywastheMacPhersonReportintothemurderoftheblack
teenagerStephenLawrence,whichconcludedthattheMetropolitanPoliceServicewas
institutionallyracist.Sincethentherehavebeenimprovementsacrossthecountry:hate
crimehasreceivedamuchgreaterpriority(racistcrimeinLondonhasbeencut
significantly,forexample)andtherehasbeenasustainedefforttorecruitmorepolice
officersfromBMEgroups.Thepoliceneedtocontinuethisworkandensurethatthey
areequallyresponsivetotheconcernsofdifferentcommunities.
Thepolicehavebecomedecreasinglyaccountabletolocalcommunities
Onefinal–andsignificant–reasonforthissensethatthepolicehavebecomeless
responsivetolocalcommunities,isthelocalaccountabilitydeficit.
Originally,Britain’spoliceservicewashighlydecentralised:madeupofhundredsof
smallpoliceforcesaccountabletolocalauthoritiesthroughtheirelectedwatch
committees.However,overthecourseofthe19thand20thcenturies,national
governmentintroducedanumberofchangesthatcutthelinksbetweenelectedlocal
governmentandthepolice:
• Policingwasnotmadeastatutorydutyoflocalgovernmentwhencounty
councilswereestablishedin1888
• Forcesincreasinglyreceivedtheirfundingdirectlyfromcentralgovernment
• Chiefconstablesweredeclaredtobeaccountabletothelawratherthanlocal
politicians
• In1964thenewtripartitesystemofpolicegovernancewassetup,ongrounds
ofreducingpolicecorruption.
(Williams2003)
Underthetripartitesystem,43policeforceswereestablished(cutfromtheprevious
106),withchiefconstablesbeingaccountabletolargerpoliceauthoritiesandtheHome
Office.After1964,thepowerofchiefconstablestocontrolforcefinanceswas
increasedand,morerecently,theestablishmentofcentralperformancetargetshas
effectivelymadechiefconstablesmoreaccountabletotheHomeOfficethantotheir
localpoliceauthorities(LovedayandMcClory2007).Andaswehaveseen,police
authorities,ascurrentlyconstituted,donotprovideaneffectivelinktothepublic.
Underthissystemthereisnoformalstructurethroughwhichlocalcommunitiescanset
theprioritiesforthelocalpolicingthatthey,toasignificantextent,payfor.Inthenext
sectionwesetoutsomeofthewayswemightchangethis.
15 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
3.Optionsforreform
3.Optionsforreform
Wehavearguedthatthepolicearecurrentlyunder-performingonanumberofkey
crime-reductionindicatorsandthattheyareinsufficientlyresponsivetolocalneedsand
circumstances.Thereareanumberoffactorslyingbehindthesechallenges,butwe
havearguedthattheaccountabilitydeficitinpolicingisanimportantdeterminantof
both.Therelationshipbetweenthecentreandthepoliceiscurrentlydysfunctionaland
requiresreform.Therelationshipbetweenlocalpoliceforcesandthecommunitiesthey
serveisalsobrokenanditistimetointroducenewwaysofholdingthepoliceto
accountlocally.Itisthislatterchallengewithwhichweareconcernedhere(wewill
returntotheissueofnationalaccountabilityandleadershipinourfinalreport).
Inthissectionwesetoutanumberofoptionsforreformthatwouldputthecitizen,
onceagain,attheheartofpolicing.Theseoptionsfallundertwoverygeneralheadings:
• Changestothewaypolicingisdoneday-to-daythatwouldmaketheservice
moreresponsivetoandfocusedontheconcernsofthecitizen.
• Changestodecision-makingstructuresthatwouldmakethepolicemore
accountabletolocalcommunitiesinthesettingofstrategicpriorities.
Citizen-
Citizen-focusedpolicing
focusedpolicing
Thereareanumberofreformsthatcouldbeundertakentotacklepublicdissatisfaction
withpoliceperformanceandmakepolicingmorecitizen-focusedthatdonotrequire
changestotheformalproceduresforholdingthepolicetoaccount.Weoutlinethese
below.However,itisourbeliefthatthesereforms,tobetrulyeffective,wouldneedto
beaccompaniedbywiderreformstopolicegovernance.Weturntothewayswemight
dothatinthefinalsectionofthispaper.
