Principles of Philosophy, by Rene Descartes

Project Gutenberg's The Principles of Philosophy, by Rene Descartes #2 in our series by Rene Descartes Copyright laws are changing all over the worl ! "e sure to chec# the copyright laws for your country before istributing this or any other Project Gutenberg file! $e encourage you to #eep this file, e%actly as it is, on your own is#, thereby #eeping an electronic path open for future rea ers! Please o not re&ove this! This hea er shoul be the first thing seen when anyone starts to view the ete%t! Do not change or e it it without written per&ission! The wor s are carefully chosen to provi e users with the infor&ation they nee to un erstan what they &ay an &ay not o with the ete%t! **Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** **Etexts Readable By Both H mans and By !omp ters, "ince #$%#** *****These Etexts &re Prepared By Tho sands of Vol nteers'***** 'nfor&ation on contacting Project Gutenberg to get ete%ts, an further infor&ation, is inclu e below! $e

nee your onations! The Project Gutenberg (iterary )rchive *oun ation is a +,-.c/.0/ organi1ation with 2'3 42&ployee ' entification 3u&ber5 678622-+7Title9 The Principles of Philosophy )uthor9 Rene Descartes Release Date9 )ugust, 2,,0 42te%t# 70:-5 4;es, we are &ore than one year ahea of sche ule5 4This file was first poste on <anuary 22, 2,,25 2 ition9 -, (anguage9 2nglish Character set enco ing9 )=C'' Project Gutenberg's The Principles of Philosophy, by Rene Descartes >>>>>>>This file shoul be na&e pnpph-,!t%t or pnpph-,!1ip>>>>>>> Correcte 2D'T'?3= of our ete%ts get a new 3@A"2R, pnpph--!t%t B2R='?3= base on separate sources get new (2TT2R, pnpph-,a!t%t Pro uce by =teve Carris, Charles *ran#s an the ?nline Distribute Proofrea ing Tea&! Project Gutenberg 2te%ts are often create fro& several printe e itions, all of which are confir&e as Public Do&ain in the @= unless a copyright notice is inclu e ! Thus, we usually o not #eep ete%ts in co&pliance with any particular paper e ition!

$e are now trying to release all our ete%ts one year in a vance of the official release ates, leaving ti&e for better e iting! Please be encourage to tell us about any error or corrections, even years after the official publication ate! Please note neither this listing nor its contents are final til &i night of the last ay of the &onth of any such announce&ent! The official release ate of all Project Gutenberg 2te%ts is at Ai night, Central Ti&e, of the last ay of the state &onth! ) preli&inary version &ay often be poste for suggestion, co&&ent an e iting by those who wish to o so! Aost people start at our sites at9 http9DDgutenberg!net or http9DDpro&o!netDpg These $eb sites inclu e awar 8winning infor&ation about Project Gutenberg, inclu ing how to onate, how to help pro uce our new ete%ts, an how to subscribe to our e&ail newsletter .freeE/! Those of you who want to ownloa any 2te%t before announce&ent can get to the& as follows, an just ownloa by ate! This is also a goo way to get the& instantly upon announce&ent, as the in e%es our cataloguers pro uce obviously ta#e a while after an announce&ent goes out in the Project Gutenberg 3ewsletter! http9DDwww!ibiblio!orgDgutenbergDete%t,0 or ftp9DDftp!ibiblio!orgDpubD ocsDboo#sDgutenbergDete%t,0 ?r Dete%t,2, ,-, ,,, ::, :F, :G, :6, :+, :7, :0, :2, :2, :or :, <ust search by the first five letters of the filena&e you want, as it appears in our 3ewsletters!

(nformation abo t Pro)ect * tenber+

.one page/ $e pro uce about two &illion ollars for each hour we wor#! The ti&e it ta#es us, a rather conservative esti&ate, is fifty hours to get any ete%t selecte , entere , proofrea , e ite , copyright searche an analy1e , the copyright letters written, etc! ?ur projecte au ience is one hun re &illion rea ers! 'f the value per te%t is no&inally esti&ate at one ollar then we pro uce H2 &illion ollars per hour in 2,,- as we release over +, new 2te%t files per &onth, or +,, &ore 2te%ts in 2,,, for a total of 7,,,I 'f they reach just -8 2J of the worl 's population then the total shoul reach over 0,, billion 2te%ts given away by year's en ! The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give )way ?ne Trillion 2te%t *iles by Dece&ber 0-, 2,,-! 4-,,,,, % -,,,,,,,,,, K - Trillion5 This is ten thousan titles each to one hun re &illion rea ers, which is only about 7J of the present nu&ber of co&puter users! )t our revise rates of pro uction, we will reach only one8thir of that goal by the en of 2,,-, or about 7,,,, 2te%ts! $e nee fun ing, as well as continue efforts by volunteers, to &aintain or increase our pro uction an reach our goals! The Project Gutenberg (iterary )rchive *oun ation has been create to secure a future for Project Gutenberg into the ne%t &illenniu&! We need yo r donations more than e,er' )s of 3ove&ber, 2,,-, contributions are being solicite fro& people an organi1ations in9 )laba&a, )r#ansas, Connecticut, Delaware, *lori a, Georgia, ' aho, 'llinois, 'n iana, 'owa, Lansas, Lentuc#y, (ouisiana, Aaine, Aichigan, Aissouri, Aontana, 3ebras#a, 3eva a, 3ew

<ersey, 3ew Ae%ico, 3ew ;or#, 3orth Carolina, ?#laho&a, ?regon, Pennsylvania, Rho e 'slan , =outh Carolina, =outh Da#ota, Tennessee, Te%as, @tah, Ber&ont, Birginia, $ashington, $est Birginia, $isconsin, an $yo&ing! >'n Progress $e have file in about 7+ states now, but these are the only ones that have respon e ! )s the reMuire&ents for other states are &et, a itions to this list will be &a e an fun raising will begin in the a itional states! Please feel free to as# to chec# the status of your state! 'n answer to various Muestions we have receive on this9 $e are constantly wor#ing on finishing the paperwor# to legally reMuest onations in all +, states! 'f your state is not liste an you woul li#e to #now if we have a e it since the list you have, just as#! $hile we cannot solicit onations fro& people in states where we are not yet registere , we #now of no prohibition against accepting onations fro& onors in these states who approach us with an offer to onate! 'nternational onations are accepte , but we on't #now )3;TC'3G about how to &a#e the& ta%8 e uctible, or even if they C)3 be &a e e uctible, an on't have the staff to han le it even if there are ways! )ll onations shoul be &a e to9 Project Gutenberg (iterary )rchive *oun ation PA" --0 -G0: @niversity )ve! ?%for , A= 0F6++87-,: Contact us if you want to arrange for a wire transfer or

pay&ent &etho other than by chec# or &oney or er! The Project Gutenberg (iterary )rchive *oun ation has been approve by the @= 'nternal Revenue =ervice as a +,-.c/.0/ organi1ation with 2'3 42&ployee ' entification 3u&ber5 678622-+7! Donations are ta%8 e uctible to the &a%i&u& e%tent per&itte by law! )s fun raising reMuire&ents for other states are &et, a itions to this list will be &a e an fun raising will begin in the a itional states! $e nee your onations &ore than everE ;ou can get up to ate onation infor&ation at9 http9DDwww!gutenberg!netD onation!ht&l >>> 'f you can't reach Project Gutenberg, you can always e&ail irectly to9 Aichael =! Cart NhartOpobo%!co&P Prof! Cart will answer or forwar your &essage! $e woul prefer to sen you infor&ation by e&ail! >>

The -e+al "mall Print

>> .Three Pages/ >>>=T)RT>>TC2 =A)(( PR'3TE>>*?R P@"('C D?A)'3 2T2QT=>>=T)RT>>> $hy is this R=&all PrintER state&ent hereS ;ou #now9 lawyers! They tell us you &ight sue us if there is so&ething wrong with your copy of this ete%t,

even if you got it for free fro& so&eone other than us, an even if what's wrong is not our fault! =o, a&ong other things, this R=&all PrintER state&ent isclai&s &ost of our liability to you! 't also tells you how you &ay istribute copies of this ete%t if you want to! *BEF.RE'* /.0 0"E .R RE&D TH(" ETE1T "y using or rea ing any part of this PR?<2CT G@T23"2RG8t& ete%t, you in icate that you un erstan , agree to an accept this R=&all PrintER state&ent! 'f you o not, you can receive a refun of the &oney .if any/ you pai for this ete%t by sen ing a reMuest within 0, ays of receiving it to the person you got it fro&! 'f you receive this ete%t on a physical &e iu& .such as a is#/, you &ust return it with your reMuest! &B.0T PR.2E!T *0TE3BER*4T5 ETE1T" This PR?<2CT G@T23"2RG8t& ete%t, li#e &ost PR?<2CT G@T23"2RG8t& ete%ts, is a Rpublic o&ainR wor# istribute by Professor Aichael =! Cart through the Project Gutenberg )ssociation .the RProjectR/! )&ong other things, this &eans that no one owns a @nite =tates copyright on or for this wor#, so the Project .an youE/ can copy an istribute it in the @nite =tates without per&ission an without paying copyright royalties! =pecial rules, set forth below, apply if you wish to copy an istribute this ete%t un er the RPR?<2CT G@T23"2RGR tra e&ar#! Please o not use the RPR?<2CT G@T23"2RGR tra e&ar# to &ar#et any co&&ercial pro ucts without per&ission! To create these ete%ts, the Project e%pen s consi erable efforts to i entify, transcribe an proofrea public o&ain wor#s! Despite these efforts, the Project's ete%ts an any &e iu& they &ay be on &ay contain RDefectsR!

)&ong other things, Defects &ay ta#e the for& of inco&plete, inaccurate or corrupt ata, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual property infringe&ent, a efective or a&age is# or other ete%t &e iu&, a co&puter virus, or co&puter co es that a&age or cannot be rea by your eMuip&ent! -(5(TED W&RR&3T/6 D("!-&(5ER .F D&5&*E" "ut for the RRight of Replace&ent or Refun R escribe below, 4-5 Aichael Cart an the *oun ation .an any other party you &ay receive this ete%t fro& as a PR?<2CT G@T23"2RG8t& ete%t/ isclai&s all liability to you for a&ages, costs an e%penses, inclu ing legal fees, an 425 ;?@ C)B2 3? R2A2D'2= *?R 32G('G23C2 ?R @3D2R =TR'CT (')"'('T;, ?R *?R "R2)CC ?* $)RR)3T; ?R C?3TR)CT, '3C(@D'3G "@T 3?T ('A'T2D T? '3D'R2CT, C?3=2T@23T')(, P@3'T'B2 ?R '3C'D23T)( D)A)G2=, 2B23 '* ;?@ G'B2 3?T'C2 ?* TC2 P?=='"'('T; ?* =@CC D)A)G2=! 'f you iscover a Defect in this ete%t within :, ays of receiving it, you can receive a refun of the &oney .if any/ you pai for it by sen ing an e%planatory note within that ti&e to the person you receive it fro&! 'f you receive it on a physical &e iu&, you &ust return it with your note, an such person &ay choose to alternatively give you a replace&ent copy! 'f you receive it electronically, such person &ay choose to alternatively give you a secon opportunity to receive it electronically! TC'= 2T2QT '= ?TC2R$'=2 PR?B'D2D T? ;?@ R)=8'=R! 3? ?TC2R $)RR)3T'2= ?* )3; L'3D, 2QPR2== ?R 'AP('2D, )R2 A)D2 T? ;?@ )= T? TC2 2T2QT ?R )3; A2D'@A 'T A); "2 ?3, '3C(@D'3G "@T 3?T ('A'T2D T? $)RR)3T'2= ?* A2RCC)3T)"'('T; ?R *'T32== *?R )

P)RT'C@()R P@RP?=2! =o&e states o not allow isclai&ers of i&plie warranties or the e%clusion or li&itation of conseMuential a&ages, so the above isclai&ers an e%clusions &ay not apply to you, an you &ay have other legal rights! (3DE53(T/ ;ou will in e&nify an hol Aichael Cart, the *oun ation, an its trustees an agents, an any volunteers associate with the pro uction an istribution of Project Gutenberg8t& te%ts har&less, fro& all liability, cost an e%pense, inclu ing legal fees, that arise irectly or in irectly fro& any of the following that you o or cause9 4-5 istribution of this ete%t, 425 alteration, &o ification, or a ition to the ete%t, or 405 any Defect! D("TR(B0T(.3 03DER 7PR.2E!T *0TE3BER*4tm7 ;ou &ay istribute copies of this ete%t electronically, or by is#, boo# or any other &e iu& if you either elete this R=&all PrintER an all other references to Project Gutenberg, or9 4-5 ?nly give e%act copies of it! )&ong other things, this reMuires that you o not re&ove, alter or &o ify the ete%t or this Rs&all printER state&ent! ;ou &ay however, if you wish, istribute this ete%t in &achine rea able binary, co&presse , &ar#8up, or proprietary for&, inclu ing any for& resulting fro& conversion by wor processing or hyperte%t software, but only so long as >2'TC2R>9 4>5 The ete%t, when isplaye , is clearly rea able, an oes >not> contain characters other than those inten e by the author of the wor#, although til e .U/, asteris# .>/ an un erline .i/ characters &ay be use to convey

punctuation inten e by the author, an a itional characters &ay be use to in icate hyperte%t lin#sV ?R 4>5 The ete%t &ay be rea ily converte by the rea er at no e%pense into plain )=C'', 2"CD'C or eMuivalent for& by the progra& that isplays the ete%t .as is the case, for instance, with &ost wor processors/V ?R 4>5 ;ou provi e, or agree to also provi e on reMuest at no a itional cost, fee or e%pense, a copy of the ete%t in its original plain )=C'' for& .or in 2"CD'C or other eMuivalent proprietary for&/! 425 Conor the ete%t refun an replace&ent provisions of this R=&all PrintER state&ent! 405 Pay a tra e&ar# license fee to the *oun ation of 2,J of the gross profits you erive calculate using the &etho you alrea y use to calculate your applicable ta%es! 'f you on't erive profits, no royalty is ue! Royalties are payable to RProject Gutenberg (iterary )rchive *oun ationR the 6, ays following each ate you prepare .or were legally reMuire to prepare/ your annual .or eMuivalent perio ic/ ta% return! Please contact us beforehan to let us #now your plans an to wor# out the etails! WH&T (F /.0 *W&3T* T. "E3D 5.3E/ EVE3 (F /.0 D.38T H&VE T.9 Project Gutenberg is e icate to increasing the nu&ber of public o&ain an license wor#s that can be freely istribute in &achine rea able for&! The Project gratefully accepts contributions of &oney, ti&e, public o&ain &aterials, or royalty free copyright licenses! Aoney shoul be pai to the9 RProject Gutenberg (iterary )rchive *oun ation!R

'f you are intereste in contributing scanning eMuip&ent or software or other ite&s, please contact Aichael Cart at9 hartOpobo%!co& 4Portions of this hea er are copyright .C/ 2,,- by Aichael =! Cart an &ay be reprinte only when these 2te%ts are free of all fees!5 4Project Gutenberg is a Tra eAar# an &ay not be use in any sales of Project Gutenberg 2te%ts or other &aterials be they har ware or software or any other relate pro uct without e%press per&ission!5 >23D TC2 =A)(( PR'3TE *?R P@"('C D?A)'3 2T2QT=>Ber!-,D,7D,->23D> Pro uce by =teve Carris, Charles *ran#s an the ?nline Distribute Proofrea ing Tea&! =2(2CT'?3= *R?A TC2 PR'3C'P(2= ?* PC'(?=?PC; ?* R232 D2=C)RT2= .-+:68-6+,/ TR)3=()T2D "; <?C3 B2'TCC, ((! D! ()T2 PR?*2==?R ?* (?G'C )3D RC2T?R'C '3 TC2 @3'B2R='T; ?* G()=G?$ *ro& the Publisher's Preface! The present volu&e contains a reprint of the preface an the first part of the Principles of Philosophy, together with selections fro& the secon , thir an fourth parts of that wor#, correspon ing to the e%tracts in the *rench

e ition of Ga&ier, are also given, as well as an appen i% containing part of Descartes' reply to the =econ ?bjections .vi1!, his for&al e&onstrations of the e%istence of Deity/! The translation is base on the original (atin e ition of the Principles, publishe in -677! The wor# ha been translate into *rench uring Descartes' lifeti&e, an personally revise an correcte by hi&, the *rench te%t is evi ently eserving of the sa&e consi eration as the (atin originals, an conseMuently, the a itions an variations of the *rench version have also been given88the a itions being put in sMuare brac#ets in the te%t an the variations in the footnotes! ) copy of the title8page of the original e ition, as given in Dr! C! Guttler's wor# .Aunich9 C! C! "ec#! -:,-/, are also repro uce in the present volu&e! =2(2CT'?3= *R?A TC2 PR'3C'P(2= ?* PC'(?=?PC; ?* D2=C)RT2= TR)3=()T2D *R?A TC2 ()T'3 )3D C?(()T2D $'TC TC2 *R23CC (2TT2R ?* TC2 )@TC?R T? TC2 *R23CC TR)3=()T?R ?* TC2 PR'3C'P(2= ?* PC'(?=?PC; =2RB'3G *?R ) PR2*)C2! =ir,88The version of &y principles which you have been at pains to &a#e, is so elegant an finishe as to lea &e to e%pect that the wor# will be &ore generally rea in *rench than in (atin, an better un erstoo ! The only

apprehension ' entertain is lest the title shoul eter so&e who have not been brought up to letters, or with who& philosophy is in ba repute, because the #in they were taught has prove unsatisfactoryV an this &a#es &e thin# that it will be useful to a a preface to it for the purpose of showing what the A)TT2R of the wor# is, what 23D ' ha in view in writing it, an what @T'('T; &ay be erive fro& it! "ut although it &ight be &y part to write a preface of this nature, seeing ' ought to #now those particulars better than any other person, ' cannot nevertheless prevail upon &yself to o anything &ore than &erely to give a su&&ary of the chief points that fall, as ' thin#, to be iscusse in it9 an ' leave it to your iscretion to present to the public such part of the& as you shall ju ge proper! ' shoul have esire , in the first place, to e%plain in it what philosophy is, by co&&encing with the &ost co&&on &atters, as, for e%a&ple, that the wor PC'(?=?PC; signifies the stu y of wis o&, an that by wis o& is to be un erstoo not &erely pru ence in the &anage&ent of affairs, but a perfect #nowle ge of all that &an can #now, as well for the con uct of his life as for the preservation of his health an the iscovery of all the arts, an that #nowle ge to subserve these en s &ust necessarily be e uce fro& first causesV so that in or er to stu y the acMuisition of it .which is properly calle philosophi1ing/, we &ust co&&ence with the investigation of those first causes which are calle PR'3C'P(2=! 3ow these principles &ust possess T$? C?3D'T'?3=9 in the first place, they &ust be so clear an evi ent that the hu&an &in , when it attentively consi ers the&, cannot oubt of their truthV in the secon place, the #nowle ge of other things &ust be so epen ent on the& as that though the principles the&selves &ay in ee be #nown apart fro& what epen s on the&, the latter cannot nevertheless be

