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TheNuclearRenaissance:
Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism
ApolicybrieffortheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityforthe21stCentury

byFrankBarnaby
EmeritusConsultanttotheOxfordResearchGroup

March2009
©ippr2009

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
2 ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Aboutippr
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,producing
cutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.Since
1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughour
independentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutions
tochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,
whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnerships
andinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.
ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:info@ippr.org
www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065
ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinMarch2009.©ippr2009

ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity
TheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityisanall-partyCommissionpreparinganindependent
nationalsecuritystrategyfortheUK.Itisco-chairedbyLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLord
AshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon.ThefullCommissionmembershipincludes:

•LordPaddyAshdown,Co-Chair,formerleader •SirChrisFox,formerChiefConstableof
oftheLiberalDemocraticPartyandformer
HighRepresentativeforBosnia.
•LordGeorgeRobertson,Co-Chair,former
SecretaryofStateforDefenceandformer
SecretaryGeneralofNATO.
•DrIanKearns,DeputyChair,DeputyDirector,
ippr.
•SirJeremyGreenstock,Directorofthe
DitchleyFoundationandformerBritish
AmbassadortotheUnitedNations.
•SirDavidOmand,formersecurityand
intelligencecoordinatorintheCabinetOffice
andformerPermanentSecretaryintheHome
Office.
•LordCharlesGuthrie,formerChiefofthe
DefenceStaff.
•LordMartinRees,PresidentoftheRoyal
SocietyandMasterofTrinityCollege,
Cambridge.
NorthamptonshireandformerPresidentof
theAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers.
•ProfessorMichaelClarke,Director,Royal
UnitedServicesInstitute,andProfessorof
DefenceStudiesatKing’sCollegeLondon.
•ProfessorTariqModood,Directorofthe
LeverhulmeProgrammeonMigrationand
Citizenship,BristolUniversity.
•ConstanzeStelzenmüller,Directorofthe
BerlinofficeoftheGermanMarshallFund.
•ProfessorJimNorton,formerchiefexecutive
oftheRadioCommunicationsAgencyand
nowattheInstituteofDirectors.
•IanTaylorMP,ChairoftheConservativeParty
PolicyTask-forceonScience,Technology,
EngineeringandMathematics,Conservative
MPforEsherandWaltonandformerminister
forScienceandTechnologyatthe
DepartmentofTradeandIndustry.

ThispolicybriefisoneofaseriessupportedbytheEconomicandSocialResearchCouncil(ESRC).
FormoreinformationontheworkoftheCommissionpleasegotowww.ippr.org/security

Theviewsinthispaperarethoseoftheauthoraloneandarebeingpublishedhereinthehopeof
advancingpublicdebate.TheydonotrepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionpanelortheviewsof
anysponsoringorganisation.
3 ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Introduction
Globalclimatechangeisoneofthegreatestchallengeswefacethiscentury.Thereisanoverwhelming
consensusamongclimatescientiststhattheworldisheatingupbecauseofhumanactivitiesthatemit
greenhousegases,particularlycarbondioxide,intotheatmosphere(seeIPCC2007),andfewserious
commentatorsdoubtthaturgentactionisneededtopreventcatastrophicchangesintheclimate.1
Therearetwoschoolsofthoughtaboutthebestwaytodealwithglobalwarming.Onewantstobring
aboutasocialrevolution,tomakesocietylessconsumeristandlessmaterialisticandtolowerthe
consumptionofenergyintheprocess.Theotherislessambitious,andperhapsmorerealistic.It
believesintheuseoftechnologytosolvetheproblembyexpandingtheuseofnuclearfission
reactorsandrenewableenergysources,bydevelopingawaytocaptureandstorecarbondioxide
emittedbyexistingfossilfuelpowerstations,and,inthelongterm,bycreatinganewandrelatively
carbon-freesourceofenergysuchasnuclearfusion.
Moreradicalideasinclude:reflectingsunlightbycreatingartificialcloudstoreducetheamountof
sunlightreachingtheEarth’ssurface,mainlyattheArctic;growingphytoplanktonintheoceansto
capturelargeamountsofcarbondioxide;andusingmachines(‘scrubbers’)toabsorbcarbondioxide
fromtheatmosphere.
Eachofthesebroadsocialandtechnologicalsolutionshasitsdifficulties.Asustainablesocial
revolutionwouldtakegenerationstobringabout.Meanwhile,atechnologicalfix,thoughattractivein
somerespects,willalsorequiretimeandconsiderablefinancialresourcestoovercomeverydifficult
technicalproblems;namely,thefactthatappropriatetechnologyhasnotyetbeendeveloped.
Britain’sPrimeMinisterGordonBrownisanenthusiasticadvocateofarelianceontechnology,
backingbothnuclearpowerandcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)technologiestogetherwith
improvementsinenergyefficiency(Grice2008).Manyotherpoliticalleadersarelookingtonuclear
powerasthebestwaytoreducetheemissionsofgreenhousegases.Wemustthereforeexpecttosee
alargeincreaseintheglobaluseofnuclearpowerforelectricitygeneration:whathasbecomeknown
asanuclearrenaissance.
Atpresent,thereisasurprisinglackofacademicdebateandresearchabouttheglobal,regionaland
nationalsecurityconsequencesofthespreadofnuclearknowledgeandtechnology,andabouthow
theinternationalandregionalcommunitiescancopewiththisspread.Thereisgeneralagreementthat
inthenuclearrenaissancemanycountrieswillhaveaccesstoplutoniumthatcouldpotentiallybeused
tofabricatenuclearweapons,bothbycountriesandbyterrorists,sincetheinformationneededto
producenuclearweaponsiswidelyavailable.Butthereisstillapoorunderstandingoftherangeof
riskspresentinanunregulatednuclearworld.
Researchisurgentlyneededonhowtocontroltheserisks.Anobviouscontrolmeasurewouldbeto
strengthentheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT).Thiswillinvolvethequestions:Howcanthe
nuclear-weaponpowersbepersuadedtogiveuptheirnuclearweapons?Istheabolitionofnuclear
weaponsfeasibleorapipe-dream?Shouldnon-nuclear-weaponcountriesbeencouragedtodevelop
civilnucleartechnology?Ifso,underwhatconditions?Whatmeasureswouldbejustifiedtopreventa
countryacquiringnuclearweapons?Wouldmilitaryactioneverbejustified?
Anotherareainwhichfurtherresearchisnecessaryisaroundthethreatofnuclearterrorism.This
presentsalargenumberofquestions,including:Howlikelyisitthataterroristgroupwillacquire
nuclearweapons?Whichterroristgroupswouldbeabletodevelopthem?Cannuclearterrorismbe
prevented?Ifnot,whatmeasuresshouldbeputinplacetocopewithit?Howcanthelargeamount
ofradioactivematerialaroundtheworldbemadesecure?Howcannuclearterrorismbecountered?

