Preferred Citation: Dorter, Kenneth.

Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: The Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, and Statesman. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1994 1994. http://ark.cdli .or!/ark:/1"#"#/ft$199n%!n/

Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues

The Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman Kenneth Dorter
UNIVERSITY F !"#IF RNI" PRESS

Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford

$ %&&' The Regents o( the Uni)ersit* o( !ali(ornia

&o 'y 'other and to the 'e'ory of 'y father

Preferred Citation: Dorter, Kenneth. Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: The Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, and Statesman. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1994 1994. http://ark.cdli .or!/ark:/1"#"#/ft$199n%!n/

&o 'y 'other and to the 'e'ory of 'y father

Pre(ace
&he fo(r dialo!(es e)a'ined here for' a nat(ral !ro(p *ith se+(ential concerns. ,ince the ai' of the present st(dy is to try to (nderstand the !ro(p as a *hole, - have sacrificed the advanta!e of !reater detail that ook.len!th co''entaries *o(ld provide, in order to present a 'ore synoptic pict(re. B(t altho(!h the treat'ent of individ(al dialo!(es *ill not e as e)tensively detailed as in ook.len!th st(dies, - have tried to pay caref(l attention oth to the concept(al ar!('ents and to the dra'atic and literary events, and have tried to ens(re that the lessenin! of detail *o(ld not 'ean a lessenin! of attentiveness. - call this !ro(p of dialo!(es /leatic, as a convenient incl(sive ter', even tho(!h the ter' is only indirectly applica le to the Theaetetus . Unlike the other three dialo!(es, the Theaetetus is cond(cted neither y Par'enides nor the /leatic stran!er, and its s( 0ect 'atter is 1eracleitean and its dra'atic conte)t 2e!arian 3o*in! to the choice of /(cleides and &erpsion as the introd(ctory speakers4. 5evertheless, Par'enides is 'entioned at an i'portant 0(nct(re as so'eone *hose vie*s o(!ht to e

considered as an alternative to the philosophy of eco'in! that &heaetet(s defends *itho(t s(ccess 316#d.161a4, and the fail(re to disc(ss the /leatic philosopher is ascri ed only to the fact that he is too i'portant to e considered in the availa le ti'e 316"c.164a4. 1e is th(s the only alternative indicated to the theories that fo(nder in the Theaetetus , and their collapse 'ay a'o(nt to an indirect endorse'ent of the /leatic. 5othin! is pres(pposed philosophically y desi!. 7)7 natin! the dialo!(es in this *ay. 2y intention is rather to avoid the pres(ppositions involved in callin! the' Plato8s 9critical9 dialo!(es, as is often done on the ass('ption that they are partial rep(diations of the theory of for's. &he latter desi!nation is in any case 'isleadin! *ith re!ard to the Statesman . ,o'e of the 'aterial has een derived fro' the previo(sly p( lished st(dies listed elo*, and is (sed *ith the per'ission of the editor or p( lisher. 9:(stice and 2ethod in Plato8s Statesman 9 3,. Pana!ioto(, ed., Justice, La and Philosoph! in "lassical #thens ;/d'onton: <cade'ic Printin! and P( lishin!, 196%= 1#>.$$4? 9&he &heory of @or's and Parmenides -9 3:. <nton and <. Pre(s, eds., Essa!s in #ncient Gree$ Philosoph! , ---: Plato ;<l any: ,U5A Press, 1969= 16".$#$4? 9Diairesis and the &ripartite ,o(l in the Sophist 9 3#ncient Philosoph! 1# ;199#= 41.B14? 9Cevels of Kno*led!e in the Theaetetus 9 3%evie o& 'etaph!sics 44 ;199#= "4".%"4. - *o(ld like to thank the ,ocial ,cience and 1('anities Desearch Co(ncil of Canada for a one.year research !rant, and the University of E(elph for a sa atical year, oth of *hich helped i''eas(ra ly in the preparation of this ook. - *o(ld also like to thank &ho'as Chance, E. D. @. @errari, 2itchell 2iller, and the late Do ert Br(' a(!h for their !enerosity in readin! thro(!h the *ork, in *hole or part, and for their val(a le co''ents and criticis's? and 'y st(dents and collea!(es, at E(elph and at other depart'ents and conferences *here - !ave papers on this 'aterial, *ho have often 'ade helpf(l co''ents and s(!!estions. K/55/&1 DFD&/D U5-G/D,-&A F@ EU/CP1

Introduction
%+ ,uestions o( !hronolog*
717 -n an earlier st(dy of Plato;1= - tried to co'e to ter's *ith the nat(re of his 9'iddle period9 philosophy, that is, *ith the the'es for *hich he is est kno*n, s(ch as the theory of for's, doctrine of recollection, i''ortality of so(l. &he present st(dy is the prod(ct of an atte'pt to (nderstand the si!nificance of the set of fo(r dialo!(es that are (s(ally tho(!ht to follo* this period, and that p(rs(e philosophy in a *ay apparently different fro' that of their predecessors. Hhether they *ere *ritten consec(tively is not kno*n, (t they are evidently 'eant to e read as a set: the e!innin! of the Statesman refers ack to the Sophist , the e!innin! of the Sophist to the Theaetetus , and the Theaetetus to the Parmenides . &he latter reference is less e)plicit than the others. ,ocrates re'arks, 9'et the 'an ;Par'enides= *hen - *as +(ite yo(n! and he +(ite old9 3Theaetetus 16"e4. ,ince the 'eetin! is (nlikely to have act(ally taken place, the reference *o(ld see' to e to the dialo!(e Parmenides . 2any scholars are not convinced y this, and prefer to take the Theaetetus as the earlier

of the t*o, eca(se its aporetic nat(re 'ore closely rese' les Plato8s earlier dialo!(es, *hile the technical nat(re of the Parmenides 'ore closely rese' les the later ones. De!ardless of the order in *hich the Parmenides and Theaetetus 'ay ;1= Plato's Phaedo: #n (nterpretation 3&oronto: University of &oronto Press, 196$4, hereafter PP . 7$7 have een *ritten, ho*ever, Plato leaves (s in no do( t that the Theaetetus is 'eant to e read as the first 'e' er of a trilo!y, follo*ed y the Sophist and Statesman : at the e!innin! of the Statesman 3$>6a4 ,ocrates re'arks, 9- 'yself had a disc(ssion *ith &heaetet(s yesterday ;the Theaetetus =, and no* - have listened to hi' replyin! ;the Sophist =.9 -n any case, nothin! of s( stantial i'portance *ill depend on the order in *hich *e read the Parmenides and Theaetetus . He cannot p(rs(e s(ch a st(dy today *itho(t eco'in! part of the forty.year.old de ate, as initiated y E. /. C. F*en, a o(t *hether Plato radically chan!ed his vie*s at this ti'eIaltho(!h that +(estion is only incidental to the p(rpose of these st(dies. 5o o servations a o(t the develop'ent of Plato8s philosophy are co'pletely (ncontroversial, (t so'e are co'paratively so. &here is a !eneral tho(!h not (niversal consens(s that in the dialo!(es considered to e early, Plato see's concerned pri'arily to investi!ate the nat(re of the virt(es and of other *ays of ein!, especially those that *e *o(ld call val(es?;$= that the dialo!(es considered to elon! to his 'iddle period !ro(nd this concept of 9nat(res9 on the ontolo!ical 'odel of the doctrine of separate for's? and that in the 9/leatic9 dialo!(es (nder consideration here, *hich are attri (ted to his last period, this theory of for's itself is ro(!ht into +(estion in so'e sense. &he first part of the Parmenides appears to attack the theory o(tri!ht, altho(!h the si!nificance of this attack is rendered a' i!(o(s y Par'enides8 concl(din! re'ark that if one does not accept so'e s(ch theory, 9he *ill not have anythin! on *hich to fi) his tho(!ht . . . and in this *ay he *ill (tterly destroy the po*er of disco(rse9 31"> .c4. &he Theaetetus , for *hatever reason, then proceeds to all (t i!nore the theory of for's in its atte'pt to define kno*led!e. &his is follo*ed y the Sophist , in *hich so'ethin! like a theory of for's is e'ployed, (t for's that are very different fro' those of the 'iddle dialo!(es. -nstead of foc(sin! on val(es, it foc(ses on 9kinds,9 *hich are e)plicitly said to e val(e.ne(tral 3$$%a. 4. &he Statesman then contin(es this approach and applies it to political +(estions. -t 'i!ht see' fro' this, as 'any co''entators concl(de, that Plato has rep(diated his 9'iddle period9 theory of for's and replaced it *ith so'ethin! 'ore <ristotelian. 5ot only do the 9kinds9 of the Sophist see' very dose to the ;$= 9Gal(e9 is a (sef(l ter' in disc(ssin! Platonic philosophy, as lon! as *e do not take it as follo*in! fro' 9to val(e,9 and therefore as so'ethin! !ro(nded in individ(al s( 0ectivity. @or Plato it can only 'ean so'ethin! inherentl! !oodIa so(rce of val(e rather than a conse+(ence of val(ation. 7"7 <ristotelian conception of cate!ories, (t the partic(lar ones sin!led o(t for first 'ention 3 ein!, rest, and 'otion4 are three of the 'ost i'portant cate!ories for <ristotle as *ell. &here are o stacles, ho*ever, to this revisionist interpretation of Plato8s /leatic dialo!(es as a transfor'ation of his 'etaphysics into one that is proto.<ristotelian. -n no ancient so(rce is there ever any s(!!estion that Plato chan!ed his vie*s in a radical *ay. 5ot only does <ristotle, for e)a'ple, al*ays *rite as tho(!h Plato consistently defended the theory of for's thro(!ho(t his life, (t he al*ays *rites as tho(!h Plato8s position needs to e contin(ally attacked. 1ad Plato 'ean*hile

s(rrendered on the +(estion of the separation of for's, this contin(ed assa(lt *o(ld 'ake no sense. <ristotle had only to point to Plato8s capit(lation as evidence of the (ntena ility of the theory. <t the e!innin! of 'etaph!sics 2.4 <ristotle s(!!ests that the theory of for's *as not at first connected *ith 'athe'atics, (t that s(ch a connection *as s( se+(ently dra*n. -f <ristotle *as in a position to 'ention a develop'ent so co'paratively sli!ht as this, he certainly *o(ld have 'entioned one that *as '(ch !reater and very a!reea le to hi'. 5either does Dio!enes Caerti(s, that repository of anecdotes of every stripe, provide the sli!htest hint of s(ch an occ(rrence. -t is hardly credi le that if one of the t*o !reatest thinkers of ancient Ereece capit(lated to the criticis's of the other, no r('or of that 'o'ento(s event *o(ld have reached those ears. &his ar!('ent fro' silence is not the only o stacle to the revisionist vie*. < second o stacle lies in the internal i'plications of the /leatic dialo!(es the'selves. He shall see in the s( se+(ent chapters that these dialo!(es contain no pers(asive evidence that Plato rep(diated any si!nificant aspect of the theory of for's, and indeed stron! evidence that he retained the theory in all its essentials. < third o stacle to the revisionist thesis is e)ternal to those dialo!(es. -t involves the Timaeus and Phile)us , oth of *hich *ere tho(!ht to e later than the /leatic dialo!(es, and oth of *hich defend a theory of for's see'in!ly si'ilar to that of the 'iddle dialo!(es. Devisionists co(nter the threats that these dialo!(es pose to their thesis in co'ple'entary *ays. &hey ackno*led!e the lateness of the Phile)us (t not the separation of its for's,;"= and they ackno*led!e the separation of the Timaeus's for's (t not the lateness of its date. ;"= ,ee, for e)a'ple, Do!er ,hiner, *no ledge and %ealit! in Plato's Phile)us 3<ssert: van Eorc(', 19%44? and Kenneth ,ayre, Plato's Late +ntolog! 3Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196"4. 747 &here are n('ero(s passa!es in the Phile)us that recapit(late earlier dialo!(es8 assertions a o(t the theory of for's: @irst *e '(st consider *hether s(ch (nities tr(ly e)ist. &hen, since each of the' is one and al*ays the sa'e, ad'ittin! neither !eneration nor destr(ction, ho* they can nevertheless per'anently e this (nity. <fter these, in the thin!s that co'e to e and that are (nli'ited, *hether *e are to ass('e that it is dispersed in the' and has eco'e 'any, or *hether it is *hole and apart fro' itself 3*hich 'i!ht see' to e 'ost i'possi le of all4, ein! the sa'e and one, co'in! to e si'(ltaneo(sly in one and 'any. 31> 4 &he kno*led!e of ein! and reality and *hat y nat(re is al*ays co'pletely in itself, elieve that everyone in *ho' even a little reason is present *ill consider this to e y far the tr(est kno*led!e. 3>6a4 <nd one kno*led!e differs fro' another: the one lookin! to*ard thin!s that co'e to e and are destroyed, the other to*ard *hat neither co'es to e nor is destroyed (t that e)ists eternally in itself and the sa'e . . . ;s(ch as= 0(stice itself. ;&hese t*o kinds of kno*led!e are called h('an and divine, respectively.= 3B1d.B$a4 5o*, then, the po*er of the !ood has hidden itself fro' (s in the nat(re of the ea(tif(l. @or certainly 'oderation and proportion co'pletely correspond to ea(ty and virt(e. 3B4e4

&he repeated dis0(nction et*een *hat is in itself, (nchan!in!, eternal, rational, !ood, and divine, and *hat co'es to e and passes a*ay, chan!es, and is characteristic of *hat is h('an rather than divine, repeats all the essentials of the 'iddle period theory of for's. 5ot all the points are 'ade *ith the sa'e e'phasis and detail as in the Phaedo and %epu)lic , (t that *o(ld hardly e s(rprisin! if Plato. had no reason to e)pect his readers to think that he had a andoned his earlier vie*s. 5evertheless, the lack of detail in his presentation per'its advocates of the revisionist thesis to +(estion ho* concl(sively and co'pletely the theory of for's is reaffir'ed here. ,o the foc(s of the controversy reverts to the date of the Timaeus I *here the affir'ation of the ontolo!ical difference et*een for's and individ(als is entirely (na' i!(o(sIand *hether that dialo!(e can e sho*n to e later than the Parmenides . &he datin! of the dialo!(es has een a perilo(s enterprise. /arlier acco(nts, s(ch as ,chleier'acher8s,;4= ;4= (ntroductions to the Dialogues o& Plato 3Ca' rid!e: Dei!hton, 16"B4. 7>7 that *ere ased on a vie* of ho* Plato8s tho(!ht ought to have developed, o vio(sly have no po*er as independent evidence for a partic(lar vie*. &he dialo!(es the'selves !ive (s occasional scraps of evidence *hen one dialo!(e pres(pposes prior kno*led!e of another, as in the case of the /leatic dialo!(es, or in the case of the Timaeus , *hich recalls the %epu)lic . B(t this does not take (s far, and in partic(lar it does not esta lish *hether the Timaeus *ith its (na' i!(o(s affir'ation of the separation of the for's is earlier or later than the Parmenides , *hich +(estions their separation. &he only other d(e that has co'e do*n fro' anti+(ity is <ristotle8s state'ent that the La s is later than the %epu)lic ,;>= and Dio!enes Caerti(s8s re'ark, 9,o'e say that Philip of Fp(s transcri ed the La s , *hich *ere in *a).9;B= &he latter is !enerally interpreted to 'ean that the La s *as the only dialo!(e that Plato hi'self *as (na le to see thro(!h the p( lishin! process efore his death, and that it '(st therefore have een his last. &his is a pla(si le inference (t hardly an infalli le one, especially in vie* of the (ncertainty of the story itself 39,o'e say . . .94.;%= -t is in any case the closest thin! that Platonic stylo'etry has to a Dosetta stone. -f one ass('ed, on the asis of that evidence, that the La s *as the last dialo!(e, other dialo!(es that sho* a stron! stylistic affinity *ith it 'i!ht e pres('ed to co'e fro' the sa'e period. &he search *as on for 'eas(res of stylistic affinity. Candidates that *ere fo(nd incl(ded reply for'(las 3the responses of the interloc(torsI (seless, ho*ever, in the case of a narrative like the Timaeus 4, cla(s(la rhyth's 3the endin!s of periods or colons4, avoidance of hiat(s 3follo*in! a *ord endin! in a vo*el *ith one e!innin! in a vo*el4, and (se of hapa, legomena 3(ni+(e appearances of *ords4 or (n(s(al *ords. B(t each of these enco(nters diffic(lties in 'eas(re'ent. -n 'eas(rin! reply for'(las do *e take into acco(nt the personality of the interloc(tor and the nat(re of the +(estions ein! askedJ <nd do *e co(nt sli!ht variations as ein! the sa'e? or for'(las i' edded *ithin lon!er sentences in the sa'e *ay as isolated for'(lasJ Do *e co(nt cla(s(lae only in lon! periods, *hich allo* 'ore freedo' for rhyth'ic variation, and, if so, ho* 'any sylla les '(st the period e in order to !et ;>= Politics $.B.1$B4 $B.$%. ;B= Lives o& the Eminent Philosophers ".". ;%= :aco 1o*land !ives a caref(l, scholarly ar!('ent to the effect that there is neither relia le evidence on *hich the chronolo!y of Plato8s *ritin!s co(ld e esta lished, nor any reason to elieve that s(ch a chronolo!y *o(ld enhance o(r (nderstandin! of Plato8s philosophy 39Dereadin! Plato: &he Pro le' of Platonic Chronolo!y,9 Phoeni, 4> ;1991= 169.$144.

7B7 co(ntedJ Do *e co(nt 9(no 0ectiona le9 3re'ova le y elision, apostrophe, or crasis4 hiat(s in the sa'e *ay as 9o 0ectiona le9 hiat(s, and, if not, *hat differences in *ei!htin! sho(ld e assi!nedJ -s hiat(s affected y p(nct(ation, and does it therefore 'atter *hich edition is (sedJ -n co(ntin! (n(s(al *ords, do *e co(nt only the first occ(rrence or all occ(rrences, and, if only the first, does the len!th of the dialo!(e need to e taken into acco(nt at allJ -n addition to all these decisions, *hich considera ly li'it the possi ility of scientific o 0ectivity, *e '(st also decide *hether to take into acco(nt the nat(re and s( 0ect 'atter of the dialo!(es. ,ho(ld *e e)pect to find the sa'e stylistic feat(res in a narrative 'yth 3Timaeus 4, an e)ercise in a stract dialectic 3Parmenides I*hich is so ano'alo(s as to have fre+(ently een dis'issed y stylo'etrists as sp(rio(s4, or a set of speeches 3S!mposium 4, as in dialo!(es like the %epu)lic, Theaetetus , or La s-n vie* of all these varia les, and of the f(rther co'plication that several investi!ators relied on fla*ed ass('ptions or on data o tained y fa(lty co(ntin! 3*hether their o*n or that in <st8s Le,icon Platonicum 4, it is re'arka le that in fact a road consens(s e'er!ed fro' the vario(s investi!ations. &here is considera le a!ree'ent, for e)a'ple, that five other dialo!(es *ere *ritten in the sa'e period as the La s , na'ely, the Timaeus, "ritias, Sophist, Statesman , and Phile)us . -t is (s(ally ass('ed that the so'e*hat a r(pt chan!e of style, in several respects, at this point in Plato8s career *as a res(lt of the i'pression 'ade on hi' y -socrates8 treatise on rhetoric. Usin! Ceonard Brand*ood8s ast(te and painstakin! s(rvey as a !(ide,;6= - have s(''ariKed in the follo*in! chart the res(lts of the investi!ations as they ear on the +(estion of the relative date or period of the Timaeus and Parmenides . ,ince the n(' er of periods identified y vario(s investi!ators varies, all periods other than the first and last have een a'al!a'ated into a 9'iddle9 period in order to facilitate co'parisons. Hhere a dialo!(e is incl(ded in the last period, the n(' ers in parentheses refer to the place assi!ned *ithin the period, and the n(' er of dialo!(es assi!ned to that period, so that 94/B9 'eans 9fo(rth o(t of si).9 Ff the t*enty that - have s(''ariKed, Brand*ood concl(ded that the 'ost i'portant are Ditter, :anell, Kal(scha, and Billi! 3p. iii4, *hile the investi!ations of @rederkin!, K(!ler, ,ie eck, ;6= 9&he Datin! of Plato8s Horks y the ,tylo'etric 2ethodI< 1istorical and Critical ,(rvey,9 $ vols. 3dissertation, University Colle!e, Condon, 19>9? Brand*ood8s st(dy has recently een p( lished as The "hronolog! o& Plato's Dialogues ;Ca' rid!e: Ca' rid!e University Press, 199#=4. - have o'itted only those st(dies that *ere inconcl(sive *ith re!ard to oth the Parmenides and Timaeus : i.e., P. Droste 3166B4, /. Hal e 316664, 1. Kallen er! 3191"4, and C. Ditter 319">4. 7%7 C(tosla*ski, 5atorp, von <rni', and @oss(' 9proved to e of no val(e for vario(s reasons9 3p. "96 n.4. -nvesti!ator C. Ca'p ell P. Blass Date 16B% 16%4 Chief criterion (n(s(al *ords hiat(s Parmenides 'iddle ;not dated= Timaeus late 34/B4 late 34/B4

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early

late

;9= B(t so ano'alo(s *ith other late dialo!(es that Ditten er!er +(estioned its a(thenticity 3Brand*ood, 9Datin!9 "B4. ;1#= &his res(lt *as o tained y @rederkin! in order to discredit the 'ethod, (t Brand*ood sho*s that the pro le' is rather *ith @rederkin!8s e'ploy'ent of the 'ethod. ;11= -n the case of the Parmenides different indicators led to different res(lts, fro' *hich K(!ler tended to do( t the dialo!(e8s a(thenticity. &he seventh 9dialo!(e9 added to the set of late dialo!(es is %epu)lic 6. Brand*ood 39Datin!9 >B4 *onders *hether K(!ler, *ho *as a disciple of @rederkin!8s, *as not tryin! to discredit the 'ethod y prod(cin!, in so'e cases, iKarre res(lts 3e.!., placin! the "rito after %epu)lic % and i''ediately efore the Sophist 4. ;1$= B(t considered ina(thentic y Ditter. 767 Brand*ood concl(ded that one co(ld separate the Timaeus, "ritias, Sophist, Statesman , and Phile)us fro' the rest to for' a final !ro(p *ith the La s . &his *as possi le eca(se Plato8s style in these *orks differs !reatly fro' that in the precedin! *orks, the chan!e ein! s(dden and a r(pt. &here *o(ld see' to e little do( t that for so'e reason Plato decided at this point to e' race the precepts of the -socratean school of rhetoric . . . . Hhilst the criterion of hiat(s y itself effectively distin!(ished the si) *orks . . . , that of cla(s(la rhyth' prod(ced the order indicated. 3pp. "99.4##4 <ll the investi!ations concl(ded that the Parmenides precedes the Timaeus , (t in 19>" E. /. C. F*en p( lished an infl(ential paper in *hich he ar!(ed for the reverse order.;1"= 1e clai'ed, first, that the cla(s(lae are a etter indicator of the se+(ence of *ritin! than hiat(s, in *hich case the Timaeus does not appear to e a'on! the final three dialo!(es. 2oreover, even tho(!h it still appears to e later than the Parmenides , F*en s(!!ested that eca(se of its (n(s(al character Plato 'ay have een led to a different style of *ritin!, *hich he only later transferred to conversational dialo!(es 3pp. "1>.1B4. Hhat lay ehind F*en8s challen!e to the traditional datin! *as his conviction that the Parmenides. Theaetetus.Sophist !ro(p for' a set of 9critical9 dialo!(es in *hich certain feat(res of the 'iddle period8s theory of for's 3especially their stat(s as paradi!'s4 are rep(diated. -n that case it *o(ld not 'ake sense for Plato to have s( se+(ently *ritten a dialo!(e like the Timaeus , in *hich these feat(res are reaffir'ed. @o(r years later 1arold Cherniss replied in detail to F*en8s ar!('ents;14= in order to co(nter their !ro*in! infl(ence, and the de ate contin(es today.;1>= Brand*ood, *ritin! t*o years after Cherniss, re0ected the latter8s ar!('ents for placin! the Timaeus a'on! the final three ;1"= 9&he Place of the Timaeus in Plato8s Dialo!(es,9 "lassical /uarterl! , n.s., " 319>"4 %9.9>? reprinted in D. /. <llen, ed., Studies in Plato's 'etaph!sics 3Condon: Do(tled!e and Ke!an Pa(l, 19B>4 "1"."6. Pa!e references *ill e to the <llen edition. ;14= 9&he Delation of the Timaeus to Plato8s Cater Dialo!(es,9 #merican Journal o& Philolog! %> 319>%4 $$>.BB? reprinted in <llen, ed., SP' ""9.%6. Pa!e references *ill e to the <llen edition. ;1>= -n the past decade, for e)a'ple, Kenneth ,ayre has defended so'ethin! like F*en8s position 3PL+ appendi) B4, and Hillia' Prior has defended so'ethin! like Cherniss8s position 30nit! and

Development in Plato's 'etaph!sics ;Ca,alle: Fpen Co(rt, 196>= appendi) --4. <n ano'alo(s position is that of 1enry &eloh, *ho, like F*en and ,ayre, 'aintains the revisionist vie*, (t also accepts Cherniss8s ar!('ents for the lateness of the Timaeus , and is conse+(ently (ncertain ho* the t*o 'ay e reconciled 3The Development o& Plato's 'etaph!sics ;University Park: Pennsylvania ,tate University Press, 1961= $#9.164. 797 dialo!(es, (t nevertheless re!arded it as definitely elon!in! to the final !ro(p of si), and therefore later than the Parmenides . &here is no need to disc(ss here the details of the respective ar!('ents, eca(se the real iss(e, as F*en sho*ed, is not statistics (t philosophy. -f the /leatic dialo!(es 'ake 'ost sense as a re0ection of the earlier theory of for's, then it *ill e possi le to find a loophole in the i'precision of stylo'etric statistics 3or in the initial ass('ptions4 thro(!h *hich one can escape fro' the late datin! of the Timaeus . &his disc(ssion of the pro le's of datin! the Timaeus , in partic(lar, see's to i'ply 'y acceptance of the prevailin! vie* a o(t the order in *hich the other dialo!(es *ere *ritten, despite the ca(tionary note so(nded at the e!innin!. &hat +(estion, ho*ever, *ill not e an iss(e here. Hhen it is convenient - shall contin(e to (se the !enerally accepted se+(ence as a fra'e of reference, in spite of its attendant (ncertainties, (t nothin! of s( stance *ill e at stake in 'y so doin!. &he only se+(ence that *ill e relevant to 'y interpretation is that of the fo(r dialo!(es e)a'ined here 3especially the trilo!y4, and the internal evidence 'entioned a ove !ives a'ple s(pport to that order.

-+ Princi.les o( Inter.retation
<s is often the case *ith.de ates a o(t interpretation, an ins(pera le o stacle to resol(tion is the fact that o(r very perception of the evidence is infl(enced y o(r prior eliefs. -f *e elieve that Plato8s ori!inal for'(lation of the theory of for's is serio(sly fla*edIan e)ploratory, (nsatisfactory sta!e on the *ay to <ristotle8s cate!orial analysis, for e)a'pleIthen *e *ill *elco'e any evidence that Plato hi'self ca'e to hold this vie*, *elco'e it not only as a confir'ation of o(r o*n 0(d!'ent, (t also eca(se it *o(ld ena le (s to see Plato in a 'ore favora le li!ht. He *o(ld re!ard this as the 'ost charita le *ay of interpretin! hi'. &he fact that Plato dearly raised serio(s +(estions a o(t the theory of for's in one dialo!(e, and then rele!ated it to 3at est4 the ack!ro(nd in the ne)t three dialo!(es, 'i!ht readily e interpreted in this *ay. Fn the other hand, those *ho have a hi!her re!ard for the theory of for's see no reason to e)pect Plato to chan!e his 'ind a o(t it, and *o(ld accept s(ch a ne!ative interpretation of the /leatic dialo!(es only if less drastic interpretations *ere not possi le. &he factors that !ive s(pport to either interpretation are never f(lly e)plicit or entirely free fro' a' i!(ity 3little in Plato is4, and so oth sides consider the'selves s(pported y the te)t(al evidence. 7 1# 7 < second o stacle to co'plete o 0ectivity in o(r eval(ation of the evidenceI*hich !reatly infl(ences the firstIlies in o(r differin! conceptions of the nat(re of philosophy !enerally, as (nderstood oth y Plato and y o(rselves. &hose *ho elieve that there is a perennial di'ension to philosophy, and *ho think that s(ch ti'eless concerns *ere central to Plato8s enterprise, *ill have less reason to e)pect s( stantial chan!es in 3as opposed to pro!ressive deepenin! of4 the f(nda'entals of his tho(!ht d(rin! the co(rse of his career? they *ill e inclined to !ive 'ore *ei!ht to the evidence for contin(ity in his tho(!ht than to the evidence for radical discontin(ity. @or so'eone, on the other hand, *ho elieves

that the pri'ary concern of philosophy is in an area characteriKed y historical pro!ress, s(ch as descriptive lo!ic, it *o(ld not see' condescendin! to re!ard Plato8s *ork 3like that of <rchi'edes4 as e)traordinarily incisive y the standards of his day, (t s(perseded y develop'ents in the intervenin! 'illenniaIand for that 'atter contin(ally s(perseded y his o*n f(rther pro!ress in the co(rse of his career. Conse+(ently, even tho(!h revisionists 'ay approach Plato *ith considera le respect, the fact that they see hi' as a pioneer in an enterprise that leads nat(rally to a 'ore <ristotelian positionIand (lti'ately to*ard their o*n analytic philosophyIis likely to cast hi' as an only partially s(ccessf(l investi!ator into their o*n techni+(es.;1B= -t is only to e e)pected, therefore, that he is lia le to 'ake 'istakes, or to fail to !rasp pro le's, that to (s 'ay see' o vio(s. &h(s Dichard Do inson s(!!ests that in the Theaetetus Plato 9still thought he elieved in ;the theory of for's=, tho(!h in his active in+(iries he *as in fact eyond it, and it f(nctioned as a theory to e criticised instead of as the rock of salvation it had een in his 'iddle period.9;1%= <nd Kenneth ,ayre, one of the 'ost recent and 'ost pro'inent defenders of the revisionist vie*, ar!(es that in the first part of the Parmenides ,;16= !iven the ar!('ents as *e find the', it *o(ld e +(ite (nreasona le to e)pect these ar!('ents the'selves to constit(te Plato8s reason for *antin! to replace this partic(lar theory . . . . ;Dather,= he is dra*in! attention to certain diffic(lties involved in the theoryI (t doin! so dra'atically rather ;1B= <s Cherniss p(ts it: 9&he <nalysts of F)ford have s(cceeded to their o*n satisfaction in readin! the dialo!(es that they call 8critical8 as pri'itive essays in their o*n philosophical 'ethod. &he a(thor of these *orks, they feel, they co(ld adopt as their *orthy prec(rsor, if only he co(ld e a solved of the e' arrassin! doctrine of ideas that he ela orated in all its 'etaphysical and episte'olo!ical a s(rdity in the Phaedo , the S!mposium , the %epu)lic , and the Phaedrus 9 39Delation9 "4%4. ;1%= 9@or's and /rrors in Plato8s Theaetetus 9 3Philosophical %evie 12 ;19>#= "."#4 19? e'phasis in ori!inal. ;16= PL+ $$, $>. 7 11 7 than dialectically. <nd the reason Plato chooses this 'odality of presentation is that the diffic(lties have to do *ith aspects of the theory *hich had re'ained (nintelli!i le in earlier dialo!(es, and hence co(ld not even e artic(lated in the dear 'anner re+(ired for dialectical disc(ssion. &hird, even those *ho a!ree a o(t the val(e of the theory of for's, and a o(t the central concerns of philosophy, 'ay disa!ree a o(t the de!ree to *hich *e o(!ht to !ive Plato the enefit of the do( t *hen *e interpret recalcitrant passa!es. Hhen *e co'e (pon a tro( leso'e section, sho(ld *e ass('e, as a 3falli le4 he(ristic principle, that Plato very likely kne* *hat he *as doin!, and that *e therefore need to *ork harder to see *here he is leadin! (sJ Fr sho(ld *e ass('e that he *as 'ore likely conf(sed hi'self, the victi' of a r(di'entary sta!e in the develop'ent of analytical lo!icJ -n short, are the diffic(lties in the te)t 'ore likely to arise fro' a depth and s( tlety in Plato8s thinkin! or fro' a lack of sophistication and self.a*arenessJ &here are o vio(sly s( stantial correlations a'on! these three sets of predilections. &hose *ho take the theory of for's serio(sly, as an insi!htf(l representation of the pri'acy of the intelli!i le and ti'eless over the corporeal and chan!in!, are likely to elieve that the (lti'ate foc(s of Plato8s philosophy is not s(scepti le of historical pro!ress, and are likely to read Plato *ith !reat respect. &hose, on the other hand, *ho elieve that the theory of for's is a perhaps rilliant (t nevertheless r(di'entary first state'ent of the principles of cate!orial analysis are likely to elieve that Plato8s

s( 0ect 'atter is inherently capa le of contin(al refine'ent, and that Plato is likely to have enco(ntered concept(al diffic(lties that *e are in a '(ch etter position to detect and resolve. 5evertheless, it is not al*ays the case that (nitarians read Plato in a 'ore charita le *ay than the revisionists do. 5o one co(ld approach Plato *ith 'ore respect than does 2yles B(rnyeat, for e)a'ple, in his caref(lly analytic co''entary on the Theaetetus , altho(!h B(rn.year dearly elieves that so'e kind of revision of the 'etaphysics of the %epu)lic is takin! place.;19= Fn the other hand, H. E. D(nci'an has sho*n y his o*n e)a'ple that it is possi le to e a (nitarian y havin! a lo er re!ard than 'ost revisionists for Plato8s ac('en. D(nci'an elieves that Plato did not 'odify his position in the direction of <ristotelianis' precisely eca(se he lacked the sophistication to e a le ;19= 9He co(ld *ell read the Theaetetus as a lon! 'editation on that rief passa!e of the %epu)lic . . . . < 'editation of s(ch len!th and co'ple)ity does not leave its topic (nchan!ed. -t is no (se !oin! ack to the %epu)lic no*9 3The Theaetetus o& Plato ;-ndianapolis: 1ackett, 199#= $"6."94. 7 1$ 7 to do so. &h(s, Plato did not achieve 9in the Sophist a conscio(s sophistication s(ch as '(st entail a radical revision . . . of his earlier tenets.9;$#= <nd if only Plato had not een 'istaken a o(t the nat(re of his s( 0ect.'atter, he *o(ld have roken thro(!h to an astonishin!ly sophisticated (nderstandin! of the str(ct(re and f(nction of lan!(a!e . . . . -t is at least te'ptin! to ascri e the prevention directly to Plato8s do!!ed retention of the &heory of @or's, despite the criticis's of his Parmenides and the different 'ethod of approach *hich s(cceeded the'. 3p. 1$B4 2y o*n vie* is that an interpretation in *hich Plato e'er!es as one *ho has i'portant thin!s to teach (s a o(t the 'ost f(nda'ental 'atters of philosophy is prefera le to one that is forced to concl(de that he does not 3e)cept y the e)a'ple of the limitations of his s(ccess4. &he interpretation to *hich the present investi!ations lead *ill re0ect the stron!ly revisionist vie* that the /leatic dialo!(es are a retreat fro' so'e of the 'ore distinctive feat(res of the theory of for's, and are a s( se+(ent salva!in! of *hat re'ains. B(t it *ill also re0ect the dia'etrically oppposed vie*, that Plato is not co'pletely serio(s a o(t the pro le's he raises in the /leatic dialo!(es a o(t the theory of for's, and that the o 0ections are 'aintained only fro' a point of vie* that is not Plato8s o*n. -t *ill ar!(e instead that in the Parmenides Plato is indeed raisin! serio(s pro le's a o(t the 'iddle period theory of for's, (t that the pro le's are not s(ch as can e resolved y a revision of the theory. &he pro le's are sy'pto'atic of serio(s li'itations in the theory, (t no other theory is possi le that avoids f(nda'ental li'itations of one kind or another. Fn the contrary, the dialo!(es after the Parmenides sho* *hy the theory '(st e espo(sed in spite of its li'itations. -n accordance *ith *hat - said a ove, - entertain no ill(sion a o(t the possi ility of 9de'onstratin!9 these clai's in a concl(sive *ay. -t is possi le nevertheless to sho* that s(ch a readin! is co'pletely consistent *ith *hat takes place in these dialo!(es, and that it e)plains 'any passa!es 'ore readily than do other interpretations. <ltho(!h in considerin! these dialo!(es no one can re'ain entirely (nto(ched y the pole'ics that have een s*irlin! aro(nd the' for several decades, those +(estions are only incidental to 'y pro0ect here. 2y 'ain concern is not to prove or disprove any theses a o(t Plato8s develop'ent, (t to learn fro' Plato as '(ch as - can. - hope that the ;$#= Plato's Earlier Epistemolog! 3Ca' rid!e: Ca' rid!e University Press, 19B$4 1$>.

7 1" 7 details of the interpretations *ill have so'e val(e in the'selves, as atte'pts to (nderstand the tho(!ht of a !reat thinker, apart fro' *hatever val(e they 'ay have as evidence for a partic(lar thesis a)out Plato.

/+ 0ethod o( 1*.othesis and 0ethod o( Di)ision

-n the dialo!(es elieved to elon! to his 9'iddle period,9 especially the Phaedo and %epu)lic , Plato p(ts for*ard the 'ethod of hypothesis as an indirect *ay 3

4 of discernin! the hi!hest tr(th *hen *e cannot apprehend it directly. <ccordin! to the Phaedo 31##a, 1#1d.e4, the 'ethod has t*o steps: 314 *hen *e posit a hypothesis or theory, *e e)a'ine its conse+(ences to see *hether they lead to har'onio(s res(lts? 3$4 then *e look for a hi!her hypothesis (ntil *e find one that is satisfactory. <ccordin! to the %epu)lic 3B.>11 4, this point is not attained (ntil *e reach the unh!pothetical principle, the -dea of the !ood. -n the Phaedrus 3$B>c.$BB 4 Plato speaks of another kind of 'ethod, *hich he does not deploy (ntil the Sophist and Statesman : the 'ethod of division. <ccordin! to that 'ethod as it is (sed in the Sophist , *e search for the essence of so'ethin! y e!innin! *ith the hi!hest for' or essence, then pro!ressively isectin! this into ever s'aller species, (ntil *e discover *hat *e are lookin! for as a part in relation to the *hole. Hhat is the relationship et*een these t*o 'ethodsJ -nterpreters *ho approach Plato fro' the direction of analytic philosophy nat(rally prefer the second, *hich, in a 'anner that anticipates certain feat(res of their o*n practice, analyKes the nat(re and str(ct(re of class relationships. &he 'ethod of hypothesis, on the other hand, operates synthetically and spec(latively, *hich 'ay e re!arded as a depart(re fro' strict lo!ical ri!or. -t is therefore reasona le to s(ppose, fro' the analytic point of vie*, that Plato hi'self ca'e to reco!niKe the s(periority of the analytic 'ethod of division over the synthetic 'ethod of hypothesis? and the fact that the 'ethod of division *as pro'(l!ated after that of hypothesis !ives so'e s(pport to this vie*. &he Sophist , *hich is the first dialo!(e to 'ake overt (se of the 'ethod of division, is indeed al'ost co'pletely analytic. &he stran!er fro' /lea, *ho cond(cts the investi!ation, 'akes no atte'pt to search for 9hi!her9 tr(ths? he si'ply follo*s his startin! point 9do*n9 to its res(lts. Ff co(rse oth 'ethods 'ove in oth directions. &he first part of the 'ethod of hypothesis, the ded(ctive 'o'ent, !oes fro' hi!her to 7 14 7 lo*er? *hile the second 'ove'ent, the spec(lative search for a hi!her hypothesis, !oes in the opposite direction. -n the case of the 'ethod of division, the division itself is preceded y a collection, in *hich individ(als and species are ro(!ht to!ether (nder a hi!her !en(s, so it too proceeds in oth directions. &here are t*o i'portant differences et*een the 'ethods, ho*ever. @irst, in the 'ethod of hypothesis the lo*er is for the sake of the hi!her: the do*n*ard, analytic path leads to the (p*ard, spec(lative one, for the !oal is the (nhypothetical principle fro' *hich everythin! else follo*s. -n the 'ethod of division, y contrast, the hi!her is for the sake of the lo*er: synthetic collection leads to analytic division, for the !oal is the definition of a lo*est species. ,econd, eca(se the hypothetical principle is the -dea of the !ood, the 'ethod of hypothesis is (lti'ately teleolo!ical: it seeks the (lti'ate 9*hy9

and is rooted in the !ro(nd of val(e. &he 'ethod of division, on the other hand, not only refrains fro' in+(irin! into the nat(re of the !ood, the hi!hest principle, (t the /leatic stran!er e)pressly *arns that his 'ethod 'akes no distinction et*een !reater and lesser val(e: &he 'ethod of definitions ;

= does not care 'ore or less a o(t spon!in! than a o(t takin! 'edicine, nor *hether one provides (s *ith !reater or s'aller enefits than the other. -t ai's at ac+(irin! an (nderstandin! of *hat is akin and *hat is not akin in all the arts, and, *ith this intention, it honors all of the' e+(ally. 3$$%a. 4 &he 'ethod of division, then, is very a'ena le to analytic philosophy, not only eca(se its e'phasis is on analysis rather than synthesis, (t also eca(se its a straction fro' +(estions of val(e shares *ith analytic philosophy a resistance to any atte'pt to derive val(es fro' facts, the o(!ht fro' the is. -n the Statesman , ho*ever, Plato once a!ain en!a!es in philosophical spec(lation a o(t the hi!hest principle of val(e, and it is (nfort(nate that this dialo!(e is al'ost al*ays i!nored y those *ho st(dy the Theaetetus and Sophist , even tho(!h it is the e)plicit se+(el to the'. &he prevailin! tendency to attach !reat i'portance to the Theaetetus and Sophist *hile i!norin! their se+(elIin other *ords, to treat *hat is in fact the e!innin! and 'iddle of a trilo!y as if they *ere co'plete and concl(sive in the'selvesIhas led to a one.sided perception of the 'ethod of division. &he Statesman , as if in accordance *ith the 'ethodolo!y of division itself, is isected do*n the 'iddle. &he first half s(perficially rese' les the Sophist *ith its ela orate isective divisions, and at $BBd the stran!er even repeats his earlier in0(nction a!ainst payin! attention to 7 1> 7 distinctions of val(e. &he second half, ho*ever, not only e)plicitly avoids the techni+(e of isective division (t 'akes constant reference to val(e distinctions? in fact the states'an is de&ined as the one *ho kno*s the est thin! to do in any partic(lar sit(ation 3"#4a."#>d4. @or so'e reason, then, in the Statesman the 'ethod of division leads to the sa'e kind of a)iolo!ical ontolo!y that the 'ethod of hypothesis leads to in other dialo!(es. &o (nderstand this tension et*een the *ay the 'ethod of division is e'ployed in the t*o dialo!(es, *e '(st look at the pro!ression of the /leatic tetralo!y as a *hole, co'prisin! the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist , and Statesman . -n the first of these dialo!(es Par'enides raises serio(s +(estions a o(t the theory of for's, altho(!h it is clear that his attack is not intended as an o(tri!ht ref(tation since he stip(lates in concl(sion that (nless one does accept so'e s(ch theory, 9he *ill not have anythin! on *hich to fi) his tho(!ht . . . and in this *ay he *ill (tterly destroy the po*er of disco(rse9 31"> .c4. 5evertheless Par'enides8 ar!('ents sho* that the theory of for's is pro le'atic eca(se it '(st constantly fall ack on 'etaphor and analo!y: the li'itations of h('an concept(aliKation 'ake this inevita le. -n that case, ho* can the theory of for's e 0(stified in the face of concept(al aporiae s(ch as are pointed o(t y Par'enidesJ &he only 'eans availa le is the 'ethod of hypothesis, and in fact the trilo!y that follo*s the Parmenides can e read as an e)tended application of the 'ethod of hypothesis in defense of the theory of for's. Cornford attri (ted a f(nction of this kind to the Theaetetus , *hich never rin!s in the theory of for's at all, *hen he *rote: 9&he @or's are e)cl(ded in order that *e 'ay see ho* *e can !et on *itho(t the'? and the ne!ative concl(sion of the *hole

disc(ssion 'eans that, as Plato had ta(!ht ever since the discovery of the @or's, *itho(t the' there is no kno*led!e at all.9;$1= &he fail(re of the Theaetetus's hypothesis, that kno*led!e is ased on the perception of partic(lars, de'onstrates the need for a hi!her hypothesis on *hich the resid(al +(estions of that dialo!(e can e ans*ered. &he theory of for's, altho(!h never appearin! e)plicitly in the Theaetetus , *ill e visi le in the ack!ro(nd in a n(' er of *ays. 5o*, the theory of for's co'prises t*o f(nda'ental clai's. @irst, for's are (niversals, instances of 9sa'eness9 in reality: it is y virt(e of the prior reality of a for' that a '(ltit(de of individ(als 'ay e ;$1= Plato's Theor! o& *no ledge 3Condon: Do(tled!e and Ke!an Pa(l, 19">4 $6. 7 1B 7 identified y the sa'e na'e.;$$= ,econd, for's are val(es: they are artic(lations of the goodness of reality, and therefore the 'ost f(nda'ental for's are the !ood, ea(tif(l, 0(st, and so forth.;$"= Hhat Plato does after the Theaetetus is to reintrod(ce each of these t*o aspects se+(entially. -n the Sophist he sho*s that y reintrod(cin! the concept of (niversal kinds in a straction fro' the concept of val(e, *e can solve the f(nda'ental aporiae of the Theaetetus .;$4= 1o*ever, the Sophist , altho(!h not e)plicitly aporetic itself, nevertheless ends in a 'ost (nsatisfyin! and (nconvincin! *ay. &he sophist and philosopher are not distin!(ished fro' each other in ter's of their val(es, as had een the case in previo(s dialo!(es, (t in val(e.free technical ter's: the philosopher is a 'aker of acc(rate i'a!es, the sophist a 'aker of inacc(rate ones. &he distinction is transparently inade+(ate, for it fails to distin!(ish love of *isdo' fro' *isdo' itself, a distinction that Plato else*here treats as f(nda'ental, and so a philosopher eco'es identical to a *ise person? on the other hand, philosophers *ho in a 'o'ent of i!norance prod(ce an inacc(rate i'a!e eco'e y definition sophists. Fn the Sophists definition there is no lover of *isdo'Ithere is either a *ise person or a sophist. -n the case of sophists, too, the definition fails to distin!(ish et*een their prod(cts and their intentions, so that sophists *ho happen to !et the facts ri!ht a o(t so'ethin!, that is, to prod(ce an acc(rate i'a!e of it, are philosophers y definition, re!ardless of the p(rpose to *hich they p(t that i'a!e. ,ophists cannot e distin!(ished ade+(ately fro' philosophers *itho(t reference to their !oals, that is, to the concept of val(e. <ccordin!ly, the ne)t dialo!(e, the Statesman , responds to these dishar'onio(s conse+(ences *ith a hi!her hypothesis? that not only are there (niversals, (t that (nderlyin! everythin! is the !ood, the 9'ean.9 -n the li!ht of that concept, the stran!er *ill e)plicitly dis'iss the i'portance of the distinction et*een acc(rate i'a!es and inacc(rate ones that he had 'ade so '(ch of in the Sophist . <nyone *ho prod(ces i'a!es at all, rather than directly e' odyin! the 'ean, he calls 9the ;$$= Cf. %epu)lic 1#.>9Ba: 9He are in the ha it of positin! one for' *ith re!ard to each !ro(p of thin!s to *hich *e apply the sa'e na'e.9 ;$"= Cf. %epu)lic B.>#9 : 9&o the thin!s kno*n ;i.e., the for's= not only their kno*.a ility, yo( '(st say, is provided y the !ood, (t even their ein! and essence co'es to the' fro' it.9 ;$4= &he Theaetetus fo(ndered in an atte'pt to !ive an acco(nt of the nat(re of kno*led!e, sty'ied in the end y its ina ility to find a satisfactory8 definition of lo!os, in partic(lar *ith reference to opinion, do)a. -n the Sophist , ho*ever, the stran!er 3*ho calls his 'ethod the 'ethod of logoi : $$%a4 does !ive a definition of lo!os, and in relation to do)a 3$B1d.$B"e4. 7 1% 7 sophists of sophists9 3"#" .c4. &he real difference et*een the sophistic pretender to *isdo' and the

!en(ine possessor of *isdo' *ill e that the latter alone possesses the science of the 'ean, that is, of partic(lar goodness . ,( se+(ently, in the Phile)us and Timaeus the theory of for's *ill reappear *ith rene*ed vi!or, and very '(ch in the service of the +(estion of val(e. <t the sa'e ti'e, the Statesman co(nters the 'ore radical conse+(ences of the Parmenides 8 de'onstration of the li'itations of 'etaphorical and analo!ical thinkin!, y defendin! the i'portance of 'etaphorical and analo!ical 9paradi!'s.9 &he (nderlyin! pro le's re'ain intact to *hich the criticis's of the Parmenides had pointed, (t the li'itations of o(r a ility to dispense *ith the' no* eco'e 'ore evident. Plato8s elief that ontolo!ical thinkin! can transfor' (s not only intellect(ally (t also 'orally is s(pported y a lon! tradition in oth Hestern and /astern philosophy. B(t in the last cent(ry and a half this tradition has eco'e eclipsed. <'on! the 'ost infl(ential 'ove'ents of the t*entieth cent(ry there is virt(ally (nani'o(s a!ree'ent that there is no ontolo!ical asis for val(e. Fn one hand se'inal thinkers as diverse as 1eide!!er, He er, and 2oore have ar!(ed 3like the /leatic stran!er in the Sophist 4 that so'e kind of nonar itrary kno*in! is possi le only *hen one distin!(ishes ein!s fro' val(es: *e can have f(nda'ental kno*led!e of ontolo!y, facts, or the 9is,9 (t not of ethics, val(es, or the 9o(!ht.9 Fn the other hand, 5ietKscheans and pra!'atists, *ho 3like Prota!oras in the Theaetetus 4 tend to re0ect this dichoto'y alto!ether, s( ordinate the ontolo!ical di'ension to that of val(e, so that the for'er has its asis less in the order of thin!s than in h('an val(ation, the *ill. -n oth cases the possi ility that ontolo!ical thinkin! 'ay lead to 'oral or spirit(al transfor'ation has een eli'inated. @or those of (s *ho find in this reorientation reason for serio(s concern, it is i'portant to rethink the insi!hts of so'eone like Plato, for *ho' the connection et*een ontolo!y and 'oral !oodnessIthe point of (nion et*een the divided line and the tripartite so(lIis intensely evident. 7 19 7

!ha.ter ne The Parmenides

%+ The Pro2lem o( the Parmenides
Plato8s intentions are 'ore eni!'atic in the Parmenides than in any other dialo!(e. &he first part depicts ,ocrates, in his yo(th, haltin!ly e)po(ndin! his theory of for's to the a!ed Par'enides, *ho proceeds to de'olish it *ith a series of five ar!('ents, only to concl(de that 9on the other hand if anyone . . . does not ad'it the e)istence of for's of thin!s or 'ark off a for' (nder *hich each individ(al thin! is classed, he *ill not have anythin! on *hich to fi) his tho(!hts . . . and in this *ay he *ill (tterly destroy the po*er of disco(rse9 31"> .c4. @or those *ho consider the theory of for's to e (ntena le, the dialo!(e is often *elco'ed as a si!n that Plato hi'self ca'e to see the error of his *ays, and Par'enides8 s( se+(ent endorse'ent of the theory is interpreted as only a li'ited endorse'ent that does not e)tend to all the feat(res of the theory that have co'e (nder attack. Hhat re'ains, they s(!!est, is a 'odified theory that no lon!er post(lates the for's as separate fro' thin!s. &he dra'at(r!y of the dialo!(e, ho*ever, see's to point in the opposite direction. &he Platonic ,ocrates *ho here as a yo(th falls victi' to Par'enides8 ref(tations is the sa'e one *ho' Plato has previo(sly portrayed as contin(in! to defend the theory in his 'at(rity and even on his death ed. He

are even re'inded of the f(t(re ,ocrates of the %epu)lic y the presence of Ela(con, <dei'ant(s, and so'eone na'ed 7 $# 7 Cephal(s 3altho(!h not the sa'e Cephal(s *ho appears in the %epu)lic 4, none of *ho' serve any other f(nction *ithin the Parmenides itself. Cephal(s, to e s(re, is the narrator, (t since he only repeats <ntiphon8s narration 31$%a4 it *o(ld have een si'pler to leave Cephal(s 3and Ela(con and <dei'ant(s4 o(t alto!ether and have <ntiphonIor etter, Pythodor(s, *ho *as the ori!inal narrator fro' *ho' <ntiphon learned itInarrate the story directly. -t is as tho(!h Plato *anted to (nderline the !rat(ito(sness of his incl(sion of these na'es. -f Plato *anted (s to take Par'enides8 ar!('ents as decisive, it *o(ld e odd for hi' to 'ake the victi' so'eone *ho' he has already depicted as s( se+(ently, and in !reater 'at(rity, (nshaken in his adherence to the theory. -t *o(ld 'ake far 'ore sense to cast one of ,ocrates8 disciples 3Phaedo, for e)a'ple4 as the defeated cha'pion of the theory here 3and so'eone like the /leatic stran!er as its ref(ter, since Par'enides *o(ld no lon!er e alive4. B(t those *ho find the theory of for's too spec(lative for their taste tend to feel the sa'e *ay a o(t concl(sions dra*n fro' Plato8s dra'at(r!y. <fter all, it is not inconceiva le that Plato is si'ply !ivin! ,ocrates a 9fresh start9 here. &he contrary interpretation, accordin! to *hich Plato considered the theory of for's to e (nscathed y these ar!('ents, faces the diffic(lty of findin! a pla(si le alternative e)planation of the ar!('ents, *hich do, after all, seem to e intended as ref(tations of the theory. &o dis'iss Par'enides8 ar!('ents as parodies of sophistry or as ironic 0okes, as is so'eti'es done, is too easy. -f *e can pick and choose *hich of Plato8s ar!('ents to take serio(sly and *hich ironically, on as little evidence as this, there *ill e no escape fro' ar itrary and capricio(s interpretation. 2oreover, in the dialo!(es i''ediately follo*in! the Parmenides Ithe Theaetetus, Sophist , and Statesman IPlato see's to e e)plorin! alternatives to the theory, *hich s(!!ests that he is indeed dissatisfied *ith it in so'e sense. Fne 'i!ht reply that Plato, havin! said in previo(s dialo!(es all he had to say a o(t the for's, is no* e)plorin! ne* aven(es *itho(t reno(ncin! the old? (t in the Sophist he does speak as tho(!h ein! a 9friend of the for's9 is no lon!er an ade+(ate position 3$4B ff.4. - shall ar!(e that Plato intended these ar!('ents to raise serio(s pro le's a o(t the theory of for's, (t that he did not consider the pro le's to e fatal. He shall see that the 'at(re theory of for's has at its disposal the 'eans to 'iti!ate the devastatin! concl(sions that Par'enides dra*s, and that Plato even !ives (s indications of *here Par'enides8 ar!('ents 'ay e assailed. B(t *e shah also see that the o 0ections cannot e dispelled entirely, so the +(estion of ho* far Plato 7 $1 7 considered the theory to e (nder'ined y the' ad'its of no si'ple ans*er. He shall have to take a detailed look at the ar!('ents to see precisely *here they lead (s.

-+ The Theor* o( Forms

-n previo(s dialo!(es the for's have served a variety of f(nctions, as ca(ses, (niversals,;1= ontolo!ical paradi!'s, and referents of kno*led!e. ,o'e readers have clai'ed that these f(nctions are inco'pati le, and that the theory as a *hole is incoherent. -t is tr(e that the f(nctions are y no 'eans identical, (t they are nevertheless co'pati le and are even related in an order of concept(al entail'ent,;$= altho(!h - *o(ld not insist that the order of lo!ical priority necessarily corresponds to

the order of their discovery or of their i'portance in Plato. 1. &he theory of for's is al*ays linked to the pri'ordiality of.!oodness.;"= &he nat(re of reality is not 0(st a 'atter of chance or spontaneity, (t a conse+(ence of the fact that for Plato ein! is insepara le fro' val(e. &he 9for's9 that reality takes are therefore not rando' (t are conse+(ences of *hat follo*s fro' the nat(re of !oodness: 9&o the thin!s kno*n ;the for's= not only their kno*a ility, yo( '(st say, is provided y the !ood, (t even their ein! and essence co'es to the' fro' it9 3%epu)lic B.>#9 4. <ccordin!ly, the 'ost i'portant for's are al*ays those that 'ost o vio(sly 'anifest val(e: !oodness, ea(ty, virt(e, 0(stice, *isdo', piety, 'oderation, co(ra!e. &he others '(st also e 'anifestations of !oodness insofar as they 'anifest reality, (t the connection is no lon!er e)plicit. $. Hhen Plato speaks of the for's as ca(ses, as he does in the Phaedo , for e)a'ple 31##c ff.4, it is dear that he does not 'ean that they activel! prod(ce an effect 3efficient ca(sality4Isince the for's are not active. &hey are &ormal ca(ses, *hose po*er lies not in an activity on the part of the for', (t in their capacity to e participated in y so'ethin! else. Precisely *hat is 'eant y this is one of the aporiae of Platonic philosophy, (t it is helpf(l to think of the for's as the possi)ilities of reality, possi ilities of the $inds of thin!s and +(alities that can e)ist in accordance *ith the nat(re of reality. &he Presocratics ;1= @or convenience - (se the ter' 9(niversal9 thro(!ho(t to desi!nate the Platonic 9one over 'any.9 5o post.Platonic connotations are intended. ;$= <n earlier and less co'plete version of the follo*in! acco(nt *as developed in PP 1$> .$B. ;"= S!mposium $#>e.$#Ba? Phaedo 99c? %epu)lic B.>#9 ? Phaedrus $4>e? Phile)us 1"e, 1>a? Timaeus $9e. 7 $$ 7 reco!niKed that the 'aterial of *hich all thin!s are co'posed '(st e eternal, and Plato reco!niKed f(rther that the possi le for's that this 'aterial can take '(st in so'e sense e eternal as *ell. Understood in this *ay, for's are ca(ses in the p(rely for'al sense that a thin! or +(ality of a certain kind co(ld not e)ist if s(ch kinds did not follo* fro' the nat(re of reality. -t is a necessary condition for the e)istence of a thin! that s(ch thin!s e possi le. ". 5o*, if the for's are the possi ilities of a kind of thin! or +(ality co'in! into ein!, then each for' *ill also e *hat all instances of that kind have in co''on, and it *ill accordin!ly have the character of a (niversal. &his feat(re is not al*ays e'phasiKed y Plato 3it is not evident in the Phaedo , for e)a'ple4, (t it is e)plicitly 'entioned at least in the S!mposium 3$1# 4, %epu)lic 3>9Ba4, and Parmenides 31"$a4, and *as i'plicit in the early dialo!(es, in *hich ,ocrates searched for (nivocal definitions that e)hi it the character co''on to all instances of a certain kind, a +(est o(t of *hich the theory of for's 'ay have developed. 4. <!ain, as (niversals, or the essence of *hat a n(' er of thin!s or +(alities have in co''on, the for's a stract fro' everythin! e)traneo(s and deficient, and so are purel! and per&ectl! that essence. <s s(ch they are also paradigms of their kind. &his *ill appear to e an (n0(stified transition if *e think of a (niversal in p(rely lo!ical ter's s(ch as a class, for a class is not a perfect instance of its 'e' ers. Fn s(ch a vie* the theory of for's *ill appear incoherent, and it is precisely this i'p(ted incoherence on *hich the theory of for's is often tho(!ht to fo(nder in the Parmenides . @or Plato, ho*ever, the one that stands over the 'any and defines it is not a class (t an independent ontolo!ical reality. <s one over 'any it is (niversal, and as the are essence itself it is the p(re and therefore perfect +(ality. Conceived in ter's of Plato8s conception of reality rather than in ter's of ontolo!ies

that are forei!n to Plato8s *ay of thinkin!, and ased on very different ass('ptions, the for's8 characteristics as (niversal and paradi!'atic are not only co'pati le (t necessarily connected. >. @inally, as paradi!'s the for's are characteriKed y the sa'e +(ality that partic(lar thin!s possess y participatin! in the', and are therefore in a certain sense 3*hich *ill e clarified later4 self. referential. Beca(se they possess a deter'inate character they are in principle kno*a leIindeed, as paradi!'s they are the (lti'ate referents of all o(r kno*led!e, as Plato ar!(es in the disc(ssion of recollection in the Phaedo 3%4a.%>a4. 7 $" 7 - have recalled these feat(res of the theory eca(se they see' to e *hat !(ided Plato in his choice of Par'enides8 ar!('ents, and perhaps even their order. 314 -n the preli'inary in+(iry Par'enides attacks the valual aspect of the for's y askin! *hether there can e for's not only of no le thin!s like the 0(st, ea(tif(l, and !ood, (t also of 9very i!no le9 3

4 thin!s like hair, '(d, and dirt. 3$4 &he first ar!('ent attacks the for's as causes , assertin! that the cr(cial concept of participation, on *hich the for's8 ca(sality is fo(nded, is incoherent. 3"4 &he second attacks the' as universals , char!in! that an infinite re!ress res(lts fro' this conception. 344 &he fo(rth attacks the' as paradigms , once a!ain pointin! to infinite re!ress, and 3>4 the fifth attacks the' as o)3ects o& $no ledge , ar!(in! that s(ch a conception leads to a !(lf that 'akes the for's (nkno*a le y (s, and o(rselves (nkno*a le y the !ods. &he third ar!('ent alone deals *ith a clai' a o(t the for's that has not een part of the theory advanced in previo(s dialo!(esIthe vie* that the for's are nothin! (t conceptsIand *e shall see that Plato accordin!ly treats this ar!('ent so'e*hat differently fro' the others. Cet (s !o thro(!h the ar!('ents no* in t(rn, to see *hat they prove and *hat Plato 'ay have tho(!ht they prove. <fter the preli'inary in+(iry, *hich is not strictly an ar!('ent at all, *e shall find that altho(!h ,ocrates ans*ers 'ost of Par'enides8 +(estions *ith alacrity, he eco'es tentative at a cr(cial step in each ar!('ent (t the third, (sin! the *ord

39perhaps94 or 39so it see's94. &his is no coincidence, for *e shall see that in each case the step is a +(estiona le one, and it therefore see's likely that the ano'alo(s tentativeness of ,ocrates8 replies is 'eant to call this to o(r attention. &he third ar!('ent is the only one in *hich no s(ch hesitation takes place, and it is also the only one *hose tar!etIconcept(alis'I*as not part of the previo(sly developed theory. &he ref(tation of this (n.Platonic concept(alis' is, - elieve, the only ref(tation that Plato f(lly endorses, and therefore the only one in *hich ,ocrates8 a!ree'ent is never tentative.

/+ Preliminar* In3uir* 4%-5e6%/7e8

&he 'ain part of the conversation e!ins *hen ,ocrates proposes to solve a parado) of Leno8s y 'eans of the theory of for's. Fnly the concl(sion of the parado) is !iven: 9-f ein!s are 'any, it is necessary for the' to e si'(ltaneo(sly si'ilar and dissi'ilar, *hich is i'possi le9 31$%e4. Perhaps

the ar!('ent itself 3*hich Plato 'ay have ass('ed his readers *o(ld e fa'iliar *ith4 *as to the effect that *e are 7 $4 7 si'ilar eca(se *e are all h('an ein!s 3or share so'e other attri (te4, (t dissi'ilar eca(se *e are distinct individ(als.;4= Hhatever the ar!('ent 'ay have een, ,ocrates replies to it y speakin! of si'ilarity and dissi'ilarity as separate for's, *hose very separation fro' the thin!s that participate in the' resolves the parado): there is no contradiction in sayin! that - participate in si'ilarity and dissi'ilarity, rather than )eing oth si'ilar and dissi'ilar 31$9a4. &he sa'e !oes for co'para le parado)es a o(t the one and 'any, or rest and 'otion 31$9 .e4. Under Par'enides8 +(estionin!, ,ocrates says that there are for's the'selves. y.the'selves 3

4 also of the 0(st, the ea(tif(l, and the !ood 31"# 4? that he is at an i'passe 3 4 a o(t *hether there are separate 3 4 for's s(ch as h('an ein!, fire, or *ater 31"#c4? and that he thinks there is no separate for' of hair, '(d, and dirt, (t they are 0(st as *e see the'I e is tro( led y the tho(!ht that *hat is tr(e of one sho(ld perhaps e tr(e of all, (t is afraid this *ill 'ake hi' fall into a pit of nonsense 31"#c.d4. Par'enides replies: 9Ao( are still yo(n!, ,ocrates, and philosophy has not yet taken hold of yo( in the *ay that, in 'y opinion, it event(ally *ill, at *hich ti'e yo( *ill not despise any of these. B(t no* yo( still consider people8s opinions eca(se of yo(r a!e9 31"1e4. &here are a n(' er of concl(sions *e can dra* fro' this passa!e. @irst, ,ocrates8 i''ediate acceptance of val(e.laden for's like 0(stice, ea(ty, and !oodness, to!ether *ith his o(tri!ht re0ection of the e)istence of for's for 9very i!no le and ase9 3 , 1"#c4 thin!s like hair, '(d, and dirt, sho*s the i'portance to hi' of the for's8 role as the earers of val(e, a role that 'akes the' hard to reconcile *ith *hat is trivial or (nclean. &he 'at(re ,ocrates8 description of the' as offsprin! of the !ood 3%epu)lic B.>#9 4 is testi'ony to the fact that reality is shaped y the teleolo!y of !oodness,;>= and so the f(nda'ental possi ilities of reality *ill also e 'anifestations, ho*ever indirect, of the nat(re of the !ood. 5ot only is there a connection et*een reality and teleolo!ical !oodness, (t there is also a connection et*een philosophy8s atte'pt to apprehend that reality, and 'oral !oodness. ,(ch a connection has already een dra*n in detail in the %epu)lic 8s doctrine of the tripartite ;4= ,(ch an interpretation is s(!!ested y ,ocrates8 e)trapolation of the ar!('ent to the 9one and the 'any9 at 1$9c. <lso see D. /. <llen, Plato's Parmenides 3F)ford: Black*ell, 196"4 %6. ;>= <t least as far as is per'itted y the nat(re of 'aterial necessity. Cf. Timaeus 4%e.46a. 7 $> 7

so(l, and the present section contains a !raphic re'inder of that doctrine. Leno re'arks that he *rote his pole'ic *hen he *as yo(n!, in a spirit of yo(thf(l co' ativeness 3

4 rather than that of an older 'an8s love of honor 3 , 1$6e4. &hese alternatives represent yo(thf(l and 'at(re versions, respectively, of the spirited part of the tripartite so(l, the irasci le part. -t is interestin!, then, that *hen ,ocrates treats Par'enides and especially Leno so disrespectf(lly;B= Iso insensitively to their love of honorIthat Pythodor(s e)pected the' to e an!ry *ith hi', they only s'ile in ad'iration of ,ocrates8 cleverness 31"#a4. He are sho*n that Leno8s yo(thf(l spiritedness did not in his 'at(rity develop into an e+(ally a!!ressive 9older 'an8s love of honor,9 (t is rather replaced y a nonco' ative appreciation of rationality. <ntiphon, on the other hand, (nder!oes an opposite transfor'ation: 9Hhen he *as a yo(th he st(died ;Pythodor(s8s acco(nt of the conversation= *ith !reat care? tho(!h no* he devotes 'ost of his ti'e to horses . . .. Hhen *e asked hi' to repeat the conversation, he *as at first (n*illin!Ifor he said it *as a lot of tro( leI (t then he did so9 31$Bc.1$%a4. &h(s he see's to have !one fro' a yo(th 'otivated y rationality to an ad(lt 'otivated pri'arily y pleas(re. &here is the s(!!estion in all this that philosophy, if one perseveres at it, can transfor' (s for the etterI (t not if one allo*s oneself to eco'e laKy and self.ind(l!ent. &hat s(!!estion *ill e a'plified in the dra'atic ack!ro(nd of the Theaetetus . @or no*, ho*ever, *e 'ay o serve the presence here of the cate!ories of the tripartite so(l 3pleas(re, co'petitiveness, reason4, and therefore the i'plicit re'inder of the 'oral di'ension of philosophy, *hich does not co'e (nder active consideration in the dialo!(e. ,econd, val(e is not the only factor that deter'ines for ,ocrates *hat for's there are, for he introd(ced the theory in ter's of the for's of 9sa'e and not.sa'e, pl(rality and one, and rest and 'otion9 31$9d. e4, *hich have no o vio(s connection *ith val(es. &he val(al aspect of the for's *as introd(ced y Par'enides8 +(estions? prior to that the characteristic that ,ocrates had e'phasiKed *as the for's8 separation fro' corporeal thin!s. &he +(ality of the for' as separate 3

4 fro' 'ateriality, that is, as s( sistin! itself. y.itself 3 4, is, to!ether *ith val(e, the f(nda'ental concern of the present passa!e. Gery likely this is *hy ,ocrates alks at ackno*led!in! the e)istence of for's ;B= &his is ri!htly taken y <llen to e a *ay of e'phasiKin! ,ocrates8 i''at(rity 3PP B%4. <llen also refers to Euth!demus $%"a, *here Ctesipp(s is descri ed as 9insolent d(e to his yo(th9 3n. "64. 7 $B 7 for nat(ral kinds, like h('an ein!s, fire, and *ater. &hese e)a'ples are not trivial or lackin! in no ility, like hair, '(d, and dirt, so his (ncertainty a o(t the e)istence of separate for's for the for'er three cannot e on acco(nt of an 9(n*orthiness.9 &hey 'ay e (nconnected *ith val(e in an o vio(s *ay, (t the sa'e *as tr(e of sa'eness, not.sa'eness, pl(rality, oneness, rest, and 'otion, *hich ,ocrates hi'self had offered as his first instances of for's. &he reason that it is diffic(lt to think of h('an ein!s, fire, and *ater as separate fro' their corporeal 'anifestations '(st lie else*here. -

s(spect it lies in the fact that h('an ein!s, fires, and *ater act(ally e)ist in the physical *orld? *hereas sa'eness, not.sa'eness, pl(rality, oneness, rest, 'otion, 0(stice, !oodness, and ea(ty never e)ist corporeally as s(ch,;%= (t only as attri (tes of physical thin!s. &here is no risk of identifyin! these latter for's *ith corporeal instances, eca(se there are no corporeal instances of the' as s(ch? corporeal entities are 3in <ristotelian ter's4 s( stances, not attri (tes. B(t since there are corporeal instances of su)stantial for's like h('an ein!, fire, and *ater, it *o(ld e harder to esta lish that their essential ein! lies o(tside the'selves, so'eho* separate fro' individ(al h('an ein!s, fires, and *aters.;6= Beca(se <ristotle re0ected the separation of for's fro' individ(al thin!s, the for's of nat(ral kindsIs( stantial for's or speciesIare for hi' the 'ost i'portant, and attri (tes have only a s( ordinate i'portance. @or 9,ocrates,9 the reverse is tr(e. &hird, ,ocrates nevertheless needs to reco!niKe that in order to e consistent he '(st accept that *hat is tr(e in so'e cases is tr(e in all. Hhy sho(ld so'e thin!s, (t not others, o*e their nat(re to for'al ca(sality, and ho* can ,ocrates divide the one fro' the other *itho(t ein! ar itraryJ 1ence his indecision a o(t nat(ral kinds. -f the theory of for's reco!niKes that there is s(ch a factor as for'al ca(sality opera.five in the *orld, then it '(st !eneraliKe the ca(sal efficacy of for's to all cases. &he for's8 character as necessary ca(ses of pheno'ena *ithin ;%= &hat is *hy the 9'ethod of paradi!'s9 is so i'portant in the Statesman 3$%%d ff.4. ;6= <llen8s interpretation here, altho(!h conceived in very different ter's, (lti'ately points in the sa'e direction: 9,(ch -deas ;as 2an, @ire and Hater= are s( stantival? their distinctive feat(re is that, (nlike those ,ocrates has 0(st accepted, they have no opposite 3Phaedo 1#4a. , 1#>a, %epu)lic G-- >$4d. >$>a4. ,ince ,ocrates introd(ced the theory of -deas to e)plain *hy +(alification y opposites does not i'ply the identity of opposites, it 'ay see' an open +(estion, so far as the Parmenides is concerned, *hether -deas are re+(ired *here opposition is not involved 3as is tr(e of %epu)lic G-- >$"c ff.49 3PP 1#%4. &he connection et*een <llen8s interpretation and 'y o*n 'ay e e)pressed in <ristotelian ter's: it is '(ch 'ore diffic(lt to re!ard a s( strate as separa le fro' 'atter than so to re!ard the contraries y *hich it 'ay e characteriKed. 7 $% 7 the physical *orld '(st e insisted (pon as ri!oro(sly as their separation fro' the physical *orld. @o(rth, as the end of the passa!e sho*s, ,ocrates8 fail(re to ans*er s(ccessf(lly the +(estions posed y Par'enides is 'eant to ill(strate his i''at(rity. 1e is too concerned *ith *hat others *ill think of hi', and not yet f(lly co''itted to philosophy. -n other *ords, like the yo(n! Leno, he is still too '(ch (nder the infl(ence of the spirited part of his nat(re and its concern *ith rep(te, and not s(fficiently dedicated to the rational. &he defense of the theory of for's has not een p(t into the 'ost capa le of hands. Cater, *hen ,ocrates has sho*n hi'self (na le to cope *ith Par'enides8 first fo(r challen!es to the theory of for's, Par'enides introd(ces the fifth and !reatest challen!e y sayin! that only 9so'eone *ith '(ch e)perience9 3

4 *o(ld e a le to disprove the contention that even if the for's e)ist they *ill e (nkno*a le 31"" . c4. &he reference to the need for 9'(ch e)perience9 is an all(sion to the yo(th and ine)perience of ,ocrates that *e already see in this passa!e. Par'enides !oes on to 'ake that clear, and to s(!!est ho* ,ocrates 'i!ht attain !reater sophistication 31">c.1"Ba4. He '(st therefore keep in 'ind that *hat is tr(e of this preli'inary in+(iry is 'eant to prefi!(re the s( se+(ent ar!('entsIthat ,ocrates8 fail(re to ans*er the later challen!es sho(ld, as here, e taken as a reflection on his yo(th at least as '(ch as

on the li'itations of the theory of for's. -f Plato alieved that the 9!reatest diffic(lty9 co(ld e 'et y a thinker of s(fficient a ility and e)perience, he *o(ld pres('a ly elieve the sa'e to e tr(e of the other, lesser ar!('ents.;9= <nd if Plato *ere serio(sly presentin! (s *ith a ref(tation of the theory of for's or one of its 'a0or co'ponents, it does not see' likely that he *o(ld i'p(!n the co'petence of its defender. &his is not to deny that he re!ards the challen!es to the theory of for's as serio(s and i'portant.

'+ First "rgument9 Partici.ation 4%/7e6%/%e8

&he first ar!('ent foc(ses on the for's8 f(nction as ca(ses, and con.d(des that the relation of participation, the 'echanis' of this ca(sality, is incoherent. &he ar!('ent t(rns on a dile''a: either 3a 4 the for' *ill e *hole and entire in each of the thin!s that participate in it, or ;9= Cf. 2itchell 2iller, Plato's Parmenides: The "onversion o& the Soul 3Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196B4, B# n. $4 3p. $194. 7 $6 7 3) 4 it *ill e partitioned a'on! the'. -f a , 9then ein! one and the sa'e it *ill e *hole in 'any separate individ(als at once, and *o(ld th(s itself e separate fro' itself9 31"1 4. -f ) , then it *ill no lon!er e possi le to 'aintain that the for' is 9one9 31"1c4, a (nity, as ,ocrates8 theory had ass('ed 31"1a4. &o drive ho'e the point, Par'enides adds three 'ore specific reductios : the parts of i!ness *ill no lon!er e i! since they are s'all relative to the *hole, the parts of e+(ality *ill no lon!er e e+(al to e+(ality since they are s'aller than e+(ality as a *hole, and s'allness *ill e lar!er than its parts since it e' races the' all 31"1d.e4.;1#= Clearly a is closer than ) to representin! the theory as p(t for*ard in previo(s dialo!(es 3altho(!h, as *e shall see, it can e 'isleadin! even to think of the for's as *holes since they are si'ple and inco'posite, as at Phaedo %6c f.4. -n fact, y treatin! for's as if they *ere spatially e)tended and capa le of addition, s( traction, and division, ) e)e'plifies the conf(sion et*een for'al and 'aterial ca(sality that ,ocrates *arned a!ainst in the Phaedo 39Bd f., 1#1a f.4. <ccordin!ly a is the horn ,ocrates tries to !rapple *ith. -n reply to Par'enides8 concl(sion at a , ,ocrates says: 9-t *o(ld not ; e separate fro' itself= if it *ere like day, *hich is one and the sa'e, is in 'any places at once, and yet is not itself separated fro' itself? so each of the for's too *o(ld e one and the sa'e in all its participants at once.9;11= Par'enides replies, ho*ever: 9Ao( 'ake one and the sa'e to e in 'any places at once, 0(st as if yo( spread a sail over 'any people and then said it *as one and the *hole of it *as over 'any. -sn8t so'ethin! like that *hat yo( 'ean to sayJ9 9Perhaps9 3

4, is ,ocrates8 hesitant reply 31"1 .c4. ,ocrates 'ay *ell have 'is!ivin!s a o(t the s( stit(tion Par'enides ;11= &his e)a'ple, accordin! to Procl(s, derives fro' the disco(rse of Leno 3"ommentar! on Plato's Parmenides ;Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196%= $$94. 7 $9 7 'akes here. Co''entators so'eti'es take Par'enides8 point to e that, if ,ocrates co'pares participation to the presence of dayli!ht to different individ(als, *e can still reply that the li!ht that

falls on one individ(al is a different part of the li!ht than that *hich falls on anotherIlike Par'enides8 e)a'ple of a sail.;1$= B(t ,ocrates did not co'pare for's to li!ht (t to day 3

4, and this is a different 'atter entirely, for *hen - say that today is present to all of (s, this does not 'ean that different parts of the day are present to each of (s.;1"= &o e s(re, it has een pointed o(t since anti+(ity that a day can e divided, in the sense that the s(n reaches so'e places later than others. B(t this *o(ld not e tr(e *ithin the sa'e city, for instance 3or alon! any lon!it(de4, so ,ocrates8 e)a'ple is valid. Co'present individ(als are separated fro' one another spatially, not te'porally, (t a (nit of ti'e 3like a day4 is divisi le only te'porally and not spatially, so it cannot e divided a'on! (s. 3Ci!ht, on the other hand, is spatial, like a sail, and so can e partitioned a'on! spatially discrete individ(als.4 By s( stit(tin! a spatial 'etaphor for ,ocrates8 te'poral one Par'enides 'isrepresents ,ocrates8 ar!('ent. <ltho(!h the yo(thf(l ,ocrates is not +(ite +(ick eno(!h to p(t his fin!er on *hat *ent *ron!, his d( io(s 9perhaps9 s(!!ests that Plato 'ade the s*itch deli erately and so(!ht to aro(se o(r s(spicion and 'ake (s p(rs(e the 'atter f(rther. -t 'i!ht e tho(!ht that Plato portrays ,ocrates as tentative here and in the other ar!('ents only to sho* that ,ocrates senses defeat and *o(ld like to e a le to find another ans*er. Certainly that is part of it, (t there are three reasons *hy - do( t that it is the *hole e)planation. @irst, ,ocrates hesitates only at one cr(cial step in each ar!('ent, *hereas if the hesitation *ere si'ply a 'atter of dra'atic verisi'ilit(de *e sho(ld e)pect his hesitations to e 'ore e)tensive. ,econd, each step *here he hesitates is in fact a +(estiona le rather than over*hel'in! one, *hich is the reverse of *hat *e sho(ld e)pect on the other hypothesis. &hird, ,ocrates is not 'ade to hesitate at all in the third ar!('ent altho(!h he is a!ain ref(ted, and this is *hat *e sho(ld e)pect if the hesitations are fla!s of fallacio(s steps, for this ar!('ent 3a!ainst concept(alis'4 is the one ;1$= Both <llen 3PP 11B.1%4 and 2iller 3PP 49 n. $$ ;$#9=4 interpret ,ocrates in this *ay, and accordin!ly concl(de that the retort is 'eant to sho* ,ocrates8 lack of sophistication. 7 "# 7 ar!('ent *ith *hich Plato is pres('a ly in sy'pathy, and it does not in fact see' to involve any deli erate fallacies.;14= &he first ar!('ent sho*s, in any case, not only that the si'(ltaneo(s presence of the for's to 'any individ(als is (nintelli!i le on the asis of o(r e)perience of spatial thin!s, (t also that it can e 'ade intelli!i le on analo!y *ith te'poral (nits. &he concept of participation has not therefore een sho*n to e incoherent, (t neither has it een entirely vindicated. < *eak interpretation of ,ocrates8 point is that since it is possi le for so'e thin!s, like days, to e si'(ltaneo(sly present to 'any individ(als *itho(t ein! divided, then s(ch a sit(ation is possi le in !eneral and 'ay therefore e possi le also for for's. Clearly this does not sho* that 3or ho*4 for's can e (ndividedly present to 'any thin!s, (t only that it is not prima &acie i'possi le. /ven !ivin! a stron! interpretation to his point does not help '(ch. He can interpret it as an elliptical ar!('ent y analo!y, ass('in! *e are 'eant to (nderstand that there is a certain rese' lance et*een for's and te'poral (nits in that oth are aspatial. &h(s, if a te'poral (nit can e (ndividedly present to 'any individ(als eca(se it is aspatial, then so can a for' since it too is aspatial. &his is only an analo!y, ho*ever, eca(se the a! that for'al ca(ses 'ay e present to '(ltiple individ(als *o(ld hardly e the sa'e as the *ay this is tr(e of te'poral (nits? and eca(se it is only an analo!y, neither *e nor Par'enides are re+(ired to accept the inference fro' the o served si'ilarity 3aspatiality4 to the i'p(ted one 3(ndivided '(ltipresence4.

&hat is *hy *e resort to analo!ies only *hen *e are not a le to !ive an acco(nt of so'ethin! in itself, ;1>= and so the need here to fall ack (pon 3at est4 analo!y is an ad'ission of a li'itation in the e)planatory po*er of the theory of for's. &he li'itation is not 'erely contin!ent, a f(nction of the ,ocrates8 lack of sophistication,;1B= for even in the Phaedo , *here the concept of ;1>= Cf. %epu)lic >#Bc.d, Phaedrus $4Ba. ;1B= 2iller ar!(es other*ise. 1e, too, elieves that 9in his portrayal of ,ocrates, Plato is servin! notice that an indirect, analo!ical (nderstandin! of the doctrine of for's is not eno(!h9 3PP B>4. B(t he takes this as a reflection on the as.yet.inade+(ate level of concept(aliKation on the part of yo(n! ,ocrates, rather than as a reflection on the li'itations of the 'at(re theory 3>B n. "9 ;$1%=4. Ao(n! ,ocrates is not yet s(fficiently adept at a stract concept(aliKation to (nderstand the nat(re of the for's in the'selves? he can only conceive of the' in corporeal ter's and therefore only in ter's of si'ile and 'etaphor. &he second part of the dialo!(e, 2iller ar!(es, is desi!ned to address this deficiency y trainin! hi' in a stract concept(aliKation. &h(s the Parmenides f(nctions as a kind of steppin!.stone to*ard the %epu)lic . 9&he elder ,ocrates8 philosophical co''and of the theory of for's in the %epu)lic is the !oal, al eit retrospectively posed, to*ard *hich the concept(al la or prescri ed in the Parmenides is a needed 'eans . . . . &he yo(thf(l ,ocrates8 task is to appropriate f(lly, y critical and concept(al in+(iry, *hat *as !iven to Ela(con and <di'ant(s 'ore in the 'anner of a(thoritative prono(nce'ent and in the 'odes of i'a!e and analo!y9 3$#4. B(t since even the ,ocrates of the %epu)lic con. stantly (ses 9i'a!e and analo!y9 in speakin! of the for's, *hat reason is there to s(p. pose that Plato elieved a p(rely concept(al acco(nt to e possi leJ - a!ree *ith 2iller that the ,ocratic *isdo' of the %epu)lic is 'ore like the !oal at *hich the Parmenides ai's, than a re0ected ideal fro' *hich it flees? (t - do not think *e are !iven any reason to e)pect that *isdo' to e a le to p(r!e its concepts of 'etaphor and analo!y. 7 "1 7 participation receives the 'ost e)tensive treat'ent, it is never characteriKed other than 'etaphorically. ,ocrates is (ncertain there *hether to descri e the relationship et*een for' and individ(al as presence 3

4, co''(nion 3 4, or in so'e other *ay 31##d4I previo(sly he had descri ed it as a strivin! 3 4 of thin!s to e'(late the for' 3%4d4, and as the participation 3 4 of the thin! in the for' 3e.!., 1##c4. <ll these are 'etaphors or analo!ies, and they are never translated into a p(rely concept(al acco(nt. -n the present acco(nt, therefore, the theory has not een ref(ted, (t one of its li'itations has een 'ade apparent.