#nown apart fro& the for&er! 't will accor ingly be necessary thereafter to en eavour so to e uce fro& those principles the #nowle ge of the things that epen on the&, as that there &ay be nothing in the whole series of e uctions which is not perfectly &anifest! Go is in truth the only being who is absolutely wise, that is, who possesses a perfect #nowle ge of all thingsV but we &ay say that &en are &ore or less wise as their #nowle ge of the &ost i&portant truths is greater or less! )n ' a& confi ent that there is nothing, in what ' have now sai , in which all the learne o not concur! ' shoul , in the ne%t place, have propose to consi er the utility of philosophy, an at the sa&e ti&e have shown that, since it e&braces all that the hu&an &in can #now, we ought to believe that it is by it we are istinguishe fro& savages an barbarians, an that the civilisation an culture of a nation is regulate by the egree in which true philosophy nourishes in it, an , accor ingly, that to contain true philosophers is the highest privilege a state can enjoy! "esi es this, ' shoul have shown that, as regar s in ivi uals, it is not only useful for each &an to have intercourse with those who apply the&selves to this stu y, but that it is inco&parably better he shoul hi&self irect his attention to itV just as it is oubtless to be preferre that a &an shoul &a#e use of his own eyes to irect his steps, an enjoy by &eans of the sa&e the beauties of colour an light, than that he shoul blin ly follow the gui ance of anotherV though the latter course is certainly better than to have the eyes close with no gui e e%cept one's self! "ut to live without philosophi1ing is in truth the sa&e as #eeping the eyes close without atte&pting to open the&V an the pleasure of seeing all that sight iscloses is not to be co&pare with the satisfaction affor e by the iscoveries of philosophy! )n , finally, this stu y is &ore i&peratively reMuisite for the

regulation of our &anners, an for con ucting us through life, than is the use of our eyes for irecting our steps! The brutes, which have only their bo ies to conserve, are continually occupie in see#ing sources of nourish&entV but &en, of who& the chief part is the &in , ought to &a#e the search after wis o& their principal care, for wis o& is the true nourish&ent of the &in V an ' feel assure , &oreover, that there are very &any who woul not fail in the search, if they woul but hope for success in it, an #new the egree of their capabilities for it! There is no &in , how ignoble soever it be, which re&ains so fir&ly boun up in the objects of the senses, as not so&eti&e or other to turn itself away fro& the& in the aspiration after so&e higher goo , although not #nowing freMuently wherein that goo consists! The greatest favourites of fortune88those who have health, honours, an riches in abun ance88 are not &ore e%e&pt fro& aspirations of this nature than othersV nay, ' a& persua e that these are the persons who sigh the &ost eeply after another goo greater an &ore perfect still than any they alrea y possess! "ut the supre&e goo , consi ere by natural reason without the light of faith, is nothing &ore than the #nowle ge of truth through its first causes, in other wor s, the wis o& of which philosophy is the stu y! )n , as all these particulars are in isputably true, all that is reMuire to gain assent to their truth is that they be well state ! "ut as one is restraine fro& assenting to these octrines by e%perience, which shows that they who &a#e pretensions to philosophy are often less wise an reasonable than others who never applie the&selves to the stu y, ' shoul have here shortly e%plaine wherein consists all the science we now possess, an what are the egrees of wis o& at which we have arrive ! The first egree contains only notions so clear of the&selves that they can be acMuire without &e itationV the

secon co&prehen s all that the e%perience of the senses ictatesV the thir , that which the conversation of other &en teaches usV to which &ay be a e as the fourth, the rea ing, not of all boo#s, but especially of such as have been written by persons capable of conveying proper instruction, for it is a species of conversation we hol with their authors! )n it see&s to &e that all the wis o& we in or inary possess is acMuire only in these four waysV for ' o not class ivine revelation a&ong the&, because it oes not con uct us by egrees, but elevates us at once to an infallible faith! There have been, in ee , in all ages great &in s who en eavoure to fin a fifth roa to wis o&, inco&parably &ore sure an elevate than the other four! The path they essaye was the search of first causes an true principles, fro& which &ight be e uce the reasons of all that can be #nown by &anV an it is to the& the appellation of philosophers has been &ore especially accor e ! ' a& not aware that there is any one of the& up to the present who has succee e in this enterprise! The first an chief whose writings we possess are Plato an )ristotle, between who& there was no ifference, e%cept that the for&er, following in the footsteps of his &aster, =ocrates, ingenuously confesse that he ha never yet been able to fin anything certain, an that he was contente to write what see&e to hi& probable, i&agining, for this en , certain principles by which he en eavoure to account for the other things! )ristotle, on the other han , characterise by less can our, although for twenty years the isciple of Plato, an with no principles beyon those of his &aster, co&pletely reverse his &o e of putting the&, an propose as true an certain what it is probable he hi&self never estee&e as such! "ut these two &en ha acMuire &uch ju g&ent an wis o& by the four prece ing &eans, Mualities which raise their

authority very high, so &uch so that those who succee e the& were willing rather to acMuiesce in their opinions, than to see# better for the&selves! The chief Muestion a&ong their isciples, however, was as to whether we ought to oubt of all things or hol so&e as certain,88a ispute which le the& on both si es into e%travagant errorsV for a part of those who were for oubt, e%ten e it even to the actions of life, to the neglect of the &ost or inary rules reMuire for its con uctV those, on the other han , who &aintaine the octrine of certainty, supposing that it &ust epen upon the senses, truste entirely to the&! To such an e%tent was this carrie by 2picurus, that it is sai he venture to affir&, contrary to all the reasonings of the astrono&ers, that the sun is no larger than it appears! 't is a fault we &ay re&ar# in &ost isputes, that, as truth is the &ean between the two opinions that are uphel , each isputant eparts fro& it in proportion to the egree in which he possesses the spirit of contra iction! "ut the error of those who leant too &uch to the si e of oubt, was not followe for any length of ti&e, an that of the opposite party has been to so&e e%tent correcte by the octrine that the senses are eceitful in &any instances! 3evertheless, ' o not #now that this error was wholly re&ove by showing that certitu e is not in the senses, but in the un erstan ing alone when it has clear perceptionsV an that while we only possess the #nowle ge which is acMuire in the first four gra es of wis o&, we ought not to oubt of the things that appear to be true in what regar s the con uct of life, nor estee& the& as so certain that we cannot change our opinions regar ing the&, even though constraine by the evi ence of reason! *ro& ignorance of this truth, or, if there was any one to who& it was #nown, fro& neglect of it, the &ajority of

those who in these later ages aspire to be philosophers, blin ly followe )ristotle, so that they freMuently corrupte the sense of his writings, an attribute to hi& various opinions which he woul not recognise as his own were he now to return to the worl V an those who i not follow hi&, a&ong who& are to be foun &any of the greatest &in s, i yet not escape being i&bue with his opinions in their youth, as these for& the staple of instruction in the schoolsV an thus their &in s were so preoccupie that they coul not rise to the #nowle ge of true principles! )n though ' hol all the philosophers in estee&, an a& unwilling to incur o iu& by &y censure, ' can a uce a proof of &y assertion, which ' o not thin# any of the& will gainsay, which is, that they all lai own as a principle what they i not perfectly #now! *or e%a&ple, ' #now none of the& who i not suppose that there was gravity in terrestrial bo iesV but although e%perience shows us very clearly that bo ies we call heavy escen towar s the center of the earth, we o not, therefore, #now the nature of gravity, that is, the cause or principle in virtue of which bo ies escen , an we &ust erive our #nowle ge of it fro& so&e other source! The sa&e &ay be sai of a vacuu& an ato&s, of heat an col , of ryness an hu&i ity, an of salt, sulphur, an &ercury, an the other things of this sort which so&e have a opte as their principles! "ut no conclusion e uce fro& a principle which is not clear can be evi ent, even although the e uction be for&ally vali V an hence it follows that no reasonings base on such principles coul lea the& to the certain #nowle ge of any one thing, nor conseMuently a vance the& one step in the search after wis o&! )n if they i iscover any truth, this was ue to one or other of the four &eans above &entione ! 3otwithstan ing this, ' a& in no egree esirous to lessen the honour which each of the& can justly clai&V ' a& only constraine to say, for the consolation of those who have not given their

attention to stu y, that just as in travelling, when we turn our bac# upon the place to which we were going, we rece e the farther fro& it in proportion as we procee in the new irection for a greater length of ti&e an with greater spee , so that, though we &ay be afterwar s brought bac# to the right way, we cannot nevertheless arrive at the estine place as soon as if we ha not &ove bac#war s at allV so in philosophy, when we &a#e use of false principles, we epart the farther fro& the #nowle ge of truth an wis o& e%actly in proportion to the care with which we cultivate the&, an apply ourselves to the e uction of iverse conseMuences fro& the&, thin#ing that we are philosophi1ing well, while we are only eparting the farther fro& the truthV fro& which it &ust be inferre that they who have learne the least of all that has been hitherto istinguishe by the na&e of philosophy are the &ost fitte for the apprehension of truth! )fter &a#ing those &atters clear, ' shoul , in the ne%t place, have esire to set forth the groun s for hol ing that the true principles by which we &ay reach that highest egree of wis o& wherein consists the sovereign goo of hu&an life, are those ' have propose in this wor#V an two consi erations alone are sufficient to establish this88the first of which is, that these principles are very clear, an the secon , that we can e uce all other truths fro& the&V for it is only these two con itions that are reMuire in true principles! "ut ' easily prove that they are very clearV firstly, by a reference to the &anner in which ' foun the&, na&ely, by rejecting all propositions that were in the least oubtful, for it is certain that such as coul not be rejecte by this test when they were attentively consi ere , are the &ost evi ent an clear which the hu&an &in can #now! Thus by consi ering that he who strives to oubt of all is unable nevertheless to oubt

that he is while he oubts, an that what reasons thus, in not being able to oubt of itself an oubting nevertheless of everything else, is not that which we call our bo y, but what we na&e our &in or thought, ' have ta#en the e%istence of this thought for the first principle, fro& which ' very clearly e uce the following truths, na&ely, that there is a Go who is the author of all that is in the worl , an who, being the source of all truth, cannot have create our un erstan ing of such a nature as to be eceive in the ju g&ents it for&s of the things of which it possesses a very clear an istinct perception! Those are all the principles of which ' avail &yself touching i&&aterial or &etaphysical objects, fro& which ' &ost clearly e uce these other principles of physical or corporeal things, na&ely, that there are bo ies e%ten e in length, brea th, an epth, which are of iverse figures an are &ove in a variety of ways! =uch are in su& the principles fro& which ' e uce all other truths! The secon circu&stance that proves the clearness of these principles is, that they have been #nown in all ages, an even receive as true an in ubitable by all &en, with the e%ception only of the e%istence of Go , which has been oubte by so&e, because they attribute too &uch to the perceptions of the senses, an Go can neither be seen nor touche ! "ut, though all the truths which ' class a&ong &y principles were #nown at all ti&es, an by all &en, nevertheless, there has been no one up to the present, who, so far as ' #now, has a opte the& as principles of philosophy9 in other wor s, as such that we can e uce fro& the& the #nowle ge of whatever else is in the worl ! 't accor ingly now re&ains for &e to prove that they are suchV an it appears to &e that ' cannot better establish this than by the test of e%perience9 in other wor s, by inviting rea ers to peruse the following wor#! *or, though ' have not treate in it of all &atters8 8that

being i&possible88' thin# ' have so e%plaine all of which ' ha occasion to treat, that they who rea it attentively will have groun for the persuasion that it is unnecessary to see# for any other principles than those ' have given, in or er to arrive at the &ost e%alte #nowle ge of which the &in of &an is capableV especially if, after the perusal of &y writings, they ta#e the trouble to consi er how &any iverse Muestions are therein iscusse an e%plaine , an , referring to the writings of others, they see how little probability there is in the reasons that are a uce in e%planation of the sa&e Muestions by principles ifferent fro& &ine! )n that they &ay the &ore easily un erta#e this, ' &ight have sai that those i&bue with &y octrines have &uch less ifficulty in co&prehen ing the writings of others, an esti&ating their true value, than those who have not been so i&bue V an this is precisely the opposite of what ' before sai of such as co&&ence with the ancient philosophy, na&ely, that the &ore they have stu ie it the less fit are they for rightly apprehen ing the truth! ' shoul also have a e a wor of a vice regar ing the &anner of rea ing this wor#, which is, that ' shoul wish the rea er at first to go over the whole of it, as he woul a ro&ance, without greatly straining his attention, or tarrying at the ifficulties he &ay perhaps &eet with in it, with the view si&ply of #nowing in general the &atters of which ' treatV an that afterwar s, if they see& to hi& to &erit a &ore careful e%a&ination, an he feel a esire to #now their causes, he &ay rea it a secon ti&e, in or er to observe the connection of &y reasoningsV but that he &ust not then give it up in espair, although he &ay not everywhere sufficiently iscover the connection of the proof, or un erstan all the reasonings88it being only necessary to &ar# with a pen the places where the ifficulties occur, an continue

to rea without interruption to the en V then, if he oes not gru ge to ta#e up the boo# a thir ti&e, ' a& confi ent he will fin in a fresh perusal the solution of &ost of the ifficulties he will have &ar#e beforeV an that, if any still re&ain, their solution will in the en be foun in another rea ing! ' have observe , on e%a&ining the natural constitutions of ifferent &in s, that there are har ly any so ull or slow of un erstan ing as to be incapable of apprehen ing goo opinions, or even of acMuiring all the highest sciences, if they be but con ucte along the right roa ! )n this can also be prove by reasonV for, as the principles are clear, an as nothing ought to be e uce fro& the&, unless &ost &anifest inferences, no one is so evoi of intelligence as to be unable to co&prehen the conclusions that flow fro& the&! "ut, besi es the entangle&ent of preju ices, fro& which no one is entirely e%e&pt, although it is they who have been the &ost ar ent stu ents of the false sciences that receive the greatest etri&ent fro& the&, it happens very generally that people of or inary capacity neglect to stu y fro& a conviction that they want ability, an that others, who are &ore ar ent, press on too rapi ly9 whence it co&es to pass that they freMuently a &it principles far fro& evi ent, an raw oubtful inferences fro& the&! *or this reason, ' shoul wish to assure those who are too istrustful of their own ability that there is nothing in &y writings which they &ay not entirely un erstan , if they only ta#e the trouble to e%a&ine the&V an ' shoul wish, at the sa&e ti&e, to warn those of an opposite ten ency that even the &ost superior &in s will have nee of &uch ti&e an attention to re&ar# all ' esigne to e&brace therein! )fter this, that ' &ight lea &en to un erstan the real esign ' ha in publishing the&, ' shoul have wishe

here to e%plain the or er which it see&s to &e one ought to follow with the view of instructing hi&self! 'n the first place, a &an who has &erely the vulgar an i&perfect #nowle ge which can be acMuire by the four &eans above e%plaine , ought, before all else, to en eavour to for& for hi&self a co e of &orals, sufficient to regulate the actions of his life, as well for the reason that this oes not a &it of elay as because it ought to be our first care to live well! 'n the ne%t place, he ought to stu y (ogic, not that of the schools, for it is only, properly spea#ing, a ialectic which teaches the &o e of e%poun ing to others what we alrea y #now, or even of spea#ing &uch, without ju g&ent, of what we o not #now, by which &eans it corrupts rather than increases goo sense88but the logic which teaches the right con uct of the reason with the view of iscovering the truths of which we are ignorantV an , because it greatly epen s on usage, it is esirable he shoul e%ercise hi&self for a length of ti&e in practising its rules on easy an si&ple Muestions, as those of the &athe&atics! Then, when he has acMuire so&e s#ill in iscovering the truth in these Muestions, he shoul co&&ence to apply hi&self in earnest to true philosophy, of which the first part is Aetaphysics, containing the principles of #nowle ge, a&ong which is the e%plication of the principal attributes of Go , of the i&&ateriality of the soul, an of all the clear an si&ple notions that are in usV the secon is Physics, in which, after fin ing the true principles of &aterial things, we e%a&ine, in general, how the whole universe has been fra&e V in the ne%t place, we consi er, in particular, the nature of the earth, an of all the bo ies that are &ost generally foun upon it, as air, water, fire, the loa stone an other &inerals! 'n the ne%t place it is necessary also to e%a&ine singly the nature of plants, of ani&als, an above all of &an, in or er that we &ay thereafter be able to iscover the other sciences that are useful to us!

Thus, all Philosophy is li#e a tree, of which Aetaphysics is the root, Physics the trun#, an all the other sciences the branches that grow out of this trun#, which are re uce to three principal, na&ely, Ae icine, Aechanics, an 2thics! "y the science of Aorals, ' un erstan the highest an &ost perfect which, presupposing an entire #nowle ge of the other sciences, is the last egree of wis o&! "ut as it is not fro& the roots or the trun#s of trees that we gather the fruit, but only fro& the e%tre&ities of their branches, so the principal utility of philosophy epen s on the separate uses of its parts, which we can only learn last of all! "ut, though ' a& ignorant of al&ost all these, the 1eal ' have always felt in en eavouring to be of service to the public, was the reason why ' publishe , so&e ten or twelve years ago, certain 2ssays on the octrines ' thought ' ha acMuire ! The first part of these 2ssays was a RDiscourse on the Aetho of rightly con ucting the Reason, an see#ing Truth in the =ciences,R in which ' gave a su&&ary of the principal rules of logic, an also of an i&perfect ethic, which a person &ay follow provisionally so long as he oes not #now any better! The other parts were three treatises9 the first of Dioptrics, the secon of Aeteors, an the thir of Geo&etry! 'n the Dioptrics, ' esigne to show that we &ight procee far enough in philosophy as to arrive, by its &eans, at the #nowle ge of the arts that are useful to life, because the invention of the telescope, of which ' there gave an e%planation, is one of the &ost ifficult that has ever been &a e! 'n the treatise of Aeteors, ' esire to e%hibit the ifference that subsists between the philosophy ' cultivate an that taught in the schools, in which the sa&e &atters are usually iscusse ! 'n fine, in the Geo&etry, ' professe to e&onstrate that ' ha iscovere &any things that were before un#nown, an thus affor groun for

believing that we &ay still iscover &any others, with the view of thus sti&ulating all to the investigation of truth! =ince that perio , anticipating the ifficulty which &any woul e%perience in apprehen ing the foun ations of the Aetaphysics, ' en eavoure to e%plain the chief points of the& in a boo# of Ae itations, which is not in itself large, but the si1e of which has been increase , an the &atter greatly illustrate , by the ?bjections which several very learne persons sent to &e on occasion of it, an by the Replies which ' &a e to the&! )t length, after it appeare to &e that those prece ing treatises ha sufficiently prepare the &in s of &y rea ers for the Principles of Philosophy, ' also publishe itV an ' have ivi e this wor# into four parts, the first of which contains the principles of hu&an #nowle ge, an which &ay be calle the *irst Philosophy, or Aetaphysics! That this part, accor ingly, &ay be properly un erstoo , it will be necessary to rea beforehan the boo# of Ae itations ' wrote on the sa&e subject! The other three parts contain all that is &ost general in Physics, na&ely, the e%plication of the first laws or principles of nature, an the way in which the heavens, the fi%e stars, the planets, co&ets, an generally the whole universe, were co&pose V in the ne%t place, the e%plication, in particular, of the nature of this earth, the air, water, fire, the &agnet, which are the bo ies we &ost co&&only fin everywhere aroun it, an of all the Mualities we observe in these bo ies, as light, heat, gravity, an the li#e! 'n this way, it see&s to &e, ' have co&&ence the or erly e%planation of the whole of philosophy, without o&itting any of the &atters that ought to prece e the last which ' iscusse ! "ut to bring this un erta#ing to its conclusion, ' ought hereafter to e%plain, in the sa&e &anner, the nature of the other &ore particular bo ies that are on the earth, na&ely, &inerals, plants, ani&als, an especially &anV finally, to treat thereafter with accuracy of Ae icine, 2thics, an