1.ForanexampleofaviewdifferentfromtheconsensusseeSvensmarkandCalder2007.
4 ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Whatmeasuresshouldbeputintoplacetodealeffectivelywithnuclearterroristattacks?Andhowwill
alltheseissuesbeaffectedbythenuclearrenaissance?
Whilethesequestionsarebeyondthescopeofthisdiscussionpaper,thematerialbelowdiscusses
someofthemoreserioussecurityissuesthatwillbeassociatedwithanuclearrenaissance,including:
•Theshortageofhigh-qualityuraniumforuseasnuclearfuel
•Theconsequencesoftheuseoffastbreederreactors(FBRs)andthewidespreaduseof
plutoniumtofuelthem
• Theincreasedriskinaplutoniumeconomyofthespreadofnuclearweaponstoboth
countriesandterroristgroups.
Beforediscussingthesesecurityimplications,thepapersetsthecontextbydescribingimportant
elementsofthenuclearfuelcycleandbyaddressingissuesrelatedtouraniumsupplyandthe
changingtechnologybeingusedinnuclearpowerreactors.

Scientificcontext
Thenuclearfuelcycle
Theproductionoffuelfornuclear-powerreactorsisbasedonuranium,whichisfoundinalarge
numberofminerals(chemicalcompounds)andisembeddedindifferenttypesofrock,seawater,fresh
water,andsoil.MosturaniumisdispersedthroughtherocksoftheEarth’scrustandonlyasmall
fractionisfoundinoresthatcontainsignificantconcentrations.2
However,thereisnomajordifficultyintheminingofuraniumores.Abouttwothirdsoftheworld’s
currentknowneconomicallyrecoverableresourcesofuraniumarefoundinfiveaccessiblecountries–
Australia(24percent),Kazakhstan(17percent),Canada(9percent),theUSA(7percent)and
SouthAfrica(7percent)(WorldNuclearAssociation2007).Thecomplexitycomesintheprocessing
ofuranium,afactthathasbeenhelpfultodateintermsofnon-proliferation.
Oncemined,theoresareprocessedinmillstoextracttheuraniumintheformofyellowuranium
oxide(U3O8),calledyellowcake.Afterproduction,yellowcakeisrefinedandpurifiedandsentto
conversionplantswhereitisconvertedtouraniumhexafluoride.Thishexafluorideissenttoa
uranium-enrichmentplantwheretheconcentrationofuranium-235isincreasedfromthenaturalvalue
of0.72percenttobetweenabout3and5percent.3 Afterenrichment,thehexafluorideisnormally
convertedintouraniumdioxide(UO2),thebasicfuelusedformostcurrentnuclearreactors.
Enrichmentisnotastraightforwardoperation(WorldNuclearAssociation2008a).Becausethe
isotopesuranium-235anduranium-238arechemicallyidentical,theycannotbeseparatedand
enrichedbyachemicalmethod;aphysicalmethodmustbeused.Moderncommercialuranium
enrichmentplantsusegascentrifugesasthephysicalmethod.