Developmentofcustomercare,inter--personalandcommunicationsk
Developmentofcustomercare,inter personalandcommunicationskills
ills
ills
Publicconfidenceinthepoliceisdrivenlargelybycontactandcommunicationwithits
offices.So,forexample,93percentofwitnessestreatedinacourteousmannerare
satisfiedwiththepolice,comparedto27percentforthosewhoarenottreatedinsuch
amanner(Flanagan2008).Improvingcustomercarerequiresextensiveworkforce
modernisation.Muchgreaterspecialisationofroleswithinthepoliceserviceis
advocatedelsewherebyippr.Thiswouldallowconstableswhoenjoytheinterfacewith
thepublictospecialiseinoutwardfacingroles.Morecivilianspecialistscouldalsobe
employedtocarryouttasks,suchasvictimsupport,anddealingwithreportsfromthe
public(Gash2008).Inevitably,promotingacustomercareculturethroughoutthepolice
servicewillrequireimprovedtrainingforconstablesmoregenerallyandthepromotion
ofawidercultureofprofessionaldevelopmentthroughoutthepoliceservice,sothat
managersareequippedtopromotethesekindsofskillsamongtheirofficers(ibid).
Lesstimespentonpaperwork
Lesstimespentonpaperwork
HomeOfficeresearchshowsthat,onaverage,officersspendalmostasmuchtimeinthe
stationasoutofitandlessthanafifthoftheirtimeonthebeat.Fourteenpercentof
theirtimeisspentonpatrol,while19percentisspentonpaperwork.InvestmentinIT
systemsandnewhardware,suchasmobilehandsets(asrecentlyannouncedbythe
Government),plusgreateruseofcivilianstafftocarryoutadministrativetasksanda
reductioninsomereportingrequirements,couldfreeupmoretimetobespentonthe
beat.Ofcourse,anyreductionsinunnecessarypaperworkneedtobecarefullyweighed
upagainsttheneedtorecordmonitoringinformation:forexample,thereremain
16 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
concernsaboutthedisproportionateuseofstopandsearchagainstpeoplefrom
minoritygroups(Flanagan2008).
Neighbourhoodpolicing
Neighbourhoodpolicing
NeighbourhoodpolicinghasnowbeenrolledoutacrossEnglandandWalesanditsmain
aimistoputmore‘bobbiesonthebeat’.Itinvolvesvisiblefootpatrols,community
engagementanda‘problem-solving’approachtocrimeanddisorder,withofficers
seekingtopreventcrimeslocallybyworkinginpartnershipwithlocalpeopleandother
agencies.Whileitistooearlytoassessthesuccessofthisnewapproachhere,ithas
beenfoundtodeliverimpressiveresultsinanumberofothercontexts.InChicago,a
similarcommunitypolicingapproachhasresultedinsignificantincreasesinpublic
satisfaction,reducedcrimerates(fasterthantheUSnationalaverage)andreducedfear
ofcrime(SkoganandSteiner2004).InBritain,‘reassurancepolicing’alongtheselines
wasfoundinanumberofpilotareastoleadtoreducedfearofcrime,higherlevelsof
publicsatisfaction,higherlevelsofofficerfamiliarityandreducedperceptionsofanti-
socialbehaviour(Tuffinetal2006).
Aswellasmorevisiblelocalfootpatrols,neighbourhoodpolicinginvolvesnewwaysof
empoweringthepublictoholdthepolicetoaccount.Forexample,aspartofthisnew
programme,theGovernmenthaslaunchedaNationalPolicingPledgewhichprovides
everyareawithasetofstandardstheycanexpectandthatcanbeusedtoscrutinize
theirlocalpolicingteam.Moreover,therehasbeenthelaunchofSaferNeighbourhood
Panelstoensurethatlocalpeopleareconsultedonpolicingprioritiesandlocalresidents
canusethenewCommunityCallforActiontotriggeractiononissueslikeanti-social
behaviour.
Thepriorityforforcesshouldbetoembedneighbourhoodpolicingand,inparticular,to
preventcompetingprioritiescorrodingitovertime.
Information
Information
Ensuringthatresidentshavestatisticalinformationoncrimelevelsshouldimprovethe
answerabilityoflocalforcesfortheirperformanceandmayhelpreducetheperception
gapbetweenthefearofcrimeandactuallevelsofcrime(Flanagan2007,Duffyetal
2008).Someforceshaveusednewtechnologytomapoutwherecrimehotspotsare,for
example,andthenewmayorofLondonBorisJohnsonhaspromisedtomakesuchcrime
mapsavailabletothepublic.