Aechanics! ' shoul reMuire to o this in or er to give to the worl a co&plete bo y of philosophyV an ' o not yet feel &yself so ol ,8 8' o not so &uch istrust &y strength, nor o ' fin &yself so far re&ove fro& the #nowle ge of what re&ains, as that ' shoul not are to un erta#e to co&plete this esign, provi e ' were in a position to &a#e all the e%peri&ents which ' shoul reMuire for the basis an verification of &y reasonings! "ut seeing that woul e&an a great e%pen iture, to which the resources of a private in ivi ual li#e &yself woul not be a eMuate, unless ai e by the public, an as ' have no groun to e%pect this ai , ' believe that ' ought for the future to content &yself with stu ying for &y own instruction, an posterity will e%cuse &e if ' fail hereafter to labour for the&! Aeanwhile, that it &ay be seen wherein ' thin# ' have alrea y pro&ote the general goo , ' will here &ention the fruits that &ay be gathere fro& &y Principles! The first is the satisfaction which the &in will e%perience on fin ing in the wor# &any truths before un#nownV for although freMuently truth oes not so greatly affect our i&agination as falsity an fiction, because it see&s less won erful an is &ore si&ple, yet the gratification it affor s is always &ore urable an soli ! The secon fruit is, that in stu ying these principles we will beco&e accusto&e by egrees to ju ge better of all the things we co&e in contact with, an thus be &a e wiser, in which respect the effect will be Muite the opposite of the co&&on philosophy, for we &ay easily re&ar# in those we call pe ants that it ren ers the& less capable of rightly e%ercising their reason than they woul have been if they ha never #nown it! The thir is, that the truths which they contain, being highly clear an certain, will ta#e away all groun of ispute, an thus ispose &en's &in s to gentleness an concor V whereas the contrary is the effect of the controversies of the schools,

which, as they insensibly ren er those who are e%ercise in the& &ore wrangling an opinionative, are perhaps the pri&e cause of the heresies an issensions that now harass the worl ! The last an chief fruit of these Principles is, that one will be able, by cultivating the&, to iscover &any truths ' &yself have not unfol e , an thus passing by egrees fro& one to another, to acMuire in course of ti&e a perfect #nowle ge of the whole of philosophy, an to rise to the highest egree of wis o&! *or just as all the arts, though in their beginnings they are ru e an i&perfect, are yet gra ually perfecte by practice, fro& their containing at first so&ething true, an whose effect e%perience evincesV so in philosophy, when we have true principles, we cannot fail by following the& to &eet so&eti&es with other truthsV an we coul not better prove the falsity of those of )ristotle, than by saying that &en &a e no progress in #nowle ge by their &eans uring the &any ages they prosecute the&! ' well #now that there are so&e &en so precipitate an accusto&e to use so little circu&spection in what they o, that, even with the &ost soli foun ations, they coul not rear a fir& superstructureV an as it is usually those who are the rea iest to &a#e boo#s, they woul in a short ti&e &ar all that ' have one, an intro uce uncertainty an oubt into &y &anner of philosophi1ing, fro& which ' have carefully en eavoure to banish the&, if people were to receive their writings as &ine, or as representing &y opinions! ' ha , not long ago, so&e e%perience of this in one of those who were believe esirous of following &e the &ost closely, 4*ootnote9 RegiusV see (a Bie e A! Descartes, re uite en abrege ."aillet/! (iv! vii!, chap! vii!88T!5 an one too of who& ' ha so&ewhere sai that ' ha such confi ence in his genius as to believe that he a here to no opinions which ' shoul not be rea y to avow as &ineV for he last year publishe a boo# entitle R*un a&ental Physics,R in

which, although he see&s to have written nothing on the subject of Physics an Ae icine which he i not ta#e fro& &y writings, as well fro& those ' have publishe as fro& another still i&perfect on the nature of ani&als, which fell into his han sV nevertheless, because he has copie the& ba ly, an change the or er, an enie certain &etaphysical truths upon which all Physics ought to be base , ' a& oblige wholly to isavow his wor#, an here to reMuest rea ers not to attribute to &e any opinion unless they fin it e%pressly state in &y own writings, an to receive no opinion as true, whether in &y writings or elsewhere, unless they see that it is very clearly e uce fro& true principles! ' well #now, li#ewise, that &any ages &ay elapse ere all the truths e ucible fro& these principles are evolve out of the&, as well because the greater nu&ber of such as re&ain to be iscovere epen on certain particular e%peri&ents that never occur by chance, but which reMuire to be investigate with care an e%pense by &en of the highest intelligence, as because it will har ly happen that the sa&e persons who have the sagacity to &a#e a right use of the&, will possess also the &eans of &a#ing the&, an also because the &ajority of the best &in s have for&e so low an esti&ate of philosophy in general, fro& the i&perfections they have re&ar#e in the #in in vogue up to the present ti&e, that they cannot apply the&selves to the search after truth! "ut, in conclusion, if the ifference iscernible between the principles in Muestion an those of every other syste&, an the great array of truths e ucible fro& the&, lea the& to iscern the i&portance of continuing the search after these truths, an to observe the egree of wis o&, the perfection an felicity of life, to which they are fitte to con uct us, ' venture to believe that there will not be foun one who is not rea y to labour har in so profitable a stu y, or at least to favour an ai

with all his &ight those who shall evote the&selves to it with success! The height of &y wishes is, that posterity &ay so&eti&e behol the happy issue of it, etc! T? TC2 A?=T =2R232 PR'3C2==, 2('W)"2TC, 2(D2=T D)@GCT2R ?* *R2D2R'CL, L'3G ?* "?C2A'), C?@3T P)()T'32, )3D 2(2CT?R ?* TC2 =)CR2D R?A)3 2AP'R2! A)D)A,88The greatest a vantage ' have erive fro& the writings which ' have alrea y publishe , has arisen fro& &y having, through &eans of the&, beco&e #nown to your Cighness, an thus been privilege to hol occasional converse with one in who& so &any rare an esti&able Mualities are unite , as to lea &e to believe ' shoul o service to the public by proposing the& as an e%a&ple to posterity! 't woul ill beco&e &e to flatter, or to give e%pression to anything of which ' ha no certain #nowle ge, especially in the first pages of a wor# in which ' ai& at laying own the principles of truth! )n the generous &o esty that is conspicuous in all your actions, assures &e that the fran# an si&ple ju g&ent of a &an who only writes what he believes will be &ore agreeable to you than the ornate lau ations of those who have stu ie the art of co&pli&ent! *or this reason, ' will give insertion to nothing in this letter for which ' have not the certainty both of e%perience an reasonV an in the e%or iu&, as in the rest of the wor#, ' will write only as beco&es a philosopher! There is a vast ifference between real an apparent virtuesV an there is also a great iscrepancy between those real virtues that procee fro& an accurate #nowle ge of the truth, an such as are acco&panie with ignorance or error!

The virtues ' call apparent are only, properly spea#ing, vices, which, as they are less freMuent than the vices that are oppose to the&, an are farther re&ove fro& the& than the inter&e iate virtues, are usually hel in higher estee& than those virtues! Thus, because those who fear angers too &uch are &ore nu&erous than they who fear the& too little, te&erity is freMuently oppose to the vice of ti&i ity, an ta#en for a virtue, an is co&&only &ore highly estee&e than true fortitu e! Thus, also, the pro igal are in or inary &ore praise than the liberalV an none &ore easily acMuire a great reputation for piety than the superstitious an hypocritical! $ith regar to true virtues, these o not all procee fro& true #nowle ge, for there are so&e that li#ewise spring fro& efect or errorV thus, si&plicity is freMuently the source of goo ness, fear of evotion, an espair of courage! The virtues that are thus acco&panie with so&e i&perfections iffer fro& each other, an have receive iverse appellations! "ut those pure an perfect virtues that arise fro& the #nowle ge of goo alone are all of the sa&e nature, an &ay be co&prise un er the single ter& wis o&! *or, whoever owns the fir& an constant resolution of always using his reason as well as lies in his power, an in all his actions of oing what he ju ges to be best, is truly wise, as far as his nature per&itsV an by this alone he is just, courageous, te&perate, an possesses all the other virtues, but so well balance as that none of the& appears &ore pro&inent than another9 an for this reason, although they are &uch &ore perfect than the virtues that bla1e forth through the &i%ture of so&e efect, yet, because the crow thus observes the& less, they are not usually e%tolle so highly! "esi es, of the two things that are reMuisite for the wis o& thus escribe , na&ely, the perception of the un erstan ing an the isposition of the will, it is only that which lies in the will which all &en can possess eMually, inas&uch as

the un erstan ing of so&e is inferior to that of others! "ut although those who have only an inferior un erstan ing &ay be as perfectly wise as their nature per&its, an &ay ren er the&selves highly acceptable to Go by their virtue, provi e they preserve always a fir& an constant resolution to o all that they shall ju ge to be right, an to o&it nothing that &ay lea the& to the #nowle ge of the uties of which they are ignorantV nevertheless, those who preserve a constant resolution of perfor&ing the right, an are especially careful in instructing the&selves, an who possess also a highly perspicacious intellect, arrive oubtless at a higher egree of wis o& than othersV an ' see that these three particulars are foun in great perfection in your Cighness! *or, in the first place, your esire of self8 instruction is &anifest, fro& the circu&stance that neither the a&use&ents of the court, nor the accusto&e &o e of e ucating la ies, which or inarily con e&ns the& to ignorance, have been sufficient to prevent you fro& stu ying with &uch care all that is best in the arts an sciencesV an the inco&parable perspicacity of your intellect is evince by this, that you penetrate the secrets of the sciences an acMuire an accurate #nowle ge of the& in a very short perio ! "ut of the vigour of your intellect ' have a still stronger proof, an one peculiar to &yself, in that ' have never yet &et any one who un erstoo so generally an so well as yourself all that is containe in &y writings! *or there are several, even a&ong &en of the highest intellect an learning, who fin the& very obscure! )n ' re&ar#, in al&ost all those who are versant in Aetaphysics, that they are wholly isincline fro& Geo&etryV an , on the other han , that the cultivators of Geo&etry have no ability for the investigations of the *irst Philosophy9 inso&uch that ' can say with truth ' #now but one &in , an that is your own, to which both stu ies are ali#e congenial, an which ' therefore, with propriety,

esignate inco&parable! "ut what &ost of all enhances &y a &iration is, that so accurate an varie an acMuaintance with the whole circle of the sciences is not foun in so&e age octor who has e&ploye &any years in conte&plation, but in a Princess still young, an whose countenance an years woul &ore fitly represent one of the Graces than a Ause or the sage Ainerva! 'n conclusion, ' not only re&ar# in your Cighness all that is reMuisite on the part of the &in to perfect an subli&e wis o&, but also all that can be reMuire on the part of the will or the &anners, in which benignity an gentleness are so conjoine with &ajesty that, though fortune has attac#e you with continue injustice, it has faile either to irritate or crush you! )n this constrains &e to such veneration that ' not only thin# this wor# ue to you, since it treats of philosophy which is the stu y of wis o&, but li#ewise feel not &ore 1eal for &y reputation as a philosopher than pleasure in subscribing &yself,88 ?f your &ost =erene Cighness, The &ost evote servant, D2=C)RT2=! ?* TC2 PR'3C'P(2= ?* C@A)3 L3?$(2DG2! '! TC)T in or er to see# truth, it is necessary once in the course of our life, to oubt, as far as possible, of all things! )s we were at one ti&e chil ren, an as we for&e various ju g&ents regar ing the objects presente to our senses, when as yet we ha not the entire use of our reason, nu&erous preju ices stan in the way of our arriving at the #nowle ge of truthV an of these it see&s i&possible for us to ri ourselves, unless we un erta#e,

once in our lifeti&e, to oubt of all those things in which we &ay iscover even the s&allest suspicion of uncertainty! ''! That we ought also to consi er as false all that is oubtful! Aoreover, it will be useful li#ewise to estee& as false the things of which we shall be able to oubt, that we &ay with greater clearness iscover what possesses &ost certainty an is the easiest to #now! '''! That we ought not &eanwhile to &a#e use of oubt in the con uct of life! 'n the &eanti&e, it is to be observe that we are to avail ourselves of this general oubt only while engage in the conte&plation of truth! *or, as far as concerns the con uct of life, we are very freMuently oblige to follow opinions &erely probable, or even so&eti&es, though of two courses of action we &ay not perceive &ore probability in the one than in the other, to choose one or other, seeing the opportunity of acting woul not unfreMuently pass away before we coul free ourselves fro& our oubts! 'B! $hy we &ay oubt of sensible things! )ccor ingly, since we now only esign to apply ourselves to the investigation of truth, we will oubt, first, whether of all the things that have ever fallen un er our senses, or which we have ever i&agine , any one really e%istV in the first place, because we #now by e%perience that the senses so&eti&es err, an it woul be i&pru ent to trust too &uch to what has even once eceive usV secon ly, because in rea&s we perpetually see& to perceive or i&agine innu&erable objects which have no

e%istence! )n to one who has thus resolve upon a general oubt, there appear no &ar#s by which he can with certainty istinguish sleep fro& the wa#ing state! B! $hy we &ay also oubt of &athe&atical e&onstrations! $e will also oubt of the other things we have before hel as &ost certain, even of the e&onstrations of &athe&atics, an of their principles which we have hitherto ee&e self8evi entV in the first place, because we have so&eti&es seen &en fall into error in such &atters, an a &it as absolutely certain an self evi ent what to us appeare false, but chiefly because we have learnt that Go who create us is all8powerfulV for we o not yet #now whether perhaps it was his will to create us so that we are always eceive , even in the things we thin# we #now best9 since this oes not appear &ore i&possible than our being occasionally eceive , which, however, as observation teaches us, is the case! )n if we suppose that an all8 powerful Go is not the author of our being, an that we e%ist of ourselves or by so&e other &eans, still, the less powerful we suppose our author to be, the greater reason will we have for believing that we are not so perfect as that we &ay not be continually eceive ! B'! That we possess a free8will, by which we can withhol our assent fro& what is oubtful, an thus avoi error! "ut &eanwhile, whoever in the en &ay be the author of our being, an however powerful an eceitful he &ay be, we are nevertheless conscious of a free o&, by which we can refrain fro& a &itting to a place in our belief aught that is not &anifestly certain an un oubte , an thus guar against ever being eceive !

B''! That we cannot oubt of our e%istence while we oubt, an that this is the first #nowle ge we acMuire when we philosophi1e in or er! $hile we thus reject all of which we can entertain the s&allest oubt, an even i&agine that it is false, we easily in ee suppose that there is neither Go , nor s#y, nor bo ies, an that we ourselves even have neither han s nor feet, nor, finally, a bo yV but we cannot in the sa&e way suppose that we are not while we oubt of the truth of these thingsV for there is a repugnance in conceiving that what thin#s oes not e%ist at the very ti&e when it thin#s! )ccor ingly, the #nowle ge, I TC'3L, TC2R2*?R2 I )A, is the first an &ost certain that occurs to one who philosophi1es or erly! B'''! That we hence iscover the istinction between the &in an the bo y, or between a thin#ing an corporeal thing! )n this is the best &o e of iscovering the nature of the &in , an its istinctness fro& the bo y9 for e%a&ining what we are, while supposing, as we now o, that there is nothing really e%isting apart fro& our thought, we clearly perceive that neither e%tension, nor figure, nor local &otion,4*ootnote9 'nstea of Rlocal &otion,R the *rench has Re%istence in any place!R5 nor anything si&ilar that can be attribute to bo y, pertains to our nature, an nothing save thought aloneV an , conseMuently, that the notion we have of our &in prece es that of any corporeal thing, an is &ore certain, seeing we still oubt whether there is any bo y in e%istence, while we alrea y perceive that we thin#! 'Q! $hat thought .C?G'T)T'?/ is! "y the wor thought, ' un erstan all that which so ta#es

place in us that we of ourselves are i&&e iately conscious of itV an , accor ingly, not only to un erstan .'3T2(('G2R2, 23T23DR2/, to will .B2((2/, to i&agine .'A)G'3)R'/, but even to perceive .=23T'R2, =23T'R/, are here the sa&e as to thin# .C?G'T)R2, P23=2R/! *or if ' say, ' see, or, ' wal#, therefore ' a&V an if ' un erstan by vision or wal#ing the act of &y eyes or of &y li&bs, which is the wor# of the bo y, the conclusion is not absolutely certain, because, as is often the case in rea&s, ' &ay thin# that ' see or wal#, although ' o not open &y eyes or &ove fro& &y place, an even, perhaps, although ' have no bo y9 but, if ' &ean the sensation itself, or consciousness of seeing or wal#ing, the #nowle ge is &anifestly certain, because it is then referre to the &in , which alone perceives or is conscious that it sees or wal#s! 4*ootnote9 'n the *rench, Rwhich alone has the power of perceiving, or of being conscious in any other way whatever!R5 Q! That the notions which are si&plest an self8evi ent, are obscure by logical efinitionsV an that such are not to be rec#one a&ong the cognitions acMuire by stu y, 4but as born with us5! ' o not here e%plain several other ter&s which ' have use , or esign to use in the seMuel, because their &eaning see&s to &e sufficiently self8evi ent! )n ' freMuently re&ar#e that philosophers erre in atte&pting to e%plain, by logical efinitions, such truths as are &ost si&ple an self8evi entV for they thus only ren ere the& &ore obscure! )n when ' sai that the proposition, I TC'3L, TC2R2*?R2 I )A, is of all others the first an &ost certain which occurs to one philosophi1ing or erly, ' i not therefore eny that it was necessary to #now what thought, e%istence, an certitu e are, an the truth that, in or er to thin# it is necessary to be, an the li#eV but, because these are the &ost si&ple notions,

an such as of the&selves affor the #nowle ge of nothing e%isting, ' i not ju ge it proper there to enu&erate the&! Q'! Cow we can #now our &in &ore clearly than our bo y! "ut now that it &ay be iscerne how the #nowle ge we have of the &in not only prece es, an has greater certainty, but is even clearer, than that we have of the bo y, it &ust be re&ar#e , as a &atter that is highly &anifest by the natural light, that to nothing no affections or Mualities belongV an , accor ingly, that where we observe certain affections, there a thing or substance to which these pertain, is necessarily foun ! The sa&e light also shows us that we #now a thing or substance &ore clearly in proportion as we iscover in it a greater nu&ber of Mualities! 3ow, it is &anifest that we re&ar# a greater nu&ber of Mualities in our &in than in any other thingV for there is no occasion on which we #now anything whatever when we are not at the sa&e ti&e le with &uch greater certainty to the #nowle ge of our own &in ! *or e%a&ple, if ' ju ge that there is an earth because ' touch or see it, on the sa&e groun , an with still greater reason, ' &ust be persua e that &y &in e%istsV for it &ay be, perhaps, that ' thin# ' touch the earth while there is one in e%istenceV but it is not possible that ' shoul so ju ge, an &y &in which thus ju ges not e%istV an the sa&e hol s goo of whatever object is presente to our &in ! Q''! Cow it happens that every one oes not co&e eMually to #now this! Those who have not philosophi1e in or er have ha other opinions on this subject, because they never istinguishe with sufficient care the &in fro& the

bo y! *or, although they ha no ifficulty in believing that they the&selves e%iste , an that they ha a higher assurance of this than of any other thing, nevertheless, as they i not observe that by TC2A=2(B2=, they ought here to un erstan their A'3D= alone 4when the Muestion relate to &etaphysical certainty5V an since, on the contrary, they rather &eant their bo ies which they saw with their eyes, touche with their han s, an to which they erroneously attribute the faculty of perception, they were prevente fro& istinctly apprehen ing the nature of the &in ! Q'''! 'n what sense the #nowle ge of other things epen s upon the #nowle ge of Go ! "ut when the &in , which thus #nows itself but is still in oubt as to all other things, loo#s aroun on all si es, with a view to the farther e%tension of its #nowle ge, it first of all iscovers within itself the i eas of &any thingsV an while it si&ply conte&plates the&, an neither affir&s nor enies that there is anything beyon itself correspon ing to the&, it is in no anger of erring! The &in also iscovers certain co&&on notions out of which it fra&es various e&onstrations that carry conviction to such a egree as to ren er oubt of their truth i&possible, so long as we give attention to the&! *or e%a&ple, the &in has within itself i eas of nu&bers an figures, an it has li#ewise a&ong its co&&on notions the principle TC)T '* 2T@)(= "2 )DD2D T? 2T@)(= TC2 $C?(2= $'(( "2 2T@)( an the li#eV fro& which it is easy to e&onstrate that the three angles of a triangle are eMual to two right angles, etc! 3ow, so long as we atten to the pre&ises fro& which this conclusion an others si&ilar to it were e uce , we feel assure of their truthV but, as the &in cannot always thin# of these with attention, when it has the re&e&brance of a conclusion without recollecting the

or er of its e uction, an is uncertain whether the author of its being has create it of a nature that is liable to be eceive , even in what appears &ost evi ent, it perceives that there is just groun to istrust the truth of such conclusions, an that it cannot possess any certain #nowle ge until it has iscovere its author! Q'B! That we &ay vali ly infer the e%istence of Go fro& necessary e%istence being co&prise in the concept we have of hi&! $hen the &in afterwar s reviews the ifferent i eas that are in it, it iscovers what is by far the chief a&ong the&88that of a "eing o&niscient, all8powerful, an absolutely perfectV an it observes that in this i ea there is containe not only possible an contingent e%istence, as in the i eas of all other things which it clearly perceives, but e%istence absolutely necessary an eternal! )n just as because, for e%a&ple, the eMuality of its three angles to two right angles is necessarily co&prise in the i ea of a triangle, the &in is fir&ly persua e that the three angles of a triangle are eMual to two right anglesV so, fro& its perceiving necessary an eternal e%istence to be co&prise in the i ea which it has of an all8perfect "eing, it ought &anifestly to conclu e that this all8perfect "eing e%ists! QB! That necessary e%istence is not in the sa&e way co&prise in the notions which we have of other things, but &erely contingent e%istence! The &in will be still &ore certain of the truth of this conclusion, if it consi er that it has no i ea of any other thing in which it can iscover that necessary e%istence is containe V for, fro& this circu&stance alone, it will iscern that the i ea of an all8perfect "eing has not been fra&e by itself, an that it oes not represent a

chi&era, but a true an i&&utable nature, which &ust e%ist since it can only be conceive as necessarily e%isting! QB'! That preju ices hin er &any fro& clearly #nowing the necessity of the e%istence of Go ! ?ur &in woul have no ifficulty in assenting to this truth, if it were, first of all, wholly free fro& preju icesV but as we have been accusto&e to istinguish, in all other things, essence fro& e%istence, an to i&agine at will &any i eas of things which neither are nor have been, it easily happens, when we o not stea ily fi% our thoughts on the conte&plation of the all8perfect "eing, that a oubt arises as to whether the i ea we have of hi& is not one of those which we fra&e at pleasure, or at least of that class to whose essence e%istence oes not pertain! QB''! That the greater objective .representative/ perfection there is in our i ea of a thing, the greater also &ust be the perfection of its cause! $hen we further reflect on the various i eas that are in us, it is easy to perceive that there is not &uch ifference a&ong the&, when we consi er the& si&ply as certain &o es of thin#ing, but that they are wi ely ifferent, consi ere in reference to the objects they representV an that their causes &ust be so &uch the &ore perfect accor ing to the egree of objective perfection containe in the&! 4*ootnote9 Ras what they represent of their object has &ore perfection!R88 *R23CC!5 *or there is no ifference between this an the case of a person who has the i ea of a &achine, in the construction of which great s#ill is isplaye , in which circu&stances we have a right to inMuire how he ca&e by this i ea, whether, for e%a&ple, he so&ewhere saw

such a &achine constructe by another, or whether he was so accurately taught the &echanical sciences, or is en owe with such force of genius, that he was able of hi&self to invent it, without having elsewhere seen anything li#e itV for all the ingenuity which is containe in the i ea objectively only, or as it were in a picture, &ust e%ist at least in its first an chief cause, whatever that &ay be, not only objectively or representatively, but in truth for&ally or e&inently! QB'''! That the e%istence of Go &ay be again inferre fro& the above! Thus, because we iscover in our &in s the i ea of Go , or of an all8perfect "eing, we have a right to inMuire into the source whence we erive itV an we will iscover that the perfections it represents are so i&&ense as to ren er it Muite certain that we coul only erive it fro& an all8perfect "eingV that is, fro& a Go really e%isting! *or it is not only &anifest by the natural light that nothing cannot be the cause of anything whatever, an that the &ore perfect cannot arise fro& the less perfect, so as to be thereby pro uce as by its efficient an total cause, but also that it is i&possible we can have the i ea or representation of anything whatever, unless there be so&ewhere, either in us or out of us, an original which co&prises, in reality, all the perfections that are thus represente to usV but, as we o not in any way fin in ourselves those absolute perfections of which we have the i ea, we &ust conclu e that they e%ist in so&e nature ifferent fro& ours, that is, in Go , or at least that they were once in hi&V an it &ost &anifestly follows 4fro& their infinity5 that they are still there! Q'Q! That, although we &ay not co&prehen the nature of Go , there is yet nothing which we #now so clearly as his perfections!