2.Theconcentrationofuraniuminoresvariesoverawiderange.Therichestorescontainabout20per
centuranium(about200grammesofuraniuminakilogrammeofrock).Butsomeorescontainingno
morethan0.13grammesofuraniumperkilogrammeofrockarecurrentlybeingmined.

3.Therearetwomaintypesofuraniumatoms.About99.3percentisoftheisotopeuranium-238and
0.7percentisoftheisotopeuranium-235.Uranium-235isafissileisotope,fissilematerialbeingthe
essentialingredientforbothnuclearpowerandnuclearweaponsproduction.Whenuraniumisenriched
toveryhighlevels,typically90percentofU-235orabove,itprovidesthefissilematerialnecessaryin
theproductionofanuclearexplosivedevice.Enrichedtolowerlevels(3-5percentofU-235),itprovides
thefissilematerialrequiredfornuclearpower.
5 ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Thesecentrifugesdependontheverysmalldifferenceinmassbetweenuranium-235anduranium-
238atoms,witharapidlyspinningcentrifugebeingusedtoseparatethetwoisotopes.Thecentrifuge
isacylindricaldrumrotatingatveryhighspeeds.Theheavieruranium-238atomsconcentrateatthe
outerradiusoftherotorandaremadetoflowinonedirection,whiletheuranium-235atomsare
enrichednearthecentralaxisofthedrumandmadetoflowintheoppositedirection.Theenriched
uranium-235isthencollectedthroughanexitorifice.
Theoutputofuraniumisotopespercentrifugeisverysmall.Acommercialcentrifugeplantistherefore
designedwithalargenumberofcentrifugesincascadetoproduceausefulamountofenriched
uranium.Theveryslightlyenricheduraniumfromthefirstcentrifugeinthecascadeisfedintothe
inputnozzleofthesecondcentrifuge,theslightlymoreenricheduranium-235fromthesecond
centrifugeisfedintothethird,andsoon,untiltherequireddegreeofenrichmentisobtained.
Theenrichmentprocessrequiressophisticatedtechnologyandonlyasmallnumberofcountries
operatesignificanturanium-enrichmentplantstoday,namelyArgentina,France,Iran,Japan,Pakistan,
RussiaandtheUSA.Germany,theNetherlandsandtheUKjointlyrunURENCO,auranium-
enrichmentcompany.
Thislimiteddispersalofthetechnologyofenrichmenthashistoricallybuttressedtheglobalnuclear
non-proliferationregime,sincethetechnologytoenrichuraniumisoneoftwokeystotheproduction
ofnuclearweapons(theotheristheabilitytoreprocessspentnuclearfueltoseparateandextract
plutoniumfromit,towhichwereturnlater).However,theplannedshifttotheuseofmoreplutonium
andlessuraniuminnuclearreactorsthreatenstosweepasidetheoldsafeguards.

Thelong-termsupplyofuranium
AccordingtotheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)andtheOrganisationforEconomic
CooperationandDevelopment(OECD),theknownrecoverableuraniumresourcesare4.7million
tonnes(OECDandIAEA2008).Thisfigureincludesuraniumoresthatareofrelativelylowgrade,
occuratgreatdepths,involvelengthytransportationdistancesandarehardertomine.
Theworld’scurrentnuclear-powerreactorsconsumeuraniumattherateof65,000tonnesayear
(WorldNuclearAssociation2008c).Ifthisratestaysconstant,knownuraniumreserveswilllastforless
than70years.Giventhattherichesturaniumoresaredepletedfirst(becausetheseusuallygenerate
thelargestprofitsfortheminingcompanies)thenetenergyextractedfromuraniumorewillalso
decreaseovertime.4 Atthecurrentrateofconsumption,thehighestqualityuraniumoreswillbe
depletedwithinadecadeandtheaveragegradewillfallbelow0.1percent.
Itisalsoveryunlikelythatnewuraniumresourcesofhighqualitywillbediscoveredinthenextfew
decades.Thisismainlybecauseuraniumdepositsthatarerelativelynearthesurfaceandtherefore
mineableusingtheleastenergyemissionsofgreenhousegaseshavealreadybeendiscovered.
Depositsatgreaterdepthsrequiremoreenergytobemined,andareofpoorerquality.
AccordingtocalculationsmadebyJanWillemStormvanLeeuwen,anexpertonuraniumresources,
assumingthatworldnuclearcapacityremainsconstantat372GW,thenetenergyfromuraniumwill
falltozerobyabouttheyear2070(StormvanLeeuwen2007and2008).Assumingthatworld
nuclearshareremainsconstantat2.2percentofworldenergysupply,andthatenergydemandwill
increasetomeettheneedsofarapidlygrowinghumanpopulation,thenetenergybenefitwillfallto
zerobyabout2050.