:+ Second "rgument9 Uni)ersals 4%/-a628

&he second ar!('ent is no lon!er concerned *ith the ca(sal relation y *hich for's are so'eho* present to partic(lars, (t *ith the aspect of for's as (niversals:;1%= 9- think yo( elieve that each for' is one for so'e s(ch reason as this,9 said Par'enides? 9*hen 'any thin!s appear to yo( to e i!, perhaps there see's to yo(, as yo( look at the' all, to e so'e one -dea that is the sa'e in all of the', and fro' this yo( concl(de that the i! is one.9 9Hhat yo( say is tr(e,9 he said. 9Hhat a o(t the i! itself and the other i! thin!s? if yo( look at the' ;1%= <llen interprets the *hole series of ar!('ents as a sin!le e)tended ar!('ent 3e.!., PP 9>, 1B64, (t the connections he 'akes et*een the' so'eti'es see' strained. -n the present case he *rites, 9&he Parado) of Divisi ility ;i.e., the present ar!('ent= ass('es the second dis0(nct of the Dile''a of Participation: if there is participation, there is participation in parts of -deas9 31"44. &his see's (nlikely for t*o reasons. @irst, there is nothin! in the second ar!('ent to s(!!est that the 'e' ers of the infinite re!ress are related as parts and *holes? even if there *ere, this *o(ld follo* as the concl(sion rather than ein! an ass('ption. ,econd, <llen ackno*led!es that 9the i'plication of the ;first ar!('ent= is that oth dis0(ncts of the Dile''a of Participation are false9 31"#4, in *hich case it *o(ld e odd to ass('e the tr(th of one of the' as the asis for the ne)t ar!('ent. 7 "$ 7 all in the sa'e *ay *ith yo(r so(l, *ill not a sin!le i! appear a!ain y *hich all these appear to e i!J9 9,o it see's9 ;

=. 9&hen another for' of i!ness *ill appear, eyond i!ness itself and the thin!s that participate in it? and after all these yet another, y *hich they *ill all e i!? and each of yo(r for's *ill no lon!er e one, (t their n(' er *ill e (nli'ited.9 Best kno*n y its post.Platonic na'e of the &hird 2an ar!('ent, this second ar!('ent, so'eti'es in con0(nction *ith the fo(rth, has received far 'ore attention than all the others co' ined. -n an enor'o(sly infl(ential article Ere!ory Glastos ar!(ed that the re!ress arises fro' an inco'pati ility et*een the self.referential aspect of the for's 3 i!ness is itself i!4 and the principle of separation or 9nonidentity9 3 i!ness is distinct fro' *hat is i!4.;16= &hese t*o principles are inco'pati le, ho*ever, only if the sense in *hich a for' has its o*n +(ality is e)actly the sa'e as the sense in *hich corporeal thin!s have it, and this is not in fact the case. Cet (s e!in at the point *here ,ocrates a!ain displays a certain hesitation, replyin! only 9so it see's9 *hen Par'enides s(!!ests that if he looked at the i! itself and the other i! thin!s in the sa'e *ay, there *o(ld have to e another i! to acco(nt for *hat they have in co''on. 1ere a!ain there are !ood !ro(nds for hesitation. Par'enides8 instr(ctions are to look at the for' and thin!s in the sa'e *ay *ith o(r so(l. 9Hith o(r so(l,9 eca(se for's cannot e perceived *ith o(r eyes (t only *ith the 'ind, that is, *ith reason. <n inte!ral part of the theory of for's has al*ays een the insistence that the

ody perceives onl! individ(als, and the 'ind 3reason4 onl! for's: rational kno*led!e is not sense perception (t 9recollection.9 &he inco''ens(ra ility et*een the t*o kinds of perceivin! is *hy, for e)a'ple, not only are the prisoners in the cave 3*ho are at the level of sense perception4 (na le to see the for's o(tside the cave *hen they look, (t the philosophers o(tside 3*ho perceive the for's *ith their so(l4 are no lon!er a le to see the individ(alities *ithin. Conse+(ently, *hile it is evident that the ;16= 9&he &hird 2an <r!('ent in the Parmenides,4 Philosophical %evie B" 319>44 "19.49. Cf. Hilfrid ,ellars, 9Glastos and the &hird 2an,9 Philosophical %evie B4 319>>4 4#>."%? Peter Eeach, 9&he &hird 2an <!ain,9 Philosophical %evie B> 319>B4 %$.6$? and Glastos, 9Postscript to the &hird 2an: < Deply to 2r. Eeach,9 Philosophical %evie B> 319>B4 6".94. <ll (t the ,ellars are reprinted in <llen, ed., SP'. The de ate to *hich these articles have !iven rise contin(es to this day, (t - a' inclined to a!ree *ith Do ert &(rn (ll 39&he &hird 2an <r!('ent and the &e)t of Parmenides ,9 in :ohn <nton and <nthony Pre(s, eds., Essa!s in #ncient Gree$ Philosoph! ", Plato ;<l any: ,U5A Press, 1969= $#".$>4 that 9'ost of the Glastos.inspired controversy is irrelevant to the interpretation of that te)t and its conte)t9 3$#"4. 7 "" 7 for' of i!ness is to e perceived *ith o(r so(l rather than o(r eyes, ho* are *e s(pposed to perceive i! things 3individ(als4 9in the sa'e *ay ith !our soul ,9 since individ(als are perceived not y reason (t y the sensesJ &he ter' 9so(l,9 or psyche, 'ay e road eno(!h to incl(de oth sense perception and reason, as it does in <ristotle, (t one is hardly (sin! the so(l 9in the sa'e *ay9 in oth cases. Hhat Par'enides s(!!ests is si'ply inconceiva le in ter's of the 'at(re ,ocrates8 theory of for's. He need not revie* the episte'olo!y of the 'at(re theory of for's, ho*ever, to see that this is so. &he present ar!('ent is often disc(ssed in ter's of the post.Platonic e)a'ple of the for' of 9'an9 rather than Plato8s e)a'ple of the for' of 9 i!,9 (t this is (nfort(nate eca(se Plato8s e)a'ple see's strate!ically chosen to ill(strate so'ethin! that is 'ore o sc(re in the other. He can see fro' Plato8s e)a'ple that the for' and the thin!s cannot e looked at 9in the sa'e *ay9 eca(se 9 i!9 cannot e predicated (nivocally of oth. Predicated of things , 9 i!9 'eans occ(pyin! 'ore space than nor'al, and it clearly cannot 'ean this *hen predicated of the for' since for's are aspatial 3as *e *ere re'inded y the i'plications of the first ar!('ent4. Plato co(ld scarcely have chosen an e)a'ple etter calc(lated to sho* the i'possi ility of (nivocal predication, that is, of lookin! at the t*o 9in the sa'e *ay.9 -n fact this very e)a'ple *as (sed in the Phaedo to ill(strate the inco''ens(ra ility et*een for's and thin!s. Bi! thin!s can e oth i! and s'all at the sa'e ti'e, as ,i''ias is i! in co'parison *ith ,ocrates and s'all in co'parison *ith Phaedo, *hereas i!ness itself can never e oth i! and s'all 31#$ .d? cf. 1#" 4. -t *as on si'ilar !ro(nds that ,ocrates had earlier ar!(ed that it is i'possi le to derive the concept of e+(ality itself fro' o(r sensi le e)perience of e+(al thin!s 3%4 .%> 4. ,ocrates had 'ade a si'ilar point earlier in the Parmenides , (sin! an e)a'ple that *ill eco'e pro'inent in the second part of the dialo!(e, na'ely, that of the 9one.9 1e says that it is easy to sho* that the sa'e thing is oth one and 'anyIsince a corporeal thin! is, on one hand, a collection of parts and therefore 'any, and, on the other hand, a discrete individ(al and therefore oneI (t that the one itself can never e 'any or the 'any itself one. @or's, in other *ords, display an a sol(te nat(re, *hile thin!s display only an e+(ivocal nat(re, and one cannot look at the' in the sa'e *ay. -t is pro le'atic ho* an! predicate *ithin the corporeal *orld can e applied (nivocally to an incorporeal reality.

7 "4 7 Fn the other hand, neither can the predication si'ply e e+(ivocal, as the fifth ar!('ent *ill sho*, for then the for' and thin! *o(ld ear no essential relation to each other and the theory of for's *o(ld e pointless. &he only alternative is to take the d(al predication analo!ically 3as 'edieval theolo!y does in e)plainin! ho* predicates derived fro' the corporeal *orld can e applied to Eod4 and say that i!ness itself is not i! in the sense of takin! (p space, (t in so'e sense that is the intelli!i le analo!(e of takin! (p space. &he reply to Par'enides8 second ar!('ent, then, like the first, '(st fall ack (pon analo!ical reasonin!. -n the first ar!('ent it *as a three.ter' analo!y 3for's are to thin!s as te'poral (nits are to thin!s4 s(ch as Plato had (sed in the 9affinity9 ar!('ent of the Phaedo 3%6 ff.4, and here a fo(r.ter' analo!y 3 i!ness itself is to i! as the intelli!i le is to the corporeal4 s(ch as he (sed in the Divided Cine. Fnce a!ain the apparent ref(tation of the theory of for's contains *ithin itself a re'inder of ho* the o 0ection can e 'etIin ter's already fa'iliar to (s fro' the 'iddle dialo!(esI (t once a!ain the i'plicit defense can do no 'ore than partially vindicate the theory. -n the first ar!('ent the analo!y !ave (s no *ay of.(nderstandin! intrinsicall! precisely ho* a for' is *holly present to 'any thin!s, and here *e find that *e have no (nderstandin! of *hat i!ness itself 3or any for'4 is intrinsically, (t only analo!ically.

;+ Third "rgument9 !once.ts 4%/-26d8

&he ne)t ar!('ent foc(ses on the for's8 f(nction as concepts. &he yo(thf(l ,ocrates sees that the key to ans*erin! Par'enides8 second ar!('ent is to sho* that the for's are f(nda'entally different fro' thin!s, so that the t*o cannot e taken to!ether in the sa'e *ay. 1o*ever he does not yet for'(late this difference in the sophisticated 'anner of the Phaedo and %epu)lic , (t s(!!ests instead that 9each of these for's 'ay e only a tho(!ht, in *hich case it *o(ld not e appropriate for it to e)ist any*here other than in o(r so(ls? for in that *ay each *o(ld e one and *o(ld no lon!er s(ffer the conse+(ences that *ere 0(st 'entioned.9 ,ince this is the only feat(re of yo(n! ,ocrates8 defense of the theory of for's that *as not part of the 'at(re ,ocrates8 conception of the for's in other dialo!(es, it is not dear *hy Plato introd(ces it here at allIonly to depict it as co'pletely re0ected. -t 'ay e that eca(se of Plato8s opposition to 'aterialis', and his elevation of the 'ind over the senses as the to(chstone of reality, he *as seen as an ally y so'e of those *ho 3like the follo*ers of Prota!oras and Eor!ias4 7 "> 7 elieve reality to e entirely s( 0ective.;19= -n that case this central one of the five ar!('ents 'ay e 'eant to si!nal his opposition to that e)tre'e interpretation of his anti'aterialis'. &he ar!('ent disc(ssed in the ne)t para!raph, in any case, see's to prefi!(re the ref(tation that ,ocrates (ndertakes a!ainst Prota!oras in the Theaetetus . -n a series of steps Par'enides esta lishes that if the for' is a tho(!ht, the tho(!ht '(st e of an independently real (niversal: 314 a tho(!ht '(st e of so'ethin!, 3$4 na'ely, of so'ethin! that is, and 3"4 it '(st e co''on to all its instances 31"$ .c4. &he point see's to e that concept(alis' i'plies its ne!ation, realis', eca(se tho(!hts are of independently real e)istents, in *hich case concept(alis' is incoherent. B(t *hy '(st the referents of tho(!hts e real independently of the 'indJ <ltho(!h this pre'ise 'ay see' +(estion. e!!in!, it 'ay instead have een taken fro' the historical Par'enides8 clai' that 9it is the sa'e thin! that can e tho(!ht and that can e9 3fr. "4, and 9not *itho(t ein! . . . *ill yo( find thinkin!9 3fr. 6.">."B4.;$#= He can interpret these fra!'ents in a Platonic, rationalistic *ay, to 'ean that reason 3thinkin!,

4 is the test of *hat is real. <!ainst the vie* of those in the cave, *ho define reality in ter's of *hat is visi le, Plato 3follo*in! Par'enides and anticipatin! 1e!el4 ar!(es that the real sho(ld e defined in ter's of the rational and that the rational conse+(ently i'plies the real.;$1= Fn s(ch a principle one 'ay re0ect a concept(alis' that ;19= Kla(s Fehler 'ay e ri!ht in s(!!estin! that Plato is the ancient thinker *ho co'es closest to 'odern idealis': 9Der *esentliche BeK(! dieses Denkens a(f Mffent.lichkeit ist a(ch der letKte Er(nd, *ar(' dieses Denken sich hie in der Heise spaterer Defle)ion a(f sich sel st K(rNck!eKo!en (nd ein i' stren!en ,inne philosophisches ,el st e*() tsein konstit(iert hat, (' von sich a(s, a(s seine' -nneren, die Helt 8syste'atisch8 K( ent*erfen, o *ohl es !erade Platon, *ar, der dieser 2o!lichkeit von allen antiken Denkern, <(!(stin(s a(s!eno''en, a' nOchsten !eko''en ist9 3Die Lehre vom noetischen und dianoetischen Den$en )ei Platon und #ristoteles ;2(nich: Beck, 19B$= 1#>4. ;$1= 1ans Dochol 39&he Dialo!(e Parmenides : <n -nsol( le /ni!'a in Platonis'J9 (nternational Philosophical /uarterl! 11 ;19%1= 49B.>$#4 !oes so far as to s(!!est that 9this theory, concl(din! fro' the e)istence of thinkin! to the e)istence of an o 0ectively e)istin! o 0ect of thinkin!, is at the sa'e ti'e the !ist and asic theory of Platonis'9 3>#B.%4. 7 "B 7 treats rationality as independent of reality, and that clai's that the ein! of concepts 'ay e confined to the 'ind. Par'enides follo*s this *ith a f(rther point, that if for's are tho(!hts, and thin!s are *hat they are y participatin! in for's, then 9either everythin! is 'ade of tho(!hts, and all thin!s think, or despite ein! tho(!hts, they are *itho(t tho(!ht.9 -f - have interpreted this second, rather o sc(re part of the ar!('ent correctly, it does not see' to have '(ch force, since the second alternative, that thin!s 'ay e constit(ted y tho(!hts *itho(t the'selves thinkin!, is not a s(rd. 1o*ever, the second horn *o(ld no do( t have see'ed 'ore parado)ical in the days efore Berkeley and Kant than it does to (s, Prota!oras not*ithstandin!. -n any case, the ar!('ent as a *hole is the only one in *hich ,ocrates displays no hesitation 3see a ove, n. 144. ,ocrates had introd(ced this ar!('ent to circ('vent the conse+(ences of the &hird 2an ar!('ent, reco!niKin! that the key to lockin! the infinite re!ress is to deny that for's and thin!s can e looked at y the so(l in the sa'e *ay. -f the for's are concepts and cannot 9e)ist any*here other than in o(r so(ls,9 then clearly the so(l cannot look at 'aterial thin!s in the sa'e *ay as for's. B(t this tactic t(rns o(t to e too e)tre'e, for it *o(ld precl(de any ontolo!ical relationship at all et*een for's and ein!s 3a diffic(lty that arises on other !ro(nds in the fifth ar!('ent4. Par'enides8 ref(tation 'akes this point, (t only in a ne!ative *ay: it re0ects ,ocrates8 inappropriate conception (t *itho(t offerin! an alternative. &he 'iddle dialo!(es !ive (s a three.level ontolo!y, co'prisin! corporeal 'atter, thinkin! so(l, and eternal for's. Hhereas 'odern transcendental philosophy seeks to 'ake for' a f(nction of 'ind, Plato8s 'iddle dialo!(es keep so(l ri!idly distinct fro' the for's. Kno*in! is not refle)ive (t is the so(l8s apprehension of so'ethin! other than itself, and the first part of the present ar!('ent reaffir's this separation.;$$= Hhether this ar!('ent arose in response to 'is(nderstandin!s of the theory of for's or concept(alist challen!es to it is i'possi le to deter'ine. Conceiva ly it is 'eant to 'ake dear the difference et*een, on one hand, the Platonic position that tr(th is to e fo(nd in the 'ind as separated fro' the ody and the physical *orld !enerally 3e.!., Phaedo B>d.BBa4? and, on the other, the

Prota!orean position that tr(th is su)3ective , *ith no ascertaina le o 0ective referent. ;$$= 1ans.Eeor! Eada'er s(spects that in the second part of the dialo!(e there 'ay e hints even of a distinction et*een psyche and no(s, *hich paves the *ay for the Plotinian position 39Plato8s Par'enides and -ts -nfl(ence,9 Dion!sius ;196"= ".1B4. 7 "% 7 &he ar!('ent f(nctions in another *ay as *ell. &he first t*o ar!('ents e)plored the p(rely ontolo!ical aspects of the for's, as ca(ses and (niversals, *hile the last t*o introd(ce the episte'olo!ical di'ension, first i'plicitly in the fo(rth ar!('ent8s concept of paradi!', then e)plicitly in the fifth ar!('ent8s foc(s on the pro le' of kno*led!e. &he third ar!('ent is the transition et*een these pairs, and in its ref(tation of e)tre'e concept(alis' the relationship et*een ein! and thinkin! is riefly indicated.

<+ Fourth "rgument9 Paradigms 4%/-d6%//a8

&he *ay to reconcile the ontolo!ical f(nction of for's *ith their episte'olo!ical relation to concepts is not, as ,ocrates no* sees, y identi&!ing for's *ith concepts (t y thinkin! of the' as paradi!'s that serve oth as the ontolo!ical asis of individ(al thin!s and as the referent of o(r concepts.;$"= 1e proceeds, accordin!ly, to p(t for*ard a ne* interpretation of for's no* as paradi!'s, altho(!h *itho(t e)plicit reference to their episte'olo!ical aspect. 9&he 'ost likely vie* appears to 'e to e this, that these for's e)ist in nat(re as paradi!'s and other thin!s rese' le the' and are like the'? and their participation in the for's t(rns o(t to e nothin! (t an assi'ilation to the'.9 9&hen if anythin!,9 Par'enides said, 9rese' les the for', is it possi le for that for' not to e like the thin! that rese' les it, insofar as the thin! has een 'ade to rese' le it? or is there any *ay that the like can e (nlike the likeJ9 9&here is none.9 9<nd is there not a !reat necessity that the like participate in one and the sa'e for' as its likeJ9 95ecessarily.9 9<nd *on8t that, y participation in *hich like thin!s are 'ade like, *on8t it e the for' itselfJ9 9< sol(tely.9 9&hen it is not possi le for anythin! e like the for' or for the for' to e like anythin! else? other*ise eyond the for' another for' *ill al*ays appear, and, if that is like anythin!, still another, and *itho(t end a ne* for' *ill al*ays arise contin(o(sly, if the for' is like *hat participates in it.9 9Hhat yo( say is very tr(e.9 ;$"= <s <llen 3PP 1B"4 and 2iller 3PP >B4 note, the paradi!'.copy 'odel of participation *o(ld also offer ,ocrates a *ay o(t of the earlier dile''a of participation, since a 'odel is neither divided a'on! nor present in its copies.

7 "6 7 9&hen it is not y likeness that other thin!s partake in the for's, (t it is necessary ' seek so'e other 'eans y *hich they partake.9 9,o it see's9 ;

=. 1ere Par'enides does not 'erely ask ,ocrates to 9look at the for' and thin!s in the sa'e *ay,9 as he did in the second ar!('ent, (t offers an ar!('ent *hy it o(!ht to e possi le to do soIthe reciprocality of the relation of likeness. ,ocrates, *ho has already conceded the infinite re!ress in the second ar!('ent, no* assents (nhesitatin!ly to each of the preli'inary steps, (t he hesitates this ti'e at the concl(sion that Par'enides dra*s fro' the'. @ro' the point of vie* of the 'iddle dialo!(es it is not s(rprisin! that ,ocrates hesitates. Par'enides8 concl(sion is that the infinite re!ress res(lted fro' ,ocrates8 clai' that the for's are paradi!'s and therefore rese' le the partic(lars in so'e *ay. 1o*ever the re!ress does not follo* specifically fro' this clai', (t fro' Par'enides8 treat'ent of the concept of rese' lance as a sy''etrical relation. -n the 'iddle dialo!(es the rese' lance et*een for's and partic(lars is represented y the 'at(re ,ocrates not as a sy''etrical one (t as one et*een (ne+(als. -n the Phaedo , for instance, (sin! the e)a'ple of e+(ality, he says that partic(lars strive to e like the for' (t fall short 3%4d ff.4, and he 'akes a si'ilar point in the %epu)lic in ter's of the e)a'ples of the ea(tif(l, the 0(st, and the pio(s 34%9a4. &he relationship is th(s an (neven one in the sense that the for's have an a sol(te perfection that the thin!s participatin! in the' can never achieve. @or's and thin!s are (lti'ately inco''ens(ra le and cannot properly e set into a reciprocal relationship in the *ay that Par'enides proposes. -t 'akes sense to say that e+(al sticks strive to e like e+(ality itself, (t not to say that e+(ality itself strives to e like e+(al sticks. -ndeed, the fifth ar!('ent *ill trade on this very type of inco''ens(ra ility. <nd since the for's are self.referential in any case, there is no need to posit f(rther for's to acco(nt for their nat(re? they are the (lti'ate referent oth of the'selves and of partic(lars. Fn the other hand, if the rese' lance et*een for's and thin!s is (lti'ately inco''ens(ra le, ho* can it e a rese' lance at allJ -f the for's are the standards a!ainst *hich partic(lars are 'eas(red, ho* can the latter e inco''ens(rate *ith their 'eas(reJ &his is a f(nda'ental aporia in the theory of for's, *hich *as noted as early as the Phaedo , *here ,ocrates, in passin!, calls o(r attention to the diffic(lty of decidin! *hether or not thin!s can e said to e 9like9 for's 3%4c.d4.;$4= B(t 7 "9 7 altho(!h Plato see's to have een a*are of the pro le' fro' the ti'e he first ela orated the theory of for's, he !ives no evidence of elievin! that it co(ld definitively e solved. <s in the first and second ar!('ents, the 9sol(tion9 see's to e that the rese' lance et*een for's and the thin!s they participate in is not a (nivocal one 3and therefore does not !ive rise to an infinite re!ress4 (t an analo!ical one: the ea(ty of the ea(tif(l itself is to the ea(ty of ea(tif(l thin!s as the a sol(te is to the relative, not different in de!reeIand certainly not sy''etricalI (t different in di'ension. Fnce a!ain there is nothin! in the fo(rth ar!('ent that the 'at(re ,ocrates of the 'iddle dialo!(es co(ld not and did not ans*er, (t once a!ain the ans*ers '(st (lti'ately fall ack on analo!y and th(s lack the transparency to *hich reason aspires.

5+ Fi(th "rgument9 Se.aration 4%//a6%/'e8

&here is an i'portant introd(ction to the fifth ar!('ent, to *hich co''entators do not al*ays pay eno(!h attention. 9Do yo( see, then, ,ocrates, ho* !reat the i'passe is, if so'eone 'aintains that for's are 'arked off as entities the'selves. y.the'selves ;

=J9 9Aes, indeed.9 9Ao( 'ay e s(re,9 he said, 9that yo( do not yet, so to speak, !rasp ho* !reat the i'passe is if yo( 'aintain that each for' is one and is so'ethin! al*ays 'arked off apart ;

= fro' partic(lar thin!s ;

=.9 91o* is thatJ9 said he. 9&here are 'any factors,9 he said, 9 (t the !reatest is this: if anyone sho(ld say that it is not even fittin! for the for's to e kno*n if they are s(ch as *e say they '(st e, no one *o(ld have any *ay to sho* the speaker that he *as *ron!, (nless the disp(tant *ere a 'an of '(ch e)perience and not *itho(t nat(ral a ility, and *ere *illin! to follo* a lon! and co'plicated proof? other*ise he *ho insists that they are (nkno*a le *o(ld e (nconvinced.9 31""a.c4 Hhat is re'arka le here is first of all Par'enides8 clai' that it *o(ld e an error to elieve that if the for's are separate 3

and , 1""a9, $4 they are (nkno*a le, even tho(!h it *o(ld not e easy to de'onstrate the error. @or this is to concede in advance that the fifth ar!('ent, *hich 'akes precisely this clai', is in principle ans*era le altho(!h only *ith !reat diffic(lty. 2oreover, eca(se of the relationship of this ar!('ent to the previo(s ones, Par'en. 7 4# 7

ides8 *ords s(!!est that those too sho(ld e ans*era le, if only in an el(sive 'anner. De'arka le too are Par'enides8 *ords 3in the last speech a ove4, 9if ;the for's= are s(ch as *e say they '(st e,9 *hich i'ply that he shares ,ocrates8 vie*. &he conte)t s(!!ests that Par'enides is (sin! the first person pl(ral earnestly, and not as a patroniKin! for' of the second person sin!(lar. -f the previo(s ar!('ents *ere to have een re!arded as effective ref(tations, he co(ld hardly incl(de hi'self as one of the theory8s s(pporters. <nd since the reference is specifically to the assertion that the for's are independent and distinct fro' thin!s, Par'enides is here professin! to share ,ocrates8 advocacy of the theory of separate for's. &hat the historical Par'enides sho(ld e portrayed as sy'pathetic to the theory of for's is perhaps not s(rprisin! in li!ht of the ter's in *hich the theory is stated a ove: 9each for' is one and is so'ethin! al*ays 'arked off apart fro' partic(lar thin!s.9 &his state'ent co(ld e taken e+(ally as a depiction of Par'enides8 o*n criterion of reality, e)cept that the for's are '(ltiple. Plato al*ays speaks of Par'enides *ith respect, and it is *idely a!reed that he sees the theory of for's as an e)tension of the Par'enidean vie* of reality. <ccordin!ly he 'ay *ell have felt that Par'enides *o(ld have accepted the theory of for's. B(t that this dramatis persona Par'enides, *ho is leadin! an attack (pon the theory of for's, sho(ld speak here as an advocate of that theory see's +(ite i'pla(si le (nless his ar!('ents are to e re!arded not as hostile ref(tations (t as the 9friendly9 criticis's of one *ho is sy'pathetic to the theory (t not lind to its li'itations. <n a*areness of its li'itations *o(ld entail a re0ection of the theory only if one *ere a le to replace it *ith one that is free of s(ch li'itations, and Plato does not see' to have considered s(ch an alternative possi le. &he fifth ar!('ent is the lon!est of the five, and the one that Par'enides considers the 'ost i'portant 31"" 4. -n it the episte'olo!ical i'plications of the for's8 character as paradi!'s eco'e e)plicit for the first ti'e in the dialo!(e. &he ar!('ent 'ay e s(''ariKed in the follo*in! steps. 1. 9Hhoever clai's that the essence of each thin! is itself. y.itself ;

... = *o(ld a!ree, first, that none of the' are in (s9 31""c4. $. 9&hose ideas that are *hat they are in relation to one another ;

= have their essence in relation to one another,9 that is, in relation to other for's rather than in relation to concrete thin!s. 7 41 7 9<nd the thin!s a'on! (s that have the sa'e na'es as those, *ill like*ise stand in relation to each other and not to the for's.9 @or e)a'ple, if *e are a 'aster or slave *e are 'aster or slave of another person, not of a for', and the for's of 'astery and slavery are si'ilarly relative to each other, not to partic(lar persons 31""c.1"4a4. ". &h(s 9that *hich is kno*led!e itself *o(ld e kno*led!e of that *hich is tr(th itself,9 that is, of the for's? *hereas 9the kno*led!e that e)ists a'on! (s *o(ld e kno*led!e of the tr(th that e)ists a'on! (s9 31"4a. 4.

4. 5o*, since 9the for's the'selves, as yo( a!ree ;in step 1=, *e do not have, and they cannot e)ist a'on! (s9? and since 9*hat each of these kinds the'selves is, is kno*n y the for' itself of kno*led!e9 ;cf. step "=? 9then none of the for's is kno*n y (s, since *e do not participate in kno*led!e itself.9 9-t see's not ;

=9 31"4 .c4. >. 2oreover, since the for's are far 'ore perfect than the partic(lar thin!s a'on! (s, it is appropriate that !od8s kno*led!e *ill e of the', in *hich case he *ill e (na le to kno* o(r *orld, since 9the for's there are not a le to have any relationship to the thin!s a'on! (s, nor the thin!s a'on! (s to those there9 31"4c.d4. B. <nd in this case !od *ill no 'ore e a le to kno* the thin!s a'on! (s than *e can kno* the for's, nor *ill the !ods e a le to e o(r 'asters since their co''erce is *ith the &orm of 'astery, *hich does not stand in relation to (s at all 3step $? 1"4d.e4. &he first three steps 3to *hich the yo(n! ,ocrates assents *itho(t hesitation4 co(ld easily e accepted y the ,ocrates of the 'iddle dialo!(es since they insist only on the separation of for's fro' thin!s, and on the fact that *e are not capa le of a sol(te kno*led!e or *isdo', oth of *hich clai's are co''on eno(!h in the theory of for's 3e.!., Phaedo BB .e4. &he fo(rth step, ho*ever, dra*s a 'ore radical conse+(ence fro' o(r alienation fro' a sol(te kno*led!eIthat is, that *e can have no kno*led!e of the for'sIand it is here alone that ,ocrates hesitates. -f *e look at *hat has happened, *e can see *hy his a!ree'ent is (ncertain 39-t see's not94, altho(!h he cannot +(ite identify *hat is *ron!. Par'enides has ar!(ed fro' the fact that the ter's constit(tin! certain relations, s(ch as 'astery and slavery, stand in relationship only to other ter's at their o*n level 3for's to for's, partic(lars to partic(lars4, to the concl(sion that no relationship can e)ist et*een 7 4$ 7 for's and partic(lars, incl(din! the relation of kno*in!. Kno*led!e itself kno*s tr(th itself and kno*s those entities 3

4, the for's? and kno*led!e a'on! (s kno*s the tr(th and the entities 3

4 that e)ist a'on! (s 31"4a. 4. @ro' the point of vie* of the 'iddle dialo!(es, th(s far the clai's are not (n0(stified. Kno*led!e itself 3*isdo'4 is indeed kno*led!e of the for's and is indeed eyond (s, as *e noted in the precedin! para!raph, and our kno*led!e is of the tr(th and ein! of the thin!s of o(r *orld. Hhat is 'issin!, ho*ever, is the f(rther clai' of the 'iddle dialo!(es that the tr(th and ein! of the thin!s of this *orld necessarily refer to the tr(th and ein! of the for's? the for's are the tr(th of this *orld.;$>= -n order to esta lish s(ch a pre'ise at this point, the yo(n! ,ocrates *o(ld have to ar!(e that not all relations are of the kind that Par'enides descri es, that so'e relations do in fact rid!e the !ap et*een the *orld of for's and thin!s. &he 'iddle dialo!(es !ive (s at least three s(ch

relations: participation, recollection, and eros. Be!innin! *ith the 'eno , the 'at(re ,ocrates rid!es the !ap et*een o(r corporeal real' and the real' of the for's y the concepts of participation and recollection: since corporeal thin!s participate in the for's, *e can reco!niKe or recollect the for's fro' their li'ited presence in corporeal thin!s. &his does not +(ite ena le (s to kno* the' as they are in the'selves 39kno*led!e itself9 or *isdo' is not availa le to (s4, (t it ena les (s to kno* something of the for's. 1ere, ho*ever, Plato 'akes the yo(n! ,ocrates respond to Par'enides8 ar!('ent as if he had not yet for'(lated the rid!in! concept of recollection? and Par'enides has previo(sly disco(ra!ed ,ocrates8 atte'pts to for'(late the concept of participation 3perhaps ,ocrates8 present hesitation indicates a s(spicion that so'e s(ch for'(lation can e fo(nd4. -t is ironic then that Par'enides sho(ld (se the very ter' participation here, *here the concept itself is conspic(o(sly o'itted: 9&hen none of the for's is kno*n y (s since *e do not participate ;

= in kno*led!e itself9 31"4 4Ia phrase that is repeated in step > 31"4c1#4. -n step $ *as an even 'ore pre!nant re'inder of the doctrine: &hose ideas that are *hat they are in relation to one another have their essence in relation to one another, (t not in relation to the thin!s a'on! (sIlikenesses or *hatever rise *e call the'? and *e *ho participate in the' take o(r na'es fro' the'. <nd the thin!s a'on! (s that have the sa'e na'es as those *ill like*ise stand in relation only to one another and not to the for's. ;$>= Cf. Phaedrus $4%d, $49d. 7 4" 7 ,ocrates forthri!htly asks, 9Hhat do yo( 'eanJ9 and Par'enides responds *ith the 'aster.slave e)a'ple. B(t altho(!h that e)a'ple ill(strates his point, Par'enides had 0(st provided (s *ith t*o that do not: participation and na'in!. He and all thin!s in o(r *orld participate in the for's, and the predicates that apply to (s are the na'es of the for's in *hich *e participate, s(ch as ani'al, 0(st, ea(tif(l, i!, and even 'aster or slave. -f partic(lar thin!s are th(s related to the for's y participation and na'in!, then o(r kno*led!e of these thin!s is ipso &acto a kno*led!e, ho*ever i'perfect, of the for's, as the doctrine of recollection 'aintained. &his point is connected also *ith the lesson of the third ar!('ent: that thinkin! refers to a ein! that is not red(ci le to tho(!ht. &he activities of thinkin! and kno*in! stand in relation to the for's *itho(t collapsin! the distinction et*een thinkin! and ein! 3for's4. Cike eros in ,ocrates8 speech in the S!mposium , thinkin! and kno*in! are f(nctions of so(l, and they therefore 'ediate et*een the corporeal and the intelli!i le or divine *itho(t elon!in! e)cl(sively to either. &he fifth ar!('ent arrives at its parado)ical concl(sion y i!norin! the 'ediatin! nat(re of kno*led!e and tryin! to acco(nt for kno*led!e entirely in ter's of the opposite poles of the divine and the corporeal. B(t altho(!h the 'at(re theory of for's has the reso(rces to *ithstand this final assa(lt too, the latter *as no 'ore pointless than *ere the other criti+(es. He sa* in the first ar!('ent that the relation of participation is concept(ally aporetic, 'arkin! one of the o(ndaries *here concept(al clarity e!ins to reak do*n and !ive *ay to 'etaphor and analo!y. &here it res(lted in a li'itation as to *hat co(ld e said a o(t the role of participation in e)plainin! the ontological relationship et*een for's as ca(ses and the partic(lars that depend (pon the'. -n this fifth ar!('ent it res(lts in a si'ilar li'itation a o(t

the epistemological relationship et*een for's as paradi!'s and the partic(lars that ena le (s to kno* the'. &he doctrine of recollection 'ay sho* that *e are led fro' partic(lars to kno*led!e of the for's, and that Par'enides8 dichoto'y is therefore a false one, (t recollection is no less 'etaphoric than participation. Par'enides8 attack sho*s that it is far fro' o vio(s ho the real's of partic(larity and of for' can stand in relation to each other, and ho therefore *e are to conceive of the relations of participation and recollection that 'ake kno*led!e possi le. 2ore than that, in e'phasiKin! the deft, rather than the rid!es, et*een h('an thinkin! and the nat(re of reality in itself, the fifth ar!('ent ill(strates *hy all philosophical theoriKin! '(st (lti'ately fall short of co'plete ade+(acy to reality. 7 44 7 &he ar!('ent concl(des *ith a re'ark si'ilar to the one that preceded it: 9<nd yet, ,ocrates, the for's contain these diffic(lties and still very 'any 'ore esides the', if these ideas of thin!s e)ist and *e 'ark off ;

= each for' as so'ethin! in itself. &herefore he *ho hears s(ch assertions is at an i'passe and contends that the for's do not e)ist, or, even if they do e)ist, it is very necessary that they are (nkno*a le y h('an nat(re. <nd he thinks that there is so'ethin! in *hat he says, and, as *e 0(st said, he is a'aKin!ly hard to convince. Fnly a 'an of very !reat nat(ral a ility *ill e a le to (nderstand that there is a certain !en(s and essence, itself. y. itself ; =, for each thin!, and only a still 'ore a'aKin! 'an *ill e a le to discover all these thin!s and teach so'eone else to eval(ate the' properly.9 9- a!ree *ith yo(, Par'enides,9 said ,ocrates, 9for *hat yo( say is very '(ch after 'y o*n 'ind.9 9B(t yet,9 said Par'enides, 9if anyone, in vie* of these and other s(ch diffic(lties, *ill not per'it the e)istence of for's of thin!s or 'ark off ;

= a sin!le for' in each case, he *ill not have anythin! on *hich to fi) his tho(!hts, as lon! as he does not per'it the idea of each thin! to e al*ays the sa'e, and in this *ay he *ill (tterly destroy the po*er of disco(rse. Ao( see' to 'e to have een *ell a*are of this.9 9Hhat yo( say is tr(e,9 he said. 31"4e.1">c4 -n the face of this see'in!ly (na' i!(o(s concl(sion in favor of the theory of for's, *hy *o(ld anyone 'aintain that Plato re!arded the precedin! ar!('ents as fatal o 0ections to itJ &he (s(al response is that Plato still elieves that some theory of for's is necessary, (t that he is a andonin! one of the 'ost characteristic feat(res of his previo(s theory, the separation of for's fro' thin!s.;$B= B(t to 'aintain this is to foc(s on the second 'ain para!raph a ove to the e)cl(sion of the first, *here Par'enides 'aintains that 9a 'an of very !reat nat(ral a ility *ill e a le to (nderstand that there is a certain !en(s and essence, itself. y.itself ;

=, for each thin!.9 -t is hard to i'a!ine that can 'ean anythin! other than e)istin! distinctly fro' sensi le thin!s,;$%= especially since at 1"# 6 39itself. ;$B= ,ayre, for e)a'ple, *rites, 9Hhat Par'enides o vio(sly has o'itted fro' this last.'in(te defense of the theory is any 'ention of the @or's as entirely separate entities . . . . Hhat Plato has Par'enides sayin! is that certain aspects of this theory ,ocrates has een 'aintainin!, here and in earlier dialo!(es, indeed are essential for intelli!i le disco(rseIna'ely those aspects providin! @or's that are definite and al*ays the sa'eI (t that the notion that these @or's e)ist in total separation fro' the thin!s that participate in the' not only is inessential (t leads to endless diffic(lties9 3PL+ $$4. 7 4> 7 y.itself94 is (sed interchan!ea ly *ith

39separate94 at ", >, c1, and d1. &he sa'e concl(sion is i'plied y the passa!e *ith *hich the final ar!('ent e!an, *here Par'enides said that so'eone 9of '(ch e)perience and not *itho(t nat(ral a ility, and . . . *illin! to follo* a lon! and co'plicated proof9 *o(ld (nderstand *hy it *o(ld e *ron! to 9say that it is not even fittin! for the for's to e kno*n if they are s(ch as *e say they '(st e,9 na'ely, 9'arked off as entities the'selves. y.the'selves ;

= . . . apart ; = fro' partic(lar thin!s ; =.9 -ndeed, in vie* of this (se of and , *e 'ay say that 39'ark off94 in the present passa!e also 'eans 9separate.9 &he face that Plato does not here (se the *ord

39separate94 is not si!nificant *hen he (ses synony'o(s ter's s(ch as and . &he present passa!e, therefore, affords no evidence that Plato at this point did anythin! (t reaffir' the theory of for's in all its essentials. Fn the asis of this e)a'ination there see's no reason to concl(de that Plato intended these ar!('ents to e a ref(tation or recantation of the theory of for's, and several reasons to elieve that he did not: 1. &he ar!('ents are easily ans*ered on the asis of feat(res of the theory that *ere pro'inent in the 'iddle dialo!(es and that co(ld pla(si ly e o'itted here only y portrayin! ,ocrates as ein! in the early sta!es of developin! the theory. $. By havin! ,ocrates hesitate precisely at the point *here s(ch factors can e ro(!ht into play to repel Par'enides8 attack, Plato see's to hint at the inconcl(sive nat(re of the ar!('ents. ". 5ot only the ans*ers (t the pro le's the'selves *ere anticipated in the 'iddle dialo!(es: the pro le' of !ivin! non'etaphorical acco(nts of participation and recollection, and the a' i!(ity of rese' lance and predication *ith re!ard to for's and thin!s, are clearly present in the Phaedo , *here the co'plete theory *as first introd(ced. Plato evidently reco!niKed these pro le's fro' the e!innin! (t felt that the theory *as not vitiated y the'. 7 4B 7 4. &he final ar!('ent e!ins and ends *ith speeches that sho* Par'enides to e ,ocrates8 ally in the theory, a devil8s advocate rather than ne'esis, *hich *o(ld hardly e possi le if the ar!('ents *ere intended as serio(s ref(tations. &he 'otive for e)hi itin! and even e)a!!eratin! these pro le's 'ay have een partly to re'ind (s that the theory of for's cannot e re!arded as a do!'a or perfected doctrine (t only as a val(a le 3perhaps indispensa le4 altho(!h ine)act *ay of interpretin! the *orld. -n Plato8s letters it is said that philosophical tr(th cannot (lti'ately e p(t into *ords, and '(st instead e n(rt(red indirectly in its recipient: &here is no co'position of 'ine concernin! these thin!s, nor *ill there ever e. @or it cannot e e)pressed in speech like other kinds of kno*led!e, (t after a lon! attendance (pon the 'atter itself, and co''(nion *ith it, then s(ddenly;$6= Ias a laKe is kindled fro' a leapin! sparkIit is orn in the so(l and at once eco'es self.no(rishin!. 3%."41c."4$a? cf. $."14a.c4 &he a(thenticity of the letters has never een esta lished concl(sively, (t on this point the letters are s(pported y the 'ythic, ironic, do( t.so*in! character of the dialo!(es the'selves, in *hich all *ords are (ttered thro(!h 'o(ths other than that of the a(thor. &he Phaedrus in partic(lar !ives direct s(pport to this senti'ent: 1e *ho thinks that he has e+(eathed in his *ritin!s so'e e)pertise ;

=, and he *ho receives the' thinkin! that anythin! dear and fir' *ill e in the', *o(ld e very si'ple'inded . . . if he tho(!ht that *ritten *ords are 'ore than re'inders, to the one *ho already kno*s, of that a o(t *hich they are *ritten . . . . Ao( 'i!ht think that they speak *ith a certain *isdo', (t if yo( +(estion *hat is said, eca(se yo( *ant to learn, they al*ays say the sa'e one thin!. 3$%>c.d4 - think a '(ch finer *ay of ein! serio(s co'es a o(t *hen so'eone, (sin! the art of dialo!(e, takes an appropriate so(l, and plants and so*s it *ith kno*led!ea le *ords that are a le to help oth the'selves and their planter? *ords that are not arren, (t have *ithin the' seeds fro' *hich other *ords !ro* in other characters, *hich are ever a le to 'ake the' i''ortal, and 'akin! their possessor happy to the !reatest e)tent that is h('anly possi le. 3$%Be.$%%a4 7 4% 7 <ccordin!ly, the first part of the Parmenides 'ay readily e re!arded as Plato8s *ay of sho*in! that his o*n theory of for's 3*hich is pro'inent in the Phaedrus 4 is no e)ception to the li'itations on the possi ility of philosophical disclos(re that the latter dialo!(e stip(lates. &he theory of for's, too, can at est e an inse'ination, never a do!'a.

&+ Transition to the 1*.otheses "2out the

ne 4%/'e6%/<c8

Par'enides had said that 9only a 'an of very !reat nat(ral a ility *ill e a le to (nderstand that there is a certain !en(s and essence, itself. y.itself, for each thin!, and only a still 'ore a'aKin! 'an *ill e a le to discover all these .thin!s and teach so'eone else to eval(ate the' properly9 31">a. 4. 1e no* concl(des, 9Hhat then *ill yo( do a o(t philosophyJ Hhere can yo( t(rn if these thin!s are (nkno*nJ9 31">c4. ,ocrates is (ncertain 9at present,9 and Par'enides attri (tes thisIas he had ,ocrates8 reservations a o(t for's of dirt, '(d, and hairIto his philosophical i''at(rity. ,ocrates has tried to define ea(ty, 0(stice, !ood, and all the other ideas efore he has een trained in the kind of dialectic that see's to 'ost people to e (seless lo+(acity, (t is in fact the 'eans of capt(rin! tr(th. ;$9= ,ocrates has een ri!ht to confine his attention to intelli!i le for's rather than sensi le thin!s, that is, to pay attention to likeness and (nlikeness. 9B(t it is necessary to do this as *ell as that: in the case of each hypothesis not only '(st yo( e)a'ine *hat follo*s if *hat is hypothesiKed e)ists, (t also if it does not e)istIif yo( *ish to e 'ore f(lly trained9 31">e.1"Ba4. -f *e sho*ed only *hat follo*ed fro' the hypothesis that so'ethin! e)ists, then any pro le's *e enco(ntered 'i!ht convince (s pre'at(rely to re0ect o(r hypothesis? *hereas if *e also considered *hat follo*ed fro' denyin! it, *e 'i!ht find the conse+(ences 'ore o 0ectiona le than those of acceptin! it. &h(s the Theaetetus *ill sho* that the pro le's conse+(ent on denyin! the e)istence of the for's are even 'ore pro le'atic than those that follo* fro' affir'in! their e)istence. <nd in the second part of the Parmenides *e *ill find that the pro le's of affir'in! the e)istence of the Fne *ill not e as severe as those of denyin! its e)istence. Hith this, *e are led into the second part of the dialo!(e, *hich is ;$9= Leno later seconds this: 9&he 'any are i!norant that *itho(t this passa!e and *anderin! thro(!h all thin!s it is i'possi le for the 'ind to happen (pon tr(th9 31"Bd.e4.

7 46 7 even 'ore eni!'atic than the first. Procl(s 3pp. $9."44 distin!(ishes fo(r different *ays of interpretin! even the overall intent of the ar!('ents, re!ardless of any disp(tes a o(t their content: 314 9<poretic,9 altho(!h not in o(r sense of the *ord as 9inconcl(sive,9 (t rather in the sense of elenctic or ref(tation. 3$4 9Ey'nastic,9 in the sense of lo!ical e)ercises intended to develop o(r po*ers of a stract reasonin!. 3"4 9Fntolo!ical,9 in the sense of a st(dy of the nat(re of the Fne. 344 9Fntolo!ical9 in the sense of 9ontic,9 that is, a st(dy of the ein!s that derive fro' the Fne. He 'ay add at least t*o 'ore approaches that Procl(s does not 'ention. 3>4 9:oc(lar9: <. /. &aylor *rites that 9the Parmenides is an ela orate 3eu d'esprit . . . . -ts p(rpose is to 8have so'e f(n8 *ith 2onists *ho re!ard the sensi le as ill(sion, and very little 'ore.9;"#= 3B4 9Co!ical,9 in the sense of *orkin! o(t the i'plications of the concept 9one.9 Hith so'e e)ceptions, this latter has een the do'inant interpretation at least since Cornford.;"1= /ven those *ho a!ree, either that the ar!('ents are positive de'onstrations or ne!ative ref(tations, do not a!ree on *hat they de'onstrate or ref(te. &he 9aporetic9 or elenctic vie* often held that the ar!('ents are ref(tations of Leno, (t 'ore recently it has een ar!(ed that they are ref(tations of the historical Par'enides 3Cornford, @ried.lOnder4, or even of Plato8s o*n earlier theory of for's, *hether on acco(nt of their (nity;"$= or their separateness.;""= -n the 'ore positive in. ;"#= Plato: The 'an and 5is 6or$ 3<tlantic 1i!hlands: 1('anities Press, 19>$4 ">#. &his approach, too, !oes ack to anti+(ity, accordin! to Do ert Br(' a(!h 3Plato on the +ne: The 5!potheses in the Parmenides ;5e* 1aven: Aale University Press, 19B1= >4. H. @. D. 1ardie 'akes an appropriate response to it: 9-t see's to 'e clear that the passa!e of transition . . . is calc(lated to lead (s to e)pect that the second part of the dialo!(e *ill thro* so'e real li!ht on the diffic(lties *hich have een raised in the first . . . . &he reference in the Theaetetus 316"/4 to the 8no le depth8 of *hat *as (ttered y 8Par'enides8 on this occasion see's to 'e to tell stron!ly a!ainst the vie* that the hypotheses of the second part are nothin! (t an o sc(re 0oke or a lon! and tedio(s parody9 3+(oted y @. 2. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides ;Condon: Do(tled!e and Ke!an Pa(l, 19"9= 1144. ;"1= 9-t is a nat(ral inference that a 'ain p(rpose of the *hole e)ercise '(st e to point o(t that even the apparently si'plest ter's, s(ch as 8Fne8 and 8 ein!8, *hich *ill appear at the threshold of any 'etaphysical disc(ssion, are dan!ero(sly a' i!(o(s9 3Cornford, PP 11#4. Decent e)ceptions to the lo!ical interpretation incl(de Pa(l @ried.lander, Plato , vol. " 3Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19B9 ;ori!. 19B#=4? /!il Hyller, 9Plato8s Parmenides : <nother -nterpretation9 3%evie o& 'etaph!sics 1> ;19B$= B$1.4#4, *hich s(''ariKes his ook Platons Dialog Parmenides in seinem 7usammenhang mit S!mposion und Politeia 3Fslo, 19B#4? Br(' a(!h, P+ ? and 2iller, PP . ;"$= 2a)i'ilian Beck *rites: 9-t is de'onstrated indirectly in this dialo!(e, na'ely, y carryin! the contrary thesis to a s(rdity, that ideas are neither (nifies nor '(ltit(des, neither *holes nor parts, have neither spatial nor te'poral e)tension? ideas are eyond any +(antitative cate!ory? they are p(rely +(alitative identities9 39Plato8s Pro le' in the Parmenides,4 Journal o& the 5istor! o& (deas 6 ;194%= $"$."B at $"44. ;""= &h(s ,ayre. 1e ar!(es that the fo(r hypotheses (nder 9if the Fne is9 sho(ld e paired *ith their analo!(es (nder 9if the Fne is not.9 -n that case, he says, if *e p(t to!ether hypothesis - 39if Unity e)ists, then this Unity *ith reference to itself has no characters94 *ith hypothesis G- 39if Unity does not e)ist, then this Unity *ith reference to itself has no characters94, *e !et the concl(sion that a (nity that refers only to itself 3i.e., a separate for', accordin! to ,ayre4 has no characters unconditionall! 3i.e., *hether or not it e)ists4 3PL+ 44.4B4. -n other *ords, the very concept of separate for's is e'pty. Hhat ,ayre does not notice, ho*ever, is that y the sa'e lo!ic *e can arrive at the opposite concl(sion y pairin! hypotheses -- and G. 1ypothesis -- is that 9if Unity e)ists, then this Unity *ith reference to

others has all 3contradictory4 characters,9 and hypothesis G is that 9if Unity does not e)ist, then this Unity *ith reference to others has all 3contradictory4 characters.9 Fn ,ayre8s principles, therefore, the t*o to!ether 'ean that a (nity that refers to other thin!s 3a nonseparate for'4 is self.contradictory unconditionall! 3i.e., *hether it e)ists or not4. ,o ,ayre8s concl(sion, that Plato is here rep(diatin! the concept of separate for's in favor of for's that are not separate, is n(llified. He shall find that as lon! as *e concentrate only on the stated concl(sions of the hypotheses, and do not penetrate to the i'plicit distinctions *ithin the details of the ar!('ents, *e *ill not e a le to red(ce the appearance, of a '(t(al cancelin!.o(t of all the hypotheses, into a positive concl(sion. 7 49 7 terpretations, candidates for *hat is ein! de'onstrated incl(de the nat(re and relationship of for's and thin!s 3Br(' a(!h, 2iller4, the i'plications of the ori!inal 9participation9 ref(tation in Part 1 3<llen4, and 9a nonhierarchical lin!(istic !ro(nd intrinsic to all e)pression of tho(!ht9 3,ternfeld and Lyskind4.;"4= Hhether 9the Fne9 refers to Par'enides8 'onis', as so'e of the a ove vie*s hold, or to so'e Platonic principle, is not easy to de'onstrate. Both vie*s are defensi le. &he latter see's 'ore pla(si le, ho*ever, for the first part of the dialo!(e deals *ith diffic(lties i'plicit in the theory of for's, and *e *o(ld e)pect there to e a the'atic contin(ity et*een the t*o parts. &he for's are 9one over 'any,9 and therefore Fnes. &heir (nity *as threatened in the first part y at least three of the ar!('ents: the first, in *hich the for's divide into their individ(al 'anifestations, like so 'any pieces of a sail? and the second and fo(rth, in *hich the for's '(ltiply in infinite re!ress. -t *o(ld not e s(rprisin!, therefore, to find the second half of the dialo!(e devoted to these +(estions, *hereas there see's no reason s(ddenly to introd(ce Par'enides8 3or Leno8s4 principles in order to ref(te the'Ie)cept insofar as they 'ay coincide *ith principles (nderlyin! the theory of for's as *ell. 5ot only is each for' a Fne in itself, (t all to!ether are (nified y their co''on ori!in in the !ood 3%epu)lic B.>#9 4. -t 'ay e, then, that the follo*in! disc(ssions apply at one level to each of the for's, and at another level to the Platonic Fne, the !ood.;">= ;"4= Do ert ,ternfeld and 1arold Lyskind, 'eaning, %elation, and E,istence in Plato's Parmenides: The Logic o& %elational %ealism 35e* Aork: Can!, 196%4 9#. ;">= &he latter interpretation is often referred to as the 5eoplatonic interpretation eca(se the 5eoplatonists sa* their o*n doctrines in it. B(t not everyone *ho considers Plato to elieve in an overarchin! transcendent principle is a 5eoplatonist. Procl(s8s co''entary on the Parmenides , *hich is the paradi!'atic 5eoplatonic interpretation, is do!'atic and +(estion. e!!in! to a de!ree that *o(ld deter 'ost co''entators fro' acceptin! the sa'e appellation. 7 ># 7 -n the first part of the dialo!(e *e fo(nd a d(e to interpretation in the fact that ,ocrates hesitated at a sin!le cr(cial 0(nct(re of each ar!('ent (t the one a!ainst concept(alis'. Hill a si'ilar approach help (s to (nderstand *hat is !oin! on in the second halfJ &his possi ility has had at least one defender,;"B= (t the evidence see's to e a!ainst it. <ristoteles hesitates so'e fifty.three ti'es d(rin! the ei!ht e)tended ar!('ents, and there is no conspic(o(s pattern. s(!!ested y the 0(nct(re at *hich the hesitations take place. &he follo*in! chart sho*s ho* often <ristoteles hesitates in each hypothesis, and *here he hesitates first 3s( se+(ent hesitations are often e)tensions of the initial one4.

1ypothesis -

1esitations 1"

-nitial 1esitation 1"6eB: Hhat neither has parts nor is a *hole cannot co'e to e. 14"a": &he Fne that is *ill e (nli'. ited in +(antity. 1>Be$: &he instant is in et*een chan!e and rest. 1>%d%: ,o'ethin! cannot e part of a '(ltit(de that incl(des it. 1>9c4: &he Fne and the others *ill never e in the sa'e thin!. 1B#e1: &here is otherness in the Fne. 1B"d6: &he none)istent Fne neither perishes nor co'es to e.

--

$$

<ppendi)

---

"

-G

"

G G-

6 $

G-G---

# #

-f the hesitations *ere si!nals of fla*s in the reasonin!, the 'ost fla*ed ar!('ents, relative to their len!th, *o(ld e hypotheses -- 3if the Fne is, then everythin! *ill e inconsistently tr(e of it in relation to the ;"B= Br(' a(!h 3PF 144 elieves that <ristoteles8 hesitations are si!nificant, (t he 'akes no s(stained atte'pt to sho* this. Cf. <llen8s reply to Br(' a(!h 3PP "#6 n. %64. 7 >1 7 others4 and G 3if the Fne is, nothin! can e said of the others in relation to the Fne4. <nd the only ones free of fla*s *o(ld e G-- 3if the Fne is not, everythin! *ill e inconsistently tr(e of the others in relation to the'selves4 and G--- 3if the one is not, nothin! can e said of the others in relation to the Fne4. B(t there see's no reason *hy Plato *o(ld *ant (s to find the for'er t*o least pers(asive and the latter t*o 'ost pers(asive. 5or does the initial hesitation see' al*ays to coincide *ith a cr(cial step of the ar!('ent. &his s(!!ests that, (nlike in Part 1, there is nothin! to e !ained y lookin! for keys to the ref(tation of Par'enides8 ar!('ents in the replies of his respondent. Ao(n! ,ocrates *as portrayed as ast(te and i'pressive, and it *as his o*n theory that *as (nder

disc(ssion. Fne *o(ld e)pect his 'o'ents of hesitation to e revealin! a o(t the stat(s of the ar!('ent. Ao(n! <ristoteles, on the other hand, *as chosen to replace hi' in the second part eca(se Par'enidesIprofessin! hi'self old, and tired, and dreadin! the la ors efore hi'I*anted the yo(n!est, least de'andin!, respondent 31"%a. 4. &he fact that he is introd(ced as 9the one *ho eco'e one of the &hirty ;tyrants=9 31$%d4 does not see' calc(lated to enco(ra!e o(r confidence in his perspic(ity. 2oreover, since the theory (nder disc(ssion has nothin! other*ise to do *ith hi', his hesitations do not see' to e 'ore than cas(al responses. &o ill(strate his reco''endation that *e consider *hat follo*s oth fro' the tr(th and falsity of a hypothesis, Par'enides (ses Leno8s hypothesis 9if the 'any e)ist9: 3-4 if the 'any are, *e '(st ask *hat '(st happen to the 'any the'selves in relation to the'selves and in relation to the Fne, and *hat '(st happen to the Fne in relation to itself and to the 'any? and 3--4 if the 'any are not, *hat happens to the Fne and the 'any, oth in re!ard to the'selves and each other 31"Ba4. ,che'atically, this 'ay e represented as sho*n in @i!(re 1. &he ei!ht hypotheses that are s( se+(ently considered, ho*ever, are posed not in ter's of the 9'any9 (t in ter's of the 9Fne.9;"%= < sche'a that e!an fro' the Fne and follo*ed the sa'e order as the precedin! e)a'ple *o(ld look like the follo*in! 3Par'enides s( se+(ently s( stit(tes the ter' 9the others9 for 9the 'any94. Co'parin! it *ith the act(al order of the hypotheses 3the last line4 *e can see that the first fo(r hypotheses follo* this sche'a e)actly, (t the last fo(r do ;"%= ,trictly speakin! there are only t*o hypotheses: if the Fne is, and if the Fne is not. &he n(' er ei!ht is reached y specifyin! each of these t*o hypotheses in fo(r different *ays. -t has eco'e conventional, ho*ever, to refer to each of the specifications as a hypothesis, and - shall o serve that convention here. 7 >$ 7

@i!(re 1

@i!(re $ not 3see @i!. $4. Beca(se the previo(s hypotheses *ere ased on the opposition et*een the 'any and the Fne, it see's likely that 9the others9 is 'eant as a synony' for 9the 'any.9 -n 'ost of its appearances this see's to e the case, and in one place the e+(ivalence is e)plicit 31B>e4, (t 9the others9 is denotatively less deter'inate, *hich *ill !ive the ar!('ent !reater fle)i ility in places. 3,ee elo*, note 44.4 < f(ll treat'ent of the pro le' o(!ht to repeat the ei!ht hypotheses, once (nder the hypothesis that the others e)ist, and a!ain (nder the hypothesis that they do not? or at least the ei!ht hypotheses a o(t the 'any sho(ld e added to the ei!ht a o(t the Fne. 2oreover, Par'enides also says that he '(st do the sa'e *ith likeness, (nlikeness, 'otion, rest, !enesis and destr(ction, and ein! and not. ein!. -n other *ords one '(st consider each thin! (nder oth hypotheses, oth in relation to itself and to every other thin! that yo( *ish, 9if yo( are to 7 >" 7

train yo(rself to see thro(!h to the tr(th in a co'pletely 'asterf(l *ay9 31"B .c4. &he ei!ht hypotheses dealt *ith here are therefore ar itrarily li'ited, and any atte'pt to see the' as representin! an ei!ht. part co'plete classification of the relationship et*een the Fne and the 'any *o(ld e +(estiona le. /ven prior to Procl(s there had een so'e +(estion as to *hether the hypotheses are to e re!arded as ei!ht or nine in n(' er. &he appendi) to the first t*o hypotheses e!ins *ith the *ords: Cet (s disc(ss it a!ain for the third ti'e. -f the Fne is as *e descri ed it, ein! oth one and 'any and neither one nor 'any, and participatin! in ti'e: *ill it not e necessary, on one hand, that since the Fne is, it *ill at one ti'e participate in ein!, and on the other hand, since it is not, it *ill also at so'e ti'e not participate in ein!J 31>>e4 &he reference to 9the third ti'e9 has convinced so'e readers, fro' anti+(ity to the present, that the appendi) is a separate hypothesis, and that the entire ar!('ent sho(ld e constr(ed as co'prisin! nine s( .ar!('ents rather than ei!ht.;"6= -n that case, 0(st as the third ar!('ent *o(ld reconcile the tension et*een the first t*o, the si)th 'i!ht reconcile that et*een the fo(rth and fifth, and the ninth that et*een the seventh and ei!hth. &he sche'e 'i!ht even e ela orate eno(!h for the last !ro(p of three to reconcile a tension et*een the first t*o !ro(ps. ,(ch an interpretation *o(ld accord *ell *ith Plato8s proclivity for triadic !ro(ps, and even so intricate an architect(re as this *o(ld e co'pati le *ith the care *ith *hich he *rote. B(t - cannot see any convincin! *ay of so interpretin! the present ar!('ents. 2oreover, even apart fro' the fact that the initial sche'a *orks y if(rcation and therefore i'plies ei!ht rather than nine possi ilities, the hypothesis *ith *hich the appendi) e!ins is, 9if the Fne is as *e descri ed it,9 *hich is a different order of hypothesis fro' the others 39if the Fne is9 ;i.e., 9e)ists9=, 9if the Fne is not94. &he asis for Plato8s choice of the concepts dealt *ith ithin each hypothesis, and for the order in *hich they are presented, has een a 'atter of considera le spec(lation. Cornford 'akes a convincin! case for ascri in! it to the treatise of Leno,;"9= (t it is not a +(estion that *ill ;"6= Procl(s pp. ">$, 4#$. &he 'ost recent defenders of this sche'a are ,ternfeld and Lyskind, chap. ". ;"9= 9@ro' the fra!'ents and fro' references in Plato and Procl(s *e o tain the follo*in! list of contraries *hich appeared in the vario(s sections. ,o'e con0ect(ral ite's are added in italics ;Cornford8s so(rces have een o'itted fro' this s(''ary=: Fne and 2any. Divisi le and -ndivisi le. @inite and -nfinite in n(' er. <t Dest and in 2otion. (n itsel& and in another . ,a'e and Different. Cike and Unlike. (n contact and 8ot in contact . Car!e and ,'all. /+(al and Une+(al. &his list corresponds pretty closely *ith the series of contraries in the 1ypotheses of the Parmenides 9 3PP >%4. 7 >4 7 concern (s here. 2ore i'portant is the +(estion of *hat the ar!('ents are intended to de'onstrate. &he final cont(sion of the ar!('ent is that 9*hether the Fne is or is not, oth it and the others, oth in relation to the'selves and each other, oth are and are not in every *ay, and oth appear and do not appear to e so9 31BBc4. &his leaves (s *ith t*o alternatives: either the o 0ect of the disc(ssion is to prod(ce co'plete skepticis' *ith re!ard to the po*ers of philosophy 3i.e., 'isolo!y4, or the parado)es are intended to 'otivate (s to discern hidden distinctions that render the parado)es apparent rather than real. Clearly the second of these t*o is *hat *e *o(ld e)pect of Plato, especially in li!ht of Par'enides8 stated ai' of developin! ,ocrates8 po*er of concept(al reasonin! 31">c.d4? and an e)a'ination of the ei!ht hypotheses *ill ear this o(t. -n fact the seventh hypothesis introd(ces the distinction et*een false appearance and tr(th. -n the follo*in! synopses of the hypotheses - have tried

to red(ce so'e very co'plicated ar!('ents to *hat - take to e their asic str(ct(re. B(t *hatever s(ccess - 'ay have had in tracin! that str(ct(re acc(rately has had to e p(rchased thro(!h the sacrifice of considera le richness of detail.

%7+ I( the

ne Is 4%/<c6%;728

1*.othesis I+ I( the ne Is= >hat Follo?s (or It in Relation to Itsel(9 Nothing !an 2e Said o( It 4%/<c6%'-"8
&he ar!('ent 'ay e divided into t*o distinct sets of ded(ctions, each of *hich follo*s fro' an initial ad'ission: 3a4 that the Fne cannot have parts, and 3 4 that *e cannot predicate of the Fne any attri (te *hose 'eanin! is not identical *ith 9one.9 3a4 ,ince the Fne cannot e 'any, it cannot e a *hole, *hich *o(ld i'ply '(ltiple parts 31"%c.d4? since it has no parts, it cannot have shape 3it is indefinite,

4, or therefore place, or therefore 'otion or rest. 3 4 -t cannot even e the sa'e as itself eca(se, since 9sa'e9 is not identical *ith 9one,9 '(ltiplicity *o(ld res(lt 31"9 .e4? if it cannot e called 9sa'e9 it cannot e called 9like9 or 9e+(al9 and therefore cannot e spoken of in ter's of a!e or ti'e, and if it cannot e said to e)ist at so'e ti'e, it cannot e said 7 >> 7 even to e)ist 3141e4. <ccordin!ly there is no na'e, lo!os, kno*led!e, or perception of it. <ll the ad'issions that *ere ded(ced fro' a co(ld have een ded(ced fro' ) alone. 5one of the ter's, 9*hole,9 9shape,9 9place,9 9'otion,9 or 9rest,9 'eans the sa'e thin! as the ter' 9one,9 and thereforeI accordin! to ) 8s principle that nonidentical attri (tes i'ply a lack of (nityIto predicate any Ff the' of the Fne is to introd(ce '(ltiplicity and destroy its oneness. B(t Par'enides does not !eneraliKe that principle, and therefore 'akes (se of t*o pre'ises instead of 0(st pre'ise ) . /ven tho(!h Plato 'i!ht have dispensed *ith principle a on !ro(nds of lo!ical econo'y, it is likely that he *anted to rin! it in eca(se of the i'portant role that the *hole.part relationship *ill have here 3and s( se+(ently in the Theaetetus 4.

1*.othesis II+ I( the ne Is= >hat Follo?s (or It In Relation to the E)er*thing Is 4Inconsistentl*8 True o( It 4%'-"6%::E8

thers9

&his ar!('ent 'ay e divided into fo(r 'ain sections, *hich are se+(ential rather than 3as in 1ypothesis -4 parallel. a. -f the Fne is, it '(st participate in and therefore e different fro' ein! 3

4. -n that case the Fne and ein! 3e)istence4 '(st e parts of 9the e)istent Fne9 3 4 314$ .d4. &h(s the e)istent Fne is a *hole of parts, and since each part is a!ain an e)istent Fne, the *hole is divided ad in&initum 3

4 and contains (nli'ited 3 4 n(' er. . ,ince the Fne is divided, it cannot e a *hole? it can only e parts li'ited y an e,trinsic *hole 3144d4. 3&his contradicts 1"%c, *hich states that to e a *hole it must e divided into parts.4;4#= Conse+(ently the Fne is oth one and 'any, *hole and parts, li'ited and (nli'ited? and since it is oth *hole and parts, it is oth in itself and in another. c. @ro' this it is fallacio(sly ded(ced 3 y e+(ivocation4 that the Fne '(st e not only at rest (t also in 'otion, since 9in another9 'eans 9chan!in!.9 3B(t in fact 9in another9 *as previo(sly (sed in a ;4#= &here is a si'ilar tension in the Theaetetus . <t $#4a. &heaetet(s distin!(ished et*een 9*holes,9 *hich are not red(ci le to their parts, and 9s('s,9 *hich are so red(ci le. ,ocrates ref(tes this at $#>a si'ply y e!!in! the +(estion a!ainst &heaetet(s and ass('in! that a *hole too is si'ply the s(' of its parts. 7 >B 7 very different sense, that of spatial incl(sion.4 <nd it '(st e not only the sa'e as itself (t other than itself as *ell, eca(se it is 9in itself9 and the relation 9in9 can hold only et*een different thin!s. 3<nother e+(ivocation.4 &he Fne '(st also e oth other than the others 3 y definition4 and the sa'e as the others 3 eca(se it is other than itself: 14>e.14% 4. Beca(se it th(s participates in sa'eness and otherness it '(st e oth like and (nlike itself and the others. -t also follo*s that the Fne oth to(ches and does not to(ch itself and the others 3a!ain eca(se of the 9in9 relationship4, and is oth e+(al and (ne+(al to itself and the others 314%c.1"1e4. d. @inally, since the Fne is, and 9is9 i'plies present ti'e, the Fne participates in ti'e and !ro*s older. B(t if it is eco'in! older than itself, then the latter is eco'in! relatively yo(n!er, so it is oth older and yo(n!er than itself. 1o*ever, the a!e difference et*een t*o e)istin! thin!s can never increase or decrease, so it '(st e the sa'e a!e as itself. Conse+(ently 9the Fne oth is and eco'es oth older and yo(n!er than oth itself and the others, and neither is nor eco'es either older or yo(n!er than either itself or the others9 31>"c4. <ccordin!ly, there is kno*led!e, opinion, and perception, as *ell as na'e, lo!os, and so on, of it. &hese first t*o hypotheses o vio(sly are desi!ned to appear to contradict each other to the !reatest possi le e)tent. &he challen!e to the reader is to dissolve the contradictions as far as possi le y dra*in! o(t s(ppressed distinctions, as part of the trainin! referred to at 1""c.d. 2ost o vio(sly, so'e of the internal contradictions of -- disappear if *e distin!(ish a p(rely concept(al sense of 9in itself9 and 9in another9 fro' the spatial sense !iven to the' in c . B(t the other a' i!(ities are less strai!htfor*ard. -n hypothesis - there are no indefensi le inferences. &here are only inconsistencies *ith hypothesis --. /ven the concl(sionIthat nothin! can e said of the Fne, not even that it e)istsI'akes sense if one p(shes the historical Par'enides8 o*n position to the e)tre'e. <t a p(rely literal level Par'enides8 concl(sion here 'ay appear inco'pati le *ith the historical Par'enides8 poe', *hich insists a ove all else that 9it is.9 B(t the poe' also avers that 9it is one.9 &he present ar!('ent sho*s that if *e atte'pt to think the oneness of the *orld *e '(st a stract fro' all deter'inations. <s soon as *e even

conceive of a d(ality et*een oneness and the '(ltiplicity of deter'inations, the oneness that *e atte'pt to conceive collapses. 7 >% 7 <s for the e)cl(sion of the Fne fro' the deter'ination of e,istence in partic(lar, it is i'portant to notice ho* this concl(sion is arrived at. &he historical Par'enides had ar!(ed that 9it9 is not te'poral: one cannot speak of it in the past tense or f(t(re tense, (t only in ter's of the ti'eless no* 3fr. 6.>4. &hese clai's *ere echoed in the co(rse of the first hypothesis8s ar!('ent, and it *as then concl(ded that *hat does not e)ist in ti'e cannot e)ist at all. <ccordin!ly the ar!('ent sho*s only that the Fne cannot e)ist in the sense of havin! te'poral e)istence. -t does not occ(r to <ristoteles to *onder *hether there 'i!ht e so'e 'ode of ein! that is nonte'poral. B(t Par'enides and Plato certainly tho(!ht that there *as. &he concl(sion of this first hypothesis, that the Fne does not participate in ein! 3

4, echoes the %epu)lic's doctrine that the !ood is eyond ein! 3 4.;41= -n oth cases there is at *ork a distinction et*een 9 ein!9 in the sense that is applied to te'poral reality, and in so'e other sense that is related to the first only analo!ically. He sa* that this 9ontolo!ical difference9 *as pointed to in Part 1 y the &hird 2an ar!('ent: 9lar!e9 cannot 'ean the sa'e thin! *ith reference to for's as it does *ith reference to spatial ein!s. &he sa'e is tr(e of 9e)istence.9 &he ein! of for's is of a different order fro' that of physical thin!s, and if *e define e)istence *ith reference to the latter 3as does hypothesis -4, the for'er cannot e said to 9e)ist.9 &his concl(sion follo*s *hether *e take the Fne to refer to the overarchin! principle of the !ood, or to the '(ltiplicity of individ(al for's. -nsofar as a for' is a one.over.'any *ith re!ard to physical thin!s, it cannot e said to e)ist in their sense. <nd insofar as the !ood is the one.over.'any *ith re!ard to the '(l. 7 >6 7 tiple for's, neither can it e said to e)ist in their sense. &he three are related as individ(ality, for', and telos. -n Plato, as in <ristotle, the for'al ca(se and the final ca(se never co'pletely coincide. &he inconsistency of hypothesis - *ith hypothesis -- arises eca(se the latter e!ins *ith a pre'ise in fla!rant contradiction to the 9transcendent9 position of hypothesis -. Hhereas the first hypothesis ended y ar!(in! that the Fne does not even participate in e)istence 3

... , 141e4, the second hypothesis starts *ith the clai' that if the Fne is, it must participate in e)istence 3

... , 14$ 4. Fnce this is !ranted it eco'es a *ed!e to split the Fne pro!ressively into an (nli'ited 'any, (ntil *e end (p *ith a position that is the very reverse of Par'enides8Inot (nity (t indefinite divisi ility. Perhaps Plato has in 'ind the philosophy of 1eracleit(s, *hich he contrasts *ith that of Par'enides in the ne)t dialo!(e, the Theaetetus . Fr perhaps, as the fre+(ent reiteration of the *ord 39(nli'ited94 s(!!ests, he has <na)i'ander in 'ind. B(t the pri'ary candidate 'ay e <na)a!oras, *ith his doctrine of infinite divisi ility. &he dialo!(e e!ins *ith the re+(est y disciples of <na)a!oras, *ho have traveled fro' ClaKo'enae, to hear the acco(nt of ,ocrates8 'eetin! *ith Par'enides.;4$= Hhether Plato had one of these philosophers in partic(lar in 'ind, or the tradition as a *hole that e'phasiKed the (nli'ited aspect of reality, *hat is i'portant is the contrast et*een this vie* and the vie* p(t for*ard in the first hypothesis: the contrast et*een (nity and dissol(tion. <ltho(!h historical antecedents of this contrast 'ay e post(lated in ter's of specific historical fi!(res, its pri'ary i'portance for Plato is in ter's of his o*n contrast, as reported y <ristotle, et*een the Fne and the indefinite dyad, indefinite pl(rality.;4"= &he first hypothesis conceives of the Fne in relation to itself, *hile the second conceives of it in relation to the (nli'ited 'any. &he Fne of the first hypothesis is *hat is eyond ein!, like the -dea of the !ood, *hile that of the second hypothesis participates in ein!. -t is the difference et*een a first principle conceived as independent of space and ti'e 3i.e., of ein! 9ua spatiote'poral e)istence4, and one conceived as spatial and te'poral. 1ypotheses - and -- do not (lti'ately contradict each other, eca(se their concl(sions are predicated of different s( 0ectsIof transcendent ein! in one case and of i''anent ein! in the ;4$= Procl(s attests that 9the visitin! nat(re philosophers ;*ere= the follo*ers of the teachin! of <na)a!oras9 3p. $>4. Br(' a(!h 3P+ , and 9&he P(rpose of Plato8s Par'enides9 ;#ncient Philosoph! 1 3196#4 "9.46=4 and 2iller 3PP $B.$64 stress the i'portance of this for the conte)t of the dialo!(e as a *hole. ;4"= <ristotle, 'etaph!sics <.B.96% $>.966 1. 7 >9 7 other. &his e)plains the discrepancies et*een the t*o hypotheses on the nat(re of 9*hole9 and 9(nli'ited9 3

4. <ccordin! to hypothesis -, *hich considers the Fne only in relation to itself, the Fne cannot e a *hole, eca(se a *hole i'plies parts 31"%c.d4. <ccordin! to hypothesis --, *hich considers the Fne in relation to the others, the Fne cannot e a *hole precisely eca(se it is partitioned, and *holeness i'plies ein! (ndivided 3144d4. &h(s the *hole is in one sense so'ethin! that transcends its parts, and in another sense so'ethin! that red(ces to its parts. Fnce a!ain the distinction reflects the difference et*een the Par'enidean and pl(ralistic vie*points. &he sa'e a' i!(ity in the conception of *hole and part *ill reappear in the Theaetetus 3$#"e.$#>e4, directly in the shado* of the distinction et*een the 1eracleitean and Par'enidean *orldvie*s 316#d.164a4. &hro(!ho(t the ei!ht hypotheses, the a' i!(ity et*een *hole and parts is reflected !enerally in an

a' i!(o(s (se of the ter' 9the Fne.9 -n the first hypothesis the Fne i'plies a s(pervenient (nity. -n the second it refers not to a transcendent principle (t to the a!!re!ate of 'aterial reality. -n the third it *ill refer oth to the latter 39ua *hole4 and to the (nity of each part of the *hole.;44= &he a' ivalences a'on! these three senses of the Fne 3transcendent (nity, totality, individ(ality of each part4 rec(r thro(!ho(t the ei!ht hypotheses and reflect precisely the 'o'ents of the *hole.part dialectic: *holeness is the principle of (nification, (t since the entity itself is an a!!re!ate of parts, the *holeness in so'e sense transcends the physical entity as s(ch? on the other hand, since this *holeness is o& the physical entity, the entity has an inherent inte!rity and so a *holeness that is immanent ? (t this i'plies parts and therefore concept(al dissol(tion of the *holeness of the entity into co'ponent (nities, *hich are the'selves *holes.;4>= ;44= &he a' i!(ity of the ter' 9others9 depends on that of the ter' 9Fne.9 &he follo*in! chart sho*s ho* the t*o ter's are (sed in the vario(s hypotheses: Fne ----G G GG-G--transcendent i''anent, infinitely divisi le ;(nspecified= transcendent concept(al none)istent none)istent 3(nity4 none)istent 3(nity4 Fthers ;(nspecified= infinitely divisi le ;(nitiesJ= 'ediatin! et*een (nli'ited and for' *itho(t characteristics ;(nspecified= *itho(t characteristics apparent, not real, characteristics none)istent

;4>= - s(spect that these are the sa'e three senses that Procl(s has in 'ind *hen he *rites, 98&he Fne8 can e (sed in three senses. He have the Fne that transcends all ein!s, and that *hich is present to!ether *ith all ein!s, *hich also, *ith the Fne, prod(ces all the orders of ein!s, and thirdly *e have that *hich is inferior to Bein! and *hich is, as it *ere, 8s*allo*ed do*n8 y it9 3p. "614. 7 B# 7 -n the sa'e sense that the Fne is oth a *hole and parts, it is oth li'it 3*hole4 and (nli'ited 3parts: 144e.14>a4. &his is i'plicit also in the a' i!(o(s *ay that 9(nli'ited9 3

4 has een (sed in these t*o hypotheses. -n hypothesis - it 'eans 9for'less,9 that is, eyond spatiality

31"%d4, *hereas in hypothesis -- it 'eans coe)tensive *ith spatiality and therefore 9(nli'itedly divisi le9 314"a4. 9Unli'ited9 3 eyond spatiality4 in the first hypothesis corresponds to 9li'it9 3 eyond divisi ility4 in the second hypothesis, that is, the s(pervenient *hole. &he !eneral contrast et*een the t*o anticipates not only the distinction et*een li'it and (nli'ited in the Phile)us 3$"c.$> 4, (t also parallel distinctions in other dialo!(es, s(ch as et*een the for'alists and the 'aterialists in the Sophist 3$4Ba.c4, et*een relative 'eas(re and the 'ean in the Statesman 3$6"e.$6>c4, and et*een reason and chaos in the Timaeus 3$9a."# 4. -t also recalls s(ch earlier acco(nts as the S!mposium's opposition et*een the divine and the h('an 3$#$c.d4 and the Phaedo's conflict et*een the 'aterialistic hypothesis 39Ba.e4 and the hypothesis of for's 31## .e4. 5one of the other dialo!(es, ho*ever, presents the opposition as starkly as does the Parmenides . -n each of the other dialo!(es the antithesis is resolved y 'eans of a synthesis of the t*o,;4B= (t here any s(ch synthesis '(st e con0ect(ral. &he key to the possi ility of s(ch a synthesis in the Parmenides lies in the appendi) to the first t*o hypotheses. &his appendi), *hich co' ines oth 'o'ents of the previo(s antino'y, concl(des that the Fne so'eti'es participates in ein! and so'eti'es does not. B(t since it cannot 9so'eti'es have and so'eti'es not have the sa'e thin! (nless it receives it at so'e ti'e and a!ain loses it,9 it '(st !o thro(!h s(ccessive sta!es of !eneration and destr(ction, chan!in! fro' the Fne to the 'any and ack a!ain 31>>e.1>B 4. &he concl(sion loses its parado)ical character if *e can interpret these s(ccessive sta!es as chan!es of aspect or relation rather than chan!es of state. ,(ch an interpretation is s(!!ested y the previo(s antino'y, since the first hypothesis considers the Fne in relation to itself and the second considers it in relation to the others. &he parado) *as !enerated y o sc(rin! the difference et*een these t*o aspects: reality appears ;4B= Phile)us $> .$% , Sophist $4Bc.$49d, Timaeus 4%e.46a, S!mposium $#$d.$#"a, Phaedo 1#> .c. ,ince the Statesman is there 'akin! (se of the 'ethod of division, the synthesis is the (nity of the t*o *ithin the !en(s of 'eas(re. 7 B1 7 as oth one and 'any, dependin! on *hether one looks to its (nified character or its diversity. Par'enides hi'self provides the fo(ndation for resolvin! the parado) in this *ay. Hhen the Fne alternates et*een (nity and '(ltiplicity it alternates et*een 'otion and rest, and *hen it does so 9it is necessary for it not to e in any ti'e.9 &he point of chan!e et*een 'otion and rest '(st itself neither e the one nor the other, 9and there is no ti'e in *hich so'ethin! can neither e in 'otion nor at rest at once9 31>Bc4. Par'enides introd(ces the concept of the instant 3

4 as this li'itin! case of ti'e in *hich chan!e can e e)plained 31>Bc.e4, and !oes on to s(!!est that the chan!es of the Fne et*een e)istence and none)istence, and et*een ein! one and 'any, and so forth, are to e e)plained in the sa'e *ay 31>Be.1>% 4. &he fact that these chan!es are said to take place not in ti'e (t at the li'itin! case of ti'e, at the o(ndary of ti'e and nonti'e, provides a asis for re!ardin! the s*itch et*een (nity and '(ltiplicity as nonte'poral also in the *ay s(!!ested a ove, that is, as a chan!e of aspect rather than a chan!e of state. -f the chan!e et*een (nity and pl(rality occ(rs at the o(ndary et*een ti'e and nonti'e, that chan!e is evidently nothin! (t the conti!(o(s sides of the o(ndary itself.

&he concept of the instant provides (s *ith the 'ediation et*een the Par'enidean and pl(ralistic antino'ies inas'(ch as it posits a point of contact et*een the ti'eless and the te'poral, et*een the s(pervenient (nifyin! principle of reality and physical reality itself. -t is in this intersection, too, that *e '(st conceive participation and recollection to occ(r, and accordin!ly the concept of the instant provides an el(sive (t non'etaphorical s( stit(te for the 'etaphors *hose li'itations *ere e)posed y the ar!('ents of Part 1.

1*.othesis III+ I( the ne Is= >hat Follo?s (or the thers In Relation to Themsel)es9 E)er*thing Is 4Inconsistentl*8 True o( Them 4%:<@6%:&@8
1ere a!ain, as *ith hypothesis --, the inconsistencies *ill t(rn o(t to e only apparent. ,ince the others are other than one they cannot e (nities and therefore '(st consist of parts. &he parts are parts not of a 'any 3

4 or a s(' 3 4 (t of a *hole 3 4, eca(se a 'any or a s(' has no character as a totality (t is si'ply each part.;4%= B(t as ;4%= &his is perhaps the 'ost o sc(re passa!e in the dialo!(e. < literal, if not al*ays intelli!i le, translation 'ay e rendered: 9-f so'ethin! is a part of a 'any, in *hich it itself is, it *ill e a part of itself, *hich is i'possi le, and of each one of the others, if indeed it is a part of all. @or if it is not a part of one of the', it *ill e a part of the others esides this one, and th(s it *ill not e a part of each one, and not ein! a part of each it *ill e a part of none of the 'any. B(t it is i'possi le for so'ethin! that is a part of none of these 'any, of *hich it is not a part of any, to e any other kind of part at all9 31>%c.d4. &he ar!('ent see's to e that if *e call so'ethin! a part of a 'any, this is different fro' callin! it a mem)er of the 'any, or a part of one of the 'e' ers. &o e a part of the 'any 'eans to e a part of the 'any distri)utivel! , i.e., to e a part of each 'e' er. ,o in the case of so'ethin! that is a part of a 'any in *hich it is also a 'e' er, then it '(st e a part of itself, *hich is i'possi le. Plato8s point *o(ld then e that if *e speak of reality in ter's of *holes and parts, this sho(ld not e assi'ilated to the 'odel of a s(' 3or a 'any4 and its 'e' ers. 7 B$ 7 parts of a *hole they participate in one -dea 3

, 1>%e4, and each part also participates in the Fne since it is a (nity. B(t efore they participated in the Fne they participated in a for' 3 4 y virt(e of *hich each of the' is (nli'ited in +(antity 3

4.;46= &h(s in relation to the Fne they participate in li'it, (t in their o*n nat(re they are (nli'ited 31>6c.d4. Beca(se of this d(ality they are also oth like and (nlike, the sa'e and not the sa'e, in 'otion and at rest, and so on 31>6e.1>9 4. He can see that this hypothesis develops the synthesis, only hinted at in the appendi), of the opposition esta lished in the first t*o. 1ere is 'ade e)plicit the opposition of li'it and (nli'ited as connected *ith the Fne and the infinitely divisi le 'any, and the a' i!(ity of the totality as a s(pervenient (nity 3*hole4 or 'ere a!!re!ation 3s('4.;49= &he relationship et*een the 'any and their s(pervenient character 3*hether as (nified or (nli'itedly divisi le4 is e)pressed in ter's of participation in for's? the 'etaphor is reintrod(ced after the a stract for'(lation of the appendi). -t is not therefore Plato8s intention to do a*ay *ith 'etaphor entirely, *hich *o(ld hardly e possi le, (t to 'ake (s a*are of o(r reliance on it and the *ay that this reliance li'its the transparency of o(r concepts. &he Statesman , in fact, *ill defend the i'portance of 'etaphoric and analo!ic 9paradi!'s.9

1*.othesis IV+ I( the ne Is= >hat Follo?s (or the Nothing !an 2e Said o( Them 4l:&@6%;7@8

thers In Relation to the

ne9

,ince the Fne and the others are 0ointly e)ha(stive, there can e no third entity to 'ediate et*een the', so they '(st e a sol(tely sepa. ;46= &his dis0(nction et*een specific for' and (nity can only e e, h!pothesi for Plato. ;49= Cf. Theaetetus $#"e.$#>e. 7 B" 7 rate, and the others cannot participate in the Fne. ,ince the others cannot in any sense e one, neither can they e 'any, since each *o(ld then e one part. 5or can *e speak of the' in ter's of likeness or (nlikeness, eca(se then they *o(ld participate in t*o for's 3

, 1>9e? , 1B#a4, *hich is i'possi le if they cannot participate even in one. ,ince they are (na le to participate in anythin!, they cannot e characteriKed in any *ay at all. -f the third hypothesis provided a positive 'ediation et*een the antitheses of the first t*o, the fo(rth provides its ne!ative co(nterpart y sho*in! that unless participation in for's is possi le, *e *ill have the res(lt that Par'enides had *arned of in the first part of the dialo!(e: 9-f anyone . . . does not ad'it the e)istence of for's of thin!s or 'ark off a for' (nder *hich each individ(al thin! is classed, he *ill not have anythin! on *hich to fi) his tho(!hts . . . and in this *ay he *ill (tterly destroy the po*er of disco(rse9 31"> .c4. &he present ar!('ent sho*s that so'e s(ch post(lation '(st e accepted if 'eanin!f(l speech is to e at all possi le. -t th(s anticipates the Theaetetus's pervasive ar!('ent that a *orld of fl() *itho(t sta le for's is (nintelli!i le and *o(ld 'ake speech (nintelli!i le.;>#= &he pre'ise on *hich this fo(rth hypothesis rests, that since the Fne and the others are 0ointly e)ha(stive

there can e no tertium 9uid thro(!h *hich they can stand in relation to one another, had already een ans*ered in the appendi) in ter's of the concept of the instant as the tertium 9uid et*een 'otion and rest, and et*een all s(ch other oppositions. -t had also een ans*ered in the 'iddle dialo!(es in ter's of the relation of participation, y *hich the (nity of the for' and the '(ltiplicity of corporeality are 'ediated. &hat very ter' appears here ei!ht ti'es in the half.pa!e et*een 1>9d and 1B# . -f Par'enides had asked *hether anythin! co(ld e)ist esides the Fne and the man! , 9the relationship et*een the'9 *o(ld have s(!!ested itself as a possi le ans*er. B(t eca(se he had s( stit(ted for the ter' 9'any9 the 'ore !eneral ter' 9others,9;>1= the +(estion is p(t in a *ay that precl(des that ans*er and e)a!!erates the parado). 1is phrase 9the thin!s that are other than the Fne9 31>9 4 '(st y definition incl(de even the relations )et een the Fne and *hat is other than the Fne, and so ar itrarily e)cl(des any ans*er. Co' inin! the first fo(r hypotheses, Par'enides concl(des that 9if Fne e)ists, the Fne is all thin!s and nothin! at all in relation oth to ;>#= Cf. esp. 16$c.16" . ;>1= <t the end of hypothesis G-- 9the 'any9 is (sed as a synony' for 9the others9 31B>e4. 7 B4 7 itself and to all others9 31B# 4. He have seen, ho*ever, that altho(!h on the s(rface these concl(sions appear to cancel one another o(t, red(cin! their '(t(al antecedent to a s(rdity, the details of the ar!('ents reveal a consistent (nderlyin! teachin!. &hey sho* ho* the theory of for's 'ediates the anta!onis' et*een the Par'enidean and pl(ralistic *orldvie*s and overco'es the one.sidedness of each.