This will appear sufficiently certain an &anifest to those who have been accusto&e to conte&plate the i ea of Go , an to turn their thoughts to his infinite perfectionsV for, although we &ay not co&prehen the&, because it is of the nature of the infinite not to be co&prehen e by what is finite, we nevertheless conceive the& &ore clearly an istinctly than &aterial objects, for this reason, that, being si&ple, an unobscure by li&its, 4*ootnote9 )fter ('A'T=, Rwhat of the& we o conceive is &uch less confuse ! There is, besi es, no speculation &ore calculate to ai in perfecting our un erstan ing, an which is &ore i&portant than this, inas&uch as the consi eration of an object that has no li&its to its perfections fills us with satisfaction an assurance!R8 *R23CC!5 they occupy our &in &ore fully! QQ! That we are not the cause of ourselves, but that this is Go , an conseMuently that there is a Go ! "ut, because every one has not observe this, an because, when we have an i ea of any &achine in which great s#ill is isplaye , we usually #now with sufficient accuracy the &anner in which we obtaine it, an as we cannot even recollect when the i ea we have of a Go was co&&unicate to us by hi&, seeing it was always in our &in s, it is still necessary that we shoul continue our review, an &a#e inMuiry after our author, possessing, as we o, the i ea of the infinite perfections of a Go 9 for it is in the highest egree evi ent by the natural light, that that which #nows so&ething &ore perfect than itself, is not the source of its own being, since it woul thus have given to itself all the perfections which it #nowsV an that, conseMuently, it coul raw its origin fro& no other being than fro& hi& who possesses in hi&self all those perfections, that is, fro& Go ! QQ'! That the uration alone of our life is sufficient to

e&onstrate the e%istence of Go ! The truth of this e&onstration will clearly appear, provi e we consi er the nature of ti&e, or the uration of thingsV for this is of such a #in that its parts are not &utually epen ent, an never co8e%istentV an , accor ingly, fro& the fact that we now are, it oes not necessarily follow that we shall be a &o&ent afterwar s, unless so&e cause, vi1!, that which first pro uce us, shall, as it were, continually repro uce us, that is, conserve us! *or we easily un erstan that there is no power in us by which we can conserve ourselves, an that the being who has so &uch power as to conserve us out of hi&self, &ust also by so &uch the greater reason conserve hi&self, or rather stan in nee of being conserve by no one whatever, an , in fine, be Go ! QQ''! That in #nowing the e%istence of Go , in the &anner here e%plaine , we li#ewise #now all his attributes, as far as they can be #nown by the natural light alone! There is the great a vantage in proving the e%istence of Go in this way, vi1!, by his i ea, that we at the sa&e ti&e #now what he is, as far as the wea#ness of our nature allowsV for, reflecting on the i ea we have of hi& which is born with us, we perceive that he is eternal, o&niscient, o&nipotent, the source of all goo ness an truth, creator of all things, an that, in fine, he has in hi&self all that in which we can clearly iscover any infinite perfection or goo that is not li&ite by any i&perfection! QQ'''! That Go is not corporeal, an oes not perceive by &eans of senses as we o, or will the evil of sin! *or there are in ee &any things in the worl that are to

a certain e%tent i&perfect or li&ite , though possessing also so&e perfectionV an it is accor ingly i&possible that any such can be in Go ! Thus, loo#ing to corporeal nature,4*ootnote9 'n the *rench, Rsince e%tension constitutes the nature of bo y!R5 since ivisibility is inclu e in local e%tension, an this in icates i&perfection, it is certain that Go is not bo y! )n although in &en it is to so&e egree a perfection to be capable of perceiving by &eans of the senses, nevertheless since in every sense there is passivity 4*ootnote9 'n the *rench, Rbecause our perceptions arise fro& i&pressions &a e upon us fro& another source,R i!e!, than ourselves!5 which in icates epen ency, we &ust conclu e that Go is in no &anner possesse of senses, an that he only un erstan s an wills, not, however, li#e us, by acts in any way istinct, but always by an act that is one, i entical, an the si&plest possible, un erstan s, wills, an operates all, that is, all things that in reality e%istV for he oes not will the evil of sin, seeing this is but the negation of being! QQ'B! That in passing fro& the #nowle ge of Go to the #nowle ge of the creatures, it is necessary to re&e&ber that our un erstan ing is finite, an the power of Go infinite! "ut as we #now that Go alone is the true cause of all that is or can be, we will oubtless follow the best way of philosophi1ing, if, fro& the #nowle ge we have of Go hi&self, we pass to the e%plication of the things which he has create , an essay to e uce it fro& the notions that are naturally in our &in s, for we will thus obtain the &ost perfect science, that is, the #nowle ge of effects through their causes! "ut that we &ay be able to &a#e this atte&pt with sufficient security fro& error, we &ust use the precaution to bear in &in as &uch as possible that Go , who is the author of things, is infinite,

while we are wholly finite! QQB! That we &ust believe all that Go has reveale , although it &ay surpass the reach of our faculties! Thus, if perhaps Go reveal to us or others, &atters concerning hi&self which surpass the natural powers of our &in , such as the &ysteries of the incarnation an of the trinity, we will not refuse to believe the&, although we &ay not clearly un erstan the&V nor will we be in any way surprise to fin in the i&&ensity of his nature, or even in what he has create , &any things that e%cee our co&prehension! QQB'! That it is not nee ful to enter into isputes 4*ootnote9 Rto essay to co&prehen the infinite!R88 *R23CC!5 regar ing the infinite, but &erely to hol all that in which we can fin no li&its as in efinite, such as the e%tension of the worl , the ivisibility of the parts of &atter, the nu&ber of the stars, etc! $e will thus never e&barrass ourselves by isputes about the infinite, seeing it woul be absur for us who are finite to un erta#e to eter&ine anything regar ing it, an thus as it were to li&it it by en eavouring to co&prehen it! $e will accor ingly give ourselves no concern to reply to those who e&an whether the half of an infinite line is also infinite, an whether an infinite nu&ber is even or o , an the li#e, because it is only such as i&agine their &in s to be infinite who see& boun to entertain Muestions of this sort! )n , for our part, loo#ing to all those things in which in certain senses, we iscover no li&its, we will not, therefore, affir& that they are infinite, but will regar the& si&ply as in efinite! Thus, because we cannot i&agine e%tension so great that we cannot still conceive greater, we will say that the &agnitu e of possible things is

in efinite, an because a bo y cannot be ivi e into parts so s&all that each of these &ay not be conceive as again ivi e into others still s&aller, let us regar Muantity as ivisible into parts whose nu&ber is in efiniteV an as we cannot i&agine so &any stars that it woul see& i&possible for Go to create &ore, let us suppose that their nu&ber is in efinite, an so in other instances! QQB''! $hat ifference there is between the in efinite an the infinite! )n we will call those things in efinite rather than infinite, with the view of reserving to Go alone the appellation of infiniteV in the first place, because not only o we iscover in hi& alone no li&its on any si e, but also because we positively conceive that he a &its of noneV an in the secon place, because we o not in the sa&e way positively conceive that other things are in every part unli&ite , but &erely negatively a &it that their li&its, if they have any, cannot be iscovere by us! QQB'''! That we &ust e%a&ine, not the final, but the efficient, causes of create things! (i#ewise, finally, we will not see# reasons of natural things fro& the en which Go or nature propose to hi&self in their creation .i! e!, final causes/, 4*ootnote9 R$e will not stop to consi er the en s which Go propose to hi&self in the creation of the worl , an we will entirely reject fro& our philosophy the search of final causesER88*rench!5 for we ought not to presu&e so far as to thin# that we are sharers in the counsels of Deity, but, consi ering hi& as the efficient cause of all things, let us en eavour to iscover by the natural light 4*ootnote9 R*aculty of reasoning!R88*R23CC!5 which he has plante

in us, applie to those of his attributes of which he has been willing we shoul have so&e #nowle ge, what &ust be conclu e regar ing those effects we perceive by our sensesV bearing in &in , however, what has been alrea y sai , that we &ust only confi e in this natural light so long as nothing contrary to its ictates is reveale by Go hi&self! 4*ootnote9 The last clause, beginning Rbearing in &in !R is o&itte in the *rench!5 QQ'Q! That Go is not the cause of our errors! The first attribute of Go which here falls to be consi ere , is that he is absolutely veracious an the source of all light, so that it is plainly repugnant for hi& to eceive us, or to be properly an positively the cause of the errors to which we are consciously subjectV for although the a ress to eceive see&s to be so&e &ar# of subtlety of &in a&ong &en, yet without oubt the will to eceive only procee s fro& &alice or fro& fear an wea#ness, an conseMuently cannot be attribute to Go ! QQQ! That conseMuently all which we clearly perceive is true, an that we are thus elivere fro& the oubts above propose ! $hence it follows, that the light of nature, or faculty of #nowle ge given us by Go , can never co&pass any object which is not true, in as far as it attains to a #nowle ge of it, that is, in as far as the object is clearly an istinctly apprehen e ! *or Go woul have &erite the appellation of a eceiver if he ha given us this faculty perverte , an such as &ight lea us to ta#e falsity for truth 4when we use it aright5! Thus the highest oubt is re&ove , which arose fro& our ignorance on the point as to whether perhaps our nature was such that we &ight be eceive even in those

things that appear to us the &ost evi ent! The sa&e principle ought also to be of avail against all the other groun s of oubting that have been alrea y enu&erate ! *or &athe&atical truths ought now to be above suspicion, since these are of the clearest! )n if we perceive anything by our senses, whether while awa#e or asleep, we will easily iscover the truth provi e we separate what there is of clear an istinct in the #nowle ge fro& what is obscure an confuse ! There is no nee that ' shoul here say &ore on this subject, since it has alrea y receive a&ple treat&ent in the &etaphysical Ae itationsV an what follows will serve to e%plain it still &ore accurately! QQQ'! That our errors are, in respect of Go , &erely negations, but, in respect of ourselves, privations! "ut as it happens that we freMuently fall into error, although Go is no eceiver, if we esire to inMuire into the origin an cause of our errors, with a view to guar against the&, it is necessary to observe that they epen less on our un erstan ing than on our will, an that they have no nee of the actual concourse of Go , in or er to their pro uctionV so that, when consi ere in reference to Go , they are &erely negations, but in reference to ourselves, privations! QQQ''! That there are only two &o es of thin#ing in us, vi1!, the perception of the un erstan ing an the action of the will! *or all the &o es of thin#ing of which we are conscious &ay be referre to two general classes, the one of which is the perception or operation of the un erstan ing, an the other the volition or operation of the will! Thus, to perceive by the senses .=23T'R2/, to i&agine, an to conceive things purely intelligible, are only ifferent

&o es of perceiving .P2RC'P '23D'/V but to esire, to be averse fro&, to affir&, to eny, to oubt, are ifferent &o es of willing! QQQ'''! That we never err unless when we ju ge of so&ething which we o not sufficiently apprehen ! $hen we apprehen anything we are in no anger of error, if we refrain fro& ju ging of it in any wayV an even when we have for&e a ju g&ent regar ing it, we woul never fall into error, provi e we gave our assent only to what we clearly an istinctly perceive V but the reason why we are usually eceive , is that we ju ge without possessing an e%act #nowle ge of that of which we ju ge! QQQ'B! That the will as well as the un erstan ing is reMuire for ju ging! ' a &it that the un erstan ing is necessary for ju ging, there being no roo& to suppose that we can ju ge of that which we in no way apprehen V but the will also is reMuire in or er to our assenting to what we have in any egree perceive ! 't is not necessary, however, at least to for& any ju g&ent whatever, that we have an entire an perfect apprehension of a thingV for we &ay assent to &any things of which we have only a very obscure an confuse #nowle ge! QQQB! That the will is of greater e%tension than the un erstan ing, an is thus the source of our errors! *urther, the perception of the intellect e%ten s only to the few things that are presente to it, an is always very li&ite 9 the will, on the other han , &ay, in a certain sense, be sai to be infinite, because we observe nothing that can be the object of the will of any other,

even of the unli&ite will of Go , to which ours cannot also e%ten , so that we easily carry it beyon the objects we clearly perceiveV an when we o this, it is not won erful that we happen to be eceive ! QQQB'! That our errors cannot be i&pute to Go ! "ut although Go has not given us an o&niscient un erstan ing, he is not on this account to be consi ere in any wise the author of our errors, for it is of the nature of create intellect to be finite, an of finite intellect not to e&brace all things! QQQB''! That the chief perfection of &an is his being able to act freely or by will, an that it is this which ren ers hi& worthy of praise or bla&e! That the will shoul be the &ore e%tensive is in har&ony with its nature9 an it is a high perfection in &an to be able to act by &eans of it, that is, freelyV an thus in a peculiar way to be the &aster of his own actions, an &erit praise or bla&e! *or self8 acting &achines are not co&&en e because they perfor& with e%actness all the &ove&ents for which they were a apte , seeing their &otions are carrie on necessarilyV but the &a#er of the& is praise on account of the e%actness with which they were fra&e , because he i not act of necessity, but freelyV an , on the sa&e principle, we &ust attribute to ourselves so&ething &ore on this account, that when we e&brace truth, we o so not of necessity, but freely! QQQB'''! That error is a efect in our &o e of acting, not in our natureV an that the faults of their subjects &ay be freMuently attribute to other &asters, but never to Go !

't is true, that as often as we err, there is so&e efect in our &o e of action or in the use of our liberty, but not in our nature, because this is always the sa&e, whether our ju g&ents be true or false! )n although Go coul have given to us such perspicacity of intellect that we shoul never have erre , we have, notwithstan ing, no right to e&an this of hi&V for, although with us he who was able to prevent evil an i not is hel guilty of it, Go is not in the sa&e way to be rec#one responsible for our errors because he ha the power to prevent the&, inas&uch as the o&inion which so&e &en possess over others has been institute for the purpose of enabling the& to hin er those un er the& fro& oing evil, whereas the o&inion which Go e%ercises over the universe is perfectly absolute an free! *or this reason we ought to than# hi& for the goo s he has given us, an not co&plain that he has not blesse us with all which we #now it was in his power to i&part! QQQ'Q! That the liberty of our will is self8evi ent! *inally, it is so &anifest that we possess a free will, capable of giving or withhol ing its assent, that this truth &ust be rec#one a&ong the first an &ost co&&on notions which are born with us! This, in ee , has alrea y very clearly appeare , for when essaying to oubt of all things, we went so far as to suppose even that he who create us e&ploye his li&itless power in eceiving us in every way, we were conscious nevertheless of being free to abstain fro& believing what was not in every respect certain an un oubte ! "at that of which we are unable to oubt at such a ti&e is as self8 evi ent an clear as any thing we can ever #now! Q(! That it is li#ewise certain that Go has fore8or aine all things!

"ut because what we have alrea y iscovere of Go , gives us the assurance that his power is so i&&ense that we woul sin in thin#ing ourselves capable of ever oing anything which he ha not or aine beforehan , we shoul soon be e&barrasse in great ifficulties if we un ertoo# to har&onise the pre8or ination of Go with the free o& of our will, an en eavoure to co&prehen both truths at once! Q('! Cow the free o& of our will &ay be reconcile with the Divine pre8or ination! "ut, in place of this, we will be free fro& these e&barrass&ents if we recollect that our &in is li&ite , while the power of Go , by which he not only #new fro& all eternity what is or can be, but also wille an pre8 or aine it, is infinite! 't thus happens that we possess sufficient intelligence to #now clearly an istinctly that this power is in Go , but not enough to co&prehen how he leaves the free actions of &en in eter&inateX an , on the other han , we have such consciousness of the liberty an in ifference which e%ists in ourselves, that there is nothing we &ore clearly or perfectly co&prehen 9 4so that the o&nipotence of Go ought not to #eep us fro& believing it5! *or it woul be absur to oubt of that of which we are fully conscious, an which we e%perience as e%isting in ourselves, because we o not co&prehen another &atter which, fro& its very nature, we #now to be inco&prehensible! Q(''! Cow, although we never will to err, it is nevertheless by our will that we o err! "ut now since we #now that all our errors epen upon our will, an as no one wishes to eceive hi&self, it &ay see& won erful that there is any error in our ju g&ents at all! 't is necessary to re&ar#, however, that there is a

great ifference between willing to be eceive , an willing to yiel assent to opinions in which it happens that error is foun ! *or though there is no one who e%pressly wishes to fall into error, we will yet har ly fin any one who is not rea y to assent to things in which, un#nown to hi&self, error lur#sV an it even freMuently happens that it is the esire itself of following after truth that lea s those not fully aware of the or er in which it ought to be sought for, to pass ju g&ent on &atters of which they have no a eMuate #nowle ge, an thus to fall into error! Q('''! That we shall never err if we give our assent only to what we clearly an istinctly perceive! "ut it is certain we will never a &it falsity for truth, so long as we ju ge only of that which we clearly an istinctly perceiveV because, as Go is no eceiver, the faculty of #nowle ge which he has given us cannot be fallacious, nor, for the sa&e reason, the faculty of will, when we o not e%ten it beyon the objects we clearly #now! )n even although this truth coul not be establishe by reasoning, the &in s of all have been so i&presse by nature as spontaneously to assent to whatever is clearly perceive , an to e%perience an i&possibility to oubt of its truth! Q('B! That we unifor&ly ju ge i&properly when we assent to what we o not clearly perceive, although our ju g&ent &ay chance to be trueV an that it is freMuently our &e&ory which eceives us by lea ing us to believe that certain things were for&erly sufficiently un erstoo by us! 't is li#ewise certain that, when we approve of any reason which we o not apprehen , we are either eceive , or, if we stu&ble on the truth, it is only by

chance, an thus we can never possess the assurance that we are not in error! ' confess it sel o& happens that we ju ge of a thing when we have observe we o not apprehen it, because it is a ictate of the natural light never to ju ge of what we o not #now! "ut we &ost freMuently err in this, that we presu&e upon a past #nowle ge of &uch to which we give our assent, as to so&ething treasure up in the &e&ory, an perfectly #nown to usV whereas, in truth, we have no such #nowle ge! Q(B! $hat constitutes clear an istinct perception!