4.Thenetenergy,ameasureofthequalityoftheuraniumore,istheenergyproducedpertonneof
uraniumfuelminustheenergyusedtoproducethereactorfuelelements.Ifthepurposeofexpanding
theuseofnuclearpoweristomeetenergyneedswhilemitigatingclimatechange,thequalityofthe
world’suraniumresourcesisthereforemuchmoreimportantthanthequantity oftheseresources,atleast
foraslongasfossilfuelsareusedtodrivetheuraniumminingandreactorfuelproductionprocess.
6 ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Movestoaplutoniumeconomy
Thisisnotarosypictureintermsofuraniumsupply,giventheheavyrelianceofcurrentthird-
generationreactorsonuranium.5 Afourthgenerationofreactorsisgoingtobenecessary,andislikely
tobeattheheartofthecomingrenaissanceintheglobalnuclearindustry.
Fourth-generation(GenerationIV)reactorsincludeveryadvancedreactordesigns,suchastheFast
BreederReactorwhichproduces(orbreeds)morenuclearfuelthanituses(seeNuttall2005).Inthese
designs,whentheuranium-238surroundingthereactorcapturesfastneutronsfromthecore,enough
U-238isconvertedtoplutonium-239(itselfafissilematerial)tofuelanotherFBR.Thisplutonium239
canbeisolatedforuseaspartofareprocessingofspentnuclearfuelaimedatseparatingreusable
fromunusablereactorwaste.Intheory,afamilyofFBRsshouldeventuallybeself-sufficientinfuel
withonlyasmallinjectionofuranium.TheFBRhasthereforebeenseenasthesolutiontothecoming
shortageofhighqualityuranium.
FastBreedReactorsdonotbreedveryfast.ForeseeabledesignsarelikelytoproduceFBRsthatwill
take30yearstoproduceenoughnuclearfuel(thedoublingtime)tooperateanotherFBR(Rodriguez
andLee1998).However,byusingwell-designedFBRs,theutilisationofuraniumcouldeventually
reachabout70percent,comparedwithlessthan1percentinlight-waterreactors.Indiaisnow
activelydevelopingFBRsandplanstoconstructfour.JapanhasbuiltaresearchFBRatJoyoanda
pilotoneatMonju,inTsuruga.ChinaisconstructingaprototypeFBR.
ThisswitchtoFBRsisworryingfortworeasons.First,earlierattemptstoconstructandoperateFBRs
inFrance,India,Japan,Russia,theUKandtheUShavehadachequeredhistory.ThefirstBritishFBR,
theDounreayFastReactor(DFR),firstwentcriticalin1959atDounreay,Scotland.Thesecondwas
thePrototypeFastReactor(PFR),whichstartedoperatingin1976,alsoatDounreay.TheBritishFBR
programmecloseddownin1994whentheGovernmentstoppedfinancingit.
GermanyconstructedtwoFBRs,butbothwerecloseddownin1991.Thebiggest,builtatKalkar,
Rhine-Westphalia,wascompletedin1985butwasneveroperatedbecauseofpoliticaloppositionand
concernsaboutsafety.Japan’sMonjuFBRbeganoperatingin1994butwasshutdowninDecember
1995followingaleakofthesodiumcoolantandafire.Itmaynotberestartedbecauseofdoubtsthat
largequantitiesofliquidsodiumcanbehandledsafely.
Second,theswitchtoFBRswillallowmorenuclearreactorstocomeonstream,whichinturn
generatesarangeofnewsecuritychallenges.Forexample,iftheworldisusing3,000GWofnuclear
electricityin2075,andifthisisgeneratedviatheearlieronce-throughnuclearcycleusinglight-water
reactors,approximately600tonnesofplutonium(aby-productoftheprocess)willbeproduced
annually(Feiveson2003).However,ifthisnuclearcapacityisprovidedbyFBRs,asthenuclear
industrypredicts,morethan4,000tonnesofplutoniumwillhavetobefabricatedintofreshreactor
fueleachyear(ibid).Thiswouldbeenoughplutoniumtoproduceatleastamillionnuclearweapons.
LargeamountsofplutoniumwillbeneedediftheworldcomestorelyonFBRs,becauseplutonium
providesamuchlargerfractionofthenuclearfuelusedinthemthandothecurrentordinaryreactors,
whicharefuelledjustwithuranium(intheformofuraniumdioxide).
Anycountrythatchoosestooperatefourth-generationreactorsinthefuturewillhaverelativelyeasy
accesstoplutonium(usableasthefissilematerialinthemostefficientnuclearweapons)andwillhave
competentnuclearphysicistsandengineerswhocoulddesignandfabricatesuchweapons.Because
theycouldproduceanuclearforceinashorttime–monthsratherthanyears–thesecountrieswould
needtoberegardedaslatentnuclear-weaponpowers.Itmustalsobeexpectedthatsomeofthem
willtakethepoliticaldecisiontobecomeactualnuclear-weaponpowers.