Toconcludethissectionwenotethatmanyoftheunderlyingcausesofdeclining
satisfactionwiththepolice(thelackofacustomercareculture,thedeclineoffoot
patrolsandademandformorecommunitypolicing)arerootedinworkforceand
organisationalculturequestions.Weargue,however,thatweareunlikelytowitnessa
fundamentalshiftinresponsivenessandperformanceunlessweaddressthefactthat
policegovernanceisfragmentedandthatlocalaccountabilityisextremelyweak.
Whilelinesofaccountabilityareweakandfragmented,stakeholderswillnotbeableto
holdchiefconstablestoaccountforperformance.Whileresourceallocationand
strategicpolicingdecisionscontinuetobemadeatforcelevel,alignedlargelytotargets
setinWhitehall,policingwillcontinuetoignorethespecificneedsoflocal
neighbourhoodsandforce-levelprioritiesarelikelytotakeprecedenceovercommunity
policingpriorities.Itisforthesereasonsthatchangestostrategicgovernanceare
requiredandthatthelocalaccountabilitydeficitmustbetackled.
17 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
Increasinglocalaccountability
Increasinglocalaccountability
Inthissectionweexploresixdifferentoptionsforenhancingtheaccountabilityofthe
policeserviceatthelocallevel.Thesecanbedistinguishedbetweenthosebringing
greateraccountabilityattheforcelevel,andthosewhichenhanceaccountabilityatthe
levelofthebasiccommandunit,themainoperatingunitforthedeliveryofcommunity
policing.Theimportantissueofneighbourhoodaccountabilityhasbeenbrieflyexplored
above(weshallsaymoreaboutthisinourfinalreport).
Inthispaperwedonotargueinfavourofonesingleoptionforincreasingthe
accountabilityofthepolicetolocalpeoplebutrathersetoutthebenefitsand
challengesthatcomewitheach.Weshouldnotethatwhetheranyofthesemodelscan
genuinelyholdthepolicetoaccountdependsonthedegreetowhichtheyhavethe
powertodothreethings:
• Setpolicepriorities
• Controlallorpartofthepolicebudget
• Appointandappraisechiefpoliceofficersorlocalpolicecommanders.
IftheGovernmentistointroducenewelectedbodiestoholdthepolicetoaccountthen
itmustensurethattheyaregiventhenecessarypowers,forinstanceoverresourcesand
priority-setting,tocarryoutthisfunction.Ifthecentredeprivesthemofthesepowers
thenlocalaccountabilitywillbenofurtheradvanced.
Weshouldnotethatsomecommentatorsareconcernedthatincreasinglocal
accountabilityrisks‘politicising’policing(seeFlanagan2008).Inevitably,givinga
greaterroletoelectedrepresentativesmeansthatpolicingprioritieswouldbesubjectto
thepressuresofpoliticalcontestation.However,therealdangersofpoliticisationwould
comeifelectedfiguresweretakingday-to-daypolicingdecisions,whichmaywellopen
policinguptocorruptionandpartisanbias.Onthecontraryunderalloftheoptions
belowthedoctrineof‘operationalindependence’isleftintact:thedirectlyorindirectly
electedrepresentativessetthepolicyframework,whichisthenappliedonaday-to-day
operationalbasisbythechiefconstable.Thisisnomorepoliticalthanthecurrent
systemunderwhichnationalprioritiesaresetbytheHomeOffice,alsoheadedby
electedpoliticians.
Forcelevelaccountability
Forcelevelaccountability
Option1.Adirectlyelectedpolicecommissioner
Onerelativelysimplewayofintroducinggreateraccountabilityofthepolicetolocal
communitieswouldbetoelectapersonorbodytooverseetheirwork.Thishasthe
benefitsofsimplicity:itwouldcreateasinglelineofaccountabilityfromthechief
constablewhomakesthestrategicdecisionsfortheforcetoapersonorbodyelected
bylocalpeople.
TheConservativeParty’sPoliceReformTaskforceconcludedthatthebestwayofdoing
thiswouldbetoabolishpoliceauthoritiesandintroduceadirectly-electedpolice
commissionerforeveryforce.Thecommissionerwould:
• Appointthechiefconstable
• Setpolicingpriorities
• Approvetheforcebudget.
18 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
Thereareanumberofadvantagestothismodel.Thecombinationofaclearelectoral
mandatewitheffectivepowerstoholdthechiefconstabletoaccountcouldsignificantly
helptransformpoliceperformance.Moreover,givingthesepowerstoasinglevisible
leaderwouldensurethepublicknowwhoisresponsibleforpolicingandholdthemto
accountaccordingly.Thismightalsohelptopersuadecentralgovernmenttoletgoof
itscurrentlyhighlyprescriptiveperformancemanagementframework.Thisisbecause
ministersneedtobeassuredthatoncetheyletgo,thebuckwillstopwiththe
commissioner–andnotgetpassedbacktotheminWhitehall.