%%+ I( the

ne Is Not 4%;726 %;;c8

&he second !ro(p of fo(r hypotheses is odd in t*o *ays. @irst, three of the hypotheses are a s(rd in their very for'(lation. -f the Fne does not e)ist, it 'akes no sense to ask ho* the Fne is related to itself or to the others, or ho* the others are related to it. ,econd, it see's odd that Plato8s Par'enides *o(ld even entertain the hypothesis that the Fne is not, since the historical Par'enides vehe'ently denied that it is possi le to say or even think that 9it is not.9;>$= Perhaps, then, the second fo(r hypotheses are serio(sly 'eant to e *hat the first fo(r only appeared to e: a reductio ad a)surdum of the antecedent. -n that case they *o(ld a'o(nt to an indirect de'onstration of the Fne y sho*in! the incoherence of its denial. &his !ro(p, (nlike the previo(s one, does not contain an i'plicit escape fro' incoherence. &he ar!('ents 'ay f(rther f(nction as a *ay of preventin! the first fo(r fro' ein! taken as a reductio , for there is no point in re0ectin! the hypothesis that the Fne e)ists, on the !ro(nds that it leads to a s(rdity, if the re0ection of that hypothesis leads to a s(rdity as *ell. /ven if this !ro(p f(nctions as a reductio , ho*ever, the care that Plato has p(t into the ar!('ents s(!!ests that there is so'ethin! to e learned fro' their content as *ell as their for'.

1*.othesis V+ I( the ne Is Not= >hat Follo?s (or the ne In Relation to the thers9 E)er*thing Is 4Inconsistentl*=8 True o( It 4%;7@6%;/@8
&o say that the Fne is not, it '(st e that *e can distin!(ish the Fne fro' other thin!s, and *e '(st therefore have kno*led!e of it. -t '(st therefore partake of si!nifiers s(ch as 9that,9 9so'e,9 9this,9 and so on, and relations s(ch as likeness and (nlikeness, e+(ality and ine+(ality, and so forth, and *e *ill

e a le to say *hat is tr(e of it. 9B(t if *e say *hat is tr(e, it is dear that *hat *e speak of '(st e)ist9 31B1e4. 5ot only does *hat.is.not th(s participate in ein!, (t *hat.is participates in not. ein!, insofar as its o*n non ein! is not , and so ein! and ;>$= Cf. fra!'ents $, B, %. Cornford, ho*ever, takes these hypotheses to e Plato8s controversion of the historical Par'enides8 clai' 3PP $$#, $4#4. 7 B> 7 not. ein! participate in the'selves and in each other 31B$a. 4. ,ince it participates in opposites it '(st chan!e, (t since it is neither in space nor capa le of eco'in! other than itself it '(st e at rest. &h(s it '(st oth chan!e and not chan!e, oth co'e into ein! and perish, and neither co'e into ein! nor perish. &his see's to e an indirect confir'ation, y reductio , of Par'enides8 *arnin! a!ainst tryin! to speak a o(t non ein!. &o speak of non. ein! is to treat it as a ein!, *hich leads to a s(rdity. -n the Sophist a disciple of Par'enides *ill sho* that it is possi le in one sense to speak of non ein!, (t only in a predicational sense, not 3as here4 in an e)istential sense. &his indirect conse+(ence of the present ar!('ent eco'es the direct conse+(ence of the ne)t one.

1*.othesis VI+ I( the ne Is Not= >hat Follo?s (or the Nothing !an @e Said o( It 4%;/@66%;'"8

ne In Relation to Itsel(9

,ince the Fne is not, it cannot participate in anythin!, and therefore none of the a ove +(alities 3nor any others4 pertain to it.

1*.othesis VII+ I( the ne Is Not= >hat Follo?s (or the thers In Relation To Themsel)es9 E)er*thing Is 4Inconsistentl*8 True o( Them 4%;'@6%;:E8
&he others '(st e)ist if *e can speak of the', (t they cannot e 9other9 than the Fne, for e, h!pothesi there is no Fne, so they '(st e 9other9 than each other. &hey can only e so in !eneral 3

4 rather than 9ua individ(als, since individ(als i'ply (nity, *hich does not e)ist. < !iven 'ass of 9others9 is (nli'ited 3 4 in +(antity and infinitely divisi le, and is therefore oth one 3in appearance4 and 'any 3in reality4. ,ince they co' ine apparent (nity *ith '(ltiplicity, they *ill appear to possess n(' er, lar!eness, s'allness, e+(ality, and li'it. 2oreover, dependin! on *hether one looks to their appearance or their reality, they *ill appear as oth (nli'ited and li'ited, one and 'any, like and (nlike, sa'e and different, to(chin! and separate, in 'otion and at rest, co'in! to e and perishin!, and the rest. &he contradictions are of co(rse only apparent, since they are et*een *hat the 'any appear to e 3as *e i'a!ine the' no*4 and *hat they really are. &he hypothesis reverses the Platonic *orldvie*: the inner reality eyond. appearances is no lon!er the (nity and for' of thin!s, (t their diversity and for'lessness. &o e precise, !iven the indefinite and individ(al nat(re of these 9others,9 Par'enides is talkin!

7 BB 7 a o(t *hat *o(ld later e called pri'e 'atter, or *hat the Timaeus calls chaos, that is, the 'aterial asis of e)istence hypothetically den(ded of all for'. &h(s, as *ith the precedin! pairs of hypotheses, the conse+(ences of this first 'e' er of the fo(rth pair only apparentl! contradict those of its co'panion. 1ere *e are 'ade to realiKe that *itho(t oneness reality *o(ld red(ce to (nfor'ed 'atter. &he ne)t hypothesis sho*s that nothin! can e conceived or said a o(t reality so conceived. <s <ristotle *as s( se+(ently to conceive it, 'atter is only potentially for e)istence, *hich cannot eco'e act(al e)istence in the a sence of for' 3(nity4.

1*.othesis VIII+ I( the ne Is Not= >hat Follo?s (or the ne9 Nothing !an @e Said o( Them 4%;:E6%;;!8

thers In Relation To the

,ince 9'any9 is a pl(rality of ones, then if there is no s(ch thin! as 9one,9 the others not only cannot e one, (t cannot e 'any either. 5or do they even appear to e one or 'any, eca(se *hat is cannot e conceived of 3

4 in ter's of *hat is not. -f they cannot e conceived in relation to the Fne, they cannot e conceived as like or (nlike, sa'e or different, to(chin! or separate, or anythin! else. -t follo*s that 9if the Fne is not, nothin! is.9

%-+ !onclusion
&o p(t the res(lts of o(r e)a'ination of the second part of the dialo!(e as s(ccinctly as. possi le, the distinctions i'plicit in the first fo(r hypotheses have led to the concl(sion that (nless there is so'ethin! y *hich the li'itin! Fne and the (nli'ited 'any can stand in relation to each other, 'eanin!f(l speech and tho(!ht *ill e i'possi le. &he ne)t fo(r ill(strate this point ne!atively y sho*in! *hat happens if *e try to conceive of the 'any other*ise than in relation to the Fne. 1ypotheses G-- and G--- sho* ne!atively and positively that reality *itho(t (nity red(ces to so'ethin! like p(re potentiality. ,(ch a reality 'ay appear 3to o(r i'a!ination4 as a kind of e)istence 3G--4, (t it cannot in fact e)ist *itho(t (nity 3G---4. -n that case any atte'pt even to conceive or speak of it is del(ded, for it *ill appear to e oth incoherent in relation to others 3G4 and e'pty in relation to itself 3G-4. &he %epu)lic's re'ark that the for's are !ro(nded in the !ood, oth in ter's of their kno*a ility and their e)istence 3>#9 4, sho*s 7 B% 7 that all thin!s in the *orld of eco'in!, *hich participate directly in the 9specific9 oneness of a for' 3 ein!4, also participate indirectly in an 9a sol(te9 Fne, the !ood, *hich is eyond ein!. &he f(nda'ental pro le' for the theory of for's is to !ive an acco(nt of the nat(re of these t*o relationships.;>"= &he first part of the Parmenides casts do( t on o(r a ility to !ive a non'etaphorical acco(nt of the nat(re of participation y thin!s in for's 3i.e., y 9 eco'in!9 in 9 ein!94, *hile concl(din!, ho*ever, that (nless *e nevertheless affir' the e)istence of for's and participation *e *ill not e a le to acco(nt for the possi ility of tho(!ht and disco(rse 31"> .c4. &he second part of the dialo!(e has no* sho*n, in its diKKyin! *ay, that a si'ilar concl(sion follo*s fro' a consideration of the relationship et*een o(r *orld of eco'in! and the Fne that is )e!ond ein!. Fnce *e enter into

the 9!y'nastic9 di'ension of these ar!('ents and respond to their challen!e to dra* cr(cial distinctions, *e can distin!(ish et*een the ar!('ents that reflect !en(ine parado)es, and those that are only for'(lated in a parado)ical 'anner (t can readily e resolved y 'eans of the distinctions *ith *hich Plato s(pplies (s. &his has led (s to concl(de that altho(!h the relationship et*een the te'poral 3 eco'in!4 and the ti'eless 3the Fne4 can e hinted at in ter's of the concept of the 9instant,9 a f(lly ela orated acco(nt re'ains recalcitrant, and the third hypothesis is forced to ret(rn to the 'etaphor of participation. B(t 0(st as the first part of the dialo!(e concl(ded y sayin! that, despite the pro le's of concept(aliKin! the relation of participation, to atte'pt to do a*ay *ith that relationship *o(ld destroy the possi ility of tho(!ht and disco(rse? here too the fo(rth hypothesis sho*s the i'possi ility of dispensin! *ith the relation of participation. <nd the final fo(r hypotheses sho* that it is i'possi le to avoid the pro le's of the first fo(r si'ply y doin! a*ay *ith the concept of the Fne 3*hether applied to the specific for's or to the !ood4, for in that case the res(ltin! parado)es eco'e *holly intolera le. He no* t(rn to the Theaetetus , *hich can, in fact, readily e interpreted as an e)ploration of the clai' that, if so'eone does not reco!niKe the e)istence of for's, 9he *ill not have anythin! on *hich to fi) his tho(!hts, as lon! as he does not per'it the idea of each thin! to e al*ays the sa'e, and in this *ay he *ill (tterly destroy the po*er of lo!os.9 ;>"= Cf. PP chap. 6 P>. 7 B6 7

!ha.ter T?o The Theaetetus

%+ Kno?ledge and Virtue 4%'-a6%:/e8
5ear the e!innin! of the dialo!(e ,ocrates asks &heaetet(s *hether kno*led!e and *isdo' are the sa'e thin! 314>e4. &heaetet(s ans*ers in the affir'ative, and ,ocrates responds nonco''ittally: 95o* it is this very thin! that perple)es 'e, and - a' not s(fficiently capa le of !raspin! y 'yself *hat kno*led!e is.9 &here 'atters are allo*ed to rest. <fter %epu)lic 48s analysis of h('an *isdo' as kno*led!e together ith sel&.master! 3the s( ordination of appetite and co'petitiveness to reason in the tripartite so(l, 44$c4, this (ncritical identification of *isdo' *ith kno*led!e is provocative, and leads (s to *onder *hether the aporetic endin! of the dialo!(e is in any *ay connected *ith this oversi'plified e!innin!. Plato8s readers *o(ld hardly have for!otten the doctrine of the tripartite so(l so +(ickly, and there see's to e a deli erate re'inder of it in the na'es of the initial speakers, /(cleides 39Deno*n94 and &erpsion 39Deli!ht94, *hich correspond to the t*o lo*er 'otivations of the so(l, 9love of honor9 and 9love of pleas(re.9 Cater, in the lon!, central di!ression that recalls the %epu)lic and Phaedo ,;1= *here ,ocrates speaks not as a 'id*ife (t fro' his o*n 7 B9 7 conviction, he says that *e '(st seek to escape the evils of the corporeal *orld, and that 9to escape 'eans assi'ilation to !od, and assi'ilation 'eans to eco'e 0(st and pio(s, *ith *isdo'9 31%B 4. &he *ord for *isdo' here is phron:sis 3sophia is (sed in the earlier passa!e and in the %epu)lic 4, (t the

point is the sa'e, that the hi!hest rational attain'ent !oes eyond intellect(al kno*led!e alone 3*hich 'ay e in the service of o(r irrational passions4 and involves the s( ordination of 9corporeal evils9 to the 9divine.9 <ccordin!ly, ,ocrates !oes on to say that 9kno*led!e of this ;ho* to assi'ilate o(rselves to !od= is tr(e *isdo' ;sophia this ti'e= and virt(e9 31%Bc4. &here are 'ore direct re'inders of the %epu)lic doctrine. Before ,ocrates 'eets &heaetet(s, &heodor(s descri es hi' as ein! +(ick to learn, !entle, and co(ra!eo(s, and re'arks that this is a co' ination *hich other*ise - *o(ld not have s(pposed to e)ist, nor do - see it. Dather, those *ho are as sharp as he is, and +(ick and *ith retentive 'e'ories, are also for the 'ost part +(ick.te'pered, . . . 'anic rather than co(ra!eo(s. &hose on the other hand *ho are 'ore sedate are also so'e*hat sl(!!ish *hen they co'e (p a!ainst their st(dies, and are for!etf(l. 3144a. 4 He can restate this passa!e, *hich recalls the +(alities so(!ht for in the !(ardian class of the %epu)lic 3$."%> ."%Bc4, in ter's of the cate!ories of that dialo!(e: intelli!ent people are al'ost al*ays do'inated y their spirited nat(re, and those *ho are not spirited tend to e laKy or sl(!!ish, that is, 'ore interested in co'fort than in effort. 2ost people are th(s do'inated y love of honor or love of pleas(re, and it is only &heaetet(s8s nat(re that 'akes &heodor(s realiKe that it is possi le to e intellect(al *itho(t ein! do'inated y spiritedness: that is, that love of reason is distinct fro' love of honor, and that there are three types of persons rather than t*o 3this classification *ill eco'e i'portant a!ain at the end of the trilo!y, in the cont(sion of the Statesman 4. &he laKy, for!etf(l type *as e)e'plified y the t*o characters *ith *ho' the dialo!(e opens.;$= Hhen &erpsion asks /(cleides if he can repeat the conversation that &heaetet(s had *ith ,ocrates, he replies, ;$= <ltho(!h their na'es reflect the opposition et*een appetite and spiritedness, their ehavior see's in oth cases to e 'otivated y a variety of appetite. &he e)cessively spirited type, on the other hand, is 'entioned only indirectly, in ,ocrates8 reference to the irrationally an!ry response of people *hose vie*s he has sho*n to e false 31>1c.d4. 7 %# 7 95o, y Le(sQ 5ot y heart9 314$e4. B(t ,ocrates has recited it for hi' ver ati' and refreshed his 'e'ory every ti'e /(cleides *ent to <thens, (ntil y no* /(cleides has al'ost all of it *ritten do*n 314"a4. 5ot only is /(cleides8 'e'ory not i'pressive, (t he has !one a o(t this task in a laKy, piece'eal fashion. &erpsion too is (ni'pressive for his 'e'ory or ener!y: he has 9al*ays intended9 to ask /(cleides to read the acco(nt of the conversation et*een ,ocrates and &heaetet(s, (t has not act(ally done so (ntil no*I*hether o(t of for!etf(lness or laKy procrastination, he does not say. 1e *ants to hear it no*, ho*ever, eca(se he is tired and needs to rest 314"a4. /(cleides, too, is tired and *o(ld like a rest, so he decides to have his slave read the conversation to the' *hile they are restin! 314" 4. 1e also 'entions that he p(t the conversation in the for' of direct disco(rse rather than narrative eca(se it *o(ld e too '(ch tro( le 3

4 to p(t in ,ocrates8 narrative asides, s(ch as, 9<nd - said,9 et*een all the speeches 314"c4. &his co' ination of poor 'e'ory and laKy lack of spirit eco'es i''ediately evident ithin the conversation in the character of &heodor(s, *ho cannot re'e' er *ho &heaetet(s8 father is 3altho(!h ,ocrates, *ho has never 'et hi', kno*s his father and native city as soon as he sees &heaetet(s4,;"=

and *ho fearf(lly resists every atte'pt to dra* hi' into the disc(ssion.;4= &he si!nificance of 'e'ory, *hich Plato foreshado*s y these dra'at(r!ic 'eans, *ill e'er!e in d(e co(rse? (t so'e preli'inary re'arks 'ay e 'ade a o(t co(ra!e 3*hich is here opposed oth to laKiness and to fearf(lness4. &hro(!ho(t the ens(in! disc(ssion the need for co(ra!e and oldness is contin(ally e'phasiKed.;>= < cl(e to the reason for this 'ay e fo(nd in a passa!e of the 'eno . &here, after introd(cin! the doctrine of recollection, ,ocrates concl(des that this ref(tes 2eno8s parado) y sho*in! that learnin! is possi le if one is courageous and does not desist fro' seekin!? for seekin! and learnin! are the *hole of recollection. Fne '(st not e convinced y that conten. ;"= Donald Polansky s(!!ests another interpretation of this: 9&heodor(s, y contrast ;*ith ,ocrates=, is so (nconcerned *ith the fathers of the yo(ths he instr(cts that he for!ets the na'e of &heaetet(s8 parent. 1is 'athe'atical instr(ction de'ands little political ca(tion or involve'ent *ith the personal ack!ro(nd of the yo(th9 3Philosoph! and *no ledge: # "ommentar! on Plato's Theaetetus ;Ce*is (r!: B(cknell University Press, 199$= 4#4. ;4= 14B , 1B$a. , 1B>a. , 1B9a. , 1%%c, 16"c.d. ;>= /.!., 146d, 1>1d, 1>1d.e, 1>%d, 1BBa. , 1%%d, 16% . Cf. 1>" . ,ee also Sophist $B1 . 9Co(ra!e9 in this sense, ho*ever, does not necessarily i'ply all the attri (tes ascri ed to it as one of the cardinal virt(es in %epu)lic 4 344$c4. 7 %1 7 tio(s doctrine ;2eno8s parado)=? that doctrine *ill 'ake (s la;! and is pleasant for soft people to hear. &his one, ho*ever, 'akes people ener!etic and searchin!. 361d, e'phasis added4 &he Theaetetus , in fact, recalls the 'eno at al'ost every t(rn. @or e)a'ple: 314 at 14Bc.d &heaetet(s is re (ked for !ivin! a list of e)a'ples in ans*er to the +(estion, 9Hhat is kno*led!eJ9 as 2eno had een for 9Hhat is virt(eJ9 3%$a4. 3$4 <t 146c ,ocrates offers a definitional e)a'ple of day as earth 'i)ed *ith *ater, as he had offered 2eno the e)a'ple of shape defined as *hat al*ays acco'panies color 3%> 4. 3"4 &he 'eno took as its 'odel the kno*led!e that the s+(are root of an area of ei!ht is not e)pressi le as a *hole n(' er (t 'ay e e)pressed as a dia!onal 36$ .6> 4? the Theaetetus proceeds to take as an e)a'ple of kno*led!e the distinction et*een areas *hose roots are e)pressi le as *hole n(' ers 3s+(ares4 and those *hose are not 3o lon!s? 14%d.146 4.;B= 344 ,ocrates8 re'ark that so'e people think he is a 'ost stran!e person *ho red(ces others to an i'passe 3149a4 precisely echoes 2eno8s co'plaint at %9e.6# . 3>4 &he Theaetetus 316% ff.4, like the 'eno 39%a ff.4, disc(sses kno*led!e y co'parison *ith tr(e opinion. 3B4 &he Theaetetus 'ore than once 3196c.d? cf. 19Bd.e, $#9e4 all(des to 2eno8s parado) 36#d4. 3%4 <fter <nyt(s *arns ,ocrates that he 'ay find hi'self in serio(s tro( le for critical re'arks he has 0(st 'ade 394e4, the 'eno ends *ith ,ocrates sayin!, 9Convince yo(r friend <nyt(s of these thin!s of *hich yo( are no* convinced, so that he 'ay eco'e 'ore cal'. -f yo( convince hi' yo( 'ay also enefit the <thenians,9 a pointed anticipation of ,ocrates8 trial and e)ec(tion? the Theaetetus ends *ith ,ocrates !oin! off to ans*er the indict'ent of 2elet(s, of *hich <nyt(s *as coa(thor. 364 @. 2. Cornford, *ho notes several of the a ove as *ell, s(!!ests also that ,ocrates8 'id*ifery corresponds to the 'eno's doctrine of recollection.;%= 1is s(!!estion is often re0ected on the !ro(nds that the ans*ers elicited y 'id*ifery are fre+(ently *ron!, ;6= (t *e 'i!ht say the sa'e a o(t the ans*ers elicited y ,ocrates fro' 2eno8s slave 36$e, 6"e4. ;B= 2alcol' Bro*n points o(t that 9already in anti+(ity this point of parallelis' *as 'ade y the

anony'o(s co''entator on Theaetetus 3eds. 1. Dials and H. ,ch( art, Berliner Klassikerte)te ii, 19#>4: 8the ;side of the= .t*o.foot s+(are is also inco''ens(ra le . . . (t he left it o(t, they say, eca(se it is in the 'eno 9 39 Theaetetus : Kno*led!e as Contin(ed Cearnin!,9 Journal o& the 5istor! o& Philosoph! < ;19B9= "B# n. 44. ;%= PT* $%.$6. <s a ninth parallel *e 'ay add D(nci'an8s o servation 3p. %4 that the concl(sion of the Theaetetus is only apparently aporetic, like that of the 'eno . ;6= /.!., :ohn 2cDo*ell, Plato: Theaetetus 3F)ford: Clarendon Press, 19%"4 11%. 7 %$ 7 5evertheless 'id*ifery, (nlike recollection, cannot e considered a necessar! condition for attainin! kno*led!e, so the correspondence is only appro)i'ate. Hhether or not Plato deli erately plays o(t the Theaetetus a!ainst the ackdrop of the 'eno's doctrine of recollection, the Theaetetus reaffir's the latter8s clai' that, *hatever theoretical kno*led!e 'ay e, it is not so'ethin! easily ac+(ired. -t re+(ires the co(ra!e to persist a'id diffic(lties and fr(strations, and the oldness to p(rs(e hypotheses that 'ay fly in the face of co''on sense. <ccordin! to the di!ression in the 'iddle of the dialo!(e, *hat is called for (lti'ately is nothin! less than the co(ra!e to chan!e o(r *ay of life. &his is not the kind of kno*led!e that &heaetet(s *ill take as his 'odel, ho*ever. Ur!ed on y ,ocrates8 pro'ise to act as the 'id*ife of his conceptions 3a 'etaphor that *ill f(nction in a n(' er of *ays in the dialo!(e4, &heaetet(s rin!s forth the idea that kno*led!e is sense perception.

-+ The 1eracleitean6Protagorean Pro2lematic 4%:%e6%;7e8

&hat Plato sho(ld assi!n to a 'athe'atician the role of definin! kno*led!e as sense perception is not s(rprisin! *hen *e consider that for the Ereeks 'athe'atics centered on !eo'etry, *hose proofs *ere ill(strated y dia!ra's. &he 'eno , ho*ever, re'inded (s that *hat one learns onl! y lookin! at the dia!ra's is not kno*led!e at all. ,ocrates says there a o(t the slave: 9<t present these opinions, havin! 0(st een stirred (p in hi', are like a drea'. -f, ho*ever, one *ere to ask hi' the sa'e thin!s 'any ti'es and in 'any *ays, yo( kno* that finally he *o(ld have kno*led!e of the' that is no less acc(rate than anyone8s9 36>c.d4. &he slave8s opinions *ill not e transfor'ed into kno*led!e (ntil he frees hi'self fro' dependence on partic(lar dia!ra's or for'(lations. -n the Theaetetus ,ocrates p(rs(es the opposite path, 'ovin! *ithin the real' of sense perception rather than a stractin! fro' it. &o e!in *ith, &heaetet(s8s 'odel of s(rds and roots ears only a s(perficial rese' lance to the dia!ra' of the 'eno . Hhereas ,ocrates (sed that dia!ra' as a 'eans of discovery, &heaetet(s (ses his 'odel only as a 'eans of classifyin! *hat is already kno*n. -t is a preli'inary application of the 'ethod of collection and division 39*e tried to collect the' ;the roots= into a (nity,9 14%d? 9*e divided all n(' er into t*o,9 14%e4. 2oreover, *hen &heaetet(s (ses this 'athe'atical e)a'ple as 7 %" 7 an instance of kno*led!e, ,ocrates does not proceed to 'ake a connection et*een the nat(re of 'athe'atics and the nat(re of kno*led!e !enerally, and to (se this as an i'pet(s to lead his partner in the direction of the intelli!i le, as in previo(s dialo!(es. ,ocrates instead p(shes hi' in the contrary direction, to the 'ost pheno'enalistic *ay of conceivin! kno*led!e. &he *orld is 0(st as it see's to

each o server. Plato e!ins the dialo!(e *ith the 'ost ele'entary conception of kno*led!e, that is, the lo*est !rade of infor'ation, 'ere sense e)perience. @ro' this he *ill !enerate (nder the press(re of criticis' pro!ressively 'ore co'plete 'odels, in accordance *ith the 'ethod of hypothesis.;9= By e!innin! in this *ay Plato is a le to respond to the attack on sta ility la(nched y 1eracleit(s, *ho insisted that concept(al distinctions are al*ays ar itrary, re!ardless of *hether they refer to val(es s(ch as ea(ty, or fact(al de'arcations s(ch as (p and do*n, day and ni!ht, or alive and dead. &he *orld of tho(!ht, like the *orld of ein!s, is p(re eco'in! or fl(), and concept(al kno*led!e is therefore del(sory. &he ne)t !eneration took the ne)t step and *ondered ho*, if 1eracleit(s is ri!ht, it is possi le for hi' to say so *itho(t inconsistency. <ccordin!ly, his disciple Cratyl(s re0ected his teacher8s clai' that *e cannot step into the sa'e river t*ice, for *e cannot step into it even once. <nd to 'ake his point *ith !reater consistency Cratyl(s a andoned speech alto!ether and li'ited hi'self to pointin! *ith his fin!er.;1#= -t is a!ainst this ack!ro(nd that the Theaetetus takes place, a dialo!(e e)plicitly concerned *ith the 1eracleitean fo(ndations of fifth.cent(ry sophistry. &oday8s 9post'odernists9 have advanced *orldvie*s that are parallel in so'e *ays to that of the /phesians. Cike their Presocratic co(nterparts, they atte'pt to reak do*n the perceived str(ct(res of e)perience into ne!ativity and flo*Ithe pro le'atic of the Theaetetus is of interest today not only for historical reasons. -t is no accident that the reaction of the analytic.'inded 'athe'atician &heodor(s to the school of 1eracleit(s is evocative of the reaction of conte'porary analysts and traditionalists to Deconstr(ctionists: -t is no 'ore possi le, ,ocrates, to disc(ss these doctrines ;*ith their adherents= . . . than *ith 'aniacs. @or they are, in accordance *ith their trea. ;9= @or this interpretation of the 'ethod of hypothesis, see 'y PP 1$%."6. Kenneth ,ayre points o(t that 9the Theaetetus (n+(estiona ly is Plato8s 'ost a' itio(s and s(stained atte'pt to apply the 'ethod of hypothesis in 'atters of philosophic ar!('entation9 3Plato's #nal!tic 'ethod ;Chica!o: University of Chica!o Press, 19B9= $"$4. ;1#= <ristotle, 'etaph!sicsG .>.1#1# 11.1". 7 %4 7 tises, co'pletely in 'otion? and as for keepin! to an ar!('ent or a +(estion and cal'ly ans*erin! and askin! in t(rn, there is less than nothin! of that in the' . . . . -f yo( ask one of the' so'ethin!, he p(lls an eni!'atic little phrase o(t of his +(iver and shoots it off. <nd if yo( try to !et an acco(nt of *hat e said, yo( *ill e hit ane* y another t(rn of phrase. Ao( *ill never reach any concl(sion *ith any of the'? nor, indeed, do they the'selves *ith one another? (t they take very !ood care to let nothin! e sta le, either in an ar!('ent or in their o*n so(ls. 31%9e.16# 4 ,ocrates8 re0oinder, that the 1eracleiteans pro a ly e)a!!erate these +(alifies to &heodor(s eca(se of his hostility, re'inds (s that Plato hi'self sho*s considera le respect for 1eracleit(s8s doctrines, and in the Timaeus descri es the cos'os as partly !ro(nded in chaos. &he de!ree of his endorse'ent of 1eracleitean destr(ct(rin! is o sc(red y his concern a o(t the propriety of disse'inatin! s(ch vie*s even if they are tr(e. 1alf a pa!e after &heodor(s8s re'arks, ,ocrates says, 1ave *e not heard fro' the ancients, *ho concealed it fro' the 'any y 'eans of poetry, that the ori!in of all thin!s, Fcean(s and &ethys, are flo*in! strea's, and that nothin! stands stillJ <nd also fro' the 'ode's *ho, eca(se they are *iser, reveal these thin!s

openly so that even the co lers 'ay hear the' and learn their *isdo' and cease fro' their foolish elief that so'e thin!s stand still *hile others are in 'otion, and, once they have learned that all thin!s are in 'otion, 'ay honor these teachersJ 316#c.d4 -n vie* of his elief that *e do ordinary people no favor y convincin! the' that sta ility is an ill(sion, *e '(st e)pect that *hatever affinity Plato has for the vie*s of 1eracleit(s *ill not e strai!htfor*ardly ackno*led!ed. 5evertheless, these doctrines are taken very serio(sly in the Theaetetus . He need to consider ho* receptive Plato is to the o 0ections a!ainst nat(ral sta ility and to *hat e)tent his o*n philosophy of for' 0(stifies itself a!ainst the considerations that lead to the desta iliKin! of *hat appears to e sta le. -n the Parmenides Plato thre* the theory of for's into (ncertainty. <nd even tho(!h Par'enides reaffir'ed the need for for's if thinkin! and disco(rse are to e possi le, the for's are 'issin! fro' the Theaetetus , at least on the s(rface. He *o(ld e)pect the' to 'ake an appearance *hen ,ocrates disc(sses the pro le' of +(antitative relativity: it see's (npro le'atic to assert that si) dice are 'ore than fo(r y a half and less than t*elve y a half 31>4c4, (t, he says 3in a dear echo of the 'ethod of hypothesis4, *e need 9to o serve o(r tho(!hts in relation to the'selves, *hichever ones *e think, to see *hether for (s they are consonant *ith one another or 7 %> 7 not at all9 31>4e? cf. Phaedo 1##a, 1#1d4. -n the present case, three s(ch eliefs prod(ce tension *ith the state'ent a o(t the relative siKe of n(' ers: 5othin! can ever eco'e 'ore or less, either in siKe or n(' er, as lon! as it is e+(al to itself. <nd second, that to *hich nothin! is added and fro' *hich nothin! is s( tracted, is neither increased nor decreased, (t is al*ays e+(al. &hird, that so'ethin! previo(sly *as not, (t later is, *itho(t eco'in!, is i'possi le. 31>>a. 4 9&hese three ad'issions fi!ht *ith the'selves in o(r 'inds *hen *e talk a o(t the dice,9 or *hen *e say that if &heaetet(s !ro*s taller, then ,ocrates !oes fro' ein! taller to ein! shorter *itho(t chan!in! siKe 31>> .c4. &heir 9fi!ht *ith the'selves9 pres('a ly consists of the fact that each of the' see's clearly tr(e *hen taken 0(st y itself, (t clearly false *hen applied to the relative lar!eness and s'allness Ff n(' ers 3the dice4 and siKes 3,ocrates and &heaetet(s4.;11= -t is i'portant to keep in 'ind that the fi!ht '(st e a tension ithin each state'ent, rather than a tension among the', for the e)a'ples of the dice and &heaetet(s falsify either all three of the ad'issions to!ether or none at all. 3-t is 'isleadin! therefore to translate

as 9contend *ith one another, 9 *hich i'plies that if *e !ot rid of t*o of the' the re'ainin! one *o(ld e (npro le'atic.4 -n the Phaedo 31##e.1#"a4 s(ch pro le's are resolved y 'eans of the theory of for's: relations like lar!er and s'aller are not corporeal properties of individ(als. &hey are therefore not s( 0ect to the three ad'issions 'entioned a ove, *hich apply only to nonrelational s( 0ects. &hey are conceived instead as relational essences, *hich are distinct fro' any corporeal individ(al, (t *hich 'ay e participated in y individ(als in certain circ('stances. <ccordin!ly, *e *o(ld not say, in violation of the first principle 39ad'ission94, that ,ocrates, *hile re'ainin! e+(al to hi'self, has !one fro' ein!

taller to ein! shorter, (t only that in one co'parison he participates in the relation 9taller9 and in another 9shorter.9 5or *o(ld *e say, in violation of the second principle, that ,ocrates has decreased *itho(t anythin! havin! een ;11= Polansky 94 p(ts it so'e*hat differently, y descri in! the tension as res(ltin! fro' the possi ility of interpretin! each state'ent either as referrin! to so'ethin! in itself, or as referrin! to it relative to so'ethin! rise. &h(s in each case the s( 0ect is (nchan!ed in itself (t 'ay e different relative to so'ethin! else. 7 %B 7 s( tracted fro' hi', (t only that he participates in a different relation eca(se the siKe of the other referent 3&heaetet(s4 has chan!ed. 5or a!ain, in violation of the third principle, that ,ocrates has !one fro' not.short to short *itho(t a process of eco'in!, (t only that he participates in one relational for' rather than the other eca(se of a eco'in! that attached to the other referent. Unlike the Phaedo , the Theaetetus 'akes no 'ention of the theory of for's and offers no sol(tion. &heaetet(s hi'self is left in a state of perple)ity y the p(KKles, and ,ocrates re'arks, 9&his feelin!I *onderIvery '(ch pertains to philosophy. @or there is no other e!innin! of philosophy than this, and it see's that the one *ho said that -ris is the child of Honder did not !enealo!iKe adly9 31>>d4. &his 'etaphor of 9parent and child9 pervades the Theaetetus . -t *as i'plicit at the e!innin! of this passa!e as *ell. -f ,ocrates only *anted to ill(strate the si'ple 9parado)9 that si) dice co(ld e oth 'ore 3than a s'aller +(antity4 and less 3than a !reater one4 *itho(t chan!in!, *hy did he needlessly co'plicate the e)a'ple y 'akin! the lar!er and s'aller +(antities, not five and seven as *e *o(ld e)pect, (t fo(r and t*elveIthe e)tre'es of *hich si) is the har'onic 'eanJ 1e even !oes to the tro( le of pointin! o(t, for no apparent reason, that si) is not only 'ore than fo(r and less than t*elve, (t 'ore than fo(r y a half and less than t*elve y a half 31>4c4. &he only p(rpose this *o(ld see' to serve is to 'ake (s think of si) as a kind of prod(ct or 9offsprin!9 of fo(r and t*elve, as the 'ean that (nifies the'.;1$= &he parent.child relation is in fact the do'inant leit'otiv of the dialo!(e. &he Theaetetus contains at least si) e)plicit references to parenta!e, and at least seven references to the relation for *hich parental procreation is a 'etaphor, that is, the e)planation of so'ethin! as a prod(ct of the interco(rse of t*o prior ele'ents. &he e)plicit references e!in 314 *hen ,ocrates, after ein! told a o(t &heaetet(s y &heodor(s, i''ediately asks *ho &heaetet(s8s father is 3144c4. 3$4 Cater he speaks of his o*n 'other, Phaenarete 3149a4Ithe only ti'e in any dialo!(e that he does so.;1"= 3"4 1e then !oes on to co'pare the for'(latin! of opinions to !ivin! irth 31>1, 1>%c.d4, and 344 s( se+(ently refers to the deceased Prota!oras8s theory as an orphan 31B4e4. -n et*een *ere 3>4 the reference to Honder as ;1$= Cf. Dose'ary Des0ardins, The %ational Enterprise: Logos in Plato's Theaetetus 3<l any: ,U5A Press, 199#4 16B. ;1"= &ho'as Chance re'inds 'e that ,ocrates 'entions his father, ,ophronisc(s, at Euth!demus $9%e. 7 %% 7 the father of philosophy 31>>d4, and 3B4 the forthco'in! disc(ssion of perception as the 9t*in offsprin!9 of o 0ective and s( 0ective eco'in! 31"Ba.1>%c4. &he sa'e pheno'enonIthe e)planation of an e)istent as the prod(ct of t*o pro!enitorsIis operative *itho(t the parenta!e 'etaphor in 314 ,ocrates8 definition of day as the 'i)t(re of earth and *ater

314%c4, *hich is to serve as a 'odel for &heaetet(s in his search for a definition of kno*led!e. 3$4 -n response to ,ocrates8 e)a'ple of clay, &heaetet(s reco(nts his and his yo(n! friend ,ocrates8 idea of classifyin! all n(' ers into those that are the prod(ct of t*o e+(al roots 3s+(ares4 and those that are the prod(ct of t*o (ne+(al roots 3o lon!s4. 3"4 ,ocrates hi'self is presented as a 'i)t(re of &heaetet(s8s looks 314"e4 and yo(n! ,ocrates8 na'e 314%d? cf. Statesman $>%d4. 344 -n the present passa!e *e have seen that relations like i!!er and s'aller can e e)plained only as the prod(ct of t o referents, not as the property of one. 3>4&he analysis of sylla les at $#" sho*s that they are nor'ally the prod(ct of 'i)in! vo*els and consonants. 3B4 <t $#9d ,ocrates refers to the s$!tal: 9a staff a o(t *hich a strip of leather *as rolled, on *hich dispatches *ere so *ritten that *hen (nrolled they *ere ille!i le (ntil rolled a!ain (pon another staff of the sa'e siKe and shape9 3@o*ler4. -t too is therefore a 'odel of intelli!i ility ased on the interco(rse et*een t*o ele'ents. 3%4 &he dialo!(e as a *hole, that is, the acco(nt of the conversation et*een ,ocrates and &heaetet(s, is a prod(ct of the 0oint efforts of /(cleides and ,ocrates 314"a4. &he si!nificance of all this e'phasis on parenta!e *ill e considered later on. <t this point, after the i'plicit de'onstration that relations '(st e a prod(ct of 3at least4 t*o ter's, and the reference to Honder and -ris as father and child, *e are !iven a iparental 'odel of sense perception. -f none of the (ninitiated is listenin!I y *ho' ,ocrates 'eans coarse 'aterialists *ho deny the e)istence of anythin! nonpercepti le, incl(din! chan!eI,ocrates *ill introd(ce &heaetet(s to the 'ysteries of '(ch cleverer people. &hese are evidently the 1eracleiteans. 5o criticis' is offered of this doctrine, and the pres('ption see's to e that it is a vie* that Plato accepts,;14= (t ,ocrates is nonco''ittal *hen &heaetet(s tries to find o(t *hether he s( scri es to this theory 31>%c4. ;14= 5ot all scholars *o(ld a!ree. ,ee, for e)a'ple, &erence -r*in, 9Plato8s 1eracleiteanis'9 3Philosophical /uarterl! $% ;19%%= 1.1"4? David Bostock, Plato's Theaetetus 3F)ford: Clarendon Press, 19664 1>". &he +(estion re'ains contin(o(sly in vie* d(rin! B(rnyeat8s disc(ssion of the first part of the dialo!(e 3TP %.B>4. 7 %6 7 Hithin 1eracleitean fl() chan!in! thin!s 'ay e descri ed as !rad(al processes or 9slo* 'otions,9 so'e of *hich are capa le of actin! (pon or ein! acted (pon y others, in s(ch a *ay that perception res(lts 31>Ba4. Perception is accordin!ly like the offsprin! of t*o parents. &he pro!eny is al*ays t*ins. Hhen the slo* 'otion that is a !rad(ally chan!in! o 0ect co'es *ithin ran!e of the slo* 'otion that is a !rad(ally chan!in! eye, they prod(ce the t*ins, perception and the perceived thin!Ifor e)a'ple, the perception of *hiteness and the representation of a *hite o 0ect 31>Bd4. &hese pro!eny of the slo* 'otionsIthat is, of the !rad(al 'otions of chan!in! thin!sIare +(icker eca(se they 'ove fro' place to place: fro' their '(t(al irthplace et*een the eye and the o 0ect, the perception 'oves to the eye, and the perceived o 0ect 'oves to its perceived location. <ccordin!ly, 9nothin! is one , itself y itself, (t it al*ays co'es to e &or so'eone9 31>%a4. <ny perceived thin! is only pheno'enal, in so'ethin! like Kant8s sense: it is the prod(ct of the interco(rse et*een a thin! in itself and o(r or!ans of perception. &he physical *orld is therefore only a constr(ction? the *orld in itself is p(re fl() or 'otion. &he *orld of discrete and self.identical thin!s is 9o 0ective9 only in the sense that the pheno'enal *orld is so for Kant: it is the *orld that is 9!iven9 in nor'al e)perience. &he doctrine applies not only to individ(al thin!s (t also to 9(niversals.9 9-t is necessary to speak in this *ay oth *ith re!ard to individ(als and a o(t '(ltit(des collected to!ether ;

=. -t is to s(ch collections that they apply the ter's 8h('an8 and 8stone,8 and every ani'al and for'9 31>% .c4. < little later ,ocrates incl(des 9!ood9 and 9 ea(tif(l9 31>%d4. Fne of the reasons that Plato is (s(ally held to s( scri e to the fl() theory of perception is that it fits in *ith his vie* of the physical *orld as 9 eco'in!9 rather than 9 ein!.9 B(t all the evidence of the previo(s dialo!(es indicates that this f(rther e)tension of the theory, y *hich 9'(ltit(des collected to!ether,9 or (niversals, are relativiKed in the sa'e *ay as sensi les, is one to *hich he does not s( scri e. Fn the 1eracleitean hypothesis, ho*everI*hich is ein! e)plored hereIthe nat(ral interpretation of (niversals is that they are artificial constr(cts a stracted 3not 9recollected94 fro' partic(lar e)periences. -t 'i!ht see', ,ocrates points o(t, that *e can disp(te this doctrine y pointin! to the fact that in drea's, 'adness, and other illnesses, perceptions of reality contradict those of nor'al, *akin! perceivers, and are o 0ectively false 31>%e.1>6a4. -f *e reco!niKe that so'e opinions are false, then *e '(st e a le to reco!niKe a standard of correct. 7 %9 7 ness, in *hich case, pace Prota!oras, not everyone is the 'eas(re of tr(th. &his o 0ection proves to e *itho(t s( stance, for accordin! to the theory o(r 0(d!'ents do not have the sa'e referents as those of anyone elseIsick people and drea'ers incl(dedIand therefore do not contradict one another and cannot e considered false. -f *ine that everyone 0(d!es to e s*eet is 0(d!ed y 'e to e itter eca(se - a' sick, there is no contradiction. Hhen - say 9this *ine9 - a' referrin! not to the 9*ine in itself9 (t to one of the t*in offsprin!s of oth the *ine and 'y or!ans of perception. &his offsprin! is n('erically different fro' the offsprin! that anyone else intends y the phrase 9this *ine,9 and that is the partial offsprin! of their or!ans of perception. &he doctrine is th(s co'pati le *ith the principle of noncontradiction;1>= and not falsifia le on any o vio(s !ro(nds. <ccordin!ly, ,ocrates proceeds to e)plore 'ore s( tle pro le's to *hich the hypothesis leads.

/+ Perce.tion and Understanding 4%;7e6%;5c8

,ocrates8 i''ediate concern *ill not e the theoretical 'odel of perception underl!ing &heaetet(s8s definition of kno*led!e as e+(ivalent to perception, (t the conse9uences of that e+(ivalence. -f the hypothetical e+(ivalence is discredited thro(!h its conse+(ences, then the 'odel fro' *hich it follo*s cannot e accepted in its entirety either. ,ocrates interprets the e+(ivalence of kno*led!e and perception as a denial of the possi ility that kno*led!e can e falsified. Hhen Prota!oras says that a person is the 'eas(re of all thin!s, this 'eans that there is nothin! o(tside o(r individ(al perceptions y *hich they 'i!ht e rendered false. ,ocrates la(nches an initial attack of this conception in fo(r sta!es. = >=?=).=?@aA. Prota!oras 'i!ht as *ell have said that the 'eas(re of all thin!s is not a person (t a pi! or a oon. &hen he co(ld la(!h at (s for thinkin! hi' as *ise as a !od *hen in fact he is no *iser than a tadpole. -n that case it *o(ld 'ake no sense for anyone to pay to e his st(dent, or to practice ,ocratic 'id*ifery or dialectic, since tr(th is already to e fo(nd in 'ere perception 31B1c.e4. 5either &heodor(s nor &heaetet(s can find anythin! *ron! *ith this ;1>= 9Hhat is in every *ay different fro' so'ethin! else cannot in any *ay have the sa'e capacity as the other9 31>6e4.

7 6# 7 ref(tation, (t ,ocrates points o(t that it is an e)a'ple of de'a!o!(ery 31B$d4, and that Prota!oras *o(ld acc(se the' of acceptin! appeals to 'ere likelihood 31B$e4. He are not to e deterred y the seeming a s(rdity of sayin! that a pi! or a oon is the 'eas(re of all thin!s. Fn the asis of the fore!oin! theory of perception, *hich asserted that the o 0ect of perception is al*ays relative to the perceiver, it is pla(si le and even necessary to concl(de that pi!s and a oons are the 'eas(res of all thin!s 3i.e., all that they perceive4. B(t a resid(e of ,ocrates8 o 0ection s(rvives this reply. 1is second point still stands. Fn Prota!oras8s acco(nt it 'akes no sense to consider one person to e *iser than another or for one person to pres('e to teach or criticiKe another. -n fact, ho*ever, Prota!oras char!ed for teachin!, and ,ocrates8 'id*ifery and dialectics *ere considered val(a le y his st(dents. Prota!oras8s clai's are not invalidated y this point only eca(se he is really talkin! a o(t a different level of kno*led!e. &he o 0ection speaks of interpretive kno*led!eI(nderstandin!I rather than percept(al infor'ation. B(t altho(!h this i'plicit distinction does not ref(te Prota!oras at present, it *ill event(ally eco'e a *ed!e *ith *hich to dislod!e Prota!orean relativis'. <ccordin!ly, *hile the ar!('ent see's at first inconse+(ential, on closer inspection it i'plies a distinction et*een t*o levels of kno*led!e, a distinction that *ill t(rn o(t to e i'portant. &he i'plications of the ne)t three o 0ections *ill pro!ressively specify *hat is involved in the i'plicit distinction et*een perception and (nderstandin!, and they *ill do so in ter's of concepts that see' to recall the doctrine of recollection: reco!nition, 'e'ory, and intelli!i ility. B >=?@a.cA . Hhat a o(t hearin! a forei!n lan!(a!e, ,ocrates asks, or even seein! *ritten *ords in o(r o*n lan!(a!e *hen *e cannot readJ 1o* can it e 'aintained that perception is kno*led!e *hen *e perceive these so(nds and sy' ols (t do not (nderstand the'J &heaetet(s replies: He shall say that *e kno* a o(t the' 0(st *hat *e see and hear. -n the one case *e oth see and kno* the shape and color, and in the other case *e hear and at the sa'e ti'e kno* the hi!her and lo*er so(nds. 1o*ever, those thin!s that the !ra''arian and the interpreter teach a o(t the', *e neither perceive y si!ht or hearin!, nor kno*. 31B" .c4 ,ocrates praises this ans*er (t adds, 9- had etter not disa!ree *ith yo( a o(t this, so that yo( *ill !ro*.9 7 61 7 Co'in! after the last o 0ection, the asis on *hich ,ocrates 'i!ht have disa!reed is not hard to discern. Fnce a!ain the t*o levels of kno*led!e are visi le, sensory infor'ation and (nderstandin!, (t here the latter is 'ade evident rather than 'erely i'plicit. <t the first levelI so(nds and shapesI everyone8s kno*led!e is coe)tensive *ith the infor'ation s(pplied y their senses, and none is any etter than any other. B(t at the second level it is (ndenia le that so'e people 3especially !ra''arians4 reco!niKe the meaning of these pheno'ena etter than other people, and this second kind of kno*led!e is not coe)tensive *ith sense perception. Fnce a!ain a portion of ,ocrates8 o 0ection re'ains (nto(ched y the reply. &here is an interpretive, reco!nitive, as *ell as a sensory kind of kno*led!e, and the for'er is not red(ci le to the latter. @ >=?@c.=?1)A . Fn the hypothesis that kno*led!e is perception, if *e see so'ethin! *e '(st kno* it. B(t if *e dose o(r eyes, then, even if *e still re'e' er the o 0ect, *e '(st e said no lon!er to kno* it. &his *o(ld e a 9'onstro(s9 concl(sion 31B"c.1B4 4.

5o reply is 'ade to this o 0ection, (t ,ocrates re'arks that their concl(sion *as derived fro' a contentio(s rather than philosophical style of ar!('ent 31B4c4 and that if Prota!oras *ere here he *o(ld have '(ch to say in reply 31B4e4. &he fallacy of the ar!('ent 'ay e e)pressed as a collapsin! of the distinction et*een 'e'ory o& kno*led!e and 'e'ory as kno*led!e. - can look at a ook and say that - perceive and therefore kno* that a ook is on 'y desk. - can then dose 'y eyes and say that re'e' er perceivin! and kno*in! that a ook *as on 'y desk. B(t it does not follo* that - still kno* that there is a ook on 'y desk. &here is no contradiction or 'onstro(s concl(sion. 5evertheless 'e'ory is a kind of kno*led!e, altho(!h of a different order than perception. <nd as <ristotle 'entions at the e!innin! of the 'etaph!sics 3<.1.96# $9.961a 14, a pl(rality of 'e'ories constit(tes e)perience, *hich is an i'portant kind of kno*in! different fro' sense perception. 2e'ory is in fact a necessary condition for interpretive kno*led!e, and th(s a precondition for the distinction i'plied y the previo(s e)a'ples. C >=?1).eA . &he final o 0ection in this series, introd(ced indeed as 9the 'ost for'ida le,9 is that if *e look at so'ethin! *ith one eye dosed, then *e oth see and do not see, and accordin!ly oth kno* and do not kno* the o 0ect. &his is said to red(ce &heaetet(s8s hypothe. 7 6$ 7 sis, that perceivin! is kno*in!, to a s(rdity 31B>d4. &heaetet(s is dearly not pers(aded y the ar!('ent, (t lacks the *eapons *ith *hich to fi!ht it. Hith so'e enco(ra!e'ent he 'i!ht have hit (pon the distinctions 'ade in the definition of contradiction in the %epu)lic ,;1B= *hich stip(lates that a !en(ine contradiction '(st refer to the sa'e ti'e, the sa'e part of the s( 0ect, and the sa'e o 0ect 3in fact, the converse of that definition appeared a ove at 1>6e: see n. 1>4. -n the present case *e are speakin! of different parts 3eyes4 of the s( 0ect, and so there is no contradiction. ,ocrates, ho*ever, does not !ive &heaetet(s enco(ra!e'ent, (t the reverse. Hhat is the point of this 9'ost for'ida le9 (t 'ost transparently fallacio(s ar!('entJ 2i!ht the t*o different eyes, one open and one dosed, e 'eant 'etaphoricallyJ &he previo(s three o 0ections have re'inded (s of the difference et*een percept(al and interpretive kno*led!e, and the difference et*een perception and the precondition for interpretive kno*led!e, 'e'ory. -n other dialo!(es, especially the 'eno Ithe dialo!(e 'ost often all(ded to in the Theaetetus I'e'ory *as (sed as a 'etaphor for a latent co'ponent of kno*led!e, f(rnished not y the senses (t y the 'ind itself, the analo!(e of <ristotle8s 9active intellect.9 <ctivated y perception, this latency 'ay e 9recollected,9 'akin! possi le 0(d!'ents of attri (tion 39this is ea(tif(l94 and (nderstandin! 390(stice is the har'ony of the tripartite so(l94. -n the dialo!(es after the 'eno , recollection is pict(red as an intellect(al 9seein!9 of the for's.;1%= <nd shortly hereafter in the Theaetetus *e *ill e told that there are t*o kinds of seein! and t*o kinds of fail(re to see.;16= &he philosopher sees *hat lies 9a ove9 altho(!h he 'ay e lind to *hat lies at his feet or in front of his eyes 31%4a.c4, *hile others see *hat is at their feet and efore their eyes (t cannot see the *hole nor *hat is 9a ove9 the' 31%4e.1%>d, 1%Be4. &he 9hi!her9 real' of the philosopher is that of divinity and !oodness, *hile the other is that of the 'ortal and evil 31%Ba4. <re these t*o kinds of seein! prefi!(red in the ar!('ent a o(t the open and closed eye, an ar!('ent that is anno(nced as 9the 'ost for'ida le9 (t that is a 0oke if taken literallyJ ,ocrates !oes on to say that si'ilar pro le's *o(ld arise if so'eone *ere to ask *hether *e can kno* the sa'e thin! sharply and di'ly, close y (t not at a dis. ;1B= %epu)lic 4.4"B ff. ;1%= /.!., Phaedrus $4%c ff., %epu)lic %.>1Ba. , Parmenides 1"$a.

;16= Cf. %epu)lic %.>1%d.>16 ? also <ristotle8s distinction et*een *hat is 'ost dear to (s and *hat is 'ost dear in itself 3'etaph!sicsa .1.99" 9.11, L.".1#$9 ".1$4. 7 6" 7 tance, intensely and +(ietly 31B>d4. <ccordin! to the doctrine of recollection, one 'i!ht say that sensi les are perceived sharply, dose y, and intensely, *hile intelli!i les are perceived di'ly, at a distance, and +(ietly. Perhaps there is so'e prefi!(ration of this f(nda'ental distinction in the openin! *ords of the dialo!(e: 9:(st no*, &erpsion, or lon! a!o . . . J9 -n a dialo!(e devoted to discoverin! the so(rces of kno*led!e, it *o(ld not e eyond Plato8s dra'at(r!y to !ive these *ords a do( le 'eanin!. Fn the literal level they ask *hen &erpsion arrived fro' the co(ntry, (t they are also appropriate to the f(nda'ental episte'olo!ical alternatives of e'piricis' and rationalis': on the e'pirical 'odel kno*led!e e!ins 0(st no* *hen *e perceive so'ethin!? on the rational 'odel *hat *e perceive no* calls into play so'ethin! ac+(ired lon! a!o. He need not try to decide *hether Plato intended these connections or not. &he only i'portant +(estion *ill e *hether the doctrine of the direct apprehension of for's 'ay in fact e ro(!ht (sef(lly to ear on the pro le's of the Theaetetus . &hat +(estion, *hich is '(ch de ated in the literat(re, *ill e ans*ered affir'atively in the co(rse of this st(dy, and it 'ay e that the present passa!e is 'eant to anticipate that ans*er. &he distinction et*een perception and (nderstandin! eco'es all (t e)plicit in *hat follo*s. ,ocrates, speakin! in the persona of Prota!oras, defends Prota!oras8s theory a!ainst the precedin! ref(tations y 'eans of a distinction et*een kno*led!e and *isdo' 3a distinction that &heaetet(s had collapsed at the e!innin! of the dialo!(e4. 1e reaffir's that each of (s is the 'eas(re of all thin!s eca(se 9*hat is9 cannot 'ean anythin! other than *hat appears to a perceiver. B(t altho(!h in this sense everyone is e+(ally kno*led!ea le, *isdo' 'ay e distin!(ished fro' s(ch kno*led!e as the a ility, 9*hen ad thin!s appear and are for so'eone, to i'ple'ent a chan!e and 'ake !ood thin!s appear and e to hi'9 31BBd4. &h(s, (nderstandin! 3*isdo'4 e)ists in addition to percept(al kno*led!e, (t it is of a pra!'atic rather than fact(al nat(re. -t does not tell (s *hat e)ists (t only *hat is desira le and ho* to achieve it. -t is in this sense that doctors, ed(cators, and sophists are *iser than ordinary people. &hey replace the *orse *ith the etter, (t not the false *ith the tr(e. &here is no s(ch thin! as falsity, 9 eca(se it is i'possi le to think ;

= *hat is not9 31B%a4. 9Prota!oras9 doses *ith a ,ocratic appeal for fairness and serio(sness in ar!('ent so that 9yo(r partners *ill la'e the'selves for their conf(sion and aporia, rather than yo(, and they *ill follo* and love 7 64 7 yo(, and hate and flee fro' the'selves to philosophy in order that, y eco'in! different, they 'ay e li erated fro' their for'er selves9 31B6a4. &he senti'ent is o vio(sly ,ocratic rather than Prota!orean, and points (p the difference et*een the', *hich *ill soon e ela orated in ,ocrates8 di!ression. @or Prota!oras *isdo' 'eans the a ility to eli'inate (npleasant perceptions in favor of pleasant ones? for ,ocrates it 'eans overco'in! one kind of life in favor of another.;19=

'+ Understanding and Value9 @eginning 4%;5c6%<-28

&he first set of fo(r o 0ections *as ai'ed at the Prota!orean definition of kno*led!e as perception. -nsofar as the ar!('ents s(cceeded in forcin! a distinction et*een percept(al and interpretive kno*led!e 3(nderstandin!4, that definition has een serio(sly co'pro'ised. &he ne)t set, also of fo(r o 0ections, *ill foc(s on interpretive kno*led!e alone. 1ere ,ocrates finally s(cceeds in press(rin! &heodor(s to replace &heaetet(s as his partner. = >=<Da.=<=dA . &he first ref(tation of this series is the fa'o(s palintrope or self.ref(tation ar!('ent: 9,hall *e say that people al*ays elieve;$#= tr(ly, or so'eti'es tr(ly and so'eti'es falselyJ -n oth cases it follo*s that they don8t al*ays elieve *hat is tr(e (t oth ;*hat is tr(e and *hat is false=9 31%#c4. &he concl(sion o vio(sly follo*s fro' the second alternative, of *hich it is a restate'ent. &he s( se+(ent ar!('ent is desi!ned to sho* that the concl(sion '(st follo* fro' the first alternative as *ell. &he ar!('ent 'ay initially e si'plified as follo*s. &he 'inor pre'ise is that people !enerally disa!ree *ith Prota!oras8s clai' that each person is the only 0(d!e of *hat is tr(e for hi'. &hey think that different people have different de!rees of *isdo' a o(t different thin!s, and that *isdo' is tr(e tho(!ht and that i!norance is false opinion 31%#c? cf. 1%#a. 4. &he 'a0or pre'ise is that Prota!oras clai's that *hat people elieve is tr(e 31%1c4. &he concl(sion follo*s, that Prota!oras '(st concede the !eneral opinion to e tr(e, that not everythin! *e ;19= &his radical conception is already present in several of the early dialo!(es. &h(s 2artha 5(ss a(' points o(t that in the Protagoras , 9,ocrates offers (s, in the !(ise of e'pirical description, a radical proposal for the transfor'ation of o(r lives9 3The Fragilit! o& Goodness ;Ca' rid!e: Ca' rid!e University Press, 196B= 11%4. 7 6> 7 elieve is tr(e. ,ince this contradicts his o*n position the latter '(st e false. &he act(al co(rse of the ar!('ent is 'ore co'plicated eca(se of Prota!oras8s insistence that tr(th is al*ays relative to so'e eliever. <n opinion is not tr(e si'ply, (t tr(e &or so'eone. <ccordin!ly, the *ay the ar!('ent p(ts it is that Prota!oras8s theory 'ay e tr(e for hi' (t false for tens of tho(sands of others 31%#e4. 2oreover, if the theory *ere ri!ht, then if no one elieved it, it *o(ld e, h!pothesi e false for everyone and therefore false. <nd if no one elieved it (t Prota!oras, then: @irst, y as '(ch as those *ho elieve it o(tn(' er those *ho do not, it is that '(ch 'ore not tr(e than tr(e. . .. ,econd co'es a 'ost ele!ant point: he accepts that the tenet of those *ho elieve in opposition to hi' a o(t his o*n tenetIin that they elieve it is falseI'(st so'eho* e tr(e, since he a!rees that *hat anyone elieves really is. 31%1a4 &he validity of this ar!('ent has een '(ch de ated.;$1= -t is so'eti'es felt that the reasonin! depends on an illicit transition fro' 9tr(e for so'eone9 to 9tr(e9 si'ply: Prota!oras *o(ld accept that his theory is not tr(e for 'ost people, (t it *o(ld still e tr(e for hi' and no contradiction *o(ld arise. ,(ch a defense, altho(!h technically valid, *o(ld e disin!en(o(s. Prota!oras *ants to pers(ade (s that his theory is tr(e for everyone, other*ise his ar!(in! for it, p( lishin! it, and teachin! it *o(ld e ine)plica le. -t *o(ld e da'a!in! for Prota!oras to e forced to ad'it that his theory is tr(e onl! for hi'self 3and perhaps a fe* others4, (t false for everyone else. 2oreover, havin! ad'itted that, it *o(ld e diffic(lt for hi' to deny that the theory is false in general .;$$= Hhat this ar!('ent de'ands of Prota!oras is that he ackno*led!e that at the level o& interpretation or

understanding not all 0(d!'ents are e+(ally valid. 1e *as *illin! to ackno*led!e that at this level *e can distin!(ish opinions that are pra!'atically s(perior fro' those that are pra!'atically inferior, (t not opinions that are tr(e fro' those that ;$1= Cf. ,ayre, P#' 66.9$? 2yles B(rnyeat, 9Prota!oras and ,elf.Def(tation in Plato8s Theaetetus 3Philosophical %evie 6> ;19%B= 1%$.9>4? :ay 5e*'an, 9&he Decoil <r!('ent9 3#peiron 1B ;196$= 4%.>$4? and Bostock 9$.9>. ;$$= -f Prota!oras *ere to rise fro' the !ro(nd (p to his neck, ,ocrates says, he *o(ld acc(se 'e of talkin! nonsense efore sinkin! ack and r(nnin! off 31%1d4. &his is so'eti'es taken to e an ad'ission y Plato that the ar!('ent is fla*ed, (t, as B(rnyeat points o(t 39Prota!oras9 1914, the fact that Prota!oras *o(ld r(n a*ay after rep(diatin! the concl(sion s(!!ests that his reasons *o(ld not e !ood ones. 7 6B 7 are false. &he present ar!('ent 'akes the point that, on the contrary, Prota!oras does re!ard his interpretations as tr(er than those of non.relativists, and that (nless he ackno*led!es that his percept(al relativis' ceases to e relativistic at the level of interpretation or theory, he cannot help (t (nder'ine his entire position. 1e '(st concede that no one 9is the 'eas(re of any sin!le thin! that he does not (nderstand ;

=9 31%1c4. Perception 'ay e relativiKed, (t (nderstandin! 'ay not. B >=<=d.=<B)A . &he ne)t ref(tation is interr(pted y ,ocrates8 di!ression. ,ocrates e!ins the ar!('ent y recapit(latin! the clai' 'ade earlier in Prota!oras8s defense: altho(!h sensi le +(alities are 0(st as they appear to each of (s, one person 'ay e *iser 3i.e., 9'ore effective94 than another in pra!'atic p(rs(its s(ch as 'edicine 31%1e4. &he sa'e dichoto'y no* appears in the lar!er conte)t of the state. <ccordin! to the theory, val(es are relative to the state, as sensa are to the individ(al: -n political affairs, *ith re!ard to *hat is no le and sha'ef(l, 0(st and (n0(st, pio(s and not: ho*ever each state le!islates these in accordance *ith its opinions, that is ho* they in tr(th are for it. <nd in these 'atters no one is *iserIneither one individ(al than another, nor one state than another. . .. 5one of these has y nat(re an essence ;

= of its o*n, (t rather the co''on opinion eco'es tr(e *hen it is elieved, and for as lon! a ti'e as it is elieved. 31%$a, 4 B(t here, too, ,ocrates replies, *hen it co'es to *hat is advantageous or disadvantageous to the state, Prota!oras *o(ld not deny that one adviser differs fro' another, and one state fro' another, *ith respect to tr(th. 1e *o(ld not dare to say that *hatever a state elieves to e in its advanta!e necessarily is so 31%$a. 4. &he escape fro' relativis', 'ade possi le y the distin!(ishin! of (nderstandin! fro' perception, e)tends to val(e as *ell. 5ot everyone (nderstands e+(ally *ell *hat is !ood, and if in 'any cases there is no *ay of ad0(dicatin! disp(tes a o(t *hat is eneficial, there are at least so'e occasions, especially in politics, *hen so'eone 'ay proven ri!ht or *ron!.

:+ Socrates' Digression 4%<-c6%<<28

-t is si!nificant that the di!ression e!ins 0(st at the point *here val(es are ascri ed to convention rather than nat(re, for one of the f(nctions of the di!ression is to rep(diate the clai' that 0(stice and piety are ar itrary val(es *itho(t essence in nat(re. Dather, they are precisely the 7 6% 7 nat(ral essences that the philosopher strives to kno* 31%>c, 1%B 4. -t is ac+(isition of this type of kno*led!e that re+(ires the co(ra!e spoken of in the dialo!(e8s openin! passa!es. Kno*led!e of this kind *o(ld e different oth fro' the percept(al and interpretive kno*led!e of the corporeal *orld that *ere distin!(ished a ove. &he latter t*o correspond to the lo*est levels of the Divided Cine, ei$asia and pistis. Ei$asia , as portrayed in the Cave, is the (ncritical a*areness and 'e'ory of passin! perceptions, and pistis , *hich is y contrast the hi!hest a*areness of the corporeal *orld, is therefore o(r interpretation of the for'er e)periences.;$"= &he kind of kno*led!e referred to in the di!ression, on the other hand, *o(ld correspond to the %epu)lic's cate!ory of no:sis . &he re'ainin! kind of kno*led!e 3accordin! to the Divided Cine4, dianoia Ithe dra*in!.o(t of the i'plications of o(r initial post(latesI has een ill(strated thro(!ho(t the dialo!(e y the ded(ctive aspect of the 'ethod of hypothesis, and *ill e ill(strated 'ore !enerally in the 9aviary9 'odal of kno*led!e. &he di!ression is re'iniscent of the 'iddle ooks of the %epu)lic 3especially the Divided Cine and the <lle!ory of the Cave4 eca(se of its place'ent as *ell as eca(se of its content: like the central ooks of the %epu)lic , it occ(rs in the very center of the dialo!(e and reaks into the e!innin! of the disc(ssion of a political +(estion, *hich is s( se+(ently res('ed as if the di!ression had never taken place.;$4= &he s( stance of the di!ression, a!ain like the 'iddle ooks of the %epu)lic , deals *ith the difference et*een a life devoted to corporeal, 'ortal val(es, and one devoted to intelli!i le, divine val(es. -t is a s(stained co'parison of the life of the philosopher *ith the life of those *ho devote the'selves to la* and politics. Hhere the deniKens of the Cave *ere descri ed in the %epu)lic as prisoners, here politicians and orators are descri ed as slaves, inas'(ch as their s(ccess depends on their adherence to ar itrary r(les and on the approval of their a(dience 31%$d.1%$e4. <s in the %epu)lic , the philosopher *ho enters their *orld *ill appear to e i!norant and (na le to see *hat is in front of hi' 31%4 4, (t 9*hen he dra!s the other (p*ard . . . then the sit(ation is reversed9 31%>c, d4 and the political person *ill then etray his o n ina ility to see 31%4e.1%>a, 1%Be4. &here are also i'portant di&&erences et*een this acco(nt and that of the %epu)lic , especially that the pres. ;$4= Cp. %epu)lic 449a. *ith >4"c.>44a. 7 66 7 ent acco(nt foc(ses on political life in partic(lar, rather than on the ordinary !enerality of people depicted in the Cave. -n that respect the di!ression is a contrast et*een kno*led!e p(rs(ed for its o*n sake and kno*led!e p(rs(ed for the sake of social re*ards and honors 3a the'e that *as present in the Cave (t in a s( ordinate *ay: >1Bc.d4, that is, a contrast et*een reason as an end in itself and reason as a servant of spiritedness.;$>= B(t here, as in the %epu)lic , the &undamental contrast is et*een the corporeal *orld and the intelli!i le *orld. @or the philosopher, 9in reality only his ody occ(pies and d*ells in the city, *hile his 'ind, considerin! all s(ch thin!s as of little or no i'portance, is conte'pt(o(s of the'9 31%"e4. &he contrast is dra*n to s(ch an e)tre'e de!ree that even ,ocrates 'ay not +(alify as a philosopher, for the p(re type represented here has no kno*led!e of *here the 'arketplace is, or the la* co(rts, nor

does he kno* anythin! a o(t parties *ith fl(te !irls. -n factIin f(rther contrast to ,ocratesIhe is so o livio(s to these thin!s, and to hi'self 31%4 4, that 9all these thin!s he doesn8t even kno* that he doesn8t kno*9 31%"e4. Frdinary people think they kno* thin!s *hen they do not? ,ocrates has risen so far a ove their vanity that he kno*s that he is i!norant? (t the tr(e philosopher has risen so far a ove even this self.conscio(sness that he no lon!er kno*s even that he is i!norant. ,ocrates does not fit the description of the philosopher here, for it is a conception, like that in the Phaedo , or in the %epu)lic's -slands of the Blessed 3>19c4, of the 'ost e)tre'e transcendence of the corporeal real' i'a!ina le, in favor of the intelli!i le. &he transcendence is not for the sake of a stract intellect(al kno*led!e, (t for the sake of !oodness. <s in the Phaedo , the corporeal *orld of 'ortals is the a ode of evil, *hile a'on! the !ods e)ists !oodness alone 31%Ba4. &he !oal of life, therefore, is to eco'e as !odlike as possi le, *hich 'eans 9to eco'e 0(st and pio(s to!ether *ith *isdo'9 31%B 4. @or, &*o patterns, 'y friend, are set (p in reality, one divine and 'ost lessed, the other !odless and 'ost 'isera le. Un0(st people do not see that this holds tr(e, and eca(se of their foolishness and co'plete lack of (nderstandin! they are (na*are that they eco'e 'ore like one of the', d(e to their (n0(st ehavior, and less like the other. @or this they pay the penalty of livin! the life that is an i'a!e of *hat they rese' le. 31%Be.1%%a4 ;$>= <ccordin! to the %epu)lic , this is one of the t*o f(nda'ental species of in0(stice in partic(lar and vice in !eneral, the other ein! the s( servience of reason ' appetite 344$ .44"e4. 7 69 7 -n vie* of Plato8s contin(in! interest in politics and social 0(stice, ho*ever, *e 'ay ass('e that the reason *hy ,ocrates8 o*n character fails to confor' to the conception of the philosopher here is not eca(se he has not yet reached that sta!e, (t rather eca(se, like the philosopher *ho ret(rns to the Cave fro' the -slands of the Blessed, his e)perience of transcendence ena les hi' to return to the corporeal *orld, in a transfor'ed *ay.

;+ Understanding and Value9 !onclusion 4%<<c6%5<a8

B >continued, =<<c.=<2dA . <fter the di!ression ,ocrates reiterates the e!innin! of the previo(s ar!('ent: people like Prota!oras 'ay clai' that 3ustice is only a 'atter of *hat is le!islated y the state, (t no one *o(ld say that *hatever a state thinks is good or 9advanta!eo(s to itself really is so9 31%%d4. Hhether it is so or not can e deter'ined only in the f(t(re, and Prota!oras can hardly 'aintain that each of (s is the 'eas(re of *hat is !oin! to happen. Dather, the a ility to 'ake predictions is *hat sets e)perts apart fro' ordinary people in s(ch 'atters as 'edicine, food, and '(sic, and *hat sets Prota!oras apart in 'atters of la* 31%6a.e4. -t follo*s that so'e of (s are *iser than others, and that it is they *ho are the 'eas(re, not ordinary people 31%9 4.;$B= 9Prota!oras9 had already a!reed that so'e people are *iser than others in that they are a le to replace *orse sensations *ith etter ones, (t he denied that this had anythin! to do *ith tr(th or falsity 31BBd4. ,ocrates here co(nters that denial y pointin! o(t that the a ility to 'ake s(ch replace'ents s(ccessf(lly is the a ility to predict *hat *ill happen, and predictions are indeed +(alifia le as tr(e or false. <t this point ,ocrates 'akes f(lly e)plicit the difference et*een the 3infalli le4 percept(al and 3falli le4 interpretive levels of kno*led!e that has een i'plicit thro(!ho(t the earlier disc(ssions: &here are also 'any other *ays to esta lish that not every opinion of everyone is tr(e. 1o*ever, *ith re!ard to the passin! i'pressions fro' *hich o(r sense perceptions and the correspondin! opinions co'e to e, it is harder to

7 9# 7 confir' that they are not tr(e. . .. -t 'ay e that they are (nassaila le, and that those *ho say they are f(lly dear and instances of kno*led!e are perhaps sayin! *hat is really so. 31%9c4 - have een referrin! to (nderstandin! as 9interpretive kno*led!e,9 (t it is not dear *hat 'akes s(ch interpretation and (nderstandin! possi le. <ccordin! to the fl() theory, even s(ch concepts as h('an, stone, and 9every ani'al and for',9 incl(din! the !ood and the ea(tif(l, arise in the sa'e *ay as perceptions 31>% .d4. -n that case the concepts, y *hich *e (nderstand o(r perceptions, '(st e said to arise o(t of those perceptions the'selves. &hose *ho have s(perior (nderstandin! of !oodness can e said only to have e)tracted or !eneraliKed instances of the' 'ore effectively. &here are t*o pro le's *ith this acco(nt. @irst, if nonrelativistic kno*led!e is i'possi le at the percept(al level, ho* can relativity e overco'e at the level of (nderstandin! 'erely y a stractionJ ,econd, there *o(ld e a circ(larity not (nlike that of 2eno8s parado) 3*hich is often recalled in this dialo!(e4: in order to e)tract concepts fro' the fl() of e)perience *e '(st e in possession of the interpretive principles that already pres(ppose those concepts. &he Platonic ans*er to oth these pro le's has een that interpretive kno*led!e has its so(rce not only in the senses8 relation to the corporeal *orld, (t also in reason8s relation to the intelli!i le *orld. -n the re'ainin! t*o ar!('ents of this section ,ocrates *ill reaffir' this ans*er oth ne!atively and positively: ne!atively, y sho*in! that if *e try to acco(nt for kno*led!e only in ter's of the fl() 'odel, *e *ill e red(ced to silence 3like Cratyl(s4? positively, y sho*in! that at least so'e of the concepts y *hich *e interpret e)perience have their so(rce in so'ethin! other than sensory e)perience. @ >=EDc.=ECaA . -f everythin! is in fl(), then all that e)ists is the transitory i'pressions of the perceiver 31>$d4Ithis *as the point of the theory of perception developed earlier 31>Ba.1>%c4 and repeated here 316$a. 4. &here can e no other kno*led!e than this. &he fl() theory is that everythin! is in 'otion, not only in the sense of 'ove'ent in space, (t also in the sense of alteration 3161c.e4. -t follo*s that the sens(o(s +(alities that *e perceive are chan!in! at the very 'o'ent *e perceive the', and the act of perception itself is al*ays chan!in! into nonperception. 2oreover, since perception is kno*led!e, kno*led!e too (lti'ately collapses into an identity *ith nonkno*led!e: each is 7 91 7 contin(o(sly chan!in! into the other 316$c.e4. Conse+(ently, 9if everythin! is in 'otion, every ans*er a o(t anythin! one is asked *ill e e+(ally ri!ht,9 and lan!(a!e itself *ill reak do*n 316"a. 4. Par'enides had told ,ocrates that if anyone does not ad'it the e)istence of for's of thin!s, or 'ark off a for' (nder *hich each individ(al thin! is classed, he *ill not have anythin! on *hich to fi) his tho(!hts, as lon! as he does not ad'it that the -dea of each thin! is al*ays the sa'e, and in this *ay he *ill (tterly destroy the po*er of disco(rse. 3Parmenides 1"> .c4 -s the present ar!('ent 'eant to re'ind (s of this *arnin!, and there y of the theory of for'sJ 3,ocrates8 re'ark that 9- 'et hi' *hen - *as +(ite yo(n! and he +(ite old9 ;16"e= see's clearly 'eant to re'ind (s of that dialo!(e.4 -f so, it *o(ld e)plain the p(KKlin! fact that Par'enides is 'entioned i''ediately efore and after the present passa!e (t to no o vio(s p(rpose. Beforehand ,ocrates says that he 9nearly for!ot that others declare the opposite9 of the fl() theory. &hese others are 2eliss(s and

Par'enides, *hose vie*s ,ocrates proposes to e)a'ine after they e)a'ine the proponents of fl() 316#d.161a4. <fter*ards, &heaetet(s re'inds ,ocrates of this ne)t task, (t ,ocrates declines to p(rs(e it, on the !ro(nds that they co(ld not do 0(stice to Par'enides8 vie*s e)cept at !reat len!th 316"c. 164a4. C >=EC).=E<aA . -f this *as an indirect re'inder of the theory of for's, the ne)t section is a direct re'inder of it. ,ocrates raises the +(estion *hether there is so'e one for' *ithin (s 3*hich *e 'i!ht call the so(l4 *ith *hich *e perceive to!ether *hatever each of the senses perceives only separatelyI so'ethin! that perceives so(nds and si!hts, and the like, each of *hich alone is proper to a specific sense 3l64d.e4. &he test is *hether there is anythin! *e can think a o(t that involves 'ore than one sense. -f there is, this co''on factor cannot e red(ced to *hat the individ(al senses !ive (s and '(st so'eho* e provided y or thro(!h the 'ind or so(l itself. -n fact there are several s(ch co''on +(alities. He can think that the o 0ects of seein! and hearin! oth are , and that each is di&&erent fro' the other and the same as itself 316>a4. ,ocrates th(s !enerates three of the five 9!reatest kinds9 of the Sophist , e)istence, sa'eness, and difference 3the other t*o, 'otion and rest, are already evident in the 1eracleitean 'odel and its re0ection y the /leatics4. ,ocrates f(rther esta lishes that the 'ind *ill discern that each of these o 0ects is 7 9$ 7 one , and oth to!ether are t o , and that it can also ask *hether they are similar or dissimilar 316> 4. &o these +(alities &heaetet(s adds odd and even 316>d4, t*o of the traditional Platonic for's. <nd ,ocrates, re'arkin! that &heaetet(s has sho*n hi'self to e not (!ly, as &heodor(s had clai'ed, (t ea(tif(l and !ood, proceeds to add to the list the for's )eauti&ul and ugl! , and good and )ad 316Ba4, *hich had earlier een assi'ilated to the fl() 'odel of perception 31>%d4. Hhat all these +(alities have in co''on is that the so(l so'eho* perceives the' thro(!h itself rather than thro(!h the ody8s sensory fac(lties 316>e4. 5o*, conceptions a o(t ein! 3

4 and val(e 3 4 can e attained, if at all, only thro(!h a lon! and diffic(lt ed(cation, and tr(th and kno*led!e are inaccessi le (nless *e can discern ein!. <ccordin!ly, kno*led!e can e fo(nd only thro(!h the +(alities that the so(l finds y itself, rather than those that it received fro' the odily senses. Kno*led!e cannot therefore e the sa'e as sense perception 316Bc.e4. &his ar!('ent is p(t to the episte'olo!ical p(rpose of ref(tin! &heaetet(s8s clai' that kno*led!e is perception. B(t it also has conse+(ences for the ontolo!ical fo(ndation on *hich, accordin! to ,ocrates, &heaetet(s8s position restsIthat all is fl(). Clearly, the intended inference is that all these for's, *hich are not the'selves in fl(), are real and i'ply so'e kind of sta ility *ithin 1eracleitean fl(). <re these +(alities in fact the Platonic for'sJ;$%= Cike the for's of the %epu)lic they are apprehended only as the res(lt of a lon! and diffic(lt ed(cation,;$6= (t *hether they 'ay e re!arded as 9separate9 for's or not cannot e ans*ered on the stren!th of this passa!e. <t the very least they correspond to the for's8 aspect as 9(niversals,9 altho(!h even this is not entirely e)plicit. Unlike the characteriKation

of for's in %epu)lic 1#, they are not said to e posited for 9each '(ltiplicity to *hich *e !ive the sa'e na'e9 3>9Ba4. -nstead, *e have a pl(rality of senses 3si!ht, hearin!, etc.4 to *hich *e can apply the sa'e intepretive cate!ories. B(t it co'es to the sa'e thin!. &o say that *e oth see and hear ;$%= Cf. Bostock 96.99: 91e does 'ake it +(ite dear in this di!ression that he has not stopped elievin! in the for's, for the philosopher8s *ider vision is e)plicitly credited to his concern *ith the &orms of 0(stice, in0(stice, happiness, and so on 31%>c, and possi ly 1%Be4. &he sa'e concl(sion is also dear fro' later passa!es in o(r dialo!(e. B(t *hat is not very dear is ho* e)actly Plato no* conceives of the for's, or indeed *hether he has a definite vie* on this +(estion at all . . . . <ll that one can say *ith co'plete confidence is that they are still re!arded as i'percepti le entities 316>c.e, 19>d.19Ba4.9 ;$6= -n the %epu)lic si) sta!es are specified: 314 arith'etic, >$>a. ? 3$4 plane !eo'etry, >$Bc? 3"4 solid !eo'etry, >$6 ? 344 astrono'y, >$6c? 3>4 har'ony, >"#d? 3B4 dialectics, >"1d. &heaetet(s has st(died the first five of these *ith &heodor(s 314>c.d4. 7 9" 7 so'ethin! ea(tif(l is to say that 9 ea(tif(l9 is not a (ni+(e na'e, (t rather one that can e applied to a pl(rality of sensory e)periences? that is, it is a (niversal. &he present passa!e affir's the need for (niversals, and f(rther affir's that these (niversals are not red(ci le to sensory infor'ation, 9 (t rather the so(l, itself y itself, discerns *hat is co''on to all9 316>d.e4. Cet (s consider *hat is i'plied ontolo!ically y each e)a'ple, and to *hat e)tent each 'ay indeed e considered necessarily !iven in o(r e)perience. 9Bein!9 is the first e)a'ple eca(se it has the !reatest !enerality, (t for that sa'e reason it indicates nothin! 'ore than the are need for s(ch concepts.;$9= &he e)a'ple of 9different9 and 9sa'e9 does, ho*ever, i'ply a differentiation *ithin reality, and is 'oreover a contrast that is al'ost (niversally e'ployed: even for 'odern neo.1eracleiteans like 5ietKsche and Derrida there are identifia le selves as *ell as differentiation 3ho*ever (nco'pleta le4. Cratyl(s 'i!ht perhaps re0ect s(ch a concept, in vie* of his insistence that *e cannot step into the sa'e river even once. Aet insofar as he contin(ed to point his fin!er he contin(ed to differentiate, and to i'ply the relative inte!rity of *hat he indicated. &he e)a'ples of 9one9 and 9t*o9 s(!!est that *e are intrinsically capa le of distin!(ishin! (nity fro' '(ltiplicity, and th(s that *e are y nat(re capa le of discri'inatin! et*een part and *hole. &his follo*s fro' the previo(s dichoto'y, for, as ,ocrates sho*s, if *e can distin!(ish one thin! fro' another, *e can distin!(ish et*een the (nity of the pair and the partic(larity of its 'e' ers. -f Cratyl(s, pointin!, distin!(ishes one thin! fro' another, he distin!(ishes the' also as parts *ithin a co'ple). &he ne)t pair, the si'ilar and dissi'ilar, has 'ore radical i'plications. -f *e discern si'ilarity and dissi'ilarity, then *e discern co''on feat(res? and if there are co''on feat(res, then so'ethin! like the e)istence of for's is indicated. -t is not necessary to assi!n an ontolo!ical stat(s to these for's, as Plato or <ristotle didIthey 'ay so far e interpreted 'erely episte'olo!ically, as in Descartes and Kant, or lin!(istically as in conte'porary tho(!htI (t there is no reason in the present passa!e to s(ppose that Plato8s Gie*s are any different here fro' those e)pressed in the Phaedo and %epu)lic . -n any case, *e 'ay at least !rant to Plato that *ith o(r 'ind8s eye *e see rese' lances, ;$9= @or a different vie*, see :ason Renakis, 9/ssence, Bein! and @act in Plato: <n <nalysis of Fne of Theaetetus 8Koina89 3*ant.Studien C2 ;19>%.>6= 1B%.614.