5.Thefirstgenerationofreactorsweretheearlyprototypereactorsofthe1950sand1960s,mainlyused
toobtainplutoniumfornuclearweapons.Thesecondgenerationwerethecommercialreactors
constructedinthe1970sand1980sandthethirdgenerationaremostofthereactorsbeingbuiltright
nowtoreplaceoraddtothem.
 7 ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism
Fabricatinganuclear
weaponfromplutonium
ThefuelpelletsinMOXfuel
assembliesarecomposed
entirelyofpurereactor
gradeplutoniumand
depleteduranium,both
presentasdioxidesand
fusedtogetherbyheatto
formaceramic.Thematerial
isdesignedtobesolublein
fairlyconcentratednitricacid
foreaseofreprocessing.The
chemicalseparationof
plutoniumdioxidefrom
uraniumdioxideinMOXfuel
pelletsisfacilitatedbythe
factthattheseelements
haveverydifferent
oxidation/reduction
chemistries.
Theproceduresrequired
wouldbesimpleandwell
withinthetechnological
capabilitiesofamoderately
sophisticatedterrorist
organisation.Thesimplest
methodtoseparate
plutoniumfromMOXision-
exchangeusinganion-
exchangeresin(Chenetal
2005).Theplutonium
dioxide,onceseparated,
couldthenbeconvertedto
plutoniummetal.The
plutoniumdioxideorthe
plutoniummetalcouldbe
usedinaprimitivedesignto
makenuclearexplosive.
Therewillalsobeaheightenedriskthatterroristswillacquireplutonium,fabricateanuclearweapon
anddetonateit.Eminentphysicistswithknowledgeofthecharacteristicsandproductionofnuclear
weaponshavenodoubtthateffectivenuclearweaponscanbefabricatedfromreactor-grade
plutoniumproducedbycivilnuclear-powerreactors(Marketal1987).
Thisriskisalreadybeingsignificantlyenhancedbytheincreaseduseofmixedoxide(MOX)fuel–a
mixtureofuraniumdioxideandplutoniumdioxideusedinsomeofthenewernuclearreactorsnow
replacingthosethatareobsolete.Somecurrent(secondgeneration)light-waterreactorsin
Belgium,France,Germany,IndiaandSwitzerlanduseMOXfuelelementsinafraction(normally
aboutathird)oftheircores.IfaterroristgroupacquiredMOXfuel,itcouldrelativelyeasily
separatetheplutoniumdioxidefromtheuraniumdioxidebymeansofstraightforwardchemistry,
andusetheplutoniumtofabricateanuclearweapon(seebox).Itwouldonlytaketwoorthree
peoplewiththeappropriateskillstodesignandfabricateacrudenuclearexplosive(Stober2003),
asshownbytheNthCountryexperiment.6 Theywouldnotneedtohaveaccesstoclassified
documents,sincethenuclearphysicsdataneededtodesignacrudenucleardeviceisalready
availableinopen-sourceliterature(Lovins1990).
Theoperationsinvolvedwouldrequiresomeskill,butmanyterroristorganisationshaveshown
themselvescapableofsophisticatedplanningandtheapplicationofscientificprinciples.The
constructionoftheconventionalexplosivedevicethatdestroyedthePanAmjumbojetoverLockerbie
on21December1988requireddetailedplanningandscientificskills,asdidtheconstructionofthe
SarinnervegasweaponusedintheTokyoundergroundbytheAUMgroupon20March1995.
Indeed,thepreparationofSarinforthatattackinvolvedconsiderablymorecomplexchemistryand
greateracutedangertotheoperatorsthanthatrequiredfortheseparationofplutoniumfromMOX.
Thechemistryisevenlesssophisticatedthanthatrequiredfortheillicitpreparationofdesigner
recreationaldrugs.Moreover,ruthlessterroristsarelikelytoberelativelyunconcernedabouttheir
safetyoraboutpollutingtheenvironment(withplutonium,forexample)otherthantotheextentthat
accidentsorreleasesmayrevealtheirclandestineactivity.
Otherdangersposedbynuclearterroristsinclude:theproductionanddetonationofaradiological
weapon,commonlydescribedasa‘dirtybomb’,tospreadradioactivematerial;attacksonnuclear-
powerreactorsoronradioactivewastetanksandplutoniumstoresatareprocessingplantlike
Sellafieldtospreadradioactivity;andthesabotageorhijackingoftransportersofnuclearmaterials.
Apartfromadirtybomb,allofthesetypesofnuclearterrorismhavethepotentialtocauselarge
numbersofdeaths.Oftheseoptions,nuclearterroristswouldprobablyprefertosetoffanuclear
explosionbecauseofthegreatdamageitwoulddo,perhapsusingastolennuclearweaponormore
likelyusinganuclearexplosivefabricatedfromacquiredfissilematerial.
Themostprimitiveterroristnucleardevicewouldbeadirtybomb,consistingofaconventionalhigh
explosive(forexample,semtex,dynamiteorTNT),someincendiarymaterial(likethermite)
surroundingtheconventionalexplosive,andaquantityofaradioisotope,probablyplacedatthe
centreoftheexplosive.Whentheconventionalhighexplosiveisdetonatedtheradioactivematerial
wouldbevaporised.Thefireignitedbytheincendiarymaterialwouldcarrytheradioactivityupinto
theatmosphere.Itwouldthenbeblowndownwind,spreadingradioactivityasitwent.Generally,the
explosionoftheconventionalexplosivewouldbethemostlikelycauseofanyimmediatedeathsor
seriousinjuries.Areasaslargeastensofsquarekilometresmightbecontaminatedwithradioactivity
tolevelsabovethoserecommendedbynationalradiologicalprotectionauthoritiesfortheexposureof
civilianstoradioactivityandthesewouldhavetobeevacuatedanddecontaminated,averylengthy
andexpensiveoperation(Barnaby1997).
Themainpotentialimpactofadirtybombwouldbepsychological,inthatitwouldcauseconsiderable
fear,panicandsocialdisruption:exactlytheeffectsterroristswishtoachieve.Thepublicfearof
radiationisverygreatindeed,somesayirrationallyso.
6.TheNthCountryexperimentshowedthatthreepost-doctoralstudentswithnonuclearknowledge
coulddesignaworkingatombomb.SeeBurkeman2003formoreinformation.
8 ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Policyoptionsinanuclearrenaissance
Thenuclearrenaissancewillleadtothespreadofplutoniumtomanycountries,asMOXfuelis
increasinglyusedasanuclearfuelandasplutoniumisusedtofuelfutureFBRs.Thefactthatthis
plutoniumcanbeusedbycountriestofabricatenuclearweaponsandbyterroriststomakenuclear
explosivesisanobviousthreattoglobalsecurity.
Theinternationalcommunityurgentlyneedstodotwothingstoreducetheplutoniumthreat.First,
andmostimportant,istostrengthentheNon-ProliferationTreatybyactionatthenextNPTReview
Conferencein2010.Second,stepsmustbetakentodiscouragenewcountriesfromobtainingthe
capabilitytoenrichuraniumand/ortoreprocessspentnuclearfuel,themostsensitiveelementsofthe
nuclearfuelcycleasfarasnuclear-weaponproliferationandterrorismareconcerned.
Twomajorproposalshavebeenputforwardtoreducetheplutoniumthreat:theGlobalNuclear
EnergyPartnership(GNEP)andtheNuclearFuelBank.However,botharediscriminatoryinthesense
thattheyallowthecountriesthatalreadyhaveenrichmentandreprocessingtechnologiestomaintain
thembuttrytopreventthosecountriesthatdonotnowhavethemfromacquiringthem.
Somecountrieswanttheoptiontoacquirenuclearweaponsiftheylatertakethepoliticaldecisionto
dosoand,therefore,toacquireenrichmentand/orreprocessingtechnologies.Anumberofthese,and
especiallyIran,willnotbewillingtogiveuptheoptionofacquiringthem,arguingthatArticleIVof
theNPTgivesthemaninalienablerighttodosounderinternationalIAEAcontrol.