There are in ee a great &any persons who, through their whole lifeti&e, never perceive anything in a way necessary for ju ging of it properlyV for the #nowle ge upon which we can establish a certain an in ubitable ju g&ent &ust be not only clear, but also, istinct! ' call that clear which is present an &anifest to the &in giving attention to it, just as we are sai clearly to see objects when, being present to the eye loo#ing on, they sti&ulate it with sufficient force! an it is ispose to regar the&V but the istinct is that which is so precise an ifferent fro& all other objects as to co&prehen in itself only what is clear! 4*ootnote9 Rwhat appears &anifestly to hi& who consi ers it as he ought!R88 *R23CC!5 Q(B'! 't is shown, fro& the e%a&ple of pain, that a perception &ay be clear without being istinct, but that it cannot be istinct unless it is clear! *or e%a&ple, when any one feels intense pain, the #nowle ge which he has of this pain is very clear, but it is not always istinctV for &en usually confoun it with the obscure ju g&ent they for& regar ing its nature, an thin# that there is in the suffering part so&ething

si&ilar to the sensation of pain of which they are alone conscious! )n thus perception &ay be clear without being istinct, but it can never be istinct without li#ewise being clear! Q(B''! That, to correct the preju ices of our early years, we &ust consi er what is clear in each of our si&ple 4*ootnote9 Rfirst!R88 *R23CC!5 notions! )n , in ee , in our early years, the &in was so i&&erse in the bo y, that, although it perceive &any things with sufficient clearness, it yet #new nothing istinctlyV an since even at that ti&e we e%ercise our ju g&ent in &any &atters, nu&erous preju ices were thus contracte , which, by the &ajority, are never afterwar s lai asi e! "ut that we &ay now be in a position to get ri of these, ' will here briefly enu&erate all the si&ple notions of which our thoughts are co&pose , an istinguish in each what is clear fro& what is obscure, or fitte to lea into error! Q(B'''! That all the objects of our #nowle ge are to be regar e either .-/ as things or the affections of things9 or .2/ as eternal truthsV with the enu&eration of things! $hatever objects fall un er our #nowle ge we consi er either as things or the affections of things,4*ootnote9 Things an the affections of things are .in the *rench/ eMuivalent to Rwhat has so&e .i!e!, a R2)(/ e%istence,R as oppose to the class of Reternal truths,R which have &erely an 'D2)( e%istence!5 or as eternal truths possessing no e%istence beyon our thought! ?f the first class the &ost general are substance, uration, or er, nu&ber, an perhaps also so&e others, which notions apply to all the #in s of things! ' o not, however, recognise &ore than two highest #in s .=@AA) G232R)/ of thingsV the first of intellectual things, or such as have

the power of thin#ing, inclu ing &in or thin#ing substance an its propertiesV the secon , of &aterial things, e&bracing e%ten e substance, or bo y an its properties! Perception, volition, an all &o es as well of #nowing as of willing, are relate to thin#ing substanceV on the other han , to e%ten e substance we refer &agnitu e, or e%tension in length, brea th, an epth, figure, &otion, situation, ivisibility of parts the&selves, an the li#e! There are, however, besi es these, certain things of which we have an internal e%perience that ought not to be referre either to the &in of itself, or to the bo y alone, but to the close an inti&ate union between the&, as will hereafter be shown in its place! ?f this class are the appetites of hunger an thirst, etc!, an also the e&otions or passions of the &in which are not e%clusively &ental affections, as the e&otions of anger, joy, sa ness, love, etc!V an , finally, all the sensations, as of pain, titillation, light an colours, soun s, s&ells, tastes, heat, har ness, an the other tactile Mualities! Q('Q! That the eternal truths cannot be thus enu&erate , but that this is not necessary! $hat ' have alrea y enu&erate we are to regar as things, or the Mualities or &o es of things! $e now co&e to spea# of eternal truths! $hen we apprehen that it is i&possible a thing can arise fro& nothing, this proposition, 2Q 3'C'(? 3'C'( *'T, is not consi ere as so&ewhat e%isting, or as the &o e of a thing, but as an eternal truth having its seat in our &in , an is calle a co&&on notion or a%io&! ?f this class are the following988't is i&possible the sa&e thing can at once be an not beV what is one cannot be un oneV he who thin#s &ust e%ist while he thin#sV an innu&erable others, the whole of which it is in ee ifficult to enu&erate, but this is not necessary, since, if blin e by

no preju ices, we cannot fail to #now the& when the occasion of thin#ing the& occurs! (! That these truths are clearly perceive , but not eMually by all &en, on account of preju ices! )n , in ee , with regar to these co&&on notions, it is not to be oubte that they can be clearly an istinctly #nown, for otherwise they woul not &erit this appellation9 as, in truth, so&e of the& are not, with respect to all &en, eMually eserving of the na&e, because they are not eMually a &itte by all9 not, however, fro& this reason, as ' thin#, that the faculty of #nowle ge of one &an e%ten s farther than that of another, but rather because these co&&on notions are oppose to the preju ices of so&e, who, on this account, are not able rea ily to e&brace the&, even although others, who are free fro& those preju ices, apprehen the& with the greatest clearness! ('! $hat substance is, an that the ter& is not applicable to Go an the creatures in the sa&e sense! "ut with regar to what we consi er as things or the &o es of things, it is worth while to e%a&ine each of the& by itself! "y substance we can conceive nothing else than a thing which e%ists in such a way as to stan in nee of nothing beyon itself in or er to its e%istence! )n , in truth, there can be conceive but one substance which is absolutely in epen ent, an that is Go ! $e perceive that all other things can e%ist only by help of the concourse of Go ! )n , accor ingly, the ter& substance oes not apply to Go an the creatures @3'B?C)((;, to a opt a ter& fa&iliar in the schoolsV that is, no signification of this wor can be istinctly un erstoo which is co&&on to Go an the&!

(''! That the ter& is applicable univocally to the &in an the bo y, an how substance itself is #nown! Create substances, however, whether corporeal or thin#ing, &ay be conceive un er this co&&on conceptV for these are things which, in or er to their e%istence, stan in nee of nothing but the concourse of Go ! "ut yet substance cannot be first iscovere &erely fro& its being a thing which e%ists in epen ently, for e%istence by itself is not observe by us! $e easily, however, iscover substance itself fro& any attribute of it, by this co&&on notion, that of nothing there are no attributes, properties, or Mualities9 for, fro& perceiving that so&e attribute is present, we infer that so&e e%isting thing or substance to which it &ay be attribute is also of necessity present! ('''! That of every substance there is one principal attribute, as thin#ing of the &in , e%tension of the bo y! "ut, although any attribute is sufficient to lea us to the #nowle ge of substance, there is, however, one principal property of every substance, which constitutes its nature or essence, an upon which all the others epen ! Thus, e%tension in length, brea th, an epth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substanceV an thought the nature of thin#ing substance! *or every other thing that can be attribute to bo y, presupposes e%tension, an is only so&e &o e of an e%ten e thingV as all the properties we iscover in the &in are only iverse &o es of thin#ing! Thus, for e%a&ple, we cannot conceive figure unless in so&ething e%ten e , nor &otion unless in e%ten e space, nor i&agination, sensation, or will, unless in a thin#ing thing! "ut, on the other han , we can conceive e%tension without figure or &otion, an thought without i&agination or sensation, an so of the othersV as is clear to any one who atten s to these

&atters! ('B! Cow we &ay have clear an istinct notions of the substance which thin#s, of that which is corporeal, an of Go ! )n thus we &ay easily have two clear an istinct notions or i eas, the one of create substance, which thin#s, the other of corporeal substance, provi e we carefully istinguish all the attributes of thought fro& those of e%tension! $e &ay also have a clear an istinct i ea of an uncreate an in epen ent thin#ing substance, that is, of Go , provi e we o not suppose that this i ea a eMuately represents to us all that is in Go , an o not &i% up with it anything fictitious, but atten si&ply to the characters that are co&prise in the notion we have of hi&, an which we clearly #now to belong to the nature of an absolutely perfect "eing! *or no one can eny that there is in us such an i ea of Go , without groun lessly supposing that there is no #nowle ge of Go at all in the hu&an &in ! (B! Cow uration, or er, an nu&ber &ay be also istinctly conceive ! $e will also have &ost istinct conceptions of uration, or er, an nu&ber, if, in place of &i%ing up with our notions of the& that which properly belongs to the concept of substance, we &erely thin# that the uration of a thing is a &o e un er which we conceive this thing, in so far as it continues to e%istV an , in li#e &anner, that or er an nu&ber are not in reality ifferent fro& things ispose in or er an nu&bere , but only &o es un er which we iversely consi er these things! (B'! $hat are &o es, Mualities, attributes!

)n , in ee , we here un erstan by &o es the sa&e with what we elsewhere esignate attributes or Mualities! "ut when we consi er substance as affecte or varie by the&, we use the ter& &o esV when fro& this variation it &ay be eno&inate of such a #in , we a opt the ter& Mualities 4to esignate the ifferent &o es which cause it to be so na&e 5V an , finally, when we si&ply regar these &o es as in the substance, we call the& attributes! )ccor ingly, since Go &ust be conceive as superior to change, it is not proper to say that there are &o es or Mualities in hi&, but si&ply attributesV an even in create things that which is foun in the& always in the sa&e &o e, as e%istence an uration in the thing which e%ists an en ures, ought to be calle attribute an not &o e or Muality! (B''! That so&e attributes e%ist in the things to which they are attribute , an others only in our thoughtV an what uration an ti&e are! ?f these attributes or &o es there are so&e which e%ist in the things the&selves, an others that have only an e%istence in our thoughtV thus, for e%a&ple, ti&e, which we istinguish fro& uration ta#en in its generality, an call the &easure of &otion, is only a certain &o e un er which we thin# uration itself, for we o not in ee conceive the uration of things that are &ove to be ifferent fro& the uration of things that are not &ove 9 as is evi ent fro& this, that if two bo ies are in &otion for an hour, the one &oving Muic#ly an the other slowly, we o not rec#on &ore ti&e in the one than in the other, although there &ay be &uch &ore &otion in the one of the bo ies than in the other! "ut that we &ay co&prehen the uration of all things un er a co&&on &easure, we co&pare their uration with that of the greatest an &ost regular &otions that give rise to years an ays, an which we call ti&eV hence what is so

esignate is nothing supera e to uration, ta#en in its generality, but a &o e of thin#ing! (B'''! That nu&ber an all universals are only &o es of thought! 'n the sa&e way nu&ber, when it is not consi ere as in create things, but &erely in the abstract or in general, is only a &o e of thin#ingV an the sa&e is true of all those general i eas we call universals! ('Q! Cow universals are for&e V an what are the five co&&on, vi1!, genus, species, ifference, property, an acci ent! @niversals arise &erely fro& our &a#ing use of one an the sa&e i ea in thin#ing of all in ivi ual objects between which there subsists a certain li#enessV an when we co&prehen all the objects represente by this i ea un er one na&e, this ter& li#ewise beco&es universal! *or e%a&ple, when we see two stones, an o not regar their nature farther than to re&ar# that there are two of the&, we for& the i ea of a certain nu&ber, which we call the binaryV an when we afterwar s see two bir s or two trees, an &erely ta#e notice of the& so far as to observe that there are two of the&, we again ta#e up the sa&e i ea as before, which is, accor ingly, universalV an we li#ewise give to this nu&ber the sa&e universal appellation of binary! 'n the sa&e way, when we consi er a figure of three si es, we for& a certain i ea, which we call the i ea of a triangle, an we afterwar s &a#e use of it as the universal to represent to our &in all other figures of three si es! "ut when we re&ar# &ore particularly that of figures of three si es, so&e have a right angle an others not, we for& the universal i ea of a right8angle triangle, which being relate to the prece ing as &ore general, &ay be calle

speciesV an the right angle the universal ifference by which right8angle triangles are istinguishe fro& all othersV an farther, because the sMuare of the si e which sustains the right angle is eMual to the sMuares of the other two si es, an because this property belongs only to this species of triangles, we &ay call it the universal property of the species! *inally, if we suppose that of these triangles so&e are &ove an others not, this will be their universal acci entV an , accor ingly, we co&&only rec#on five universals, vi1!, genus, species, ifference, property, acci ent! (Q! ?f istinctionsV an first of the real! "ut nu&ber in things the&selves arises fro& the istinction there is between the&9 an istinction is threefol , vi1!, real, &o al, an of reason! The real properly subsists between two or &ore substancesV an it is sufficient to assure us that two substances are really &utually istinct, if only we are able clearly an istinctly to conceive the one of the& without the other! *or the #nowle ge we have of Go ren ers it certain that he can effect all that of which we have a istinct i ea9 wherefore, since we have now, for e%a&ple, the i ea of an e%ten e an corporeal substance, though we as yet o not #now with certainty whether any such thing is really e%istent, nevertheless, &erely because we have the i ea of it, we &ay be assure that such &ay e%istV an , if it really e%ists, that every part which we can eter&ine by thought &ust be really istinct fro& the other parts of the sa&e substance! 'n the sa&e way, since every one is conscious that he thin#s, an that he in thought can e%clu e fro& hi&self every other substance, whether thin#ing or e%ten e , it is certain that each of us thus consi ere is really istinct fro& every other thin#ing an corporeal substance! )n although we suppose that Go unite a bo y to a soul so

closely that it was i&possible to for& a &ore inti&ate union, an thus &a e a co&posite whole, the two substances woul re&ain really istinct, notwithstan ing this unionV for with whatever tie Go connecte the&, he was not able to ri hi&self of the power he possesse of separating the&, or of conserving the one apart fro& the other, an the things which Go can separate or conserve separately are really istinct! (Q'! ?f the &o al istinction! There are two #in s of &o al istinctions, vi1!, that between the &o e properly so8calle an the substance of which it is a &o e, an that between two &o es of the sa&e substance! ?f the for&er we have an e%a&ple in this, that we can clearly apprehen substance apart fro& the &o e which we say iffers fro& itV while, on the other han , we cannot conceive this &o e without conceiving the substance itself! There is, for e%a&ple, a &o al istinction between figure or &otion an corporeal substance in which both e%istV there is a si&ilar istinction between affir&ation or recollection an the &in ! ?f the latter #in we have an illustration in our ability to recognise the one of two &o es apart fro& the other, as figure apart fro& &otion, an &otion apart fro& figureV though we cannot thin# of either the one or the other without thin#ing of the co&&on substance in which they a here! 'f, for e%a&ple, a stone is &ove , an is withal sMuare, we can, in ee , conceive its sMuare figure without its &otion, an reciprocally its &otion without its sMuare figureV but we can conceive neither this &otion nor this figure apart fro& the substance of the stone! )s for the istinction accor ing to which the &o e of one substance is ifferent fro& another substance, or fro& the &o e of another substance, as the &otion of one bo y is ifferent fro& another bo y or fro& the &in , or as &otion is ifferent

fro& oubt, it see&s to &e that it shoul be calle real rather than &o al, because these &o es cannot be clearly conceive apart fro& the really istinct substances of which they are the &o es! (Q''! ?f the istinction of reason .logical istinction/! *inally, the istinction of reason is that between a substance an so&e one of its attributes, without which it is i&possible, however, we can have a istinct conception of the substance itselfV or between two such attributes of a co&&on substance, the one of which we essay to thin# without the other! This istinction is &anifest fro& our inability to for& a clear an istinct i ea of such substance, if we separate fro& it such attributeV or to have a clear perception of the one of two such attributes if we separate it fro& the other! *or e%a&ple, because any substance which ceases to en ure ceases also to e%ist, uration is not istinct fro& substance e%cept in thought .R)T'?32/V an in general all the &o es of thin#ing which we consi er as in objects iffer only in thought, as well fro& the objects of which they are thought as fro& each other in a co&&on object! 4*ootnote9 Ran generally all the attributes that lea us to entertain ifferent thoughts of the sa&e thing, such as, for e%a&ple, the e%tension of bo y an its property of ivisibility, o not iffer fro& the bo y which is to us the object of the&, or fro& each other, unless as we so&eti&es confuse ly thin# the one without thin#ing the other!R88*R23CC!5 't occurs, in ee , to &e that ' have elsewhere classe this #in of istinction with the &o al .vi1!, towar s the en of the Reply to the *irst ?bjections to the Ae itations on the *irst Philosophy/V but there it was only necessary to treat of these istinctions generally, an it was sufficient for &y purpose at that ti&e si&ply to istinguish both of the& fro& the real!

(Q'''! Cow thought an e%tension &ay be istinctly #nown, as constituting, the one the nature of &in , the other that of bo y! Thought an e%tension &ay be regar e as constituting the natures of intelligent an corporeal substanceV an then they &ust not be otherwise conceive than as the thin#ing an e%ten e substances the&selves, that is, as &in an bo y, which in this way are conceive with the greatest clearness an istinctness! Aoreover, we &ore easily conceive e%ten e or thin#ing substance than substance by itself, or with the o&ission of its thin#ing or e%tension! *or there is so&e ifficulty in abstracting the notion of substance fro& the notions of thin#ing an e%tension, which, in truth, are only iverse in thought itself .i!e!, logically ifferent/V an a concept is not &ore istinct because it co&prehen s fewer properties, but because we accurately istinguish what is co&prehen e in it fro& all other notions! (Q'B! Cow these &ay li#ewise be istinctly conceive as &o es of substance! Thought an e%tension &ay be also consi ere as &o es of substanceV in as far, na&ely, as the sa&e &in &ay have &any ifferent thoughts, an the sa&e bo y, with its si1e unchange , &ay be e%ten e in several iverse ways, at one ti&e &ore in length an less in brea th or epth, an at another ti&e &ore in brea th an less in lengthV an then they are &o ally istinguishe fro& substance, an can be conceive not less clearly an istinctly, provi e they be not regar e as substances or things separate fro& others, but si&ply as &o es of things! *or by regar ing the& as in the substances of which they are the &o es, we istinguish the& fro& these substances, an ta#e the& for what in truth they are9 whereas, on the other han , if

we wish to consi er the& apart fro& the substances in which they are, we shoul by this itself regar the& as self8subsisting things, an thus confoun the i eas of &o e an substance! (QB! Cow we &ay li#ewise #now their &o es! 'n the sa&e way we will best apprehen the iverse &o es of thought, as intellection, i&agination, recollection, volition, etc!, an also the iverse &o es of e%tension, or those that belong to e%tension, as all figures, the situation of parts an their &otions, provi e we consi er the& si&ply as &o es of the things in which they areV an &otion as far as it is concerne , provi e we thin# &erely of loco&otion, without see#ing to #now the force that pro uces it, an which nevertheless ' will essay to e%plain in its own place! (QB'! Cow our sensations, affections, an appetites &ay be clearly #nown, although we are freMuently wrong in our ju g&ents regar ing the&! There re&ain our sensations, affections, an appetites, of which we &ay also have a clear #nowle ge, if we ta#e care to co&prehen in the ju g&ents we for& of the& only that which is precisely containe in our perception of the&, an of which we are i&&e iately conscious! There is, however, great ifficulty in observing this, at least in respect of sensationsV because we have all, without e%ception, fro& our youth ju ge that all the things we perceive by our senses ha an e%istence beyon our thought, an that they were entirely si&ilar to the sensations, that is, perceptions, we a of the&! Thus when, for e%a&ple, we saw a certain colour, we thought we saw so&ething occupying a place out of us, an which was entirely si&ilar to that i ea of colour we were then conscious ofV an fro& the habit of ju ging in

this way, we see&e to see this so clearly an istinctly that we estee&e it .i!e!, the e%ternality of the colour/ certain an in ubitable! (QB''! That we are freMuently eceive in our ju g&ents regar ing pain itself! The sa&e preju ice has place in all our other sensations, even in those of titillation an pain! *or though we are not in the habit of believing that there e%ist out of us objects that rese&ble titillation an pain, we o not nevertheless consi er these sensations as in the &in alone, or in our perception, but as in the han , or foot, or so&e other part of our bo y! There is no reason, however, to constrain us to believe that the pain, for e%a&ple, which we feel, as it were, in the foot is so&ething out of the &in e%isting in the foot, or that the light which we see, as it were, in the sun e%ists in the sun as it is in us! "oth these beliefs are preju ices of our early years, as will clearly appear in the seMuel! (QB'''! Cow in these things what we clearly conceive is to be istinguishe fro& that in which we &ay be eceive ! "ut that we &ay istinguish what is clear in our sensations fro& what is obscure, we ought &ost carefully to observe that we possess a clear an istinct #nowle ge of pain, colour, an other things of this sort, when we consi er the& si&ply as sensations or thoughtsV but that, when they are ju ge to be certain things subsisting beyon our &in , we are wholly unable to for& any conception of the&! 'n ee , when any one tells us that he sees colour in a bo y or feels pain in one of his li&bs, this is e%actly the sa&e as if he sai that he there saw or felt so&ething of the nature of which he was entirely ignorant, or that he i not #now what he saw or felt! *or although, when less attentively