7 94 7 co''on properties, (niversals, in the *orld. &here is then at least a prima &acie case for an (nderlyin! ontolo!ical str(ct(re. Hith the concepts of odd and even, &heaetet(s e)plicitly introd(ces 'athe'atics, *hich *as only i'plicit in the earlier e)a'ple of one and t*o. Fne of Plato8s favorite ar!('ents for the ontolo!ical si!nificance of a priori for's of kno*led!e is the efficacy of 'athe'atics. -f the principles of 'athe'atics are kno*n to (s y nat(re, as the 'eno ar!(es, and if they also t(rn o(t to e the principles y *hich e)ternal nat(re operates, as astrono'y and Pytha!orean science s(!!est, then *e are y nat(re att(ned to (nderstandin! the str(ct(re of reality. &his *o(ld s(!!est not only that reality is co'prehensi le for practical p(rposes, (t also that it is inherentl! rational, and even that it has val(e, since the rational is the !ood. &he rational, val(e.laden aspect of the for's is 'ade e)plicit y the last t*o e)a'ples, the ea(tif(l and the !ood, and *ith the' the entire theory of for's is present y i'plication. &his is clearly the direction to *hich Plato points (s in the atte'pt to ans*er the e)tre'e 1eracleiteans.

<+ The Parentage o( Kno?ledge

-f the Theaetetus is hintin! that the 1eracleitean pro le'atic can e ans*ered y 'eans of the theory of for's, s(ch an ans*er see's open to the follo*in! o 0ection. -n sense perception, accordin! to the precedin! 'odel, the thin! 9ua perceived is not the sa'e as the thin! in itself 3the affective slo* 'otion4. &he offsprin! is not the sa'e as the parent. -f the sa'e 'odel is to e (sed no* for kno*led!e, it *o(ld follo* that the act of kno*in! also re+(ires t*o parentsIthe perceived o 0ect and o(r interpretive conceptsIand that it too prod(ces t*ins, kno*led!e and the thin! +(a kno*n. &he latter is not identical either *ith the thin! +(a perceived or *ith the thin! as it is in itself. Kno*led!e *o(ld then e possi le only in an e+(ivocal sense. &here are three levels: 314 the thin! in itself, that is, the o 0ective slo* 'otion? 3$4 the perception of that thin!, *hich is not identical *ith it, (t is one of its t*in offsprin!? and no* 3"4 $no ledge of that offsprin!, *hich is a ne* t*in offsprin!. &he thin! 9ua kno*n, therefore, is the !randchild of the thin! in itself? and kno*led!e, rather than rin!in! (s closer to reality than perception did, takes (s a step farther a*ay. -n this respect Kant and 1eracleit(s are (lti'ately allies. B(t Plato *o(ld not disa!ree either. -n fact s(ch considerations for' the asis of his clai' that kno*led!e of 7 9> 7 the e'pirical *orld is not possi le. 1o*ever, the for's, *hich are the o 0ects Ff tr(e kno*led!e for Plato, cannot e radically discontin(o(s fro' the physical *orld, or else the doctrine of recollection *o(ld 'ake no sense. 1o* then *o(ld Plato e a le to find for'al str(ct(re in a destr(ct(red reality of p(re fl()Iass('in! that he accepts that vie* of the physical *orldJ 1is ar!('ent that fl() cannot e the *hole story is the co(nterpart of the Parmenides 8 clai', +(oted a ove, that (nless there are for's all disco(rse eco'es i'possi le. 1ere the ar!('ent is that if there is only fl(), then the referents of *ords are constantly chan!in!, and *ords *ill have no sta le 'eanin!s and *ill e (lti'ately self.contradictory and incoherent 3161 .16" 4. /ven if Prota!oras *ere to reply that *ords need only refer to percept(al, not no('enal, reality, ,ocrates *o(ld press the point that, in a *orld of p(re fl(), *ords cannot refer to anythin! individ(ated, *hether o 0ective or s( 0ective. ,ocrates8 previo(s re'ark to &heodor(s 3*ho is the respondent here4 that 9they are no friends of yo(rs9 316# 4 s(!!ests that 'athe'atics too !ives (s reason to re0ect the e)tre'e for' of 1eracleiteanis'.

,ince the s( 0ective, relativistic aspect of the percept(al o 0ect '(st e passed alon! to its offsprin!, the o 0ect of e'pirical kno*led!e, s(ch kno*led!e does not reach as far as physical reality itself, *hich is p(re eco'in!. &hat is *hy ,ocrates had said that *e '(st search for kno*led!e 9in *hatever na'e the so(l has *hen, itself y itself, it is occ(pied *ith *hat is9 31>%a4. -n other *ords, if it is i'possi le to have kno*led!e of the offsprin! 3the e'pirical *orld4, or of one of its parents 3the perceived +(ality4, it is nevertheless possi le in the case of the other parent, the for's. &he for's '(st e kno*n, no lon!er in their children (t in the'selves. Cike li!ht 3one of Plato8s favorite 'etaphors4, their presence is detected initially y their ill('ination of e'pirical o 0ects, (t they can e kno*n in themselves only if *e a stract fro' the o 0ects ill('inated. &he i'portance of this *ay of lookin! at the pro le's of kno*led!e and perception e)plains Plato8s persistent (se of the parent.child the'e as a dra'atic leit'otiv in the early part of the dialo!(eIit appears in at least thirteen direct or indirect instances 3see a ove, section $4. -n one of those instances, ,ocrates t(rned o(t to e a 'i)t(re of &heaetet(s8s looks and yo(n! ,ocrates8 na'e. F(r looks or appearance reflect o(r chan!in! nat(re, the slo* 'otion of o(r fl(). F(r na'e, on the other hand, reflects o(r constant identity? and *hen *e t(rn fro' individ(als to co''on nat(res, the na'e reflects the eternal for'. &heaetet(s t(rns 7 9B 7 o(t to e the representative of appearance oth in ter's of *hat he shares *ith ,ocrates and in ter's of the *ay he atte'pts to define kno*led!e.;"#= -n fact his atte'pt to !ive an acco(nt of kno*led!e *ill fail eca(se he sees kno*led!e only in ter's of one of its parents, and is lind to the other.;"1=

5+ Fi)e 0odels o( Kno?ledge 4%5<a6-7%c8

&he a ove disc(ssions sho*, ,ocrates says, 9that *e sho(ld not seek ;kno*led!e= in perception at all, (t in *hatever the na'e is, *hen the so(l, itself y itself, is en!a!ed *ith *hat is real9 316%a4. &heaetet(s8s response to this is 'ini'al: he revises his definition of kno*led!e to 9tr(e opinion9 3

4. B(t ,ocrates, in ret(rn, *onders ho* an opinion co(ld ever e other*ise 316% .d4. -n an atte'pt to ans*er this he develops five 'odels of kno*led!e, *hich, like the earlier ref(tations, 'ay e constr(ed as pro!ressively 'ore ade+(ate hypotheses. = >=EEa.cA . &he first 'odel is the si'plest, deli erately a stractin! fro' learnin! and for!ettin!, and concentratin! only on kno*in! and not kno*in!. Fn this 'odel false opinion can 'ean only that *e think that 314 so'ethin! *e kno* is either 3a4 so'ethin! else that *e kno* or 3 4 so'ethin! that *e do not kno*? or else that 3$4 so'ethin! *e do not kno* is either 3a4 so'ethin! else that *e do not kno* or 3 4 so'ethin! that *e kno*. <ll these are interpreted as 0(d!'ents of identity, as if *e said, 31a4 9,ocrates, *ho' - kno*, is &heaetet(s, *ho' - also kno*,9 31 4 9,ocrates, *ho' - kno*, is so'eone *ho' - do not kno*,9 3$a4 9,ocrates, *ho' - don8t kno*, is &heaetet(s, *ho' - also don8t kno*,9 or 3$ 4 9,ocrates, *ho' - don8t kno*, is &heaetet(s, *ho' - kno*.9 Conse+(ently they are dis'issed as i'pla(si le acco(nts. 5evertheless, in cases of 'istaken identity any one of these kinds of 0(d!'ents 'i!ht arise. -n ad li!ht or fro' a distance 31a4 ;"#= Plato is perhaps conscio(s, too, of the irony that &heaetet(s died of 9fl(),9 dysentery 314$a4. <ltho(!h this 'ay e historically fact(al, there *as no need to 'ention it. ;"1= Decall the di!ression8s distinction et*een t*o kinds of seein! and t*o kinds of fail(re to see

31%4a.c, 1%>d, 1%Bc, 1%Be, and perhaps 1B> .c4. &here have also een literal references to the parent.child relationship, in ,ocrates8 re'arks a o(t his 'other, and his in+(iry a o(t the identity of &heaetet(s8s father. &he res(lt is that &heaetet(s is identified in ter's of his father, and ,ocrates in ter's of his 'other. -f this is not 'erely a coincidence 3it is, ho*ever, the only ti'e in the dialo!(es that Phaenarete is 'entioned, and perhaps the only ti'e that ,ocrates in+(ires after so'eone8s paternity4, perhaps it is a hint that there is so'ethin! one.sided 3 (t 0ointly co'ple'entary4 a o(t oth &heaetet(s8s e'phasis on percept(al 'aterial, and ,ocrates8 9sterile9 3as he descri es hi'self4 rational criticis's of the pro!eny of others. 7 9% 7 'i!ht 'istake ,ocrates for his yo(n!er look.alike, &heaetet(s? or 31 4 - 'i!ht fail to reco!niKe hi' and think he is so'eone - do not kno*? or, 3$a4 never havin! seen either Ce(kipp(s or De'ocrit(s, - 'i!ht hear the for'er lect(re and think he is the latter? or, 3$ 4 if there *ere so'e rese' lance et*een the', - 'i!ht see Ce(kipp(s and think at first that it *as ,ocrates. B(t this 'odel a stracts fro' sense perception as *ell as fro' learnin! and for!ettin!. -t is concerned only *ith the lo!ical relationship et*een the concepts of so'ethin! kno*n and so'ethin! not kno*n. -t is 'eant to e inade+(ate, as a *ay of forcin! (s into 'ore sophisticated for'(lations. &he parado) on *hich it is ased is ele!antly for'(lated y B(rnyeat: 9< necessary condition for 'istakin! F for G is also a s(fficient condition for not 'istakin! F for G . &he necessary condition is that one kno* F and G . B(t this, it is clai'ed, is a s(fficient condition for kno*in! that F is not G .9;"$= B >=EEc.=E2)A . &he second 'odel is ontolo!ical rather than episte'olo!ical. -t s( stit(tes 9 ein!9 for 9kno*in!,9 so that to have a false opinion 'eans to elieve 9*hat is not9 a o(t so'ethin! 3166d4. 1ere the 9is9 of 0(d!in! is interpreted as e)istential rather than identificatory, (t the revision does not resolve the diffic(lty. /arlier Prota!oras had insisted that there is no s(ch thin! as falsity 9 eca(se it is i'possi le to think *hat is not9 31B%a4. <nd here too ,ocrates concl(des that 9thinkin! *hat is not9 'eans 9thinkin! nothin!,9 *hich 'eans 9not thinkin!9 3169a4. Fnce a!ain i'portant distinctions have een s(ppressed, in partic(lar the distinction et*een the t*o senses of 9not ein!9 that *e *ill enco(nter in the Sophist : 9none)istence9 and 9difference.9 Pres('a ly this is done to ena le (s to perceive the inade+(acy of the 'ost si'plistic 'odels of e)planation, and th(s 'ake (s etter a le to appreciate the need for the pro!ressively increasin! co'ple)ity that *ill follo*. @ >=E2).=2DeA . -n the ne)t 'odel ,ocrates co' ines the first t*o. 5o* false opinion is 9other. elievin!9 3

4, *hich 'eans that *e 9al*ays have an opinion a o(t so'ethin! that is, (t of one thin! instead of another9 3169 .c4. &he first cla(se of that description is e)istential 39opinion a o(t so'ethin! that is94 like the previo(s 'odel, the second identificatory 39one thin! instead of another94 like the first one. &heaetet(s approves of this 'odel, 9for *hen so'eone thinks ea(tif(l instead of (!ly, or (!ly instead of ea(tif(l, then, 'ost tr(ly, his opinion is false9 31>9c4. <fter re (kin! hi' for the o)y'oronic ;"$= TP %%. 7 96 7 phrase 9tr(ly his opinion is false,9;""= ,ocrates de'(rs, sayin! that *e *o(ld never say that 9the ea(tif(l is (!ly9 or 9the (n0(st is 0(st9 or 9the odd is even9 319# 4.

,ocrates has perverted &heaetet(s8s 'eanin!. Clearly, &heaetet(s *as thinkin! of predication: 'y opinion is false if - elieve that a ea(tif(l thin! is (!ly 3so'ethin! (nfa'iliar 'ay see' (!ly to 'e at first, (t ea(tif(l on f(rther ac+(aintance4. B(t ,ocrates 'isrepresents the 0(d!'ent as one of identity, as in the first 'odal. Plato !ives *ith one hand and takes ack *ith the other. 1e has &heaetet(s re'ind (s that the f(nction of 0(d!'ent 'ay e predication 3*hich *o(ld !o a lon! *ay to*ard solvin! the present aporia4, (t he then has ,ocrates s(ppress the concept.;"4= -n fact this is the closest that the Theaetetus ever co'es to e)plorin! predication, even tho(!h it is dear fro' other dialo!(es 3 oth those considered to e earlier and those considered to e later4 that that is *here the 'odels for tr(e and false opinion '(st e so(!ht. C The 6a, Hloc$ >=2=c.=2?dA . <t this point learnin! and 'e'ory are added to the 'odel 3191c.d4, after havin! een e)pressly e)cl(ded since the e!innin!. Cearnin! is co'pared to the i'pression 'ade y a shape in a lock of *a), and 'e'ory is the retention of that shape. ,ocrates no* !oes thro(!h an odd, selectively e)ha(stive, list of types of 0(d!'ent, in order to discover cases *here false opinion is possi le ;"4= ,ince other dialo!(es e)plain predication in ter's of the participation of thin!s in for's, the present passa!e 'ay e intended as an indirect re'inder of the theory of for's, in keepin! *ith Cornford8s s(!!estion that 9the @or's are e)cl(ded ;fro' the Theaetetus = in order that *e 'ay see ho* *e can !et on *itho(t the'? and the ne!ative concl(sion of the *hole disc(ssion 'eans that, as Plato had ta(!ht ever since the discovery of the @or's, *itho(t the' there is no kno*led!e at all9 3PT* $64. He can connect this interpretation *ith 9Par'enides89 re'ark that 9in the case of each hypothesis not only '(st yo( e)a'ine *hat follo*s if *hat is hypothesiKed e)ists, (t also if it does not e)ist9 31">e.1"Ba4. &he Theaetetus 'ay e taken as s(ch an e)ercise *ith respect to the theory of for's. Cornford interprets the Theaetetus's 'any all(sions to earlier dialo!(es, in *hich the theories of for's and recollection *ere presented, as hints that those doctrines sho(ld e ro(!ht to ear on the present disc(ssions. 2cDo*ell, on the contrary, thinks that s(ch all(sions 9can e read as an i'plicit criticis' of the &heory of @or's and the &heory of Decollection9 3p. $194, and that 9it is hard to see ho* Plato co(ld have s(pposed, as Cornford8s thesis *o(ld i'ply, that a restate'ent of the &heory of @or's *o(ld solve all these pro le's at a stroke9 3p. $>64Ia vie* that he shares *ith Elenn 2orro* 39Plato and the 2athe'aticians: <n -nterpretation of ,ocrates8 Drea' in the Theaetetus ;$#1e.$#Bc=,9 Philosophical %evie , %9 ;19%#= "#9."" at "1$4 and Bostock $41.4". Fthers, s(ch as ,ayre 3P#' 1E n. $, 1">4 and 0Nr!en ,pr(te 39S er den /rkenntnis e!riff in Platons Theaitet,4 Phronesis 1" ;19B6= 4%. B%, esp. >$, B%4, are closer to Cornford8s position. - shall ar!(e that the theories of for's and recollection can, in facts lar!ely overco'e the aporiae of the Theaetetus . 7 99 7 319$a.c4.;">= -t is not possi le to 'ake false 0(d!'ents of the follo*in! kinds. 3K T so'ethin! Kno*n, D T so'ethin! De'e' ered, P T so'ethin! Perceived, C T so'ethin! *hose i'print *e place in Correspondence *ith *hat *e are perceivin! ;

=. Letters *ithin s+(are rackets indicate ter's that see' to e pres(pposed (t are not 'entioned. &he s( scripts indicate cases *here the te)t e,plicitl! speaks of 'istakin! one s(ch thin! ;)= for a di&&erent one ;y = ;altho(!h that condition is pres('a ly i'plicit in the other cases as *ell=. &h(s 1a translates as, 9Fne thin! that *e kno* and re'e' er (t do not perceive is so'ethin! else that *e kno* and

re'e' er (t do not perceive.94 1. a. 3KDUP4) .K c. UK) d. UK $. a. P) .P c. UP) d. UP ". a. 3KPC4) . 3KPC4) c. 3KPC4) 4. a. 3UKUP4) . 3UKUP4) c. 3UKUP4) >. is is is is is is is is is is is is is is 3KDUP4, UKUD UKy K Py UP UPy P 3KPC4y Ky ;UP= Py ;UK= 3UKUP4y UK, ;P= UPy ;K=

9-t re'ains in the follo*in! cases, if indeed any*here, that ;false 0(d!'ent= *ill co'e a o(t9 319$c.d4: a. K) . K) is is 3KP4y 3UKP4y

c. 3KP4) B.

is

3KP4y

9@alse 0(d!'ent re'ains in the follo*in! case3s49: a. 3KPUC4) . KP is is 3KPUC4y 319" .c, 194a4 KUPUC 319"d4

<ccordin! to >, false 0(d!'ent occ(rs *hen so'ethin! *e kno* 3and possi ly (t not necessarily perceive4 is 'istaken for so'ethin! ;">= :aco Klein 'akes the intri!(in! o servation that 0(st as 9&heodor(s . . . distin!(ished &ourteen o lon! rectan!les fro' the three e+(ilateral ones? . . . ,ocrates also distin!(ishes &ourteen cases in *hich false opinion is precl(ded fro' the three cases *hich ad'it it9 3Plato's Trilog! ;Chica!o: University of Chica!o Press, 19%%= 1$64. 7 1## 7 else that *e perceive 3and possi ly (t not necessarily kno*4. &he 'istake can happen only eca(se *e have failed to p(t the *a) i'print of the thin! *e kno* 3, 4 to!ether *ith the present perception 3! 4 *ell eno(!h to see that they do not fit.;"B= &his eco'es e)plicit in B, *here false 0(d!'ent is said to occ(r *hen so'ethin! *e kno* and perceive 3 (t *hose i'print *e 'ay not place in correspondence *ith the perception4 is 'istaken for so'ethin! else that *e kno* 3and possi ly (t not necessarily perceive4 and *hose i'print *e do not place in correspondence *ith the perception. -n other *ords, in the case of at least one of the thin!s that *e are conf(sin! *ith each other, *e fail to co'pare ade+(ately o(r kno*led!e 3i'print4 of a thin! *ith o(r perception of it. &he !eneral concl(sion that follo*s fro' all this 3altho(!h it is not clear *hy ,ocrates chooses 0(st the e)a'ples that he does4 is that false 0(d!'ent occ(rs eca(se *e so'eti'es fail to co'pare present perceptions *ith past i'prints properly. &he *a) 'odel is th(s s(ccessf(l in acco(ntin! for error in at least so'e cases of sense perception, (t ,ocrates no* proceeds to sho* that it fails *hen *e atte'pt to apply it to intelli!i le rather than visi le thin!s? for in that case *e can no lon!er speak of error as havin! to do *ith the fittin!.to!ether of kno*led!e *ith perception. @or e)a'ple, *hen *e 'entally add five and seven, and think the ans*er is eleven, *e then think that eleven, *hich *e kno*, is t*elve, *hich *e also kno*. B(t this *o(ld 'ean that *e think that one thin! that *e kno* 3 (t do not perceive4 is another that *e kno* 3and do not perceive4Ia scenario that has een declared i'possi le accordin! to the previo(s s(rvey of per'(tations 31a4, so the 'odel on *hich that s(rvey *as ased '(st e discarded 319Ba. 4. 5o* that this hypothesis has een discredited, a fifth one is proposed, (t efore *e t(rn to that *o(ld like to raise a +(estion a o(t the ela orate classification that *e have 0(st revie*ed: Hhat happens to the cate!ory of 'e'ory 3D4J <ltho(!h 'e'ory is presented as the distinctive feat(re of the *a) 'odel 3191d, 194d.e4, it is 'entioned in al'ost none of the cases specified.;"%= -t is present on oth sides of 1a, then on only one side of 1 , and then not at all in the rest of the classification. 2oreover, *hen 1a, 1 , and 1c are restated et*een steps > ;"B= -n the case of >a and >c, *here *e not only perceive (t also kno* ! , *e '(st also have failed to fit the perception of ! *ith its o*n i'print.

;"%= <ccordin!ly B(rnyeat 3TP 9%4 and Polansky 31664 do not even 'ention it in their sche'atic representations. <ll of ,ocrates8 e)a'ples are represented in ter's of P and K alone. 7 1#1 7 and B, D is left o(t alto!ether even tho(!h P is no* specified 'ore e)plicitly 319"a. 4. -t is left o(t a!ain *hen ,ocrates red(ces all the e)a'ples to a !eneral state'ent: 9- co(ld never have false opinions a o(t yo( and &heodor(s either *hen - kno* oth of yo( or *hen - kno* one (t not the other? and the sa'e applies to perceivin!, if yo( follo* 'e9 319" 4. <nd it is left o(t of the t*o s(''aries as *ell: at 194a. ,ocrates says that false opinion t(rned o(t to e i'possi le a o(t thin!s that *e do not kno* and have never perceived, (t possi le a o(t thin!s that *e oth kno* and perceive? at 19>c.d he s(''ariKes their findin!s as, 9false opinion e)ists neither in the relation of perceptions to one another nor in tho(!hts (t in the fittin!.to!ether of perception *ith tho(!ht.9 &h(s, in case Ba *e *ere told that the reason for the 'is'atch et*een the t*o o 0ects is that the perception is indistinct 319" . c4, (t nothin! *as said a o(t the o vio(s possi ility that one8s memor! of one of the' 'i!ht e indistinct, altho(!h the possi ility is e)plicitly (ilt into the 'odel 3194e4. &he reason that 'e'ory disappears fro' consideration see's to e that it is conceived in a *ay that e+(ates it *ith active kno*led!e. &his can e seen fro' the fact that, in the three places *here it does appear, its tr(th val(e is identical *ith that of kno*led!e. Fn this 'odel, to kno* is to re'e' er and to re'e' er is to kno*. 2e'ory re'ains i'plicitly present in ter's of C 3*hich *as introd(ced after D *as dropped4, for the a ility to 'atch the i'print to the perception i'plies havin! a correct 'e'ory of o(r for'er perception, (t to s( stit(te C for D is to leave o(t *hat is distinctive a o(t 'e'ory, that is, the fact that it 'ay eco'e partially (t not *holly lost, that it 'ay e)ist in a state of latency. &hat *ill e re'edied y the 9havin!/possessin!9 distinction 'ade in the ne)t 'odel, the aviary. -f all this is 'eant to 'ake (s a*are of the inade+(acy of the *a). lock 'odel of 'e'ory, the ela orateness of the device *o(ld see' to e an indication of the i'portance of 'e'ory to the dialo!(e8s concerns. 1 The #viar! >=2?d.BDDcA . &he fact that 'e'ory can e latent rather than act(aliKed is ill(strated at the very e!innin! of the aviary 'odel. ,ocrates asks &heaetet(s, 91ave yo( heard *hat people no* say that kno*in! isJ9 and &heaetet(s replies, 9Perhaps, (t - do not re'e' er at present9 319%a4. <ppropriately, ,ocrates !oes on to distin!(ish 9havin!9 kno*led!e, *hich i'plies a*areness, fro' 9possessin!9 it, *hich does not. Hhen *e learn so'ethin!, *e possess it? (t if like &heaetet(s *e cannot recall it, then *e cannot e said to have it at 7 1#$ 7 that 'o'ent. -t is as if o(r 'ind *ere an aviary containin! 9all kinds of irds, so'e in flocks apart fro' the others, others in s'all !ro(ps, and so'e alone flyin! rando'ly thro(!h the' all9 319%d4. -t is far fro' dear *hat these last details refer to. Plato 'ay have in 'ind the sort of pro!ression that <ristotle *rites of at the e!innin! of the 'etaph!sics : fro' individ(al perceptions 3rando' individ(als4, to the e,perience that res(lts fro' a '(ltiplicity of si'ilar perceptions 3s'all !ro(ps4, to the science that discerns the principle co''on to all s(ch perceptions 3distinct flocks4. <lternatively, the pict(re 'ay e a reference to the 'ethod of collection 3*hich *as all(ded to at 14%d4. &he sin!le irds 'ay e individ(al kno*led!es that have not yet een related to others, as *hen *e do not yet see that o(r kno*led!e of ,ocrates and o(r kno*led!e of &heaetet(s elon! to!ether *ithin a kno*led!e of the species of h('an ein!s. &he s'all !ro(ps 'ay represent vario(s kno*led!es of species that have not yet een discerned as e' raced *ithin a !en(s, as *hen *e reco!niKe the species of h('an

ein!s (t do not yet see its relationship to other ani'als. <nd the flocks 'ay represent o(r kno*led!e of !enera. Fn either e)planation the aviary appears to ill(strate the pro!ression of kno*led!e fro' individ(al perceptions to (niversal kinds.;"6= &he aviary is e'pty at o(r irth, and the kno*led!es that *e ac+(ire thro(!h learnin! are irds that *e capt(re for the aviary. Hhen *e first catch one and i'prison it, *e 'ay e said to 9possess9 it, (t *e do not act(ally 9have9 it (ntil *e catch hold of it a!ain 319%c.e4, that is, 'ake (se of it. &he 'odal has the advanta!e over the *a) lock that it can acco(nt for kno*led!e that is latent rather than act(al. B(t it has the disadvanta!e that it is no lon!er possi le to 'atch kno*led!e a!ainst perceptionIthe irds do not see' to refer to anythin! o(tside the aviary. &his does not see' at first to e a disadvanta!e, ho*ever, for ,ocrates8 e)a'ples are no lon!er concerned *ith percept(al kno*led!e (t only *ith 'athe'atics. -t is as if *e have no* 'oved eyond pistis to dianoia on the Divided Cine. B(t the 'odel cannot e assi'ilated to the doctrine of recollection, eca(se it posits a 'ind e'pty at irth and filled entirely y e'pirical 'eans. -n fact the s(!!estion that *e learn 'athe'atics y havin! it handed over fro' teacher to st(dent 3196a. 4 flies in the face of the 'eno . ;"6= Polansky, citin! Ce*is Ca'p ell 3The Theaetetus o& Plato ;F)ford: Clarendon Press, 166"= 199 n. 114, offers a different s(!!estion: 9&he s'all !ro(ps contain kno*led!e of species and !enera, *hich e' race these individ(als. &he solitary irds flyin! thro(!h all are the co''on thin!s, s(ch as ein!, like, !ood, and so on, referred to earlier 316>a ff49 319% and n. 4#4. 7 1#" 7 By distin!(ishin! et*een possessin! kno*led!e 3latently4 and havin! it 3actively4 the aviary 'odel ena les (s to avoid the parado)ical concl(sion that false opinion is si'ply not kno*in! *hat one kno*s 3199c4. He can no* say that it 'ay e not havin! *hat one possesses. B(t t*o other diffic(lties arise. -f false opinion is the 'istakin! of one ird for anotherI!raspin! the kno*led!e of eleven, for e)a'ple, *hen *e o(!ht to e !raspin! that of t*elveIthen *e 'ake a mista$e precisely y !raspin! a $no ledge , *hich is a very stran!e concl(sion. &h(s, first, for a person havin! kno*led!e of so'ethin!, to e i!norant of this very thin!, not thro(!h his i!norance (t thro(!h his kno*led!e? second, to have the opinion that this is so'ethin! else and so'ethin! else is this? ho* can it not e very a s(rd for the so(l, *hen kno*led!e has co'e to it, to kno* nothin! and e i!norant of everythin!J 3199d4 &heaetet(s s(!!ests circ('ventin! the pro le' y s(pposin! that the aviary contains i!norances as *ell as kno*led!es 3199e4, (t ,ocrates replies that in that case the pro le' that the aviary *as 'eant to solveI91o* can *e 'istake one thin! for anotherJ9Ireappears *ithin it. He '(st ask ho* *e can 'istake an i!norance for a kno*led!e, and any atte'pt to ans*er the +(estion *o(ld involve either an aporia or an infinite re!ress 3$##a.c4. B(t in a sense &heaetet(s is ri!ht, and *e do have i!norance *ithin the aviary: that *as precisely the point of distin!(ishin! et*een the 3latent4 possession and 3active4 havin! of kno*led!e. Hhen *e cannot !rasp a kno*led!e that *e possess, *e are at that 'o'ent not in a state of kno*in!. Possessin!, as distin!(ished fro' havin!, is a 'i)t(re of kno*led!e and i!norance. Cet (s consider the 'odel 'ore closely. ,ocrates says that 'istakin! eleven for t*elve *o(ld e like 'istakin! a pi!eon for a dove 3199 4. &he analo!y eco'es clearer *hen later, in a different conte)t, ,ocrates says that *e have the sa'e n(' er in 'ind 9*hen *e say one, t*o, three, fo(r, five, si)? or t*ice three? or three ti'es t*o? or fo(r pl(s t*o? or three pl(s t*o pl(s one9 3$#4 .c4. &his 'eans, if *e apply it to the present case, that o(r kno*led!e of eleven '(st incl(de > V B and 4 V %, *hile o(r kno*led!e of t*elve *o(ld incl(de > V %, *hich s(fficiently rese' les the other t*o that

it is readily 'istaken for the', as a pi!eon is for a dove.;"9= Hhen *e first 'ake s(ch a 'istake, *e place into o(r ;"9= <lso see D. 1ackforth, 9&he <viary &heory in the Theaetetus 9 3"lassical /uarterl! "$ ;19"6= $%. $94 $6. &he fact that *e can kno* a n(' er 3especially a lar!e one4 *itho(t kno*in! all the vario(s operations y *hich it 'ay e derived 39one, t*o, three, fo(r, five, si)? or t*ice three? or three ti'es t*o? or fo(r pl(s t*o? or three pl(s t*o pl(s one94, sho*s that a n(' er is a *hole that is not 'erely the s(' of its parts. &his *ill e of so'e i'portance later on. 7 1#4 7 aviary an 9i!norance,9 that % V> T 11, *hich *e 'ay contin(e to find there. 1o* then *o(ld *e ans*er ,ocrates8 +(estion as to ho* *e can think that so'ethin! *e kno* is so'ethin! *e do not kno*J Fn the *a) 'odel s(ch false opinions *ere e)plained as a 'is'atchin! of perception to kno*led!e 3 eca(se, for e)a'ple, of the for'er8s indistinctness4. B(t the aviary 'odel cannot provide s(ch an e)planation, eca(se the irds, (nlike the *a) i'pressions, do not re&er to anythin! eyond the'selves. -t often happens in Platonic dialectic that if t*o hypotheses are re0ected a third is proposed that co' ines the positive feat(res of each *hile avoidin! their *eaknesses, as n(' er " in this section co' ined n(' ers 1 and $.;4#= 5o si)th 'odel is proposed here to follo* the *a) and aviary hypotheses, (t if *e try to i'a!ine *hat s(ch a 'odel *o(ld have to e like, it *o(ld e one that co' ined the 9reco!nition9 factor of the *a) 'odal *ith the 9latency9 factor of the aviary 'odel.;41= -n vie* of the e'phasis on 'e'ory oth in the last t*o sections and in the dra'atic yplay of the openin! of the dialo!(e, and in vie* of the fre+(ent all(sions to the 'eno , it 'ay e si!nificant that the doctrine of recollection does in fact incorporate oth the feat(res of latency and reco!nition. &hat *e are 'eant to co'e a*ay *ith so'ethin! positive fro' these disc(ssions is s(!!ested y the fact that ,ocrates co(ld have ref(ted the 9kno*led!e is tr(e opinion9 definition at the very o(tset if he had chosen to. <fter the aviary 'odel is dis'issed, &heaetet(s reiterates this definition as still the est he can devise, and ,ocrates replies that tr(e opinion cannot e the sa'e as kno*led!e, eca(se 0(rors can e pers(aded to have a tr(e opinion a o(t so'ethin! they have not *itnessed, *hereas only eye*itnesses have kno*led!e 3$#1 .c4.;4$= ,ince ,ocrates ;4#= Des0ardins has doc('ented in detail ho* this kind of dialectic for's the ack. one of the Theaetetus , as *ell as fi!(rin! stron!ly in other dialo!(es. ,he sche'atiKes it as a kind of destr(ctive dile''a, in *hich the (naccepta le conse+(ences of an ori!inal dis0(nction i'ply the need to replace that dis0(nction *ith a third possi ility, in *hich the ori!inal opposition is reconciledI y 'eans of *hat she ter's the 9co'ple) e'er!ence of ne* entities.9 ,ee her %E . ;41= :ohn <ckrill points o(t that 9at the very e!innin! 3191d>4, ,ocrates says: 8*hatever *e *ant to re'e' er, of the thin!s *e see or hear or thin$ o&, *e i'print on the lock.8 5othin! is 'ade of this last case *ithin the *a) lock section. B(t at the transition to the aviary it is dearly i'plied that ite's tho(!ht of and i'printed on the lock are 3or incl(de4 a stract or (niversal ideas &h(s the acco(nt of 'isidentification in ter's of the 'isconnectin! of t*o ite's . . . can e *idened to cover 'isdescription and 'isclassification9 39Plato on @alse Belief: Theaetetus 16%.$##,9 The 'onist ># ;19BB= "6".4#$ at "944. 1ence Plato prepares (s in advance for the fact that the *a) 'odal can e 'ade to conver!e *ith the aviary 'odel. ;4$= <s B(rnyear points o(t 3TP 1$44, a fe* lines earlier ,ocrates see's to say that it 'i!ht have een possi le for the advocates to !ive the 0(rors s(ch kno*led!e thro(!h their oratory, if ti'e *ere not so li'ited 3$#1a. 4. &he tension et*een these passa!es is an interestin! one, (t it does not affect the present point. - shall co''ent on that tension later on.

7 1#> 7 does not offer this si'ple (t cr(shin! ref(tation at the o(tset, (t chooses first to develop the a ortive 'odels in detail, it is *orth tryin! to see the val(e of their i'plications. ,ocrates8 re'ark that *e can only kno* *hat *e have seen 3$#1 4 is re'iniscent 3at a different level4 of the clai' that lies at the asis of the doctrine of recollection. <s the 'eno p(ts it, kno*led!e is possi le eca(se in so'e sense *e have already 9seen9 reality.;4"= He can e)tend the aviary 'odel in this direction. -n so'e sense *e have latent kno*led!e of reality a priori , and *e can add this kind of ird to the latent 'e'ories of a posteriori kno*led!e *ith *hich ,ocrates stocked the aviary. Beca(se the for'er is only latent *e cannot al*ays !rasp it, 0(st as *e cannot al*ays !rasp the correct ird in the ori!inal aviary. Hhen *e perceive so'ethin! 3*hether *ith the senses or the 'ind4, it re'inds (s of one of these irds? and if *e can !rasp the correct ird, *e then have kno*led!e of the thin! perceived. B(t eca(se 'any of the irds rese' le one another, and eca(se they are 3as latent4 indistinct,;44= *e can 'is'atch a perception *ith a latent kno*led!e. &his 'odel 3even in cases that do not re+(ire an a priori factor4 avoids the parado)es of the other one eca(se *hen *e 'ake a 'istake *e are not in active possession of kno*led!e. <ctive kno*led!e arises only fro' the correct 'atch 3i.e., reco!nition4 et*een latent kno*led!e and perception. /ven the revised aviary 'odel, ho*ever, *o(ld leave (s *ith the pro le' of ho* *e can tell *hen *e are 'atchin! correctly. 1o* can *e distin!(ish in practice et*een the tr(e 'atchin! of > V % T 1$ and the false 'atchin! of > V % T 11, or, 'ore recalcitrantly, et*een 9:(stice is an ar itrary convention9 and 9:(stice is a nat(ral val(e9J -f the *a) lock provided (s *ith a correspondence 'odel of tr(th, the aviary, *hich 'akes no reference to anythin! o(tside (s, i'plicitly provides (s *ith so'ethin! 'ore like a coherence 'odel. @ive and seven do not 9correspond9 to the t*elve. ird in the sa'e sense that o(r re'e' ered kno*led!e of &heaetet(s corresponds to the &heaetet(s *ho' *e no* perceive? rather, the proposition > V % T 1$ is internally coherent. -n the case of the arith'etical e)a'ples that ,ocrates !ives thro(!h. ;4"= 61c? cf. Phaedrus $49e.$>#a. ;44= Cf. the disc(ssion of 1B>d, p. 6" a ove. 7 1#B 7 o(t the aviary disc(ssion, *e can see ho* the tr(th of the propositions 'i!ht e tested y co(ntin!,;4>= (t no 'ethod is !iven to (s y *hich *e 'i!ht test the tr(th of o(r opinions generall! . &hat see's to e the f(nction of the concept of logos , *hich *ill no* e introd(ced, and *hich plays a si'ilar role in the 'eno 396a4. -f the *a) and aviary 'odels are related to each other as the correspondence and coherence 'odels of tr(th, then in the Theaetetus correspondence leads to coherence, *hich in t(rn leads to the need for so'e kind of 'ethodolo!y or lo!os. < central pro le' of the correspondence 'odel of tr(th has al*ays een that of validation: 1o* can *e tell *hether o(r tho(!hts correspond to so'ethin! o(tside the', since *e cannot !et o(tside o(r tho(!hts to co'pare the t*oJ <ccordin!ly, proponents of a correspondence theory of tr(th tend in !eneral to 'ake (se of a coherence 'odel in order to validate correspondence. ,ince no other validation is possi le, if *e can ass('e that reality is lo!ically coherent, the de!ree of coherence Hithin o(r tho(!hts *ill e a !ood test of the de!ree to *hich they correspond *ith reality. &his *as certainly Plato8s vie*, and to!ether *ith the correspondence 'odel i'plicit in the theories of recollection and p(rification, a coherentis' is i'plicit in the 'ethods of hypothesis and division.;4B= &h(s in the 'eno ,ocrates defends the dianoetic

3coherence4 approach to noetic 3evidentness and correspondence4 kno*led!e y sayin!, 9,ince all nat(re is akin, and since the so(l has learned all thin!s ;9prenatally,9 (t has since 9for!otten9 the'=, then if it recollects even one thin!I*hich people call learnin! itInothin! prevents it fro' discoverin! all other thin!s if one is co(ra!eo(s and does not stop searchin!9 361d4. He sa* earlier 3n. 4$4 that ,ocrates !ives t*o apparently conflictin! acco(nts, in close pro)i'ity *ith each other, of ho* e'pirical kno*led!e 'ay e ac+(ired. <t $#1a he says, ;4>= Cf. B(rnyeat: 9Hhat corresponds in the <viary to the Ha) Block8s fittin! of an i'print to a perception is counting . Co(ntin! is the atte'pt to identify, not the ite's the'selves, a stract or concrete, *hich have n(' er, (t their n(' er9 3TP 1#94. ;4B= &he correspondence theory is possi le, 'oreover, only on the ass('ption that so'ethin! is evident to (s independently of o(r tho(!hts. <ccordin!ly, if correspondence leads to coherentis' as a 'ethod of validatin! its s(ccess, it leads to evidentness or 9ill('ination9 as a 0(stification of its possi ility 3cf. Phaedo 22e, %epu)lic >#%d. >#9c, Phaedrus $46d4. &his tri(ne conception of tr(th 'ay e fo(nd in <ristotle as *ell: not only is he the first e)plicitly to for'(late the correspondence theory, (t he is also the first to *ork o(t in detail the lo!ic of coherence as a tool or 9or!anon9 of achievin! correspondence, and he also 'akes (se of the i'a!e of evidentness or ill('ination 3e.!.,8 'etaph!sics a . 1.99" 9.114. -t is often said that Descartes and his s(ccessors replaced the correspondence theory *ith the coherence theory, (t it *o(ld e 'ore acc(rate to say that they disengaged the coherence theory fro' the correspondence theory. 7 1#% 7 Fr do yo( think there are any teachers so clever that, in cases of ro ery or other violence *here there *ere no *itnesses, they are a le to teach, *ithin the short ti'e allo*ed y the *ater clock, the tr(th a o(t *hat happenedJ B(t at $#1 .c he !oes on to say, Hhen 0(rors are 0(stly pers(aded a o(t 'atters that can e kno*n only y an eye*itness and not other*ise, if then they decide these thin!s fro' hearsay, ac+(irin! a tr(e opinion, don8t they decide *itho(t kno*led!e, ein! ri!htly pers(aded if they passed 0(d!'ent *ellJ &he first state'ent appears to accept that, if 'ore ti'e *ere availa le, teachin! could take the place of *itnessin!? the second insists that that is not possi le. He co(ld escape fro' the tension y interpretin! the first re'ark in the sense of 9especiall! *ithin the short ti'e allo*ed y the *ater clock,9 *hich *o(ld re'ove the tension (t *o(ld not e)plain *hy ,ocrates others to 'ention the clock at all, a reference that only conf(ses the iss(e. Dather than tryin! in this *ay to eli'inate the tension, et*een the direct kno*in! of the *itness and the indirect kno*in! of those to *ho' the facts are de'onstrated y ar!('ent, *e *ill do etter to notice that this tension, *hich is operative *ith respect to kno*led!e of the physical *orld, drops a*ay at the level of noetic kno*led!e. <s the 'eno's slave de'onstration sho*ed, at this level rational ar!('ent 'ay indeed rin! (s to the point *here *e are capa le of seein! for o(rselves, *here pers(asion and *itnessin!, coherence and correspondence, coincide 36>c.d4.;4%=

&+ The #ogos o( Kno?ledge 4-7%c6-%7d8

-n response to ,ocrates8 co(ntere)a'ple a o(t 0(ries, &heaetet(s s(ddenly recalls so'ethin! that he had for!otten 3at 146e he said that he had never heard a definition of kno*led!e4: he once heard so'eone say that kno*led!e is tr(e opinion *ith a lo!os 3$#1c4. -n an inadvertent ill(stration of the

pheno'enon of recollection, he does not think that he can e)plicate this clai' hi'self, (t thinks that he co(ld follo* so'eone else *ho did. ,ocrates replies, 89Cisten, then, to a drea' in 7 1#6 7 e)chan!e for a drea', for - see'ed to hear it fro' certain people9 3$#1d.e4. &he p(KKlin! description of this theory as a drea' has !iven rise to several e)planations.;46= -t is re'iniscent of the (se of that ter' in a previo(sly cited passa!e of the 'eno : 9<t present these opinions, havin! 0(st een stirred (p in hi', are like a drea'. -f, ho*ever, one *ere to ask hi' the sa'e thin!s 'any ti'es and in 'any *ays, yo( kno* that finally he *o(ld have kno*led!e of the' that is no less acc(rate than anyone8s9 36>c.d4. Perhaps the (se of the ter' 9drea'9 here in the Theaetetus is 'eant to s(!!est that the theory that follo*s is one that *e sho(ld e a le to reco!niKe as tr(e, (t only indistinctlyIas 2eno8s slave reco!niKed the tr(th of the 'athe'atical de'onstration. -t is a not.yet.ade+(ate 9recollection9 of the nat(re of kno*led!e. B(t eca(se of its lack of distinctness, &heaetet(s, *ho like the slave can follo* it (t not e)hi it it hi'self,;49= *ill never s(ccessf(lly for'(late it in this dialo!(e. /arlier, ,ocrates descri ed the so(l8s thinkin! as 9nothin! other than a talk ;

= *ith itself, in *hich it asks itself +(estions and ans*ers the', and affir's and denies9 3169e.19#a4. <ccordin! to 2eno8s parado), if *e need to ask the +(estions in the first place, ho* can *e ans*er the' y o(rselvesJ Conversely, if *e can ans*er the', *hy did *e need to ask the'J Fn the theory of recollection this kind of dialo!(e 7 1#9 7 is possi le eca(se *e kno* the ans*ers latently (t not overtly, and o(r self.+(estionin! is desi!ned to rin! the 9drea'9 into clearer foc(s. &he sa'e is tr(e of ,ocrates8 'aie(tic +(estionin!. ,ocrates says that he is like a 'id*ife in that he is sterile 3*ith re!ard to *isdo'4, and that he has al*ays een so 31># 4. B(t he said earlier that altho(!h 'id*ives '(st e past child earin!, they '(st also have previo(sly !iven irth, 9 eca(se h('an nat(re is too *eak to ac+(ire an art concernin! thin!s *ith *hich it is not e)perienced9 3149 .c4. -t does not see' possi le, then, that ,ocrates *as al*ays sterile Ior, at least, if he can e a 'id*ife to *isdo', he '(st have so'ethin! li$e a 9'e'ory9 or 9recollection9 of *isdo', even if he never act(ally had *isdo'. Hith ,ocrates as his 'id*ife, &heaetet(s prod(ces three versions of the drea' theory, the third of *hich itself has three divisions. &he theory is 9that the pri'ary ele'ents fro' *hich *e and everythin! else are co'posed have no lo!os.9 &hey can only e na'ed? *e cannot even say that an ele'ent is or is not, or *e *o(ld e addin! ein! or not. ein! to it. B(t *e can !ive a lo!os of co'posite thin!s y na'in! the ele'ents of *hich they are co'posed 3$#1e.$#$c4. &heaetet(s reco!niKes this as the theory he has heard. &he paradi!'s that this theory has in 'ind, ,ocrates says, are 9the ele'ental letters and co'posite sylla les of *ritin! ;

'eans oth 9ele'ents9 and 9letters9=. Fr do yo( think that the one *ho said the thin!s *e have 'entioned *as lookin! so'e*here elseJ9 3$#$e4. &heaetet(s ans*ers in the ne!ative, (t others have

not al*ays een so s(re.;>#= = >BD@a.dA . ,ocrates first points o(t that it 'akes no sense to say that the sylla le can e kno*n only on the asis of its ele'ents, its co'ponent letters. @or since the letters are ele'ents, they are not red(ci le to a f(rther lo!os? (t since kno*led!e e, h!pothesi re+(ires a lo!os, the letters '(st e (nkno*a le. -n that case they can hardly confer kno*a ility Upon the sylla le. @or e)a'ple, if kno*in! the first sylla le of 9,ocrates9 'eans that *e can !ive an acco(nt 3

4 of it y analyKin! it into the letters , and o , *e *ill e (na le to kno* these ;>#= /.!., Hinifred 1icken 39Kno*led!e and @or's in Plato8s Theaetetus,4 Journal o& 5ellenic Studies %% ;19>%= 46.>"4, 2orro* "$6, @riedlOnder ".16B. -t is !enerally reco!niKed that certain aspects of the drea' theory are re'iniscent of the theory of for's. Hhether the ref(tation of the drea' theory is there y also a ref(tation of the theory of for's is, ho*ever, a 'atter of disp(te. Dorty $"> and K(nion Hatana e 39&he Theaete.tus on Cetters and Kno*led!e,9 Phronesis "$ ;196%= 14".B>, esp. 1B"4 think that it does ref(te it, *hile 1icken >#.>1 and 2cDo*ell $4".44 ar!(e that it does not. 7 11# 7 ele'ents the'selves eca(se they are not f(rther analyKa le into so'ethin! 'ore ele'ental still. -t is th(s pro le'atic ho* a co'ple) can e kno*n in ter's of ele'ents that are the'selves not kno*n. B >BD@e.BD?cA . ,ocrates then distin!(ishes a 9*hole9 3

4 fro' a 9s('9 3 4. ,FCD<&/,: Perhaps *e sho(ld have proposed, not that the sylla le is its ele'ents, (t that fro' these a sin!le for' ;

= arises, *hich itself has a sin!le -dea ; = of its o*n, different fro' the ele'ents. &1/</&/&U,: < sol(tely. <nd perhaps it *ill even e etter this *ay than the other. ,FCD<&/,: Cet it e then as *e are no* sayin!, the sylla le is a sin!le -dea ;

= arisin! fro' the several con0oined ele'ents, and it is the sa'e in *ritin!s and in all other thin!s. &1/</&/&U,: < sol(tely.

B(t ,ocrates +(ickly c(ts off this ro(te of escape: ,FCD<&/,: -sn8t it the case that there '(st not e parts of itJ &1/</&/&U,: 1o* soJ ,FCD<&/,: Beca(se if so'ethin! has parts, the *hole is necessarily the s(' of parts. Fr do yo( also say that the *hole that arises fro' the parts '(st e so'e sin!le for' ;

= that is different fro' the s(' of the partsJ 3$#"e.$#4a4 &his ne* hypothesis is attacked *ith a dile''a, the first horn of *hich i''ediately collapses the ne* distinction et*een *hole and s('. 9< *hole is . . . that fro' *hich nothin! is 'issin!, and that fro' *hich so'ethin! is 'issin! is neither a *hole nor a s(', *hich to!ether eco'e the sa'e for the sa'e reason9 3$#>a4. ,ocrates8 o 0ection e!s the +(estion y ass('in! that no acco(nt of a 9*hole9 can e !iven that *o(ld satisfy the ori!inal stip(lation that it is 9*itho(t parts9 and 9different fro' the parts.9;>1= Can s(ch an acco(nt e !ivenJ -f a *hole is *itho(t parts, ho* can *e speak of it in ter's of 9the parts9 at allJ -t is this oddity that 'akes ,ocrates8 ref(tation pla(si le. &he ans*er *o(ld see' to lie in esta . ;>1= ,ee a ove, Chap. 1 ,1#, 1ypothesis li . <lso see 2cDo*ell $4".44: 9<t Parmenides 1>%c4.e$ Plato sets o(t an ar!('ent, e)ploitin! the sa'e principles as the a ove reductio ad a)surdum , in order ' sho* that *hat a part is a part of, i.e. a *hole, is not an entity desi!nated y the standard (se of the e)pression 8all the parts.8 . . . Plato deli erately, and pointedly, (ses a!ainst the drea' theory a pre'ise *hich he kno*s to e false.9 7 111 7 lishin! that a *hole is correlated to a s(', so that one can speak of the parts of the s(' in relation to the *hole, (t not as parts o& the *hole. &here are vario(s e)a'ples that can ill(strate s(ch a relation. a. < species can e tho(!ht of as a *hole, and in a sense *e can think of its 'e' ers as parts of the species? (t they are not parts in the strict sense, eca(se the species retains its inte!rity *hen individ(al 'e' ers cease to e)ist or co'e into ein!. Correlated *ith the species is the totality of its present 'e' ers, *hich stands to the species as a s(' to a *hole. &he totality is affected y addition and s( traction of parts, (t the species is not. . -n the case of a sylla le, since historically speech preceded *ritin!, the *hole so(nd *as !iven first Ias a (nity that *as only s( se+(ently analyKed into letters y later !ra''arians. Conse+(ently, in different lan!(a!es the sa'e so(nd is fre+(ently represented y different collections of ele'ents. &he lon! o, in the first sylla le of 9,ocrates,9 can e re!arded as a sin!le so(nd, as represented y the o'e!a in Ereek? or as a co' ination of t*o so(nds, a short o 3o 4 follo*ed y a lon! u , as represented y 9o(9 in the Hade.Eiles and pinyin syste's of transcri in! Chinese? or, for that 'atter, 9oh9 in /n!lish, *hich does not have separate vo*els correspondin! to the Ereek o'e!a 3lon! o 4 and o'icron 3short o 4, and therefore adds the h to indicate that the so(nd '(st e len!thened. /ven to the e)tent that a sylla le can e analyKed (npro le'atically into ele'ents, the s(' of the ele'ents is not the sa'e as the sylla le (nless they are properly (nited *ith re!ard to se+(ence, relative d(ration, e'phasis, and so on. &h(s, altho(!h in one sense *e can speak of the sylla le as the s(' of its constit(ent letters, in another sense it is a pre!iven *hole to *hich *e '(st look, as a paradi!', in order to p(t the ri!ht

ele'ents to!ether in the ri!ht *ay. Hholeness i'plies an organi;ation of the parts, *hereas a s(' is a si'ple a!!re!ation. -n ter's of ,ocrates8 later e)a'ple of the parts of a *a!on: *hen a *a!on has een dis'antled, or *ron!ly p(t to!ether, the parts constit(te a 'ere s('. &he s(' does not i'ply *holeness (ntil the parts have een p(t to!ether in a (ni+(ely correct *ay. c. <ccordin! to the theory of for's, as *ell, the essential character of a thin! precedes it as a paradi!', rather than follo*in! (pon it as a conse+(ence.;>$= &he i'portance of the s('/*hole distinction to the 7 11$ 7 theory of for's *as already visi le in the first ar!('ent of the Parmenides, the ar!('ent fro' participation 3Chapter 1, section 44. <n analo!o(s distinction *as visi le in relation to that dialo!(e8s treat'ent of the Fne, in the distinctions i'plicit in the differences et*een the first and second hypotheses, and e)plicit in the third 3Chapter 1, section 1#4. d. -n the Phaedo ,ocrates re0ects ,i''ias8s conception of the so(l as an epipheno'enon of odily parts 3a s('4. &he so(l is rather *hat 'akes possi le the or!aniKation of the odily ele'ents into a (nity in the first place. 1o* the t*o present hypotheses 3that a sylla le is its ele'ents, and that a sylla le is a *hole that is not identical *ith its parts4 'ay e inte!rated to achieve the 'odel of a *hole that is related to its parts (t is not identical *ith the' *ill eco'e evident in the third hypothesis, elo*.;>"= &he second horn of the dile''a is that if the sylla le is a *hole that ;>"= &he pro le' as presented here is related in part to Eail @ine8s interpretation of the drea' theory 39Kno*led!e and Logos in the Theaetetus,4 Philosophical %evie 66 ;19%9= "BB.9%4. ,he ar!(es that altho(!h one cannot kno* the *hole y en('eratin! the parts, 9(nderstandin! any syste' consists in (nderstandin! ho* its ele'ents are interrelated.9 B(t since it is also the case that 9one does not (nderstand a discipline8s ele'ents (ntil one (nderstands the syste' to *hich they elon!,9 it follo*s that 9acco(nts proceed in a circ(lar fashion9 3p. ">B4. &he circ(larity is not, she feels, 9an (nfort(nate pro le'. Dather, it is one of Plato8s si!nificant contri (tions to episte'olo!y to have seen that *e do not possess its of kno*led!e in isolated, fra!'ented se!'ents9 3p. "9B4. -n another sense, of co(rse, Plato does re!ard the circ(larity as an (nfort(nate pro le'Ii.e., insofar as it !ives rise to 2eno8s parado). &he only *ay o(t is that the *hole '(st in so'e sense e !iven independently of the parts. &he 'etaphor of recollection of for's *o(ld e one *ay of representin! s(ch !ivenness. <le)ander 5eha'as *rites, 9&he interrelation 'odel of kno*led!e *as act(ally first located in the dialo!(e y 2ay Aoh . . . . Aoh, ho*ever, proceeds to connect this pro'isin! 'odel, +(ite !rat(ito(sly, *ith the theory of @or's9 39Epist:m: and Logos in Plato8s Cater &ho(!ht,9 in <nton and Pre(s, eds., $66 n. "$4. Aoh8s acco(nt differs fro' the present one in that she does not connect the for's *ith the *holes, or *ith the interrelation of the ele'ents, (t *ith the ele'ents the'selves 39Fn the &hird <tte'pted Definition of Kno*led!e, Theaetetus $#1c.$1# ,9 Dialogue 14 ;19%>= 4$#.4$, esp. 4"#4. -n this respect - *o(ld not disa!ree *ith 5eha'as that the connection is !rat(ito(s. B(t it is not !rat(ito(s to rin! in the for's *hen they are conceived not as ele'ents (t as principles of (nity. 7 11" 7 is not co'posed Ff parts, then it is as irred(ci le as the letters, and e+(ally (nkno*a le 3 y lo!os4: 9&he sylla le falls into the sa'e for' ;

= ;as the ele'ents= if it has no parts and is a sin!le -dea ;

=9 3$#>d4. ,ocrates adds a 'ore !eneral o 0ection to the drea' theory. F(r e)perience in the learnin! of *ritin! and '(sic has ta(!ht (s that it is easier to kno* the ele'ents than the co'posites, *hich is the opposite of *hat the theory clai's.;>4= 1e adds that this can e de'onstrated in other *ays as *ell 3$#Bc4. -n vie* of the *ay that the lan!(a!e in the a ove +(otations irresisti ly re'inds (s of the theory of for's, it *o(ld not e s(rprisin! if the pri'acy of kno*in! 9(nifor'9 for's over '(ltifor' individ(als 'ay e *hat is meant .;>>= @a >BD?c.eA . ,ocrates leaves aside the s('/part/*hole +(estion and t(rns to the +(estion of *hat is 'eant y lo!os. &he first hypothesis is that it 'eans the 'irrorin! in *ords of one8s opinions. &he hypothesis is dis'issed eca(se lo!os in this sense is nat(ral to all nor'al people, so nothin! *o(ld e !ained y addin! 9*ith lo!os9 to the definition of kno*led!e as ri!ht opinion. &he i'a!e 8*ith *hich the hypothesis *as presented is nevertheless a strikin! one: 9the 'akin! dear of one8s o*n tho(!ht ;

= thro(!h the voice *ith ver s and no(ns, as in a 'irror or *ater, i'a!in! the opinion in the strea' thro(!h the 'o(th9 3$#Bd4. 1ere *ords are vie*ed fro' the other side, as pri'ary ele'ents of 'eanin! rather than as derivative co'ple)es of ele'ental letters. 5o(ns and ver s are the re!(larities that 'ake it possi le to !ive 'eanin!f(l for' to the other*ise (ndifferentiated strea' of voice thro(!h the 'o(th. -n the sa'e *ay the for's al*ays *ere for Plato the re!(larities that 'ade it possi le for a 'eanin!f(l *orld to arise o(t of the (ndifferentiated strea' of 1eracleitean fl(). 1ere the analo!y et*een no(ns and ver s, on one hand, and for's, on the other, is never 'ade e)plicit, (t in the Sophist no(ns and ver s *ill f(nction as the si!ns of individ(al for's 3$>9e.$B4 4. &here the /leatic stran!er *ill echo ,ocrates, sayin! that speech 3 4 'anifests o(r tho(!ht 3 4 in 9a strea' proceedin! fro' the so(l thro(!h the 'o(th *ith voice9 3$B"e4? ;>4= $#Ba. . B(rnyeat notes that 9his silence a o(t '(sical str(ct(re has the sa'e provocative intent as his silence a o(t the order of letters in a sylla le. -n '(sic it is even 'ore o vio(s than in spellin! that the en('eration of ele'ents is not eno(!h. -t is act(ally i'possi le to en('erate '(sical ele'ents *itho(t reference, i'plicit or e)plicit, to str(ct(re9 3TP $1# n. 944. 7 114 7 (t he adds that speech is possi le only 9 eca(se of the inter*eavin! of for's *ith one another9 3$>9e4. @) >BD<a.BDE)A . &he second hypothesis is that lo!os 'eans an acco(nt of so'ethin! in ter's of its ele'ents, s(ch as listin! the parts of a *a!on. &his is ref(ted y the o servation that one 'ay e a le to en('erate ele'ents *itho(t havin! kno*led!e in the nor'al sense. ,o'eone 'i!ht say, for e)a'ple,

that the first sylla le of 9&heaetet(s9 is spelled 9&he9 3/ V e 4, (t incorrectly think that the first sylla le of 9&heodoros9 is spelled 9&e9 3& V e 4. -n this case he does not $no ho* to spell the sylla le, (t !ets it ri!ht in the first case y ri!ht opinion. &herefore, on this (nderstandin! of lo!os, *e can satisfy the definition *itho(t havin! kno*led!e 3$#%d.$#6 4. <ltho(!h this hypothesis does not f(rther the investi!ation directly, the e)a'ples (sed have i'plications that f(rther it indirectly. -n the Theaetetus ,ocrates ref(tes the 9drea'9 theory in ter's of the *ay *e learn to read. ,ylla les are *holes, and all kno*led!e is of a *hole in ter's of its parts, s(ch as the sylla le in ter's of its letters? (t on that definition of kno*led!e the (lti'ate ele'ents or letters *ill e (nkno*a le since they have no parts 3e.!., S and o in the first sylla le of 9,ocrates94, and kno*led!e of the sylla le *ill e indistin!(isha le fro' ri!ht opinion 3e.!., 9&he9 in the na'es 9&heaetet(s9 and 9&heodor(s94. B(t *hen *e think a o(t this e)a'ple of readin!, *e find that ,ocrates has inverted it. He noted a ove that historically it *as speech that preceded *ritin!, rather than the reverse, and it is even 'ore o vio(s that as individ(als *e learn to read only after *e learn speech. &herefore *e learn letters in ter's of sylla les, and sylla les in ter's of *ords, instead of the other *ay aro(nd. -n fact the Statesman *ill 'ake this point e)plicitly. -n a passa!e that recalls ,ocrates8 e)a'ple here of the child *ho can spell the sylla le 9&he9 in 9&heaetet(s9 (t cannot spell the sa'e sylla le in 9&heodor(s,9 the /leatic stran!er says that children learn letters y seein! at first ho* they constit(te the si'plest sylla les, and then (sin! this kno*led!e as a paradi!' for reco!niKin! the sa'e letters in 'ore diffic(lt sylla les. &he letters are then kno*n in ter's of their sa'eness *ith and difference fro' the letters in other sylla les 3$%%e.$%6c4. &h(s *e co'e to kno* parts y noticin! the si'ilarities and differences a'on! *holes, and seein! ho* these are reflected in the parts. Kno*led!e of the *hole precedes that of the parts. &his point follo*s even 'ore dearly fro' the e)a'ple of kno*in! the *a!on y listin! its parts. ,ocrates adds that it *o(ld not, on this 7 11> 7 definition, co(nt as kno*in! the *a!on if *e co(ld na'e the *heels, a)le, ody, rails, and yoke, (t not the 9h(ndred pieces of *ood9 fro' *hich they are (ilt 3$#%a4? nor as kno*in! the na'e 9&heaetet(s9 if one co(ld list the sylla les (t not the letters 3$#% 4. &he reference to kno*in! the name y kno*in! the sylla les re'inds (s that the present disc(ssion of *hole and parts had alto!ether a stracted fro' the na'e or *ord as a *hole, and asked only a o(t the relationship et*een letter and sylla le. B(t the 'eanin! of the sylla le co'es fro' t*o directions: fro' the letters, *hich f(rnish its 'aterials, and fro' the *ord itselfIthe no(ns and ver s 'entioned at $#BdI*hich !ives the sylla les their p(rpose and 'eanin!. ,i'ilarly, the asic parts of the *a!on can e e)plicated either in ter's of the h(ndred pieces of *ood fro' *hich they are constr(cted, or in ter's of the (nity of the *a!on, *hich is their reason for ein!. &he h(ndred pieces of *ood are not a *a!on (ntil they are properly (nified.;>B= -'plicit in the previo(s disc(ssion *as a conception of a 9*hole9 that is not red(ci le to its parts. -'plicit in this one is the conception of a (nifyin! for' that can e)plain the parts of a s(' fro' a ove instead of fro' elo*. &he si)th of the fifteen aporiae that <ristotle raised in Book B of the 'etaph!sics is,;>%= *hether it is the !enera that sho(ld e taken as ele'ents and principles, or rather the pri'ary constit(ents of a thin! . . . . &o 0(d!e fro' these ar!('ents, then, the principles of thin!s *o(ld not e the !enera? (t if *e kno* each thin! y its definition, and the !enera are the principles or startin!.points of definitions, the !enera '(st also e the principles of

defina le thin!s . . . . <nd so'e also of those *ho say (nity or ein!, or the !reat and the s'all, are ele'ents of thin!s, see' to treat the' as !enera. /ssentially the sa'e +(estion (nderlies the present disc(ssion of the Theaetetus . -n response to this, Plato, like <ristotle, t(rns to a consideration of the nat(re of definitionIa co(rse s( se+(ently p(rs(ed 'ore intensively in the Sophist . &here the 9pri'ary ele'ents9 *ill not e the 'in(test partic(lars (t the 'ost (niversal !enera. &he Sophist accordin!ly f(rthers the inconcl(sive in+(iry of the Theaetetus in at least three *ays. 3i4 &he Drea' parado), that co'ple)es are kno*a le in ter's of their de'erits (t ele'ents are (lti'ately (nkno*a le, is, if not re. ;>B= &his has not !one (nnoticed. Cf. /. :. F8&oole, 9@or's and Kno*led!e in the Theaetetus 9 3Philosophical Studies 19 ;19%#=4 11>? Dorty $"%? 2cDo*ell $4>? Dosen, 9,ocrates8 Drea'9 16>.6B? B(rnyeat, 9,ocrates and the :(ry: Parado)es in Plato8s Distinction et*een Kno*led!e and &r(e Belief9 3Supplementar! Iolume L(I o& the #ris.totelian Societ! ;196#= 1%".9$4 16%.66, and TP 19".94? and Polansky $$#. ;>%= B.".99>6.$1. 11? Doss8s translation. 7 11B 7 f(ted, at least (nderc(t. &he reciprocity of collection and division 'eans that the *hole and part are so'eho* i'plicit in each other: thro(!h collection 3*hich appears only rarely in the Sophist 4 *e (nderstand the *hole in ter's of the parts, (t thro(!h division *e (nderstand the part in ter's of the *hole. 3ii4 /ven tho(!h the *hole 'ay e kno*n in ter's of its parts, this kno*led!e is not reduci)le to its parts 3as in $, a ove4, for *e can kno* *hat 9prod(ction9 or 9ac+(isition9 is *itho(t kno*in! every kind of prod(ction or ac+(isition. 3iii4 Beca(se parts can e kno*n in ter's of the *hole, the lo!os of a thin! need not e (nderstood as the additive sum of the constit(tive ele'ents of the thin!. Dather, the correct 9'ethod of lo!oi9 3Sophist $$%a4 is to deter'ine the essence of so'ethin! y dividing the pre!iven *hole into derivative species. &he 'ethod of division al*ays takes precedence over the 'ethod of collection.;>6= &he *ay that the Sophist !oes eyond the Theaetetus can also e seen in its handlin! of the sa'e ill(strations. He have already seen that in the first 'odel of 9lo!os9 3"a4 the re!(larity inherent in the paradi!' of 9no(ns and ver s9 i'plied the co' ina ility of (niversal for's, and that this conception eco'es e)plicit in the Sophist . &he sa'e is tr(e of the present paradi!' of 9letters.9 Cetters in their o*n *ay represent re!(larities that li'it the other*ise (nli'ited strea' of vocal so(nd 3cf. Phile)us 1% 4, and as s(ch provide ill(strations of the sta ility and co' ina ility of for's. &he /leatic stran!er 'akes (se of this paradi!' too, in the Sophist , to ill(strate the properties of for's: 9,ince so'e for's *ill co' ine and others not, they are in virt(ally the sa'e condition as *ritten letters? for so'e of these do not fit each other, (t others do9 3$>$e.$>"a4. &he Statesman takes the co'parison farther still: not only do letters provide an i'a!e of the sta ility and selective co' ina ility of the for's, (t o(r a ility to read lan!(a!e eco'es a paradi!' of o(r a ility to (nderstand incorporeal reality. &he fact that *e can transfer o(r readin! proficiency fro' easy sylla les to diffic(lt ones, eca(se of the re!(larity of letters, is a paradi!' of o(r a ility to discover in corporeal paradi!'s the re!(larities that ena le (s to 9read9 the hi!hest thin!s, 9the lon! and diffic(lt sylla les of act(ality ;

=9 3$%6c.d4. Beca(se the hi!hest for's are of +(alities 3!ood. ;>6= ,ee 2ichel @attal 39Ce Sophiste: Logos de la synthWse o( logos de la divisionJ9 in 2ichel 5arcy, ed., Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon ;Bi liopolis: C.5.D., Centro di ,t(dio del Pensiero <ntico, 19914

1>B and n. 1%. @attal s(!!ests a connection et*een the priority that Plato assi!ns to division over collection, and Plato8s preference for Par'enides over 1eracleit(s: the concept of lo!os, @attal ar!(es, is asse' lative in 1eracleit(s (t artic(latory in Par'enides. 7 11% 7 ness, ea(ty, 0(stice, and even sa'eness and difference4 rather than species 3h('an ein!, ird, pi!4 there are no o vio(s visi le e)a'ples of the': 9Ff the !reatest and 'ost val(a le ;

= thin!s there is no i'a!e 'ade clear for h('an ein!s, y the e)hi ition of *hich so'eone *ishin! to satisfy the so(l of the in+(irer can, y applyin! it to one of his senses, s(fficiently satisfy it . . . . @or the incorporeal, ein! finest and !reatest, can e dearly e)hi ited only y reason and not y anythin! else9 3$6>e.$6Ba4. 1o*ever, *e can (se the visi le *orld as a paradi!' of the intelli!i le in an indirect *ay. Cearnin! to read, y (sin! the co' inations of letters in easy sylla les as paradi!'s of those in diffic(lt ones, is offered as a paradi!' of this kind of paradi!' 3$%%d4. @c >BDEc.B=D)A . &he final hypothesis is *hat hoipolloi *o(ld sayIthat lo!os is the a ility to na'e the si!n y *hich one thin! is distin!(ished fro' everythin! else, that is, the definition. B(t this hypothesis too '(st fail, eca(se *e '(st already kno* the difference et*een one thin! and another in order to have an opinion a o(t it in the first place, and so nothin! ne* is !ained y the addition 3$#9a f.4. &his definition of kno*led!e *ill e either a s(rd or circ(lar, dependin! on *hether the lo!os a o(t a thin!8s distinctness is itself re!arded as opinion or kno*led!e. -f it is an opinion, then *e are told to add an opinion 3lo!os4 a o(t so'ethin! to the ri!ht opinion *e already have a o(t it? and 9to co''and (s to ac+(ire the very thin!s that *e have, so that *e 'ay learn the thin!s that *e already elieve to e so, !reatly rese' les so'eone co'pletely in the dark9 3$#9e4. -f, on the other hand, it is kno*led!e, then kno*led!e is defined in ter's of itself, and the definition is circ(lar 3$1#a4. -n the eval(ation of this hypothesis the only e)a'ple considered is the definition of 9&heaetet(s9 3$#9a.c4. Conse+(ently, definition is conceived only in ter's of an individ(al thin! rather than a for' or kind. B(t as a preli'inary 'odel ,ocrates had defined the s(n as 9the ri!htest of the heavenly odies that revolve aro(nd the earth9 3$#6d4. &his e)a'ple is a' i!(o(s. <ltho(!h the s(n is, like &heaetet(s, an individ(al, it is a (ni+(e individ(al of its kind and therefore, like (niversals, ad'its of a definition y species and differentia. -t is not 'ade dear here *hether a definition of an individ(al *ithin a 'any.'e' ered in&ima species is possi le at all 3$#9 .c4? it is at least '(ch easier to define a (niversal 3$#6d4. 5evertheless, even if &heaetet(s cannot e defined, he can e $no n in the sense that ena led &heodor(s and ,oc. 7 116 7 rates to reco!niKe hi' at the e!innin!. &his kno*in! is not dependent on a sin!le specifia le 'ark, (t on his overall 9look,9 *hich 'akes hi' easily distin!(isha le fro' ,ocrates, despite the si'ilarity of individ(al feat(res or 9ele'ents.9;>9= /ven if a definition of &heaetet(s is not possi le, the e)a'ple sho*s in an analo!o(s *ay the i'portance, for kno*led!e, of the (nifyin! 9for'.9 5or sho(ld *e for!et that the other e)a'ple, the s(n, tends to e associated in Plato *ith the theory of for's.;B#= &he definition of the s(n is a co(nterinstance to the present ar!('ent8s concl(sion that definition is not possi le. 1o* are *e a le to define the s(n in spite of ,ocrates8 reductio- &he reductio is a restate'ent of 2eno8s parado), (t there is no +(estion in this case of recollection, since *e are askin! a o(t a

visi le o 0ect. 5evertheless the ans*er is analo!o(s: the e)plicit definition can e so(!ht and reco!niKed eca(se *e already kno* it i'plicitly. He have all the infor'ation necessary to concl(de that the s(n is the ri!htest heavenly o 0ect, even if the (nification of the infor'ation into that description has never e)plicitly occ(rred to (s. -f *e ask in t(rn ho* definitions are possi le of the co''on properties that ,ocrates speaks of at $#6d 3(nity, !oodness, etc.4, *e *ill e led to an analo!o(s conception of latency, this ti'e re!ardin! none'pirical kno*led!e. ,(ch a conception is to e fo(nd in the theory of recollection. -n the case of latent e'pirical kno*led!e the data are !iven, (t the principle of (nification is not? in the theory of recollection8s conception of latent a priori kno*led!e the (nity itself is !iven, (t only in an el(sive *ay.

%7+ Kno?ledge and >isdom

He have seen that the Theaetetus's e)a'ination of kno*led!e !oes thro(!h a pro!ression of several different kinds of kno*led!e, a pro!ression that reflects in a !eneral *ay that of the Divided Cine. -t passes fro' percept(al 3

4 to interpretive 3 4 to 'athe'atical 3 4 kno*led!e, efore endin! in aporia after a disc(ssion that con. ;>9= ,ee 2itchell 2iller, 9Unity and Co!os: < Deadin! of Theaetetus $#1c.$1#a9 3paper presented at the ,ociety for <ncient Ereek Philosophy, Dec. $%, 19694 1B. <lso B(rnyeat, TP $"#. ;B#= /.!., %epu)lic >#%a.>1%c, Phaedo 99d. Cf. ,ayre P#' 1">. &he s(n is referred to not only here in the very last ar!('ent of the dialo!(e, (t also in the very first ar!('ent 31>"c.d, the (liad's 9!olden rope94, and i'plicitly in the central di!ression 31%4a4, *here &hales is represented as the paradi!'atic philosopher, *ho is concerned *ith the heavenly odies 3of *hich the s(n is here defined as the ri!htest4. 7 119 7 stantly evokes 3 (t never invokes4 the theory of for's and doctrine of recollection. &he ne)t step *o(ld e to ret(rn to the s(!!estions 'ade y ,ocrates in the di!ression 3and previo(sly s(!!ested y the dra'atic yplay at the e!innin! of the dialo!(e4, (t never incorporated into the dialo!(e proper: in partic(lar, the s(!!estion that the p(rs(it of *isdo' is not (lti'ately satisfied even y ade+(ate definitions, (t event(ally entails a chan!e fro' one kind of life to another, like the 9t(rnin! aro(nd of the so(l9 in the <lle!ory of the Cave 3%epu)lic %.>16c f.4. &o the 'ode' ear it so(nds stran!e that o(r *ay of life sho(ld have anythin! to do *ith o(r intellect(al a ility to kno* thin!s. &here see's no o vio(s reason *hy thoro(!h!oin! hedonists *ho p(rs(e philosophy as a profession eca(se they are clever and can 'ake 'oney at it sho(ld not e a le to have a p(rely intellect(al !rasp of the nat(re of thin!s *itho(t refor'in! their val(es and *ay of life. /ven Plato8s o*n doctrine of the tripartite so(l see's to co(ntenance this vie*, for it 'akes clear that even if *e kno* the tr(th a o(t thin!s, *e 'ay not have the self.'astery necessary to act on it in opposition to

the de'ands of appetite and a' ition. &h(s *e 'ay have kno*led!e *itho(t ein! !ood. <ltho(!h this is tr(e of ordinary kno*led!e, at the hi!hest level of kno*led!e it is no lon!er tr(e 3accordin!ly, ,ocrates repeatedly insists on the inade+(acy of his definitions of the virt(es and the !ood in the %epu)lic 4.;B1= 1ere, *hat *e kno* and *hat *e are coincide. &he cons(''ation of the Divided Cine coincides *ith the cons(''ation of the tripartite so(l. &his is the doctrine of 9p(rification,9 *hich Plato advances in the lan!(a!e of the 'ysteries.;B$= &he hi!hest, 9'oral9 for's can e ade+(ately !rasped only to the e)tent that *e are capa le of e)periencin! 'oral tr(th *ithin o(rselves, and *e *ill e capa le of this only to the e)tent that *e are free of attach'ent to the pleas(res of appetite and a' ition. Perhaps the dearest ill(stration of this is to e had in <ristotle8s 8icomachean Ethics , *here *e find that no ade+(ate concept(al definition of !oodness is possi le, altho(!h *e can define it 'erely for'ally as 9that at *hich all thin!s ai'9 or the 9'ean et*een the e)tre'es of e)cess and deficiency.9 Fnly !ood individ(als the'selves can !ive content to these for'(las? only they infalli ly reco!niKe !oodness in concrete sit(ations. &he *isdo' of the !ood person is not propositional, ;B1= 4.4">c.d, B.>#4 , B.>#9c. ;B$= /.!., S!mposium $1#a.d, Phaedo 6$d.6"e, %epu)lic %.>19a. . 7 1$# 7 (t is closer to *hat *e earlier called 9(nderstandin!.9;B"= &his is Plato8s point as *ell, that kno*led!e of the hi!hest thin!s re+(ires an inner reco!nition that is insepara le fro' o(r devotion to those thin!s. ;B4= <nd like Plato, <ristotle affir's that the difference et*een philosophy and sophistry is a difference in the kind of life that one chooses 3

, 'etaph!sics @.$.1##4B$$.$>4. He have seen n('ero(s re'inders of the theory of for's thro(!ho(t the Theaetetus , and have s(!!ested that the aporetic nat(re of this dialo!(e 'ay e a conse+(ence of the overt a sence of the for's. 5evertheless, it is est not to short.circ(it Plato8s enterprise in these dialo!(es y too hastily s(pplyin! 9sol(tions9 fro' other dialo!(es. &here are certainly, to e s(re, n('ero(s re'inders *ithin the Theaetetus of those earlier *ays of resolvin! so'e of the present +(estions? (t nevertheless the Sophist and Statesman are clearly intended to e se+(els to the Theaetetus , and it *o(ld e pre'at(re to interpose the earlier doctrines in their ori!inal for' efore *e have follo*ed the trilo!y8s o*n line of in+(iry to its concl(sion. -n o(r disc(ssion of " 3a ove4 *e sa* that the Sophist f(rthers the in+(iry of the Theaetetus y sho*in! that the part 'ay e kno*n in ter's of the *hole, as *ell as the other *ay aro(nd? that kno*led!e of the *hole is not red(ci le to kno*led!e of the parts? and that a lo!os 3definition4 can s(cceed y e!innin! *ith the *hole and dividin! it pro!ressively into species, rather than tryin! to proceed y a!!re!ation fro' (nkno*a le ele'ents. ,( se+(ently, in o(r disc(ssion of "c *e sa* that the Theaetetus's pro0ect of definition failed eca(se, as is the case thro(!ho(t the dialo!(e, the foc(s *as on 3(nkno*a le4 individ(als rather than !enera or kinds. &his too *ill e re'edied in the Sophist . ;B"= cf. B(rnyear: 92(ch of *hat Plato says a o(t kno*led!e and its relation to tr(e elief falls into place if *e read hi', not as 'isdescri in! the concept *hich philosophers no* analyKe in ter's of

0(stified tr(e elief ;th(s D(nci'an 16" n. $$=, (t as ela oratin! a richer concept of kno*led!e tanta'o(nt to (nderstandin!9 39,ocrates9 16B4. <lso see his TP $1%, *here he adds, 9- have an ally in Bishop Berkeley, *ho conceived hi'self to e follo*in! Plato *hen he *rote, 8He kno* a thin! *hen *e (nderstand it.89 ;B4= Cf. Pascal: 9Hhereas in speakin! of h('an thin!s *e say they '(st e kno*n efore they can e loved, the saints on the contrary say in speakin! of divine thin!s that they '(st e loved in order to e kno*n9 39Fn Eeo'etrical De'onstration,9 in Pascal The Provincial Letters, PensJes, Scienti&ic Treaties , vol. "" of Ereat Books of the Hestern Horld ;Chica!o: /ncyclopaedia Brittanica, 19>$= 44#4. 7 1$1 7

!ha.ter Three The So.hist

%+ The So.hist and Its Predecessors 4-%;a6-%<e8
-n the 'iddle dialo!(es s(ch as the Phaedo and %epu)lic , Plato defines reality *ith reference to the criterion of rationality. Deason apprehends *hat is (niversal and (nchan!in!, (t not *hat is partic(lar and in fl(). &he senses apprehend *hat is partic(lar and in fl(), (t not *hat is (niversal and (nchan!in!. ,ince reason is a 'ore tr(st*orthy !(ide to tr(th than are the chan!ea le and deceptive senses, tr(e reality is to e identified *ith 9 ein!9 3the (niversal and (nchan!in!4 rather than 9 eco'in!9 3the partic(lar and fl(id4. &his is the dichoto'y represented later in the Sophist y the !ods 3friends of the for's4 and !iants 3'aterialists4, respectively. &he for'er 'aintain a!ainst the 'aterialists that 9thro(!h the ody *e have interco(rse *ith eco'in! y 'eans of the senses, and y 'eans of reason thro(!h the so(l *e have interco(rse *ith real ein!, *hich al*ays re'ains the sa'e in the sa'e respects, *hereas eco'in! is different at different ti'es9 3$46a4. &he leader of this dialo!(e is not ,ocrates (t an (nna'ed stran!er fro' /lea, *ho apparently is proposin! to !ive (p this dichoto'y y ne(traliKin! the difference et*een the !ods and !iantsIin *hich case he *o(ld destroy the theory of for's in one of its 'ost f(nda'ental feat(res. Conse+(ently it is 'ore i'portant in the case of the Sophist than *ith 'ost other dialo!(es to consider its standpoint in relation to that of its predecessors. &here are in fact nota le differences et*een the *ay soph. 7 1$$ 7 istryIthe definin! foc(s of the present dialo!(eIis portrayed here and in the ,ocratic dialo!(es. -n the %epu)lic , *here the dichoto'y et*een the divine and the corporeal is 'ost thoro(!hly *orked o(t, there is no the'atic disc(ssion of the nat(re of the sophist, (t thro(!h the characteriKation of &hrasy'ach(s and the vie*s he cha'pions in Book 1 the sophist appears as the paradi!' of the (n0(st 'an, *ho s( ordinates his rational fac(lty to one or oth of his lo*er fac(lties, appetite and spiritedness 3*hich in hi' take the e)tre'e for's of !reed and a' ition4.;1= &he entire teachin! of the %epu)lic , especially that of the tripartite so(l, arises o(t of the challen!e posed y these vie*s in their restate'ent y Ela(con and <dei'ant(s in Book $. &he connection et*een sophistry and in0(stice *ill see' ar itrary and even +(estion. e!!in! to (s if *e think of sophistry as skepticis' a o(t o 0ective kno*led!e, *hich event(ates in techni+(es for *innin! ar!('ents. ,kepticis' in itself is neither 0(st nor (n0(st, and the techni+(es of ar!('ent can e e'ployed for 0(st as *ell as (n0(st

p(rposes? the %epu)lic itself insists on this do( le.ed!ed nat(re of techne 3"""e.""4 4. @or Plato, ho*ever, sophistry is not si'ply e+(ivalent to techni+(es for *innin! ar!('ents. Fther*ise, ,ocrates *o(ld have een for hi', as for <ristophanes, a kind of sophist. &he key to Plato8s e+(ation of sophistry *ith in0(stice lies in the sophist8s oast to ena le the *eaker ar!('ent 3

4 to defeat the stron!er. Fne *hose art ai's at s(ch a !oal cannot e 'otivated y reason 3 4? the 'otivation for *ishin! to defeat the stron!est reasons '(st lie o(tside reason. <ccordin! to the doctrine of the tripartite so(l, it '(st therefore lie in a desire for personal !ain, either in the for' of the satisfaction of appetite or in the f(rtherin! of a' ition. &he po*er of sophistry ena les one to defeat reason *ith its o*n *eapons, and therefore to p(t reason in the service of appetite or spiritedness. -t is the p( lic e+(ivalent of 9rationaliKation,9 *here the concl(sion is dictated in advance y o(r self. interested desires 3appetitive or spirited4 and reason is directed to 0(stify this *ith the appearance of rationality. ,ophistry necessarily involves the !overnance of reason y the irrational parts of o(r nat(re, and therefore 3in accordance *ith the %epu)lic's definition4 is intrinsically (n0(st. <ccordin!ly, in the Gorgias ,ocrates says that there see's to e no (se for Eor!ias8s techne e)cept as a 'eans to (n0(st ends 3461 4. &here, ;1= - have disc(ssed this at len!th in 9,ocrates8 Def(tation of &hrasy'ach(s and &reat'ent of Girt(e9 3Philosoph! and %hetoric % ;19%4= $>.4B4. 7 1$" 7 too, in0(stice 'eans the defeat of reason y appetite.;$= Eor!ias8s techne is called rhetoric 3449a4, ho*ever, *hich ,ocrates distinguishes fro' sophistry: rhetoric is related to the sphere of 0(stice 3

4, and sophistry to that of la*'akin! 3 4.;"= 5evertheless, since the t*o differ only in their sphere of e'ploy'ent, their asic nat(re '(st e si'ilar. &his concl(sion is s(pported y the Protagoras , *hose fide character is a sophist, oth y !eneral rep(te 3"11e4 and y his o*n avo*al 3"1% 4. Prota!oras, ho*ever, is less candid than is Callicles or even Pol(s in the Gorgias , and he cites the pop(lar vie* that an (n0(st person o(!ht never to ad'it that he is s(ch 3"$" 4. 1e does rel(ctantly ad'it that self.control 3

4, *hich is a virt(e, does not necessarily i'ply 0(stice 3"""d4. B(t this does not co''it hi' to an approval of in0(stice, since, (nlike ,ocrates, he is *illin! to consider the different virt(es as independent of one another. 5evertheless the fact that he *as the first to char!e for teachin! virt(e 3"49a4 *o(ld e da'nin! eno(!h in the eyes of ,ocrates, *ho says in the Gorgias that it is sha'ef(l to char!e 'oney for teachin! 0(stice and virt(e. -f one s(cceeds in teachin! it, the st(dent, ein! 0(st, *ill of his o*n volition co'pensate the teacher *ho has enefited hi'. -f the st(dent does not do so, the

teacher has failed to 'ake hi' 0(st and deserves no co'pensation 3>$1d.e4. <ccordin!ly, in the Protagoras ,ocrates sees the sophist not as a teacher or thinker (t as a 'oney'aker, 'ore concerned *ith sellin! his *ares than *ith *hether they are any !ood 3"1"c.e4. 1e is !overned y the val(es of the appetite rather than reason and is, therefore, essentially (n0(st. Co'in! to the Sophist fro' the Protagoras, Gorgias , and %epu)lic , *e *o(ld e)pect that here too the sophist *ill e identified in ter's of his f(nda'ental in0(stice, his (se of reason not as an intrinsic !ood (t as an instr('ent of !ain, *hether for the sake of po*er or the satisfaction of appetites. -t co'es as a s(rprise, therefore, to discover that at the end of the dialo!(e the sophist is defined in 'erely technical ter's, as 314 the 'aker of se' lances rather than likenesses 3$BBd.e4, 3$4 op. ;"= Gorgias 4B4 .c. -n the sa'e place rhetoric and sophistry are, in t(rn, related to each other as 'edicine is to !y'nastics. &he Sophist 3$$%e.$$9a4 *ill (se 'edicine and !y'nastics as analo!(es of, respectively, chastise'ent of evil so(ls 3res(ltin! in 0(stice4 and teachin! of i!norant so(ls 3res(ltin! in kno*led!e4. ,o in oth dialo!(es 0(stice appears as analo!o(s to 'edicine in distinction fro' !y'nastics. 7 1$4 7 eratin! on the asis of opinion rather than investi!ation into his s( 0ect 3$B% .e4, and 3"4 'akin! his clai's *ith irony 3$B6a4.;4= &here is no e)plicit reference to the tripartite so(l, and nothin! is said a o(t the s( ordination of reason to a' ition or hedonis'. -ndeed, sophistry is 'ade an aspect of prod(ction rather than ac+(isitiveness 3$B>a4.;>= &he a sence of any reference to appetite and a' ition is the 'ore perple)in! in vie* of the fact that these cate!ories ret(rn as central at the end of the Sophist's se+(el, the Statesman , *here they define the t*o f(nda'ental types of citiKen, the 'oderate and the co(ra!eo(s. < second +(estion, *hich *ill t(rn o(t to e related to the previo(s one, is *hy Plato e!ins the dialo!(e *ith several apparently inconse+(ential preli'inary capt(res of the sophist. @or the p(rposes of de'onstratin! the 'ethod of division, the <n!ler division *o(ld have s(fficed. &he key to oth these +(estions lies in the ori!inal one, the relationship of the Sophist to the doctrine of the tripartite so(l in the %epu)lic . <ltho(!h that doctrine is never e)plicitly 'entioned in the Sophist , there are n('ero(s indirect references to it in the preli'inary divisions of the dialo!(e, *hich depict the sophist in ter's of 'oney'akin! and con+(est. @ollo*in! the <n!ler division, there are a total of si) 9sophist9 divisions 3accordin! to the en('eration at $"1d.e4: fo(r 'ain divisions pl(s s(!!estions for t*o additional versions of the second.