TherearealreadysignsthattheintroductionofanelectedmayorinLondon,for
example,evenwithoutfullresponsibilitiesforsettingpolicepriorities,hasmeantthat
responsibilityfordealingwithissuessuchasrisingknifeandguncrimeisatleastseen
assharedbetweenthemayor,theMetropolitanPoliceCommissionerandtheHome
Office.
Therearesomedrawbackstothecommissionermodel,althoughtheyarenot
insurmountable.First,weknowthatpoliceauthoritiesastheystandarebarelyvisibleto
thepublic.Democratisinganexistingtierofgovernanceofwhichmostofthe
populationareunawarerisksgeneratingverylowlevelsofinterestandparticipation.
Second,theproblemwithintroducinggreateraccountabilityattheforcelevel,which
coverslargeanddiverseareas,isthatthislevelistoodistantfromthedistinctiveneeds
oflocalneighbourhoods.Weknowthatpeopletendtobemostconcernedaboutcrime
intheirownstreetorlocaltowncentre:votingforaforcecommissionerwouldnot
enablelocalpeopletohaveasayonhowtheirimmediatelocalcommunityispoliced.In
otherwordsthisoptionmightstruggletodeliveramorelocallyresponsiveformof
policing.
Third,thereareconcernsaboutthenarrownessoftherole’sfocus.Havingasingle
crime-focusedpositiondoesriskseparatingpolicingoutfromotherrelatedservices,in
particularthecommunitysafetyworkcarriedoutbylocalgovernment–butalsothe
widerworkingsofthecriminaljusticesystem.Thisrunsagainstthegrainofjoined-up
servicedelivery,whichmostseniorpoliceofficersandpolicymakersbelieveisessential
toreducingcrime(LovedayandMcClory2007).
Havinganelectionsolelyfocusedoncrimealsoposestheriskofencouragingpopulist
campaigns,leadingtoanarmsraceinhardlinelawandorderinitiatives,cutofffromany
moreconsideredprocessofdeliberationastotheireffectiveness.Bycontrast,more
holisticelections(formayorsandcouncillors,forexample)mighthelptakesomeofthe
‘heat’outoflawandorderdebate.Thisisastrongargumentforenhancingtheroleof
localgovernmentinpolicing,whichwediscussindetailbelow.
Fourth,thereareconcernsthatthismodelwouldputtoomuchpowerinthehandsof
oneperson.Awayofmitigatingthiswouldbetoensurethatanelectedpolice
commissionerweresubjecttoastrongdegreeofdemocraticscrutiny.Onemight
thereforedecidetoretainapoliceauthoritytoscrutinisethecommissioner’sdecisions.
Ifwedidthis,however,wewouldhavetoenhancethelegitimacyandqualityofpolice
authoritymembership.TodothistheGovernmentcouldrequirethatthememberson
theauthorityshouldbetheleadersorthecommunitysafetyportfolioholdersfromthe
differentlocalauthoritieswithintheforcearea.Thiswouldensurethatthe
commissionerwerescrutinisedbyseniorandpowerfullocalpoliticalfigures.Thisdeals
19 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
withacommoncriticismofpoliceauthoritiesastheycurrentlystand,whichisthatmany
oftheirelectedmembersdonotcarrythepoliticalweightnordotheyhavetheright
skillstoholdthepoliceeffectivelytoaccount.
Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority
Onewayofensuringthatpowerisnotconcentratedinthehandsofasingleindividual
wouldbetoholddirectelectionsforthewholepoliceauthority.Directelectionwould
enhancethedemocraticaccountabilityofpoliceauthoritiesandprovideimpetusfor
improvingpoliceperformance.Itmightalsoprovideforalessremoteformof
accountabilityifeachofthememberswereelectedforageographicalareawithinthe
force’sboundaries.Ifthishappened,localpeoplewouldhaveageographicallyrooted
representativewhowouldbetterunderstandspecificlocalneedsthanacommissioner
fortheentireforce.
However,afullyelectedpoliceauthoritybringswithititsownproblems.Thismodel
providesformuchlessaccountabilitythanthepolicecommissionermodelbecausethe
authority’smemberswouldinevitablybelessvisibletothepublic.Indeedelectingthe
wholepoliceauthoritymaysimplyservetoconfusethepublicoverwhoisincharge.