e%a&ining his thoughts, a person &ay easily persua e hi&self that he has so&e #nowle ge of it, since he supposes that there is so&ething rese&bling that sensation of colour or of pain of which he is consciousV yet, if he reflects on what the sensation of colour or pain represents to hi& as e%isting in a coloure bo y or in a woun e &e&ber, he will fin that of such he has absolutely no #nowle ge! (Q'Q! That &agnitu e, figure, etc!, are #nown far ifferently fro& colour, pain, etc! $hat we have sai above will be &ore &anifestV especially if we consi er that si1e in the bo y perceive , figure, &otion .at least local, for philosophers by fancying other #in s of &otion have ren ere its nature less intelligible to the&selves/, the situation of parts, uration, nu&ber, an those other properties which, as we have alrea y sai , we clearly perceive in all bo ies, are #nown by us in a way altogether ifferent fro& that in which we #now what colour is in the sa&e bo y, or pain, s&ell, taste, or any other of those properties which ' have sai above &ust be referre to the senses! *or although when we see a bo y we are not less assure of its e%istence fro& its appearing figure than fro& its appearing coloure ,4*ootnote9 Rby the colour we perceive on occasion of it!R88 *R23CC!5 we yet #now with far greater clearness its property of figure than its colour! (QQ! That we &ay ju ge of sensible things in two ways, by the one of which we avoi error, by the other fall into it! 't is thus &anifest that to say we perceive colours in objects is in reality eMuivalent to saying we perceive so&ething in objects an are yet ignorant of what it is, e%cept as that which eter&ines in us a certain highly

vivi an clear sensation, which we call the sensation of colours! There is, however, very great iversity in the &anner of ju ging9 for so long as we si&ply ju ge that there is an un#nown so&ething in objects .that is, in things such as they are, fro& which the sensation reache us/, so far are we fro& falling into error that, on the contrary, we thus rather provi e against it, for we are less apt to ju ge rashly of a thing which we observe we o not #now! "ut when we thin# we perceive colours in objects, although we are in reality ignorant of what we then eno&inate colour, an are unable to conceive any rese&blance between the colour we suppose to be in objects, an that of which we are conscious in sensation, yet because we o not observe this, or because there are in objects several properties, as si1e, figure, nu&ber, etc!, which, as we clearly #now, e%ist, or &ay e%ist in the& as they are perceive by our senses or conceive by our un erstan ing, we easily gli e into the error of hol ing that what is calle colour in objects is so&ething entirely rese&bling the colour we perceive, an thereafter of supposing that we have a clear perception of what is in no way perceive by us! (QQ'! That the chief cause of our errors is to be foun in the preju ices of our chil hoo ! )n here we &ay notice the first an chief cause of our errors! 'n early life the &in was so closely boun to the bo y that it atten e to nothing beyon the thoughts by which it perceive the objects that &a e i&pression on the bo yV nor as yet i it refer these thoughts to anything e%isting beyon itself, but si&ply felt pain when the bo y was hurt, or pleasure when anything beneficial to the bo y occurre , or if the bo y was so highly affecte that it was neither greatly benefite nor hurt, the &in e%perience the sensations we call tastes, s&ells, soun s, heat, col , light, colours, an the li#e,

which in truth are representative of nothing e%isting out of our &in , an which vary accor ing to the iversities of the parts an &o es in which the bo y is affecte ! 4*ootnote9 Rwhich vary accor ing to the iversities of the &ove&ents that pass fro& all parts of our bo y to the part of the brain to which it .the &in / is closely joine an unite !R88*R23CC!5 The &in at the sa&e ti&e also perceive &agnitu es, figures, &otions, an the li#e, which were not presente to it as sensations but as things or the &o es of things e%isting, or at least capable of e%isting out of thought, although it i not yet observe this ifference between these two #in s of perceptions! )n afterwar s when the &achine of the bo y, which has been so fabricate by nature that it can of its own inherent power &ove itself in various ways, by turning itself at ran o& on every si e, followe after what was useful an avoi e what was etri&entalV the &in , which was closely connecte with it, reflecting on the objects it pursue or avoi e , re&ar#e , for the first ti&e, that they e%iste out of itself, an not only attribute to the& &agnitu es, figures, &otions, an the li#e, which it apprehen e either as things or as the &o es of things, but, in a ition, attribute to the& tastes, o ours, an the other i eas of that sort, the sensations of which were cause by itselfV 4*ootnote9 Rwhich it perceive on occasion of the&R .i!e!, of e%ternal objects/!88*R23CC!5 an as it only consi ere other objects in so far as they were useful to the bo y, in which it was i&&erse , it ju ge that there was greater or less reality in each object, accor ing as the i&pressions it cause on the bo y were &ore or less powerful! Cence arose the belief that there was &ore substance or bo y in roc#s an &etals than in air or water, because the &in perceive in the& &ore har ness an weight! Aoreover, the air was thought to be &erely nothing so long as we e%perience no agitation of it by the win , or i not feel it hot or col !

)n because the stars gave har ly &ore light than the slen er fla&es of can les, we suppose that each star was but of this si1e! )gain, since the &in i not observe that the earth &ove on its a%is, or that its superficies was curve li#e that of a globe, it was on that account &ore rea y to ju ge the earth i&&ovable an its surface flat! )n our &in has been i&bue fro& our infancy with a thousan other preju ices of the sa&e sort which afterwar s in our youth we forgot we ha accepte without sufficient e%a&ination, an a &itte as possesse of the highest truth an clearness, as if they ha been #nown by &eans of our senses, or i&plante in us by nature! (QQ''! That the secon cause of our errors is that we cannot forget these preju ices! )n although now in our &ature years, when the &in , being no longer wholly subject to the bo y, is not in the habit of referring all things to it, but also see#s to iscover the truth of things consi ere in the&selves, we observe the falsehoo of a great &any of the ju g&ents we ha before for&e V yet we e%perience a ifficulty in e%punging the& fro& our &e&ory, an , so long as they re&ain there, they give rise to various errors! Thus, for e%a&ple, since fro& our earliest years we i&agine the stars to be of very s&all si1e, we fin it highly ifficult to ri ourselves of this i&agination, although assure by plain astrono&ical reasons that they are of the greatest,88so prevailing is the power of preconceive opinion! (QQ'''! The thir cause is, that we beco&e fatigue by atten ing to those objects which are not present to the sensesV an that we are thus accusto&e to ju ge of these not fro& present perception but fro& pre8 conceive opinion!

"esi es, our &in cannot atten to any object without at length e%periencing so&e pain an fatigueV an of all objects it has the greatest ifficulty in atten ing to those which are present neither to the senses nor to the i&agination9 whether for the reason that this is natural to it fro& its union with the bo y, or because in our early years, being occupie &erely with perceptions an i&aginations, it has beco&e &ore fa&iliar with, an acMuire greater facility in thin#ing in those &o es than in any other! Cence it also happens that &any are unable to conceive any substance e%cept what is i&aginable an corporeal, an even sensible! *or they are ignorant of the circu&stance, that those objects alone are i&aginable which consist in e%tension, &otion, an figure, while there are &any others besi es these that are intelligibleV an they persua e the&selves that nothing can subsist but bo y, an , finally, that there is no bo y which is not sensible! )n since in truth we perceive no object such as it is by sense alone 4but only by our reason e%ercise upon sensible objects5, as will hereafter be clearly shown, it thus happens that the &ajority uring life perceive nothing unless in a confuse way! (QQ'B! The fourth source of our errors is, that we attach our thoughts to wor s which o not e%press the& with accuracy! *inally, since for the use of speech we attach all our conceptions to wor s by which to e%press the&, an co&&it to &e&ory our thoughts in connection with these ter&s, an as we afterwar s fin it &ore easy to recall the wor s than the things signifie by the&, we can scarcely conceive anything with such istinctness as to separate entirely what we conceive fro& the wor s that were selecte to e%press it! ?n this account the &ajority atten to wor s rather than to thingsV an thus

very freMuently assent to ter&s without attaching to the& any &eaning, either because they thin# they once un erstoo the&, or i&agine they receive the& fro& others by who& they were correctly un erstoo ! This, however, is not the place to treat of this &atter in etail, seeing the nature of the hu&an bo y has not yet been e%poun e , nor the e%istence even of bo y establishe V enough, nevertheless, appears to have been sai to enable one to istinguish such of our conceptions as are clear an istinct fro& those that are obscure an confuse ! (QQB! =u&&ary of what &ust be observe in or er to philosophi1e correctly! $herefore if we woul philosophi1e in earnest, an give ourselves to the search after all the truths we are capable of #nowing, we &ust, in the first place, lay asi e our preju icesV in other wor s, we &ust ta#e care scrupulously to withhol our assent fro& the opinions we have for&erly a &itte , until upon new e%a&ination we iscover that they are true! $e &ust, in the ne%t place, &a#e an or erly review of the notions we have in our &in s, an hol as true all an only those which we will clearly an istinctly apprehen ! 'n this way we will observe, first of all, that we e%ist in so far as it is our nature to thin#, an at the sa&e ti&e that there is a Go upon who& we epen V an after consi ering his attributes we will be able to investigate the truth of all other things, since Go is the cause of the&! "esi es the notions we have of Go an of our &in , we will li#ewise fin that we possess the #nowle ge of &any propositions which are eternally true, as, for e%a&ple, that nothing cannot be the cause of anything, etc! $e will farther iscover in our &in s the #nowle ge of a corporeal or e%ten e nature that &ay be &ove , ivi e , etc!, an also of certain sensations that affect

us, as of pain, colours, tastes, etc!, although we o not yet #now the cause of our being so affecte V an , co&paring what we have now learne' , by e%a&ining those things in their or er, with our for&er confuse #nowle ge of the&, we will acMuire the habit of for&ing clear an istinct conceptions of all the objects we are capable of #nowing! 'n these few precepts see& to &e to be co&prise the &ost general an i&portant principles of hu&an #nowle ge! (QQB'! That we ought to prefer the Divine authority to our perceptionV 4*ootnote9 Rreasonings!R88*R23CC5! but that, apart fro& things reveale , we ought to assent to nothing that we o not clearly apprehen ! )bove all, we &ust i&press on our &e&ory the infallible rule, that what Go has reveale is inco&parably &ore certain than anything elseV an that, we ought to sub&it our belief to the Divine authority rather than to our own ju g&ent, even although perhaps the light of reason shoul , with the greatest clearness an evi ence, appear to suggest to us so&ething contrary to what is reveale ! "ut in things regar ing which there is no revelation, it is by no &eans consistent with the character of a philosopher to accept as true what he has not ascertaine to be such, an to trust &ore to the senses, in other wor s, to the inconsi erate ju g&ents of chil hoo than to the ictates of &ature reason!

P&RT ((:
?* TC2 PR'3C'P(2= ?* A)T2R')( TC'3G=! '! The groun s on which the e%istence of &aterial things &ay be #nown with certainty!

)lthough we are all sufficiently persua e of the e%istence of &aterial things, yet, since this was before calle in Muestion by us, an since we rec#one the persuasion of their e%istence as a&ong the preju ices of our chil hoo , it is now necessary for us to investigate the groun s on which this truth &ay be #nown with certainty! 'n the first place, then, it cannot be oubte that every perception we have co&es to us fro& so&e object ifferent fro& our &in V for it is not in our power to cause ourselves to e%perience one perception rather than another, the perception being entirely epen ent on the object which affects our senses! 't &ay, in ee , be &atter of inMuiry whether that object be Go , or so&ething ifferent fro& Go V but because we perceive, or rather, sti&ulate by sense, clearly an istinctly apprehen , certain &atter e%ten e in length, brea th, an thic#ness, the various parts of which have ifferent figures an &otions, an give rise to the sensation we have of colours, s&ells, pain, etc!, Go woul , without Muestion, eserve to be regar e as a eceiver, if he irectly an of hi&self presente to our &in the i ea of this e%ten e &atter, or &erely cause it to be presente to us by so&e object which possesse neither e%tension, figure, nor &otion! *or we clearly conceive this &atter as entirely istinct fro& Go , an fro& ourselves, or our &in V an appear even clearly to iscern that the i ea of it is for&e in us on occasion of objects e%isting out of our &in s, to which it is in every respect si&ilar! "ut since Go cannot eceive us, for this is repugnant to his nature, as has been alrea y re&ar#e , we &ust unhesitatingly conclu e that there e%ists a certain object e%ten e in length, brea th, an thic#ness, an possessing all those properties which we clearly apprehen to belong to what is e%ten e ! )n this e%ten e substance is what we call bo y or &atter! ''! Cow we li#ewise #now that the hu&an bo y is closely

connecte with the &in ! $e ought also to conclu e that a certain bo y is &ore closely unite to our &in than any other, because we clearly observe that pain an other sensations affect us without our foreseeing the&V an these, the &in is conscious, o not arise fro& itself alone, nor pertain to it, in so far as it is a thing which thin#s, but only in so far as it is unite to another thing e%ten e an &ovable, which is calle the hu&an bo y! "ut this is not the place to treat in etail of this &atter! '''! That the perceptions of the senses o not teach us what is in reality in things, but what is beneficial of hurtful to the co&posite whole of &in an bo y! 't will be sufficient to re&ar# that the perceptions of the senses are &erely to be referre to this inti&ate union of the hu&an bo y an &in , an that they usually &a#e us aware of what, in e%ternal objects, &ay be useful or a verse to this union, but o not present to us these objects as they are in the&selves, unless occasionally an by acci ent! *or, after this observation, we will without ifficulty lay asi e the preju ices of the senses, an will have recourse to our un erstan ing alone on this Muestion by reflecting carefully on the i eas i&plante in it by nature! 'B! That the nature of bo y consists not in weight har ness, colour an the li#e, but in e%tension alone! 'n this way we will iscern that the nature of &atter or bo y, consi ere in general, oes not consist in its being har , or pon erous, or coloure , or that which affects our senses in any other way, but si&ply in its being a substance e%ten e in length, brea th, an epth! *or with respect to har ness, we #now nothing of it by sense

farther than that the parts of har bo ies resist the &otion of our han s on co&ing into contact with the&V but if every ti&e our han s &ove towar s any part, all the bo ies in that place rece e as Muic#ly as our han s approache , we shoul never feel har nessV an yet we have no reason to believe that bo ies which &ight thus rece e woul on this account lose that which &a#es the& bo ies! The nature of bo y oes not, therefore, consist in har ness! 'n the sa&e way, it &ay be shown that weight, colour, an all the other Mualities of this sort, which are perceive in corporeal &atter, &ay be ta#en fro& it, itself &eanwhile re&aining entire9 it thus follows that the nature of bo y epen s on none of these! B! That the truth regar ing the nature of bo y is obscure by the opinions respecting rarefaction an a vacuu& with which we are pre8 occupie ! There still re&ain two causes to prevent its being fully a &itte that the true nature of bo y consists in e%tension alone! The first is the prevalent opinion, that &ost bo ies a &it of being so rarefie an con ense that, when rarefie , they have greater e%tension than when con ense V an so&e even have subtili1e to such a egree as to &a#e a istinction between the substance of bo y an its Muantity, an between Muantity itself an e%tension! The secon cause is this, that where we conceive only e%tension in length, brea th, an epth, we are not in the habit of saying that bo y is there, but only space an further voi space, which the generality believe to be a &ere negation! B'! 'n what way rarefaction ta#es place! "ut with regar to rarefaction an con ensation, whoever gives his attention to his own thoughts, an

a &its nothing of which he is not clearly conscious, will not suppose that there is anything in those processes further than a change of figure in the bo y rarefie or con ense 9 so that, in other wor s, rare bo ies are those between the parts of which there are nu&erous istances fille with other bo iesV an ense bo ies, on the other han , those whose parts approaching each other, either i&inish these istances or ta#e the& wholly away, in the latter of which cases the bo y is ren ere absolutely ense! The bo y, however, when con ense , has not, therefore, less e%tension than when the parts e&brace a greater space, owing to their re&oval fro& each other, an their ispersion into branches! *or we ought not to attribute to it the e%tension of the pores or istances which its parts o not occupy when it is rarefie , but to the other bo ies that fill these intersticesV just as when we see a sponge full of water or any other liMui , we o not suppose that each part of the sponge has on this account greater e%tension than when co&presse an ry, but only that its pores are wi er, an therefore that the bo y is iffuse over a larger space! B''! That rarefaction cannot be intelligibly e%plaine unless in the way here propose ! )n in ee ' a& unable to iscover the force of the reasons which have in uce so&e to say that rarefaction is the result of the aug&entation of the Muantity of bo y, rather than to e%plain it on the principle e%e&plifie in the case of a sponge! *or although when air or water is rarefie we o not see any of the pores that are ren ere large, or the new bo y that is a e to occupy the&, it is yet less agreeable to reason to suppose so&ething that is unintelligible for the purpose of giving a verbal an &erely apparent e%planation of the rarefaction of bo ies, than to conclu e, because of their

rarefaction, that there are pores or istances between the parts which are increase in si1e, an fille with so&e new bo y! 3or ought we to refrain fro& assenting to this e%planation, because we perceive this new bo y by none of our senses, for there is no reason which obliges us to believe that we shoul perceive by our senses all the bo ies in e%istence! )n we see that it is very easy to e%plain rarefaction in this &anner, but i&possible in any otherV for, in fine, there woul be, as appears to &e, a &anifest contra iction in supposing that any bo y was increase by a Muantity or e%tension which it ha not before, without the a ition to it of a new e%ten e substance, in other wor s, of another bo y, because it is i&possible to conceive any a ition of e%tension or Muantity to a thing without supposing the a ition of a substance having Muantity or e%tension, as will &ore clearly appear fro& what follows! B'''! That Muantity an nu&ber iffer only in thought .R)T'?32/ fro& that which has Muantity an is nu&bere ! *or Muantity iffers fro& e%ten e substance, an nu&ber fro& what is nu&bere , not in reality but &erely in our thoughtV so that, for e%a&ple, we &ay consi er the whole nature of a corporeal substance which is co&prise in a space of ten feet, although we o not atten to this &easure of ten feet, for the obvious reason that the thing conceive is of the sa&e nature in any part of that space as in the wholeV an , on the other han , we can conceive the nu&ber ten, as also a continuous Muantity of ten feet, without thin#ing of this eter&inate substance, because the concept of the nu&ber ten is &anifestly the sa&e whether we consi er a nu&ber of ten feet or ten of anything elseV an we can conceive a continuous Muantity of ten feet without thin#ing of this or that eter&inate substance, although

we cannot conceive it without so&e e%ten e substance of which it is the Muantity! 't is in reality, however, i&possible that any, even the least part, of such Muantity or e%tension, can be ta#en away, without the retrench&ent at the sa&e ti&e of as &uch of the substance, nor, on the other han , can we lessen the substance, without at the sa&e ti&e ta#ing as &uch fro& the Muantity or e%tension! 'Q! That corporeal substance, when istinguishe fro& its Muantity, is confuse ly conceive as so&ething incorporeal! )lthough perhaps so&e e%press the&selves otherwise on this &atter, ' a& nevertheless convince that they o not thin# ifferently fro& what ' have now sai 9 for when they istinguish .corporeal/ substance fro& e%tension or Muantity, they either &ean nothing by the wor .corporeal/ substance, or they for& in their &in s &erely a confuse i ea of incorporeal substance, which they falsely attribute to corporeal, an leave to e%tension the true i ea of this corporeal substanceV which e%tension they call an acci ent, but with such i&propriety as to &a#e it easy to iscover that their wor s are not in har&ony with their thoughts! Q! $hat space or internal place is! =pace or internal place, an the corporeal substance which is co&prise in it, are not ifferent in reality, but &erely in the &o e in which they are wont to be conceive by us! *or, in truth, the sa&e e%tension in length, brea th, an epth, which constitutes space, constitutes bo yV an the ifference between the& lies only in this, that in bo y we consi er e%tension as particular, an conceive it to change with the bo yV whereas in space we attribute to e%tension a generic

unity, so that after ta#ing fro& a certain space the bo y which occupie it, we o not suppose that we have at the sa&e ti&e re&ove the e%tension of the space, because it appears to us that the sa&e e%tension re&ains there so long as it is of the sa&e &agnitu e an figure, an preserves the sa&e situation in respect to certain bo ies aroun it, by &eans of which we eter&ine this space! Q'! Cow space is not in reality ifferent fro& corporeal substance! )n in ee it will be easy to iscern that it is the sa&e e%tension which constitutes the nature of bo y as of space, an that these two things are &utually iverse only as the nature of the genus an species iffers fro& that of the in ivi ual, provi e we reflect on the i ea we have of any bo y, ta#ing a stone for e%a&ple, an reject all that is not essential to the nature of bo y! 'n the first place, then, har ness &ay be rejecte , because if the stone were liMuefie or re uce to pow er, it woul no longer possess har ness, an yet woul not cease to be a bo yV colour also &ay be thrown out of account, because we have freMuently seen stones so transparent as to have no colourV again, we &ay reject weight, because we have the case of fire, which, though very light, is still a bo yV an , finally, we &ay reject col , heat, an all the other Mualities of this sort, either because they are not consi ere as in the stone, or because, with the change of these Mualities, the stone is not suppose to have lost the nature of bo y! )fter this e%a&ination we will fin that nothing re&ains in the i ea of bo y, e%cept that it is so&ething e%ten e in length, brea th, an epthV an this so&ething is co&prise in our i ea of space, not only of that which is full of bo y, but even of what is calle voi space!