-+ Preliminar* Di)isions 4-%5a6-/-28

&he f(nda'ental dichoto'y fro' *hich all the s( se+(ent divisions proceed is et*een the art of prod(ction and the art of ac+(isition, and ;4= 2oreover, as E(thrie >.1>6 points o(t, in the final dichoto'y the sophist is identified *ith the 'aker of contradictions rather than speeches, the reverse of *hat Plato8s (s(al characteriKation of sophists 3in the Gorgias, Protagoras , and %epu)lic 1, for e)a'ple4 *o(ld lead (s to e)pect. 7 1$> 7 it is re'arka le that altho(!h the s( se+(ent final division *ill locate the sophist (nder the for' of prod(ction 3$B>a4, all (t the last of the preli'inary divisions find the sophist (nder the for' of

ac+(isition. 2oreover, the latter, *hich alone tries to locate hi' *ithin the prod(ctive rather than ac+(isitive arts, fails to discover the sophist at all 3$"#e.$"1a4, and precisely for that reason. &he stran!er s(''ariKes the res(lts of these preli'inary divisions at $"1d.e. -n the first division the sophist sho*ed hi'self as 9the paid h(nter of rich yo(n! 'en, . . . second, as a kind of 'erchant ;

, travelin! (siness'an= of thin!s learned in the so(l, . . . third, as a retailer ; = of these sa'e thin!s.9 &heaetet(s interr(pts to say, 9and fo(rth, as a vendor ; = of thin!s learned that he hi'self prod(ced.9 &he stran!er8s response, 9Ao( have re'e' ered correctly,9 is ironic, for *hat &heaetet(s calls the fo(rth version had ori!inally een part of the third: 9B(yin! so'e, and 'akin! y hi'self other thin!s learned, and sellin! the', he 'akes his livin! fro' this9 3$$4d4. -t *as not assi!ned a separate n(' er, and &heaetet(s had !one on to call the ne,t one n(' er fo(r 3$$>e4. &hat is no* called the fifth appearance: the sophist as 9an athlete in contests of *ords, *ho has appropriated the eristic art9 3$"1d.e4. &he si)th is a p(rifier of the so(l 3$"1e4. &he precise n(' er of divisions is th(s overtly a' i!(o(s. -n fact there are only fo(r f(nda'entally different preli'inary divisions of the sophist, and they syste'atically reflect the %epu)lic's acco(nt of the sophist ased on the tripartite so(l. -n order to avoid the n('erical a' i!(ity, and to collapse the variations of 'erchant.retailer.vendor into one, - shall desi!nate the fo(r as < ;T -=, B ;T --/---/-G=, C ;T G=, and D ;T G-=. &he de'onstration division of the <n!ler 3$16e.$$1c4, *hich provides the 'odel for the others, e!ins *ith the *ords, 9,hall *e consider hi' as havin! an art or as so'eone *itho(t an art (t *ith so'e other po*erJ9 3$19a4. -'plicitly, then, the division e!ins *ith the for' of po*er 3

Iinto *hich the stran!er later collapses the t*o.*orld distinction4 divided into the species of art 3 4 and nonart 3see @i!(re "4. &he s(''ary, apart fro' its lack of reference to the preli'inary for' of 9po*er,9 is co'plete and acc(rate, as are the final t*oI *hich 'akes 'ore intri!(in! the fact that the ne)t three are not.;B= &he <n!ler division is follo*ed y division < of the sophist 3$$1c.$$" 4, *hich recapit(lates steps > and B of the <n!ler division, efore ;B= &he inacc(racies are noted also y Klein 3PT 4, Dosen 3PS 4, and Benardete. 7 1$B 7

@i!(re "

7 1$% 7

@i!(re 4 takin! its o*n depart(re fro' Ba 3see @i!(re 44. <ltho(!h the s(''ary is 'ore e)plicit than the division in so'e places, it also drops one 3and only one4 of the division8s steps, the distinction et*een pers(asion and violence in step 6, and there y the distinction et*een reason and spiritedness. He shall ret(rn to this point later. &he third s( division of the <n!ler 3e)chan!e/con+(est4 corresponds 7 1$6 7 to the %epu)lic's distinction et*een the co''ercial and spirited alternatives to reason. <ccordin!ly, the fact that the first division of the sophist e!ins on the side of con+(est s(!!ests that *e are here lookin! at hi' (nder his spirited aspect. B(t this is so'e*hat 'oderated y the ne)t s( division, step >, *hich casts hi' in the role of a h(nter rather than a fi!hter. ,ince a h(nter ai's at providin! hi'self *ith s(stenance, h(ntin! 'akes reference to the appetitive as *ell as to the spirited side of o(r nat(re. ;%= &he stran!er8s description of this sophist as 9the paid h(nter of rich yo(n! 'en9 3$"1d4 co' ines oth the attri (tes of co''erce and a!!ression. Hhere this first division incorporates the spirited and appetitive ele'ents 0ointly in its startin! point, the startin! points of divisions B and C *ill present each one separately. Division B follo*s i''ediately, e!innin! (nder the headin! of e)chan!e, that is, s( division "a (nder <n!ler 3see @i!(re >4. 1ere a!ain the s(''ary o'its precisely one of the ori!inal steps, na'ely, step > 3there is also a difference in the *ordin! of step 64, the distinction et*een sellin! one8s o*n prod(cts and those prod(ced y so'eone else. &he collapsin! of that distinction i'plies that a sophist 'ay e a 'erchant of his o*n prod(cts, *hich co'pletes the sy''etry: 'erchant of so'eone else8s prod(cts 3division --4, retailer of his o*n prod(cts 3division ---4, and retailer of so'eone else8s prod(cts 3division -G4. 2oreover, it i'plies that *hat 'atters is not *hether he is prod(ctive, (t that he is 'ercenary. -n this appearance the sophist is !(ided e)cl(sively y appetitive 'otives. 1e is o(t to 'ake 'oney y sellin! his kno*led!e of virt(e. &he i'plicit sy''etry 'entioned a ove is 'ade e)plicit *hen the stran!er s(!!ests that the sophist need not travel 3$$4d4, and 'i!ht therefore e a retailer 3Ba4 rather than a 'erchant 3B 4, and 3$$4e4 that he 'i!ht 'ake his o*n prod(cts 3>a4 rather than sellin! so'eone else8s 3> 4. -f these alternatives had een p(rs(ed, they *o(ld have yielded three 'ore divisions 3all variants on the appetitive aspect of the sophist4. B(t they are not p(rs(ed, and &heaetet(s, as *e sa*, co(nts this in one place as one 'ore division 3$$>e4 and in another place as t*o 3$"1d4. 1e 'i!ht e+(ally have co(nted it as three 3as the discrepancy et*een the division and the s(''ary i'plied a ove4, or as none, since all are 'inor variations on the precedin! one. &he introd(ction of so 'any variations e'phasiKes that the cr(cial point is the sellin!, not the ;%= -n the %epu)lic , h(nters enter the city 3"%" 4 only *hen the for'erly healthy, asic polis eco'es feverish 3"%$e4 and e!ins to chan!e fro' an a!rarian 3appetitive4 society to a *arrior 3spirited4 one 3"%"d.e4. 7 1$9 7

@i!(re > f(rther distinctions (nder > and B. &he point co''on to the' all is the restriction of sophistry to co''erce, *hich is reflected later in the stran!er8s description of this !ro(p as sho*in! the sophist to e a 'erchant or retailer 3$"1d.e4. <fter this co'es division C, *hich e!ins *ith species 4a (nder <n!ler 3fi!htin!4, altho(!h the s(''ary e!ins *ith division $ 3ac+(isition4. &he italics indicate *here the initial steps are recalled fro' the <n!ler division in accordance *ith 3altho(!h in 'ore detail than4 the s(''ary 3see @i!(re B4. Fnce a!ain, a sin!le step is o'itted fro' the s(''ary, na'ely, the distinction in step " et*een e)chan!e and con+(est. 1ere it is the spirited ele'ent that is isolated as the startin! point. 9@i!htin!9 rather than 9h(ntin!9 leaves no do( t that only the spirited 7 1"# 7

@i!(re B ele'ent is initially considered. &he spirited nat(re of this aspect of the sophist is confir'ed y the stran!er8s s(''ary of the present division, *hich reveals the sophist to e 9an athlete in contests of *ords, *ho has appropriated the eristic art9 3$"1d.e4. 5evertheless the final distinction is et*een 'oney*astin! and 'oney'akin!, *hich s(!!ests that even at his 'ost spirited the sophist is never entirely free of 'ercenary 'otivesIa point that is e'phasiKed y the s(''ary8s i'plicit collapsin! of the e)chan!e/con+(est distinction, and its addition of the prior cate!ory of 9ac+(isition.9 By contrast, in the case of the specifically appetitive sophist of division B, no spirited factors entered at all. &he %epu)lic's third ele'ent, reason, is present in all three divisions, 7 1"1 7 (t al*ays in the role of a 'eans to an end, rather than an end in itself or point of depart(re. -n division < it appears in the for' of pers(asion 36 4, *hich the sophist as h(nter (ses in lie( of violence to catch his prey. -ts s( ordinate role is e'phasiKed even 'ore in the s(''ary, *hich o'its the distinction in step 6 et*een pers(asion and violence. -n division B it appears a'on! the *orks that serve the so(l rather than the ody 3% 4, partic(larly those concerned *ith virt(e 39 4, *hich are sold y the sophist as retailer or as 'erchant. <nd in division C it appears as the ver al rather than physical *eapons that are e'ployed y the sophist as fi!hter 3B 4. -n each case reason is s( ordinated to appetite or spiritedness, and the three cases correspond to the t*o types of in0(stice, and their co' ination, *hich are developed in the %epu)lic and ill(strated in the person of &hrasy'ach(s. Division D, *hich follo*s, is the only one in the dialo!(e 3incl(din! the final one4 that does not follo* fro' the <n!ler division, and the only one that follo*s fro' a preli'inary 9collection,9 in accordance *ith the *ay the 'ethod is descri ed in the Phaedrus 3$B>c.$BB 4.;6= &he stran!er s(rveys vario(s types of tasks perfor'ed y servants 3$$B .c4, the co''on deno'inator of *hich is that they all involve an act of division 3

4 and are accordin!ly !iven the na'e of discri'ination 3 4. &he division proceeds as sho*n in @i!(re %. 1ere *e do not find the sophist 3or any discrepancy in the s(''ary4. Hhat *e find is a species a o(t *hich the stran!er says, 9-8' afraid to say ;these are= sophists . . . lest *e accord to the' too !reat an honor9? they rese' le sophists, (t only as the do! rese' les a *olf 3$"1a4. 1e calls this species instead 9no le sophistry9 3$"1 4. &he 9no le sophist9 is !enerally reco!niKed to e a reference to ,ocrates 3cf. $"#a.d4, and the !eneral for' fro' *hich the division e!ins, 9discri'ination9 or 9division9 3

4, shares its latter na'e *ith the philosophical 'ethod of the stran!er.;9= &he stran!er and &heaetet(s do not find the sophist precisely eca(se they e!in *ith a p(rely rational for' and 'ake no reference to appetite or spiritedness. &his division de'onstrates ne!atively *hat the others de'onstrated positively, a necessary connection et*een sophistry and the lo*er parts of the tripartite so(l. Hhere *e find the sophist *e are *ithin the real' of one or oth of the ;6= ,ocrates8 openin! re'ark in the Sophist , that the stran!er 'ay e a !od in dis!(ise 3$1Ba4, is perhaps 'eant to re'ind (s of the Phaedrus , *here so'eone *ho is a le to perfor' collections and divisions properly is co'pared to a !od 3$BB 4. ;9= &he elief that i!norance is never vol(ntary, is held not only y oth the no le sophist and ,ocrates, (t y the stran!er as *ell 3$$6c4. 7 1"$ 7

@i!(re % irrational parts of the so(l, and *hen *e confine o(rselves to the so(l8s p(rely rational operations, *e do not find the sophist. -f *e think in ter's of appetite 3division B4, or spiritedness 3division C4, or oth to!ether 3division <4, *e *ill find the sophist, (t if *e confine o(rselves to rational discri'ination alone 3division D4, *e *ill not. &he 'ost direct reference to the tripartite so(l occ(rs in division D, step ", *hen the stran!er dra*s a distinction et*een chastise'ent, *hich corrects vice, and teachin!, *hich corrects i!norance 3$$%d. e4. &he difference et*een vice and i!norance is that i!norance, like defor'ity in the ody, is a kind of 'issin! of the 'ark, *hereas vice, like disease in the ody, is a kind of dishar'onio(sness.;1#= &he latter is in ;1#= &he distinction t(rns o(t to e less a sol(te than it see's at first. <t $"#c the stran!er co'pares one aspect of the instr(ction that corrects the so(l8s i!norance to the practice of physicians. &his dra*s an i'plicit connection et*een i!norance and disease, *hereas previo(sly i!norance *as connected *ith defor'ity, and vice *ith disease. &he i'plication is that even tho(!h i!norance is no lon!er conceived as a necessar! condition for vice 3as it *as y ,ocrates4, it is still conceived as a su&&icient condition. ,o'eone *ith the *ron! ideas a o(t !oodness *ill not e virt(o(s, even tho(!h the ri!ht

ideas are no !(arantee of virt(e either. @or a perceptive and caref(lly annotated disc(ssion of this passa!e, see Pa(l Eooch, 98Gice -s -!norance8: &he -nterpretation of Sophist $$B<.$"1B,9 Phoeni, $> 319%14 1$4."". 7 1"" 7 fact the definition of vice 3in0(stice4 !iven in %epu)lic 4 in ter's of the tripartite so(lI oth as dishar'ony 3444 4 and disease 3444c.e4. 2oreover, d(rin! the disc(ssion of vice the stran!er re'arks, 9-n the so(ls of people *ho are in a *orthless condition, do *e not see opinions opposed to appetites ;

=, an!er 3 4 to pleas(res, reason 3 4 to pains, and all of these opposed to one anotherJ9 3$$6 4. 1ere *e see not only echoes of the oppositions (sed in %epu)lic 4 to esta lish the three parts of the so(l 34"% .441c4, (t the very ter's y *hich the three parts are deno'inated. &h(s *e 'i!ht say that division D provides (s *ith, a'on! other thin!s, the sche'a y *hich to reco!niKe the pattern 3the doctrine of the tripartite so(l4 (nderlyin! the previo(s ones.;11= /ven the distinction et*een i!norance and vice already i'plied the tripartite so(l. &he ,ocrates of the early dialo!(es had e+(ated virt(e *ith kno*led!e, and there y vice *ith i!norance. B(t these e+(ations co(ld not e)plain *hat <ristotle later called 'oral *eakness 3

4, in *hich o(r kno*led!e of *hat is ri!ht cannot overco'e the opposin! p(ll of o(r passions. &he tripartite division of the so(l ena led Plato to introd(ce the concept of self.'astery 3%epu)lic 4.4"#e. 4"1a4, that is, control of an!er and appetite y 'eans of reason, *hich s(pplied the deficiency in the ,ocratic acco(nt and at the sa'e ti'e denied the si'ple e+(ation of virt(e *ith kno*led!e and vice *ith i!norance. -f o(r so(l is not har'oniKed y self.control, then kno*in! the !ood *ill not ens(re doin! the !ood. &he distinction here et*een vice and i!norance therefore i'plies the concept of self. control and, to readers of the %epu)lic , f(rther i'plies the tripartite so(l. ;11= <ll this 'eans that the openin! divisions have 'ore s( stantial i'portance than is !enerally reco!niKed. Hhat i'portance they are (s(ally tho(!ht to have is li'ited to their e)hi ition of diversity. @or &aylor "61 they are 'eant to sho* that the sophist is the one *ho 9can 'as+(erade in all these !(ises9 and is accordin!ly 9a pitter of disco(rse a!ainst disco(rse, a contradiction.'on!er.9 @or Cornford 3PT* 16%4, 9the first si) Divisions act(ally, tho(!h not for'ally, serve the p(rpose of a Collection preli'inary to the seventh,9 a vie* shared y ,ayre 3P#' 1>4.>>4, e)cept that for hi' 9the first &ive ,ophists serve as a collection for the seventh, and . . . the definition of 8,ophist G-8 ill(strates the *ay in *hich a co''on property is to e so(!ht.9 Fther *riters s(ch as @riedlOnder, Dosen, and Benardete take the details of the openin! divisions 'ore serio(sly and find '(ch of interest to say a o(t the', altho(!h they do not see the divisions as e' odyin! an (nderlyin! pattern.

7 1"4 7 &he fact that the Sophist does retainIeven if only i'plicitlyIthe doctrine of the tripartite so(l 'akes 'ore interestin! the +(estion *hy Plato no* a andons his for'er practice of (sin! this 'odel in order to distin!(ish philosophy fro' sophistry. <ll the 'ore so, eca(se the distinction that he dra*s et*een the' at the end of the dialo!(e, *itho(t that 'odel, proves to e (nsatisfactory.

/+ @eginning o( the Final Di)ision 4-/-a6-/;c8

&he stran!er no* (ndertakes the search for the sophist, for *hich the precedin! divisions *ere preparations. @ro' the very e!innin! this final division lacks the ri!or of its predecessors. ,everal of the steps re'ain entirely i'plicit. 2oreover, *hen the division is res('ed after a lon! di!ression, there *ill e so'e si!nificant depart(res fro' the present 'odel. Beca(se of the first of these factors - shall s(''ariKe the steps efore dia!ra''in! the', and eca(se of the second - shall (se Do'an n(' ers here, reservin! the <ra ic n(' ers for the final for' of the division. i. -n another re'inder of the %epu)lic , the sophist is no* descri ed as so'eone *ho can prod(ce everythin! thro(!h a sin!le skill 3$""a f.4, as the poet had een descri ed in %epu)lic 1# 3>9Bc f.4.;1$= &he stran!er asks, 9;Hhat= if so'eone *o(ld clai' that, y a sin!le art, he kne* ho*, not to speak or disp(te a o(t, (t to prod(ce and do all thin!s *hateverJ9 3$""d4. &his is an odd e!innin!, for after th(s contrastin! 9speakin! a o(t9 and 9prod(cin!9 as t*o different arts concernin! all thin!s, the present division looks for the sophist (nder the species of a prod(cer rather than a talker, *hich is not *hat *e *o(ld have e)pected. ii. &he stran!er contin(es, 9<nd f(rther'ore, havin! +(ickly prod(ced ;i'a!es of= the' all, he sells the' for very little 'oney9 3$"4a4. <s *ith step 4 of division B, the sophist sells his prod(cts rather than !ivin! the' a*ay. iii. &he fact that he char!es little for 9all thin!s9 'eans that he '(st e playin! 3rather than serio(s? $"4a4. iv. &his species of play is a for' of i'itation 3$"4 4. v. ,pecifically, it is i'itation in *ords rather than pict(res, res(ltin! in spoken i'a!es 3

4 3$"4 .c4. ;1$= Co'pare especially Sophist $"4 *ith %epu)lic >96 .c. 7 1"> 7 vi. -'a!es 'ay f(rther e divided into likenesses 3

4 and se' lances 3 ? $">d.$"B 4. &he difference et*een the' is that a likeness represents the proportions of the ori!inal acc(rately, *hile a se' lance co'pensates for the distortin! effect of the a(dience8s perspective. < nonver al e)a'ple of se' lance is a tall stat(e *hose (pper portions are e)a!!erated in siKe to

co'pensate for the fact that they are farther fro' the vie*er and *o(ld other*ise appear too s'all 3$">d.$"B 4.;1"= &h(s, in an i'portant sense, the se' lance is not the ori!inal. &he +(estion of ho* a se' lance cannot )e *hat it see's to e leads into the lon! central disc(ssion of the dialo!(e. &he precedin! steps 'ay e sche'atiKed as sho*n in @i!(re 6. -n all three 9s(ccessf(l9 preli'inary divisions, the sophist *as so(!ht a'on! the ac+(isitive rather than prod(ctive arts 3division D, *hich *as (ns(ccessf(l insofar as it ca(!ht only a no le co(sin to the sophist, did not 'ake (se of the prod(ctive/ac+(isitive distinction4. 1ere for the first ti'e he *ill e so(!ht a'on! the arts of prod(ction. <nd *here the first fo(r divisions classified hi' (nder ver al 3or peda!o!ical4 skills, here he is classed as prod(cin! thin!s rather than talkin! a o(t the'.;14= Hhy then is he portrayed here as prod(ctive rather than, as efore, ac+(isitiveJ &here *o(ld have een no diffic(lty in p(rs(in! the present co(rse once a!ain (nder the headin! of ac+(isitiveness. &he 'odel for doin! so *as already provided in division B, *hich e!ins *ith ac+(isition instead of prod(ction 3<n!ler $4, y e)chan!e rather than y con+(est 3<n!ler "4, and y sellin! rather than !ivin! 3,tep 44. <t that point there is a distinction et*een sellin! one8s o*n prod(cts 3>a4 and those other than one8s o*n 3> 4, *hich leads 3accordin! to &heaetet(s8s en('eration at $"1d4 to the fo(rth and third appearances of the sophist, respectively. <ccordin!ly, the final division 'i!ht have e!(n *ith >a, in *hich the sophist *o(ld e seen as a vendor of his o*n prod(cts, and the division 'i!ht then have proceeded to specify the precise nat(re of the prod(cts, as it does here. &he difference *o(ld e that all these divisions, incl(din! his art of prod(ction, *o(ld fall *ithin the for' of ac+(isitive arts. -n fact there is nothin! here a!ainst so interpretin! the present startin! point 3i.e., as proceedin! fro' >a of division B rather ;1"= Cf. the Phaedrus $>9e.$B#d, *here ,ocrates criticiKes rhetoricians for ein! 'ore concerned *ith acco''odatin! the'selves to their a(dience8s eliefs, *hether tr(e or false, than *ith acco''odatin! the'selves to the tr(th. ;14= -.e., in step i. &he ver al co'ponent is, ho*ever, read'itted in step v as a species of prod(ction: i'a!es in *ords are distin!(ished fro' i'a!es in pict(res. 7 1"B 7

@i!(re 6 than $a of the <n!ler division4, e)cept that no e)plicit enco(ra!e'ent is !iven to s(ch a 'ove. &he only reference to the sophist8s ac+(isitiveness 3and therefore the only co''on !ro(nd *ith the %epu)lic's conception of sophistry4 is to the fact that the sophist sells his prod(cts rather than !ivin! the' a*ay, and even here the 'oney see's relatively (ni'portant, since he sells the' 9for very little 'oney.9 C(rio(sly, *hen this e!innin! is recalled at the end of the dialo!(e, even the sli!ht reference to ac+(isitiveness is eli'inated, as *ell as any a' i!(ity a o(t *hether the startin! point 'i!ht e located *ithin division B, and therefore *ithin the for' of ac+(isitive rather than prod(ctive art.

'+ #iAenesses and Sem2lances 4-/;a6-'-c8

&he division fo(nders on the pro le' of ho* to say that so'ethin! 9is not.9 -f so'ethin! is an inacc(rate i'a!e, then in a si!nificant sense it 9is not9 the ori!inal. B(t Par'enides ar!(ed 3and his ar!('ents in.

7 1"% 7 spired sophists like Prota!oras4 that it is i'possi le to say or think that so'ethin! is not. Hhen *e atte'pt to do so *e '(st conceive the nothin! 3*hat is not4 as if it *ere so'ethin!, and so *e fall into contradiction. -f this aporia cannot e resolved, the present atte'pt to define sophistry in ter's of false i'a!es *ill fail 3$"Ba.$"9c4. &he stran!er no* appears to shift his !ro(nd. -t see'ed at first that the pro le' lay only *ith the falsity of se' lances. B(t no* a less o vio(s pro le' arises that tacitly roadens the pro le'atic to incl(de not only se' lances 3inacc(rate i'a!es4 (t likenesses 3acc(rate i'a!es4 as *ell. Hitho(t callin! attention to the shift, the stran!er no* asks, not for a definition of se' lances in partic(lar, (t for one of i'a!es in !eneral 3$"9d4. &he ens(in! disc(ssion *ill consistently p(t its +(estions in ter's of i'a!es in !eneral rather than se' lances in partic(lar 3$"9d.$4#c, $41e, $B4c4. 2ost s(rprisin!ly, in one place the pro le'atic is for'(lated not only not in ter's of false i'a!esI se' lancesI (t not even in ter's of i'a!es in !eneral, and rather in ter's of true i'a!es, likenesses. &he stran!er says, 9Hitho(t really ein!, then, it really is *hat *e call a likenessJ9 3$4# 4. ,horty thereafter he e)plicitly collapses the distinction et*een acc(rate and inacc(rate i'a!es, and p(ts all i'a!es on the sa'e asis for the p(rposes of the present disc(ssion: he speaks of 9false state'ents or opinionsI*hether i'a!es, likenesses, i'itations, or se' lances9 3$41e4. Hhy has the stran!er roadened his attack to incl(de all i'a!es, *hether acc(rate or inacc(rateJ < se' lance 9is not,9 in the sense that its proportions are not those of the ori!inal. <s lon! as *e confine o(r e)a'ple 3as the stran!er does4 to the relationship et*een a stat(e and its 'odel, the difference et*een se' lance and likeness is clean B(t the present case is a o(t se' lances and likenesses in ords 3

4. Hhat does it 'ean to speak of acc(rate or inacc(rate representation in *ords of the tr(e proportions of a thin!J He have already had at least fo(r different i'a!es of the sophist, at least three of the' so'e*hat pers(asive. < fifth is on the *ay, *hich *ill e 'ore ri!oro(s in so'e *ays (t less pers(asive in others. &hro(!ho(t the dialo!(es, incl(din! the Theaetetus , Plato sho*s hi'self *ell a*are of the diffic(lty, and perhaps i'possi ility, of !ivin! e)ceptionless definitions of philosophical concepts, that is, perfectly acc(rate i'a!es in *ords. Does this 'ean that *hen he has !iven (s i'perfect ver al 'odels, as ,ocrates often ad'its to doin!, he is prod(cin! se' lances rather than i'a!es, and practicin! sophistry rather than philosophyJ Unlike the sophists he does not deli)eratel! distort his 'odels in accordance *ith his a(dience8s point of vie*. &he distortion is invol(ntary and (navoida le. 7 1"6 7 B(t the +(estion of *hether the distortion is vol(ntary or not is irrelevant: if the i'a!e is a distortion, it cannot e a likeness. &he intention of the prod(cer tells (s *hat *as ai'ed at, (t not *hat *as prod(ced. Fnly the nat(re of the prod(ct tells (s that. &o p(t the 'atter 'ore radically, in a sense any i'a!e is y nat(re a distortion of the ori!inal. <t the very least the 'aterial fro' *hich it is 'ade is different fro' that of the ori!inal.;1>= &his is tr(e to a

relatively s'all de!ree if *e co'pare a *ell.sc(lpted and *ell.painted stat(e *ith the ori!inal 'odel, and it approaches a vanishin! point if *e co'pare a paintin! of a paintin! or a sc(lpt(re of a sc(lpt(re *ith the ori!inal paintin! or sc(lpt(re? (t it eco'es clearly evident *hen *e try to co'pare 0(stice itself, for e)a'ple, *ith *ords a o(t 0(stice. &he 'edi(' of *ords is so different fro' that of for's that the very concept of an acc(rate i'a!e is serio(sly pro le'atic. ,ince physical thin!s are i'a!es of for's, as the Divided Cine avers, then they necessarily fall short, if only eca(se their 'ode of e)istence is so different. &he Phaedo and the Parmenides ,;1B= too, all(de to the a' i!(ity of *hether thin!s can e said to e si'ilar to the for's in *hich they participate, (t the clearest state'ent of the pro le' is in the "rat!lus : ,FCD<&/, : Ho(ld there e these t*o s(ch thin!s as Cratyl(s and a likeness ;

= of Cratyl(s, if one of the !ods not only copied yo(r color and shape, like painters, (t also 'ade all the thin!s *ithin the sa'e as *ithin yo(, and esto*ed the sa'e softness and *ar'th, and p(t in the' 'ove'ent, so(l, and intelli!ence like yo(rs. -n a *ord, everythin! that yo( have, he *o(ld place another instance of eside yo(. Ho(ld then this e Cratyl(s and a likeness of Cratyl(s, or t*o Cratyl(sesJ CD<&ACU, : &hey see' to 'e, ,ocrates, to e t*o Cratyl(ses. ,FCD<&/, : Do yo( see then, 'y friend, that *e '(st seek a different kind of correctness of likenesses, and of the thin!s *e *ere 0(st talkin! a o(t ;na'es=, and not re+(ire that if so'ethin! s( tracts ;1>= Dosen p(ts the point 'ore stron!ly: 9<n 3acc(rate4 i'a!e of a !iven ori!inal 8is and is not8 the ori!inal, and in the sa'e respect, not in t*o different respects. <n acc(rate copy of a certain look is the sa'e look. <nd yet, precisely as the copy 3not, in other *ords, as a distinct 'aterial realiKation of the copy look4, it is not and cannot e the sa'e as the ori!inal. -n s(': if it is the sa'e, it is not a copy. -f it is a copy, it is not the sa'e9 3PS 1914. - a' not s(re, ho*ever, that one can speak of a copy as 9not . . . a distinct 'aterial realiKation of the copy look.9 -t does not see' possi le to distin!(ish a copy and ori!inal as separate thin!s (nless an individ(atin! 'aterial s( strat(' is (ilt into the 'odal. Eilles Dele(Ke is hi!hly sensitive to this a' i!(ity/insta ility in his treat'ent of the Sophist in chap. 1 of Di&&erence and %epetition. ;1B= Phaedo %4c.d 3see PP B#.B$4 and the second and fo(rth ar!('ents of the Parmenides 31"$a. , 1"$d.1""a4. 7 1"9 7 or adds so'ethin! it is no lon!er a likenessJ Fr do yo( not perceive ho* far likenesses are fro' havin! the sa'e +(alities as those thin!s of *hich they are likenessesJ 34"$ d4 -f no i'a!e can perfectly represent the ori!inal, *e can (nderstand *hy Plato e)tended the pro le' of falsity fro' overtly false i'a!es 3se' lances4 to i'a!es in !eneral, e)pressly incl(din! overtly tr(e ones 3likenesses4. <ccordin!ly, if the follo*in! disc(ssion is to e s(ccessf(l, it '(st e)plain not only ho* sophistry is possi le (t also ho* philosophy is possi le. He *ill see that this is not ade+(ately achieved in the Sophist ? and *hen *e !et to the Statesman *e *ill find that the stran!er, *itho(t distin!(ishin! et*een likenesses and se' lances, rele!ates all i'a!es and i'itations of the (nfor'(lata le 9science of the 'ean9 to the sa'e inferior stat(s, and calls those *ho prod(ce the

i'a!es 9sophists of sophists,9 re!ardless of *hether the i'a!es they prod(ce are the est possi le 3the re!i'e of a constit(tional 'onarch4 or the *orst 3that of a tyrant? "#" .c4. 2oreover, if, accordin! to the Divided Cine, physical thin!s are related to for's as i'a!es to ori!inals, the ontolo!ical stat(s of physical thin!s also co'es into +(estion at this point. -n fact, the stran!er *ill later s(!!est that connection hi'self *hen he divides the for' of divine prod(ction into 9entities the'selves9 and 9i'a!es9 3$B>e.$BBa4Ia dear re'inder of the t*o.*orld ontolo!y of the Divided Cine. Hhat 'akes it even 'ore e'phatic is that there *as no need to divide the for' of divine prod(ction at all, since the sophist is p(rs(ed *ithin the collateral for' of human prod(ction. &here is no need to *ait (ntil that point in the dialo!(e for a re'inder of the t*o.*orld ontolo!y. <s soon as the pro le' of i'a!es is defined, the stran!er asks &heaetet(s for a definition of 9i'a!e,9 and &heaetet(s, as he had done *ith ,ocrates in the Theaetetus , responds *ith a list of e)a'ples. Fne *ay in *hich this is s(!!estive is that the list (ses e)a'ples re'iniscent of those (sed to e)plicate ei$asia and pistis in the Divided Cine and the Cave: 9i'a!es in *ater and 'irrors, and, f(rther, in paintin!s and stat(es and all other s(ch thin!s9 3$"9d4. /ven 'ore s(!!estive is the stran!er8s reply. 1e does not si'ply say, as ,ocrates did in si'ilar circ('stances, that *hat he *ants is not a list (t the +(ality that ena les all ite's on the list to e called y the sa'e na'e. -nstead he prefaces that re+(est *ith the co''ent that a sophist *o(ld reply y actin! as tho(!h he had no eyes and had never seen these thin!s? he *o(ld *ant to kno* 9*hat follo*s fro' *ords alone9 3$"9e.$4#a4. By p(ttin! it in this *ay the stran!er dra*s a distinction 7 14# 7 et*een the visi le *orld and the intelli!i le *orld, and insists that philosophy 3for *hich 9the sophist9 here stands ironic pro)y4 is concerned only *ith the intelli!i le *orld. &heaetet(s8s ens(in! atte'pt to !ive a proper definition of 9i'a!e9 co'ple'ents the pro le'atic *ith *hich the section started. Previo(sly the stran!er e'phasiKed the falsity of i'a!es. 5o* &heaetet(s conversely e'phasiKes the tr(th of noni'a!es. <n i'a!e is 9another s(ch thin! 'ade in the likeness of the tr(e one ;

=9 3$4#a4. B(t the ori!inal pro le' no* reappears in this o verted for'. <s the stran!er points o(t, if 9tr(e9 'eans *hat really is 3 4, then eca(se the i'a!e does not have tr(e ein!, *e cannot say that it really is, even tho(!h it 9really is9 an i'a!e 3$4# 4. &heaetet(s ackno*led!es this, (sin! lan!(a!e that anticipates the lan!(a!e y *hich the pro le' *ill e solved: 95ot. ein! does appear to have eco'e t*isted to!ether *ith ein!, y so'e s(ch *eavin! ; =, and it is very stran!e9 3$4#c4. &he only *ay o(t of this aporia, the stran!er says, is to distin!(ish a'on! senses of not. ein!, so that there *ill e a sense in *hich it is 'eanin!f(l to say that not. ein! can e. ,o'e co''entators take this passa!e as evidence that Plato sa* hi'self as !oin! eyond Par'enides, *ho said that *e can neither say nor think that 9it is not.9 &hey point to the /leatic stran!er8s (se of the *ord 9parricide9 in relation to his teacher, 9father Par'enides.9 B(t the stran!er8s *ords are, 9Do not think that - a' eco'in! a kind of parricide9 3$41d4. -f anythin!, these *ords

s(!!est that Plato does not re!ard these distinctions as fatal to Par'enides8 position.

:+ @eing and Not6@eing 4-'-c6-:%a8

9Hhen - *as yo(n!er,9 says the stran!er, 9*henever anyone spoke of *hat no* rin!s (s to an i'passe I8not. ein!8I- tho(!ht - (nderstood it e)actly. B(t no* yo( see *hat an i'passe *e are in *ith re!ard to it . . . . &hen perhaps *e have ad'itted this sa'e condition into o(r so(l no less *ith re!ard to 8 ein!89 3$4" .c4. 1e proceeds to esta lish this y sho*in! that 3a4 neither the pl(ralists nor the 'onists have !iven an ade+(ate acco(nt of ein!, and 3 4 neither those *ho e+(ate ein! *ith corporeal 'atter nor those *ho e+(ate it *ith intelli!i le for' have done so either. 1is ref(tations of these positions *ill e alon! the !eneral lines of the Phaedo's 'ethod of hypothesis, as *ill his replace'ent of the' y a hi!her hypothesis. <ccordin!ly, the 'ethod of division cannot e re!arded as a replace'ent of the 'ethod of hypothesis, 7 141 7 as is often clai'ed. &hey co'ple'ent rather than co'pete *ith each other.

"+ The

ne and the 0an* 4-'/d6-':d8

-n a passa!e that recalls the Phaedo's co'plaint that previo(s philosophers relied on 'etaphor and physical e)planations to a de!ree that l(rred the distinction et*een philosophy and 'ytholo!y 399c4, the stran!er 'ocks the anthropo'orphic e)planations of his predecessors *ho, as if they *ere tellin! stories to children, speak of their principles as fi!htin! *ars *ith each other, or fallin! in love, 'arryin!, and havin! children 3$4$c.$4"a4. Beca(se their f(nda'ental principles *ere never clarified and s( 0ected to ri!oro(s scr(tiny, the stran!er proposes to (ndertake s(ch scr(tiny no*, especially *ith respect to the concepts 9 ein!9 and 9not. ein!,9 *hich appeared so opa+(e in the previo(s section. &he stran!er foc(ses first on d(alis', *hich he takes as paradi!'atic for pl(ralis' !enerally. Hhat is the relationship et*een the d(alists8 f(nda'ental principles and 9 ein!9J Bein! '(st e either an additional principle, or identical *ith one of the ori!inal t*o principles 3e.!., the hot and the cold4, or *ith oth of the' in co' ination. -f it is an additional principle, then there are three principles, and the d(alists *ere *ron! a o(t the n(' er of principles. -f it is identical *ith one of the', then the other cannot e said e+(ally to e. -f it is identical *ith the co' ination, then there really is only one f(nda'ental principle, and the d(alists eco'e 'onists 3$4"d.$44a4. 5e)t, (sin! ar!('ents fa'iliar to (s fro' the Parmenides , the stran!er !oes on to sho* that 'onis' is no 'ore a le than d(alis' to !ive an ade+(ate acco(nt of ein!. 1. -f ein! is the sa'e as the Fne, *e end (p *ith t*o na'es for the sa'e. <re the t*o na'es identical *ith the Fne, or different fro' itJ 3a4 -f the na'e is different fro' the. Fne, there *ill e t*o ein!s rather than one. 3 4 -f the na'e is identical *ith the Fne, then the Fne *ill e a na'e, either a na'e of nothin! 3since there is nothin! esides the Fne4 or a na'e of a na'e 3i.e., of itself? $44 .d4. $. -s the Fne the sa'e as the *hole 3i.e., the *orld4J 3a4 -f it is the sa'e, then, since a *hole has parts, the Fne *ill e '(ltiple. 3 4 -f the one ein! is not the sa'e as the *hole, then ein! *ill lack so'ethin! of ein!. 3c4 -f *e deny that the *hole e)ists, then neither co'in! into 7 14$ 7

ein! nor +(antity can e said to e 3$44e.$4>d4. 9<nd so 'yriad other +(estions, each involvin! li'itless aporiae, *ill appear to anyone *ho says that ein! is either t*o kinds or only one9 3$4>d4.

@+ Form and 0atter 4-':e 6 -'&c8

&he stran!er then considers the other dichoto'y 'entioned a ove, that et*een the cha'pions of 'atter and the cha'pions of for', *ho are assi'ilated to cha'pions of 'otion and cha'pions of rest. &his opposition et*een the 9friends of the for's9 and the 'aterialists is descri ed as gigantomachia , a *ar a!ainst the !iants. &he reference is to the 'ythical *ar in *hich the !iants tried to dra! the !ods o(t of heaven. &he !iants, literally, the 9earth orn9 3$46c4, clearly refer to the 'aterialists, *hile the friends of the for's, like the !ods, derive their *eapons fro' the invisi le 3i''aterial4 real' a ove 3$4B 4. -n 1esiod, the !ods defeat the !iants. Hhether that *ill e tr(e here in the lon! r(n re'ains to e seen? in the short ter' there *ill e no victor. @or the 'aterialists, 9 ein! and corporeality are identical.9 @or the others, 9tr(e ein! is certain intelli!i le and incorporeal for's,9 *hile corporeality is not ein! (t 9a certain eco'in! that is in 'otion9 3$4Ba.c4. &he 'aterialists, says the stran!er, are too do!'atic and intolerant to participate in civiliKed ar!('ent, so *e need to s(ppose the' to e etter than they really are, if any rapproche'ent is to e possi le 3$4Bc? repeated at $4%c4. He 'ay take this as an ad'ission that the follo*in! ar!('ent *o(ld not in fact prove its concl(sion to the 'aterialists8 satisfaction, altho(!h it does so to the stran!er8s 3and perhaps Plato8s4 satisfaction. &he ar!('ent is as follo*s: 1. &he e)istence of livin! ani'als i'plies the e)istence of so(ls 3$4Be4. $. &he fact that so(ls can e 0(st or (n0(st, *ise or (n*ise, i'plies the possession and presence of these +(alities 3$4%a4. ". ,(ch +(alities e)ist *itho(t ein! visi le or corporeal 3a. 4. 4. &herefore the 'aterialists8 e)cl(sive 'aterialis' collapses 3c4. He can see *hy the 'aterialists *o(ld have to e refor'ed to accept this ar!('ent. ,tep - *o(ld not other the' since they conceive so(ls in 'aterial ter's, as &heaetet(s points o(t 3$4% 4. B(t the i'plication in step $, and assertion in step ", that the virt(es 3and perhaps the vices4 have an e)istence that is distinct fro' that of odies, *o(ld certainly e 7 14" 7 (naccepta le to the' 3as indeed it *ill e to <ristotle4. &he ar!('ent is si'ilar to the second of the three ref(tations in the Phaedo of epipheno'enalis' 3the theory that the so(l is a harmonia of corporeal ele'ents4, *hich si'ilarly appeals to the reality of the virt(es 39$e.94 4. &hat ar!('ent *as not irresisti le,;1%= nor is this one, as the stran!er8s need for 9refor'ed9 adversaries ackno*led!es. 5evertheless it perhaps artic(lates the stran!er8s o*n reason for re0ectin! 'aterialis'. -t is si!nificant that that reason is ased on the reality of virt(e, rather than 3as *e 'i!ht e)pect4 the reality of (niversal kinds, for *e shall find that the stran!er8s 'ethod of division cannot acco''odate distinctions a'on! 9val(es,9 *hether 'oral or other*ise. &he refor'ed !iants have no* ackno*led!ed t*o kinds of ein!I corporeality and incorporeal virt(e Iand so so'e definition of ein! '(st e fo(nd to e' race oth. &he stran!er s(!!ests the definition of ein! as 9po*er9 3

4, the po*er either to affect or e affected y so'ethin! else. &he definition is only provisional, ho*ever: 9Perhaps later so'ethin! else *ill occ(r oth to (s and to the'9 3$4%d.e4. &he stran!er ne)t seeks to e)tend this definition to the position of the friends of the for's. &hey ackno*led!e that there is a difference et*een eco'in! and ein!. He co''(ne 3

4 *ith eco'in! thro(!h the ody y 'eans of perception, and *ith ein! thro(!h the so(l y 'eans of reason. &he (nity of these t*o, he s(!!ests, like the (nity of the t*o real's of the refor'ed 'aterialists, lies in the concept of po*er 3$46a. 4. 1o*ever, the friends of the for's *ill o 0ect that ein! is neither active nor passive, and therefore not a kind of po*er 3$46c4. Po*er i'plies chan!e, and for the friends of the for's ein! is (nchan!ea le. &he stran!er co(nters this y insistin! that if the for's are kno*n they '(st e acted (pon y o(r 'inds, and in this sense they are not at rest (t (nder!o an alteration 3$46e4. &his is so'eti'es seen as a radical depart(re fro' earlier conceptions of the for's. -t is, to e s(re, a different *ay of talkin! a o(t the', (t it is not a different *ay of conceivin! the'. Fne feat(re of the earlier presentation of the theory of for's *as that *hat is (nchan!in! 'ay nevertheless e a ca(se of chan!eIin a sense co'para le to <ristotle8s 9for'al9 ca(se rather than 9efficient9 ca(se.;16= He 'ay in this sense speak of for's as active, insofar as they are responsi le for an attri (te that has co'e into ein! in a partic(lar case 3for e)a'ple, the ea(ty of so'eone *ho eco'es ea(tif(l4. <nd *e 'ay speak of the' as passive insofar as they are ;1%= ,ee PP 1#".B? cf. 1#6.14. ;16= Cf. Phaedo 99a.1##e. 7 144 7 o 0ects of kno*led!e. B(t in oth cases *e are speakin! only analo!ically, as *e al*ays do *hen *e speak of for's. -n the cr(cial sense for's are not active: they do not prod(ce alteration in other thin!s y 'eans of any kind of alteration in the'selves. 5or in the cr(cial sense are they passive: in ein! 9acted (pon9 they are not in any sense altered. Hhat this disc(ssion does ill(strate is that *e conceive of for's in relation to the real' of chan!e. @or's and chan!in! thin!s are not t*o radically distinct *orlds, or *e *o(ld e v(lnera le to the fifth ar!('ent of the Parmenides . @or's are the ti'eless aspect of chan!in! thin!s, the ein! of eco'in!. B(t in that case they '(st so'eho* pres(ppose the real' of chan!e and 'otion. &his is the direction that the stran!er no* takes, y 'eans of an ar!('ent analo!o(s to the one he (sed a!ainst the 'aterialists: ,&D<5E/D : Hhat then, y Le(sJ -n tr(th shall *e e so easily pers(aded that 'otion and life and so(l and *isdo' are not present to perfect reality, and that it neither lives nor thinks, (t that a(!(st and holy, *itho(t 'ind, it is i''ova ly fi)edJ &1/</&/&U, : &hat *o(ld certainly e a terrifyin! state'ent, stran!er, to a!ree *ith . . . . ,&D<5E/D : B(t then are *e to say that it has 'ind and life and so(l, and yet stands a sol(tely i''ova le altho(!h it is enso(ledJ &1/</&/&U, : <ll these thin!s see' to 'e to e (nreasona le. 3$49a. 4 ,o there '(st e 'otion. B(t there '(st also e *hat is not in 'otion. &he stran!er had previo(sly forced the refor'ed 'aterialists to concede the e)istence of incorporeal virt(es (t had said nothin!

a o(t *hether or not these are in 'otion. &o 'ake the latter point, he no* foc(ses not on virt(e (t on kno*led!e. Fn one hand, eca(se kno*led!e co'es and !oes in the 'ind, the e)istence of 'ind forced the friends of the for's to concede that reality incl(des 'otion. Fn the other hand, eca(se 'ind cannot e)ist *itho(t 9*hat is in the sa'e respects and in the sa'e *ay and in relation to the sa'e thin!,9 and the latter cannot e)ist *itho(t rest 3$49 .c4, the e)istence of 'ind also forces the refor'ed 'aterialists to concede that reality incl(des rest. <ltho(!h in a p(rely for'al *ay, then, it is the cate!ory of po*er that reconciles the 'aterialists and the friends of the for's, in a concrete *ay it is the e)istence of 'ind that reconciles the'. &here is th(s a do( le reconciliation: a for'al one 3the definition of ein! as 9po*er94 and a s( stantial one 3each party8s reco!nition of the reality of its opponent8s real'4. Hhen the stran!er said that the positions of oth the 'aterialists and the friends of the for's can e re!arded as clai'in! 7 14> 7 that ein! is a kind of po*er, he did not there y sho* that there *as any co''on !ro(nd et*een the t*o positions e)cept in *ords only 3the concession that the virt(es *ere incorporeal *as not strictly necessary to that reconciliation4. 1e 'erely effected a collection of the t*o positions *ithin a co''on class.;19= Hhat the t*o ca'ps 'eant y po*er 'i!ht still e very different. B(t if he can no* sho* that they share a elief in the e)istence of 'ind, *hich re+(ires the reality of oth 'otion and rest, then a reconciliation of s( stance 'ay e possi le. -t is not dear, ho*ever, on *hat !ro(nds the cha'pions of rest are re+(ired to accept the 9perfect reality9 3

4 of 'otile 'ind, or *hy the cha'pions of 'otion '(st a!ree that 'ind re+(ires the (nvaryin! e)istence descri ed as 9*hat is in the sa'e respects ;

= and in the sa'e *ay ; = and in relation to the sa'e thin! ; =.9 &o take the latter +(estion first: it 'ay see' as tho(!h the for'(la is a reference to the for's, (t it is in fact si'ply an echo of the principle of noncontradiction for'(lated in %epu)lic 4: 9-t is dear that the sa'e thin! ;

= *ill not do or s(ffer opposites in the sa'e respect ; = and in relation to the sa'e thin! ;

= si'(ltaneo(sly ; =9 34"B 4. Hhat the 'aterialists are ein! asked to concede is that the o 0ect of kno*led!e '(st have a sta le self.identity. B(t *hy '(st the self.identity e sta le rather than evolvin!J -n the %epu)lic's for'(la that kind of sta ility *as not re+(ired. &he *ord 9si'(ltaneo(sly9 'eant that *e are concerned *ith the nat(re of an o 0ect only at a !iven instant? *hether it chan!es fro' one instant to the ne)t is irrelevant. 1ere, ho*ever, there is no te'poral +(alification, and the i'plication is that *hat is self.identical '(st e (nchan!in!, that is, at rest. &he link et*een the possi ility of kno*led!e and the need for sta le self.identifies has already een noted in the Theaetetus , *here ,ocrates ar!(es that if everythin! is al*ays in fl() and eco'in! its ;19= ,ayre *rites that since tan!i ility and (nchan!ea ility are not opposites, 98the attle of the Eods and Eiants8 is not a conflict et*een t*o !ro(ps *ho follo* opposite ranches in an e)ha(stive dichoto'o(s s( division of a co''on Kind9 3P#' 1BB4. 1o*ever, altho(!h they are not opposites in their intention, they i'ply each other8s contradictory, and so are opposites in their e)tension. -n other *ords, *hat is tan!i le is chan!ea le and th(s opposed to the (nchan!ea le, and *hat is (nchan!ea le is intan!i le and th(s opposed to the tan!i le. Cf. Phaedo 6# : 9,o(l is 'ost si'ilar to the divine and i''ortal and intelli!i le and (nifor' and indissol( le and *hat is al*ays related to itself in the sa'e *ay a o(t the sa'e thin!s ;sc . 9(nchan!ea le9=? and ody ;sc . 9*hat is tan!i le9= is 'ost si'ilar to the h('an and 'ortal and '(ltifor' and (nintelli!i le and dissol( le and *hat is never related to itself in the sa'e *ay a o(t the sa'e thin!s.9 - s(spect that Plato chose nonantony's to e'phasiKe that the contrast is et*een d(sters of concepts rather than one specific opposition. 7 14B 7 opposite, then kno*led!e '(st itself al*ays e eco'in! nonkno*led!e 316$c.e4. 1e inferred that 9if everythin! is in 'otion, every ans*er a o(t anythin! one is asked *ill e e+(ally ri!ht,9 and lan!(a!e itself *ill reak do*n 316"a. 4. /ven if the stran!er8s for'(la is not 'eant initially as a reference to the for's, therefore, it '(st (lti'ately i'ply the for's nevertheless. Fnly the for's f(lfill the condition of ein! at rest in the re+(isite *ay. 5evertheless *e cannot s(ppose that the unregenerate 'aterialists *o(ld e convinced y this, since the 1eracleitean and Prota!orean schools, at least, *o(ld not e tro( led y the relativity of kno*led!e. B(t if the 'aterialists *ere 9refor'ed9 eno(!h to accept the independent reality of i''aterial virt(es, pres('a ly it *o(ld not e too '(ch for the' to accept the necessity for a sol(tely stationary o 0ects of 'ind. &he stran!er does not clai' to have ref(ted 'aterialis'? he has only p(t for*ard a position that 9'ore reasona le9 'aterialists o(!ht to accept. &he other +(estion raised a ove has, of co(rse, 'ore serio(s i'plications for 9Platonis'.9 -f the cha'pions of rest are re+(ired to incl(de *ithin the concept of 9perfect reality9 not only the static for's (t also 'ind, 'otion, life, and so(l, ho* serio(sly is the classical theory of for's co'pro'isedJ &here have een appro)i'ately fo(r *ays of ans*erin! this. 314 &he phrase 9friends of the for's9 is conceiva ly not a reference to Plato8s 'iddle period theory of for's at all, (t to so'e other theory.;$#= ,(ch an approach !oes ack at least as far as Procl(s, *ho constr(es the phrase as a reference to 9the *ise 'en of -taly,9 that is, the Pytha!oreans.;$1= B(t Plato can hardly have een (na*are that, in the a sence of any other identification, s(ch a phrase *o(ld nat(rally call to 'ind his o*n earlier *ritin!s. 3$4 Fn the ass('ption that the reference is to proponents of the earlier theory of for's, it 'ay e that this episode reflects a radical revision of Plato8s earlier

thinkin! on the s( 0ect.;$$= 3"4 He 'ay, on the other hand, accept the ass('ption that the reference is to the earlier theory, (t deny that any chan!e in that theory is indicated. &his *o(ld e possi le if 9life,9 9so(l,9 9'otion,9 and 9reason9 referred not to these +(alities as pheno'ena (t only as ;$#= /.!., :ohn B(rnet 3Gree$ Philosoph!: Thales to Plato ;Condon: 2ac2illan, 1914=4 $6#, &aylor "6>, D(nci'an %B. H. D. Doss f(rther cites ,chleier'acher, Leller, BonitK, ,tall a(', and Ca'p ell 3Plato's Theor! o& (deas ;F)ford: Clarendon Press, 19>1= 1#> nn. 4.B4. ;$1= Procl(s, p. 1#B. ;$$= /.!., B(rner "49? ,ayre., P#' 1B>.BB n. $>? E(thrie >.141. 7 14% 7 for'sIthat is, the &orm of life, the &orm of so(l, and so on.;$"= 1o*ever, s(ch an interpretation !oes a!ainst the *hole sense of the passa!e, *hich portrays the friends of the for's as 'akin! a concession and e)tendin! their concept of reality.;$4= 344 -t 'ay e that a chan!e in the earlier theory of for's is indeed indicated, as the second position clai'ed, (t the chan!e 'ay not affect any of the central doctrines of the theory.;$>= @or the reasons !iven in the precedin! para!raph - elieve that the evidence is a!ainst the first and third interpretations, *hich are advanced y 'ore recent friends of the for's in the hope of resc(in! the earlier theory. Does it need to e resc(edJ <re the chan!es re+(ired y the stran!er of a kind that are cr(cial to the inte!rity of the earlier theoryJ &hat theory posited a dichoto'y et*een *hat is apprehended as real y reason and *hat is perceived as real y the senses: the for'er is (niversal and (nchan!in!? the latter, partic(lar and in fl(). ,ince reason is 'ore tr(st*orthy than the senses, therefore, the tr(e reality '(st e 9 ein!9 3the (niversal and (nchan!in!4 rather than 9 eco'in!9 3the partic(lar and fl(id4. &hese are the alternatives that are no* cha'pioned, respectively, y the friends of the for's and the 'aterialists, so if the stran!er8s reconciliation of the t*o ca'ps i'plies the collapse of this dichoto'y, then the classical theory of for's *o(ld indeed have een 'odified in one of its 'ost f(nda'ental feat(res. B(t 'atters are not so si'ple. &he pri'ary polarity *ithin the theory of for's *as et*een the intelli!i le real' of ein! and the visi le real' of eco'in!. Hhere do life, so(l, and 'ind elon! in this dichoto'yJ &hey are not for's, nor are they entirely at rest. 5evertheless, they are kno*n y reason and not y the senses? *hich 'eans, accordin! to the earlier theory of for's, that they are species of ein! rather than eco'in!.;$B= &hro(!ho(t the Phaedo there is a contrast e. ;$"= 1arold Cherniss, 9&he Delation of the Timaeus to Plato8s Cater Dialo!(es9 319>%4, in <llen, ed., SP' ">$. ;$4= ,ee E(thrie8s 3>.1444 reply to Cherniss. ;$>= ,ee, e.!., Cornford, PT* $4B? Doss 111? @riedlOnder ".$B6.%#. ;$B= Decall $46a: 9&hro(!h the ody *e co''(ne *ith eco'in! y 'eans of the senses, and y 'eans of reason thro(!h the so(l *e co''(ne *ith real ein!. *hich al*ays re'ains the sa'e in the sa'e respects, *hereas eco'in! is different at different ti'es.9 E(thrie >.144 o serves that 9the idea that Plato sho(ld ever have allo*ed the sensi le *orld to cross the rid!e et*een Beco'in! and Bein! is contradicted y every other dialo!(e early or late 1ere ho*ever he says that Bein! incl(des not only the @or's Dest and 2otion, (t also 8*hatever is (n'oved and *hatever is 'oved8, *hich !ives colo(r to the vie* . . . that it incl(des all or so'e thin!s in the physical *orld.9 &his latter point *ill e addressed elo*.

7 146 7 t*een ein!, characteriKed as intelli!i le, (nchan!in!, and eternal, and eco'in!, characteriKed as corporeal, chan!in!, and 'ortal. /ven there, in the locus classicus of the theory of for's, so(l 3and y e)tension reason and life4 is assi'ilated to ein! rather than eco'in!: *e are told that so(l is eternal eca(se it rese' les the invisi le and (nchan!ea le, *hich is eternalIrather than rese' lin! the corporeal and chan!ea le, *hich is 'ortal 3%9 .6# 4. <ccordin!ly, in the Phaedo and other dialo!(es of this period, so(l, life, and reason +(ite dearly do not elon! to the real' of eco'in!? they do not +(ite elon! to the intelli!i le real' either, eca(se they are active. &hey really act as a kind of inter'ediary et*een the t*o real's,;$%= ena lin! the visi le real' to kno* the intelli!i le real' 3 y 'eans of individ(al so(ls4 and ena lin! the intelli!i le real' to e present in the visi le 3 y 'eans of the *orld so(l4. <ltho(!h they are inter'ediate et*een ein! and eco'in!, they do not constit(te a co'pletely independent third type, distin!(ished e+(ally fro' oth, (t are closely assi'ilated to the real' of ein!. &o 'ove fro' the Phaedo's position that life, so(l, and reason have a kind of +(asi ein!, to the position of the Sophist that they 'ay e incl(ded in a )roader conception of ein!, is not a f(nda'ental chan!e. &hey 'ay e said to have ein! eca(se they are 3as the Phaedo ar!(ed4 eternal. /ven tho(!h they 'ay e characteriKed y 9 eco'in!9 insofar as they are active, nevertheless they do not change in the *ay corporeal thin!s chan!e. &hey are not (nder!oin! !eneration and destr(ction. 2oreover, eca(se they are not corporeal, they are perceived y reason rather than the senses. &he ri!oro(s distinction et*een the intelli!i le *orld and the visi le *orld see's to e as fir'ly dra*n as ever, perhaps even 'ore fir'ly dra*n, since the 'iddle is no* 'ore co'pletely assi'ilated to one of the poles. ,ocrates concl(des *ith the *ords, @or the philosopher *ho 'ost honors these thin!s, there is, it see's, every necessity on these !ro(nds neither to accept the acco(nt of those *ho say that the (niverse ;

= is at rest, *hether as one or 'any for's, nor sho(ld he listen at all to the acco(nt of those *ho set ein! ; = co'pletely in 'otion. Dather he '(st say, follo*in! the children8s prayer, that 9ho*ever 'any thin!s are (n'oved and 'oved,9 ein! ; = and the (niverse ; = are oth to!ether. 3$49c.d4 1ere a!ain the t*o.*orld distinction is 'aintained rather than collapsed, eca(se rest and 'otion are predicated of different s( 0ects: the ;$%= Cf. the concept of the dai'onic in the S!mposium 3$#$d.$#"a4.

7 149 7 philosopher *ho honors these thin!s is to re0ect those *ho say that the universe 3literally, the 9s('9 or 9all94 is at rest and those *ho say that )eing is in 'otion. -t follo*s then that the 3corporeal4 (niverse is in 'otion (t that ein! is at rest. &he final sentence retains this linka!e et*een the (niverse and 'otion, and ein! and rest: 9(n'oved and 'oved, ein! and the (niverse.9 &he philosopher *ho honors these thin!s e' races oth poles *ithin the 'ore !eneral class of 9 ein!9 3i.e., 9po*er94, (t *itho(t collapsin! the distinction et*een the'. &he reason that there is so '(ch disa!ree'ent and conf(sion a'on! co''entators a o(t *hat is ein! said in this section is that the stran!er (ses the sa'e *ord, 9 ein!,9 oth !enerically 3as 9po*er94 and specifically 3as 9(nchan!in!,9 or the co(nterpart to 9 eco'in!94. &he definition of 9passive po*er9 3 ein! affected4 has 0(st een 'ade road eno(!h to incl(de 9 ein! kno*n9? and no* the definition of 9 ein!9 is roadened to incl(de instances of active po*er.;$6= &he position of the friends of the for's 3*ho (nderstand 9 ein!9 as (nchan!ea ility or rest4 is collected to!ether *ith the position of the 'aterialists 3*ho (nderstand 9 ein!9 as corporeality or 'otion4 oth for'ally and s( stantively, as - re'arked earlier. @or'ally, they have een collected into the !en(s 9po*er.9 ,( stantively, they have een co' ined into an e)tended conception of reality that co'prises oth 9 ein!9 and 9 eco'in!,9 *ith so(l 3as the principle of oth 'ind and 'otion4 as the 'iddle ter' that rid!es the e)tre'es. B(t the chan!e fro' the earlier theory of for's is only ter'inolo!ical. -n the 'iddle dialo!(es ,ocrates had reserved 9 ein!9 for *hat is (nchan!in! and 9 eco'in!9 for *hat is chan!in!. 1e *as concerned to distin!(ish rather than co' ine the', and so he offered no na'e for the *hole. &he stran!er chooses instead to call the *hole y the na'e of its pri'ary species, (t does not in other respects depart fro' the earlier ontolo!y.;$9= 9Bein!9 is no* said to incl(de 9 eco'in!,9 (t this !en(s is no lon!er *hat the friends of ;$6= &h(s Charles Kahn takes this sense of 9po*er9 to e an instance of the 9locative.e)istential9 (se of 9to e,9 *hich 9'eans so'ethin! like 8to e effectively there, as a physical presence89 3The Ier) 'He' in #ncient Gree$ ;Dordrecht: Deidel, 19%"= "%B n. B4. ;$9= &his is essentially si'ilar, - elieve, to *hat Dosen 'eans y sayin! that 9There are t o distinct ontologies at or$ in the Sophist.. . &he doctrine of for's, so to speak, is the ,tran!er8s version of a precise speech a o(t ein!. &he doctrine of the divine o(sia is his version of i'precise speech9 3PS $$"? e'phasis in ori!inal4. Dosen !oes on to say that 9the ,tran!er . . . does nothin! to reconcile these t*o ontolo!ies9 3i id.4. -f y this Dosen 'eans that the stran!er does not collapse the distinction et*een the', then - *o(ld a!ree. B(t the stran!er does reconcile the t*o in another sense, i.e., y co'prehendin! the 9precise9 one, to!ether *ith its co(nterpart 3'aterialis'4, ithin the 9i'precise9 one, oth for'ally and s( stantively. &he !reater logical !enerality of the i'precise one does not, ho*ever, confer (pon it ontological pri'acy. 7 1># 7 the for's 'eant y 9 ein!9? hence their principle has not een rep(diated (t has only een s( s('ed (nder a 'ore incl(sive class. &he principle of the friends of the for's contin(es to retain its inte!rity, and contin(es to e referred to as 9 ein!9 or 9rest.9 <s ,ocrates *ill say in the Phile)us 31$e.1"a4, the fact that thin!s 'ay e classed *ithin the sa'e species does not prevent the' fro' ein! f(nda'entally opposed to each other in nat(re. &he precedin! disc(ssion has s(!!ested that the pro le' of ein! can e solved y definin! it as 9po*er.9 B(t the stran!er re'arks that this sol(tion 'ay e (nder'ined in the sa'e *ay that d(alis' *as (nder'ined earlier. &here the pro le' *as in the relationship of ein! to the opposed principles of the d(alis'. 1ere *e a!ain have the opposed principles of 'otion and rest, and conse+(ently the

pro le' of coordinatin! the' *ith ein!. -f ein! is co''on to oth rest and 'otion, it '(st e different fro' either one. B(t in that ease it *o(ld e neither at rest nor in 'otion, *hich is i'possi le. <s the stran!er predicted at the e!innin! of this section, the concept of ein! has collapsed into aporia 0(st as had the concept of not. ein!. 1e no* s(!!ests that the discovery of the tr(e nat(re of either one of the' 'ay entail the discovery of that of the other 3$>#e.$>1a4. &his sy''etry et*een the' *ill t(rn o(t to e si!nificant.

;+ !om2ining o( the Forms 4-:%a6-:&e8

&he aporia a o(t ein! *as ho* it is possi le to call it y 'ore than one na'eIrest and 'otion, for e)a'ple. &his diffic(lty 'ay e no 'ore p(KKlin!, the stran!er s(!!ests, than the fact that *e attri (te to a person colors, shapes, siKes, vices, and virt(es. &h(s, 9*e say that a person is not only a person (t also !ood, and endless other thin!s9 3$>1 4. Fnly the yo(n!, and those *ho learn late in life, *o(ld say that *hat is one cannot e 'any in this *ay, and 9*o(ld not allo* (s to call a person !ood, (t only the !ood !ood, and a person a person9 3$>1 .c4. &he +(estion, then, is *hether s(ch thin!s as 9 ein!9 and 9rest9 can co' ine as do 9person9 and 9!ood9I'ore precisely, *hether all s(ch thin!s co' ine, or only so'e of the', or none at all 3$>1d4. &his 'ay e the first ti'e that Plato the'atically e)plores the co' ina ility of for's, (t that does not 'eanIas is often inferredIthat in the 'iddle period the for's are conceived as a sol(tely discrete and incapa le of co' ination. Fn the contrary, there *o(ld have een no point in ,ocrates8 insistence that opposite for's cannot co' ine, as he 7 1>1 7 insists in the Phaedo 31#$d.1#>e4, (nless it *ere ass('ed that non.opposite for's are capa le of co' inin!. -n fact it is clear fro' the sa'e passa!e that in so'e sense the for' of three co' ines *ith that of oddness, the for' of fire *ith that of heat, and the for' of sno* *ith that of cold. ,i'ilarly, in the %epu)lic it is dear that not only do the 0(st and ea(tif(l co' ine *ith the for' of the !ood 3>#>a. >#Ba4, (t so in so'e sense do all other for's 3>#6e.>#9 4. &he Sophist 'ay e the first dialo!(e to e)plore the co' ina ility of for's in detail, for it is the first one that e)a'ines the for'al asis of lan!(a!e 3and not 0(st na'es, as in the "rat!lus 4, (t in so doin! it e)pands on *hat Plato has said else*here, rather than contradictin! it. &he stran!er addresses his +(estion y pointin! o(t that if none of these thin!s co' ine, then 'otion and rest *ill not share in ein! and *ill not e. -n fact, if different thin!s cannot co' ine, then ato'is' is r(led o(t as *ell, since the ato's *ill not e a le to 0oin to!ether 3$>$ Ialtho(!h pres('a ly the ato'ists *o(ld re0ect this assi'ilation of physical co' ination to for'al interaction4. 2ore i'portant, the 9late learners9 can th(s e seen to contradict the'selves, for they cannot e)press the'selves *itho(t e'ployin! all kinds of ver al attri (tion, and this 'akes a 'ockery of their clai's. Fn the other hand, if all for's co' ined, then so *o(ld opposites, and *e *o(ld e left *ith contradictions, s(ch as that 'otion is at rest, and rest in 'otion 3$>$c.d4. &he re'ainin! possi ility, that so'e for's co' ine and so'e do not, is likened to the *ay letters co' ine to for' sylla les, or the *ay hi!h and lo* so(nds co' ine to for' '(sic. -t is for the art of dialectics.the free person8s art, philosophyIto kno* *hich for's co' ine and *hich do not, 0(st as that of !ra''ar 3

4 kno*s *hich letters co' ine, and that of '(sic kno*s *hich so(nds co' ine 3$>"a. 4. -n '(sic there are no specific ele'ents 3notes4 that acco(nt for the a ility or ina ility of the notes to

co' ine. &hat a ility has a for'al rather than a 'aterial e)planation. ,e+(ences of so(nds that 'anifest ea(ty or harmonia 'ay e said to co' ine, and those that do not 'anifest it do not co' ine. &he e)a'ple th(s s(!!ests the possi ility that the +(estion of co' ina ility 'ay (lti'ately rest *ith for's of value , not 'erely for's of kind. -n the other e)a'ple, !ra''ar, the co' ination of letters into sylla les is 'ade possi le y vo*els 3altho(!h nothin! is said of the co' ination of letters or sylla les into 'eanin!f(l *ords4. -t is possi le to see the three e)a'ples as for'in! a pro!ression. -n '(sic there are specific ele'ents neither for co' inin! 7 1>$ 7 nor for separatin! the other ele'ents. -n !ra''ar there are ele'ents that ena le co' ination, (t no ele'ents that acco(nt for (nco' ina ility. -n dialectics there *ill e oth. &he +(estion, then, is *hether there are so'e for's that 'ake possi le the co' inin! of for's, and others that are responsi le for their separation 3$>$e.$>"c4. &here follo*s one of the 'ost p(KKlin! passa!es to e fo(nd any*here in Plato: ,&D<5E/D : &o divide accordin! to kinds, *itho(t thinkin! the sa'e for' to e different or a different one the sa'e, shall *e not say that this elon!s to the science of dialecticJ &1/</&/&U, : Aes, *e shall. ,&D<5E/D : Hill not he *ho is a le to do this s(fficiently perceive 314 one -dea e)tended every*here thro(!h 'any, each one of *hich lies apart? 3$4 'any -deas different fro' one another, e' raced fro' *itho(t y one? 3"4 and a!ain one thro(!h 'any *holes ro(!ht to!ether into (nity? 344 and 'any for's apart fro' each and separateJ 3$>"d4 -f only the first t*o *ere !iven, they *o(ld nat(rally see' to e e)a'ples of the t*o for's *e are seekin!: the first, that *hich co' ines 39one idea e)tended thro(!h 'any94? the second, that *hich separates 39different . . . e' raced fro' *itho(t94. B(t the third and fo(rth cate!ories apparently repeat this dichoto'y *ith sli!ht variations. &he ter' 9*holes,9 in ", see's to e e+(ivalent to 9for's9 in 4, in *hich case it refers not to individ(als (t to species: a species is already a co' ination of all the lo*er species into *hich it can e f(rther divided, and therefore a *hole of parts. -n that case, 9*holes9 in " and 9for's9 in 4 see' to 'ean the sa'e thin! as 9-deas9 in - and $, and it is hard to see *hat the difference is et*een the first pair and the second. &he passa!e is so laconic that any interpretation r(ns the risk of ein! ar itrary. <ccordin! to :(li(s ,tenKel, *ritin! in 191%, the 'ost co''on interpretation *as that in 3$4 Plato is descri in! the incl(sion of s( ordinate classes *ithin a hi!her one, and in 344 contrary classes, '(t(ally e)cl(sive to each other, s(ch as Dest and 2otion. B(t 2aier ri!htly dra*s attention to the point that 3$4 and 344 partly coincide: 9,heer disparity et*een the',9 he says, 9is (nthinka le.9 1e is entirely in the ri!ht. ,tenKel8s o*n interpretation is:;"#= Hhere he is concerned *ith the Division of *holes or (nities, he says

8 . @ro' the point of vie* of sense, the i'portant thin! is not that the

;"#= Plato's 'ethod o& Dialectic 35e* Aork: D(ssell and D(ssell, 19B4 ;ori!. 194#=4 9%, 1##.1#1. 7 1>" 7 Division e)tends thro(!h 9all,9 (t that it passes thro(!h *holes or (nities. 3$4 Conversely, *here the process of Collection is descri ed, as it *as in the precedin! phrase, the essential thin! is to incl(de all the kinds 3

4 (nder certain hi!her ones . . . . Fn o(r vie*, then, ;*holes= takes the place of the pl(ral of ;one= . . . . 3"4 and 344 are closely related, and descri e the process of o tainin! the definition, , of a sin!le for', . Cornford, asin! his o*n interpretation on that of ,tenKel, ar!(ed that the first pair refers to the !en(s and species in the act of collection, and the second pair refers to the' in the act of division.;"1= &his has een the prevalent interpretation in o(r cent(ry. -t has the virt(e of rin!in! the passa!e into a clear relationship *ith the overall the'e of division in the Sophist ? altho(!h a!ainst this '(st e alanced the fact that there is no disc(ssion of collection in the Sophist . &he interpretation has the f(rther disadvanta!e of re+(irin! that the pairs represent 'ove'ent in opposite directionsIthe first pair (p*ard and the second pair do*n*ardIand the te)t !ives no clear enco(ra!e'ent to s(ch a readin!. 5ot s(rprisin!ly, in spite of the !eneral prevalence of Cornford8s interpretation, a da(ntin! variety of alternatives to it have een proposed. - shall list 3*itho(t co''ent4 fo(r 'ore of the' to !ive so'e idea of the diversity of possi le interpretations. a. E. /. 2. <nsco' e: 93i4 ,pecies.individ(al ;individ(al for's=, 3ii4 !en(s.species ;(nifyin! for's s(ch as 9one,9 9*hole,9 9 ein!9=, 3iii4 transcendentals.other for's, 3iv4 perfectly specific for's considered in the'selves ;s(ch as the series of nat(ral n(' ers=.9;"$= . <lfonso Eo'eK.Co o: 9Soph . $>"d1.e$ does not descri e Division, it anticipates the co'parison of Bein! and 5ot.Bein! *ith other @or's *hich *ill (lti'ately provide Plato8s ans*er to the dile''a of Par'enides.9;""= c. :aco Klein: 9Cet (s (nderstand *hat the ,tran!er says, y 'eans of e)a'ples. /)a'ple a : 8'a''al8 e)tends every *ay thro(!h 8lion,8 8ca'el,8 8do!.8 . . . /)a'ple ) : 8Bein!8 e' races, 8fro' the o(tside,8 Chan!e and Dest . . . . /)a'ple c : 8ani'al is asse' led into (nity thro(!h 8'a''al,8 8fish,8 and 8 ird.8 /)a'ple d : 80(stice,8 8clo(d,8 and 8fish8 are entirely apart and separate.9;"4= ;"1= PT* $B%. 1e has een follo*ed y ,ayre 3P#' 1%6.%94, E(thrie >.1"1, and &eloh 19#, a'on! others.