Moreover,whereasanelectionforasinglepostmightattractlocalattentionand
generatepoliticalinterest,holdinganewsetofelectionsforademocraticbodyata
remotelevelwouldverylikelyresultinconsiderableapathyandalowturnout.
Anelectedpoliceauthoritywithrepresentativesfordifferentareaswithintheforce
mightalsoleadtoasituationofclashingmandates,forexamplebetweenthepolice
authorityrepresentativeandalocalcouncilleaderforthesamearea.Thisrisks
complicatinglinesofaccountabilityforpolicecommandersontheground.
Sub-
Sub-forcelevelaccountability
forcelevelaccountability
Onecriticismofintroducinggreateraccountabilityattheforcelevelisthatthisremains
tooremotefromresidents’verylocalconcernsaroundcrimeanddisorder.Inadditionto
lookingatforce-levelgovernance,then,itisvitalthataccountabilityisalsoaddressedat
amorelocallevel.Thiswouldgenerallybethelevelofthebasiccommandunit(BCU).
Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing
Therearetwomainadvantagesofgivingfirsttier(districtorunitary)localauthorities
controlofcommunitypolicingfunctions:
• Asthemainestablisheddemocraticbodyatthelocalleveltheycanprovidethe
benefitsoflegitimacyandaccountabilitywithouttheneedforadditional
elections.
• Becausesomuchlocalauthorityworkiscrucialtopreventingandreducingcrime
anddisorder,givingcouncilsagreaterroleopensupthescopeformorejoined-
upinterventionsontheground.
Underthismodeloperationalcontrolfordeliveringcommunitypolicing(todealwithso-
called‘level1’issuessuchasburglary,theft,violenceandanti-socialbehaviour)would
passtotheBCUcommander.Policeauthoritieswouldbeabolishedandfundingfor
level1functionswouldgotothelocalauthority.Thelocalauthoritywouldbegiventhe
legalpowertosetthepolicingprioritiesfortheirlocalcommander,justasnowpolice
authoritieshavethepowertoapproveorotherwisethechiefconstable’sstrategicplan.
Thelocalcouncilleadercouldbegiventhepowertoappointthelocalpolice
commander.
20 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
Thisisaradicalplanthatwouldgenuinelydelivermuchmorelocallytailoredand
accountablepolicingofthekindwelackatpresent.However,itwouldrequirethe
organisationaltransformationofpolicing.Forcescouldcontinuetoexistunderthis
modelbuttheywouldbelimitedtoproviding‘protectiveservices’todealwithserious
crimesandcross-borderissues,aswellasprovidingbackroomandadministrative
supportforlocalcommunitypolicingunits(humanresourcesfunctions,forexample).In
factitislikelythatashifttothismorelocalisedmodelwouldputtheexistenceofthe
current43forcestructureinseriousdoubt.Strippedoftheircommunitypolicing
functionstherationalefor43forcesisextremelyweakandtheargumentsformovingto
largerregionalforcesorevenanationalseriouscrimeforcesuchastheAmericanFBI
wouldlookirresistible(seeHerbert2007andO’Connor2005).
Weshouldalsonotethatempoweringlocalgovernmentwillnotonitsownresolvethe
accountabilityproblem,especiallygivenlowturnoutsinmanylocalelections.Forthis
reason,workatthislevelshouldbebuttressedbyneighbourhoodlevelengagementas
well.
Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing
Alessradicaloptionwouldbetoincreasetheaccountabilityoflocalpolicecommanders
tolocalauthorities.Asafirststeplocalauthoritiescouldbegiventhelegalpowerto
agreelocalpolicingprioritieswiththechiefconstable,throughthelocalpolice
commanderfortheirarea.Thiswouldtaketheformofalocalpolicingplanthatboth
sideswouldhavetoapprove,ensuringthattherewasbalancestruckbetweenlevel1
communitypolicingneedsandotherpriorities.
Tounderpinthesepowerswithresources,thelocalauthoritycouldretainthepolice
precept:thepartofthecounciltaxitcurrentlycollectsandpassestothepolice
authority.Althoughtheproportionofthepolicebudgetmadeupbythepreceptvaries
aroundthecountry,thiswouldmeanthatthelocalauthoritywouldhavethepowerto
commissionsomecommunitysafetyservicesfromthepolice(oreven,iftheysochose,
anotherprovider).Becausetheauthoritycouldchoosetospendsomeoftheprecept
fundingonotherinitiatives(morecrimepreventionwork,forinstance)itwould
introduceanelementofcontestability,withthepolicehavingtoprovetheywere
providingvalueformoney.