TheGlobalNuclearEnergyPartnership(GNEP)
TheproposedGNEP,announcedbytheUSDepartmentofEnergy(DoE)on6February2006,would
beaninternationalpartnershiptoreprocessspentnuclearfuelinawaythatrenderstheplutoniumin
itusablefornuclearfuelbutnotfornuclearweapons(USDepartmentofEnergy2007).
TheUnitedStateshasproposedtoworkwithotheradvancednuclearnationstodevelopnew
proliferation-resistantrecyclingtechnologiesinordertominimiseproliferationconcerns.Partner
nationswilldevelopanuclearfuelservicesprogrammetoprovidenuclearfueltodevelopingnationsin
exchangefortheircommitmentnottoenrichuraniumorreprocessspentnuclearfuel.
On16February2006theUnitedStates,FranceandJapansignedanarrangementtoconductresearch
intothedevelopmentofsodium-cooledFBRsinsupportoftheGNEP.On16September200711
morecountriessignedtheGNEPStatementofPrinciples.ThesecountrieswereAustralia,Bulgaria,
Ghana,Hungary,Jordan,Kazakhstan,Lithuania,Poland,Romania,SloveniaandUkraine.Sincethen
Canada,Italy,theRepublicofKorea,SenegalandtheUnitedKingdomhavejoined(WorldNuclear
Association2008b).
IftheGNEPoperatesaccordingtoplan,thenuclear-weaponpowerswillsellnuclear-powerreactorsto
non-nuclear-weaponpowersandthenuclearfuelforthem.Theywouldthenarrangetotakebackthe
spentfuelelementsfromthereactors,reprocessthemandeventuallypermanentlydisposeofthe
radioactivewaste.
SomeuraniumsuppliersarestronglyopposedtotheGNEP.Forexample,SouthAfricanMineralsand
EnergyMinisterBuyelwaSonjicastatedthat:‘Exportinguraniumonlytogetitbackrefined,insteadof
enrichingitinSouthAfrica,wouldbe“inconflictwithournationalpolicy”’(AgenceFrancePress
2007).Suppliersarguethattoaddvaluetotherawuranium,byenrichment,forexample,would
considerablyincreasetheirprofit.
IftheGNEPgoesaheadandtheAmericansreprocessspentreactorfuelelements,itwillreverse30
yearsofUSgovernmentpolicy.In1977PresidentJimmyCarterbannedreprocessingintheUS
becauseofconcernsthattheplutoniumseparatedfromthecivilreactorfuelelementswouldbeused
tofabricatenuclearweapons.SomebelievethatsuchareversalofAmericangovernmentpolicyis
urgentlyrequiredbuttheoppositiontoitisprobablysufficientlygreattomakeitineffective.
9 ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Anuclearfuelbankunderinternationalsafeguards
Thesecondproposalistosetupanuclear‘fuelbank’or‘reserve’,administeredbytheIAEA(IAEA
2006).Thefuelbankwouldassureaback-upsupplyoffuelfornuclear-powerreactorsonanon-
discriminatory,non-politicalbasis,therebyreducingtheneedforcountriestodeveloptheirown
uraniumenrichmentandplutoniumreprocessingtechnologies.Thefuelbankwould,itisproposed,be
setupinawaythatwouldnotdisrupttheexistingcommercialmarketinnuclearfuels.
InhisNobelPrizespeechon10December2005,IAEADirectorGeneralMohamedElBaradeiargued
thatthecontrolsoveroperationsforproducingthenuclearmaterialthatcouldbeusedinweapons
shouldbetightened,observingthat‘anycountryhastherighttomastertheseoperationsforcivilian
uses.Butindoingso,italsomastersthemostdifficultstepsinmakinganuclearbomb.Toovercome
this,Iamhopingthatwecanmaketheseoperationsmultinational–sothatnoonecountrycanhave
exclusivecontroloveranysuchoperation’(ElBaradei2005).
Tothisend,ElBaradeihassuggestedthatareservefuelbankshouldbesetupunderIAEAcontrol,to
ensurethatallcountriesreceivethefuelthattheyneedforlegitimateandpeacefulnuclearactivities.
Itistobehopedthatthissystemwouldremovetheincentiveforindividualcountriestodeveloptheir
ownfuelcycle,andstimulatethecreationofeffectivemultinationalarrangementsforenrichment,fuel
production,wastedisposalandreprocessing(ElBaradei2005).
BoththeUnitedStatesandRussiahavestatedthattheyarewillingtomakenuclearmaterialavailable
forafuelbankadministeredbytheIAEA.Russiahasproposedtheestablishmentofinternational
centresunderaGlobalNuclearPowerInfrastructure(GNPI)toprovidenuclearfuelcycleservices,
includingtheenrichmentofuranium,inanon-discriminatoryway,supervisedbytheIAEA.
InthewordsofTariqRauf,HeadoftheIAEA’sVerificationandSecurityPolicyCoordinationSection,
theestablishmentofanuclearfuelbankunderinternationalsafeguards‘isaneither/orsituation;ifwe
don’tmakeitwork,thenwemustpreparetoliveinaworldwheredozensofcountrieshavethe
capabilityandkeyingredientstomakenuclearweapons’(IAEA2006).
AswiththeGNEP,thediscriminatorynatureofthenuclearfuelbankmayconsiderablyreduceits
effectiveness,and,formanycountries,itsacceptability.Thefacthastobefacedthatacountryintent
onacquiringfissilematerialand/orthetechnologytoproduceit,andthatisabletopayforit,islikely
tosucceed.

StrengtheningtheNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT)
Giventhestrongobjectionstotheproposalscurrentlyonthetabletoreducetheplutoniumthreat,
theoptionofstrengtheningtheNPTthereforeseemsthemostlikelytosucceed.TheNPTcouldbe
reinforcedthroughmoreactivestepstowardsnucleardisarmament.With188Parties,theNPTis
almostuniversal,andanimportantbarriertothespreadofnuclearweapons.7 Thechallengeisto
strengthenitsothatitmayserveasamoreeffectivebackdroptothetwopolicysuggestions
highlightedabove.
TheNPTisabargain.Thenon-nuclear-weaponPartiesarecommittednottoacquirenuclearweapons
andtosubmitsafeguardstoIAEAtoverifythattheyarecomplyingwiththeircommitment;in
exchange,thefiveNPTnuclear-weaponPartiesarecommittedtogivetheotherPartiestotalaccessto
peacefulnucleartechnologiesandtoengageinnucleardisarmamentnegotiationsaimedatthe
ultimateabolitionoftheirnuclearweapons.Themainproblemoverthepast40yearshasbeenthat
thenuclear-weaponPartiestotheNPThavenotfulfilledtheirpartofthebargain,andhaveshown
fewcrediblesignsofbeingwillingtogetridoftheirnuclearweapons.Withagrowingnumberof
latentnuclear-weaponpowers,theworldismovingintoanunregulatedstateofnuclearanarchy.