;"$= 9&he 5e* &heory of @or's,9 The 'onist ># 319BB4 4#".$# at 419.$#. ;""= 9Plato8s Description of Dialection in the Sophist $>"d1.e$,9 Phronesis $$ 319%%4 $9.4% at 4%. ;"4= PT >$. 7 1>4 7 d. ,eth Bernadete: 9/very idea of type <1 ; T 1= is 'anifest as one idea a'on! 'any other ideai , all of *hich are co'prehended y another idea of type <$ ; T $=. <nd every idea of type B1 ; T "= is 'anifest in 'anifold ideal of type B$ ; T 4=, *hich are not co'prehended y another idea .9;">= @aced *ith s(ch a e*ilderin! variety of readin!s, the 'ost pr(dent co(rse 'i!ht e to s(spend 0(d!'ent.;"B= 5evertheless, - prefer to offer a different interpretation, reco!niKin! at the sa'e ti'e that there is ins(fficient evidence for 'aintainin! it 3or any other4 a!ainst its rivalsI especially Cornford8s I*ith '(ch confidence. -t see's to 'e that the si'plest e)planation *o(ld e to take the passa!e as descri in! a pair of divisions. &h(s - 39one -dea e)tended thro(!h 'any, each one of *hich lies apart94 refers to the startin! point of division, and $ 39'any -deas different fro' one another, e' raced fro' *itho(t y one94 to the res(lts of that division. &he openin! *ords of " 39and again , one thro(!h 'any *holes ro(!ht to!ether into (nity94 'ay e intended to s(!!est that *e do not stop after one division (t contin(e f(rther to s( divide the precedin! species. -n step " *e reco!niKe that each res(ltant species is a *hole *ith f(rther s( ordinate parts ro(!ht to!ether *ithin it. @inally, in 4 39'any for's apart fro' each and separate94 *e distin!(ish the s( species *ithin the previo(s species. &he point of listin! fo(r steps instead of only t*o *o(ld th(s e to ill(strate that the co' inin! and differentiatin! f(nctions that (nderlie diaeresis operate at 'ore than one level. Fn that interpretation, the present passa!e *o(ld e the co(nterpart of an e+(ally o sc(re passa!e of the Theaetetus , *here the aviary is said to contain 9all kinds of irds, so'e in flocks apart fro' the others, others in s'all !ro(ps, and so'e alone flyin! rando'ly thro(!h the' all9 319%d4. <ltho(!h the Theaetetus 'akes no e)plicit 'ention of the 'ethods of division and collection, they had already een ad(' rated in the Phaedrus , and the Theaetetus passa!e 'ay e intended as an ill(stration of collection, an ill(stration that is no* co'prehended in the Sophist y an ill(stration of division. Fn that interpretation, the sin!le irds represent specific or individ(al co!nitions that have not yet een ro(!ht into relation *ith others. &he s'all !ro(ps represent col. ;">= $.14>. ;"B= Dosen forthri!htly says, 9- prefer not to read 'y spec(lations into the te)t, eca(se - see no sec(re asis for a detailed positive acco(nt of *hat is here 'eant y 8dialectic89 3PS $B14. 7 1>> 7 lections taken only to the first levelIthe first species or !en(s. <nd the flocks represent the possi ility of rin!in! the res(lts of o(r first collections into pro!ressively 'ore incl(sive ones. 1o*ever that 'ay e, the +(estion at hand concerns the co' ina ility and divisi ility of the for's. He have already seen that rest and 'otion do not co' ine *ith each other eca(se they are opposites, (t that oth co' ine *ith ein! 3$>#a.d4. &his 'eans that the three are distinct: all are di&&erent fro' each other and each the same as itself 3$>4d4. Hhat then is the stat(s of 9sa'e9 and 9different9J <re they additional for's, or are they so'eho* red(ci le to the other threeJ

,&D<5E/D : B(t s(rely 'otion and rest are neither different nor the sa'e. &1/</&/&U, : 1o* soJ ,&D<5E/D : Beca(se *hatever *e *o(ld call 'otion and rest to!ether cannot e either of those t*o. &1/</&/&U, : HhyJ ,&D<5E/D : Beca(se 'otion *ill e at rest and rest *ill e in 'otion? for *ith re!ard to oth of the', *hichever one eco'es the different *o(ld force the one that is different to chan!e to the opposite of its nat(re, since it *o(ld participate in its opposite. &1/</&/&U, : /)actly. ,&D<5E/D : Both s(rely participate in the sa'e and the different. &1/</&/&U, : Aes. ,&D<5E/D : &hen let (s not say that 'otion is the sa'e or the different, or that rest is. 3$>>a. 4 -n other *ords, if 'otion *ere e+(ated *ith the different, then rest, *hich is different fro' 'otion and therefore participates in the different, *o(ld participate in 'otion 3*hich e, h!pothesi is the sa'e as the different4. &h(s rest *o(ld e in 'otion. Fn the other hand, if *e identified rest *ith the different, then, y the sa'e reasonin!, 'otion *o(ld e at rest. ,a'e and different cannot, therefore, e red(ced to 'otion and rest. 5or can they e red(ced to 9 ein!.9 -f 9sa'e9 *ere e+(ivalent to 9 ein!,9 then 314 9'otion and rest oth are 9 *o(ld 'ean 3$4 9'otion and rest are oth the sa'e.9 9&hen it is i'possi le,9 the stran!er concl(des, 9for the sa'e and ein! to e one.9 &heaetet(s replies only, 9Girt(ally so9 3

? $>> .c4. 1is reply to the stran!er8s ne)t +(estion.*hether they shall therefore consider the sa'e to e a fo(rth for'Iis '(ch 'ore e'phatic: 9< sol(tely9 3 4. B(t still *e 'ay *onder *hether there is so'ethin! to e learned fro' his hesitation in the precedin! e)chan!e. Does sentence $ really i'ply a para. 7 1>B 7 do) if interpreted in the sa'e ter's as sentence 1J ,entence $ is in fact a' i!(o(s. -t 'ay 'ean 9 . . . the sa'e as the'selves9 3as it does half a pa!e later, $>Ba4, in *hich case there is no parado). Fr it 'ay 'ean 3as the stran!er takes it to 'ean4 9 . . . the sa'e as each other.9 -n fact it is only in the first 3innoc(o(s4 sense that sentence $ follo*s fro' sentence 1. ,entence 1, in sayin! 9 oth are 9 does not 'ean that oth are each other ? it is e)istential rather than attri (tive, and therefore intransitive rather than transitive. B(t the stran!er enco(ra!es &heaetet(s to interpret the second 3p(tatively iso'orphic4 sentence as ein! transitive . &he t*o sentences '(st, ho*ever, e interpreted in parallel *ays for the inference to e co!ent. -f sentence - speaks of sa'e and different not in relation to each other (t only in relation to the'selves, then this is the only le!iti'ate *ay to (nderstand sentence $: 'otion and rest are the sa'e as themselves . Hith this ar!('ent, (nlike the precedin! one, the reductio fails. B(t it need not have failed. &he stran!er co(ld have (sed an ar!('ent si'ilar to the precedin! one. 1e co(ld have

ar!(ed that if *e e+(ated one of the pair sa'e.different *ith 9 ein!,9 then, if the other 'e' er of the pair is , it eco'es its o*n opposite. &hat is, if 9sa'e9 *ere e+(ivalent to 9 ein!,9 then *hen *e said that the different e)ists, *e *o(ld e sayin! that the different is the sa'e? and si'ilarly if different *ere e+(ivalent to ein!, *e *o(ld e forced to concl(de that the sa'e is different. Hhy did the stran!er a andon this s(ccessf(l kind of reductio in favor of a +(estiona le oneJ &heaetet(s8s initial hesitation s(!!ests that Plato 'ay not have een (na*are of its *eakness. By reflectin! on &heaetet(s8s hesitation, *e sa* that 9 ein!9 and 9the sa'e9 are in one *ay very dose in 'eanin!. He *ill shortly find that one sense of 9non ein!9 is 9the different,9 so it sho(ld not s(rprise (s to find that one i'portant sense of 9 ein!9 is 9the sa'e9 3

4.;"%= -n the Battle a!ainst the Eiants section, *e sa* ;"%= Dosen o serves that to 9replace 8sa'eness8 y 8identity8 and e)plain that, in t(rn, as one sense of 8is8 . . . destroys the distinction et*een the t*o for's )eing and sameness 9 3PS $%$4. 5evertheless, the fact that 9difference9 is a sense of 9non ein!9 does enco(ra!e s(ch an e)planation. -t 'ay *ell e that the distinction et*een 9 ein!9 and 9sa'eness9 is only one of +(asi !en(s and species. 3/uasi !en(s eca(se 9 ein!9 cannot e a tr(e !en(s: the stran!er8s dialectic a!ainst the Fne ;$44 .$4>d= i'plies that if ein! *ere a tr(e !en(s, the differentia, *hich '(st co'e fro' o(tside the !en(s of 9 ein!,9 *o(ld y definition e 9none)istent.94 -n fact *e can re!ard all fo(r of the other 9!reatest kinds9 as species of 9 ein!9: 9sa'eness,9 9'otion,9 9rest,9 and even 9not ein!9 9ua 9difference.9 9Dest9 and 9'otion9 are species of 9 ein!9 if one thinks of the' in ter's of the positions of the friends of the for's and the 'aterialists, respectively: 9 ein! as opposed to eco'in!9 3i.e., 9rest94 and 9 eco'in!9 3i.e., 9'otion94 are species of the stran!ers 9 ein! as po*er.9 <!ain, since 9not ein!9 9ua 9difference9 e,ists as ne!ativity, it too is a *ay or species of 9 ein!.9 7 1>% 7 that the friends of the for's are never asked to !ive (p their elief that reality is (nchan!in!. &hey are asked to accept the reality of *hat is in 'otion, (t not the reality of *hat is in a state of essential eco'in!. Cife, so(l, and reason are essentially connected *ith 'otion, (t, (nlike visi le thin!s, they never eco'e di&&erent fro' the'selves. < livin! ody eco'es a nonlivin! ody, solid stone eco'es sand, fire e)tin!(ishes, *ater evaporates? (t life itself never eco'es nonlife, so(l never eco'es nonso(l, reason never eco'es (nreason. -n the hi!hest sense, to e is to e selfsa'e or 9in oneself9 3

4. &he stran!er *ill in fact (se this phrase t*o speeches later. Perhaps, then, this +(estiona le reductio is 'eant to re'ind (s of the contin(o(s parallelis' et*een the dialo!(e8s treat'ent of ein! and not. ein!. &he the'es that *e have een led to consider in reflectin! on it *ill, in any case, eco'e i'portant s( se+(ently. @inally, the re'ainin! possi ility is eli'inated. &he different cannot e e+(ated *ith ein!, eca(se so'e thin!s have ein! in themselves 3

4, and nothin! can e different in itself, (t only in relation to so'ethin! else 3$>>c.d4. &h(s *e have not three (t five for's or kindsI ein!, rest, 'otion, sa'eness, differenceI*hich lend *ith each other in vario(s *ays, and *hich the stran!er desi!nates as the 9!reatest kinds.9;"6=

-n disc(ssin! the sense in *hich these for's do and do not co' ine *ith each other, the stran!er i'plicitly distin!(ishes et*een the 9is9 of sa'eness and the 9is9 of connection. &his distinction is 'ore fa'iliar to (s as the distinction et*een identity and predication. 1o*ever, if *e speak in this *ay it is i'portant to ear in 'ind that the grammatical relations of identity and predication are only analo!(es of ontological relationships in the stran!er8s acco(nt.;"9= ;"9= Cf. Pa(l ,eli!'an, Heing and 8ot.Heing: #n (ntroduction to Plato's Sophist 3&he 1a!(e: 5i0hoff, 19%44 %$. He sho(ld also keep in 'ind Kahn8s i'portant o servation that the distinctions a'on! senses of 9to e9 do not i'ply an (lti'ate lack of (nity in the concept of 9 ein!9 !enerally: 9&he ver has a n(' er of distinct (ses or 'eanin!s that are all syste'atically related to one f(nda'ental (se9 3IH#G 4#14. <lso see his article 9&he Ereek Ger 8to Be8 and the Concept of Bein!,9 Foundations o& Language $ 319BB4 $4>.B>. 7 1>6 7 He have 0(st seen that in one sense 9to e9 'eans to e the sa'e. -n that sense, *hen *e say , is @ *e can only 'ean that , is the sa'e as @. &his *as the only sense ad'itted y the 9late learners9? (t the stran!er has no* e)panded the 'eanin! of 9is9 fro' that restrictive sense in s(ch a *ay as to incl(de predication. &hat distinction is ro(!ht to ear no* in a series of concl(sions dra*n fro' the fore!oin! disc(ssion: 1. 2otion is not in any sense rest -t is neither the sa'e as rest 3$>>e4, nor does it participate in rest 3$>B 4. $. 2otion oth is and is not the sa'e. -t is not the sa'e in the sense that it is different fro' 3not identical *ith4 9the sa'e,9 (t it is the sa'e insofar as it is the sa'e as itself 3it co' ines *ith sa'eness *ith respect to itself? $>Ba. 4. Keepin! in 'ind the caveat on the precedin! pa!e, *e can 'ake the distinction clearer y sayin! that it is not identical *ith sa'eness, (t sa'eness 'ay e predicated of it. ". 2otion is different fro' the different, so in one sense 3identity4 it is not 9different,9 (t in another sense it is different 3it co' ines *ith difference *ith respect to other thin!s4 3$>B .c4. <s Hith the previo(s case, *e 'i!ht say here that 'otion is not different if *e are (sin! the 9is9 of identity, (t is different if *e are (sin! the 9is9 of predication. 4. /ven tho(!h 'otion is , in the sense that it co' ines *ith ein! 3$>Ba4, it nevertheless is not , insofar as it is different fro' ein! 3$># , $>Bd4. -n the sa'e 'anner as 4, *e 'ay say that each of the fo(r !reatest kinds other than 9 ein!9 oth is and is not. <ccordin!ly, 98 ein!8 is 'any, *hile 8not. ein!8 is (nli'ited ;

= in +(antity9 3$>Be4. :(st as there is only one *ay to e ri!ht, and an (nli'ited n(' er of *ays to e *ron!, the n(' er of thin!s that a thin! is not, is inco'para ly !reater than the n(' er of thin!s that it is. &he stran!er8s i'plicit distinction of a connective sense of 9 ein!9 is no* transferred to 9not. ein!.9 9Hhen *e say 8not. ein!,8 it see's, *e do not speak of the opposite of ein!, (t only of *hat is different9 3$>% 4. -n other *ords, *hat is not.@ need not 'ean *hat does not 7 1>9 7

e)ist (t only *hat is different fro' @. &he different is entirely relational. -t is analo!o(s to kno*led!e, *hich is divided into vario(s technai and epist:mai in accordance *ith its o 0ects. -n a si'ilar *ay the different is partic(lariKed and defined y the o 0ect fro' *hich it distin!(ishes itself 3$>%c.$>6c4. Ff the three e)a'ples that are !ivenI ea(tif(l/not ea(tif(l, lar!e/not lar!e, and 0(st/not 0(stIthe first and third are once a!ain e)a'ples of val(e. /ven lar!e 3

4 has a +(asi.val(al i'port, especially in the present conte)t of the !reatest 3 4Ithat is, 'ost i'portantIkinds. &his concl(sion, that not. ein! e)ists 9ua difference, for'ally contradicts Par'enides8 prohi ition a!ainst sayin! or thinkin! that not. ein! e)ists 3$>6d4. B(t it does not contradict the spirit of that prohi ition, eca(se 9*e lon! a!o said !ood ye to any talk a o(t an opposite of ein!, *hether it e)ists or not, and *hether it can e spoken of or is a sol(tely incapa le of ein! spoken9 3$>6e4. &o say that not. ein! e)ists 9ua difference is not to say that it e)ists 9ua the opposite of e,istence . He sa* that the stran!er has 'aintained a parallel et*een the nat(re of ein! and the nat(re of not. ein!. &he present disc(ssion has distin!(ished t*o senses of ein! and t*o senses of not. ein!. 3a4 &he t*o senses of 9 ein!9 are 9is the sa'e as9 3even difference is 9the sa'e as9 itsel& 4 and 9co' ines *ith9 3even not. ein!, i.e., difference, 9is9 a kind of ein!4. &he pri'ary sense has een co' ina ility, since identity has een distin!(ished as the additional kind, sa'eness? (t the latter sense has hovered in the ack!ro(nd as the le!acy of the late learners. 3 4 &he t*o senses of 9not. ein!9 are 9difference9 and 9none)istence.9 &he pri'ary sense has een 9difference,9 (t the sense of 9none)istence9 has een present in the ack!ro(nd as the le!acy of the sophist, *ho, as the stran!er earlier re'arked, has el(ded capt(re y hidin! hi'self in apparently (nintelli!i le not. ein! 3$"9c4. <re the t*o pairs parallelJ -n fact they are not, as *e can see fro' the follo*in! chart: B/-5E sa'eness co' ina ility J 5F&.B/-5E difference J none)istence

,a'eness and difference. are co(nterparts, as are ein! and not. ein!, (t co' ina ility and none)istence are not. &he co(nterpart of co' ina ility is not none)istence (t (nco' ina ility, and the co(nterpart 7 1B# 7 of none)istence is not co' ina ility (t e)istence. &he lack of sy''etry is disconcertin! eca(se at $>"c the stran!er spoke of the i'portance of discoverin! those for's that 'ake co' ination possi le and those that 'ake separation possi le. 9Bein!9 9ua co' ina ility certainly ans*ers to the first of these, (t *e have not een sho*n the second. Co''entators often ass('e that the for' responsi le

for (nco' ina ility is 9difference,9;4#= (t to say that for's are different is not to say that they do not co' ine. 9Dest9 and 9 ein!9 are different, (t they co' ine. Fther*ise co' ina ility *o(ld e synony'o(s *ith sa'eness, *hich is 0(st *hat the late learners clai'ed, and *hat the stran!er is at pains to deny. &he e)a'ple that *e are !iven of (nco' ina ility is 9'otion9 and 9rest9 3$>$d4. &his s(!!ests that the for'Ior at least one for'I responsi le for (nco' ina ility is 9opposition,9 a concl(sion that accords *ith the Phaedo 31#$d.1#"c4 and that is s(!!ested y the stran!er8s fre+(ent (se of this *ord. He 'i!ht !o on to 'ake 9opposition9 a species of 9difference,9 as 9difference9 is a species of 9non ein!,9 and in that case it *o(ld e tr(e to say that 9difference9 3in one of its species4 is responsi le for the ina ility of so'e for's to co' ine. B(t that !oes eyond anythin! that is e)plicit in the stran!er8s presentation. -t *o(ld see' 'ore nat(ral to 'ake 9opposition9 another species alto!ether. &h(s, one species of 9non ein!9 *o(ld e 9difference,9 that is, si'ple diversity, *hile another *o(ld e 9opposition.9 &his *o(ld !ive (s 9opposition9 as the co(nterpart to 9co' ina ility,9 (t *e still have no co(nterpart for the third species of non ein!, 9none)istence.9 @or this *e need to recall the stran!er8s earlier collection of the senses of 9 ein!,9 proposed y the 'aterialists and y the friends of the for's, into the for' 9po*er.9 9Po*er9 appears to e the co(nterpart to 9none)istence.9 &his *o(ld e)plain, too, *hy the stran!er treats 9po*er9 as the 'ost (lti'ate for', fro' *hich all (t one 3division D4 of his divisions e!in. &he e+(ation of e)istence *ith po*er, like that of (nco' ina ility *ith opposition, accords *ith Plato8s earlier dialo!(es. Hhen Ce es, for e)a'ple, asks ,ocrates to sho* that the so(l e)ists after death, he asks for proof that it has po*er and intelli!ence 3Phaedo %# 4. -n that conte)t 9po*er9 see's to 'ean so'ethin! like 9e)istence.9 <!ain, in the %epu)lic the e)alted stat(s of the !ood is e'phasiKed y sayin! that it is 9 eyond

in di!nity and po er 9 7 1B1 7 3B.>#9 4. -n that case, *e can co'plete the chart a ove8 and vindicate the stran!er8s clai' of parallelis' et*een ein! and non ein!: B/-5E sa'eness co' ina ility po*er 5F&.B/-5E difference opposition none)istence

He can see fro' this that Plato has not a andoned his earlier, 'etaphysical, conception of ein! in favor of a p(rely lo!ical or !ra''atical one, as is often ar!(ed. &he 'etaphysical concerns are rele!ated to the ack!ro(nd of the Sophist , for reasons that have already een s(!!ested and that shall ret(rn to later, (t *e are re'inded of the' nevertheless, ho*ever riefly and ho*ever indirectly. ;41= &he fact that the disc(ssion of ein! as 9po*er9 is not e)plicitly follo*ed (p in the present

passa!e does not 'ean that *e are entitled to disre!ard it *hen *e consider the i'plications of this section as a *hole, as co''entators so'eti'es ass('e.;4$= Hhen *e dra* inferences fro' the stran!er8s deli erate parallelis' et*een the pro le'atic of ein! and the pro le'atic of non ein!, it is i'portant that *e take into consideration all aspects of that parallelis'. -t is tr(e that the stran!er foc(ses pri'arily on the concept of not. ein! as relational 39difference94, (t he 'akes it +(ite dear that the relational sense is not the only sense of 9not. ein!.9 95ot. ein!9 can also 'ean 9none)istence9 3

, $"% 4. Conse+(ently 9 ein!9 also 'eans 9e)istence,9 or 9po*er.9;4"= ;4$= &h(s Doss concl(des that 9the s(pposition that kno*in! is an action and ein! kno*n a passivity, *hich is only one of several s(!!estions p(t for*ard in $46d4.%, is si'ply dropped . . . . -t is silently dropped *hen the conse+(ence of acceptin! it has een pointed o(t9 3pp. 11#.114. Doss is far fro' ein! the only one to elieve that the previo(s disc(ssion can e safely i!noredIaltho(!h (s(ally the +(estion is not even addressed. 7 1B$ 7 -t is *orth notin! that the t*o concepts that are co' ined in the a ove passa!e fro' the %epu)lic , di!nity and po*er, are oth (sed y the stran!er as *ell, (t only one is endorsed y hi'. 1e appears to e as indifferent to the concept of di!nity as he is partial to that of po*er. 1is 'ethod, he tells (s, a stracts fro' all +(estions of *hether so'ethin! is 'ore or less di!nified,;44= or *hether it is 'ore or less ridic(lo(s 3$$% 4. C(rio(sly, ho*ever, despite his apparent indifference to distinctions of val(e, *hen the stran!er no* recapit(lates his dissatisfaction *ith the late learners, he does so precisely in ter's of the lan!(a!e of val(es: the a ility to i!nore the late learners8 +(i les and 'ake the necessary distinctions is 9 oth diffic(lt and ea(tif(l9 3

? $>9c4. Fn the other hand: 92y !ood 'an ; =, the atte'pt to separate everythin! fro' everythin! rise not only is not 'elodio(s ; = (t indeed elon!s to so'eone co'pletely (n'(sical ; = and (nphilosophical,9 eca(se it o literates the possi ility of lo!os 3$>9d.$B#a4. 1is choice of *ords re'inds (s that differences of kind 3those that ad'it lendin!, those that do not4 are so'eti'es only f(lly intelli!i le *hen e)pressed as differences of etter and *orse.

<+ #ogos "nd the Forms 4-;7a6-;'c8

&he Theaetetus , *hich 'ade no e)plicit (se of for's, or kinds, or any (niversal concepts, fo(ndered in an atte'pt to e)hi it the nat(re of lo!os. 1ere s(ch an e)hi ition t(rns o(t to depend on the disc(ssion of the for's 0(st co'pleted. &he p(rpose of forcin! the late learners 9to allo* different thin!s to co' ine *ith each other . . . *as to sho* that disco(rse ;

= is for (s one of the kinds of ein!9 3$B#a4Ifor disco(rse 3*hich co' ines s( 0ects *ith predicates4 *o(ld e i'possi le *itho(t co' ination. -f disco(rse is to e 'eanin!f(l, ho*ever, it '(st also e possi le for so'e state'ents to e false. ,o the +(estion to e considered is *hether the for' 9not. ein!9 co' ines *ith the for's 9opinion9 and 9disco(rse.9 -f it does, then the possi ility of false state'ent, and therefore of disco(rse, *ill e vindicated. 2oreover, since i'a!es, likenesses, and se' lances *ere conceivedIin relation to the sophist and philosopherIas possi ilities of 9false9 disco(rse 3i.e., of sayin! *hat is not4, the parado)es s(rro(ndin! the' *o(ld dissolve as *ell 3$B#c4. &he point that *as previo(sly 'ade a o(t letters and a o(t the !reatest kinds is no* e)tended to na'es: so'e are capa le of co'. 7 1B" 7 inin!, and so'e are not. &he test is *hether or not the res(ltant se+(ence is a 'eanin!f(l one, and it *ill not e so (nless no(ns are co' ined *ith ver s, as in the 'ini'al sentence 92an (nderstands9 3$B1a.$B$c4.;4>= /very sentence '(st e a o(t so'ethin! and '(st have a +(ality 3$B$e4.;4B= -n the case of the t*o sentences 9&heaetet(s sits9 and 9&heaetet(s, *ith *ho' - a' no* conversin!, flies,9 the s( 0ect is the sa'e (t the tr(th +(ality is different. &he first states the facts 3

4, *hile the other states so'ethin! different fro' the factsIit states *hat is not as if it *ere. -n s(ch cases 9there really and tr(ly co'es a o(t a false lo!os9 3$B"a.d4. -t has often een o served that the second e)a'ple see's intended to co' ine contin!ent falsity *ith necessary falsity. -t is contingentl! false eca(se, since *e are told that &heaetet(s happens to e sittin!, *e kno* that he cannot e doin! anythin! that is inco'pati le *ith sittin!, s(ch as flyin!.;4%= -t is necessaril! false eca(se &heaetet(s is a h('an ein!, and ein! h('an is inco'pati le *ith ein! a le to fly. &he a ility to fly re+(ires *in!s, and to e *in!ed elon!s 3oddly, to e s(re4 only to species *ithin the class of *ater ani'als 3$$#a. 4. 1('an ein!s, on the other hand, are a species of land ani'al 3$$$ .c4.;46= ;4B= &he fact that in the follo*in! e)a'ples this +(ality *ill e tr(th or falsity does not 'ean that Plato failed to reco!niKe that so'e sentences are neither tr(e nor false. X(estions and co''ands 'ay e said to have a +(ality also, (t of a different kind? there is no point in disc(ssin! the' here, since the entire disc(ssion is s( servient to the +(estion of *hether &alse logos is possi le. D(nci'an is therefore precipito(s in speakin! of Plato8s 9apparent elief that every co' ination of no(n and ver '(st e a state'ent and as s(ch '(st e either tr(e or false9 3p. 1#94. ;4%= Co''entators have *ondered *hether 9sittin! in an airplane9 is an interestin! ref(tation of the stran!er8s clai'. Cf. ,ayre: 9-t does not !o *itho(t sayin!, as Renakis avo*s, 8that 9sittin!9 'eans here 9sittin! on the ground 9 not, say, 9in an airplane9893P#' $#6 n. 6>? e'phases in ori!inals4. Certainly the stran!er intends sittin! and flyin! to e '(t(ally e)cl(sive 3other*ise the con0(nction of the t*o sentences loses '(ch of its force4. ,(ch an intention is entirely defensi le, for sittin! is nor'ally constr(ed as a passive state 3 ein! s(pported4, *hile flyin! is an active state. ,trictly speakin!, *hen *e are in an airplane, it is not *e *ho fly (t the airplane? and *hen the airplane is not flyin! *e say that it 9sits9 on the !ro(nd. <ctively flyin!, as distinct fro' ein! carried y a vehicle that is flyin!, is inco'pati le *ith sittin!. -t is parallel to the earlier opposition et*een 'otion and rest.

7 1B4 7 1o* do these e)a'ples de'onstrate that 'eanin!f(l disco(rse is possi le eca(se of the co' inin! of for'sJ -n the second case the ans*er is clear eno(!h. @lyin! cannot co' ine *ith sittin! 3or *ith ein! h('an4, and so 9&heaetet(s flies9 is contin!ently 3and necessarily4 false. B(t the first sentence appears to contain only one for', 9sits,9 and a proper na'e, 9&heaetet(s.9 Hhy did the stran!er choose this as an e)a'ple of a tr(e sentence, instead of his earlier e)a'ple, 92an (nderstands,9 in *hich a co' ination of for's 'ay e discernedJ -t is te'ptin! to try to 'ini'iKe the tension et*een the e)a'ple 3an individ(al participatin! in a for'4 and the thesis it is 'eant to ill(strate 3disco(rse as rooted in the co' ina ility of for's4 y takin! only one of the t*o literally and 9'akin! allo*ances9 for the other.;49= B(t it *o(ld e etter not to have to 'ake allo*ances at all. <ss('in!, for the 'o'ent, that Plato oth stated and ill(strated his thesis co'petently, *e need to ask ho* 9&heaetet(s sits9 can involve a co' ination of for's. 9&heaetet(s flies9 'ay e false either eca(se 9flyin!9 does not co' ine *ith 9sittin!,9 or eca(se it does not co' ine *ith 9 ein! h('an9? (t in the case of a true sentence 'atters are not so si'ple. -t is i'portant to ear in 'ind, ho*ever, that the co' ination of for's is 'eant to e)plain initially not ho* sentences co'e to e tr(e or false, (t ho* they co'e to e 'eanin!f(l 3$>9e4. &o e 'eanin!f(l they '(st e capa)le of tr(th and falsity, (t to e)plain ho* a sentence is a le to e tr(e or false is not necessarily to e)plain *hether it is in fact tr(e or false. He sa* earlier that 'eanin!f(lness re+(ires oth that so'e thin!s co' ine and that so'e thin!s e (na le to co' ine. -f nothin! co' ined, then predication *o(ld e i'possi le, as the late learners contend? (t if everythin! co' ined, then opposites co(ld e predicated of each other, *hich *o(ld destroy 'eanin! 3$>1d.$>$e4. -f, no*, *e take 9sittin!9 and 9flyin!9 to e in opposition to ;49= Cornford !ives the e)a'ple precedence over the thesis *hen he *rites, 9<ll disco(rse depends on the 8*eavin! to!ether of @or's8 . . . . He can also 'ake state'ents a o(t individ(al thin!s. B(t it is tr(e that every s(ch state'ent '(st contain at least one @or'9 3PT* "##4. &he last sentence t*ists the first one eyond reco!nition. < sin!le for' cannot ill(strate a 9*eavin! to!ether of for's.9 Doss, on the other hand, !ives the thesis precedence over the e)a'ple. 1e states that the t*o present sentences 39&heaetet(s sits,9 9&heaetet(s flies94 9do not ill(strate Plato8s thesis,9 and dearly re!ards this as a lapse on Plato8s part 3p. 11>4. ,ee E(thrie >.1B1.B$ for a disc(ssion of so'e other approaches to this iss(e. :ohn <ckrill, 9S A2pL FK1 /-D6 59 3in Glastos, ed., Plato 1.$#1.94, !ives a perceptive analysis of this passa!e. 7 1B> 7 each other, then the e)a'ples do indeed ill(strate thee stran!er8s thesis. &heir opposition can e e)pressed y interpretin! 9flyin!9 as overco'in! the p(ll of !ravity 3or, in classical ter's, overco'in! the do*n*ard tendency of the earth in (s4 and 9sittin!9 as a s(spension of str(!!le a!ainst the p(ll of !ravity 3cf. n. 4%, a ove4. &herefore, if one of these can e tr(ly predicated of &heaetet(s, the other *ill e e)cl(ded. Understood in this *ay, 9&heaetet(s sits9 is 'eanin!f(l eca(se so'e for's co' ine and so'e do not. -t is 'eanin!f(l eca(se its tr(th entails the falsity of state'ents *hose predicates are for's that do not co' ine *ith 9sittin!,9 s(ch as 9flyin!.9 Pres('a ly the stran!er chose 9flyin!,9 rather than 9standin!,9 9*alkin!,9 or 9lyin! do*n,9 to ill(strate his thesis eca(se it i'plies necessary falsity as *ell as contin!ent falsity. B(t in other respects any of these other e)a'ples *o(ld have done as *ell. &he stat(s of lo!os or disco(rse has th(s een le!iti'ated: it has een sho*n to e 'eanin!f(l and th(s to co' ine *ith ein!. ,ince thinkin! 3

4 is nothin! (t the so(l8s silent disco(rse 3 4 *ith itself, it too has ein! 3$B"e4. Correspondin! to affir'ation and denial in disco(rse is 9opinion9 in thinkin!? therefore opinion has ein! as *ell. <nd *hen opinion is ro(!ht a o(t y 'eans of sense perception, the res(lt is 9se' lance9 3 , $B4a4. 1ere 9se' lance9 is (sed synechdochally to stand for the *hole class of i'a!esI*hether tr(e 3likenesses4 or false 3se' lances4Ias 9likeness9 had een (sed previo(sly 3$4# 4. 5o* that *e have seen ho* se' lance can after all have ein!, *e are ready to res('e the h(nt for the sophist that had led (s to that class earlier.

5+ Resum.tion

( the Final Di)ision 4-;'c6-;5d8

&he final division, as it is no* recalled and co'pleted, takes the for' sho*n in @i!(re 9. 5o lon!er is the initial distinction an opposition et*een speakin! a o(t and prod(cin! all thin!s, as it *as prior to the di!ression. 5o*, as in the preli'inary divisions, it is et*een ac+(isitive and prod(ctive arts. -t is no lon!er even conceiva le that the division 'i!ht fall *ithin the for' of ac+(isitiveness. -n addition, the reference to sellin! has een re'oved, so all +(estion of selfish 'otivation is no* eli'inated. Hhy sho(ld Plato have taken so '(ch tro( le to esta lish the sophist as ac+(isitive in all the preli'inary divisions, only to end (p lookin! for hi' in the for' of prod(ctive artsJ &he stran!er e)plains: 7 1BB 7

@i!(re 9 7 1B% 7 ,&D<5E/D : Did *e not e!in y dividin! the prod(ctive and ac+(isitive arts fro' each otherJ &1/</&/&U, : Aes. ,&D<5E/D : <nd (nder ac+(isitive art the sophist sho*ed hi'self to (s in the arts of h(ntin!, co'petition, co''erce, and other s(ch for's. &1/</&/&U, : < sol(tely. ,&D<5E/D: B(t no*, since the 'i'etic art has enco'passed hi', it is dear that *e '(st first of all divide the prod(ctive art itself in t*o. 3$B>a4 &his is not s(fficient !ro(nds for re'ovin! the sophist fro' the ac+(isitive for', since division B 3the co''ercial sophist4 sho*ed (s that the prod(ctive art can ree'er!e *ithin the ac+(isitive arts 3step >a4 *hen the prod(ction is (lti'ately for the sake of !ain, as it *as for the sophists. -f the sophist 'akes

his prod(cts not eca(se he sees s(ch creativity as an intrinsic !ood, (t rather eca(se they are instr('ental to profit,;>#= then he elon!s in the ac+(isitive class. 1e eco'es an e)a'ple of the sophist as a 'erchant *ho sells his o*n prod(cts 3$$4d.e4. &here is th(s no i''ediately clear reason *hy the stran!er shifts the in+(iry o(t of the sector *ithin *hich all the preli'inary divisions led (s to elieve the sophist is to e fo(nd. -t is not a +(estion *e *o(ld need to *orry a o(t if the ens(in! division led to a satisfactory definition of the sophist? (t it doYs not. &he sophist is defined as 314 the 'aker of se' lances rather than likenesses 3step 4, $BBd.e4, 3$4 operatin! on the asis of opinion rather than kno*led!e of his s( 0ect 3step B, $B% .e4, and 3"4 'akin! his clai's *ith irony 3step %, $B6a4. &his definition !ives rise to a n(' er of serio(s +(estions. ,ince the chief (rden of the dialo!(e is to distin!(ish the sophist fro' the philosopher, ho* s(ccessf(lly can *e differentiate the' in ter's of the a ove definitionJ -f *e look to the first of those three distinctions, the difference *ill e that the 'odels 3i'a!es4 (sed y the philosopher *ill al*ays e acc(rate 3likenesses4, and those Ff the sophist inacc(rate 3se' lances4. B(t the difference et*een philosophy and sophistry is not that the for'er is al*ays tr(e and the latter al*ays false. -n that case a philosopher *hose conceptions *ere not perfectly acc(rate *o(ld e nothin! (t a sophist? and a sophist *ho happened to !ive an acc(rate description of so'e state of affairs, *hen it s(ited his ;>#= -n the %epu)lic ,ocrates sho*s that &hrasy'ach(s8s (n0(st person is (n0(st not y virt(e of his kno*led!e of the principles of r(lin!, (t eca(se he (ses that kno*led!e in the service of 'oney'akin! 3"4>c."4Be4. 7 1B6 7 p(rpose, *o(ld e a philosopher, ho*ever 'anip(lative his intentions 'i!ht e. &he stran!er8s point *o(ld e 'ore defensi le if he 'eant that for the p(rposes of a sophist se' lances are ade9uate , *hereas for the p(rposes of a philosopher likenesses are necessary. B(t to introd(ce the notion of p(rpose, *hether e)plicitly or i'plicitly, is to sho* that *hat really distin!(ishes the philosopher and the sophist are their val(es and !oals, to *hich their 9prod(cts9 3likenesses or se' lances4 are only a 'eans. -n this *ay too the present definition 'isses *hat is essential. He shall ret(rn to this point. -f *e try the second distinction, et*een kno*led!e and opinion, there *ill e an analo!o(s distortion. &he philosopher al*ays kno*s *hat he is talkin! a o(t, *hile the sophist has only an opinion. -n that case, once a!ain, there co(ld e no s(ch thin! as a 'istaken or even partially i!norant philosopher? he *o(ld e a sophist y definition. &he ,ocrates of the aporetic dialo!(es, *ho fre+(ently professes his i!norance 3as he does a!ain in the Theaetetus 4 and even the ,ocrates of the %epu)lic , *ho clai's to have only opinion rather than kno*led!e of the !ood 3>#B .e4, *o(ld e a sophist y definition. <nd any sophist *ho happened to have attained kno*led!e a o(t his s( 0ect 'atter *o(ld e a philosopher, re!ardless of the (se to *hich he p(t that kno*led!e. 5either of these criteria, *hether taken sin!ly or 0ointly, provides an ade+(ate acco(nt of the essential difference et*een philosophy and sophistry. &he third distinction, in ter's of irony, so(nds 'ore pro'isin!. &o say that the sophist is ironic 'ay see' to s(!!est that he is insincere and dis!(ises his tr(e intentions, in *hich case he 'i!ht e (sin! ar!('ent as a 'eans to 'ercenary or political ends. B(t it t(rns o(t that this is not *hat the stran!er 'eans at all, for those *ho are characteriKed y irony are said to 9have a !reat s(spicion and fear that they are i!norant of the thin!s that they !ive the'selves the appearance of kno*in! in front of others.9 &heir irony is th(s a kind of 'odesty, re'arka ly like ,ocratic irony. &he species *ith *hich they are contrasted, the co(nterpart of irony, is the si'plicity 3

4 of people *ho are 9si'ple'inded ; =, elievin! that they kno* thin!s a o(t *hich they only have opinion9 3$B6a4. &he distinction, then, is et*een those *ho fear that they really kno* less than they see' to, and those *ho see' to the'selves to kno* more than they really do, that is, et*een 'odesty and conceit. By definition, neither of the' has kno*led!e, since they are the t*o species of 9opinion9 3step B 4. -n oth cases the appearance of kno*led!e falls short of the reality, and the only iss(e e. 7 1B9 7 t*een the' is *hether they s(spect and *orry a o(t this shortco'in! or not. -t is rather s(rprisin! that Plato places the sophists in the class of those *ho do have this s(spicion and *orry. @or thro(!ho(t the dialo!(es Plato portrays the sophists not only as 'akers of se' lances, (t as pleased *ith their callin!, and as denyin! any (lti'ate distinction et*een kno*led!e and opinionIor, y e)tension, et*een likeness and se' lance.;>1= &hey are never depicted as s(spectin!, '(ch less fearin!, that they have only opinions *hen they o(!ht to have kno*led!e. By endo*in! the' *ith *hat is, in effect, ,ocratic irony 3*hich in this case 'ay e represented y the ,ocratic a*areness of 9kno*in! only that one does not kno*94, Plato prevents the present dichoto'y, like the other t*o, fro' distin!(ishin! et*een the sophist and ,ocrates, or any philosophers *ho are a*are of their o*n li'itations.;>$= 1o*ever *e interpret this species of irony, it '(st (lti'ately e the ho'e of the philosopher as *ell as the sophist. <t $B6 the stran!er asks *hether the type of person that is isolated at step 6 is the *ise 'an 3

4 or the sophist 3 4. &heaetet(s replies that he '(st e the sophist, 9since *e posited hi' as not kno*in!9 3step B4. ,o in the final analysis *hat the dialo!(e distin!(ishes sophistry fro' is not philosophy 3 4 after all, (t rather kno*led!e and *isdo' 3 4.;>"= &he S!mposium insists that philosophy, 9love of *isdo',9 '(st e distin!(ished fro' *isdo' itself? as the see$ing of *isdo' it can only e in )et een *isdo' and i!norance 3$#"e.$#4 4. &his distinction is i'plicit thro(!ho(t the dialo!(es,;>4= and Plato has !iven (s no reason to elieve that it o(!ht to e collapsed here. Eiven the stark opposition et*een kno*led!e and opinion in step B, not only '(st *e p(t the *ise 'an on the side of kno*led!e, as &heaetet(s does, (t to distin!(ish et*een *isdo' and philosophy *e '(st p(t the philosopher on the side of opinion. Eiven the present alternatives, *e cannot keep the philosopher distinct fro' oth the *ise 'an on one side and the sophist on the other. He '(st either collapse the distinction e. ;>1= Cf. $B4a, *here se' lance is the prod(ct of opinion. ;>4= Fnly in the %epu)lic is it even hypothesiKed that philosophers 'i!ht finally reach their !oal of

*isdo'Iand that hypothesis is al*ays s( servient to the atte'pt to envision the 3perhaps (nrealiKa le4 perfectly 0(st city, *hich y definition *o(ld have to have *ise r(lers. 7 1%# 7 t*een the *ise 'an and the philosopher in step B, or collapse the distinction et*een the philosopher and the sophist in step %. &he only alternative *o(ld e to rele!ate the philosopher to those *ho are 9si'ple'inded, elievin! that they kno* thin!s a o(t *hich they only have opinion.9 &he !oal of the dialo!(e *as to distin!(ish the sophist fro' the philosopher and the states'an 3cf. $1%a4, (t the final division has not s(cceeded in doin! so. &he definition of the sophist is too road, eca(se so'eti'es philosophers, too, 3a4 are forced to rely on opinion, 3 4 are then destined to prod(ce se' lances, and 3c4 eca(se of this they *ill so'eti'es feel 9a !reat s(spicion and fear that they are i!norant of the thin!s that they !ive the'selves the appearance of kno*in! in front of others.9 &he definition is also too narro*, eca(se it is conceiva le that so'eti'es sophists *ill 3a4 have kno*led!e of their s( 0ect, and 3 4 create a likeness of it? and 3c4 eca(se of this, *hen they do prod(ce se' lances 3*hich is 'ost of the ti'e4 they *ill so'eti'es think they 9kno* thin!s a o(t *hich they only have opinion.9 <t 'ost, the definition provides an initial asis for a distinction et*een the sophist and the philosopher, to the e)tent that it i'plies that for the sophist se' lances are ade+(ate, *hereas the philosopher '(st strive for likenesses. B(t *e can (nderstand this difference in their 9instr('ents9 only if *e (nderstand the difference in their val(es and !oals: only their end can e)plain their 'eans. <s - previo(sly 'entioned in section 4, in the Statesman 3"#" .c4 the stran!er *ill collapse the distinction et*een likeness and se' lance, and descri e as 9sophists of sophists9 all those *ho prod(ce i'a!es of the (ncodifia le 9science of the 'ean.9 ,ince this does not distin!(ish et*een i'a!es as se' lances and i'a!es as likenesses, even the philosopher, as defined a ove in ter's of likeness 'akin!, *o(ld fit that description and e classed *ith the sophists. He *ill have to *ait for the Statesman to hear the stran!er8s final *ord on the distinctions a'on! sophistry, philosophy, and *isdo'. <ltho(!h the sophist is never s(ccessf(lly distin!(ished fro' the philosopher, he is distin!(ished at least in a perf(nctory *ay fro' the states'an. &heaetet(s a!rees that the person located (nder step 6a 3'akin! speeches4 is a de'a!o!(e rather than a states'an, and that the sophist differs fro' the de'a!o!(e y e'ployin! the art of contradiction rather than e)tended speeches 3$B6 .c4. &he distinction et*een the sophist and states'an is therefore only indirect, since they are not distin!(ished fro' each other (t '(t(ally fro' the de'a!o!(e? and indeed the distinction et*een the states'an and the de'a!o!(e is only 7 1%1 7 no'inal, since &heaetet(s does not e)plain in *hat *ay they differ fro' each other. &he philosopher , on the other hand, is never even 'entioned in the final division. &he fail(re to differentiate the sophist not only fro' the states'an and the *ise 'an, (t also fro' the philosopher, is a serio(s shortco'in!, and not only for reasons of definition. &he diffic(lty of distin!(ishin! et*een the philosopher and the sophist *as a 'a0or factor in ,ocrates8 conviction and e)ec(tion 3*hich *as all(ded to at the end of the Theaetetus , hence i'plicitly at the e!innin! of the Sophist , $1Ba4? and this diffic(lty has een kept efore o(r eyes thro(!ho(t the dialo!(e. @or e)a'ple, 314 the philosopher, like the sophist in this dialo!(e, sho*s hi'self in a '(ltit(de of for'sIone of *hich is that of the sophist 3$1%c4. 3$4 Both the philosopher 3$16d4 and the sophist 3$$1d4 are depicted as h(nters. 3"4 Hhen the sophist 3*ho 'akes inacc(rate i'a!es, or se' lances4 is said to hide in an i'penetra le place 3$"Bd, $"6c4, *e find

that the philosopher 3*ho 'akes acc(rate i'a!es, or likenesses4 is there *ith hi'. <s *e sa*, the i'penetra ility is d(e to the nat(re of i'a!es in !eneral 3$"9d.$4#c, $41e, $B4c4, not of se' lances in partic(lar, and in one place they are referred to onl! as likenesses 3$4# 4. 344 &he sophist rese' les the ,ocratic philosopher as the *olf rese' les the do! 3$"1a4. 3>4 Cike the philosopher 3cf. Theaetetus 14Bc.d4, the sophist re0ects strin!s of e)a'ples in place of definition 3$"9d.$4#a4. 1o*ever, not only does the final division never co'pletely define the sophist in a *ily that 'akes e)plicit ho* he differs fro' the philosopher? it is the only division in the dialo!(e in *hich *e cannot even i'plicitly locate the distinction et*een the sophist and the ,ocratic philosopher. -n division <8s depiction of the sophist as a h(nter of yo(ths, step 1# distin!(ished the lover *ho h(nts yo(ths in order to !ive the' so'ethin!, fro' the person *ho h(nts the' in order to take so'ethin! fro' the'. -f *e divided 1#a 39as a !ift94 alon! the sa'e lines as 1# 39for re'(neration94, the ,ocratic philosopher *o(ld e visi le as one *ho teaches virt(e as a !ift rather than for financial re*ard. -n division B the sophist is once 'ore identified as a teacher of virt(e 39 4 for the sake of 'arketin! 34 4 rather than as a !ift 34a4. &he ,ocratic philosopher co(ld therefore e fo(nd y 'eans of a parallel division *ithin 4a, that is, as one *ho teaches virt(e freely. -n division C 3step 94 the sophist is a ver al *arrior en!a!ed in eristic: ,&D<5E/D : &hat *hich, *ithin an art, ar!(es oth a o(t 0(stice itself and in0(stice and a o(t all the others !enerally, are *e not acc(sto'ed to call this eristicJ 7 1%$ 7 &1/</&/&U, : Ff co(rse. ,&D<5E/D : Ff eristic, one kind act(ally *astes 'oney, and the other 'akes 'oney. &1/</&/&U, : < sol(tely. ,&D<5E/D : - s(ppose that the one that, thro(!h the pleas(re of this p(rs(it, ca(ses so'eone to ne!lect his affairs, and the style of *hich !ives no pleas(re to 'ost of his listeners, is, in 'y opinion, called nothin! other than lo+(acity. &1/</&/&U, : &hat8s 'ore or less *hat it is said to e. ,&D<5E/D : &he opposite of this, *hich 'akes 'oney fro' private eristic ;is the sophist=. 3$$>c.e4 <s is often o served, the first of these s( divisions so(nds very '(ch like a satiric description of ,ocrates,;>>= so here a!ain the differentia et*een sophistry and ,ocratic philosophy *o(ld e the s( ordination of the for'er to personal !ain. Division D distin!(ishes the t*o ne!atively, y sho*in! that if *e confine o(r attention to reason *itho(t reference to the ac+(isitive parts of the so(l, only the philosopher and not the sophist *ill e fo(nd. 5ot only is the sophist e)cl(ded fro' division D, (t for another reason so is the /leatic stran!er8s 'ethod, and noticin! the reason for this *ill help (s (nderstand *hy, in the co(rse of the e'ploy'ent of that 'ethod, the dialo!(e 'oves !rad(ally fro' its %epu)lic. like e!innin!s to its sterile concl(sion. -t is *orth noticin!, in passin!, that even if the final division is not s(ccessf(l in ans*erin! the ori!inal +(estion of this dialo!(e 3that of the f(nda'ental difference et*een the sophist and the philosopher4, it is s(ccessf(l in offerin! a pla(si le ans*er to the Theaetetus's +(estion a o(t the nat(re of kno*led!eIaltho(!h it does so only i'plicitly. ,ince the difference et*een likeness and se' lance is that the first is an acc(rate i'a!e of reality *hile the second is only specio(s, it is possi le to define

kno*led!e as the a ility to prod(ce likenesses of reality.;>B= &hose *ho have kno*led!e can infalli ly distin!(ish et*een a likeness and a se' lance, *hereas those *ho are !(ided only y opinion cannot. &he final division is also s(ccessf(l in !ivin! a pla(si le ans*er to ;>B= &his does not 'ean that those *ith kno*led!e *ill al*ays ant to create a likeness, (t only that they are a le to do so. 7 1%" 7 the related +(estion on *hich the Theaetetus finally fo(ndered: the nat(re of episte'ic lo!os. ,(ch a lo!os *o(ld e a likeness in *ords 3cf. s( division vi4, and the Sophist a o(nds *ith e)a'ples of this kind. - do not 'ean to s(!!est y this that the aporiae of the Theaetetus have th(s een definitively resolved? - do not think that Plato re!arded s(ch +(estions as f(lly ans*era le. Consider, for e)a'ple, the +(estion of *hether lo!os 'akes kno*led!e possi le or kno*led!e 'akes lo!os possi leIa +(estion that ha(nts the dialo!(es fro' the 'eno to the Theaetetus , and is in et*een laid to rest only provisionally y 'etaphors like 9recollection.9 -f lo!os 'akes kno*led!e possi le, then *e '(st e a le to for'(late a lo!os of so'ethin! efore *e kno* that thin!, *hich see's i'possi le. -f, on the other hand, kno*led!e 'akes lo!os possi le, then *e '(st have kno*led!e efore *e can for'(late a lo!os of that thin!, in *hich case philosophical in+(iry no lon!er see's possi le. B(t even tho(!h the Sophist provides no definitive resol(tions of s(ch perple)ities, and provides (s *ith no 'odel of kno*led!e that confronts the pro le' addressed y the doctrine of recollection 3as the Statesman *ill do in the 9'ethod of paradi!'s,9 $%%d.$%6e4, o(r (nderstandin! of *hat is involved in the +(estions is raised to a hi!her level y virt(e of the dialo!(e8s foc(s on kinds rather than individ(als.

&+ Diaeresis and Value

&he for' fro' *hich division D e!an *as the art of division 3

4 or discri'ination 3 ? $$Bc4. ,o far the stran!er8s o*n 'ethod is e)pressly incl(ded, since it is called a 'ethod of division 3 4. B(t the first s( division is that, 9in the discri'inations 0(st 'entioned, there *as one that separated etter fro' *orse, and another like fro' like . . . . - do not kno* the na'e of the latter, (t the na'e of the kind of discri'ination that keeps the etter and thro*s a*ay the *orse . . . ;is= p(rification9 3$$Bd4. &he for'er 3p(rification4 is the path that they p(rs(e, and on *hich they later discover ,ocratic philosophy, (t the latter 3dividin! like fro' like4 is the for' *ithin *hich the stran!er8s 'ethod elon!s. <s he descri es it a fe* lines later, in the co(rse of this sa'e division, the 'ethod of definitions ;

= does not care 'ore or less a o(t spon!in! than a o(t takin! 'edicine, nor *hether one provides (s *ith !reater or s'aller enefits than the other. -t ai's at ac+(irin! an (nderstandin! of *hat is akin and *hat is not akin in all the arts, and, *ith this intention, it

honors

7 1%4 7 all of the' e+(ally. 2oreover, in vie* of their si'ilarities it does not consider one of the' 'ore ridic(lo(s than another. 3$$%a. 4 Unlike the ,ocratic p(rs(it of philosophy, then, the stran!er8s 'ethod does not discri'inate etter fro' *orse. -t is val(e.free. &hat is *hy the stran!erIonce he has ali!ned hi'self *ith the p(rs(it of sortin! like fro' like rather than the p(rificatory separation of etter fro' *orseIno lon!er has the 'eans to distin!(ish the sophist fro' the philosopher.;>%= -n fact, at the end of division D the stran!er does 'ake an infor'al distinction et*een the sophist 3*ho' the division did not find4 and the ,ocratic philosopher 3*ho *as fo(nd instead4, and the distinction *as precisely in ter's of val(e: 9a' afraid to call the' sophists . . . lest *e confer (pon the' too '(ch honor ;

=9 3$"1a4. &he philosopher is a 9no le9 sophist 3$"1 4. &he stran!er8s 'ethod does not, ho*ever, lend itself to e)plorin! this difference of val(e. -n principle, Plato 'i!ht still have had the stran!er discri'inate et*een the sophist and the ,ocratic philosopher y distin!(ishin! the !iver of !ifts fro' the vendor of *ares as t*o different types, neither of *hich is posited as etter than the other. &he fact that he does not do so after leadin! (s, y 'eans of the preli'inary divisions, to e)pect ;>%= ,tanley Dosen is, as far as - kno*, the first co''entator to appreciate the i'plications of this passa!e. 1e s(!!ests that the stran!ers 9insistence (pon the apolitical nat(re of his 'ethod . . . ;is= falsified y his ina ility to keep sharply distinct the criteria of like/(nlike and etter/*orse9 3PS "$B4. &he reason is that 9Plato *as e)peri'entin! *ith a technical resol(tion to the pro le's of non. ein! and falsehood and at the sa'e ti'e *as indicatin! . . . that a technical resol(tion to these pro le's is not feasi le. -n other *ords, Plato is oth presentin! a pla(si le philosophical acc(sation a!ainst ,ocrates, y 'eans of the persona of the ,tran!er, and hi'self ref(tin! that acc(sation . . . . ;&=he Statesman is the ,tran!ers recantation9 3p. "#64. - a!ree *ith Dosen a o(t the i'portance of this tension, (t it is not necessary to re!ard ,ocrates and the stran!er as serio(s adversaries *hose en'ity can e reconciled only thro(!h recantation. - ar!(ed in the previo(s chapter that in the Theaetetus ,ocrates leaves the for's in the ack!ro(nd in order to sho* ho* the in+(iry fails *itho(t the'. -n the Sophist the stran!er rin!s ack the cate!orial aspect of the for's, (t leaves the val(al aspect in the ack!ro(nd to sho* the shortco'in!s of the in+(iry *itho(t it. Hhen he reintrod(ces it in the Statesman , therefore, this can e constr(ed as the co'pletion of the pro0ect of the Sophist , rather than a recantation of it. -t is the positive co(nterpart of the Sophist's indirect de'onstration of the i'portance of val(e. &he Theaetetus.Sophist.Statesman trilo!y is a c('(lative e)ploration of the ele'ents i'plicit in the theory of for's, in ter's of oth the a sence and the presence of those ele'ents individ(ally. -t 'i!ht e o 0ected that *hen the stran!e/re0ects val(e distinctions in the present passa!e he is doin! no 'ore than his 9'aster9 Par'enides had done in the epony'o(s dialo!(e, *hen he re (ked ,ocrates for do( tin! that there are for's of lo*ly thin!s: 9Ao( are still yo(n! . . . and philosophy has not yet taken hold of yo( as, in 'y opinion, it event(ally *ill? at *hich ti'e yo( *ill not despise any of these9 3Parmenides 1"#e4. -n that passa!e, ho*ever, the +(estion *as not *hether so'e for's are 'ore

i'portant than others, (t *hether so'e kinds of thin!s *ere too lo*ly to have for's at all. 7 1%> 7 so'e s(ch differentiation 'ay e a *ay of s(!!estin! that the distinction cannot f(lly e appreciated *itho(t reference to etter and *orse. -t is not 'erely a +(estion of *hether philosophy is 9 etter9 than sophistry, altho(!h that is at least i'plicit. Hhat distin!(ishes the philosopher and the sophist is 0(st their differin! eliefs a)out *hat is !ood. @or the philosopher *hat is !ood is the love of *isdo', and the sharin! of it *ith others? for the sophist *hat is !ood is personal !ainI*hether in ter's of honors or richesIand skill in reasonin! is !ood only as a 'eans to this end. <ccordin! to every other dialo!(e in *hich the +(estion arises, the difference et*een the t*o is that, in the philosopher the etter 3part of o(r nat(re4 r(les the *orse? in the sophist the *orse r(les the etter. <s lon! as *e try to distin!(ish the' *itho(t reference to the idea of val(eIthe !oodI (t only y 'eans of the prod(cts that they !enerate in the co(rse of these p(rs(its, *e *ill e no etter than those *ho' ,ocrates ridic(les in the Phaedo for tryin! to (nderstand reasons in ter's of their 'aterial res(lts rather than in ter's of their (nderlyin! p(rposiveness. ,(ch people *o(ld say that the reason ,ocrates sits in 0ail instead of r(nnin! a*ay is the 'echanical arran!e'ent of his li' s in a sittin! position? *hereas the tr(e reason is his elief that it is )etter not to r(n a*ay 396c.99a4. &he difference et*een the philosopher and the sophist is not that the philosopher al*ays creates acc(rate i'a!es and the sophist inacc(rate ones 3for a sophist does not stop ein! a sophist *hen he happens to !ive an acc(rate description of so'ethin!, nor does a philosopher cease to e a philosopher *hen his descriptions are i'perfect4, (t that the philosopher al*ays desires to create acc(rate i'a!es, *hile the sophist desires to create pers(asive ones *hether or not they happen to e acc(rate? and so the for'er strives for likenesses *hile the latter is satisfied *ith se' lances. Fnly if *e (nderstand the differin! val(es fro' *hich these different desires sprin!, *ill the distinction et*een likeness and se' lance tell (s anythin! a o(t the real difference et*een the sophist and the philosopher. <s <ristotle re'arks, in a passa!e cited in the previo(s chapter, *hat distin!(ishes the philosopher fro' the sophist is a difference in the p(rposes of their lives.;>6= -n the Parmenides Plato e)plored the diffic(lties that res(lt fro' adherence to the theory of for's. B(t his character Par'enides also insisted that 9in the case of each hypothesis yo( '(st e)a'ine *hat follo*s not only if *hat is hypothesiKed e)ists, )ut also i& it does not e,ist 9 7 1%B 7 31">e.1"Ba4. -n the trilo!y that follo*s he e)plores the diffic(lties that res(lt fro' hypothesiKin! the none,istence of the central feat(res of the for's. &he Theaetetus *as a ne!ative de'onstration of the i'portance of the for's, *hich sho*s that if the episte'olo!ical aspect of the for's is a sent, it *ill not e possi le to !ive an acco(nt of kno*led!e. ,( se+(ently, so'ethin! like this episte'olo!ical aspect of the for's is reintrod(ced in the Sophist in ter's of the stran!er8s conception of 9kind9 3!enerally

4, *hich leads to an acco(nt of the difference et*een kno*led!e 3likeness of reality4 and error 3se' lances of reality4. B(t y confinin! itself to the cate!orial aspect of the for's *itho(t their val(al aspect, the Sophist proves (na le to distin!(ish kno*led!e fro' *isdo'Ior, therefore, sophistry fro' philosophy. Hisdo', accordin! to the %epu)lic , is kno*led!e co' ined *ith self.'astery, and the latter factor is *hat the sophist lacks. B(t self.'astery i'plies an a ility to discri'inate the etter fro'

the *orse 3the proper 'aster fro' the s( ordinate4, and this is 0(st *hat the stran!er8s 9deval(ed9 for's cannot acco'plish. -t is in the Statesman that the f(rther lack *ill e s(pplied, as the stran!er reintrod(ces the concept of val(e in ter's of his doctrine of the 'ean.;>9= -t is a serio(s 'istake to read the Sophist 3as is al'ost al*ays done4;B#= *itho(t earin! in 'ind that it is only the second install'ent in a trilo!y. Fnly in the li!ht of the Statesman is the landscape of the Sophist clearly visi le. &he Statesman , to!ether *ith its s(ccessors, the Phile)us , the La s , and perhaps the Timaeus , is centrally concerned *ith val(eIthe very thin! fro' *hich the stran!er8s 'ethod, as e'ployed here, a stracts. Hith this in 'ind let (s recall the stran!er8s s( stit(tion of 9po*er9 as the criterion of reality or e)istence, in place of Plato8s earlier criterion of 9rationality.9 -t is strikin! that in that very passa!e *here the stran!er !ives his val(e.free speech, t*o e)a'ples re'inded (s of the val(e.co''itted speech of the friends of the for's. &o sec(re the 'aterialists8 a!ree'ent that so'e thin!s are oth i''aterial and real, the stran!er (sed the e)a'ple of virt(es 3$4%a. 4. <nd to ill(strate the sophists8 techni+(e of failin! to distin!(ish et*een the 9is9 of identification and the 9is9 of attri (tion, he co'pared 92an is !ood9 *ith 92an is 'an9 and 9Eood is !ood9 3$>1a. 4. 1e f(rther re'inded (s that the phi. ;B#= Klein 3PT 4, Dosen 3PS 4, and Benardete are e)ceptions. 7 1%% 7 losopher can never e free of val(ation, for 9the philosopher especially honors9;B1= kno*led!e, *isdo', and reason 3$49c4. &here, in the 'iddle of the dialo!(e, *e *ere re'inded of the li'itations of the stran!er8s val(e.free 'ethod. &he i'portance of val(e *as also anticipated at the e!innin! of the dialo!(e, *ith ,ocrates8 openin! speech a o(t the !ods8 concern *ith *hether or not *e are virt(o(s 3$1B 4. 5o*, at the end of the dialo!(e, *e are once a!ain re'inded of the pri'acy of virt(e.;B$= -n step B of the final division, the stran!er divides i'itation into that ased on kno*led!e and that ased on opinion. 1e (ses the follo*in! e)a'ple: Hhat a o(t the pattern of 0(stice and of virt(e taken as a *holeJ <ren8t there 'any *ho, altho(!h they are i!norant of it, still have a kind of opinion, and *ho try hard to e ea!er to 'ake this, *hich they elieve to e virt(e, appear to e in the', y i'itatin! it in their ehavior and speech as '(ch as possi leJ 3$B%c4 - elieve that it is a!ainst this ack!ro(nd that the s( stit(tion of 9po*er9 for 9reason9 is to e (nderstood. &he 'iddle dialo!(es *ere concerned *ith distin!(ishin! the etter fro' the *orse? (t the stran!er is interested here only in distin!(ishin! si'ilarities and differences. Fn that asis he is a le to ask a +(estion that Plato has never efore asked: Hhat do ein! and eco'in! have in co''onJ @or the friends of the for's, the task *as to distinguish ein! fro' eco'in!. &he stran!er, on the other hand, *ants to collect the' to!ether into a co''on for', and he (ses the for' *ith *hich he e!an the <n!ler divisionIthat of po*er, i'plicitly (nderstood as e)istence. B(t at the sa'e ti'e the repeated references to virt(e and other val(es re'ind (s of *hat has had to e sacrificed in order to proceed in this *ay. <nother s(ch re'inder 'ay e fo(nd in steps $ and " of the final division, *here the stran!er divides the for' of divine prod(ction into 9entities the'selves9 and 9i'a!es9 3$B>e.$BBa4. &he division appears to e a deli erate re'inder of the t*o.*orld ontolo!y of the %epu)lic's Divided Cine. &he rese' lance is intensified y the fact that in step " the stran!er divides not only the ri!ht side of the division 3h('an prod(ction4, (t also the left side 3divine prod(ction4. 9,ince there are t*o,9 he

says, 9c(t each of the' a!ain into t*o9 3$B>e4. &here is certainly no need to c(t oth, eca(se the sophist is p(rs(ed only on the ri!ht side, and nothin! is ;B$= Cf. @riedlOnder ".$%9. 7 1%6 7 !ained y dividin! the left. &his is in fact the only place *here the stran!er sy''etrically divides oth the left. and ri!ht.hand for'sIa 9s(perfl(ity9 that is repeated in the s(''ary. ,ince there *as no 'ethodolo!ical asis for the sy''etrical division, and indeed every precedent has een a!ainst it, the reason for it '(st lie else*here. 5ot only is the proced(re of step " *itho(t precedent, (t step $, on *hich it is ased, is invalid. < properly e)ha(stive division sho(ld e, first, et*een divine and mortal prod(ction, *ith 'ortal prod(ction then s( divided into h('an and ani'al. /ven this latter division 'ay re+(ire inter'ediate steps.;B"= &he 'ost o vio(s e)planation for 'akin! the present kind of division despite the a ove o 0ections is that, th(s c(t, the divisions rese' le those of the Divided Cine. &he fo(r res(ltant kinds are divine prod(ction, i'a!es of divine prod(ction, h('an prod(ction, and i'a!es of h('an prod(ction. &aken to!ether, they present a vivid echo of the Divided Cine seen in ter's of the <lle!ory of the Cave 3>#9d.>1%c4: 314 the divine for's 3represented in the Cave alle!ory y nat(ral o 0ects, especially celestial odies4, 3$4 i'a!es of the divine for's 3represented y shado*s and reflections of nat(ral o 0ects4, 3"4 the physical *orld 3represented y h('an.'ade artifacts4, and 344 i'a!es of the physical *orld 3represented y shado*s of the artifacts4. &he i'plications of s(ch a re'inder in the conte)t of the Sophist sho(ld not e (nderesti'ated. &*o in partic(lar are *orth pointin! o(t. &he Sophist has treated the real's of ein! and eco'in! as parallel divisions. *ithin the for' of 9po*er.9 /ven here, in the passa!e 0(st disc(ssed, the divine and the h('an are treated as parallel. -n the %epu)lic , ho*ever, the entire visi le real' is treated as an image of the intelli!i le real' 3>"$c4, and so h('an prod(ction *o(ld e an i'a!e of divine prod(ction 3cf. %epu)lic >9Ba.>9% 4. &he i'portance of this is that an ori!inal 'odel has an ontolo!ical priority over its i'itated i'a!e, as the stran!er hi'self had earlier pointed o(t 3$4#a. 4. B(t the stran!er a stracts fro' all s(ch ontolo!ical priority *hen he collapses ein! and eco'in! into collateral species of 9po*er,9 and *hen he collapses the divine and h('an into collateral species of 9prod(ction.9 &he reference to the Divided Cine and the Cave re'inds (s that the stran!er8s principle of a stractin! fro' val(e distinctions s(ch as no le and ase, or hi!her and lo*er, is not *itho(t its +(estiona le side. &he other i'plication leads in a si'ilar direction. <ny re'inder of the Cine.Cave section s(!!ests the possi ility of a co'parison et*een ;B"= cf. Statesman $B$a ff. 7 1%9 7 the stran!ers (nifyin! concept of 9po*er9 and ,ocrates8 (nifyin! concept of 9the !ood.9 &here are three i'portant differences et*een these t*o concepts. @irst, the !ood is a first principle, not an incl(sive class. ,econd, it is a so(rce of val(e, not only of e)istence. &hird, the !ood is directly relevant only to the level of ein!, not to that of eco'in!Iit is the !ro(nd of the ein! of for's, not of the e)istence of partic(lar thin!s and events. &hese differences lead (s to notice the sa'e deficiencies in the stran!er8s ontolo!y that *e o served in the previo(s para!raph. -n theory, one 'i!ht t(rn this ar!('ent aro(nd and s(!!est that the reference is not 'eant to 'ake (s criticiKe the Sophist in the li!ht of the %epu)lic , (t to criticiKe the %epu)lic in li!ht of the Sophist . &he re'inder of the %epu)lic 'i!ht e a

*ay of callin! attention to the position that is ein! superseded . &here are t*o reasons *hy this is (nlikely. &he first is that in his dialo!(es after the Sophist , Plato consistently ret(rns to an ontolo!y 'ore like that of the %epu)lic , in *hich ein! is !iven ontolo!ical priority over eco'in!Ithe intelli!i le *orld over the visi le. &he second reason is that the rec(rrin! re'inders of the i'portance of val(e, *hich *e have o served at *ork thro(!ho(t the Sophist , *o(ld e ine)plica le in a dialo!(e *hose f(nda'ental orientation *as to*ard an overco'in! of the connection et*een ontolo!y and val(e. &he stran!er8s provisional overco'in! of that connection, in the service of sho*in! ho* all e)istence can e ne(trally classified in ter's of sa'eness and difference, is an i'portant philosophical point. -t represents the isolation of one of the necessary conditions for the theory of for's, na'ely, the principle of 9sa'eness.9 B(t the fact that it operates as a rid!e et*een the ontolo!y of the friends of the for's and that of the 'aterialists does not 'ean that it is a dialectical synthesis of and therefore i'prove'ent over each. -t is rather the kind of synthesis that elon!s to a co''on deno'inator, and it stands 'id*ay et*een the'. &he first three of the five 9!reatest kinds9I ein!, rest, and 'otionIcorrespond to this hi!hest kind of +(asi !en(s 3see a ove, n. "%4 and its t*o pri'ary aspects. &he hi!hest kind is ein! as po*er or e)istence 3

4. &he aspect 9rest9 corresponds to the friends of the for's8 concept of 9 ein!,9 as the real' of chan!eless for's 3*hich '(st here e desi!nated as 9rest9 eca(se its previo(s na'e, 9 ein!9 ; =, is no* reserved for the 'ore incl(sive for'4. <nd the aspect 9'otion9 corresponds to eco'in!, for'less fl().;B4= &he other t*o !reat. ;B4= - cannot, therefore, a!ree *ith Cornford that there is no special si!nificance to the (se of 'otion and rest here, and that 9the only fact a o(t the' that is relevant is that they are contrary and inco'pati le9 3PT* $%%.%64. &he present interpretation also !ives si!nificance to $4"d.$4>d, *here the stran!er sho*s that if *e take. as an ontolo!ically first principle, either a dyad of opposites or the Fne itself, a s(rdity *ill res(lt. &he passa!e in +(estion 'ay e seen as e' racin! oth the re0ected one.sided positions dialectically: the first principles are )oth a Fne 3e)istence or po*er4 and a dyad 3rest and 'otion4. 3Cf. Klein8s doc('entation of the leit'otiv of 9 oth9: PT B# and passim .4 < precisely analo!o(s dialectical ascent occ(rs in the Phaedo to ill(strate the (p*ard sta!e of the 'ethod of hypothesis: fro' the 9*ise9 31##c4 (t (nrelia le hypotheses of the 'aterialis' 39Ba.9%a4, to the 9safe9 (t 9si'ple'inded9 and 9i!norant9 version of the theory of for's 31##d4, to their event(al synthesis in a 'ore co'ple) for'(lation of the theory of for'sIfor's as earers of 'aterial properties. &he latter is still 9safe,9 like the previo(s for'(lation, (t no* 9sophisticated9 instead of 9i!norant9 31#> .c4, eca(se it incl(des the physical ca(sality of the 9*ise9 'aterialists. 7 16# 7 est kinds, sa'eness and difference, are the necessary conditions for division of a for' into its aspects 3$>4d.e4. &he aspects are collected into the co''on for' y virt(e of their sa'eness and distin!(ished *ithin the for' y virt(e of their difference. ,(ch a classification is o vio(sly of !reat philosophical interest? (t the considerations disc(ssed a ove sho* that, *hile classifications s(ch as these can enrich and e)tend the val(ational in+(iry of the friends of the for's, they can not replace or s(persede

it. &he stran!er refers to the anta!onis' et*een the friends of the for's and the 'aterialists as a gigantomachia or 9*ar a!ainst the !iants9 3$4Ba4, a reference to the attle et*een the !iants and the !ods. 9Eiants9 e)plicitly refers to the 'aterialists 3$4Ba, $46c4, *hile the friends of the for's, *hose *eapons co'e fro' the invisi le 3i''aterial4 real' a ove 3$4B 4, are i'plicitly identified *ith the !ods. &he 'etaphor s(!!ests that the stran!er appreciates that there is a difference not only of kind (t also of val(e et*een the t*o philosophies. -t 'ay e that he is on the side of the 9!ods9 after all, (t is p(shin! &heaetet(s and (s to 'ake the connections o(rselves. &his possi ility !ives hei!htened si!nificance to ,ocrates8 openin! *ords in the dialo!(e: 9Did yo( not notice, &heodor(s, that yo( have ro(!ht not a stran!er (t so'e !odJ9 7 161 7

!ha.ter Four The Statesman

%+ Statesman "s She.herd 4-:<a6-;<c8
<fter the fanfare and '(ltiple de'onstrations *ith *hich the stran!er introd(ced the 'ethod of sy''etrical division in the Sophist , it is s(rprisin! to find that that is the only dialo!(e in *hich Plato 'akes (se of it in its p(re for'. &he sa'e /leatic stran!er cond(cts the in+(iry of the Statesman , (t half*ay thro(!h the dialo!(e the divisions cease to e sy''etrical and isective, and the stran!er increasin!ly resorts to 'yth, analo!y, and 'etaphorIsespecially the 'etaphor of *eavin!Iin a *ay that rese' les ,ocratic in+(iry '(ch 'ore than it rese' les the diaeretic 'ethod e'ployed in the Sophist .;1= -n fact that 'ethod is e'ployed in a d( io(s *ay fro' the e!innin! of the dialo!(e. &he first division 'ay e sche'atiKed as in @i!(re 1#. &he details of this diaeresis sho* a re'arka le decline fro' the ri!or and precision of the divisions in the Sophist . &hree points in partic(lar are *orth co''entin! on. 1. -n the shorter *ay the distinction et*een leathered and non.leathered is 'ade t*ice: the differentia of step %, 9leathered9 3or ;1= &he shift is preceded y a disc(ssion of the i'portance of paradi!'s 3$%%d.$%9a4. He 'ay think of that disc(ssion as a deli erate te'perin! of the Parmenides 8 criti+(e of analo!ical and 'etaphorical reasonin!. &he disc(ssion ackno*led!es that paradi!'s are only an indirect *ay of presentin! *hat *e *o(ld prefer to present directly, (t that they are so'eti'es indispensa le. 7 16$ 7

@i!(re 1# 7 16" 7

9*in!ed9:

4, is repeated in step 9 3 , 4.;$= &his is an o vio(s violation of the 'ethod. Fnce 9leathered9 is e)cl(ded y step %, it can no lon!er e i'plicit in the species to e divided in step 9. ,ince this 'anifest ano'aly involves the species of irds, it calls o(r attention to a 'ore serio(s pro le' a o(t that species, the fact that the stran!er8s divisions, oth here and in the Sophist , destroy the species of irds. -n oth dialo!(es there is a distinction et*een land ani'als and *ater ani'als. &he Sophist locates irds *ithin the !en(s 9*ater ani'al9 3$$# 4 *hile the Statesman locates the' *ithin the !en(s 9land ani'al9 3$B4e4. &h(s *e can locate *ater irds *ithin one !en(s and land irds *ithin another, (t there is no !en(s that divides into the species of irds per se . He can isolate classes that are too !eneral 3ani'als4 or too specific 3*ater irds, land irds4 (t not the precise species of irds itself. &he pro le' co(ld easily have een avoided y 'akin! 9feathered9 into a prior differentia, that is, y dividin! ani'als into feathered and nonfeathered, and nonfeathered into s*i''ers and *alkers 3 irds co(ld then have een located y appropriate distinctions *ithin 9feathered94. -n fact this very point is s(!!ested y the s(''aries, oth here and at $%Ba, *hich o'it step B and there y separate the species 9feathered9 prior to any distinction et*een *ater and land. <ll this *o(ld e of little conse+(ence if the 'ethod of division *ere presented 'erely as a convenient 'ethod of classification, (t it is offered rather as a 'ethod of arrivin! at real essences, y discoverin! *hich species elon! y nat(re *ithin *hich !enera. &he stran!er speaks of distin!(ishin! one kind of thin! fro' everythin! else in ter's of its 9sin!le for'9 3

, $>6c>4, and later says, Hhen so'eone at first perceives the co''on character of 'any thin!s, he sho(ld not t(rn a*ay (ntil he sees in it all the distinctions, as 'any as lie in the for's ;

=. Hhen on the other hand he at first perceives all sorts of differences in a !reat 'any thin!s, he '(st not eco'e disco(ra!ed and stop (ntil he has p(t those that are akin into a sin!le si'ilarity, enclosed in the !en(s to *hich they really elon! ; =. 3$6>a. 4 &he pro le's *e have seen, ho*ever, 3and *ill contin(e to see4 sho(ld 'ake (s *onder *hether the 'ethod of isective division is ein! reco''ended as *holeheartedly as at first it see'ed.

7 164 7 $. &he diaeresis e!ins *ith the sa'e fla!rant violation of 'ethodolo!y *ith *hich it ended. :(st as step 9 of the shorter *ay (sed a differentia already e)cl(ded y step %, step $ (ses one already e)cl(ded y step 1. ,tep - distin!(ishes practical fro' intellect(al arts on the !ro(nds that the for'er event(ate in prod(cts 3

, $>6e4. B(t *hen the latter 3*hich y definition no* e,clude the prod(cin! of prod(cts4 are divided into critical and directive, the distinction is that the directive art is for the sake of prod(cin! 3 , $B1a. 4 and necessarily has prod(cts 3 , $B1 4. 1ere too a characteristic s(pposedly e)cl(ded y the previo(s division reappears and needs to e e)cl(ded a!ain in the s( se+(ent one 3even tho(!h the stran!er co(ld have 'ade his point *itho(t inconsistency, as *e shall see4. &his is reinforced y an oddly enfee led concl(sion that the stran!er dra*s: not that the art of the kin! is ithin the class of theoretical rather than practical arts, as the stran!er has 0(st clai'ed to sho*, (t only that his art is 9'ore akin to9 the theoretical than the practical 3$>9c.d4Ia *eak identification that is hardly ade+(ate to the re+(ire'ents of definition y division 3altho(!h it *ill e echoed in the 9*eaver9 division4, (t that faithf(lly reflects the lack of ri!or in the first t*o steps. <ll this see's too conf(sin! even for the stran!er. 1ere he locates kin!ship *ithin the directive sciences, *hich are distinguished fro' the critical? (t later he *ill say that kin!ship *as differentiated fro' other sciences as ein! )oth directive and critical 3$9$ 4.;"= 2ore than 'ethodolo!ical carelessness is involved here. <fter the stran!er distin!(ished et*een practical and intellect(al arts on the asis of *hether or not they involve prod(cts, he re'arked that 9any kin! can, *ith his hands or his *hole ody, do little to hold his r(le, co'pared *ith *hat he can do *ith his entire so(l and its force9 3$>9c4. &his distinction et*een *hat can e acco'plished y the ody and *hat y the so(l, *hich *as 'entioned only in passin!, co(ld have een (sed to avoid the pro le' that *e 0(st noticed. ,(ppose that step 1 distin!(ished the intellect(al sciences fro' the practical not y clai'in! that the latter have prod(cts and the for'er do not, (t that the latter have corporeal prod(cts 3res(ltin! fro' the activities of the ody4 *hile the for'er have intelli!i le prod(cts 3res(ltin! fro' the activities of the so(l4. -n that case, the intellect(al sciences *o(ld not have een defined in s(ch a *ay as to precl(de the' fro' 'akin! prod(cts, and there *o(ld e no contradiction *hen step $ (ses this as the differentia to ;"= Cf. Benardete ".1$B. 7 16> 7 distin!(ish the directive intellect(al sciences fro' the critical. ,tep 1 *o(ld have re0ected only corporeal prod(cts *hile step $ affir'ed intellect(al prod(cts. &h(s the incoherence is e!re!io(s and the stran!er hi'self has sho*n (s ho* he co(ld easily have 'ade these divisions *itho(t tan!lin! his distinctions. Hhy does he refer to the corporeal/ intellect(al distinction (t not (se itIespecially *hen it *o(ld have saved hi' fro' incoherenceJ &his iss(e *ill reappear in an intensified *ay *ithin the ne)t passa!e disc(ssed. ". <fter step >, *here herds are distin!(ished fro' individ(als, ,ocrates8 na'esake, yo(n! ,ocrates,

proposes that the ne)t division e et*een h('an herds and ani'al herds, and is re (ked y the stran!er for i'patiently c(ttin! off a s'all part 3herds of h('ans4 fro' the *hole 3herds4 rather than !rad(ally narro*in! the field y pro!ressive sy''etrical divisions 3$B$a. 4. 1o*ever, the stran!er has evidently not dosed the door on shortc(ts alto!ether, for he soon offers yo(n! ,ocrates the choice of a lon!er or shorter ro(te y *hich to track do*n the states'an. &he lon!er is 'ethodolo!ically 'ore correct, he repeats, (t 9it is possi le to !o y *hichever of these *ays *e *ish9 3$B>a4. Ao(n! ,ocrates (nderstanda ly *o(ld like to see oth, so they take first the lon!er, then the shorter *ay, and arrive at t*o apparently +(ite different conceptions of *hat the states'an is. Both conceptions start fro' the ass('ption that he is a herds'an of h('an ein!s, (t the *ay a h('an ein! is conceived is very different. <ccordin! to the 'ore fa'o(s shorter *ay, the lo*est !en(s to *hich h('anity elon!s is the !en(s of t*o.footed ani'als, *hich incl(des only the t*o species 9h('ans9 and 9 irds.9 &he difference et*een the t*o is that h('ans have no feathers, so o(r essence is 9featherless iped.9 <ccordin! to the lon!er *ay, the lo*est !en(s to *hich h('ans elon! is the !en(s of ta'e, hornless, noninter reedin! herd ani'als, *hich incl(des only the t*o species 9h('ans9 and 9pi!s.9;4= &he difference et*een the t*o is 7 16B 7 that h('ans have t*o le!s and pi!s have fo(r, so o(r essence is 9t*o.footed, ta'e, hornless, noninter reedin! herd ani'al.9 &here are at least t*o pro le's here. @irst, the concept 9h('an9 is radically different in each case, *ith 9t*o.footed9 actin! as the !en(s in one and the differentia in the other. ,econd, neither definition is very i'pressive: accordin! to one, h('ans are like irds *ith the feathers 'issin!? accordin! to the other *e are like pi!s *ith t*o le!s 'issin!. <nd yet this 'ethod is s(pposed to lead (s to a thin!8s very essence 3$6>a. 4. 1o* does yo(n! ,ocrates react to all thisJ 9&he ar!('ent *as ea(tif(lly done,9 he replies 3$B%a4. Perhaps, then, the pro le's are 'eant to reflect on yo(n! ,ocrates8 lack of concept(al discipline and ri!or, rather than on the 'ethod itself, for he has also i!nored the stran!er8s reco''endation to take the lon! *ay rather than the short 3$B$a.c, $B>a4.;>= Fn the other hand, perhaps he i!nored that reco''endation eca(se of its conditional character: 9-t is finest to distin!(ish *hat is so(!ht fro' everythin! rise i''ediately, if that correctly reflects ho* the thin!s really are . . . ;B(t= it is safer to 'ake one8s c(ts y !oin! do*n the 'iddle, and one *o(ld 'ore likely hit (pon the o(ndaries et*een the for's9 3$B$ 4. Concept(al ri!or and safety are serio(s concerns in Plato, as he previo(sly had sho*n in the Phaedo 31#1d.e, 1#> .c4. B(t if a different approach is called the finest or 'ost ea(tif(l one 3

4, this is certainly a still 'ore i'pressive reco''endation. /ven the safer *ay is not entirely sec(re: it is only 9'ore likely9 to hit (pon the o(ndaries. <ccordin!ly, *hile the lon!er *ay *o(ld e safer, it *o(ld not e (nreasona le for yo(n! ,ocrates to hope that the stran!er has fo(nd a valid shortc(t, *hich *o(ld, after all, e the 9finest9 sol(tion. -n fact the shorter *ay does, in effect, 9distin!(ish *hat is so(!ht fro' everythin! else i''ediately.9 ,ince leathered creat(res *ere already r(led o(t y step %, all the stran!er needs to do is distin!(ish the res(ltant species of 3featherless4 *alkin! ani'als into t*o.le!!ed and fo(r.le!!ed 3there *as no need to e)cl(de feathers a!ain in ;>= Cf. 2itchell 2iller, The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman 3&he 1a!(e: 5i0hoff, 196#4 $1.$9.

7 16% 7 step 9, as *e sa*4. ,trictly speakin!, then, the definition that the shorter *ay leads to is not 9featherless iped9 (t 9t*o.footed *alker.9 &he s( se+(ent reintrod(ction of the already discarded cate!ory of 9feathers9 can only e re!arded as a kind of 0oke since oth divisions e!in fro' the sa'e point, if the shorter *ay still needed to e)cl(de feathers so *o(ld the lon!er *ay. &he stran!er8s intention, in this calc(lated atte'pt to 'ake the shorter *ay look less respecta le than it really is, is perhaps to reinforce his effort to disco(ra!e &heaetet(s fro' lookin! for shortc(ts efore he kno*s ho* to do so properly. 1ad &heaetet(s een a le to de'onstrate at this point the a ility to see thro(!h the stran!er8s s( terf(!e, it *o(ld have een a different story. &he shorter *ay t(rns o(t to e 'ore convincin! than the lon!er one not only in its one.step definition 39t*o.footed *alker94, (t also in its proced(re. ,ince the !en(s fro' *hich the lon!er and shorter *ays e!an *as 9*alkin!,9 it is 'ore nat(ral to (se 9n(' er of feet9 as the differentia, rather than 9presence of horns.9 5or do the differentiae 9horned/hornless9 and 9inter reedin!/noninter reedin!9 tell (s anythin! si!nificant a o(t h('an nat(re. /ven tho(!h they are technically 'ore correct eca(se they proceed y 'ore sy''etrical c(ts, they are artificially devised and are 'ore in the nat(re of distractions fro', rather than concentrations (pon, the s( 0ect to e defined. 3<s ,ocrates points o(t in the Phile)us ;1%a=, it is possi le to !o fro' the one to the 'any too slo*ly as *ell as too +(ickly.4 -t is perhaps an i'plied criticis' of their artificiality that, *hen this division is later recalled, the order of these t*o (nill('inatin! differentiae is reversed 3$%Ba4.9 -t is far 'ore nat(ral to define h('an ein!s si'ply as t*o.footed ani'als than as t*o.footed noninter reedin! hornless ones.;B= Conse+(ently it is the definition of the shorter *ay that serves as the 'odel for <ristotle, *ho co''only defines 9h('an ein!9 as the 9t*o.footed ani'al9 3and descri es (s as 9 y nat(re a political ;cf. 9herd9= ani'al9: Politics 1.$.1$>"a $."4. -f *e think of the shorter *ay in ter's of the definition to *hich it really leads, rather than the red(ndancy that the stran!er tacks onto the end in order to elittle it, then there is a very pointed difference et*een the res(lts of the t*o 'ethods. Both take 9t*o.footed9 to e the final ;B= 2oreover, as 1arvey ,codel points o(t, the lon!er *ay 9is so'e*hat perverse in its i'plication, for it constr(es h('an nat(re . . . as a s(rd, *hile that of its fo(r.footed co(nterparts is rational9 3Diaeresis and '!th in Plato's Statesman ;EZttin!en: Gandenhoeck and D(precht, 196%= B>4. &he reference is to the stran!er8s description of h('an nat(re in ter's of the s+(are root of $ at $BB . 7 166 7 differentia of h('an ein!s, (t the shorter *ay (ses this to distin!(ish h('an ein!s fro' all *alkin! ani'als, *hereas the lon!er *ay (ses it to distin!(ish (s only fro' pi!s. Hhich of these reflects 'ore acc(rately the distinctive nat(re of h('anityJ -t cannot e denied that y dividin! *alkin! ani'als i''ediately into t*o.footed and fo(r.looted *e prod(ce a see'in!ly (n alanced divisionIh('ans on one side, all fo(r.footed ani'als on the otherI*hereas y the lon!er *ay the divisions are 'ore evenly alanced at each step. B(t on the other hand the lon!er *ay i!nores the distinctive nat(re of h('an ein!s. < ri!id insistence on alanced divisions 'ay confor' to the principle of relative 'eas(re, (t violate that of the 'ean 3to anticipate a distinction that the stran!er *ill 'ake later on4. -t 'ay e that h('an ein!s are so distinctive that it 'akes 'ore sense to speak of h('ans as one side and all 9other ani'als9 as the other, as yo(n! ,ocrates *as inclined to do.;%= &he stran!er did, it is tr(e, re (ke yo(n! ,ocrates for doin! so'ethin! of the sort *hen he si'ply divided 9ani'als9 into 9h('ans9 and 9 easts9 3$B$a if.4? ho*ever, the pro le' *ith yo(n! ,ocrates8 i''ediate division of ani'als into h('an and nonh('an is not that it is asy''etrical, (t that it !ives no indication of *hat

he takes to e the essential nature of h('anity. Dather than identifyin! the deter'inative differentiation of the species 9h('anity,9 yo(n! ,ocrates si'ply 'akes the species its o*n differentia, and so the definition, in its i'patience to arrive at the in&ima species , ypasses the all.i'portant step of discoverin! *hat the real differentia of h('anity is. Beca(se it dispenses *ith an identification of the essence, the distin!(ishin! feat(re of 9h('an ein!,9 it fails to !ive (s the very thin! that the process of division is s(pposed to acco'plish. -n a later re'ark the stran!er sho*s that it does in fact 'ake sense to set h('an ein!s apart fro' all other ani'als as lon! as *e can discern the tr(e differentia: 9h('an ein!s, *ho are different and 'ore divine ;

= ani'als, !overn the lo*er species of the'9 3$%1e4. Cater still *e are told that the h('an so(l co'prises a divine part as *ell as an ani'al one 3"#9c4, *hich once a!ain distin!(ishes (s i''ediately fro' all other ani'als.;6= <ltho(!h these distinctions 'ake no reference to the n(' er of o(r le!s, it is not (n(s(al to re!ard o(r t*o. ;%= :. B. ,ke'p points o(t that 9<ristotle ar!(es very thoro(!hly a!ainst any atte'pt to reach any of the in&imae species of the ani'al *orld y a process of division y dichoto'y ;De Parti)us animalium , -, $.4? B4$ ,> B44 ,$#=9 3Plato's Statesman ;Condon: Do(tled!e and Ke!an Pa(l, 19>$= %#4. ;6= ,codel >%, too, notes that 9Plato hi'self contin(es to invoke the distinction et*een 'an and east despite the ,tran!er8s strict(re 3cf. Phil . 1Ba and La s B>"e4.9 7 169 7 le!!ed post(re, *hich sets o(r head heaven*ard, as the o(t*ard si!n of o(r distinctive nat(re: &he na'e anthrKpos ;9h('an ein!9= si!nifies this: that, on one hand, the other ani'als do not e)a'ine, reason a o(t, or look (p at *hat they see? (t a h('an ein!, as soon as it has seenIand this 'eans vie*edIthen it looks (p and reasons a o(t *hat it has vie*ed. &herefore alone of the ani'als the h('an ein! is ri!htly na'ed anthrKpos , since it looks (p ;anathrKn = at *hat it has vie*ed ;opKpe =. 3"rat!lus "99c4 @or of all ani'als 'an alone stands erect, in accordance *ith his !od.like nat(re and s( stance. @or it is the f(nction of the !od.like to think and to e *ise? and no easy task *ere this (nder the (rden of a heavy ody, pressin! do*n fro' a ove and o str(ctin! y its *ei!ht the 'otions of the intellect and of the !eneral sense. 3<ristotle, Parts o& #nimals 4.1#.B6Ba $%."$, rev. F)ford translation4 -n challen!in! yo(n! ,ocrates8 division of ani'als into h('an and not h('an, the stran!er said that any other intelli!ent ani'al, as for e)a'ple the crane is tho(!ht to e, 'i!ht 'ake an analo!o(s division: for e)a'ple, cranes and noncranes 3$B"d4. &he stran!er8s pri'ary reason for speakin! of other intelli!ent ani'als here is that only an intelli!ent ani'al co(ld 'ake s(ch a distinction? (t there is a secondary conse+(ence as *ell. -f there are other intelli!ent ani'als, *e are prevented fro' (sin! intelli!ence or rationality as the o vio(s differentia y *hich to distin!(ish h('ans fro' other ani'als. &he crane 'ay e rational too. 1o*ever, as *e soon learn, only h('anity is !odlike. ,o there really is a nat(ral differentia y *hich *e 'i!ht have een distin!(ished fro' all other ani'als i''ediately. &he i'plication is that *hat distin!(ishes (s fro' other ani'als is not a technical

distinction (t a difference of val(e, 9divinity.9 &he crucial difference et*een o(rselves and other ani'als lies not 'erely in the n(' er of le!s, or even the presence of intelli!ence, (t in the divinity of o(r nat(re, that is, in the nat(re of o(r soul . &he lon!er *ay, in insistin! on e+(al divisions, 'ay often have to ypass the 9fittin!9 division, as in this case. Hhen it does so, it s(cceeds accordin! to relative 'eas(re (t fails accordin! to the 'ean. &he key to the t*o precedin! pro le's lies in the diffic(lty, for the 'ethod of division, of takin! acco(nt of nonvisi le 'arks s(ch as the distinction et*een ody and so(l, or et*een one kind of so(l and another. &his diffic(lty ste's fro' the 'ethod8s ina ility to reco!niKe 7 19# 7 differences a'on! levels of ein! that i'ply differences of val(e. ,(ch differences are all(ded to even tho(!h they are never addressed. &he stran!er said that 9the science of the kin! is never one that s(pervises so(lless thin!s, like architect(re, (t it is no ler ;

= in that it al*ays e)ercises its po*er a'on! livin! ein!s and in relation to 0(st these9 3$B1c.d4. Cater, *hen he dra*s the distinction et*een 9'ore divine9 and 9lo*er9 so(ls 3$%1e4, it is clearer still that any ade+(ate acco(nt *o(ld have to 'ake distinctions of val(e. ,ince the first part of the dialo!(e defined states'anship as the no(rishin! of h('an ein!s the *ay shepherds take care of their flock, *e 'i!ht have e)pected the concept of val(e to enter into the notion of 9no(rishin!.9 1o*ever, the stran!er never in+(ires into the 'eanin! of 9no(rishin!,9 (t only into the 'eanin! of 9h('an ein!.9 Cater he calls attention to this as a fail(re, sayin! that their investi!ation did not specify in s(fficient detail ho* the states'an r(les 3$%>a4. &he 'yth *ill redress this reticence a o(t no(rish'entIas *ill the final part of the dialo!(e 3"1#a ff.4I e)plicitly disc(ssin! the no(rish'ent of the h('an herd, oth corporeal and other*ise 3$%1e.$%$c4. -n the Sophist the stran!er had e'phasiKed that the 'ethod a stracts fro' considerations of val(e 3$$%a. 4, and this t(rned o(t to e *hy the dialo!(e8s event(al distinction et*een the sophist and the philosopher is (lti'ately (nsatisfactory. 1ere, too, at the end of the lon!er *ay, the stran!er defends the 0()taposition of pi!s and people in the (lti'ate !en(s y repeatin! the prohi ition a!ainst payin! attention to differences of val(e 3$BBd4. B(t the present dialo!(e, (nlike the Sophist , *ill violate that principle *ith increasin! fre+(ency thro(!ho(t its co(rse,;9= as it replaces the lon!er *ay *ith the shorter. -t even e!ins *ith an e)plicit reco!nition of the i'portance of val(e: ,FCD<&/, : - o*e yo( a !reat de t of !ratit(de, &heodor(s, for 'y ac+(aintance *ith &heaetet(s and also for that *ith the stran!er. &1/FDFDU, : ,oon, ,ocrates, yo( *ill e three ti'es as inde ted, *hen they have *orked o(t the states'an and philosopher for yo(. ,FCD<&/, : -ndeedJ ,hall *e say that this, 'y dear &heodor(s, is *hat *e heard fro' o(r !reat calc(lator and !eo'etricianJ . . . Ao( are placin! e+(al val(e on each of these three, *ho are farther apart in honor than yo(r art of proportions can e)press. ;9= Cf. 2ichel @attal: -n the Statesman , 9le dialecticien se' le par l[ contrevenir [ la rW!le +(8il s8est po(rtant fi)Ye dans le Sophiste en $$%a. et dans le Politi9ue l(i.'\'e en $BBd, celle +(i proscrit l8(sa!e des 8vale(rs8 co''e critWre de division9 39Ca diairesis dans le Politi9ue de Platon9 ;paper presented at the &hird ,y'posi(' Platonic(', 9Plato8s Politicus, 9 Bristol, <(!(st $>."#, 199$= 1"4.