Ifthecurrentforce/BCUstructureistoberetaineditwouldnotmakesensetogive
localcouncilleaderssolecontrolovertheappointmentoflocalBCUcommanderssince
thiswouldbreakthechainofcommandbetweenthechiefconstableandtheBCU.
Insteadotheroptionswouldneedtobeconsidered.Ataminimumthechiefconstable
shouldconsultthecouncilleader(assomealreadydo)ontheappointmentofthelocal
commander.Thecouncilcouldalsoplayaroleinappraisingthecommander’s
performance.Othermoreradicalmeasuresmightincludesomerolefortheleaderor
otherseniormembersofthelocalauthorityinappointingthecommander,suchasby
holdingasubsequentconfirmationhearing.Thelocalauthoritymightalsobegiventhe
powertoexpressavoteofnoconfidenceinthelocalcommander,witharequirement
onthechiefconstabletoappointareplacement.
Thereare,however,somechallengestobeovercometomakethisenhancedlocal
governmentoptionviable.Firstofall,introducinggreateraccountabilityatthislevel
makesthemostsenseifthereisgreatermanagerialandresourcedelegationdownto
theBCUfromforceHQ.
21 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
Thereisalsothechallengeofcreatingmultiplelinesofaccountability.Whereasunder
thecurrentsystemitisclearwhoBCUcommandersareaccountableto(chief
constables),underthissystemtheywouldbeaccountabletoboththechiefconstable
andthelocalauthority.However,whileanultimatelineofaccountabilityisnecessary
(essentiallywhohiresandfires),BCUcommandersalreadyhavetodealwithmultiple
linesofaccountability.TheyhavetoworkbothtoforceleveltargetsandtotheirLocal
AreaAgreementtargetsagreedwiththerestoftheLocalStrategicPartnershipandthe
Government.Indeedinmanyotherareasofpublicservices,notleastlocalgovernment
itself,serviceprovidersaretosomeextentaccountabletobothlocalandnational
masters.Themostimportantthingistoensurethatasinglepolicingplancanbeagreed
foreachBCUthatincorporatesbothforcelevelprioritiesandlocalprioritiesas
expressedbythelocalcouncil.
Afurtherconsequenceofthismodelisthatitwoulddemandamorerefinedroleforthe
policeauthority.Withthedecisiontosetlocalpolicingprioritiestransferredtolocal
authorities,thepoliceauthoritiescouldinsteadconcentrateoninfluencingforce
strategyandholdingthechiefconstabletoaccount.
Option5.Themayoralmodel1
Elsewhereipprhasarguedthatdirectlyelectedmayorsshouldbeintroducedacross
England(seeKennyandLodge2008).Byvirtueofbeingdirectlyelected,mayors
ensuregreaterpoliticalaccountabilitythanisachievedundertheordinarycouncil
model.Mayorstendtobewellknown,enablingthemtodevelopaconnectionwithlocal
votersthatindirectlyelectedcouncilleadersoftenfailtodo.Asurveyconductedinthe
LondonBoroughofNewham,forexample,revealedthat67percentofresidentscould
identifySirRobinWalesastheirmayor.AndastheLondonelectioncampaignproved,
mayoralelectionscangalvaniseandreinvigoratepoliticaldebateinameaningfulway.
Mayorshaveprovedcapableleaders,havingoverseenanimprovementinthe
performanceoftheircouncils.TheintroductionofamayorinHackney,forinstance,has
coincidedwithacompleteturnaroundintheLondonborough’sfortunes.Mayorshave
alsopushedthrougharangeofinnovativepoliciessuchasthecongestionchargein
London.Wehavealreadyseenoneexampleofanelectedmayortakingaprominentrole
inpolicinginthecaseofLondon.AlthoughtheLondonmayordoesnothavethepower
tohireorfiretheMetropolitanPoliceCommissioner(thisremainstheresponsibilityof
theMetropolitanPoliceAuthorityandtheHomeSecretary),themayorsetsthepolice
budget.InrecentyearsthisenabledtheformermayorKenLivingstonetousehis
elementofthecounciltaxtofundamajorroll-outofneighbourhoodpolicingacross
London,muchearlierthanintherestofthecountry.