7.Onlythreecountries,India,IsraelandPakistan,havenotjoinedtheNPT.NorthKoreawasaPartyto
thetreatybutwithdrewfromitin2003.
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KenBooth,ProfessorofInternationalPoliticsattheUniversityofWales,hasaptlydescribedthisworld
asoneof‘radicalnuclearmultipolarity’(Booth2007).Boothagreesthatbyfarthebest,andprobably
theonly,waytopreventtheworldcommunityfromfallingintoastateoftotalnuclearanarchyisto
strengthentheNPT.EveryfiveyearsaNPTReviewConferencetakesplacetoassesshowthetreaty
canbestrengthenedandtocheckhowwellthePartiesarefulfillingtheirobligationsunderthetreaty.
ThenextReviewConferenceisin2010.Thetreatyisfragileandthe2010conferencemaybeamake
orbreakeventforit.IftheNPTistobesignificantlystrengthened,thenuclear-weaponPartiesmust,
attheminimum,agreeatthe2010ReviewConferencetomakeverifiedreductionsoftheirnuclear
arsenalsandtotaketheirnuclearforcesoffalert(ortostandthemdown).
ThenegotiationofaFissileMaterialsCut-offTreaty,banningthefurtherproductionoffissilematerials
foruseinnuclearweapons,mustalsobestarted.BringingtheComprehensiveNuclear-Test-BanTreaty
intoforcewouldalsohelpaswouldatreatydefiningadequatenegativesecurityassurancestonon-
nuclear-weaponcountries.
Theestablishednuclear-weaponpowersshouldnegotiateatreatytoprohibittheuseofnuclear
weaponsagainstnon-nuclear-weaponPartiestotheNPT.Forexample,theUShasmadeanuclear
non-usepledge,knownasanegativesecurityassurance,bywhichitagreesnottousenuclear
weaponsagainstnon-nuclear-weaponNPTParties,exceptifattackedbysuchastateassociatedor
alliedwithanuclear-armedstate.Butatthesametime,theUSrefusestoruleouttheuseofnuclear
weaponsinresponsetoattacksusingbiologicalorchemicalweapons.
TheNPTwillbestrengthenedonlyifthenon-nuclear-weaponPartiesareconvincedthatthenuclear-
weaponPartiesgenuinelyintendtogetridoftheirnuclearweapons,whilemeasurestosetupand
extendtheGlobalNuclearEnergyPartnershipandaninternationalnuclearfuelbankwillonlyworkin
thecontextofapreservedandstrengthenedNPT.
Somesupportersofnuclearweaponssuggestthatabolishingthemcouldendangerworldsecurity
because,bydeterringthreats,theseweaponspreventwarandstabiliseinternationalrelations.The
eliminationofnuclearweapons,itissaid,mayalsoconsiderablyincreasetheprobabilityof
conventionalwar(GrahamandMendelsohn1999).
However,anumberofeminentpeople,includingsomewhohaveheldveryseniorpostsintheUSand
UKgovernmentsandwhohavenottraditionallybeeninfavourofnucleardisarmament,havecalled
fortheabolitionofnuclearweapons(seeSchultzetal2007andQuinlan2007).Theyhavebeen
supportedinthiscallbyauthoritativeacademics(seeKearns2007andPerkovichandActon2008).
Theargumentinfavourofnuclearweaponsalsofailstotakeintoaccounttherealdangerofalarge
increaseinthenumberofnuclear-weaponpowersandtheassociatedthreatfromnuclearterrorism.
Bothofthesedangerswillbeincreasedbytheexpansioninuseofnuclearpower,particularlyifbased
onFastBreederReactorsandplutonium.
Wearenowatacrossroads.UnlesswetakestepstoturnideasliketheGlobalNuclearEnergy
Partnershipandtheinternationalnuclearfuelbankintorealityandunlesswechangethepolitical
climatearoundtheNPTwithsomeconcreteprogressonnucleardisarmamentamongtheNPTnuclear
weaponsstates,wearegoingtomoveintoBooth’sworldof‘radicalnuclearmultipolarity’.Tomake
thatmoveasadeliberatesecuritystrategybecauseofsomemisplacedfaithinthecontinuedvalueof
nucleardeterrencewouldbe,attheleast,ill-advised.Todosoasaknee-jerkreactiontoourneedto
managethechallengeofclimatechangewouldbeunforgivable.
Weurgentlyneedthesecuritydimensionsofarenaissanceintheglobalnuclearindustrytobe
elevatedinpublicdebatesbothonUKenergystrategyandontheemerginginternationalenergy
ordertowhichUKstrategywillcontribute.Andweurgentlyneedseriouspoliticalenergydirectedat
deliveringthepolicyinnovationsoutlinedabove.
11 ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

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