7 191 7 &1/FDFDU, : By o(r !od <''on, ,ocrates, yo( have re (ked 'e *ell and 0(stly and *ith presence of 'ind. 3$>%a. 4 &he second and third of the pro le's *e noted re!ardin! the openin! division of this dialo!(e 'ay e indirect confir'ations of ,ocrates8 *arnin!: that an atte'pt to acco(nt for distinctively h('an activities *itho(t reference to val(e is doo'ed to confrontin! e)ternals rather than essentials. <nd in vie* of Plato8s association of the !ood *ith the i'a!e of the s(n, there 'ay e an o li+(e reference to val(e as *ell in &heodor(s8s oath y <''on, *ho, in his characteristic of <''on.Da, *as the /!yptian s(n !od. <s - have s(!!ested a ove, the three dialo!(es of the trilo!y 'ay in this *ay e re!arded as an e)tended application of the 'ethod of hypothesis. &he Theaetetus , y hypothesiKin! that kno*led!e is a species of perception or do)a, fo(ndered in a sea of (naccepta le conse+(ences. &he Sophist proposed a 9hi!her9 hypothesis, that esides the individ(als that co'prise the *orld of perception and do)a, there are also (niversal kinds. &his hi!her hypothesis resolved so'e of the aporiae of the Theaetetus 3re!ardin! the nat(re of kno*led!e and of episte'ic lo!os4, (t led to (naccepta le conse+(ences of its o*nIan ina ility to find the tr(e differentia et*een the sophist and the philosopher. @inally the Statesman *ill present (s *ith a hi!her hypothesis still, that of the 'ean, *hich i'plies val(e and the !ood. Fn the asis of this hypothesis the resid(al pro le's of the Sophist 3e.!., the essential difference et*een philosophy and sophistry4 *ill e 'ore convincin!ly resolved. &he doctrine of the 'ean *ill not e introd(ced e)plicitly (ntil $6"d if., (t it has een present 3in different *ays4 y indirection in ,ocrates8 openin! re'arks a o(t correct proportion and in the stran!er8s pro le'atic openin! diaeresis.;1#=

-+ 0*th o( !osmic Re)ersal 4-;<c6-<'d8

&he division is not yet co'plete, for 'erchants, far'ers, !rain *orkers, physical trainers, and physicians *o(ld all clai' that they, rather than the states'an, are the 9shepherds9 of h('anity. ,ince shepherds perfor' all s(ch d(ties and 'ore, the clai's of these rivals '(st e taken serio(sly. -nstead of si'ply dividin! f(rther to distin!(ish these rivals fro' the shepherd, the stran!er proposes to start entirely over, takin! 7 19$ 7 an alto!ether different road 3$B6d4. 1e relates a 'yth, accordin! to *hich the (niverse8s rotation alternates directions. Hhen the !od is directly in contact *ith it, the cos'os rotates to!ether *ith hi'. <t this ti'e all life sprin!s f(lly 'at(re fro' the earth and a!es in reverse, !ro*in! yo(n!er and yo(n!er (ntil it disappears ack into the earth, fro' *hich it is event(ally re orn.;11= @ood is al*ays availa le *itho(t effort, the *eather is al*ays !entle, and all ani'als live in har'ony, each species (nder the !overnance of a s( ordinate deity. B(t nothin! corporeal can contin(e indefinitely *itho(t chan!e, so event(ally, *hen each so(l has f(lfilled its allotted cycle of re irths, the !od lets !o. &his res(lts in an earth+(akelike shock that ca(ses !reat destr(ction. &he cos'os is a livin! and intelli!ent ein!, ho*ever, and does not re'ain at rest. Beca(se of its lessed nat(re 3$B9d4 and its 'e'ory of !overnance y the !od 3$%"a. 4, it seeks to e'(late its for'er state, (t its corporeality li'its oth the divinity of its nat(re 3$B9d4 and its a ility to re'e' er its for'er state 3$%" 4, so its e'(lation '(st e deficient. Conse+(ently it rotates in the opposite direction, *hich is *hy irth, a!in!, and death are reversed in o(r e)perience. 2oreover, *hen the !od lets !o, the s( ordinate !ods let !o of their o*n char!es 3$%$e4, and the cos'os reverts to the harshness and in0(stice intrinsic to its corporeal nat(re

3$%" .c4. /n'ity arises a'on! the ani'als, and hardship ro(!ht on y scarcity of food and incle'ency of *eather. -t *as as a co'pensation for this that Pro'ethe(s !ave (s fire, and 1ephaest(s and <thena !ave (s the arts 3$%4 .c4. Fver ti'e the cos'os contin(es to for!et its divine le!acy, and as it eco'es 'ore for!etf(l the proportion of disorder to !oodness increases, (ntil the cos'os and all *ithin it are in dan!er of destr(ction. &hen the orderin! !od, concerned that it 'i!ht fo(nder in conf(sion and reak (p in the sea of o(ndless dissi'ilarity,;1$= ret(rns to his place, orders it, and, correctin! it, 'akes it i''ortal and a!eless a!ain 3$%" .e4. &he cos'os is th(s i''ortal only so lon! as the !od periodically intervenes. Fther*ise it *ill perish en.tropically in co'plete (ndifferentiation. &he 'yth is si'ilar in 'any *ays to that of the Timaeus .;1"= 1ere, as *ell as in the Timaeus , the irrationality of the cos'os is d(e to its cor. ;11= &he so(ls '(st so'eho* a!e in the earth, for they each (nder!o a n(' er of re irths efore the cycle reverses 3$%$e4. ;1$= Fne *ay of lookin! at the 'ethod of division is that it ai's to provide )oundaries *ithin the sea of dissi'ilarity. ;1"= <lso see C(c Brisson, 9-nterprYtation d( 'ythe d( Politi9ue 9 >.B, and &. 2. Do inson, 9@or's, De'i(r!e and Horld.,o(l in the Politicus 9 3 oth papers presented at the &hird ,y'posi(' Platonic(rn, 9Plato8s Politicus ,9 Bristol, <(!(st $>."#, 199$4. 7 19" 7 poreal nat(re, *hich 9partook in !reat disorder efore enterin! into the present cos'os9 3$%" 4? and here too it is partly overco'e y a 'e'ory of the divine, a 'e'ory that is o sc(red y the corporeal nat(re. 2oreover, 0(st as the de'i(r!e of the Timaeus is distin!(ished fro' the Fly'pian !ods, here too the divine 9hel's'an of the (niverse9 3$%$e4 is not one of the Fly'pians, altho(!h this is not at first apparent. <t one point yo(n! ,ocrates asks, 9B(t the life that yo( say e)isted d(rin! Kronos8s rei!n, *as it in those revol(tions or theseJ @or it is dear that the reversal of the stars and s(n co'es a o(t in oth periods9 3$%1c4. &he stran!er replies, 9Ao( have follo*ed the story *ell. B(t the life yo( asked a o(t, *hen everythin! ca'e a o(t y itself for people, does not elon! to the presently esta lished period, (t this too *as of the previo(s one9 3$%1c.d4. -s the stran!er 'erely ironic *hen he praises yo(n! ,ocrates8 !rasp of the storyJ -s yo(n! ,ocrates really askin! so'ethin! as foolish as *hether the self.!eneration of all thin!s fro' the earth is happenin! no*J -n fact the +(estion *as a le!iti'ate one 3and the praise pro a ly sincere4, (t it is ans*ered elliptically. <t the e!innin! of the 'yth the stran!er 'entioned the story of Le(s8s reversin! the direction of rotation of the s(n and the heavens. Ao(n! ,ocrates has heard of it, he says. &he stran!er esta lishes that ,ocrates has also heard the story of the rei!n of Kronos, and the story of those *ho *ere orn fro' the earth 3$B9a. 4. -t appears that yo(n! ,ocrates no* *onders *hether the rei!n of Kronos and the ti'e of the earth orn coincide, for it evidently occ(rs to hi' that if Le(s *as the !od *ho reversed the rotation 3as in the traditional acco(nt of the <tre(s story4, then )oth directions of rotation *o(ld occ(r in Le(s8s rei!n, and the sa'e *o(ld pro a ly have een tr(e of Kronos8s rei!n. <s he p(ts it, 9it is dear that the reversal of the stars and s(n co'es a o(t in oth periods9 3$%1c4. ,o there sho(ld e a period of the earth orn in oth Le(s8s and Kronos8s rei!n, and it is perceptive of yo(n! ,ocrates to *onder *hich of these t*o is the fa led one. B(t the stran!er, after his initial praise, ans*ers as if the *hole of Kronos8s rei!n is the !olden a!e, and the *hole of Le(s8s rei!n the present a!e. &he reversed a!e, he says, 9*as that of the people of Kronos8s ti'e, (t the present one is said to e at the ti'e of Le(s9 3$%$ 4. -n that case it co(ld not have een Le(s *ho reversed the co(rse of the heavens, (t rather so'e 'ore f(nda'ental !od *ho is in char!e d(rin! oth periods 3altho(!h in control only in one of the'4. &his is s(pported

y the fact that the r(lin! !od never leaves the scene, and therefore co(ld not have een replaced y a different !od. Dather than de arkin! fro' 7 194 7 the ship of the (niverse, he only leaves the hel' and 'oves to a place of looko(t 3$%$e4, fro' *hich he later ret(rns to the hel' 3$%"e4.;14= &he pec(liar for' of the +(estion and ans*er at $%1c.$%$ th(s points to a tacit e'endation in the story. &he !od *ho is cele rated in the 'yth is eyond Kronos and Le(s, *ho are y i'plication rele!ated to the position of s( ordinate !ods. &he rei!n of Kronos corresponds to the period *hen the divine hel's'an takes char!e of the tiller, and the rei!n of Le(s corresponds to the period *hen the hel's'an has let !o. &hese distinctions are never e)plicit? *ith ,ocrates8 trial in the offin!, perhaps the stran!er is ca(tio(s a o(t introd(cin! 9other, ne* !ods9 in <thens. Despite the si'ilarities et*een the 'yth here and in the Timaeus , in the latter dialo!(e the divine and corporeal see' to e (nited in a perpet(al polarity, *hereas here they are (nited se+(entially. -n vie* of the political character of the dialo!(e, perhaps the se+(ential nat(re of the 'yth is 'eant to assi'ilate the 'yth to the nat(re of political history, for it is clear fro' the %epu)lic that Plato sees political states as displayin! a +(asi.cyclical se+(ence: a rise fro' the a!rarian to the *arrior state and thence to an intelli!ent 9civiliKation,9 *hich *ill pro!ressively decline into appetitiveness 3

4: fro' 9aristocracy9 to oli!archy to de'ocracy, anarchy, and tyranny. 1ere, too, *hen the !od lets !o of the cos'os it reverts to 9its innate appetitiveness ; =9 3$%$e4. &he 'yth co' ines the cos'ic point of vie* of the Timaeus *ith the political point of vie* of the %epu)lic . <nother f(nction of the se+(ential relationship of the poles 'ay e, as E. D. @. @errari has s(!!ested, that the distinction et*een r(led. y.!od and r(led.after.!od prefi!(res the dialo!(e8s later distinction et*een r(le y the states'an and r(le y la*.;1>= &his s(!!estion is stren!thened y the fact that the states'an 3$9%e.$99c4, like the !od, is co'pared to the captain of a ship. Conspic(o(s thro(!ho(t is the the'e of val(e. <t the e!innin!, *hen the stran!er refers to the si!n of the !ods8 favor that *as esto*ed (pon <tre(s 3in his rivalry *ith his rother, &hyestes, over the s(ccession to the r(le of 2ycenae4, yo(n! ,ocrates thinks he 'eans the !olden la' , *hereas he 'eans instead the s( se+(ent reversal of the heavenly directions 3$B6e.$B9a4. Ao(n! ,ocrates8 e)pectation is (nderstanda le since they had 0(st een talkin! a o(t shepherds and flocks, (t 'ore ;14= Cf. Brisson %.6. ;1>= 92yth and Conservatis' in Plato8s Politicus, 9 paper presented at the &hird ,y'posi(' Platonic(rn, 9Plato8s Politicus, 9 Bristol, <(!(st $>."#, 199$. 7 19> 7 than dra'atic nat(ralis' is involved. &he !olden la' *as a token that the !ods considered <tre(s 'ore fit to r(le than &hyestes. &he !olden attri (te si!nifies, therefore, the difference et*een etter and *orse. @indin! the states'an, *e are later told 3"#"d.e4, is like refinin! !old to separate it fro' less precio(s 'etals 3as here it is said that the states'an '(st e 'ade to stand apart and p(re: $B6 4. -t

*ill t(rn o(t not to e possi le to do this *itho(t appealin! to differences of val(e. ,i'ilarly, one of the 'ost i'portant +(estions raised in the 'yth is in *hich of the t*o periods people are happier. &he ans*er is that if those in the previo(s period (sed their special advanta!es for the p(rs(it of philosophy and *isdo', then they '(st have een ten tho(sand ti'es happier than *e? (t if they (sed the' only for idle pleas(resI eatin!, drinkin!, and storytellin!Ithen the reverse is the case 3$%$ .d4. 5ot only is it taken as eyond disp(te that the val(e of *isdo' is i''eas(ra ly !reater than that of pleas(re, (t it is also dear that the stran!er no lon!er treats differences of val(e as irrelevant to philosophical in+(iry. &he co'plete s(periorityIthe inco'para ly !reater val(eIof the cos'os8s divine co'ponent over its corporeal one is as stron!ly e'phasiKed in the Statesman 'yth as it is any*here in Plato. 9&he corporeal ele'ent in the cos'os8s co'position . . . partook of !reat disorder efore its entry into the present cos'os,9 the stran!er says. 9@or fro' its co'poser it ac+(ired all ea(tif(l thin!s, (t fro' its previo(s state co'es everythin! that is harsh and (n0(st in the heavens9 3$%" .c4. @ro' this passa!e in partic(lar, and the 'yth in !eneral, it is +(ite clear that Plato has not a andoned his 9t*o.*orld9 vie*.;1B= &he distinction et*een the divine and the corporealIand the polarity et*een the' as the 'atri) of o(r *orldIis as (na' i!(o(s here as it ever *as in the earlier dialo!(es. &he passa!e 'ay e a 9'yth,9 (t it is a 'yth that represents a t*o.*orld conception of reality. -t *o(ld e (nacco(nta le if in this very trilo!y he *ere a andonin! that conception.

/+ Paradigm o( >ea)ing 4-<'e6-5/28

&he stran!er re'arks that the 'yth has sho*n an error in their ori!inal diaeresis. 9-n one *ay the error *as relatively s'all, (t in another *ay it *as of very no le ;

= proportions and '(ch lar!er and ;1B= @or detailed disc(ssions of this +(estion, see Dichard 2ohr, 9Statesman BECc.d,4 Phronesis $$ 319%%4 $"$."4? idem , 9Disorderly 2otion in Plato8s Statesman,4 Phoeni, "> 319614 199.$1>. 7 19B 7 !reater than the other9 3$%4e4. -t treated the present h('an states'an as if he *ere the shepherd.!od of the divine cycle 3this *as the 'ore serio(s aspect of the error4, and did not specify in s(fficient detail ho* he r(les 3the less serio(s aspect4. &he difference et*een the divine shepherd and h('an kin! is that the latter shares appro)i'ately the sa'e n(rt(re and ed(cation as his char!es, *hereas the for'er 3like shepherds !enerally4 does not. &he for'er is in fact !reater 3

4 than the latter 3$%> .c4. &he difference et*een the divine and the h('an, like that et*een the divine and corporeal 3and et*een the t*o aspects of the error4, is pri'arily a difference in val(e. &o re'edy their 'istake it is necessary, first, to think of the states'an not as a herds'an, since he is not different in kind fro' his char!es, (t yet as so'eone *ho has so'ethin! in co''on *ith herds'en. &he stran!er collects these activities to!ether into the for' of 9carin! for9 3

, $%>e4. -n the precedin! diaeresis the prod(ction of livin! thin!s 34 4 *as called no(rishin! or feedin! 3

: e.!., $B1d4, and so the stran!er proposes that they replace 9no(rishin!9 *ith 9care9 3 4 and contin(e the division as efore 3$%Ba.d4. He 'ay notice that the 'ethod of hypothesis is at *ork here a!ain, in the re0ection of the ori!inal conception of the states'an as a kind of shepherd, in favor of a 'ore ade+(ate or 9hi!her9 conception. -n fact the concept of no(rishin! *ill later e distin!(ished fro', rather than s( s('ed *ithin, states'anship 3$66e.$69a4, and the states'an *ill e e)plicated on the hypothesis that he is like a *eaver rather than like a shepherd. &hey 'ade another !reat error in addition to this, he contin(es, y not 'akin! f(rther divisions in their final definition. &hey o(!ht to have divided the shepherd of h('an ein!s into a divine and a h('an shepherd, so that the states'an co(ld e distin!(ished fro' the !od. <nd they o(!ht to have distin!(ished the states'an8s r(le into r(le y force and r(le y consent, so that the kin! co(ld e distin!(ished fro' the tyrant 3$%Bc.e4.;1%= B(t if the essential difference et*een kin!s and tyrants is said to e that the for'er are o eyed vol(ntarily and the latter invol(ntarily, here a!ain the 'ethod of division has led (s not to the tr(e distin!(ishin! essence of the thin!, (t only to a s(perficial characteristic. &he *riter of the %epu)lic , for *ho' the tyrant *as the paradi!'atic (n0(st 'an, can hardly have elieved that the distin!(ishin! feat(re of the tyrant is si'ply the rel(ctance of his s( 0ects, or that ;1%= -t is odd that this is called an additional error. &he t*o ele'ents see' to correspond to the 'a0or and 'inor aspects of the ori!inal error. 7 19% 7 hoi polloi *ill necessarily o ey even 0(st la*s vol(ntarily. -n fact the stran!er *ill later rep(diate this definition e)plicitly 3$9B 4. /ven apart fro' this the stran!er is not satisfied, for the acco(nt is not only too lon!, (t still (nfinished. 9-t is diffic(lt, yo( divine 'an, to sho* *itho(t paradi!'s any of the !reater thin!s. @or each of (s kno*s everythin! al'ost as if in a drea', and then is i!norant as if he has a*akened9 3$%%d4. <s *ith the doctrine of recollection 3*hich ,ocrates, too, co'pares to a drea'like state: 'eno 6>c.d4, *e have an i'plicit kno*led!e of all thin!s, *hich *e cannot discern *hen *e try to rin! it into e)plicit foc(s. 1o* can *e find the states'an (nless *e already kno* *hat he is, and *hy do *e need to find hi' if *e do kno* *hat he isJ <!ain as *ith the doctrine of recollection, paradi!'s 'ake possi le the transition fro' 'erely i'plicit kno*led!e to e)plicit kno*led!e. 9- need to !ive a paradi!', 'y lessed one, of paradi!',9 the stran!er says. Children *ho can correctly read short and easy sylla les eco'e conf(sed *hen the sa'e letters are (sed to 'ake lon!er ones. ,o *e can (se the short sylla les as paradi!'s of ho* the letters so(nd, fro' *hich the child *ill e a le to read the lon!er ones. &h(s 9a paradi!' co'es a o(t *henever so'ethin! that is ri!htly elieved to e the sa'e in so'e second distinct thin! is co'pared *ith the first, so that the t*o to!ether res(lt in one tr(e opinion9 3$%%d.$%6c4. &he application of the epithets 9divine9 3

4 and 9 lessed9 3

4 to yo(n! ,ocrates 'ay also re'ind (s that the '(ndane can serve as a re'inder or paradi!' of the divine. -'plicit as *ell in ter's like 9 lessed9 and 9divine9 is the connotation of val(e. <fter all, the 'ethod of paradi!'s is said to e especially i'portant in dealin! *ith the !reatest and 'ost val(a le 3 4 thin!s 3$6>e4. <s a paradi!' of so'ethin! that has 9the sa'e activity as statecraft9 3$%9a4, the stran!er !ives a diaeresis of the art of *eavin! 3see @i!(re 114.;16= @or a division that is 'eant to e 9paradi!'atic,9 it is, like the previo(s one, re'arka ly la). &he first t*o s( divisions are oth nonnor'al, in opposite *ays. &he Sophists divisions e!an y distin!(ishin! prod(ction fro' ac+(isition, (t this one, on the contrary, e!ins y conflatin! the': 9<ll thin!s *hatever that *e ma$e or ac9uire are for the sake either of doin! so'ethin! or of protectin! o(rselves a!ainst s(fferin! so'ethin!9 3$%9c4. Hhereas step 1 th(s fails to divide the startin! point ;16= Charles Eris*old s(!!ests an interestin! connection et*een the choice, of the *eavin! of *oolen !ar'ents as a paradi!' of states'anship, and the incle'ent conditions of the a!e of Le(s: 9Politi$: Epist:m: in Plato8s Statesman, 9 in <nton and Pre(s, eds., 141.B%, esp. 1>$, 1B> n. $$. 7 196 7

@i!(re 11 7 199 7 as it sho(ld have done, step $, on the contrary, perfor's a do( le division instead of a sin!le one for no apparent reason: not only $ 3 arriers4 (t also $a 3protective dr(!s4 is divided in half. 2ore re'arka le than either of these lapses is the s(''ary, *hich is y far the 'ost inacc(rate of all, 'isrepresentin! the ori!inal order at al'ost every step. &he ori!inal step 4 is 'issin! alto!ether 3or else it is assi'ilated into step > in a very diff(se *ay: cf. $6#d4, and only in one case is the se+(ence et*een t*o stepsI> and BIacc(rately repeated. 5ot even the first and last steps are correctly recalled. &he 'ost serio(s deficiency is the concl(sion. <fter havin! defined clothes'akin!, the stran!er says, 9*eavin!, to the e)tent that the !reatest part of it deals *ith the 'akin! of clothin!, does not differ e)cept in na'e fro' this art of clothes.'akin!9 3$6#a4. B(t if only part of *eavin! 3even if the !reatest part4 is concerned *ith the 'akin! of clothin!, then the definition is too narro*, and avo*edly so. &he false note *as str(ck *ith step B 3*hich, perhaps si!nificantly, is treated as the (lti'ate step y the s(''ary4, *hen the stran!er divided carpets fro' *rappin!s and seeks the *eaver in the latter class, even tho(!h carpets too can e *oven. Hitho(t this step the stran!er *o(ld not have had to *eaken his concl(sion *ith the (nscientific +(alification 9for the 'ost part.9;19= 5ot only is the definition too narro*, it also t(rns o(t to e too road: not only are not all *eavers clothes'akers, (t not all clothes.'akers are *eavers, the stran!er re'inds (s. &hey are so only for the 'ost part: ,&DE/D : &he one *ho *orks at the first sta!e of clothes'akin! appears to do the opposite of *eavin!. AFU5E ,FCD<&/, : 1o* soJ

,&D<5E/D : &he *ork of *eavin! is a kind of co' inin!. AFU5E ,FCD<&/, : Aes. ,&D<5E/D : B(t the other is the separatin! of *hat is 0oined or 'atted to!ether. AFU5E ,FCD<&/, : Hhich oneJ ,&D<5E/D : &he *ork of the carder8s art. 3$6#e.$91a4 5ot only carders (t also f(llers and 'enders consider the'selves involved in the 'akin! of clothin!, altho(!h they *ill ad'it that *eavin! is 9the !reatest part9 of clothes'akin! 3$>1 4. ;19= Decall the stran!er8s e+(ally (nscientific concl(sion after the second step of the openin! diaeresis, that the art of the kin! is only 9'ore akin to9 the theoretical than the practical 3$>9c.d4. 7 $## 7 /ven those *ho 'ake the instr('ents for these arts are part of the art of clothes'akin!, (t these 'i!ht e classified as contri (tory ca(ses rather than tr(e ca(ses 3$61d.e4. &he distinction et*een contri (tory and tr(e ca(ses is re'iniscent of the Phaedo's distinction et*een the tr(e ca(se and 9that *itho(t *hich the ca(se co(ld not e a ca(se9 396 .99c ff.4. &he tr(e ca(se is teleolo!ical, *hile the contri (tin! ca(ses are the 'aterial conditions that allo* the p(rpose to e f(lfilled. &hat is the case here as *ell. -t 'ay see' s(rprisin! that the stran!er e!ins y dividin! 9doin!9 fro' 9protectin! a!ainst,9 and lookin! for *eavin! (nder the latter. He can find it 0(st as easily (nder the for'er, so it is odd that the distinction is 'ade at all. -t is evidently 'ade in order to ill(strate that an activity is est defined y its p(rpose, *e 'i!ht even say its 9val(e.9 &he reason that the sophist *as never convincin!ly differentiated fro' the philosopher in the Sophist *as that their 'ost i'portant difference, the difference in their !oals, *as never taken into acco(nt. &hey *ere treated as 'akers of prod(cts, and the p(rpose for *hich the prod(cts *ere 'ade *as i!nored. 1ere, on the contrary, the p(rpose is insisted on ri!ht fro' the e!innin! of the division, and distin!(ished fro' 'ere 'akin!. ,i'ilarly, it is only eca(se their (lti'ate p(rposes coincide that instr('ent 'akers and carders can e considered part of the art of clothes'akin!. -n a technical sense, the 'aker of the loo' is not a clothin! 'aker, nor is the person *ho cards fleece into *oolen strands. B(t the stran!er is no* no lon!er concerned *ith technical definitions as in the Sophist , (t *ith teleolo!ical, p(rposive, val(e.laden ones. -n fact *e 'i!ht even distin!(ish the *eaver fro' these others y callin! *eavin! the 'ost ea(tif(l and !reatest 3

4 of the', he says. <ltho(!h there *o(ld e so'e tr(th 3 4 in thisIa possi ility that he 'i!ht not have entertained earlierIit *o(ld not yet e a clear and co'plete distinction 3$61c.d4. <ccordin!ly, he e)pands the previo(s division, as sho*n in @i!(re 1$. 1ere a!ain *e find re'arka le fail(res in the ri!or and even (sef(lness of the division, si!naled once a!ain y the stran!er8s o*n *ords. &here is a co'paratively 'inor oddity in that the left.hand side of the division has to e taken a step farther than the ri!ht.hand side efore the latter eco'es f(lly intelli!i le, (t the serio(s pro le' e'er!es in step 1". &here the stran!er says: 9Ff *ool*orkin! there are t*o divisions, and each of the' is y nat(re a part of t*o arts9 3$>$ 4. He *o(ld have e)pected hi' to say that each has t*o arts as its parts. &o say that a species is part of t*o !enera 'eans that it is not (nified, not

7 $#1 7

@i!(re 1$ *holly s( s('ed *ithin either !en(s 3as *as prefi!(red earlier y the split species of 9 irds,9 part of *hich *as s( s('ed (nder 9*ater ani'als9 and part (nder 9land ani'als94Iin other *ords, that the division is incorrect, not 'ade at the nat(ral 0oints et*een !enera. &he stran!er sho*s this in his other*ise (nnecessary division of the left.hand species, 9dividin!.9 @or oth co' in! and cardin! t(rn o(t to e partly in one and partly in the other !en(s. &his is e)plicit in the case of co' in!, a o(t *hich the stran!er says, 9hal& of co' in! . . . elon!s to the art of dividin!9 3$>$ ? the other half elon!s to the art of co'posin!4. He *o(ld e)pect this to e tr(e of cardin! as *ell, since he had said that oth divisions are parts of t*o arts, and that is in fact the case. Cardin! incl(des not only rakin! the fleece into a *e to strai!hten it and re'ove the i'p(rities;$#= 39dividin!94 y r( in! it e. 7 $#$ 7 t*een fiat s(rfaces set *ith teeth, (t also the s( se+(ent condensin! 39co'posin!94 of the *e into a sliver, *hich can then e t*isted and sp(n. ,o cardin! too, as the stran!er re'arked, is part of oth arts. &he reason that co' in! as *ell as cardin! is in oth !enera is that the *eaver (ses the co' partly to separate the strands and partly to co' ine the *arp and *oof. B(t since it is in the act of *eavin! that the co' is (sed, the a' i!(ity in co' in! attaches to *eavin! itself and (nder'ines the definition. Cardin! &or the most part separates, and *eavin! &or the most part co' ines, (t that is hardly an ade+(ate *ay to distin!(ish the', and it certainly is not in keepin! *ith the precision de'anded y the 'ethod of division. <t this point the 'ethod of division y isection, the 9lon!er *ay,9 *hich has een (sed in an increasin!ly ineffect(al *ay thro(!ho(t the dialo!(e, eco'es co'pletely a andoned. &he stran!er *ill contin(e to 'ake divisions, (t rather than dividin! y halves, he *ill divide i''ediately into the (lti'ate speciesIthe very thin! that he had *arned yo(n! ,ocrates a!ainst at $B$ . &he reason he *ill !ive for this is that here division y isection si'ply is not possi le, (t *e shall see that that is no 'ore tr(e here than it *as previo(sly. < 'ore convincin! reason e'er!es fro' the ens(in! disc(ssion of the t*o different kinds of 'eas(re.

'+ Relati)e 0easure= the 0ean= and Diaeresis 4-5/26-5<28

9Hhy ever didn8t *e strai!hta*ay ans*er that *eavin! is the co' inin! of the *arp and *oof, instead of !oin! aro(nd in a circle and distin!(ishin! very 'any thin!s pointlesslyJ9 the stran!er asks 3$6" 4. Fn the asis of the fore!oin! disc(ssion *e can reply that one reason for the ro(nda o(t approach is that it locates *eavin! *ithin a fra'e*ork of p(rpose and val(e: *eavin! is for the sake of prod(ction. &o define it 'erely in ter's of its 'echanical activity is to i!nore *hat it is good for, and therefore its 9tr(e9 ca(se or reason for ein!. Cater the stran!er *ill clai' that 9it 'i!ht pla(si ly e said that *hatever e)ists, a'on! all that is, is an instr('ent or contri (tin! ca(se of at least one thin!9 3$6%d4. /verythin!, therefore, points to*ard so'ethin! as its p(rpose. Coo's are for the sake of *oven cloth, *oven cloth for the sake of *ar'th, *ar'th for the sake of health, health for the sake of life, and life 3as the 'yth s(!!ests4 for the sake of e' odyin! the divine. Fnly *hat is eyond ein!, the !ood itself, does not point eyond itself. &he (lti'ate 'eanin! of each thin! is its val(e.

7 $#" 7 <ltho(!h yo(n! ,ocrates does not feel that all this Has Unnecessarily len!thy or a *aste of ti'e, the stran!er *orries that he 'ay co'e to think so in the f(t(re, and seeks to precl(de this y e)plainin! t*o different *ays of 'eas(rin! len!th. ,&D<5E/D : Fne is *ith respect to the shared i!ness or s'allness of thin!s to*ard one another. &he other is *ith respect to the necessary essence of co'in! into ein! ;

=. AFU5E ,FCD<&/, : Hhat do yo( 'eanJ ,&D<5E/D : Doesn8t it see' to yo( that, in the nat(re of it, *e '(st say that the !reater is !reater than nothin! other than the less, and, a!ain, the less is less than the !reater and nothin! elseJ AFU5E ,FCD<&/, : -t certainly does. ,&D<5E/D : B(t *hat a o(t thisJ Hith re!ard to *hat e)ceeds or *hat is e)ceeded y the nat(re of the 'ean, *hether in *ords or actions, '(st *e not also say that it really e)istsJ <nd that in this lies the chief difference et*een those of (s *ho are ad and those *ho are !oodJ AFU5E ,FCD<&/, : /vidently. 3$6"d.e4 &he 9'ean9 3

4 does not refer here to a 'athe'atical 'ean 3avera!e4, any 'ore than it does in <ristotle8s 8icomachean Ethics .;$1= -t refers to the correct de!ree et*een t*o indeterminate e)tre'es s(ch as too lon! and too short. -f *e *onder, then, *hether a disc(ssion, like the previo(s one, is too len!thy, *e 'ay ans*er either y co'parin! its len!th *ith that of other disc(ssions, or y co'parin! it *ith an independent standard of 'oderation. ,i'ilarly, if *e *onder *hether individ(al people are !ood or ad, *e 'ay co'pare their +(alities *ith those of so'e other person, or *e 'ay co'pare the' *ith an independent standard of the 'ean. @or Plato, as later for <ristotle, *e can speak of !ood and ad, e)cess and deficiency, only in relation to s(ch a 'ean. &he concept of val(e has no* een introd(ced in a f(lly e)plicit *ay. 5one of the artsIincl(din! that of states'anshipI*o(ld e possi le *itho(t s(ch a 'eas(re, for any art necessarily pres(pposes a standard of !oodness at *hich to ai' 3$64a. 4. &his is in part *hat the stran!er 'eant y callin! the 'ean 9the necessary essence of co'in! 7 $#4 7 into ein!.9 5ot only human creation (t, as the 'yth sho*ed, all co'in! to e is (lti'ately dependent on an a sol(te or 9divine9 standard. &he stran!er !oes on, ho*ever, to 'ake the dependence et*een

the 'ean and the arts reciprocal. 9-f this e)ists, they e)ist, and if they e)ist, this too e)ists. B(t if one of the' does not e)ist, the other never *ill either9 3$64d4. &he 'ean cannot therefore e e+(ated *ith the %epu)lic's -dea of the !ood, *hose e)istence has a sol(te priority and is (nhypothetical. &he 'ean is not !oodness a sol(tely, (t the measure of !oodness in *ords and actions, hence insepara le fro' the'. &he conf(sion that *e *itnessed at the e!innin! of the dialo!(e, as to *hether states'anship is a practical or theoretical science, no* see's to e a deli erate ad(' ration of the nat(re of the science of the 'ean, in *hich pra,is and theKria are ine)trica ly linked. -n the earlier passa!e *e sa* that in step 1 states'anship *as intellect(al rather than practical eca(se it does not res(lt in prod(cts 3$>6d. e4, *hile in step $ it *as directive rather than critical eca(se it does res(lt in prod(cts 3$B# 4. 5o* *e see that it is indeed oth, eca(se they cannot e separated. &he !reatest science, the science of the 'ean, is do( le.sided: *hat *e kno* and *hat *e do are (lti'ately insepara le. &he ,ocratic e+(ation et*een kno*led!e and virt(e reappears here in a 'ore s( tle for'. He 'ay ass('e that this is also the reason that ac+(isition and prod(ction, *hich *ere f(nda'entally distin!(ished in the Sophist , *ere reco' ined at the e!innin! of the *eaver division 3$%9c4: kno*in! 'ay e re!arded as a kind of ac+(isition, and doin! as a kind of prod(ction. &he r(le.free fle)i ility of the science of the 'ean corresponds to <ristotle8s concept of practical *isdo' 3p)ron:sis 4,;$$= that is, the capacity for discernin! in practical sit(ations the 'ean that e' odies *hat is ri!ht or !ood. Plato is here treatin! of the individ(al application of the principles that *ere disc(ssed only in a !eneral *ay in the %epu)lic . ;$"= 7 $#> 7 &he distinction et*een relative 'eas(re and the 'ean has an i'portant conse+(ence for the 'ethod of division as it has een (sed here. -n principle the 'ethod ought to e concerned *ith the 'ean, rather than *ith relative 'eas(re: Hhen one first sees *hat is co''on a'on! 'any thin!s, one sho(ld not retire (ntil one sees *ithin it all the differences, ho*ever 'any lie in for's. <nd a!ain, on the other hand, *hen all kinds of dissi'ilarities are seen in a plethora of thin!s, one sho(ld not e lia le to !et disco(ra!ed or stop (ntil one has co'passed all the related thin!s *ithin a sin!le si'ilarity and enclosed the' in the essence of so'e !en(s. 3$6> 4 -n other *ords, the 'ean et*een the e)tre'es of seein! everythin! either as an identical (nity or as co'pletely (nrelated consists of discoverin! the sa'e and the different as it really is. 5othin! is said a o(t dividin! into halves. Hhen the stran!er had earlier reco''ended the lon!er *ay of isection into e+(al halves, over the shorter *ay of i''ediately separatin! off the species as they really are, he in effect reco''ended relative 'eas(re over the 'ean. Cet (s reconsider the episode of the lon!er and shorter *ays, *here the stran!er, for the only other ti'e in the dialo!(e, !ives (s alternative proced(res. -n a previo(sly +(oted passa!e he had said, 9-t is finest to distin!(ish *hat is so(!ht fro' everythin! else i''ediately, if that cor. 7 $#B 7 rectly reflects ho* the thin!s really are . . . ;B(t= it is safer to 'ake one8s c(ts y !oin! do*n the 'iddle, and one *o(ld 'ore likely hit (pon the o(ndaries et*een the for's9 3$B$ 4. &he dichoto'y is precisely parallel *ith that et*een relative 'eas(re and the 'ean. 9Eoin! do*n the 'iddle9 'eans co'parin! the t*o species to 'ake s(re that they are of appro)i'ately e+(al siKe, that is, dividin!

accordin! to relative 'eas(re. &he tr(e 'ean, ho*ever, *o(ld e the precise o(ndary that one is seekin!. ,ince the 'ean is connected *ith val(es s(ch as ea(ty 3

4, it is finest 3 4 to find the proper 'eas(re 3'ean4 of a thin! i''ediately, the one that 9correctly reflects ho* the thin!s really are.9 B(t in this earlier passa!e the stran!er reco''ends relative 'eas(re over the 'ean, eca(se of its !reater 9safety.9 &he tension et*een the earlier endorse'ent of the lon!er *ay, *hich corresponds to relative 'eas(re, and the later endorse'ent of the nonrelative 'ean ill('inates oth the partic(lar pec(liarity of the episode of the t*o *ays, and the !eneral pec(liarity of the fate of the 'ethod of isective division, *hich is first e'ployed *ith increasin! ineffect(ality, and then entirely a andoned for no o vio(s reason. &he episode of the t*o *ays no* see's to have een an inti'ation of the fact that the safe, isective approach to division involves only relative 'eas(re and can never e f(lly ade+(ate. <nd the pro!ressive (t (nackno*led!ed fail(re of the divisions that follo* sho*s ho* a 'echanical application of the for'al r(les of division can lead to (nsatisfactory res(lts. <s a confir'ation of this, in the re'ainder of the dialo!(e the stran!er *ill al*ays (se the shorter rather than the lon!er *ay. 1e *ill distin!(ish for's i''ediately into their in&imae species instead of proceedin! indirectly y the relative 'eas(re of 'akin! artificial distinctions desi!ned to prod(ce sy''etrical halves. He shall see that this is not eca(se s(ch artificial lon!er *ays cannot e devised. -t '(st e, then, that the shift is 'eant to reco''end the shorter *ay as (lti'ately prefera le. &he ri!id (t safe relative 'eas(re of the lon!er *ay t(rns o(t to e a peda!o!ical steppin!stone to a s( tler 'ethod of division. <nd the stran!er8s distinction et*een the t*o 'eas(res t(rns o(t to e the principle of division that if(rcates the dialo!(e itself into its t*o halvesIin 'ore *ays than one. 5ot only does it occ(r directly in the 'iddle of the dialo!(e, and f(nction as the o(ndary that separates the stran!er8s (se of the lon!er *ay in the first half fro' the shorter *ay in the second, (t 'ore i'portant, it provides the differentia y *hich the difference et*een the lon!er and shorter *ays can e identified. 7 $#% 7 &hat the lon!er *ay, the 'ethod of sy''etrical isection, sho(ld event(ally e s(perseded sho(ld not entirely s(rprise (s, for in the sa'e passa!e *here the stran!er distin!(ished the lon!er and shorter *ays, he said, *ith re!ard to his e)planation of the 'ethod of division, 9- '(st try to speak even 'ore dearly, in co!niKance of yo(r nat(re, ,ocrates. -n the present circ('stances it is not possi le to 'ake it clearly evident9 3$B$c4. Hhat is it that the stran!er cannot yet e)plain to yo(n! ,ocrates eca(se of his nat(reJ &he 'ethod of division, as the stran!er has so far e'ployed it, is evidently so'e kind of si'plification. He *ill consider in the ne)t chapter *hat it 'ay e that the stran!er is holdin! ack here, (t perhaps a d(e to the *ay that he acco''odates the 'ethod to yo(n! ,ocrates8 nat(re is to e fo(nd in the stran!er8s previo(sly 'entioned reference to 'athe'atics at the e!innin! of the dialo!(e: 9,hall *e say that this, 'y dear &heodor(s, is *hat *e heard fro' o(r !reat calc(lator and !eo'etricianJ . . . Ao( are placin! e+(al val(e on each of these three, *ho are farther apart in honor than yo(r art of proportions can e)press9 3$>%a. 4. Consider the reference to 'athe'atics *hen the stran!er divides the 'ean fro' relative 'eas(re: -t is dear that *e sho(ld divide the art of 'eas(re'ent y c(ttin! it into t*o, in accordance

*ith *hat has een said. Fne section incl(des all those arts that 'eas(re n(' er, len!th, depth, readth, or thickness in relation to their opposites. &he other incl(des all those that 'eas(re in accordance *ith *hat is d(e, fittin!, ti'ely, re+(ired, and everythin! rise that d*ells at the 'ean and a*ay fro' the e)tre'es. 3$>4e4 &h(s, 'athe'atics, like the lon!er *ay, is a species of relative 'eas(re. &o consider the si!nificance of this, let (s recall the elder ,ocrates8 first 'eetin! *ith &heaetet(s, yo(n! ,ocrates8 class'ate. ,ocrates asks *hether &heaetet(s has een learnin! !eo'etry, astrono'y, har'onics, and arith'etic fro' &heodor(s, and &heaetet(s replies that he has 314>c.d4. &hese *ere, as *e sa*, the first five of the si) disciplines that, in the %epu)lic , ,ocrates had said *o(ld t(rn o(r so(l aro(nd fro' its i'prison'ent in the Cave and lead it to an apprehension of the !ood. B(t those five *ere to e no 'ore than a preparation for the si)th, dialectic 3%epu)lic >"1d4. &his, ho*ever, has not een part of their trainin!. 5ot only is there no 'ention of it in ,ocrates8 initial conversation *ith &heaetet(s, (t less than a pa!e later &heodor(s t(rns do*n ,ocrates8 invitation to disc(ss the nat(re of kno*led!e *ith hi', eca(se 9a' not acc(sto'ed to dialectic9 314B 4. &heaetet(s and yo(n! ,ocrates are to e tho(!ht of as talented 'athe. 7 $#6 7 'aticians *ho lack any ac+(aintance *ith dialectical tho(!ht. &hey are, in the lan!(a!e of the %epu)lic , *ell versed in dianoia (t not yet at the level of noesis.;$4= <ccordin!ly, it is appropriate for the stran!er to address the' at the level of dianoia, y 'eans of a 'ethod that, like 'athe'atics, follo*s post(lates to their conse+(ences (t not to their ori!ins. &his is ho* 'athe'atics and dianoia in !eneral *ere descri ed in the %epu)lic 3>1#c4, and it applies as *ell to the lon!er 'ethod of division. &he startin! point of the division is never called into +(estion as part of the 'ethod: one si'ply post(lates it and proceeds to 'ake sy''etrical derivations fro' it. -t see's that the stran!er is providin! &heaetet(s and yo(n! ,ocrates 3and that Plato is providin! us 4 *ith a '(ltista!e trainin! in dialectic. <s he says, 9Hhy did *e set o(rselves the search for the states'anJ Has it for the sake of this s( 0ect itself, or rather for the sake of eco'in! etter dialecticians a o(t all s( 0ectsJ9 9-t is for the sake of all of the',9 yo(n! ,ocrates replies 3$6>d4. &he first sta!e of their trainin! in dianoia picks (p *here 'athe'atics leaves off. &here is still the proced(re of reasonin! do*n*ard fro' a !iven startin! point, (t that reasonin! no* shifts fro' reasonin! a o(t +(antity to reasonin! a o(t +(ality. -t is perhaps 'eant to alert (s to this that *hen ,ocrates (ses the ter' 9+(ality9 3

4 in the Theaetetus , he does not e)pect &heaetet(s to kno* *hat he 'eans.;$>= <nd perhaps it is to enhance this shift fro' +(antity to +(ality that Plato has oth ,ocrates and the stran!er (se letters and sylla les as e)a'ples of rational tho(!ht, *hereas in previo(s dialo!(es he (sed 'athe'atical e)a'ples. <t this sta!e one learns to think in ter's of 9sa'e9 and 9different,9 y 'akin! (se of the relative 'eas(re of 9e+(al halves9 to arrive at contradictory cate!ories. B(t the concl(sions at *hich one arrives do not al*ays t(rn o(t to e consistent or convincin!. < standard of correctness needs to e added, then, to the si'ple concept of relative differentiation. &his is the 'ean. B(t if *e are indeed capa le of discernin! the 'ean, then the ela orate artificiality of the relativistic divisions of the lon!er *ay are (nnecessary and even detri'entalIas all the divisions of this dialo!(e have de'onstrated. &he lon!er *ay f(nctions as a steppin!.stone to the shorter, a step for *hich yo(n!

;$4= 2iller o serves: 9 y presentin! yo(n! ,ocrates as i''ersed in 'athe'atics and not yet introd(ced to philosophy, ;Plato= see's to address his st(dents at 0(st the point in their ed(cation *here they '(st first t(rn fro' the one to the other9 3PPS 94. ;$>= 16$a 3it 'ay also e that this ter' is first coined here, and that ,ocrates needs to e)plain it on that acco(nt4. &he contrast et*een +(antity and +(ality *o(ld perhaps not look +(ite so si'ple to the Ereeks, since for the' the paradi!' of 'athe'atics *as !eo'etry, in *hich +(antity is to a certain e)tent assi'ilated to +(ality 3shape4. 7 $#9 7 ,ocrates *as not ready earlier. <t this sta!e val(e enters into the pict(re once a!ain, for correctness and tr(th are val(ed a ove error and falsity. &h(s the 'ethod of division, *hich at the earlier sta!e had a stracted fro' val(e, is no* itself 0(stified precisely on the asis of its val(e: 9By far the !reatest and pri'ary consideration is to honor ;

= the 'ethod itself of ein! a le to divide accordin! to for's9 3$6Bd4. <fter this point, *here Plato distin!(ishes the 'ean fro' relative 'eas(re, he *ill never a!ain 'ake (se of the lon!er *ay, the relative 'eas(re of isective division. 5or *ill any of his characters, incl(din! the /leatic stran!er, reiterate the stran!er8s an on 'akin! distinctions ased on val(e. Fn the contrary, 0(st as the nat(re of the 'ean 3(nlike that of relative 'eas(re4 is insepara le fro' that of val(e, the pri'acy of val(e *ill per'eate the dialo!(e fro' no* on. &he stran!er, as *e have seen, defines the 'ean in terms o& value : 9!ood and ea(tif(l9 3$64 4, 9d(e, fittin!, ti'ely, re+(ired9 3$64e4. &o p(t the 'atter so'e*hat differently, there are t*o conceptions lackin! in 'athe'atical dianoia that need to e s(pplied if a transition to noesis is to e possi le. Fne is the a ility to red(ce the indefinite '(ltiplicity of the *orld to a synoptic order, y perceivin! the *orld in ter's of connected for's or kinds or essences rather than individ(als 3cf. Sophist $>"d4.;$B= &he other is the a ility to discern the inner necessity of the e)istence of s(ch essences, the fact that, as ,ocrates p(ts it in the %epu)lic , they all sprin! fro' the nat(re of the !ood. &h(s *hat is re+(ired is that the 'athe'aticians learn to think +(alitatively rather than only +(antitatively, and event(ally learn the teleolo!ical 'ode of tho(!ht i'plied y the 'yth and pres(pposed y the concept of the 'ean.

:+ Di)ision >ithout @isection 4-5<26-&/e8

Hhen the stran!er 'oves fro' the 9safe,9 lon!er *ay of the first half of the dialo!(e to the 9finest9 3$B$ 4, shorter *ay of the second half, he 'akes it see' that he is forced to do so y the nat(re of the s( 0ect rather than y his choice of 'ethodolo!y, (t this clai' is disin!en(o(s. -t is a strata!e' co'ple'entary to the one he e'ployed in the first half in re!ard to the s(periority of the shorter *ay. &hen he tacked a red(ndant step onto the end of the shorter *ay8s definition to 'ake the ap. 7 $1# 7 proach see' a s(rd 39featherless iped9 instead of 9t*o.looted ani'al94? no* he clai's that he is proceedin! i''ediately to the final species only eca(se these !enera do not ad'it isection. Both strata!e's are atte'pts to 'ini'iKe the te'ptations, to i'patient nat(res, of the shorter *ay? (t oth prete)ts fall a*ay (nder scr(tiny.

&he stran!er says: 9&he kin!, then, has een separated fro' 'ost of his co'panions, or rather fro' all *ho have to do *ith herds. &here re'ain, *e say, the arts that have to do *ith the city itself, arts of oth contri (tory ca(ses and ca(ses, *hich *e '(st first separate fro' one another9 3$6% 4. ,o the follo*in! division picks (p *here the ori!inal one left off. He are no* lookin! at the class of contri (tory ca(ses and ca(ses, of the episte'e, intellect(al, directive, and ori!inary, of the prod(ction or n(rt(re of t*o.footed, herd ani'als. 9Cet (s then divide the', like sacrificial ani'als, y their li' s, since *e cannot c(t the' into t*o. @or it is al*ays necessary to c(t into the closest n(' er possi le9 3$6%c4. 1e th(s s(!!ests that he is dividin! the' y the li' s only eca(se division y isection does not happen to e possi le in these cases. B(t in the Phaedrus ,ocrates had introd(ced the 'ethod of division as 9the a ility to divide accordin! to for's, at the nat(ral 0oints? and not to atte'pt to hack off a part, in the 'anner of a ad (tcher9 3$B>e4. &he o 0ect of the 'ethod of division is not, then, to divide do*n the 'iddle, (t to divide correctly into the for's. ,o the reason that the stran!er *ants to divide at the nat(ral 0oints is eca(se this is *hat the 'ethod of division aims to doIand not, as he 'akes it see', eca(se sy''etrical isection, altho(!h inherently s(perior, happens not to e possi le in this case. 1e never e)plains *hy isection *ill not *ork here, (t says only: 9&he reason, - think, *ill e no less evident as *e proceed.9 He shall test this clai', and try to discover the reason that the stran!er refers to, y atte'ptin! as far as possi le to do *hat he says cannot e done, that is, to derive all the re'ainin! specifications in the dialo!(e y 'eans of isective division. < reason *hy this cannot e done *ith co'plete s(ccess *ill, in fact, eco'e evident, (t it *ill e a reason that applies to all s( 0ects, not only to this one in partic(lar. <s lon! as *e are content *ith the previo(s standards of definition, *e *ill e a le to arrive at the re'ainin! species y pro!ressive isection as easily as in all the previo(s cases. -n fact the !en(s itself is already if(rcatedI9contri (tory ca(ses and ca(ses9Iand the stran!er tacitly divides it alon! those lines )e&ore he distin!(ishes the first species, instr('ents: 9Hhatever arts 'ake any 7 $11 7 instr('ent *hether lar!e or s'all for the city, all these '(st e classed as contri (tory ca(ses9 3$6%d4. -s the !en(s, then, fro' *hich the f(rther divisions are 'ade 9 oth contri (tory and pri'ary ca(ses,9 as the stran!er said at $6% , or only 9contri (tory ca(ses,9 as he no* saysJ <ct(ally, it appears to e neither, for the stran!er proceeds to the second species *ith the *ords, 9<ll the sa'e, let8s say this a o(t another kind of possession in the city9 3$6%d.e4, and fro' then on all these species *ill e classed as kinds of possession. ,o the stran!er appears to have 'ade a f(rther silent isection, this ti'e of the class of contri (tory ca(ses into those that prod(ce possessions and those that contri (te in so'e other *ay. -t *ill later appear that this other class is that of servants. &he stran!er lists a total of seven kinds of possessions that are contri (tory ca(ses of states'anship and need to e distin!(ished fro' the art of the states'an. &hese are instr('ents, receptacles, s(pports, defenses, playthin!s, ra* 'aterials, and no(rish'ent. Co'pared *ith the divisions of the Sophist , an e)tensive list like this hardly see's like a division at all. B(t !iven the stran!er8s distinction et*een the lon!er *ay and the shorter *ay, *e can see that he is no* e'ployin! the shorter *ay, the i''ediate artic(lation of the !en(s into its (lti'ate species, *itho(t inter'ediate isections. 1ad the stran!er *ished, ho*ever, he co(ld easily have derived the' y a isective division like the one sho*n in @i!(re 1". -n the s(''ary 3$69a. 4, the stran!er 'entions that ra* 'aterials 3called there the 9first orn for',9

4 sho(ld have een p(t first, *hich confir's so'ethin! like the se+(ence in the dia!ra'. &his s(pplied series of isections is as ri!oro(s as those of the Sophist , and 'ore so than those of the Statesman ? so *hy did Plato not devise one si'ilar or etterJ &he reason cannot e that this s( 0ect in partic(lar lends itself 'ore nat(rally to division into seven, for even *itho(t the constraint of if(rcation the stran!er 'entions that certain classes have een left o(t and can only e incl(ded y force: Hhatever *e have left o(t, if *e have for!otten anythin! not very i'portant, can e fit into one of these. &h(s *ith the class ;

= of coins, seals, and every other kind of en!raved dies. &hese do not constit(te a'on! the'selves a lar!e !en(s *ith a co''on na'e, (t so'e can e 'ade ' fit (nder 9playthin!s,9 and others (nder 9instr('ents,9 altho(!h the a'al!a'ation is very forced. Hith re!ard to the possession of ta'e ani'als, e)cept slaves, the previo(sly partitioned art of herd n(rt(rin! *ill sho* itself to incl(de the' all. 3$69 .c4

7 $1$ 7

@i!(re 1" &he ad'ission that so'e thin!s have een left o(t and sho(ld e forced, not very nat(rally, into the classes 'entioned is +(ite s(rprisin!: since he proceeded i''ediately to the (lti'ate species *itho(t inter'ediate divisions, all the stran!er needed to do *as add 'ore species. ,ince the present diaeresis *as introd(ced as a contin(ation of the one *ith *hich the dialo!(e e!an, it is no pro le' to assi!n the species of ta'e ani'als to one of the earlier classifications as the stran!er reco''ends 3pres('a ly they *o(ld e placed (nder step B , 9land ani'als,9 as they *ere in the Sophist's division <, $$$ .d4, (t it is s(rprisin! that he 'entions the' at all, since they are not prod(ced y an art, a 9contri (tin! ca(se.9 -t 'ay e that, like slaves, they are 'entioned even tho(!h they are e)cl(ded fro' this classification, eca(se they too are possessions, even if not prod(cts of contri (tory arts. B(t in that case it so(nds as tho(!h 9possessions9 is the !en(s, and 9contri (tory arts9 the differentia, rather than the other *ay aro(nd. &he lines of derivation are eco'in! tan!led. 1o*ever, this does not 'ean that the s( 0ect itself does not ad'it of pro!ressive isection, (t only that 3as *ith the *eaver diaeresis4 the 'ethod has not een e'ployed as ri!oro(sly as it *as in the Sophist . 7 $1" 7 &he stran!er8s ne)t re'ark is a' i!(o(s as *ell: 9&he class of slaves and servants in !eneral re'ains, a'on! *ho' so'e*here, - prophesy, *ill eco'e evident those *ho disp(te *ith the kin! a o(t this very *eavin! ;i.e., the art of states'anship=9 3$69c4. Does this class 9re'ain9 eca(se all other species

of possessions have no* een separated and it is the re'ainin! species of possessions, or eca(se it re'ains o(tside the class of possessions alto!etherJ Fne *o(ld e)pect the for'er, eca(se it *o(ld see' pointless for the stran!er to have taken the tro( le to divide possessions into seven species if he *ere !oin! to look for his +(arry else*here? (t, on the other hand, slaves are no 'ore 9prod(ced y contri (tory arts9 than are ta'e ani'als, and the other 'e' ers of the class of servants are not possessions at all. Dather, they elon! in the class that - earlier s(!!ested is the co(nterpart to that of 9contri (tory arts of prod(ction9 *ithin the !en(s of contri (tory arts !enerally, that is, the class of servants. Pres('a ly that is *hy the stran!er, altho(!h he had in the previo(s speech 'entioned slaves in the conte)t of possessions, no* speaks of the' in the conte)t of 9servants in !eneral.9 <!ain *itho(t isection, the stran!er i''ediately proceeds to list 3i.e., divide accordin! to the shorter *ay4 five kinds of servant: slaves, distri (tors, p( lic servants, diviners, and priests. &his ti'e, not only is the list capa le of ein! derived y pro!ressive isection, (t the very order in *hich it is !iven is *hat *o(ld 'ost nat(rally follo* fro' s(ch isection 3see @i!(re 14, *hich also incl(des the i'plicit preli'inary isections that *e have already noted4. <nother a' i!(ity attaches to this representation, ho*ever. <re *e ri!ht to p(t the class of servants (nder contri (tory as distinct fro' pri'ary ca(ses 3B4, or does it proceed fro' the *ider class, that of ca(ses !enerally 3<4J -f it elon!s (nder <, then *hy did the stran!er other to distin!(ish the t*o kinds of ca(se and classify possessions as a species of contri (tory ca(se rather than of ca(se !enerallyJ B(t if it elon!s (nder B, then all the s( se+(ent distinctions are !oin! to e *ithin the class. of contri (tory rather than pri'ary ca(ses, in *hich case *e 'ay never e a le to find the states'an at all? for the stran!er see's to s(!!est that the states'an is the pri'ary ca(se of the city, as the *eaver is the pri'ary ca(se of *eavin! 3$6%c.d4. -n that case the stran!er 'i!ht as *ell say no* that the tr(e differentia of the states'an is that he is the pri'ary ca(se of the city *hereas the others are contri (tory ca(ses. -t *ill t(rn o(t, ho*ever, that the class of servants incl(des r(lers, s(ch as kin!s, and so apparently contains pri'ary ca(ses 7 $14 7

@i!(re 14 as *ell as contri (tory ones. -t see's that the class of servants elon!s (nder < after all. <s *ith the *eaver division, and to a lesser e)tent the shepherd division, the lines of division are adly tan!led. 1o*ever, that is not eca(se the s( 0ect itself resists if(rcation 'ore than any other s( 0ect. Plato co(ld have 'ade these distinctions as cleanly as any of the previo(s ones, (t there *as al*ays an artificiality a o(t that cleanliness, a pretense of definitive ri!or, *hich is no* dropped. &he tan!led lines of derivation ill(strate an i'portant pro le' in the lon!er *ay. <ll thin!s are related to one another in a '(ltit(de of *aysIthere can e no definitive concept(al 'ap of realityIand yet the lon!er *ay ar itrarily insists on a sin!le, thoro(!hly deter'ined path of derivation. &he present tan!les arise eca(se the stran!er a andons the artificial tidiness of the Sophist's divisions and e)hi its the '(ltifario(sness of relationships 7 $1> 7 y introd(cin! 'ore than one line of derivation at a ti'e: ta'e ani'als can e classified (nder ani'als or (nder possessions? slaves are species oth of possessions and of servants? and the states'an *ill t(rn

o(t to e in one *ay a 'aster (t in another *ay a servant, in one *ay a pri'ary ca(se (t in another *ay a contri (tin! ca(se 3cf. $6%d: 9it 'i!ht pla(si ly e said that *hatever e)ists, a'on! all that is, is an instr('ent or contri (tin! ca(se of at least one other thin!94. &he diffic(lty in findin! the states'an thro(!h 0(st one line of derivation *as prefi!(red in the shepherd division, *here irds are fo(nd (nder t*o.looted ani'als, land ani'als, or 3in the Sophist 4 *ater ani'als? and in the *eaver division, *here not only *ere oth co' in! and cardin! parts of t*o 3contradictory4 arts, (t *eavin! itself t(rned o(t to e a species of clothes'akin! that *as only partly concerned *ith 'akin! clothin!. 5o* that they have separated these off, ho*ever, another very lar!e cro*d eco'es visi le: 2any of the 'en rese' le lions and centa(rs and other s(ch creat(res. Hhereas very 'any others rese' le satyrs and other *eak and c(nnin! easts. <nd they +(ickly e)chan!e their for' ;

= and po*er into one another. 3$91a. 4 &hese t(rn o(t to e 9the !reatest i'postors of all the sophists,9 and in order to distin!(ish the' fro' the states'an, the stran!er distin!(ishes different types of !overn'ent 3$91c.$9$a4, for it *ill t(rn o(t that the i'postors are the 'onarch, aristocrat, de'ocrat, oli!arch, and tyrant. &he types are distin!(ished initially y *hether the r(ler is one, fe*, or 'any. &he stran!er then isects the first t*o of these, 'onarchy and oli!archy, altho(!h he does so not on his o*n initiative. 1e 'erely reports that 9people today9 e'ploy distinctions s(ch as enforced/vol(ntary, poor/rich, and la*f(l/(nla*f(l. &he res(lt is five types of !overn'ent: 'onarchy and tyranny, aristocracy and oli!archy, and de'ocracy 3*hich is called y the sa'e na'e in oth cases4.;$%= -t is (nclear *hy the stran!er conf(ses the iss(e y incl(din! the distinctions enforced/vol(ntary and rich/poor, since the only i'portant differentia ;$%= Benardete ".1"6 notes an interestin! parallel: 9&he n(' er of co''on na'es for the kinds of re!i'es . . . is e+(al to the n(' er of dis!(ises in *hich the sophist sho*ed (p in the stran!er8s divisions in the Sophist . &he parallel e)tends even farther. 5ot only is the one na'e of a re!i'e 3kin!ship4 the only possi le na'e for the correct re!i'e, 0(st as ,ocrates8 cathartics is the one sophistry no le in descent, (t the do( le for' of de'ocracy, *hich hides (nder a sin!le na'e, is e)actly parallel to &heaetet(s8 'istakin! the do( le for' of the stran!er8s third division for the third and fo(rth.9 &he concl(sion that Benardete dra*s fro' all this see's so'e*hat anticli'actic, ho*ever: 9Ao(n! ,ocrates learns that the city is the nat(ral loc(s of all sophistry.9 7 $1B 7 t(rns o(t to e la*f(l/(nla*f(l, and the other t*o pairs are not coe)tensive either *ith la*f(l/(nla*f(l or *ith each other. Kin! and tyrant, aristocrat and oli!arch, all are likely to e rich, and their s( 0ects 'ay e r(led e+(ally invol(ntarily. &he stran!er8s only stated reason for addin! the other differentiae appears to e that at the ti'e people 'ade distinctions on the asis of s(ch criteria 3$91e4, and rin!in! the criteria into the disc(ssion ena les hi' to dis'iss the'. -n fact he *ill !o on to dis'iss all three 9fashiona le9 criteria as irrelevant to the definition of the states'an 3$96a.$99 4, (t the la*f(l/(nla*f(l distinction t(rns o(t at least to e relevant to distin!(ishin! other kinds of r(lers 3"#1a.c4. -t is *orth notin!, ho*ever, that the other t*o criteria, force and *ealth, correspond to the lo*er levels of the tripartite so(l. &hey therefore represent *ays that the dictates of reason can e s( verted.

,ince states'anship *as a!reed to e a kind of science, 9the o(ndary et*een the states'an and his rivals is not 8fe*8 or 8'any,8 nor 8vol(ntary8 or 8invol(ntary,8 nor 8poor8 or 8rich,8 (t so'e science9 3$9$c4. <nd indeed to the e)tent that *e attain to this science the sy''etrical technical divisions accordin! to the lon!er *ay 3fe*/'any, vol(ntary/invol(ntary, poor/rich4 eco'e inade+(ate and irrelevant. &he only criterion that really 'atters is that of !oodness: <s lon! as they e'ploy science and 0(stice and preserve it ;the city=, chan!in! it fro' *orse to etter as far as possi le, this '(st, at that ti'e and y those 'eas(res, e for (s the only ri!ht re!i'e. <ll the others, *e say, '(st e said to e not !en(ine nor really e)istent ;in their o*n ri!ht=, (t i'itatin! this one. &hose that *e speak of as havin! !ood la*s i'itate it 'ore no ly, and the others 'ore asely. 3$9"d.e4 ,o instead of the five for's of !overn'ent that 9people today9 distin!(ish y relative 'eas(re, there is really only one, deter'ined y the 'ean 3"#1a4. <s far as its i'itations are concerned, distinctions of val(e are no* anythin! (t irrelevant to the stran!er8s 'ethod of definition. &hat *as already i'plicit in earlier passa!es, (t no* that he has replaced the val(e.free 'ethod of division y relative 'eas(re 3e+(al halves4 *ith the val(e.!ro(ndin! 'ean, in the a ove passa!e it eco'es in a sense the onl! relevant distinction.

;+ Distinguishing the Statesman 4-&/e6/7:e8

&he stran!er had said that if so'eone possesses the science of the 'ean, the distinctions et*een fe* and 'any, vol(ntary and invol(ntary, rich 7 $1% 7 and poor are irrelevant 3$9$c4. < 'ore controversial clai', that it is also irrelevant *hether s(ch a r(ler r(les *ith or *itho(t la*, is *ith ca(tion introd(ced 'ore !rad(ally. -t is not 'entioned at all in the passa!e referred to a ove, and at $9" it is only hinted at *ith the *ords, 9in accordance *ith *ritin!s or *itho(t *ritin!s.9 5ot (ntil $9"c does the stran!er specifically 'ention the irrelevance of la*, at *hich point yo(n! ,ocrates responds y sayin! only, 9@ine9 3

4. &he i'plications do not sink in (ntil the stran!er8s ne)t speech, in *hich he says that, as lon! as it is for the !ood 3 4 and in accordance *ith science and 0(stice, the states'an 'ay (ndertake s(ch actions as killin! or e)ilin! citiKens 3$9"d.e4. Fnly at this point does yo(n! ,ocrates reply, 9&he rest of *hat yo( said, stran!er, see's 'oderate ; =. B(t the state'ent that it is necessary to r(le even *itho(t la*s so(nds rather diffic(lt9 3$9"e4. /ven at this late point the stran!er feels that yo(n! ,ocrates is r(shin! hi': 9Ao( anticipate 'e a little,9 he says. 1o*ever o(tra!eo(s the clai' 'ay see', it follo*s necessarily fro' the doctrine of the 'ean, for the 'ean is not so'ethin! that can e for'(lated into *ritin!s. :(st as the fle)i ility and responsiveness of

oral teachin! 'akes it in principle s(perior to *ritten teachin! 3Phaedrus $%>d.$%%a4, and the !reater pliancy of the shorter *ay 'akes it (lti'ately prefera le to the r(le. o(nd lon!er *ay, so too is the science of r(lin! 3like <ristotle8s phron:sis 4 s(perior to any set of la*s: < la* *o(ld never e a le, y co'prehendin! acc(rately *hat is est and 'ost 0(st for everyone at once, to en0oin *hat is est. @or the dissi'ilarities a'on! h('an ein!s and actions, and the fact that nothin! is ever, so to speak, at rest in h('an affairs, do not allo* any art to declare a si'ple r(le in any case re!ardin! all people and for all ti'e. 3$94 4 -n this respect the states'an is like a physician or ship8s captain, and the stran!er sho*s at len!th the a s(rdities that *o(ld res(lt fro' havin! these t*o professions s(pervised y the rich or the 'any, or fro' s( ordinatin! the' to strict *ritten la*s of practice. Ao(n! ,ocrates is pers(aded: 9-t is clear that all the arts *o(ld e co'pletely destroyed9 3$99e4. &he stran!er does, ho*ever, address yo(n! ,ocrates8 concerns a o(t r(le *itho(t la*, y distin!(ishin! et*een t*o kinds of la*lessness. <ltho(!h r(le y la* is inferior to r(le y science, it is s(perior to the a ro!ation of la* for the sake of profit or individ(al favor. Fne *ho overrides the la*s *itho(t doin! so on the asis of science does so 7 $16 7 on the asis of i!norance and desire 3

, "#1c4. <s in %epu)lic Book 9, this e' odi'ent of desire is the tyrant. Fn the asis of the a ove distinction, the stran!er divides all the (nscientific for's of !overn'ent first into threeIr(le of one, fe*, or 'anyIand then each of these into t*o: *ith la* or *itho(t la*. -t see's at first that he is revertin! to the technical, val(e.free kind of distinctions characteristic of the Sophist , (t then he proceeds to rank the' in the order of their relative !oodness 3"#$ ."#" 4: 92onarchy, then, *hen harnessed *ithin !ood *ritin!s ; =, *hich *e call la*s, is the est of all si). B(t *itho(t la* it is diffic(lt and the 'ost oppressive to live *ith9 3"#$e4. 5othin! is said a o(t 'onarchy *ith )ad la*s. &he reason for this appears to e that only 9!ood *ritin!s9 are called la*s. <s atte'pts to i'itate science, la*s are !ood to the e)tent that they s(cceed in i'itatin! it? and to the e)tent that they fail to i'itate it, they cannot e called la*s at all. Hhen a !overn'ent is la*f(l, the stron!er and 'ore effective it is, the etter? and *hen it is la*less, the reverse is tr(e. &he stron!est !overn'ent is 'onarchy, follo*ed y oli!archy and de'ocracy. <ccordin!ly, *hen !overn'ents are la*f(l, 'onarchy *ill e est, oli!archy ne)t, and de'ocracy third? (t *hen they are la*less, de'ocracy *ill e est, oli!archy ne)t, and 'onarchy 3tyranny4 last. &his is the order of !oodness of the si) nor'al constit(tions, (t the states'an hi'self is a !od as co'pared *ith all of the'. ,ince the other si) 'erely 9preside over the !reatest i'a!es, they the'selves are s(ch. <nd, ein! the !reatest i'itators and i'postors, they t(rn o(t to e the sophists of sophists9 3"#" .c4. -n this *ay, the stran!er concl(des, *e can distin!(ish the states'an fro' the centa(rs and satyrs that *ere conf(sed *ith hi' earlier 3at $91a. 4. ,ince satyrs *ere there called *eak and c(nnin!, and since they *ere traditionally associated *ith the appetites, they 'ay perhaps e 'eant to indicate the la*less species, *hich follo* desires . Centa(rs, !ro(ped in the earlier passa!e *ith ani'als like lions, are *hat the %epu)lic classes as spirited , and f(nction there as (pholders of the

la*. ,o perhaps *e 'ay take these ter's to refer to the la*less and la*.a idin! species, respectively. 2ore i'portant, the stran!er has no* s(cceeded in doin! *hat he failed to do ade+(ately in the Sophist : he has provided a convincin! criterion for distin!(ishin! et*een the !en(ine kno*er and the sophist. -t is no lon!er a +(estion of *hat kind of i'a!es 3

4 they prod(ce in their *ordsI*hether acc(rate 3likenesses4 or inacc(rate 3se' lances4. He sa* that in the Sophist 'any of the pro le's initially ascri ed to 7 $19 7 the concept of 9se' lance9 ended (p ein! spoken of in ter's of 9likeness9 and 9i'a!e9 !enerally, altho(!h the stran!er never called attention to this in a the'atic *ay. #n! i'a!e is al*ays at a re'ove fro' reality itself. <ccordin!ly, here in the Statesman the stran!er no lon!er casti!ates the sophists eca(se they prod(ce inacc(rate i'a!es, (t eca(se they prod(ce i'a!es at all , *hether acc(rate or inacc(rate: 9Beca(se they preside over the !reatest i'a!es ;

=, they the'selves are s(ch. <nd, ein! the !reatest i'itators and i'postors, they t(rn o(t to e the sophists of sophists9 3"#" .c4. &hey do not fall short eca(se their i'a!es are inferior. Fn the contrary, they preside over the 9!reatest i'a!es9 and are the 9!reatest i'itators9? even the 'onarch *ho r(les 9*ith !ood *ritin!s9 is not e)e'pted fro' the stran!er8s attack. &he pro le' is that they provide onl! an i'a!e, an i'itation, of the principle of !oodness? and i'a!es, eca(se of their infle)i ility, necessarily petrify and distort the (nfor'(laic nat(re of !oodness.;$6= &he states'an, y contrast, *ho possesses the science of the 'ean, e' odies !oodness *ithin hi'self and does not need to distort it in infle)i le for'(lations. <s *e sa* in section 1# of the chapter on the Theaetetus , *isdo' is not only a 'atter of intellect(al kno*led!e 3i.e., i'a!es of reality4, (t a *ay of ein!: at the hi!hest level, *hat *e kno* and *hat *e are coincide, in precisely the sa'e sense that <ristotle *o(ld later ar!(e that the !ood in partic(lar cases can e kno*n only y a !ood person. 2oral for's can e !rasped only as far as *e can e)perience 'oral tr(th *ithin o(rselves, and this 'eans freein! o(rselves fro' attach'ent to the pleas(res of appetite and a' ition. Precisely this is i'possi le for the sophist, *hose enterprise is insepara le fro' these passions 3as the preli'inary divisions of the Sophist re'inded (s4. &he 'ark of the science of states'anship, then, *hich distin!(ishes the states'an fro' i'postors, is the sa'e as the 'ark of any tr(e science or techne: it is the a ility to discern the 'ean, the est co(rse. 7 $$# 7 -t is no accident that the *eaver division l('ps to!ether the ac+(isitive/prod(ctive distinction 3$%9c4 that *as so central to the Sophist , for sophists are no lon!er to e (nderstood only in ter's of ac+(isitiveness, as in the %epu)lic and earlier dialo!(es, nor in ter's of their prod(cts, as in the Sophist itself. &hey are rather those *ho i'itate the one *ho kno*s, (t *itho(t the science of the 'ean, y *hich the latter kno*s *hat is !ood. -t is not that the i'itations 3i'a!es4 prod(ced y sophists happen to e 'erely se' lances rather than likenesses, (t that, lackin! the science of the 'ean, it is i'possi le that their prod(cts e other*ise. :(st as the Sophist co'pleted the pro0ect of the Theaetetus y introd(cin! the conception of (niversal kinds, the Statesman co'pletes that of the Sophist y introd(cin! that of !oodness.

Fnce a!ain the stran!er sees a !ro(p fro' *hich the states'an still needs to e separated. &he task is co'pared to the refinin! of !old 3"#"d.e4, the separation of 'ore precio(s fro' less precio(s 'etals, *hat is of !reater val(e fro' *hat is of lesser val(e. &he aser i'p(rities have already een re'oved, so that everythin! that re'ains 3types of political episte'e4 is val(a le 3

4. &hese are the arts of the !eneral and the 0(d!e, and the royal rhetoric that is in the service of 0(stice 3"#"e."#4a4. 9By 'eans of '(sic *e '(st atte'pt to 'ake ;the states'an= clear,9 the stran!er says 3"#4a4. Hhen it is a 'atter of learnin! '(sic, or the handicrafts in !eneral, there is al*ays another science y *hich *e can decide *hether *e o(!ht to learn these or not, and that therefore !overns and r(les over the'.;$9= &h(s the science that decides *hether to (se rhetoric or force takes precedence over the science of rhetoric, and the one that decides *hether to 'ake *ar or peace s(pervenes over the science of 'akin! *ar. &hese eval(ational roles elon! to states'anship, *hich, in a different *ay, s(pervenes over 0(rispr(dence as *ell, for the 0(d!e is o(nd y the states'an8s la*s 3"#4 ."#>d4. &he hi!hest science is th(s distin!(ished fro' the technical sciences y its stat(s as a science of val(ation. -n the %epu)lic 3""$e."""d4 ,ocrates ar!(es that 0(stice does not in itself do anythin!? at est it !overns so'ethin! else that is an activity. -t *e insist on specifyin! a f(nction for 0(stice, it *ill t(rn o(t to e so'ethin! a s(rd, like the !(ardin! of 'oney *hen the 'oney itself is not in (se. 1ere, too, the stran!er has separated the states'an8s science of 0(stice fro' any specific kind of action. -t is the art that decides *hen ;$9= Hhy did the stran!er sin!le o(t '(sic in partic(larJ -s it a reference to '(sic8s role as a sens(o(s sy' ol of the divineJ 7 $$1 7 and ho* the others are to e (sed: 9&he art that is really kin!ly sho(ld not itself act, (t sho(ld r(le over those that are a le to act, reco!niKin! the ri!ht ti'e and *ron! ti'e to e!in and (r!e on the !reatest thin!s in the cities. <nd the others sho(ld do *hat it orders9 3"#Bc.d4. ,tates'anship th(s *eaves to!ether the other arts 3"#Be4. :(st as the *eaver oversees all the arts that are contri (tory to *eavin! and e)ist for its sake, the states'an oversees all these contri (tory arts of service 3e)cept the 9i'itators94, for they all e)ist (lti'ately for the sake of the polis. &he polis is their p(rpose, their reason for ein!, and therefore the (lti'ate referent of their val(e. <t this point the states'an has een f(lly distin!(ished fro' his rivals. 1ere, as earlier, *e can see that altho(!h the stran!er pretended that isective division *as no lon!er possi le, it co(ld *ell have een applied if he had chosen to do so. @i!(re 1> 3*hich incorporates the earlier isective classification of 9servants94 oth ill(strates ho* this 'i!ht have een done and !ives an overvie* of the states'an in relation to his vario(s rivals. &he states'an, it see's, is (lti'ately fo(nd *ithin the for' of 9servant,9 altho(!h this is never stated precisely. &he stran!er says only: 9B(t - don8t think - *as seein! a drea' *hen - said that so'e*here in this real' *o(ld appear those *ho 'ost of all disp(te a o(t the clai' to states'anship. 1o*ever it *o(ld see' to e e)tre'ely stran!e to seek the' in so'e s( servient ;

= part9 3$9# .c4. -t is not dear *hether 9those *ho 'ost of all disp(te a o(t the clai' to states'anship9 incl(des the states'an hi'self or only his rivals? (t since the states'an is distin!(ished fro' his

rivals only *ithin the last !enera, he '(st e present in the sa'e class to e!in *ith. < little later the stran!er says that the priest8s and diviner8s arts 9 oth are so'eho* parts of the art of service ; = . . . . ,o finally *e see' to 'e to have ca(!ht on to a trail that leads *here *e are !oin!9 3$9#d4. &he traditional kin! *ill e fo(nd in this re!ion as *ell 3$9#e.$91a ff.4? and if he is a servant, then so '(st e the states'an. &hat is not s(rprisin!, since the r(ler is in the service of the state 3the only tr(e 'asters, as the 'yth sho*ed, are divine: cf. $%4e.$%>a4. &he %epu)lic 'akes it clear that any practitioner of an art or science serves *hat the science is a o(t 31."4$c.d4. Hhether the class of servants is, in t(rn, to e fo(nd *ithin the class of ca(ses in !eneral 39contri (tory ca(ses and ca(ses94 or only contri (tory ca(ses *as, as *e have seen, a' i!(o(s. &he a' i!(ity is appropriate, for altho(!h on one hand it is clear that the states'an and 7 $$$ 7

@i!(re 1>. 7 $$" 7 those *ho' he s(pervises are related as pri'ary ca(se to contri (tin! ca(ses, on the other hand everythin! *as said to e a contri (tin! ca(se in so'e sense 3$6%d4. <ccordin! to the Phaedo the only tr(e ca(se is the p(rpose, the !ood, to *hich every other kind of ca(se is 'erely instr('ental 396 . 99c4. -n the sa'e *ay the states'an, altho(!h in one sense the a(thor of his instr(ctions, is in another sense an acolyte of the 'ean, and his activity is the trans'ission of the !ood into the city. &his final diaeresis is pro le'atic in another and 'ore f(nda'ental *ay as *ell. By distin!(ishin! states'anship as a science that s(pervises rather than acts directly, the dialo!(e has in fact co'e f(ll circle ack to the openin! steps of the first diaeresis, *here the science of states'anship *as differentiated fro' other sciences as ein! intellect(al rather than practical 3$>6d.e4, directive rather than critical 3$B# 4, and ori!inary rather than trans'issive 3$>6d.$B1a4. ,o'e of the sa'e lan!(a!e is even (sed. ,tates'anship *as distin!(ished fro' the prod(ctive or practical arts 3

, $>6d.e4 in step - of the shepherd diaeresis, and is no* distin!(ished fro' arts like those of the !eneral, rhetorician, and 0(d!e in the sa'e ter's 3 , , "#>d4Ieven tho(!h s(ch arts sho(ld not e a le to appear *ithin the re!ion that re'ained after step 1. -n step $, *here the states'an *as classified as directive, the *ord (sed 3 , $B# 4 is a for' of the ter' for 9to order9 3

4? here another for' of the sa'e *ord is (sed *hen the stran!er says that the practical arts '(st follo* the orders 3 , "#>d4 of the states'an. 1o* is it possi le that a division that e!ins as an e)plicit contin(ation of the shepherd division 3$6% 4, ends (p y s( s('in! *ithin itself the openin! steps of its predecessor and th(s !ivin! irth to its parentJ &his pheno'enon, of earlier differentia reappearin! *ithin later species that o(!ht to e)cl(de the', *as the esettin! sin of the e!innin! and end of the shepherd division 3step $, and step 9 of the shorter *ay4, and its '(ltiple appearance there no* see's to have een a foreshado*in! of its !rander 'anifestation in the *hole s*eep of the dialo!(e: not 'erely as a red(ndant step 3as in the shepherd division4 (t as a !reat circle. /arlier the stran!er had spoken of 9!oin! aro(nd in a circle9 3

, $6" 4 *ith reference to the *eaver division. &he *eaver division *as not in fact circ(lar, and the stran!er8s phrase *as nothin! 'ore than a hyper olic 'etaphor for takin! a ro(nda o(t ro(te. B(t it can e taken +(ite literally as a foreshado*in! of the fate of the states'an diaeresis, of *hich the *eaver diaeresis *as said to e a paradi!'. 7 $$4 7 &his circle is the 'ost e)tensive 'anifestation of the tan!les that *e have *itnessed thro(!ho(t the dialo!(e, and that ear *itness to Plato8s elief that no definitive 'appin! of reality is possi le. &he '(ltiplicity of *ays that thin!s are related to one another 'eans that any s(ch 'ap *ill e characteriKed y ar itrariness or inconsistency, or oth.;"#= &he lon!er *ay of diaeresis atte'pts to prod(ce 0(st s(ch a 'ap, (t that techni+(e can never e final, ho*ever '(ch it can e (sef(l. /ven in the Sophist *e sa* that the sophist can e defined in 'any *aysI*ays that lead to very different conceptions of his nat(reIdependin! on o(r startin! point and ho* *e divide (p the territory. He sho(ld not for!et that the Phaedrus , *here the 'ethod of the lon!er *ay is first introd(ced 3$B>e. $BB 4, is also the dialo!(e that 'ost stron!ly *arns of the i'possi ility of ade+(ately capt(rin! reality in *ritin!s 3$%>c, $%Bd4. Dather than there ein! a sin!le hierarchy of precedence and s( ordination, of pres(pposition and entail'ent, the overarchin! circle of the Statesman ill(strates that any place that *e e!in can lead (s to any other place, once *e kno* *hat *e are doin!. Plato *as never one.sided: he al*ays reco!niKed the i'portance of 'ethodolo!ical ri!or, (t he also al*ays reco!niKed its li'itations. 2ethodical ri!or is i'portant for leadin! (s o(t of the Cave, (p fro' ei$asia , the lo*est level of the Divided Cine, thro(!h pistis , and to 'astery of ded(ctive thinkin!, dianoia. B(t *hen it is ti'e to pass fro' dianoia to noesis *e '(st pass fro' the ri!idity of ded(ctive ri!or to so'ethin! 'ore fle)i le and fl(id. :(st as the r(le of the states'an s(persedes the r(le of la* eca(se la*s are too ri!id to apply in a nonar itrary *ay to the realities of life, so too the fl(idity of the shorter *ay of thinkin!, !(ided y the 'ean, s(persedes the ri!idity of the lon!er *ay, !(ided y the artificial ri!or of relative 'eas(re. &he relationships *ithin reality are too intricate to e capt(red in a for'al *ay. -n one *ay or another the li'itations of for'al and syste'atic theoriKin!, s(ch as *ere e)posed in the first part of the Parmenides , *ill al*ays ree'er!e.