So,introducingmoredirectlyelectedmayorscouldbringconsiderablebenefitsfromthe
perspectiveofenhancingtheaccountabilityandperformanceofdemocraticlocal
government.Givingmayorscontrolorgreaterinfluenceoverpolicingprioritiesfortheir
localareas,assetoutinoptions3and4,couldalsobringconsiderablebenefits.Aswith
thecaseforgivingdistrictandunitarylocalgovernmentagreaterroleinpolicing,
adoptingamayoralmodelwouldmeantherewasnoneedforadditionalelections,
risking‘voterfatigue’,anditwouldalsohelpensurejoined-upworkingoncommunity
safety.
1
Herewefocusondirectly-electedmayorsatlocalauthoritylevel.Wedonotexploretheoptionofcity-
regionalmayorsthoughrecognisethattheymaywellbeanappropriatereformoptionforsomeareas.
22 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
However,whatthemayoralmodelwouldaddisamuchclearerlineofaccountability:
themayorwouldbemuchmorevisiblethanacouncilleader,wouldpossessapersonal
mandatethatcouldnotbeignoredandwouldlikelyengagethepublictoamuch
greaterdegreeinsettingpolicingprioritiesbyvirtueoftheirhigherprofile.Aswitha
directlyelectedcommissioneratforcelevel,havingaclearlyaccountableindividualat
locallevelwhothepublicknowisinchargeandthatthebuckstopswiththem–and
notWhitehallministers–mightalsopersuadecentralgovernmenttogiveupseekingto
micro-managepolicingfromthecentre.
Forthesereasonswebelievethatmayorswouldencouragethecentretodevolve
powersandfunctiontothelocalityinawaythattheyarecurrentlyreluctanttodo.
IndeedwenotethatwhenitcomestopolicingtheGovernmentappearsmoreinterested
indemocratisingpoliceauthoritiesthanitdoesinempoweringlocalauthoritieswitha
greatersayoverpolicing.Hadmoremayorsbeeninplacewebelievethatthecentre
wouldbemorewillingtoconsidergoingdownthelocalgovernmentroute.Wetherefore
recommendthattheGovernmentconsidercombiningpolicereformwiththe
introductionofdirectly-electedmayors.
However,weshouldnotethatamayoralmodelwouldsufferfromsomeofthe
shortcomingsofthetwootherlocalgovernmentoptionsdiscussedabove:aradical
movetogivemayorscompletecontrolovercommunitypolicingwouldleadtomajor
organisationalupheaval,andalessradicaldevolutionofpowersmightleadtomultiple
andconfusedlinesofaccountability.
Option6.Alocalpoliceboard
CrimeandDisorderReductionPartnerships(CDRPs)alreadyexistaspartnershipbodies
atboroughanddistrictlevel.Theycurrentlyhaveadutytoreflecttheviewsoflocal
residentsinsettingcommunitysafetypriorities,althoughtherealityisthattheyare(like
policeauthorities)barelyvisibletothepublic.
Itmightbepossibletoincreaselocalcommunityinputbyhavingdirectelectionsfor
partoftheCDRPmembership.Moreradicallytheycouldbetransformedintowholly
electedLocalPoliceBoards.Essentiallythesewouldbepoliceauthoritiesatamuchless
remoteandmorelocallevel.
However,thefactisthatCDRPsarecurrentlymoreinvisibletothepublicthanpolice
authoritiesare.Democratisingthistierofgovernancemaygeneratelittleinterestand
theelectionsarelikelytosufferfromalowturnout.Thisisespeciallylikelyifthebodies
weregivenfewpowers:onlyrealpowerinareassuchasappointments,budgetsand
prioritysettingwouldpreventthemfrombecomingtalkingshops.
However,evenifelectedpolicingboardsormoredemocraticCDRPsweregivensuch
powersthisoptionwouldestablishaparallelstructuretodealwithcommunitysafety
issues,detachedfromtheexistingworkoflocalgovernment.Fromtheperspectiveof
joint-workingandaproblem-focusedapproachtocrimeitmightbebettertooptfor
oneofthelocalgovernmentoptionssetoutabove.
23 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
4.Strategyforreform
4.Strategyforreform
Policereformhasalwaysbeendifficult,withcountlessreportssupportingchangebeing
lefttogatherdustovertheyears(Gash2008).Proposalsforworkforcemodernisation
havetypicallyfallenfoulofoppositionfromthePoliceFederation,whileproposalsto
changeorganisationalstructures(suchasforcemergers)havetypicallyruninto
oppositionfrompolicechiefs.