Q''! Cow space iffers fro& bo y in our &o e of conceiving it! There is, however, so&e ifference between the& in the &o e of conceptionV for if we re&ove a stone fro& the space or place in which it was, we conceive that its e%tension also is ta#en away, because we regar this as particular, an inseparable fro& the stone itself9 but &eanwhile we suppose that the sa&e e%tension of place in which this stone was re&ains, although the place of the stone be occupie by woo , water, air, or by any other bo y, or be even suppose vacant, because we now consi er e%tension in general, an thin# that the sa&e is co&&on to stones, woo , water, air, an other bo ies, an even to a vacuu& itself, if there is any such thing, provi e it be of the sa&e &agnitu e an figure as before, an preserve the sa&e situation a&ong the e%ternal bo ies which eter&ine this space! Q'''! $hat e%ternal place is! The reason of which is, that the wor s place an space signify nothing really ifferent fro& bo y which is sai to be in place, but &erely esignate its &agnitu e, figure, an situation a&ong other bo ies! *or it is necessary, in or er to eter&ine this situation, to regar certain other bo ies which we consi er as i&&ovableV an , accor ing as we loo# to ifferent bo ies, we &ay see that the sa&e thing at the sa&e ti&e oes an oes not change place! *or e%a&ple, when a vessel is being carrie out to sea, a person sitting at the stern &ay be sai to re&ain always in one place, if we loo# to the parts of the vessel, since with respect to these he preserves the sa&e situationV an on the other han , if regar be ha to the neighbouring shores, the sa&e person will see& to be perpetually changing place, seeing he is constantly rece ing fro& one shore an approaching another! )n

besi es, if we suppose that the earth &oves, an that it &a#es precisely as &uch way fro& west to east as the vessel fro& east to west, we will again say that the person at the stern oes not change his place, because this place will be eter&ine by certain i&&ovable points which we i&agine to be in the heavens! "ut if at length we are persua e that there are no points really i&&ovable in the universe, as will hereafter be shown to be probable, we will thence conclu e that nothing has a per&anent place unless in so far as it is fi%e by our thought! Q'B! $herein place an space iffer! The ter&s place an space, however, iffer in signification, because place &ore e%pressly esignates situation than &agnitu e or figure, while, on the other han , we thin# of the latter when we spea# of space! *or we freMuently say that a thing succee s to the place of another, although it be not e%actly of the sa&e &agnitu e or figureV but we o not therefore a &it that it occupies the sa&e space as the otherV an when the situation is change we say that the place also is change , although there are the sa&e &agnitu e an figure as before9 so that when we say that a thing is in a particular place, we &ean &erely that it is situate in a eter&inate way in respect of certain other objectsV an when we a that it occupies such a space or place, we un erstan besi es that it is of such eter&inate &agnitu e an figure as e%actly to fill this space! QB! Cow e%ternal place is rightly ta#en for the superficies of the surroun ing bo y! )n thus we never in ee istinguish space fro& e%tension in length, brea th, an epthV we so&eti&es, however, consi er place as in the thing place , an at

other ti&es as out of it! 'nternal place in ee iffers in no way fro& spaceV but e%ternal place &ay be ta#en for the superficies that i&&e iately surroun s the thing place ! 't ought to be re&ar#e that by superficies we o not here un erstan any part of the surroun ing bo y, but only the boun ary between the surroun ing an surroun e bo ies, which is nothing &ore than a &o eV or at least that we spea# of superficies in general which is no part of one bo y rather than another, but is always consi ere the sa&e, provi e it retain the sa&e &agnitu e an figure! *or although the whole surroun ing bo y with its superficies were change , it woul not be suppose that the bo y which was surroun e by it ha therefore change its place, if it &eanwhile preserve the sa&e situation with respect to the other bo ies that are regar e as i&&ovable! Thus, if we suppose that a boat is carrie in one irection by the current of a strea&, an i&pelle by the win in the opposite with an eMual force, so that its situation with respect to the ban#s is not change , we will rea ily a &it that it re&ains in the sa&e place, although the whole superficies which surroun s it is incessantly changing! QB'! That a vacuu& or space in which there is absolutely no bo y is repugnant to reason! $ith regar to a vacuu&, in the philosophical sense of the ter&, that is, a space in which there is no substance, it is evi ent that such oes not e%ist, seeing the e%tension of space or internal place is not ifferent fro& that of bo y! *or since fro& this alone, that a bo y has e%tension in length, brea th, an epth, we have reason to conclu e that it is a substance, it being absolutely contra ictory that nothing shoul possess e%tension, we ought to for& a si&ilar inference regar ing the space which is suppose voi , vi1!, that since there is e%tension

in it there is necessarily also substance! QB''! That a vacuu& in the or inary use of the ter& oes not e%clu e all bo y! )n , in truth, by the ter& vacuu& in its co&&on use, we o not &ean a place or space in which there is absolutely nothing, but only a place in which there is none of those things we presu&e ought to be there! Thus, because a pitcher is &a e to hol water, it is sai to be e&pty when it is &erely fille with airV or if there are no fish in a fish8pon , we say there is nothing in it, although it be full of waterV thus a vessel is sai to be e&pty, when, in place of the &erchan ise which it was esigne to carry, it is loa e with san only, to enable it to resist the violence of the win V an , finally, it is in the sa&e sense that we say space is voi when it contains nothing sensible, although it contain create an self8subsisting &atterV for we are not in the habit of consi ering the bo ies near us, unless in so far as they cause in our organs of sense, i&pressions strong enough to enable us to perceive the&! )n if, in place of #eeping in &in what ought to be un erstoo by these ter&s a vacuu& an nothing, we afterwar s suppose that in the space we calle a vacuu&, there is not only no sensible object, but no object at all, we will fall into the sa&e error as if, because a pitcher in which there is nothing but air, is, in co&&on speech, sai to be e&pty, we were therefore to ju ge that the air containe in it is not a substance .R2= =@"='=T23=/! QB'''! Cow the preju ice of an absolute vacuu& is to be correcte ! $e have al&ost all fallen into this error fro& the earliest age, for, observing that there is no necessary connection between a vessel an the bo y it contains, we thought

that Go at least coul ta#e fro& a vessel the bo y which occupie it, without it being necessary that any other shoul be put in the place of the one re&ove ! "ut that we &ay be able now to correct this false opinion, it is necessary to re&ar# that there is in truth no connection between the vessel an the particular bo y which it contains, but that there is an absolutely necessary connection between the concave figure of the vessel an the e%tension consi ere generally which &ust be co&prise in this cavityV so that it is not &ore contra ictory to conceive a &ountain without a valley than such a cavity without the e%tension it contains, or this e%tension apart fro& an e%ten e substance, for, as we have often sai , of nothing there can be no e%tension! )n accor ingly, if it be as#e what woul happen were Go to re&ove fro& a vessel all the bo y containe in it, without per&itting another bo y to occupy its place, the answer &ust be that the si es of the vessel woul thus co&e into pro%i&ity with each other! *or two bo ies &ust touch each other when there is nothing between the&, an it is &anifestly contra ictory for two bo ies to be apart, in other wor s, that there shoul be a istance between the&, an this istance yet be nothingV for all istance is a &o e of e%tension, an cannot therefore e%ist without an e%ten e substance! Q'Q! That this confir&s what was sai of rarefaction! )fter we have thus re&ar#e that the nature of corporeal substance consists only in its being an e%ten e thing, an that its e%tension is not ifferent fro& that which we attribute to space, however e&pty, it is easy to iscover the i&possibility of any one of its parts in any way whatsoever occupying &ore space at one ti&e than at another, an thus of being otherwise rarefie than in the way e%plaine aboveV an it is easy to perceive also that

there cannot be &ore &atter or bo y in a vessel when it is fille with lea or gol , or any other bo y however heavy an har , than when it but contains air an is suppose to be e&pty9 for the Muantity of the parts of which a bo y is co&pose oes not epen on their weight or har ness, but only on the e%tension, which is always eMual in the sa&e vase! QQ! That fro& this the non8e%istence of ato&s &ay li#ewise be e&onstrate ! $e li#ewise iscover that there cannot e%ist any ato&s or parts of &atter that are of their own nature in ivisible! *or however s&all we suppose these parts to be, yet because they are necessarily e%ten e , we are always able in thought to ivi e any one of the& into two or &ore s&aller parts, an &ay accor ingly a &it their ivisibility! *or there is nothing we can ivi e in thought which we o not thereby recogni1e to be ivisibleV an , therefore, were we to ju ge it in ivisible our ju g&ent woul not be in har&ony with the #nowle ge we have of the thingV an although we shoul even suppose that Go ha re uce any particle of &atter to a s&allness so e%tre&e that it i not a &it of being further ivi e , it woul nevertheless be i&properly style in ivisible, for though Go ha ren ere the particle so s&all that it was not in the power of any creature to ivi e it, he coul not however eprive hi&self of the ability to o so, since it is absolutely i&possible for hi& to lessen his own o&nipotence, as was before observe ! $herefore, absolutely spea#ing, the s&allest e%ten e particle is always ivisible, since it is such of its very nature! QQ'! 't is thus also e&onstrate that the e%tension of the worl is in efinite! $e further iscover that this worl or the whole

.universitas/ of corporeal substance, is e%ten e without li&it, for wherever we fi% a li&it, we still not only i&agine beyon it spaces in efinitely e%ten e , but perceive these to be truly i&aginable, in other wor s, to be in reality such as we i&agine the&V so that they contain in the& corporeal substance in efinitely e%ten e , for, as has been alrea y shown at length, the i ea of e%tension which we conceive in any space whatever is plainly i entical with the i ea of corporeal substance! QQ''! 't also follows that the &atter of the heavens an earth is the sa&e, an that there cannot be a plurality of worl s! )n it &ay also be easily inferre fro& all this that the earth an heavens are &a e of the sa&e &atterV an that even although there were an infinity of worl s, they woul all be co&pose of this &atterV fro& which it follows that a plurality of worl s is i&possible, because we clearly conceive that the &atter whose nature consists only in its being an e%ten e substance, alrea y wholly occupies all the i&aginable spaces where these other worl s coul alone be, an we cannot fin in ourselves the i ea of any other &atter! QQ'''! That all the variety of &atter, or the iversity of its for&s, epen s on &otion! There is therefore but one #in of &atter in the whole universe, an this we #now only by its being e%ten e ! )ll the properties we istinctly perceive to belong to it are re ucible to its capacity of being ivi e an &ove accor ing to its partsV an accor ingly it is capable of all those affections which we perceive can arise fro& the &otion of its parts! *or the partition of &atter in thought &a#es no change in itV but all variation of it, or iversity

of for&, epen s on &otion! The philosophers even see& universally to have observe this, for they sai that nature was the principle of &otion an rest, an by nature they un erstoo that by which all corporeal things beco&e such as they are foun in e%perience! QQ'B! $hat &otion is, ta#ing the ter& in its co&&on use! "ut &otion .vi1!, local, for ' can conceive no other #in of &otion, an therefore ' o not thin# we ought to suppose there is any other in nature/, in the or inary sense of the ter&, is nothing &ore than the action by which a bo y passes fro& one place to another! )n just as we have re&ar#e above that the sa&e thing &ay be sai to change an not to change place at the sa&e ti&e, so also we &ay say that the sa&e thing is at the sa&e ti&e &ove an not &ove ! Thus, for e%a&ple, a person seate in a vessel which is setting sail, thin#s he is in &otion if he loo# to the shore that he has left, an consi er it as fi%e V but not if he regar the ship itself, a&ong the parts of which he preserves always the sa&e situation! Aoreover, because we are accusto&e to suppose that there is no &otion without action, an that in rest there is the cessation of action, the person thus seate is &ore properly sai to be at rest than in &otion, seeing he is not conscious of being in action! QQB! $hat &otion is properly so calle ! "ut if, instea of occupying ourselves with that which has no foun ation, unless in or inary usage, we esire to #now what ought to be un erstoo by &otion accor ing to the truth of the thing, we &ay say, in or er to give it a eter&inate nature, that it is TC2 TR)3=P?RT'3G ?* ?32 P)RT ?* A)TT2R ?R ?* ?32 "?D; *R?A TC2 B'C'3'T; ?* TC?=2 "?D'2= TC)T )R2 '3 'AA2D')T2 C?3T)CT $'TC 'T, ?R $C'CC $2 R2G)RD )= )T R2=T,

to the vicinity of other bo ies! "y a bo y as a part of &atter, ' un erstan all that which is transferre together, although it be perhaps co&pose of several parts, which in the&selves have other &otionsV an ' say that it is the transporting an not the force or action which transports, with the view of showing that &otion is always in the &ovable thing, not in that which &ovesV for it see&s to &e that we are not accusto&e to istinguish these two things with sufficient accuracy! *arther, ' un erstan that it is a &o e of the &ovable thing, an not a substance, just as figure is a property of the thing figure , an repose of that which is at rest!

P&RT (((:
?* TC2 B'='"(2 $?R(D! '! That we cannot thin# too highly of the wor#s of Go ! Caving now ascertaine certain principles of &aterial things, which were sought, not by the preju ices of the senses, but by the light of reason, an which thus possess so great evi ence that we cannot oubt of their truth, it re&ains for us to consi er whether fro& these alone we can e uce the e%plication of all the pheno&ena of nature! $e will co&&ence with those pheno&ena that are of the greatest generality, an upon which the others epen , as, for e%a&ple, with the general structure of this whole visible worl ! "ut in or er to our philosophi1ing aright regar ing this, two things are first of all to be observe ! The first is, that we shoul ever bear in &in the infinity of the power an goo ness of Go , that we &ay not fear falling into error by i&agining his wor#s to be too great, beautiful, an

perfect, but that we &ay, on the contrary, ta#e care lest, by supposing li&its to the& of which we have no certain #nowle ge, we appear to thin# less highly than we ought of the power of Go ! ''! That we ought to beware lest, in our presu&ption, we i&agine that the en s which Go propose to hi&self in the creation of the worl are un erstoo by us! The secon is, that we shoul beware of presu&ing too highly of ourselves, as it see&s we shoul o if we suppose certain li&its to the worl , without being assure of their e%istence either by natural reasons or by ivine revelation, as if the power of our thought e%ten e beyon what Go has in reality &a eV but li#ewise still &ore if we persua e ourselves that all things were create by Go for us only, or if we &erely suppose that we coul co&prehen by the power of our intellect the en s which Go propose to hi&self in creating the universe! '''! 'n what sense it &ay be sai that all things were create for the sa#e of &an! *or although, as far as regar s &orals, it &ay be a pious thought to believe that Go &a e all things for us, seeing we &ay thus be incite to greater gratitu e an love towar hi&V an although it is even in so&e sense true, because there is no create thing of which we cannot &a#e so&e use, if it be only that of e%ercising our &in in consi ering it, an honouring Go on account of it, it is yet by no &eans probable that all things were create for us in this way that Go ha no other en in their creationV an this supposition woul be plainly ri iculous an inept in physical reasoning, for we o not oubt but that &any things e%ist, or for&erly e%iste an have now cease to be, which were never

seen or #nown by &an, an were never of use to hi&!

P&RT (V:
?* TC2 2)RTC! C(QQQB'''! ?f what is to be borrowe fro& isMuisitions on ani&als an &an to a vance the #nowle ge of &aterial objects! ' shoul a nothing farther to this the *ourth Part of the Principles of Philosophy, i ' purpose carrying out &y original esign of writing a *ifth an =i%th Part, the one treating of things possesse of life, that is, ani&als an plants, an the other of &an! "ut because ' have not yet acMuire sufficient #nowle ge of all the &atters of which ' shoul esire to treat in these two last parts, an o not #now whether ' shall ever have sufficient leisure to finish the&, ' will here subjoin a few things regar ing the objects of our senses, that ' &ay not, for the sa#e of the latter, elay too long the publication of the for&er parts, or of what &ay be esi erate in the&, which ' &ight have reserve for e%planation in those others9 for ' have hitherto escribe this earth, an generally the whole visible worl , as if it were &erely a &achine in which there was nothing at all to consi er e%cept the figures an &otions of its parts, whereas our senses present to us &any other things, for e%a&ple colours, s&ells, soun s, an the li#e, of which, if ' i not spea# at all, it woul be thought ' ha o&itte the e%plication of the &ajority of the objects that are in nature! C(QQQ'Q! $hat perception .=23=@=/ is, an how we perceive!

$e &ust #now, therefore, that although the hu&an soul is unite to the whole bo y, it has, nevertheless, its principal seat in the brain, where alone it not only un erstan s an i&agines, but also perceivesV an this by the &e iu& of the nerves, which are e%ten e li#e threa s fro& the brain to all the other &e&bers, with which they are so connecte that we can har ly touch any one of the& without &oving the e%tre&ities of so&e of the nerves sprea over itV an this &otion passes to the other e%tre&ities of those nerves which are collecte in the brain roun the seat of the soul, 4*ootnote9 >>> *??T3?T2 3?T B'='"(2 '3 P)G2 'A)G2 .#:F, Te%t p -:+/5 as ' have alrea y e%plaine with sufficient &inuteness in the fourth chapter of the Dioptrics! "ut the &ove&ents which are thus e%cite in the brain by the nerves variously affect the soul or &in , which is inti&ately conjoine with the brain, accor ing to the iversity of the &otions the&selves! )n the iverse affections of the &in or thoughts that i&&e iately arise fro& these &otions, are calle perceptions of the senses .=23=@@A P2RC2PT'?32=/, or, as we co&&only spea#, sensations .=23=@=/! CQC! ?f the istinction of the sensesV an , first, of the internal, that is, of the affections of the &in .passions/, an the natural appetites! The varieties of these sensations epen , firstly, on the iversity of the nerves the&selves, an , secon ly, of the &ove&ents that are &a e in each nerve! $e have not, however, as &any ifferent senses as there are nerves! $e can istinguish but seven principal classes of nerves, of which two belong to the internal, an the other five to the e%ternal senses! The nerves which e%ten to the sto&ach, the oesophagus, the fauces, an the other internal parts that are subservient to our natural wants, constitute one of our internal senses! This is calle the

natural appetite .)PP2T'T@= 3)T@R)('=/! The other internal sense, which e&braces all the e&otions .C?AA?T'?32=/ of the &in or passions, an affections, as joy, sa ness, love, hate, an the li#e, epen s upon the nerves which e%ten to the heart an the parts about the heart, an are e%cee ingly s&allV for, by way of e%a&ple, when the bloo happens to be pure an well te&pere , so that it ilates in the heart &ore rea ily an strongly than usual, this so enlarges an &oves the s&all nerves scattere aroun the orifices, that there is thence a correspon ing &ove&ent in the brain, which affects the &in with a certain natural feeling of joyV an as often as these sa&e nerves are &ove in the sa&e way, although this is by other causes, they e%cite in our &in the sa&e feeling .sensus, senti&ent/! Thus, the i&agination of the enjoy&ent of a goo oes not contain in itself the feeling of joy, but it causes the ani&al spirits to pass fro& the brain to the &uscles in which these nerves are inserte V an thus ilating the orifices of the heart, it also causes these s&all nerves to &ove in the way appointe by nature to affor the sensation of joy! Thus, when we receive news, the &in first of all ju ges of it, an if the news be goo , it rejoices with that intellectual joy .G)@D'@A '3T2((2CT@)(2/ which is in epen ent of any e&otion .C?AA?T'?/ of the bo y, an which the =toics i not eny to their wise &an 4although they suppose hi& e%e&pt fro& all passion5! "ut as soon as this joy passes fro& the un erstan ing to the i&agination, the spirits flow fro& the brain to the &uscles that are about the heart, an there e%cite the &otion of the s&all nerves, by &eans of which another &otion is cause in the brain, which affects the &in with the sensation of ani&al joy .()2T'T') )3'A)('=/! ?n the sa&e principle, when the bloo is so thic# that it flows but sparingly into the ventricles of the heart, an is not there sufficiently ilate , it e%cites in the sa&e nerves a &otion Muite ifferent fro& the prece ing,