<+ The Nature o( Virtue 4/7:e6/%%c8

9&hat a part ;

= of virt(e is opposed to a for' ; = of virt(e is very easily attacked y those *ho disp(te a o(t *ords, accordin! to the ;"#= Cf. :oseph 5ovak, 9Plato and the -rrationals9 3#peiron Gol. RG- ;196$= pp. %1.6> and Gol. RG-;196"= pp. 14.$%4: 9Plato is (sin! the operations *ith irrationals as a 'odel for esta lishin! divisions *hich are to ter'inate in definitions . . . ;:=(st as the e)act n('erical val(e of an irrational +(antity and the nonter'inatin! al!orith', so a @or' can never e definitively artic(lated on acco(nt of enor'o(sly co'ple) relationships revealed y a division . . . ;<=t $BB< the ,tran!er asks &heaetet(s and yo(n! ,ocrates to 'ake a division . . . 8 y the dia!onal and a!ain y the dia!onal of the dia!onal8 . . . &his reference to division y irrationals, eyond the o vio(s p(n, pro a ly 'akes reference to the *ay irrationals f(nction as a 'odel in division9 3$1.$4. 7 $$> 7 opinion of the 'any,9 the stran!er says.;"1= 5evertheless, he contin(es, it is dear that co(ra!e and 'oderation are often, in a certain *ay 3

4, fiercely opposed to each other 3"#Ba. 4. &he +(alifyin! phrase 9in a certain *ay9 is i'portant? (t it tends to e overlooked y those *ho see in this passa!e a diver!ence fro' the doctrine of the (nity 3or at least co'pati ility4 of the virt(es, fo(nd in the Phaedo and %epu)lic . -n fact there is no diver!ence e)cept no'inally 3i.e., for 9those *ho disp(te a o(t *ords94. &he doctrine contin(es to e 'aintained in the La s 39B"c.9B>d4. -n the Phaedo ,ocrates distin!(ished et*een the nat(re of co(ra!e and 'oderation *hen they e)ist in their ordinary sense and *hen they follo* fro' philosophical p(rification 3B6c.e4. Fnly in the latter sense are they tr(ly virt(o(s and (nified. <nd in Book 4 of the %epu)lic they are co'pati le only *hen they are defined in a very sophisticated *ay. ,o'eone is co(ra!eo(s *hen his spirited part preserves, thro(!h oth pains and pleas(res, the instr(ctions of reason a o(t oth *hat is to e feared and *hat is not . . . . <nd is he not 'oderate y the friendship and consonance of these sa'e parts ;the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive= *hen the r(ler and its t*o s( 0ects a!ree that the rational part sho(ld r(le and they do not re el a!ainst itJ 344$ .d4 &his conception of virt(e, like the 'ore specialiKed one in the Phaedo , is 'eant to reflect a philosophically p(rified condition, one in *hich reason r(les. -t is not intended to deny that in normal parlance *hat *e 'ean y co(ra!e is fearlessness and *hat *e 'ean y 'oderation is restraint, nor that these t*o are nor'ally in opposition. Fn the contrary, the %epu)lic too affir's that 9a !entle nat(re is opposed to a spirited one9 3"%>c4.;"$= -t is *ith these nor'al senses that the disc(ssion in the

Statesman e!ins, and the disc(ssion *ill, like its predecessors, point to a refined for' of these virt(es in *hich they are co'pati le ;"$= Cf. E(thrie >.191. 7 $$B 7 *ith each other. &hat they are not 'eant to e ultimatel! inco'pati le *as already dear at the e!innin! of the trilo!y, *hen &heodor(s reco(nted his s(rprise at findin! the' (nited in &heaetet(sI so'ethin! that he had not e)pected to e possi le 3Theaetetus 144a. 4. /ven in their nor'al senses co(ra!e and 'oderation are virt(es, altho(!h not (n+(alifiedly so. Co(ra!e is not the sa'e as recklessness, nor is 'oderation the sa'e as apathy. &hey are virt(es eca(se they are !ood, even in their (np(rified state. ,tates'anship, like any other art, can create !ood prod(cts only y (sin! !ood 'aterials. :(st as the other arts discard ad 'aterials and (se only the !ood ones, states'anship discards 9those characters that lack the po*er to share in co(ra!e and 'oderation, and *hatever other +(alities tend to*ard virt(e9 3"#6e4. &he others, *hich 9tend to*ard !odlessness, violence, and in0(stice, carried a*ay y the force of a ad nat(re, it re'oves y p(nish'ent *ith death, e)ile, and the !reatest dishonors ;

= . . . . <nd a!ain those *ho *allo* in i!norance and e)tre'e a ase'ent it yokes to the !en(s of slavery9 3"#9a4. 1o*ever thin!s 'ay stand *ith the art of diaeresis, it certainly co(ld not e said of the art of states'anship that 9it honors ; = all e+(ally9 3Sophist $$% ? cf. Statesman $BBd4. /ven tho(!h co(ra!e and 'oderation in their nor'al sense are !ood, and therefore virt(es, they are not co'pletely so. -n the strict sense they can e said only to 9tend to*ard virt(e.9 &he 'oderate type 9lacks drive and a certain sharp and active +(ickness,9 and 'ay even e si'ple'inded? *hile the co(ra!eo(s type 9is lackin! in 0(stice and ca(tion9 and 9inclines to*ards r(tality9 3"#9e, "11a. 4. &he states'an8s 0o *ill e to *eave these t*o nat(res to!ether as the literal *eaver does the *arp and *oof 3and in a *ay analo!o(s to the philosopher.kin!8s *eavin! to!ether of the appetitive and spirited nat(res4, and th(s re'ove their initial inco'pati ility.;""= ,ince the h('an so(l co'prises oth a divine and an ani'al part, there *ill e oth a divine ond and a h('an one 3"#9c4. By the divine ond the stran!er 'eans 9that *hen the really e)istent tr(e opinion, to!ether *ith constancy, a o(t the ea(tif(l, the 0(st, the !ood, and their opposites co'es to e in so(ls, it co'es to e as divine ;

= in a !odly ; = race9 3"#9c4. Hhen ;""= Benardete ".11$ s(!!ests that 9since the *arp, or vertical threads, *hich is kept distinct on the loo', stands to the *oof, or horiKontal threads, *hich '(st e packed ti!htly to!ether, as co(ra!e to 'oderation, the stran!er see's to i'ply that 'oderation '(st e adapted to co(ra!e and not vice versa.9

Pa(l @riedlOnder *rites: 9-s not the art of *eavin! as practiced y the tr(e states'an a copy of the *orld 8 o(nd to!ether8 y the la* of proportion 3Timaeus "1 et se9 .4, the 8livin! !ar'ent of the deity8J9 3".$9#.914. Cf. his n. $4 3".>$64 on the the'e of the 98*orld fa ric8 . . . in the eliefs of different peoples.9 7 $$% 7 this is present, virt(e is cons(''ated, and the co(ra!eo(s type 9is 'ade !enre and is 'ost *illin! to share in the 0(st thin!s,9 and 9the orderly nat(re . . . is 'ade really 'oderate ;

=, and *ise9 3"#9d.e4. -t is dear then that the kind of 'oderation that is opposed to co(ra!e is not 9really 'oderate,9 and the present analysis does not contradict in spirit those of earlier dialo!(es. <s in the %epu)lic , virt(e in the f(llest sense is possi le only in con0(nction *ith tr(th a o(t the !ood and ea(tif(l. &he human ond *ill e inter'arria!eIan ironic concl(sion to a dialo!(e that e!an y definin! h('anity as noninter reedin!. -nstead of 'arria!es ein! arran!ed as they no* are for the sake of *ealth or po*er 3"1# 4Ithat is, the lo*er levels of the tripartite so(lIthey *ill e arran!ed for the sake of virt(e. By inter reedin! the co(ra!eo(s and 'oderate types, the states'an *ill hope to prod(ce f(lly virt(o(s offsprin! in *hich oth +(alities are co' ined. &he trilo!y ends as it e!an, *ith the e)traordinary nat(re e)e'plified y &heaetet(s. -t is not i'possi le that the Theaetetus's dra'atic e'phasis on parents and offsprin! is a foreshado*in! of thisI (t only in part, since that f(nction *o(ld e (nintelli!i le efore the trilo!y *as co'plete. &he t*o types *o(ld not nor'ally 'arryIare nat(rally noninter reedin!Isince like is attracted to like? (t their '(t(al rep(lsion can e overco'e y 'eans of the divine ond. -f oth have the sa'e opinion a o(t the ea(tif(l and the !ood, then they *ill no lon!er e inco'pati le. &h(s the states'an *eaves the' to!ether y 9co.opinions, that is ;

=, honors, dishonors, opinions, and the !ivin! in 'arria!e of pled!es to one another9 3"1#e4. &his ondin! of the opposite te'pers *ithin the hi!her yoke of the state is a political version of the episte'ic 'ethod of hypothesis. /ach type, y itself, relies on a thesis *hose conse+(ences are in so'e sense dishar'onio(s. &he vie* that ra* co(ra!e is !ood cannot e reconciled *ith the fact that it leads to r(tality, in0(stice, and even 'adness 3"1#d4. <nd the vie* that si'ple 'oderation is !ood cannot e reconciled *ith its tendency to lead to passivity, si'ple.'indedness, and even to sloth and '(tilation 3"1#e4. &he one.sidedness of each hypothesis is overco'e y a hi!herItr(erIhypothesis or opinion a o(t the !ood, accordin! to *hich each of these appears only as a partial conse+(ence. 1ere, as in the Phaedo and %epu)lic , the 0o(rney can co'e to an end only *ith a vision of tr(e !oodness. &he 'ethod of division and the 'ethod of hypothesis conver!e in the for' of the !ood: the latter y the overco'in! of inco'pleteness, the for'er y the shorter *ay of dividin! y the 'ean rather than the avera!e. 7 $$6 7

!ha.ter Fi)e "n )er)ie?

%+ The Trilog* and the Pro2lem o( Value
<fter the criti+(e of the Parmenides , the theory of for's has een re.esta lished in its essential feat(res y 'eans of an i'plicit (se of the 'ethod of hypothesis thro(!ho(t the /leatic trilo!y. &he 'ethod operated, on one hand, ithin each dialo!(e: in the Theaetetus , &heaetet(s8s hypotheses a o(t the nat(re of kno*led!e *ere pro!ressively s(perseded y 'eans of the hypothetical 'ethod8s proced(re of testin! conse+(ences and seekin! a hi!her or 'ore incl(sive startin! point? in the Sophist the sa'e *as tr(e of the hypotheses of the 'onists and pl(ralists, and of the friends of the for's and the 'aterialists? in the Statesman the 'ethod of hypothesis led to the replace'ent of the states'an.as. shepherd hypothesis *ith the states'an.as.*eaver hypothesis, and the '(t(ally e)cl(sive hypotheses a o(t virt(e, of the 'oderate and the co(ra!eo(s citiKens, *ere replaced y one that reconciled their polarity. Fn the other hand, the 'ove'ent among the dialo!(es, too, *as characteriKed y the dyna'ic of the 'ethod of hypothesis: the Theaetetus fo(ndered in an atte'pt to provide an acco(nt of kno*led!e *itho(t reference to anythin! (t sensory partic(larity? the Sophist resolved this diffic(lty y 'eans of its theory of val(e.free (niversal 9kinds,9 (t *itho(t ein! a le to distin!(ish philosophy in its tr(est sense convincin!ly fro' the i'post(re of sophistry? and the Statesman acco'plished the latter y 'eans of the reintrod(ction of val(e, especially in the for' 7 $$9 7 of the 9'ean.9 &h(s the 'ethod of hypothesis contin(es to f(nction, as it had in the Phaedo , as an indirect approach 3

4 in the pro!ress to*ard an (nderstandin! of the nat(re of the !ood. -n the Theaetetus at its 'ost radical, *e *ere pl(n!ed into the 9sea of dissi'ilarity,9;1= the sensi le *orld8s *elter of partic(larity, *here not only are (niversal kinds a sent in favor of no'inalistic individ(ality, (t even individ(als collapse into rivers of ceaseless chan!e. <ll that e)ists are 'otions, not even individ(als, and even less (niversals. -t is a *orld fa'iliar to (s also fro' the second part of the Parmenides , *here (nity collapses into the fatho'less '(ltiplicity of the apeiron . Desc(e is possi le only if 9the sa'e9 can e fo(nd a'id 9the different.9 <ccordin!ly, the i'portance of the philosopher Par'enides, the apostle of the ,a'e, is stressed in the Theaetetus despite the a sence of any disc(ssion of his *ork. &he positive discern'ent of the ,a'e a'id the Different is the thesis of the Sophist . -ndeed, the diffic(lty for the Sophist is no lon!er ho* to acco(nt for sa'eness, as in the Theaetetus , (t ho* to acco(nt for difference, 9non ein!.9 &he discern'ent of sa'eness is the role of collection, *hich first affir's the inte!rity of individ(al instances, and then affir's the o 0ective reality of the +(alities co''on to diverse individ(als. X(estions that co(ld not e ans*ered *itho(t hypothesiKin! the reality of the ,a'e can no* e ans*ered as a conse+(ence of that hypothesis, even tho(!h the Sophist 'akes no e)plicit reference ack to the aporiae of the Theaetetus . &oday *e 'i!ht oppose the Sophist's line of ar!('ent y appealin! to the fa'iliar distinctions et*een 'etaphysical and episte'olo!ical, or lin!(istic, for', that is, et*een o 0ectivity and s( 0ectivity. 1o*ever tr(e it 'ay e that *e are constrained to or!aniKe o(r e)perience into sortal cate!ories, this fact 'ay tell (s so'ethin! not a o(t the *orkin! of reality in itself, (t only a o(t that of o(r oven

'ind, or perhaps not even that (t only a o(t the *ay lan!(a!e *orks. <nd there are so'e *ho challen!e even the necessity for lan!(a!e to *ork in this *ay, *ho e'phasiKe as '(ch as possi le the *ay sa'eness is per'eated y difference even *ithin lin!(istic str(ct(res. <!ainst s(ch challen!es no definitive defense is possi le. Plato 'ay point o(t that *itho(t (niversal referents neither lo!os nor kno*led!e is f(lly possi le, (t Kant and his s(ccessors 3like Prota!oras (t (nlike &heaetet(s4 *illin!ly accept the (nattaina ility of 9o 0ective9 3no('enal4 kno*led!e. Kno*led!e today is readily ackno*led!ed to e like a con. ;1= Cf. Statesman $6> . 7 $"# 7 str(ction, or even like a conversation, (t not like a 'irror. Co!os itself is not an i'a!e of so'ethin! eyond itself, (t 'ore like a pharma$on , a dr(!. -f s(ch o 0ections cannot e ref(ted, ho*ever, they can e deprived of the appearance of pri'acy, once it is pointed o(t that the o 0ector ass('es no less than the defender. Plato, it is tr(e, ass('es that o(r (r!e to*ard concept(aliKation reflects the str(ct(re (nderlyin! reality itself. &his is, in fact, a deli erate hypothesis 3Phaedo 1## 4, for he is *ell a*are of the li'itations of de'onstration. &he atte'pt to overco'e the hypothetical nat(re of thinkin! is a re*ardin! (t (nco'pleta le task. 2oreover, as the Statesman e'phasiKed, *hen *e try to reflect on the hi!hest, 'ost el(sive thin!s, analo!ical thinkin! 3paradi!'s4 eco'es indispensi le, and so philosophical speech carries *ith it an (navoida le 'etaphorical aspect, the li'itations and dan!ers of *hich *ere vividly displayed in the Parmenides , and reaffir'ed in the stran!er8s conde'nation of all i'a!e 'akin! as a for' 3ho*ever (navoida le4 of sophistry 3Statesman "#"c4. B(t if Plato cannot avoid 'akin! certain cr(cial ass('ptions a o(t the correspondence of the for's of lan!(a!e or tho(!ht to those of reality, it is no less an ass('ption *hen Kant or his s(ccessors insist that o(r episte'olo!ical or lin!(istic i'peratives do not correspond to the constit(tive principles of reality. &he hypothesis that Kant calls his 9Copernican revol(tion9 is defended only y contrast *ith the e'piricist hypothesis, and holds no advanta!es over the realis' of the classical philosophies.;$= &he sa'e is tr(e of the 'ore radical post.Kantian positions. &he s(ccess of 'odern science has allo*ed it to dictate the criteria of kno*led!e to a de!ree that al'ost no thinkers have een a le to escape. /ven those *ho least accept the !oals of 'ode' science find the'selves allo*in! it to define the ter's of *hat is possi le. Descartes 3*ho does accept the !oals of 'ode' science4 capt(res this spirit in his resolve to co(nt as false *hatever cannot dearly and distinctly e sho*n to e tr(e. -t follo*s fro' this that if o(r 9innate ideas9 cannot e proven to e tr(e of independent reality, they '(st e re!arded as &alse to it and 'erely s( 0ective. -t event(ally follo*s fro' this principle that if lan!(a!e cannot e proven to 'irror the *orld in itself, then it must e re!arded as 'ere conversation, inscription, and potion. ;$= ,ee 'y 9@irst Philosophy: 2etaphysics or /piste'olo!yJ9 Dialogue 11 319%$4 1.$$. 7 $"1 7 /ven 5ietKsche8s anti.Cartesian re0ection of the concept of 9tr(th9 rests on this Cartesian fo(ndation: tr(th is i'possi le eca(se certit(de is i'possi le. 1o*ever, these argumenta ad ignorationem *ere e)plicitly re0ected y Plato and <ristotle.;"= &hose thinkers *ere not (na*are that their o*n positions contained inde'onstra le ass('ptions, (t they *ere 'ore a*are than 'any of their s(ccessors that the alternative positions *ere no less hypothetical.

-f Plato8s position in part reflects a choice that he 'ade and can never 0(stify *ith 'athe'atical ri!orI a choice a o(t *hat diffic(lties he *as *illin! to live *ith in order to resolve othersIthe sa'e is no less tr(e of his rivals, ancient and 'ode'. ,(ch a choice is not 'erely a 'atter of 9aesthetic9 preference. &he +(estions of *hether there are in fact str(ct(ral for's y *hich *e or!aniKe o(r e)perience, and *hether s(ch for's are to e re!arded as revelatory of the nat(re of Bein! or only of the nat(re of thinkin!, 'i!ht e re!arded y so'e as co' inin! (ndecida ility *ith inconse+(entiality, and therefore acade'ic in the *orst sense of the *ord. 1o* *e ans*er these +(estions *o(ld then rest on nothin! 'ore sta le than the aesthetic taste of each individ(al. -f, ho*ever, the for's are for Plato no('enally constit(tive, and for Kant only pheno'enally constit(tive, and for others 'erely historical constr(ctions, these diver!ences are not self.contained hypotheses that are therefore inconse+(ential. &hey f(nda'entally affect o(r attit(de to*ard the *orld. Plato8s thesis is a po*erf(l advocacy for the priorityIthe hi!her value Iof the intelli!i le over the sensi le, and for a co''it'ent to increased spirit(ality and selflessness. < no'inalist position, on the other hand, *hich takes only individ(als to e real, leads 'ore nat(rally altho(!h not inevita ly to*ard e!ois'. <lternatives s(ch as spirit(ality and 'aterialis', altr(is' and e!ois', are reflections and conse+(ences of o(r eliefs a o(t the nat(re of !oodness, and its presence or a sence in the nat(re of reality. <s s(ch, they have i'portant i'plications for the nat(re and asis of 'orality. &hey are anythin! (t inconse+(ential or acade'ic. &hey are aesthetic only in the sense that the ea(tif(l is the sy' ol of the !ood. &hose *ho are inclined to dis'iss the Platonic for's asIat estI re!(lative principles of the 'ind rather than str(ct(rally constit(tive principles of reality 'ay *ell 'ake the sa'e char!e a!ainst the p(rported reality of the !ood, especially *hen it itself is called an -dea. B(t ;"= @or e)a'ple, in the Theaetetus 3164e.1>Be4 and De #nima 3".4.4$9 16f.4. 7 $"$ 7 in the case of the !ood it is especially clear that 'ore is at stake than choices ased on nothin! f(rther than personal taste. &he entire fa ric of 'orality is at stake. Pra!'atists, and others *ho deny any o 0ective tr(th to the concept of !oodness, ar!(e that it is 'eanin!less to speak of the real 3no('enal4 nat(re of thin!s. He can kno* reality only insofar as it enters into o(r conscio(sness, and *hether the reality that *e e)perience co!nitively corresponds to so'e 'ind.independent reality is irrelevant. -f, as Peirce ar!(ed, the meaning of a theory is the practical di&&erence that it 'akes, then the correspondence theory of tr(th is 'eanin!less: there is no *ay to see *hether o 0ective reality corresponds to o(r representations of it, so it is irrelevant to o(r ehavior, and conse+(ently *itho(t 'eanin!. <s lon! as *e confine o(r attention to episte'olo!y, this is a pla(si le ar!('ent. Hhen *e t(rn to the +(estion of val(e, ho*ever, the 'atter is different. 2any thin!s 'ay e decided y fiat or convention, (t not val(e itself, as ,ocrates points o(t in reply to Prota!oras8s pra!'atic ar!('ent in the Theaetetus . 5o one *o(ld say that *hatever a state thinks is !ood or 9advanta!eo(s to itself, really is so9 31%%d4. /ven for 5ietKsche, the s(stained atte'pt to re!ard val(e as a prod(ct of h('an creativity e)ists in perpet(al tension *ith an 9o 0ective9 preference for nat(ral val(e 3*ill to po*er4 over reactive val(e 3asceticis'4. &he tension is not a *eakness in 5ietKsche (t the 'ark of an intellect(al penetration and honesty that ref(ses to dis'iss the e)periential evidence of a nonar itrary factor in val(es, ho*ever a*k*ard that factor 'ay e for other feat(res of his perspectivis'. 1e co(ld easily have achieved !reater consistency y e' racin! a thoro(!h!oin! personal relativis', (t in order to do so he *o(ld have had to e a 'ore shallo* or less honest thinker. &he 'essa!e of the di!ression that !ro*s o(t of the a ove passa!e of the Theaetetus is that the standard of !oodness, in the li!ht of *hich alone s(ch 0(d!'ents can validly e 'ade, is the (lti'ate !oal of philosophy? and that it is so'ethin! *e need to discover rather than invent. 5ot (ntil

the doctrine of the 'ean is developed in the Statesman is the the'e of the di!ression f(rther ela orated. &he val(e of the doctrine of cate!orial for's can (lti'ately e esta lished only in relation to o(r (nderstandin! of !oodness. &his is tr(e not only in the ta(tolo!ical sense that val(e i'plies a conception of !oodness, (t also in the si!nificant sense that the 'oral i'plications of a *ay of interpretin! the *orld are the 'ost i'portant criterion for choosin! a'on! o 0ectively (ndecida le alternative interpretationsIa point that even Kant reco!niKed in the second criti+(e. 1ence the hy. 7 $"" 7 pothesis that the ,a'e has o 0ective reality, as *ell as episte'olo!ical force, is not treated as self. 0(stifyin!? its 0(stification points eyond itself. &he ass('ption of the reality of the ,a'e 0(stifies o(r tendency to classify entities, (t the very notion of etter or *orse classifications already i'plies the need for a standard of 'eas(re, and 'erely relative 'eas(re does not s(ffice. &he doctrine of the ,a'e can find (lti'ate 0(stification only if its (lti'ate 3and not 'erely re!(lative4 val(e can e esta lished. &he doctrine of the ,a'e lies ehind every kind of episte'e and techne, (ilt as they are on (niversal principles. 2oreover, as the /leatic stran!er pointed o(t, these involve not only (niversaliKation (t aspirations to*ard !oodness? *itho(t the 'ean they *o(ld e inconceiva le. &here *o(ld e no possi ility of distin!(ishin! skill 3techne4 fro' inco'petence, for e)a'ple, (nless o(r 0(d!'ent *ere !overned y so'e sense of *hat is ri!ht and !ood. /ven in the for' of 'ode' science episte'e 'akes (se of the val(e.laden he(ristic principle that reality sho(ld e e)plained in the 'ost rational possi le *ay. 1o*ever '(ch Fckha'8s raKor 'ilitates a!ainst teleolo!y in one sense, in another it pres(pposes it y enco(ra!in! rationally (nified 'odels over rando' and chaotic ones. -n this sense even the Timaeus can e considered very '(ch in keepin! *ith the spirit of Fckha'8s raKor. <n (nderlyin! 'essa!e of the Timaeus is that, i& the (niverse is to e conceiva le as rational and !ood, it can e so only at the level of inherent str(ct(re, that is, (niversal pattern, not at the level of individ(ality. &he $inds of thin!s that e)ist can e 0(stified, (t individ(al events cannot, since the real' of individ(ality is at the 'ercy of the errant ca(se, chance.;4= <ccordin!ly, the necessity of the reality of kinds follo*s for Plato fro' the post(lation of a teleolo!ical 0(stification of Bein!. &his 'eans that the 0(stification of the Sophist's post(lation 3a!ainst the Theaetetus 4 of the reality of kinds is (lti'ately predicated on the conception of !oodness inherent in the Statesman's doctrine of the 'ean. &he Sophist points eyond itself for its co'pletion, to*ard the States 'an and eyond it to the idea of the !ood that is only i'plicit in the latter. <n ar!('ent analo!o(s to this cos'olo!ical reasonin! appears at the 'icrocos'ic level. 2oral !oodness i'plies the overco'in! of e!o. ;4= 2any reli!io(s and philosophical traditions elieve that even at the level of individ(als a eneficent fate overrides 'ere contin!ency, (t Plato does not see' to have s( scri ed to s(ch a vie*I(nless one interprets in this *ay the doctrine of individ(al 9!(ardian dai'ons9 in the Phaedo 'yth. 7 $"4 7 centric desires in favor of intentions that are e+(ally concerned *ith *hat is !ood for others. &o achieve this attit(de 'eans to ai' at so'ethin! like the standpoint of the *hole, and for Plato o(r capacity for s(ch a standpoint is 9reason.9 :(stice, and virt(e !enerally, is the s( ordination of the e!ocentric desires for corporeal pleas(re 3appetite4 and po*er 3spiritedness4 to reason. Hhereas appetite and spiritedness operate *ith pri'ary reference to the individ(atin! ody, reason operates *ith pri'ary reference to the intelli!i le real' of (niversal and holistic for'. &he Sophist's pro0ect, of teachin! (s to

think in ter's of the sa'eness of (niversal kinds instead of the differentiation of corporeal individ(ality characteristic of the Theaetetus , can th(s e 0(stified on 'oral !ro(nds as *ell as episte'olo!ical ones: learnin! to see the *orld in ter's of the pri'acy of kinds over individ(ality is a *ay of overco'in! the standpoint of personal ias and self.interest. &he 'ean, y *hich the states'an eval(ates proposed action, is a standard that a stracts fro' every 'erely relative 'eas(re, and can e discerned only y one *ho has achieved the disinterestedness of a (niversal point of vie* 3altho(!h the application of the 'ean is al*ays to partic(lars4. &he dialectical 'ethods of the /leatic stran!er ena le (s to approach pro!ressively the state of 'ind that 'akes s(ch thinkin! possi le. 1ere a!ain, if *e ask *hether it 'atters *hich hypothesis *e adoptI the Platonic doctrine of for's or the Prota!orean doctrine of individ(alityI*e can point not only to the for'er8s s(periority in acco(ntin! for the nat(re of kno*led!e, (t, 'ore i'portantly, to its 'oral s(periority. -ts alle!ed s(periority in acco(ntin! for kno*led!e, taken y itself, 'i!ht easily e dis'issed y Prota!oras as nothin! 'ore than a self.a!!randiKin! pres('ption, since for hi' 9kno*led!e9 is si'ply an i!norant or pretentio(s ter' for 9opinion.9 -f Prota!oras can esta lish that *e can f(nction in the *orld y 'eans of opinion alone, Plato8s episte'olo!ical ar!('ent *ill carry less *ei!ht, for *orldvie*s 'i!ht e conceived 'erely as convenient concept(al sche'es, any n(' er of *hich 'ay have the sa'e pra!'atic servicea ility. &hey 'ay e re!arded as distinctions *itho(t difference, free.floatin! 'etaphysical spec(lation. B(t 'any of these *orldvie*s do nothin! to pro'ote an attit(de to*ard the *orld that transfor's (s 'orally, and several of the' pro'ote attit(des that actively disco(ra!e 'orality. -n s(ch cases the distinctions i'ply real and i'portant differences. -t is (s(al today to deny any connection et*een Bein! and !oodness, fact and val(e, is and o(!ht. 1eide!!er, for e)a'ple, dis'isses any s(ch connection in the stron!est ter's in his Letter on 5umanism , 7 $"> 7 and on this iss(e all 'a0or conte'porary philosophical traditions stand to!ether. -t is lar!ely for this reason that conte'porary 'oral tho(!ht is often acc(sed of displayin! an i'poverished !ro(ndlessness. Fnly fro' pra!'atists *o(ld Plato receive any conceiva le s(pport for his atte'pt to !ro(nd the theory of for's in the nat(re of the !oodIan ironic t(rn, since it *as precisely to co(nter the pra!'atis' of Prota!oras that the 'ove to*ard for'al kinds and (lti'ate teleolo!y ca'e a o(t in the trilo!y. -n fact only the second, 'icrocos'ic, ar!('ent *o(ld e accepta le on pra!'atic !ro(nds: if elief in the pri'acy of the intelli!i le and (niversal, over the partic(lar, fosters !reater 'orality, then there are pra!'atic reasons for acceptin! it. B(t Prota!oras and conte'porary pra!'atists can never in fact accept it, for it *o(ld lead to the eli'ination of their first principle, the priority of the practical over the theoretical. @or Plato, on the contrary, the theoretical is pri'ary, and for practical as *ell as theoretical reasons, since it is the stron!er !ro(nd of 'orality. :(st as the /pic(reans e!an *ith the life of the ody (t end (p *ith the life of the 'ind, a Platonic pra!'atis' e!ins *ith pra)is (t is led to theoria.

-+ @e*ond the Statesman

&he Statesman is not the end, (t only the end of the e!innin!. -t is possi le to ascend still farther, *e *ere re'inded: yo(n! ,ocrates has een sho*n only a li'ited version of the stran!er8s 'ethod 3$B$c4. Ho(ld the f(ller e)planation reveal to (s not only a 'ore co'plete portrait of the states'an, (t also the nat(re of the philosopherJ &he states'an8s 'ean *as only a principle of pra)is? it co(ld no 'ore e)ist *itho(t the arts than they co(ld *itho(t it 3$64d4. &he philosopher, y contrast, *o(ld e

concerned *ith a 'ore (lti'ate principle still, the (nhypothetical, independent so(rce of val(e, *hich is prior to any practical application. <t the e!innin! of the Sophist it is i'plied that, after investi!atin! the nat(re of the sophist and states'an, the /leatic stran!er *ill contin(e y investi!atin! that of the philosopher 3$1Bd.$1% 4. &his e)pectation is reasserted y &heodor(s at the e!innin! of the Statesman 3$>%a.c4, (t half a pa!e later the elder ,ocrates s(!!ests a sy''etrical pattern instead: he hi'self has already cond(cted an investi!ation *ith &heaetet(s as his partner? the stran!er had then done so as *ell? no* the stran!er is to cond(ct one *ith yo(n! ,ocrates as his partner, so, ,ocrates s(!!ests, yo(n! ,ocrates 9*ill reply to 'e after*ards9 3$>6a4. 7 $"B 7 5o* it see's that not the stran!er (t ,ocrates *ill lead the investi!ation into the nat(re of the philosopher. Perhaps this is another indication of the *ay that the stran!er8s approach e!ins to conver!e *ith the ,ocratic approach to philosophy d(rin! the co(rse of the Statesman . Perhaps, on the other hand, the a' i!(ity a o(t *ho *ill cond(ct the investi!ation is 'eant to s(!!est that the stat(s of the pro0ected dialo!(e is at least (ncertain. <fter all, the second 3"14a.c4 and seventh 3"41c."4$a4 letters tell (s that s(ch a pro0ect cannot e acco'plished, and sho(ld not even e atte'pted e)cept perhaps *ith the (t'ost ca(tion. 5o philosopher *as 'ore a*are than Plato of the self.overco'in! dialectic of philosophic speech. &he Parmenides sho*s ho* this is tr(e of str(ct(ralis', and the Theaetetus sho*s ho* it is tr(e of nonstr(ct(ralis'. <ccordin!ly, Plato8s dialo!(es al*ays have the character of *ithholdin! 0(st *hat they see' to offer. Plato8s o*n reticence, ,ocrates8 irony, the interloc(tors8 reservations, and vario(s literary devices contin(ally co' ine to deny definitiveness to *hatever is p(t for*ard. <nd yet thin!s are p(t for*ard, for any atte'pt to evade the dialectical tension of philosophy y refrainin! fro' assertion only res(lts in the no less pro le'atic tensions of skepticis'. &here is an (lti'ate dialectic for Plato et*een aporia and nat(ral val(eI(lti'ate in the sense that it '(st e preserved rather than overco'e. &o overco'e the tension in favor of aporia res(lts in 'isolo!y. &o overco'e it in the direction of f(lly deter'inate val(es res(lts in do!'atis'. &he difference et*een Plato and Prota!oras is not that Prota!oras alone reco!niKes the li'its of o 0ectivity, (t that Plato alone reco!niKes )oth poles of the inel(cta le tension of philosophy. &he investi!ation of the Philosopher *as perhaps never intended to e *ritten do*n in a dialo!(e, (t only presented as the i'plicit !oal of the Sophist and Statesman investi!ations. -t is a !oal that is necessarily left to readers to p(rs(e f(rther on their o*n. 5evertheless, there are hints that help (s to find a path on *hich to e!in. Consider the stran!er8s re'ark that the de'onstration of the 'ethod of division in the Sophist and Statesman is not f(lly ade+(ate. Hhat *o(ld it e like in its f(lly realiKed for'J 9-n the present circ('stances,9 he said, 9it is not possi le to 'ake it clearly evident9 3$B$c4. Hhat does he 'ean y thisJ -t see's likely that the li'itin! 9circ('stances9 3

4 refers to the li'its of yo(n! ,ocrates8 present a ilities. <s *e sa*, the application of the 'ethod see's tailored to one *ho has 'astered the first five dianoetic disciplines (t not dialectic. &he 'ethod, as (tiliKed in the Statesman , *as not i'pressive for its ri!orI 7 $"% 7 partic(lar divisions *ere often ar itrary 3so'eti'es avo*edly so: $69 4 and even contradictoryIand

*as hardly displayed in *ay that *o(ld 0(stify ,ocrates8 clai' in the Phaedrus that only a !odlike 'an co(ld perfor' it. -t *as to overco'e concept(al li'itations like those of yo(n! ,ocrates that the stran!er introd(ced the 'ethod of paradi!'s. 1is lan!(a!e *as re'iniscent of the %epu)lic's 9so(l *rit lar!e,9 and 'ore !enerally re'iniscent of the theory of recollection:;>= -t is diffic(lt, yo( divine 'an ;

=, to 'ark o(t any of the !reater thin!s *itho(t 'akin! (se of paradi!'s. @or it is as if each of (s kno*s all that he kno*s as in a drea' and then, like so'eone *akin! (p, kno*s nothin! of it at all. 3$%%d4 He can see a paradi!' of this techni+(e in the *ay children can e ta(!ht to read: &ake the' first to those cases in *hich their opinions *ere correct, and then take the' and set the' in front of the ones they do not reco!niKe, and y co'parin! the t*o sho* that they are the sa'e and have the sa'e nat(re in oth cases. 3$%6a. 4 &he sa'e kind of pro le' occ(rs in philosophy, and a si'ilar techni+(e 'ay e (sed to overco'e it: &o so'e thin!s there are y nat(re visi le likenesses that are easy to (nderstand, and that are not hard to sho* to people *hen, in response to a re+(est for an e)planation of one of the', so'eone *ishes to indicate it easily, *itho(t tro( le, and *itho(t a ver al e)planation. &o the !reatest and 'ost val(a le ;

= thin!s, ho*ever, there corresponds no i'a!e 'ade clear for h('an perception, *hich so'eone *ho *ishes to satisfy the 'ind of an in+(irer can display to one of his senses and s(cceed in satisfyin! the'. <ccordin!ly *e '(st train o(rselves to e a le to !ive and to (nderstand a rational acco(nt of each thin!. @or incorporeal thin!s, *hich are the 'ost ea(tif(l and !reatest, can e e)hi ited deafly thro(!h reason only and thro(!h nothin! else, and it is for their sake that all this has een said. B(t practicin! is in every case easier on lesser thin!s rather than on the !reater ones. 3$6>e.$6B 4 Fn the asis of this, the stran!er (ndertook an ela orate division of the art of *eavin!, as a paradi!' to help *ith the search for the states. ;>= <s ,ke'p %B points o(t, 9-t *o(ld see' that here ;$B> , $%%c, $6>e= in this doctrine of visi le likenesses *e have the late for' of the earlier doctrine of Decollection. &he visi le likeness helps the 'ind to co'prehend the @or' of *hich it is a likeness.9 7 $"6 7 'an. -t t(rned o(t that 0(st as the *eaver co' ines the *arp and *oof of the t*o kinds of *oolen strands, the states'an *eaves to!ether the *arp and *oof of the t*o kinds of s( 0ects. &he *eaver is a paradi!' for the states'an eca(se *hat the *eaver does is visi le in a sense that *hat the states'an

does is not. -n the case of the *eaver *e can easily see *hether he (nderstands the 'ean that leads to e)cellence in his craft, and *e can see *hether he is s(ccessf(lly *eavin! the *arp and *oof? *e cannot see these thin!s in the case of the states'an. 2ore to the point, *e can clearly see *hat the *eaver8s intentions and !oals are, (t not those of the states'an. &he paradi!' *as *ell chosen, for despite the difference in their visi ility *e can appreciate the parallel et*een the t*o endeavors, and th(s (nderstand the states'an y analo!y *ith the *eaver. Has this the *hole point of the e)ercise, ho*everJ Hhy *as the paradi!' developed y 'eans of an ela orate isective divisionIat fifteen steps y far the lon!est in either of the t*o diaeretic dialo!(es I *hen the techni+(e of isective division *as never to e (sed a!ain, either in the re'ainder of the Statesman or in any other dialo!(eJ Hhy did the stran!er not si'ply say that *eavin!, insofar as it is a co' ination of *arp and *oof, *ill !ive (s an i'a!e y *hich to pict(re the states'an8s activityJ Heavin! is not only the s( 0ect of the diaeresis, and a paradi!' for the art of the states'an, (t is also a paradi!' of the 'ethod of diaeresis itself: it is an inti'ate concatenation of co' inin! and separatin!, as the diaeretic 'ethod is an inti'ate concatenation of collectin! and dividin!. Perhaps not only the e)trinsic su)3ect of this division (t the very techni+(e of division itself is intended as a paradi!' of so'ethin! that cannot easily e 'ade evident to (s. -f the stran!er has not een a le to sho* (s the nat(re of division in its hi!hest sense, perhaps *hat he has sho*n (s here is a paradigm of a hi!her kind of division. &he 'ean to*ard *hich the states'an looks is not the sa'e as the -dea of the !ood, for the 'ean can e)ist only if there are arts, *hile the !ood is prior to all s(ch specification. &he states'an, in discernin! the 'ean, '(st do so in the li!ht of the !ood, (t he need not perceive the !ood directly. He '(st ass('e that this is to e *hat (lti'ately distin!(ishes hi' fro' the philosopher. <ccordin!. to the %epu)lic , once the dialectic of noesis has led the philosopher to an apprehension of the -dea of the !ood, then, 9han!in! onto the thin!s that han! on this e!innin!, it th(s descends a!ain to a concl(sion, 'akin! 7 $"9 7 (se of nothin! perceived y the senses, (t 'ovin! fro' for's the'selves, thro(!h for's, to the', it concl(des in for's9 3>11 .c4. -t is pla(si le that this do*n*ard 'ove'ent of noesis, *hich proceeds fro' the !ood to the s( se+(ent for's, is the cons(''ation of the 'ethod of division. Fr rather, that the 'ethod as portrayed in the Statesman 3and Sophist 4 f(nctions as a concrete analo!(e or paradi!' of this tr(e 'ethod. -t perfor's, at the prenoetic level of &heaetet(s and yo(n! ,ocrates, the kind of derivation of kinds that can e carried o(t ade+(ately only at the level of one *ho has attained the *isdo' necessary to the tr(e philosopher. -f that is the intention, then the stran!er8s 'ethod of division operates on several levels. 314 -t f(nctions as a (sef(l tool for classification and definition. 3$4 -t introd(ces the rid!in! concept of +(ality 3in a straction fro' val(e4 into the erst*hile e)cl(sively +(antitative dianoia practiced y yo(n! ,ocrates and &heaetet(s. 3"4 -t ill(strates the (p*ard path of the 'ethod of hypothesis or dialectic y the a andon'ent of the shepherd 'odal in favor of the *eaver 'odel of the states'an 3in *hich the concept of val(e 'akes its appearance in ter's of the 'ean4. 344 -n accordance *ith the 'ethod of analo!ical paradi!'s, it (ses this avo*edly inade+(ate version of the 'ethod of division to inti'ate to (s the cons(''ate (t as yet (nattaina le e'ploy'ent of this 'ethod, the do*n*ard path of dialectic fro' the !ood. Beca(se the e)hi ition of the 'ethod *as, y ad'ission, !reatly si'plified, it *o(ld e a 'istake to try to assi'ilate the %epu)lic passa!e very closely to the 'odels *e have een !iven in these t*o

dialo!(es. Fn s(ch a 'odel *e 'i!ht, for e)a'ple, have isected the !ood into intelli!i le and corporeal species, and the latter into active 3actin!4 and passive 3perceivin!4, and th(s derive y division the three 'a0or for's after the !ood, na'ely, *isdo', virt(e, and ea(ty. B(t these *o(ld e 'erely for'al divisions that tell (s nothin! of the content of the ter's. &he res(lts *o(ld e nearly as e)trinsic to the essential nat(re of the s( 0ects as *as the definition of 9h('an ein!9 in ter's of the a sence of feathers or le!s. &he act(al derivation of the other for's fro' the -dea of the !ood '(st pres(ppose a detailed insi!ht into the nat(re of the !ood, s(ch as not even the ,ocrates of the %epu)lic clai's to e capa le of. <nd the 'ove'ent in the Statesman fro' isective division 3relative 'eas(re4 to i''ediate division into n('ero(s species s(!!ests that a 'echanical ilateral division of the !ood, as ill(strated a ove, *o(ld never e satisfactory. &he tr(e relationship of the !ood to the 7 $4# 7 s( ordinate species of reality *o(ld need to e '(ch 'ore s( tle and n(anced. Ff the dialo!(es elieved to e later than the Statesman , the Phile)us is the only one in *hich the 'ethod of division is e'ployed even in a 'inor role. -n one place, for e)a'ple, 9lack of self. kno*led!e9 is divided into three species: *ith respect to *ealth, *ith respect to ea(ty, and *ith respect to virt(e? and the latter is divided into the t*in species of *eakness and stren!th 346d.49c4. -n another place a division is e!(n that 'i!ht al'ost have co'e fro' the Sophist , (t it does not last lon!. Kno*led!e is divided into kno*led!e of prod(ction on the one hand, and kno*led!e of ed(cation and n(rt(re on the other. Prod(ctive arts are then divided into the ine)act, like '(sic, and the e)act, like (ildin!. &he 'ost e)act of the arts, arith'etic, is ne)t divided into reckonin! *ith (ne+(al, concrete (nits 3e.!., t*o ar'ies, t*o o)en4, and *ith e+(al, a stract (nits 3t*o, fo(r4. ,ocrates o serves that the division can e carried at least one step f(rther, (t reaks it off eca(se it has already served its p(rpose, *hich is to sho* that there are p(re and i'p(re species of kno*led!e, 0(st as there *ere p(re and i'p(re species of pleas(re 3>>d.>Be4. 5either of these e)ercises in the 'ethod of division is very a' itio(s, nor is there any other e)a'ple that *o(ld 0(stify the hi!h e)pectations that the Phaedrus, Sophist , and Statesman led (s to have. -n another *ay, ho*ever, the concept of division does play a serio(s role in the Phile)us . ,ocrates says: <nd the ancients, *ho *ere s(perior to (s and lived closer to the !ods, handed do*n this sayin!, that all thin!s that are ever said to e co'e fro' one and 'any, innately possessin! li'it and (nli'itedhess in the'selves. ,ince this is ho* thin!s are ordered, *e '(st al*ays posit one -dea for each thin!, and seek itIfor *e shall find it in the thin!. &hen, if *e !rasp it, after one *e '(st look for t*o, if that is ho* 'any there are? (t if not, then three or so'e other n(' er. <nd a!ain the sa'e *ith each of those ones (ntil *e see not only that the ori!inal one is one and 'any and (nli'ited, (t also ho* 'any it is. He sho(ld not apply the -dea of the (nli'ited to the '(ltiplicity efore *e discern the *hole n(' er of it et*een the (nli'ited and the one. 31Bc.d4 &his is evidently a reference to collection and division: y collection *e discover the class in *hich the o 0ect is to e so(!ht, and then *e divide that class (ntil *e locate the o 0ect in the infi'ae species. ,ince *e are instr(cted to repeat the process *ith each of the ones *e discern, the 'ethod *ill event(ally lead to the parent of all -deas, the -dea of the 7 $41 7

!ood 3cf. %epu)lic B.>#9 4. Ulti'ately, then, the !oal is to e a le to see in retrospect the lines of division that lead fro' the !ood to all other for's, as had een ad(' rated in the %epu)lic . <ccordin!ly, later in the dialo!(e *e are told to positIas a f(rther division eyond li'it 3for'4, the (nli'ited 39'ateriality94, and their co' inationIthe ca(se of their (nion 3$"c.d4, and that can only e the !ood 3B4c f.4. <s ,ocrates introd(ces this (nifyin! conception, Protarch(s asks, 9Hhat do yo( 'ean, 'y !ood 'anJ9 3

, $"d4. &he 'ethod is not e'ployed in the Phile)us in anythin! like a concl(sive *ay: the dialo!(e ends *ith Protarch(s8s en0oinder to ,ocrates not to leave yet eca(se they have not yet finished 3*e are not told *hat re'ains to e done4. -t nevertheless has a cr(cial f(nction in the search for the nat(re of the !ood. By 'eans of the 'ethod of hypothesis, Phile (s8s hypothesis that the !ood life is the life of pleas(re, and ,ocrates8 hypothesis that the !ood life is the life of *isdo', have !iven *ay to the hi!her hypothesis that the !ood life is *hat co' ines *isdo' *ith pleas(re. ,ince this 'eans that the nat(re of the !ood life 'ay no* e conceived as a prod(ct of *isdo' 3li'it4 and pleas(re 3(nli'ited4, the 'ethod of collection and division, as descri ed a ove, can e ro(!ht into play in order to seek the (nifyin! ca(se of this 'i)t(re. ,ocrates concl(des: 9&hen if *e cannot catch the !ood *ith one -dea, let (s capt(re it *ith three: ea(ty, proportion, and tr(th. Cet (s say that *e 'ay ascri e the ca(sality to these, taken as one, 'ore correctly than to the co'ponents of the 'i)t(re. <nd thro(!h this the 'i)t(re itself has co'e to e !ood9 3B4e.B>a4. &h(s *e have fo(nd the -dea of the !ood, y virt(e of *hich the 'i)t(re of *isdo' and pleas(re constit(tes the !ood life. He have not, ho*ever, !rasped it as it is in itself, (t only in ter's of three aspects. -t is te'ptin! to think of this as the first division of the -dea of the !ood, a division into the species of ea(ty, proportion, and tr(th. &he first *e 'i!ht f(rther divide into nat(ral and artistic ea(ty, and th(s e led to the real's of eros and art? y 'eans of the second, to the real' of 'athe'atics, and y 'eans of the third to the real' of philosophy. B(t *hat of 'orality and politicsJ :(st prior to this, ,ocrates had said, 95o*, then, the po*er of the !ood has hidden itself fro' (s in the nat(re of the ea(tif(l. @or certainly 'oderation and proportion co'pletely correspond to ea(ty and virt(e9 3B4e4. Girt(e, ho*ever, is left o(t of the s( se+(ent tri(ne description of the !ood. -t t(rns o(t, then, that the division of the !ood into three parts is hardly definitive. 5ot only have *e not !rasped the !ood as it is in itself, (t even 7 $4$ 7 the three species in ter's of *hich *e have conceived it are to so'e e)tent ar itrary and inco'plete. 5evertheless *e e!in to have a clearer idea of ho* the 'ethods of division and of hypothesis 'ay, oth individ(ally and in co' ination, !ive (s !(idance and direction in o(r asy'ptotic atte'pts to !rasp the oneness of reality, and in partic(lar to !rasp the necessitatin! !ro(nd that alone can co'plete o(r (nderstandin! and endo* the *hole *ith val(e. Hhen Plato does atte'pt to !ive 'ore than a hint of content to the -dea of the !ood, he esche*s any for'al 'ethodolo!y *hatever, and resorts to the a' i!(o(s *orld of 'yth 3altho(!h even in the 'yth of the Timaeus there is an e'phasis on the for's of ,a'e and Different, *hich lie at the asis of the 'ethod of collection and division4.;B= -t *as 1e!el *ho (lti'ately atte'pted a ri!oro(s syste'atiKation of the *hole and of its necessitatin! principle. -ndeed, the dialectical 'ethod y *hich he did so ears a stron! rese' lance to the 'ethods of oth hypothesis and division. -t rese' les the for'er in its pro!ressive resol(tion, thro(!h hi!her theses, of the conflicts that res(lt fro' the inco'pleteness of lo*er ones. <nd it rese' les the latter in

its preservation of the lo*er theses, so that lo*er and hi!her are related to one another thro(!h lines of derivation and s( s('ptionIaltho(!h the *ay in *hich the lo*er are present in the hi!her is not the sa'e as the *ay species 3even the +(asi species of the Sophist and Statesman 4 are present in the !en(s. &he ri!or that 1e!el clai'ed for his (nification, ho*ever, is often elied y ar itrary steps *ithin the dialectic, and y +(estiona le ass('ptions at the ase of it. Plato8s avo*ed 'ythopoietic presentation reflects a 'ore realistic assess'ent of the possi ilityIor rather, i'possi ilityIof cons(''atin! o(r aspiration to*ard *isdo' *ith an episte'e of *isdo'. Dra'atically, the Timaeus is presented as a se+(el to the %epu)lic . &his is o vio(sly fittin! eca(se of the centrality of the creative po*er of the !ood in the latter dialo!(e. B(t the Timaeus is also the nat(ral se+(el to the investi!ations of the Phile)us , especially if *e re!ard the Timaeus 8s 'ythic presentation as an indication that the Phile)us has taken (s as far as is possi le thro(!h concept(al 'ethodolo!y alone. Hhether chronolo!ically it *as in fact a se+(el to the Phile)us is i'possi le to ascertain, (t (lti'ately the historical date of the Timaeus 'akes little difference. De!ardless of *hen the Timaeus *as *ritten, it re'ains the case that only (nder the cover of 'ytholo!y did Plato ever ;B= ">a, "Bc, "9a, 4#a. , 4"d. 7 $4" 7 feel co'forta le eno(!h to atte'pt to !ive content to his conception of the !ood. 1is fa'o(s lost lect(re on the !ood *as said to have een f(ll of 'athe'atics? (t *hether the 'athe'atics *ere any less +(alified y *hi'sy and aporia than those of the Timaeus '(st re'ain a 'atter of spec(lation. He cannot dis'iss the fact that he never p( lished it, and in this respect the *arnin!s of the second and seventh letters rin! tr(e. 7 $4> 7

@i2liogra.h* o( >orAs !ited

<ckrill, :ohn. 9Plato on @alse Belief: Theaetetus 16%.$##.9 The 'onist ># 319BB4 ">".4#$. III. 9Sg 2PL FK1 /-D6 5.9 -n Glastos, ed., Plato 3+.v.4 $#1.9. <llen, D. /. Plato's Parmenides . F)ford: Black*ell, 196". III, ed. Studies in Plato's 'etaph!sics . Condon: Do(tled!e and Ke!an Pa(l, 19B>. <nsco' e, E. /. 2. 9&he 5e* &heory of @or's.9 The 'onist ># 319BB4 4#".$#. <nton, :ohn, and <nthony Pre(s, eds. Essa!s in #ncient Gree$ Philosoph! , vol. ", Plato . <l any: ,U5A Press, 1969. Beck, 2a)i'ilian. 9Plato8s Pro le' in the Parmenides .9 Journal o& the 5istor! o& (deas 6 3194%4 $"$. "B. Benardete, ,eth. The Heing o& the Heauti&ul . Chica!o: University of Chica!o Press, 1964, 196B. Bostock, David. Plato's Theaetetus . F)ford: Clarendon Press, 1966. Brand*ood, Ceonard. The "hronolog! o& Plato's Dialogues . Ca' rid!e: Ca' rid!e University Press, 199#. III. 9&he Datin! of Plato8s Horks y the ,tylo'etric 2ethodI< 1istorical and Critical ,(rvey.9 $

Gols. Dissertation, University Colle!e, Condon. 19>9. Brisson, C(c. 9-nterprYtation d( 'ythe d( Politi9ue .9 Paper presented at the &hird ,y'posi(' Platonic(', 9Plato8s Politicus ,9 Bristol, <(!(st $>."#, 199$. Bro*n, 2alcol'. 9Theaetetus : Kno*led!e as Contin(ed Cearnin!.9 Journal o& the 5istor! o& Philosoph! % 319B94 ">9.%9. Br(' a(!h, Do ert. Plato on the +ne: The 5!potheses in the Parmenides . 5e* 1aven: Aale University Press, 19B1. 7 $4B 7 III 9&he P(rpose of Plato8s Parmenides .9 #ncient Philosoph! 1 3196#4 "9.46. B(rner, :ohn]Gree$ Philosoph!: Thales to Plato . Condon: 2ac2illan, 1914. B(rnyeat, 2yles. 9&he 2aterial and ,o(rces of Plato8s Drea'.9 Phronesis 1> 319%#4 1#1.$$. III. 9Prota!oras and ,elf.Def(tation in Plato8s Theaetetus ,9 Philosophical %evie 6> 319%B4 1%$. 9>. III. 9,ocrates and the :(ry: Parado)es in Plato8s Distinction et*een Kno*led!e and &r(e Belief.9 Supplementar! Iolume L(I o& the #ristotelian Societ! 3196#4 1%".9$. III. The Theaetetus o& Plato . -ndianapolis: 1ackett, 199#. Ca'p ell, Ce*is. The Theaetetus o& Plato . F)ford: Clarendon Press, 166". Chance, &ho'as. Plato's Euth!demus . Berkeley and Cos <n!eles: University of California Press, 199$. Cherniss, 1arold. 9&he Philosophical /cono'y of the &heory of -deas.9 -n <llen, ed., Studies 3+.v.4 1. 1". ;Fri!inally p( lished in 19"B.= III. 9&he Delation of the Timaeus to Plato8s Cater Dialo!(es.9 #merican Journal o& Philolog! %> 319>%4 $$>.BB. ;Deprinted in <llen, ed., Studies 3+.v.4 ""9.%6.= Cornford, @. 2. Plato and Parmenides . Condon: Do(tled!e and Ke!an Pa(l, 19"9. III. Plato's Theor! o& *no ledge . Condon: Do(tled!e and Ke!an Pa(l, 19">. Dele(Ke, Eilles]Di&&erence and %epetition . &ranslated y Constantine Bo(ndas. Unp( lished 'an(script. Des0ardins, Dose'ary. 9&he 1orns of Dile''a: Drea'in! and Hakin! Gision in the Theaetetus .9 #ncient Philosoph! 1 319>14 1#9.$B. III. The %ational Enterprise: Logos in Plato's Theaetetus . <l any: ,U5A Press, 199#. Diels, 1er'ann. Die Fragmente der Iorso$rati$er . Devised y Halther KranK. 1$th ed. L(rich: Heid'ann, 19BB. Dorter, Kenneth. 9@irst Philosophy: 2etaphysics or /piste'olo!yJ9 Dialogue 11 319%$4 1.$$. III. 9:(stice and 2ethod in Plato8s Statesman .9 -n ,. Pana!ioto(, ed., Justice, La and Philosoph! in "lassical #thens 1#>.$$. /d'onton: <cade'ic Printin! and P( lishin!, 196%. III. 95(ss a(' on &ranscendence in Plato and <ristotle.9 Dialogue "$ 3199"4 1#>.1>. III. Plato's Phaedo: #n (nterpretation . &oronto: University of &oronto Press, 196$.

III. 9,ocrates8 Def(tation of &hrasy'ach(s and &reat'ent of Girt(e.9 Philosoph! and %hetoric % 319%44 $>.4B. @attal, 2ichel. 9Ca diairesis dans le Politi9ue de Platon.9 Paper presented at the &hird ,y'posi(' Platonic(', 9Plato8s Politicus ,9 Bristol, <(!(st $>."#, 199$. III. 9Ce Sophiste: Logos de la synthWse o( logos de la divisionJ9 -n 5arcy, ed. 3+.v.4, 14>.B". 7 $4% 7 @errari, E. D. @. 92yth and Conservatis' in Plato8s Politicus .9 Paper presented at the &hird ,y'posi(' Platonic(', 9Plato8s Politicus ,9 Bristol, <(!(st $>."#, 199$. @ine, Eail. 9Kno*led!e and Logos in the Theaetetus .9 Philosophical %evie 66 319%94 "BB.9%. @o*ler, 1. 5. Plato .,tates'an. Coe Classical Ci rary. Ca' rid!e, 2assach(setts: 1arvard University Press, 19$>. @rede, 2ichael. PrLdi$ation und E,isten;aussage: Platons Ge)rauch !on 9. . . ist 9 und 9. . . ist nicht 9 im Sophistes . 1ypo'ne'eta 16. EZttin!en: Gandenhoeck and D(precht, 19B%. @riedlOnder, Pa(l. Plato . Gol. ". &ranslated y 1ans 2eyerhoff. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19B9. Eada'er, 1ans.Eeor!. The (dea o& the Good in Platonic.#ristotelian Philosoph! . &ranslated y P. Christopher ,'ith. 5e* 1aven: Aale University Press, 196B. III. 9Plato8s Parmenides and -ts -nfl(ence.9 Dion!sius % 3196"4 ".1B. Eallop, David. Parmenides o& Elea: Fragments . &oronto: University of &oronto Press, 1964. Eeach, Peter. 9&he &hird 2an <!ain.9 Philosophical %evie B> 319>B4 %$.6$. ;Deprinted in <llen, ed., Studies 3+.v.4 $B>.%%.= Eo'eK.Co o, <lfonso] 9Plato8s Description of Dialection in the Sophist $>"d1.e$.9 Phronesis $$ 319%%4 $9.4%. Eooch, Pa(l. 98Gice -s -!norance8: &he -nterpretation of Sophist $$B<.$"1B.9 Phoeni, $> 319%14 1$4. "". Eris*old, Charles. 9Politi$: Epist:m: in Plato8s Statesman .9 -n <nton and Pre(s, eds. 3+.v.4, 14%.B%. E(thrie, H. K. C. # 5istor! o& Gree$ Philosoph! , vol. >. Ca' rid!e: Ca' rid!e University Press, 19%6. 1ackforth, D. 9&he <viary &heory in the Theaetetus .9 "lassical /uarterl! "$ 319"64 $%.$9. 1arrison, :oan. 9Plato8s Prolo!(e: Theaetetus 14$a.14"c.9 Tulane Studies in Philosoph! $% 319%64 1#". $". 1icken, Hinifred. 9Kno*led!e and @or's in Plato8s Theaetetus .9 Journal o& 5ellenic Studies %% 319>%4 46.>". 1o*land, :aco . 9Dereadin! Plato: &he Pro le' of Platonic Chronolo!y.9 Phoeni, 4> 319914 169.$14. -r*in, &erence. 9Plato8s 1eracleiteanis'.9 Philosophical /uarterl! $% 319%%4 1.1". Kahn, Charles 1. 9&he Ereek Ger 8to Be8 and the Concept of Bein!.9 Foundations o& Language $ 319BB4 $4>.B>.

III. The Ier) 'He' in #ncient Gree$ . @o(ndations of Can!(a!e, ,(pple'entary ,eries, vol. 1B. Dordrecht: Deidel, 19%". Klein, :aco . # "ommentar! on Plato's 'eno . Chapel 1ill: University of 5orth Carolina Press, 19B>. III. Plato's Trilog! . Chica!o: University of Chica!o Press, 19%%. 2cDo*ell, :ohn. Plato: Theaetetus . F)ford: Clarendon Press, 19%". 2iller, 2itchell, :r. The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman . &he 1a!(e: 5i0hoff, 196#. 7 $46 7 III. Plato's Parmenides: The "onversion o& the Soul . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196B. III. 9Unity and Co!os: < Deadin! of Theaetetus $#1c.$1#a.9 Paper presented at the ,ociety for <ncient Ereek Philosophy, Dec. $%, 1969. 2ohr, Dichard. 9Disorderly 2otion in Plato8s Statesman .9 Phoeni, "> 319614 199.$1>. III. 9Statesman BECc.d .9 Phronesis $$ 319%%4 $"$."4. 2orro*, Elenn. 9Plato and the 2athe'aticians: <n -nterpretation of ,ocrates8 Drea' in the Theaetetus 3$#1e.$#Bc4.9 Philosophical %evie %9 319%#4 "#9."". 5arcy, 2ichel, ed. Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon . Bi liopolis: C.5.D., Centro di ,t(dio del Pensiero <ntico, 1991. 5eha'as, <le)ander. 9Epist:m: and Logos in Plato8s Cater &ho(!ht.9 -n <nton and Pre(s, eds., 3+.v.4, $B%.9$. 5e*'an, :ay. 9&he Decoil <r!('ent.9 #peiron 1B 3196$4 4%.>$. 5ovak, :oseph. 9Plato and the -rrationals.9 #peiron 1B 3196$4 %1.6> and 1% 3196"4 14.$%. 5(ss a(', 2artha. The Fragilit! o& Goodness . Ca' rid!e: Ca' rid!e University Press, 196B. Fehler, Kla(s. Die Lehre !ore noetischen und dianoetischen Den$en )ei Platon und #ristoteles . Lete'ata $9. 2(nich: Beck, 19B$. F8&oole, /. :. 9@or's and Kno*led!e in the Theaetetus .9 Philosophical Studies 19 319%#4 1#$.16. F*en, E. /. C. 9&he Place of the Timaeus in Plato8s Dialo!(es.9 "lassical /uarterl! , n.s., " 319>"4 %9. 9>. ;Deprinted in <llen, ed., Studies 3+.v.4 "1"."6.= III. 9Plato on 5ot.Bein!.9 -n Glastos, ed., Plato 3+.v.4 $$".B%. Pana!ioto(, ,piro. 9&he Conse+(ences of the Divisi ility of @or's in Plato8s Parmenides .9 Phoeni, "B 3196$4 4>.>$. Pascal, Blaise. 9Fn Eeo'etrical De'onstration.9 &ranslated y Dichard ,cofield. -n Pascal: The Provincial Letters, PensMes, Scienti&ic Treatises , vol. "" of Ereat Books of the Hestern Horld, 4"#."B. Chica!o: /ncyclopaedia Brittanica, 19>$. Polansky, Donald. Philosoph! and *no ledge: # "ommentar! on Plato's Theaetetus . Ce*is (r!: B(cknell University Press, 199$. Prior, Hillia'. 0nit! and Development in Plato's 'etaph!sics . Ca,alle: Fpen Co(rt, 196>. Procl(s. "ommentar! on Plato's Parmenides . &ranslated y Elenn 2orro* and :ohn Dillon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196%.

Do inson, Dichard. 9@or's and /rror in Plato8s Theaetetus .9 Philosophical %evie >9 319>#4 "."#. Do inson, &. 2. 9@or's, De'i(r!e and Horld.,o(l in the Politicus .9 Paper presented at the &hird ,y'posi(' Platonic(', 9Plato8s Politicus ,9 Bristol, <(!(st $>."#, 199$. Dochol, 1ans. 9&he Dialo!(e Parmenides : <n -nsol( le /ni!'a in Platonis'J9 (nternational Philosophical /uarterl! 11 319%14 49B.>$#. Dorty, <'elia] 9< ,pec(lative 5ote on ,o'e Dra'atic /le'ents in the Theaetetus .9 Phronesis 1% 319%$4 $$%."6. 7 $49 7 Dosen, ,tanley. Plato's Sophist . 5e* 1aven: Aale University Press, 196". III. 9,ocrates8 Drea'.9 Theoria 4$ 319%B4 1B1.66. III. 9Sophros!ne and Sel)st)e usstsein .9 %evie o& 'etaph!sics $B 319%"4 B1%.4$. Doss, H. D. Plato's Theor! o& (deas . F)ford: Clarendon Press, 19>1. D(nci'an, H. E. Plato's Earlier Epistemolog! . Ca' rid!e: Ca' rid!e University Press, 19B$. ,ayre, Kenneth. Plato's #nal!tic 'ethod . Chica!o: University of Chica!o Press, 19B9. III. Plato's Late +ntolog! . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 196". ,chleier'acher, @riedrich. (ntroductions to the Dialogues o& Plato . Ca' rid!e: :. ^ :. Dei!hton, 16"B. ,codel, 1arvey. Diaeresis and '!th in Plato's Statesman . EZttin!en: Gandenhoeck and D(precht, 196%. ,eli!'an, Pa(l. Heing and 8ot.Heing: #n (ntroduction to Plato's Sophist . &he 1a!(e: 5i0hoff, 19%4. ,ellars, Hilfrid. 9Glastos and the &hird 2an.9 Philosophical %evie B4 319>>4 4#>."%. ,hiner, Do!er. *no ledge and %ealit! in Plato's Phile)us . <ssen: van Eorc(', 19%4. ,horey, Pa(l. 9< Cost Platonic :oke 3Politicus $BB D4.9 "lassical Philolog! 1$ 3191%4 "#6. ,ke'p, :. B. Plato's Statesman . Condon: Do(tled!e and Ke!an Pa(l, 19>$. ,pr(te, :Nr!en. 9S er den /rkenntnis e!riff in Platons Theaitet ,9 Phronesis 1" 319B64 4%.B%. ,ternfeld, Do ert, and 1arold Lyskind. 'eaning, %elation, and E,istence in Plato's Parmenides: The Logic o& %elational %ealism . 5e* Aork: Can!, 196%. ,tenKel, :(li(s. Plato's 'ethod o& DialecticN &ranslated and edited y D. :. <llan. 5e* Aork: D(ssell and D(ssell, 19B4. ;Fri!inally p( lished in 194#.= III. Studien ;ur Ent ic$lung der platonischen Diale$ti$ von So$rates ;u #ristoteles . "d ed. Dar'stadt: Hissenschaftliche B(ch!esellschaft, 19B1. ;$d ed. CeipKi!, 19"1.= &aylor, <. /. Plato: The 'an and 5is 6or$ . Bth ed. <tlantic 1i!hlands: 1('anities Press, 19>$. &eloh, 1enry. The Development o& Plato's 'etaph!sics . University Park: Pennsylvania ,tate University Press, 1961. &ordesillas, <lonso. 9Ce point c(l'inant de la 'YtrYti+(e.9 Paper presented at the &hird ,y'posi(' Platonic(', 9Plato8s Politicus ,9 Bristol, <(!(st $>."#, 199$. &revaskis, :. D. 9&he

and the Go*el <nalo!y of Plato, Sophist $>".9 Phronesis 11 319BB4 99.11B. &(rn (ll, Do ert. 9&he &hird 2an <r!('ent and the &e)t of Parmenides .9 -n <nton and Pre(s, eds. 3+.v.4, $#".$>. Glastos, Ere!ory. 9Postscript to the &hird 2an: < Deply to 2r. Eeach.9 Philosophical %evie B> 319>B4 6".94. ;Deprinted in <llen, ed., Studies 3+.v.4 $%9.91.= 7 $># 7 III. 9&he &hird 2an <r!('ent in the Parmenides .9 Philosophical %evie B" 319>44 "19.49. ;Deprinted in <llen, ed., Studies 3+.v.4 $"1.B".= III, ed. Plato , vol. 1. Earden City: Do( leday.<nchor, 19%1. Hatana e, K(nio. 9&he Theaetetus on Cetters and Kno*led!e.9 Phronesis "$ 3196%4 14".B>. Hyller, /!il. Platons Dialog Parmenides in seinem 7usammenhang mit S!mposion und Politeia . Fslo: 19B#. III. 9Plato8s Parmenides : <nother -nterpretation.9 %evie o& 'etaph!sics 1> 319B$4 B$1.4#. Renakis, :ason] 9/ssence, Bein! and @act in Plato: <n <nalysis of Fne of Theaetetus 8Koina.89 *ant. Studien 49 319>%.>64 1B%.61. Aoh, 2ay. 9Fn the &hird <tte'pted Definition of Kno*led!e, Theaetetus $#1c.$1# .9 Dialogue 14 319%>4 4$#.4$. 7 $>1 7

IndeB o( Su2Cects
"
<na)a!oras, >6 <na)i'ander, >6 #peiron. See Unli'ited <ristophanes, 1$$ <ristotle, " , $B , >6 , BB , 6$ , 9" , 1#B n4B, 1"" , 14" , $#4 , $19 De #nima ".4.4$9a16f 'etaph!sics <.1.96# $%.961 1#: 6% n$", 1#$

<.1.96# $9.961a1: 61 <.B.96% $>.966a1: >6 n4" a .1.99" 9.11: 6$ n16, 1#B n4B B.".996a$1. 11:11> G .$.1##4 $$.$>: 1$# , 1%> G .>.1#1#a11.1":%" n1# L.".1#$9 ".1$:6$ n16 2.4:" 8icomachean Ethics , 119 , $#> n$" $.B.11#Ba$B. $6: $#" , $#" n$1 Parts o& #nimals 1.$.B4$ >.4.B44 $# 4.1#.B6Ba$%."$:169 Politics 1.$.1$>"a$ ." $.B.1$B4 $B.$%:4 <viary 'odel of kno*led!e, 1#1 .%

@
Beco'in!. See @l() Bein!, >4 .B4, 91 , 9" , 14# .B$, 1%B .6#, $"1 ."> Belief. See Fpinion Berkeley, 1$# nB" Blessed, -slands of the, 66 .69

!
Ca(se. See Contri (tory ca(ses? P(rpose Cave, <lle!ory of, "$ , "> , 6% .9, 119 , 1"9 , 1%6 , $#% , $$4 Circle, ar!('ent of Statesman as, $$" .$4 Collection, 1#$ , 1"1 , 14> , 1>4 .>>, 1B# , 16# , 19B , $$9 . See also Division, 'ethod of Concepts, for's as, "4 ."% Contri (tory ca(ses, $## , $#$ , $1# .1>, $$1 .$" Co(ra!e, $1 , $> , B9 .%$, 6% , $$> .$% Cratyl(s, %" , 9# , 9"

D
Definition, 14 , 1B n$4, $$ , %1 , %% , 11$ n>$, 11> .1%, 119 , 1"% , 14" , $1# Derrida, 9" Descartes, 9" , 1#B n4B, $"# Dialectic, 4% , 9$ n$6, 1#4 , 1#4 n4#, 1>1 .1B>, $#% .9, $"B , $"9 .4$. See also Division, 'ethod of? 1ypothesis, 'ethod of Difference 3dissi'ilarity, other4, >" .4n"9, >4 .B% passim , %> n11, 91 , 9" , 9% , 99 , 11# , 114 , 11% .16, 1$1 , 1"B .41, 1># .B$, 1%9 .6#, 16" , $#> , $#6 , $$9 , $4$ 7 $>$ 7 Dio!enes Caerti(s, > Divided Cine, 1% , "4 , 6% , 1#$ , 11> .19, 1"6 , 1"9 , 1%% .%6, $#6 , $19 n$6, $$4 Divine, 4 , 41 .4", B# , B9 , 6$ , 6% .66, 1$# nB4, 1$$ , 1"1 n6, 14$ , 1%6 .6#, 166 .96, $#$ , $#4 , $16 , $$# n$9, $$1 , $$B .$%, $"1 , $4# Division, 'ethod of, 1" .1%, %$ , 1#B , 11B , 1$4 ."B, 14# .41, 14" , 1>" .>>, 1%$ .6#, 16$ .9#, 19$ n1$, 19B .$$4, $$% , $"B .4$ Do,a: See Fpinion Drea', %$ , %6 .%9, 1#% .9, 19% , $$1 , $"% ? 39,ocrates8 Drea'94

E
/pic(reans, $">

F
@alsity, >1 , >4 , %> .6B, 9B .1#>, 1"B .4#, 1B$ .B>, $#9 @l(), %" .%4, %% .%9, 9# .9>, 11" , 11B , 1$1 , 14% , 1%9 , $$9 @or's, theory of, 1> .1B, $1 .4%, 9# .9B, 96 n"4, 1#9 n>#, 111 .1$#, 1$1 , 1"9 , 14$ .6#, $"$ .">, $"6 .$4" @riends of the for's, 14$ .>#, 1%% .6#

G
Eod3s4. See Divine Eood, for' of the, 1B n$", $1 ^ n", $4 .$B passim , 49 , >% , >% n41, BB .B%, 1B# .B1, 1%9 , $#$ , $#4 , $#% , $#9 , $$% , $"1 .">, $"6 .4"

1
1e!el, "> , $4$ 1eide!!er, 1% , $"4

1eracleit(s, >6 .>9, %" .%4, %% .%9, 91 .94, 11" , 14B 1er'ene(tics. See Can!(a!e? Hritin! 1ypothesis, 'ethod of, 1" .1%, %" , %" n9, %4 .%>, 1#B , 14# .41, 19B , $$% ."1, $41 .4$

I
(liad, The , 116 nB# -'a!e. See ,i'ilarity -ndefinite. See Unli'ited -nterpretation. See -nterpretive kno*led!e? Can!(a!e? Hritin! -nterpretive kno*led!e 3(nderstandin!4? %9 .6B, 69 .9>, 1$# -rrational3s4, %1 , 16% nB, 19$ .9", $$4 n"# -socrates, B , 6

D
:(d!e'ent. See Fpinion :(stice, 4 , $1 , $4 .B passim , B9 , 6B , 66 n$>, 69 , 1#% , 1$$ .$", 1"1 , 1"" , 14$ , 1>1 , 1>% n>#, 1%% , 19$ , 19> .9%, $#4 .$#>n$", $1B .$#, $$B , $"4

K
Kant, %6 , 9" .94, $$9 ."$

#
Can!(a!e, 9# .91, 1"% .4#, 14B , 1># .B>, $$9 ."#. See also Hritin! Ca*, 6% , 69 , 1$" , $1% .$#, $$4 CaKiness, $> , B9 .%1 Cetters and sylla les, 1#9 .$#, 1># .>1, 19% , $#6 , $"% . See also 5o(ns and ver s Cikeness. See ,i'ilarity Co!os, 1B n$4, 1#B .$#, 1$$ , 1B$ .B>, 1%" , $19 n$6, $$9 ."#

0
2aterialis', "4 .">, B# , %% , 14$ .>#, $"1 2athe'atics, " , %# n", %$ .%", 9$ .9>, 1#$ .B, 1#6 , 116 , $#% , $$4 n"#, $4# .41, $4" 2ean, 1B .1%, 69 n$B, 1"9 , 166 .69, 191 , $#" .$19, $$" .$4, $$% ."> passim , $"6 2eas(re, 69 , 69 n$B, $#" , $#% . See also 2ean and Delative 'eas(re 2eliss(s, 91 2e'ory, %# .%$, 61 .6", 96 .1#9, 1$> , 19$

2eno8s Parado), %# .%1, 9# , 1#6 , 11$ n>", 11> , 1%" 2id*ifery, ,ocrates8, %1 .%$, %9 .6#, 1#9 2oderation 3self.control4, 4 , $1 , 1$" , 1$4 , $$> .$% 2oore, 1% 2orality, $"1 .">, $41 2(sic, 69 , 11" , 11" n>4, 1>1 .>$, $$# , $$# n$9, $4#

N
5ietKsche, 1% , 9" , $"1 ."$ 5oncontradiction, principle of, %9 , %9 n1>, 6$ , 14> 5ot. ein! 3non ein!4, B4 .B%, 1"B .41, 1># , 1>B , 1>6 .B$, $$9 5o(ns and ver s, 1B$ .B>. See also Cetters and sylla les

Fckha'8s DaKor, $"" Fpinion, 1B n$4, %1 , %$ , %B , %6 , 64 .6B, 69 , 9B .1$#, 1B$ , 1B> , 1%$ , $"4 Fther. See Difference

P
Paradi!'s, $$ .$", $B , "% ."9, 4" , 11B .1%, 1%" , 161 n1, 19% , $"# , $"% ."6 Parenta!e, %B .%%, 94 .9B 7 $>" 7 Par'enides, "> , 4# , 46 .49, >B .>9, B4 , B4 n>$, B> , 91 , 1"B ."%, 14# , 1>9 , $$9 Participation, 4$ .4", 4> Pascal, 1$# nB4 Peirce, $"$ Po*er, 1$> , 14" .>#, 1B# .B$, 1%B .6# Pra!'atis', 6" .B passim , $"$ ."> Procl(s, 46 , 49 .>#n">, >" , >" n"6, >" n"9, >6 n4$, >9 .B#n4>, 14B Prota!oras, %9 .6B, 69 .9>, 9% , 1"% , 14B , $$9 , $"4 , $"B P(rification, 1#B , 119 , 1%" .%>, 19> , $$> P(rpose, 1B , $4 , 11> , 1$$ , 1B6 , 1%> , $## , $#$ , $#9 , $$1 , $$" , $"" .">

R
Dational. See Deason Deadin!. See Cetters and sylla les Deality. See Bein! Deason, % , $> .$B, "$ ."", "> ."B, B# , B9 , 6" , 66 , 9# , 94 , 1#% , 11% , 1$1 , 1$$ , 1"1 ."$, 14" .>#, 1%B .6#, $"1 , $"" , $"% recollection, $1 , $% ."1, 4$ .4", 4> , %# .%$, 6# .6", 9> , 9> n"4, 1#$ , 19% , 1#4 .9, 116 .19, 1%" , $"% , $"% n> Delative 'eas(re, 166 .69, $#" .1B, $$4 , $"" ."4, $"9

S
,elf.'astery, B6 , 119 , 1"" , 1%B ,e' lance. See ,i'ilarity ,i'ilarity 3i'a!e, likeness, se' lance, etc.4, $" .$4, "# , "% ."9, 66 , 91 , 9" .94, 114 , 11B .1%, 1"4 .41, 1>> , 1%$ .%B, 1%9 .6#, 19$ , $#6 , $16 .19, $$9 ."> passim , $"% ."9, $4$ ,ophists, 1B .1%, %" .9>, 1$1 .4#, 1>9 , $1> , $16 , $$6 , $"# ,o(l, "$ ."", "B , 91 , 111 .1$n>$, 11$ , 14$ , 144 .>#, 1>% , 164 , 169 .9# ,o(l, tripartite, 1% , $4 .$>, B6 .%1, 66 , 6> n$>, 119 , 1$$ ."4, $1B , $19 , $$> , $$% , $"4 ,ylla les. See Cetters and sylla les

T
&eleolo!y. See P(rpose &r(th, coherence, correspondence, and evidentness 'odels of, 1#> .%, $"1 ."$

U
Understandin!. See -nterpretive kno*led!e Universals, $$ .$", "1 ."4, 9$ .94, 1#$ , 1#4 n41, 11> .1B, 11% .16, 1$1 , $$# , $$6 ."> passim Unli'ited, >4 .BB, 1>6 , 19$ , $$9 , $4# .41

V
Gal(e, $ , $ n$, 1B .1%, $1 , $" .$>, %" , 64 .94, 11% , 119 , 1"1 , 14" , 1>1 , 1>9 , 1B$ , 1B6 , 1%# , 1%" .6#, 169 .91, 194 .9%, $## , $#$ .", $#B , $#9 , $1B .$6 passim , $"1 ."> Ger s, 11" . See also 5o(ns and ver s Girt(e, $"4 , $4# .41. See also Co(ra!e, :(stice, 2oderation, 2orality, Hisdo'

>
Ha) lock 'odel of kno*led!e, 96 .1#1, 1#$ , 1#4

He er, 1% Hhole.part relation, >> , >> n4#, 9" , 1#" n"9, 11# .$#, 141 .4$, 1>$ .>> Hisdo', 1B .1%, $1 , 41 .4$, 4B , B6 .B9, %4 , 6" .94, 119 .$#, $19 , $"> , $41 Hritin!, 9 .1", 4B .4%, $14 , $1% , $$4 , $$4 n"#, $"B .4". See also Can!(a!e

E
Leno, $" 7 $>> 7

IndeB o( Platonic Dialogues and Passages !ited

!
"rat!lus : 1>1 4"$ .d: 1"6 ."9 "99c: 169

E
E!th!demus $%"a: $> nB $9%e: %B n1"

G
Gorgias 449a: 1$" 4B4 .c: 1$" n" 4B%a: 1$" n$ 461 : 1$$ 491e: 1$" n$ >1%c.>16a: 1$" n$ >$1d.e: 1$"

#
La s : > .B, 1%B B>"e: 166 n6

9B"c.9B>d: $$> Letters : $4" $."14a.c: 4B , $19 , $"B %."41 .d: $19 n$6 %."41c."4$a: 4B , $"B

0
'eno : 4$ , %# .%$, 6$ , 94 , 1#$ 61c: 1#> 61d: %# .%1, 1#B 6>c.d: %$ , 1#6 , 19% 96a: 1#B

P
Parmenides date of: 4 .9 Phaedo : $$ , 4> , B6 , 66 , 9" , 9> n"", 1$1 , $#9 n$B, $$9 B>d.BBa: "B BB .e: 41 B6c.e: $$> %# : 1B# %4a.%> : $$ , "1 , "" , "6 , %6 , 1"6 n1B %6 : "4 %6c: $6 %9 .6# : 14% .46 6# : 11" n>>, 14> n19 6$d.6"e: 119 nB$ 6>e.66 : 11$ 9$e.94 : 14" 9Ba.e: $6 , B# 9Ba.1#>c: 16# nB4 96 .99c: 1%> , $## , $$" 99a.1##e: 14" n16, $19 99c: $1 n", 141 99d: 116

99e: 1#B n4B 1##a: 1" , $1 n", %4 .%> 1## .e: "1 , B# , $$9 1##e.1#"a: %> 1#1a: $6 1#1d.e: 1" , $1 n", %4 .%>, 16B 1#$ .d: "" 7 $>B 7 Phaedo 3continued 4 1#$ .d: "" 1#$d.1#>e: 1>1 , 1B# 1#" : "" 1#> .c: B# n4B, 16B Phaedrus $4>e: $1 n" $4Ba: 1" n1> $4%c ff: 6$ n1% $4%d: 4$ n$> $46d: 1#B n4B $49d: 4$ n$> $49e.$>#a: 1#> $>9e.$B#d: 1"> n1" $B>c.$BB : 1" , 1"1 , 1"1 n6, $1# , $$4 $%>c.d: 4B , $$4 $%>d.$%%a: $1% , $19 n$6, $$4 $%Be.$%%a: 4B Phile)us : " .4, 1% , 1%B , $4# .4$ 1$e.1"a: 1># 1"e: $1 n" 1>a: $1 n" 1Ba: 166 n6 1Bc.d: $4# 1%a: 16%

1% : 11B $"c.$> : B# , $41 $> .$% : B# n4B 46d.49c: $4# >>d.>Be: $4# B4c: $41 B4e.B>a: $41 Protagoras : 64 n19 "11e: 1$" "1"c.e: 1$" "1% : 1$" "$" : 1$" """d: 1$" "49a: 1$"

R
%epu)lic : B6 .B9, 9" , 1$1 , 1B9 n>4, 1%% .%9, 194 , 19% , $#4 , $#4 n$", $16 ""$e."""d: $$# """e.""4 : 1$$ , $#> n$" "4$c.d: $$1 "4>c."4Be: 1B% n># ">$d.">4a: $#> n$" ">%a."B%e: 1$$ "%$d: 16> "%$e."%"e: 1$6 n% "%> .%Bc: B9 , $$> 4"#e.4"1a: 1"" 4">c.d: 119 nB1 4"B : 6$ n1B, 14> 4"% .441c: 1"" 44$ .44"e: B6 , %# n>, 66 n$>, $$> 444 .e: 1"" 449a. : 6% n$4 4%9a: "6

>#4 : 119 nB1 >#>a.>#Ba: 1>1 >#B .e: "# n1>, 1B6 >#%a.>1%c: 116 , 1%6 >#%d.>#9c: 1#B n4B >#6e.>#9 : 1>1 >#9 : 1B n$", $1 , $1 n", $4 , 49 , >% , >% n41, BB .B%, 1B# .B1, $41 >#9c: 119 nB1 >1#c: $#6 >11 .c: 1" , $"6 ."9 >1Ba. : 6$ >1Bc.d: 6% n$", 66 >1%d.>16 : 6$ n16 >16c.>$1c: 119 >19a. : 119 nB$ >19c: 66 >$>a.>"1d: 9$ n$6, $#% >"$c: 1%6 >4"c.>44a: 6% n$4 >9Ba: 1B , $$ , 9$ >9Ba.>9% : 1%6 >9Bc: 1"4 >96 .c: 1"4 n1$

S
S!mposium 4" $#$c.d: B# $#$d.$#"a: B# n4B, 146 n$% $#"e.$#4 : 1B9 $#>e.$#Ba: $1 n" $1#a.d: $$ , 119 nB$

T
Timaeus 1% , BB , %4 , 1%B , 19$ .94, $"" $9a."# : $1 n", B#

">a.4"d passim : $4$ 4%e.46a: $4 n>, B# n4B date of: " .9, $4$ .4" 7 $>9 7 Co'positor &e)t: Display: Printer: Binder: E^, &ypesetters 1#/1" ,a on ,a on Bra(n Br('field, -nc. Bra(n Br('field, -nc.

Preferred Citation: Dorter, Kenneth. Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: The Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, and Statesman. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1994 1994. http://ark.cdli .or!/ark:/1"#"#/ft$199n%!n/