Butonereasonwhyitissodifficulttoadvancereformintheareaofaccountabilityis
simplybecausetheevidencebaseisverythin.Thereissomeinternationalevidencethat
wecanlearnfrom.LovedayandReid,forexample,pointtotheabilityofamorelocally
accountablesystemintheUnitedStatestomeetgrowingpublicconcernaboutcrime
throughnewlocallyinitiatedpoliciessuchastheCompstatdatacollectionandpolice
managementsysteminNewYork.Theycontrastthiswiththehighlycentralisedand
muchmorerigidFrenchpoliceforcewhichhasstruggledtoinnovateortomovequickly
enoughtoassuagepublicanxietyaboutcrime(LovedayandReid2003).
However,thereisinsufficientevidenceonhowdifferentlocalaccountabilitymodels
mightaffectpolicingperformanceinaUKcontext.Ministersarethereforewaryof
majorchangewhensuchchangefeelslikealeapinthedark.
Itwouldbebetterthereforetopilotanumberofdifferentoptionsbeforerollingouta
singleapproachacrossthewholecountry.Thereisalsoastrongcaseforbespoke
solutionstailoredtotheneedsofdifferentareas.So,forexample,amayoralmodel
mightbebestsuitedtoalargetownorcitylikeBirminghamorLiverpool,whereasan
electedforcecommissionermodelmightworkbetterinasmallerruralforce,suchas
Warwickshire.Withitsmayoralsystem,theLondonMetropolitanPoliceServicealready
hasadegreeofdirectpoliticalaccountabilityattheforcelevelthatmostforceslackand
shouldenhancethatmodelratherthanadoptsomethingentirelynew.
TheGovernmentshouldthereforepilotthemodelofaccountabilitythatismost
appropriatetotheparticulargovernancearrangementsinindividuallocalities.Aspartof
anydeal,theycouldoffergreaterlocalautonomyandfewercentraltargets.Oncethose
pilotshavebeenevaluated,policeforcesandlocalauthoritiesaroundthecountrycould
beaskedtochoosefromanumberofoptionsforenhancinglocalaccountability.
24 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
5.
5.Conclusion
Conclusion
Thisreporthasexploredhowwemightachieveamorelocallyaccountablepoliceservice
inEnglandandWales.Itcomesatanearlystageinourresearchintothesequestions
anditsconclusionsarethereforetentative.
However,therearesomeconclusionswecandrawatthisstage.
• Despitefallingcrimerates,policeperformancestillneedstoimproveandthe
policecontinuetobeinsufficientlyresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.
• Thereareanumberofthingsthatneedtobedonetoimprovepolice
performance,includingworkforcemodernisationandreformstooperational
structures.Thereareanumberofwaysofincreasingresponsiveness,suchasby
embeddingneighbourhoodpolicingandcreatingacustomercarecultureinthe
policeservice.However,addressingthelocalaccountabilitydeficitinpolicingis
crucialtodeliveringbothbetterperformanceandgreaterresponsiveness.
• Therearearangeofdifferentoptionsforincreasinglocalaccountability,which
varyinthebenefitstheybringandthechallengestheypose.TheGovernment
shouldgiveseriousconsiderationtothemall.Whilesome,suchasdirect
electionsattheforcelevel,bringclearlinesofdemocraticaccountabilityata
morestrategiclevel,theyalsotendtoretaindecision-makingataremote
distancefromlocaltownsandneighbourhoods.Others,suchasgivinglocal
authoritiesamuchgreaterrole,provideformorelocalresponsiveness,butmay
introducemorecomplexlinesofaccountability.Thereisnoperfectsystemand
therearesomecleartrade-offs:choicesneedtobemadedependingonthe
objectivesthatareprioritised.
• Whateveroptionischosen,itwillbemeaninglessunlessgenuinepowersare
devolvedtosetpolicingpriorities,controlbudgetsandinfluencesenior
appointments.Electingnewbodieswithnoneofthesepowerswilltakeusno
furtherforwardandwillnotbetakenseriouslybythepublic.
• Werecognisethattheevidencebaseinthisarearemainsthinandthatdifferent
optionsmaybebettersuitedtodifferentlocalareas.Werecommendthatthe
Governmentpilotaccountabilitymodelsfirstandthenrolloutbespokesolutions
indifferentpartsofthecountry.Whateverparticularmodelslocalareasadopt,it
isclearthattacklingtheaccountabilitydeficitisessentialifwearetodeliverthe
kindofresponsiveandeffectivepolicinglocalcommunitieswant.
25 ippr|ANewBeat:Optionsformoreaccountablepolicing
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