which, co&&unicate to the brain, gives to the &in the sensation of sa ness, although the &in itself is perhaps ignorant of the cause of its sa ness! )n all the other causes which &ove these nerves in the sa&e way &ay also give to the &in the sa&e sensation! "ut the other &ove&ents of the sa&e nerves pro uce other effects, as the feelings of love, hate, fear, anger, etc!, as far as they are &erely affections or passions of the &in V in other wor s, as far as they are confuse thoughts which the &in has not fro& itself alone, but fro& its being closely joine to the bo y, fro& which it receives i&pressionsV for there is the wi est ifference between these passions an the istinct thoughts which we have of what ought to be love , or chosen, or shunne , etc!, 4although these are often enough foun together5! The natural appetites, as hunger, thirst, an the others, are li#ewise sensations e%cite in the &in by &eans of the nerves of the sto&ach, fauces, an other parts, an are entirely ifferent fro& the will which we have to eat, rin#, 4an to o all that which we thin# proper for the conservation of our bo y5V but, because this will or appetition al&ost always acco&panies the&, they are therefore na&e appetites! CQC'! ?f the e%ternal sensesV an first of touch! $e co&&only rec#on the e%ternal senses five in nu&ber, because there are as &any ifferent #in s of objects which &ove the nerves an their organs, an an eMual nu&ber of #in s of confuse thoughts e%cite in the soul by these e&otions! 'n the first place, the nerves ter&inating in the s#in of the whole bo y can be touche through this &e iu& by any terrene objects whatever, an &ove by these wholes, in one way by their har ness, in another by their gravity, in a thir by their heat, in a fourth by their hu&i ity, etc!88an in as &any iverse &o es as they are either &ove or hin ere

fro& their or inary &otion, to that e%tent are iverse sensations e%cite in the &in , fro& which a correspon ing nu&ber of tactile Mualities erive their appellations! "esi es this, when these nerves are &ove a little &ore powerfully than usual, but not nevertheless to the egree by which our bo y is in any way hurt, there thus arises a sensation of titillation, which is naturally agreeable to the &in , because it testifies to it of the powers of the bo y with which it is joine , 4in that the latter can suffer the action causing this titillation, without being hurt5! "ut if this action be strong enough to hurt our bo y in any way, this gives to our &in the sensation of pain! )n we thus see why corporeal pleasure an pain, although sensations of Muite an opposite character, arise nevertheless fro& causes nearly ali#e! CQC''! ?f taste! 'n the secon place, the other nerves scattere over the tongue an the parts in its vicinity are iversely &ove by the particles of the sa&e bo ies, separate fro& each other an floating in the saliva in the &outh, an thus cause sensations of iverse tastes accor ing to the iversity of figure in these particles! 4*ootnote9 'n the *rench this section begins, RTaste, after touch the grossest of the senses,R etc!5 CQC'''! ?f s&ell! Thir ly, two nerves also or appen ages of the brain, for they o not go beyon the li&its of the s#ull, are &ove by the particles of terrestrial bo ies, separate an flying in the air, not in ee by all particles in ifferently, but by those only that are sufficiently subtle an penetrating to enter the pores of the bone we call the spongy, when rawn into the nostrils, an thus to reach

the nerves! *ro& the ifferent &otions of these particles arise the sensations of the ifferent s&ells! CQC'B! ?f hearing! *ourthly, there are two nerves within the ears, so attache to three s&all bones that are &utually sustaining, an the first of which rests on the s&all &e&brane that covers the cavity we call the ty&panu& of the ear, that all the iverse vibrations which the surroun ing air co&&unicates to this &e&brane are trans&itte to the &in by these nerves, an these vibrations give rise, accor ing to their iversity, to the sensations of the ifferent soun s! CQCB! ?f sight! *inally, the e%tre&ities of the optic nerves, co&posing the coat in the eyes calle the retina, are not &ove by the air nor by any terrestrial object, but only by the globules of the secon ele&ent, whence we have the sense of light an colours9 as ' have alrea y at sufficient length e%plaine in the Dioptrics an treatise of Aeteors! 4*ootnote9 'n the *rench this section begins, R*inally, sight is the &ost subtle of all the senses,R etc!5 CQCB'! That the soul perceives only in so far as it is in the brain! 't is clearly establishe , however, that the soul oes not perceive in so far as it is in each &e&ber of the bo y, but only in so far as it is in the brain, where the nerves by their &ove&ents convey to it the iverse actions of the e%ternal objects that touch the parts of the bo y in which they are inserte ! *or, in the first place, there are various &ala ies, which, though they affect the brain alone, yet bring isor er upon, or eprive us altogether

of the use of, our senses, just as sleep, which affects the brain only, an yet ta#es fro& us aily uring a great part of our ti&e the faculty of perception, which afterwar s in our wa#ing state is restore to us! The secon proof is, that though there be no isease in the brain, 4or in the &e&bers in which the organs of the e%ternal senses are5, it is nevertheless sufficient to ta#e away sensation fro& the part of the bo y where the nerves ter&inate, if only the &ove&ent of one of the nerves that e%ten fro& the brain to these &e&bers be obstructe in any part of the istance that is between the two! )n the last proof is, that we so&eti&es feel pain as if in certain of our &e&bers, the cause of which, however, is not in these &e&bers where it is felt, but so&ewhere nearer the brain, through which the nerves pass that give to the &in the sensation of it! ' coul establish this fact by innu&erable e%peri&entsV ' will here, however, &erely refer to one of the&! ) girl suffering fro& a ba ulcer in the han , ha her eyes ban age whenever the surgeon ca&e to visit her, not being able to bear the sight of the ressing of the soreV an , the gangrene having sprea , after the e%piry of a few ays the ar& was a&putate fro& the elbow 4without the girl's #nowle ge5V linen cloths tie one above the other were substitute in place of the part a&putate , so that she re&aine for so&e ti&e without #nowing that the operation ha been perfor&e , an &eanwhile she co&plaine of feeling various pains, so&eti&es in one finger of the han that was cut off, an so&eti&es in another! The only e%planation of this is, that the nerves which before stretche ownwar s fro& the brain to the han , an then ter&inate in the ar& close to the elbow, were there &ove in the sa&e way as they reMuire to be &ove before in the han for the purpose of i&pressing on the &in resi ing in the brain the sensation of pain in this or that finger! 4)n this clearly shows that the pain of the han is not felt by the

&in in so far as it is in the han , but in so far as it is in the brain!5 CQCB''! That the nature of the &in is such that fro& the &otion alone of bo y the various sensations can be e%cite in it! 'n the ne%t place, it can be prove that our &in is of such a nature that the &otions of the bo y alone are sufficient to e%cite in it all sorts of thoughts, without it being necessary that these shoul in any way rese&ble the &otions which give rise to the&, an especially that these &otions can e%cite in it those confuse thoughts calle sensations .=23=@=, =23=)T'?32=/! *or we see that wor s, whether uttere by the voice or &erely written, e%cite in our &in s all #in s of thoughts an e&otions! ?n the sa&e paper, with the sa&e pen an in#, by &erely &oving the point of the pen over the paper in a particular way, we can trace letters that will raise in the &in s of our rea ers the thoughts of co&bats, te&pests, or the furies, an the passions of in ignation an sorrowV in place of which, if the pen be &ove in another way har ly ifferent fro& the for&er, this slight change will cause thoughts wi ely ifferent fro& the above, such as those of repose, peace, pleasantness, an the Muite opposite passions of love an joy! =o&e one will perhaps object that writing an speech o not i&&e iately e%cite in the &in any passions, or i&aginations of things ifferent fro& the letters an soun s, but affor si&ply the #nowle ge of these, on occasion of which the &in , un erstan ing the signification of the wor s, afterwar s e%cites in itself the i&aginations an passions that correspon to the wor s! "ut what will be sai of the sensations of pain an titillationS The &otion &erely of a swor cutting a part of our s#in causes pain, 4but oes not on that account &a#e us aware of the &otion or figure of the swor 5! )n

it is certain that this sensation of pain is not less ifferent fro& the &otion that causes it, or fro& that of the part of our bo y which the swor cuts, than are the sensations we have of colour, soun , o our, or taste! ?n this groun we &ay conclu e that our &in is of such a nature that the &otions alone of certain bo ies can also easily e%cite in it all the other sensations, as the &otion of a swor e%cites in it the sensation of pain! CQCB'''! That by our senses we #now nothing of e%ternal objects beyon their figure 4or situation5, &agnitu e, an &otion! "esi es, we observe no such ifference between the nerves as to lea us to ju ge that one set of the& convey to the brain fro& the organs of the e%ternal senses anything ifferent fro& another, or that anything at all reaches the brain besi es the local &otion of the nerves the&selves! )n we see that local &otion alone causes in us not only the sensation of titillation an of pain, but also of light an soun s! *or if we receive a blow on the eye of sufficient force to cause the vibration of the stro#e to reach the retina, we see nu&erous spar#s of fire, which, nevertheless, are not out of our eyeV an when we stop our ear with our finger, we hear a hu&&ing soun , the cause of which can only procee fro& the agitation of the air that is shut up within it! *inally, we freMuently observe that heat 4har ness, weight5, an the other sensible Mualities, as far as they are in objects, an also the for&s of those bo ies that are purely &aterial, as, for e%a&ple, the for&s of fire, are pro uce in the& by the &otion of certain other bo ies, an that these in their turn li#ewise pro uce other &otions in other bo ies! )n we can easily conceive how the &otion of one bo y &ay be cause by that of another, an iversifie by the si1e, figure, an situation of its parts, but we are wholly unable to

conceive how these sa&e things .vi1!, si1e, figure, an &otion/, can pro uce so&ething else of a nature entirely ifferent fro& the&selves, as, for e%a&ple, those substantial for&s an real Mualities which &any philosophers suppose to be in bo iesV nor li#ewise can we conceive how these Mualities or for&s possess force to cause &otions in other bo ies! "ut since we #now, fro& the nature of our soul, that the iverse &otions of bo y are sufficient to pro uce in it all the sensations which it has, an since we learn fro& e%perience that several of its sensations are in reality cause by such &otions, while we o not iscover that anything besi es these &otions ever passes fro& the organs of the e%ternal senses to the brain, we have reason to conclu e that we in no way li#ewise apprehen that in e%ternal objects, which we call light, colour, s&ell, taste, soun , heat or col , an the other tactile Mualities, or that which we call their substantial for&s, unless as the various ispositions of these objects which have the power of &oving our nerves in various ways! 4*ootnote9 Rthe iverse figures, situations, &agnitu es, an &otions of their parts!R88 *rench!5 CQC'Q! That there is no pheno&enon of nature whose e%planation has been o&itte in this treatise! )n thus it &ay be gathere , fro& an enu&eration that is easily &a e, that there is no pheno&enon of nature whose e%planation has been o&itte in this treatiseV for beyon what is perceive by the senses, there is nothing that can be consi ere a pheno&enon of nature! "ut leaving out of account &otion, &agnitu e, figure, 4an the situation of the parts of each bo y5, which ' have e%plaine as they e%ist in bo y, we perceive nothing out of us by our senses e%cept light, colours, s&ells, tastes, soun s, an the tactile MualitiesV an these ' have recently shown to be nothing &ore, at least so far as

they are #nown to us, than certain ispositions of the objects, consisting in &agnitu e, figure, an &otion! CC! That this treatise contains no principles which are not universally receive V an that this philosophy is not new, but of all others the &ost ancient an co&&on! "ut ' a& esirous also that it shoul be observe that, though ' have here en eavoure to give an e%planation of the whole nature of &aterial things, ' have nevertheless &a e use of no principle which was not receive an approve by )ristotle, an by the other philosophers of all agesV so that this philosophy, so far fro& being new, is of all others the &ost ancient an co&&on9 for ' have in truth &erely consi ere the figure, &otion, an &agnitu e of bo ies, an e%a&ine what &ust follow fro& their &utual concourse on the principles of &echanics, which are confir&e by certain an aily e%perience! "ut no one ever oubte that bo ies are &ove , an that they are of various si1es an figures, accor ing to the iversity of which their &otions also vary, an that fro& &utual collision those so&ewhat greater than others are ivi e into &any s&aller, an thus change figure! $e have e%perience of the truth of this, not &erely by a single sense, but by several, as touch, sight, an hearing9 we also istinctly i&agine an un erstan it! This cannot be sai of any of the other things that fall un er our senses, as colours, soun s, an the li#eV for each of these affects but one of our senses, an &erely i&presses upon our i&agination a confuse i&age of itself, affor ing our un erstan ing no istinct #nowle ge of what it is! CC'! That sensible bo ies are co&pose of insensible particles! "ut ' allow &any particles in each bo y that are

perceive by none of our senses, an this will not perhaps be approve of by those who ta#e the senses for the &easure of the #nowable! 4$e greatly wrong hu&an reason, however, as appears to &e, if we suppose that it oes not go beyon the eye8sight5V for no one can oubt that there are bo ies so s&all as not to be perceptible by any of our senses, provi e he only consi er what is each &o&ent a e to those bo ies that are being increase little by little, an what is ta#en fro& those that are i&inishe in the sa&e way! ) tree increases aily, an it is i&possible to conceive how it beco&es greater than it was before, unless we at the sa&e ti&e conceive that so&e bo y is a e to it! "ut who ever observe by the senses those s&all bo ies that are in one ay a e to a tree while growingS )&ong the philosophers at least, those who hol that Muantity is in efinitely ivisible, ought to a &it that in the ivision the parts &ay beco&e so s&all as to be wholly i&perceptible! )n in ee it ought not to be a &atter of surprise, that we are unable to perceive very &inute bo iesV for the nerves that &ust be &ove by objects to cause perception are not the&selves very &inute, but are li#e s&all cor s, being co&pose of a Muantity of s&aller fibres, an thus the &ost &inute bo ies are not capable of &oving the&! 3or o ' thin# that any one who &a#es use of his reason will eny that we philosophi1e with &uch greater truth when we ju ge of what ta#es place in those s&all bo ies which are i&perceptible fro& their &inuteness only, after the analogy of what we see occurring in those we o perceive, 4an in this way e%plain all that is in nature, as ' have essaye to o in this treatise5, than when we give an e%planation of the sa&e things by inventing ' #now not what novelties, that have no relation to the things we actually perceive, 4as first &atter, substantial for&s, an all that gran array of Mualities which &any are in the habit of supposing, each of which is &ore ifficult to

co&prehen than all that is professe to be e%plaine by &eans of the&5! CC''! That the philosophy of De&ocritus is not less ifferent fro& ours than fro& the co&&on! 4*ootnote9 Rthat of )ristotle or the others!R88*rench!5 "ut it &ay be sai that De&ocritus also suppose certain corpuscles that were of various figures, si1es, an &otions, fro& the heaping together an &utual concourse of which all sensible bo ies aroseV an , nevertheless, his &o e of philosophi1ing is co&&only rejecte by all! To this ' reply that the philosophy of De&ocritus was never rejecte by any one, because he allowe the e%istence of bo ies s&aller than those we perceive, an attribute to the& iverse si1es, figures, an &otions, for no one can oubt that there are in reality such, as we have alrea y shownV but it was rejecte , in the first place, because he suppose that these corpuscles were in ivisible, on which groun ' also reject itV in the secon place, because he i&agine there was a vacuu& about the&, which ' show to be i&possibleV thir ly, because he attribute gravity to these bo ies, of which ' eny the e%istence in any bo y, in so far as a bo y is consi ere by itself, because it is a Muality that epen s on the relations of situation an &otion which several bo ies bear to each otherV an , finally, because he has not e%plaine in particular how all things arose fro& the concourse of corpuscles alone, or, if he gave this e%planation with regar to a few of the&, his whole reasoning was far fro& being coherent, 4or such as woul warrant us in e%ten ing the sa&e e%planation to the whole of nature5! This, at least, is the ver ict we &ust give regar ing his philosophy, if we &ay ju ge of his opinions fro& what has been han e own to us in writing! ' leave it to others to eter&ine whether the philosophy ' profess possesses a vali coherency,

4an whether on its principles we can &a#e the reMuisite nu&ber of e uctionsV an , inas&uch as the consi eration of figure, &agnitu e, an &otion has been a &itte by )ristotle an by all the others, as well as by De&ocritus, an since ' reject all that the latter has suppose , with this single e%ception, while ' reject generally all that has been suppose by the others, it is plain that this &o e of philosophi1ing has no &ore affinity with that of De&ocritus than of any other particular sect5! CC'''! Cow we &ay arrive at the #nowle ge of the figures, 4&agnitu es5, an &otions of the insensible particles of bo ies! "ut, since ' assign eter&inate figures, &agnitu es, an &otions to the insensible particles of bo ies, as if ' ha seen the&, whereas ' a &it that they o not fall un er the senses, so&e one will perhaps e&an how ' have co&e by &y #nowle ge of the&! 4To this ' reply, that ' first consi ere in general all the clear an istinct notions of &aterial things that are to be foun in our un erstan ing, an that, fin ing no others e%cept those of figures, &agnitu es, an &otions, an of the rules accor ing to which these three things can be iversifie by each other, which rules are the principles of geo&etry an &echanics, ' ju ge that all the #nowle ge &an can have of nature &ust of necessity be rawn fro& this sourceV because all the other notions we have of sensible things, as confuse an obscure, can be of no avail in affor ing us the #nowle ge of anything out of ourselves, but &ust serve rather to i&pe e it5! Thereupon, ta#ing as &y groun of inference the si&plest an best #nown of the principles that have been i&plante in our &in s by nature, ' consi ere the chief ifferences that coul possibly subsist between the &agnitu es, an figures, an situations of bo ies

insensible on account of their s&allness alone, an what sensible effects coul be pro uce by their various &o es of co&ing into contactV an afterwar s, when ' foun li#e effects in the bo ies that we perceive by our senses, ' ju ge that they coul have been thus pro uce , especially since no other &o e of e%plaining the& coul be evise ! )n in this &atter the e%a&ple of several bo ies &a e by art was of great service to &e9 for ' recogni1e no ifference between these an natural bo ies beyon this, that the effects of &achines epen for the &ost part on the agency of certain instru&ents, which, as they &ust bear so&e proportion to the han s of those who &a#e the&, are always so large that their figures an &otions can be seenV in place of which, the effects of natural bo ies al&ost always epen upon certain organs so &inute as to escape our senses! )n it is certain that all the rules of &echanics belong also to physics, of which it is a part or species, 4so that all that is artificial is withal natural59 for it is not less natural for a cloc#, &a e of the reMuisite nu&ber of wheels, to &ar# the hours, than for a tree, which has sprung fro& this or that see , to pro uce the fruit peculiar to it! )ccor ingly, just as those who are fa&iliar with auto&ata, when they are infor&e of the use of a &achine, an see so&e of its parts, easily infer fro& these the way in which the others, that are not seen by the&, are &a eV so fro& consi ering the sensible effects an parts of natural bo ies, ' have essaye to eter&ine the character of their causes an insensible parts! CC'B! That, touching the things which our senses o not perceive, it is sufficient to e%plain how they can be, 4an that this is all that )ristotle has essaye 5! "ut here so&e one will perhaps reply, that although ' have suppose causes which coul pro uce all natural objects, we ought not on this account to conclu e that

they were pro uce by these causesV for, just as the sa&e artisan can &a#e two cloc#s, which, though they both eMually well in icate the ti&e, an are not ifferent in outwar appearance, have nevertheless nothing rese&bling in the co&position of their wheelsV so oubtless the =upre&e Aa#er of things has an infinity of iverse &eans at his isposal, by each of which he coul have &a e all the things of this worl to appear as we see the&, without it being possible for the hu&an &in to #now which of all these &eans he chose to e&ploy! ' &ost freely conce e thisV an ' believe that ' have one all that was reMuire , if the causes ' have assigne are such that their effects accurately correspon to all the pheno&ena of nature, without eter&ining whether it is by these or by others that they are actually pro uce ! )n it will be sufficient for the use of life to #now the causes thus i&agine , for &e icine, &echanics, an in general all the arts to which the #nowle ge of physics is of service, have for their en only those effects that are sensible, an that are accor ingly to be rec#one a&ong the pheno&ena of nature! 4*ootnote9 Rhave for their en only to apply certain sensible bo ies to each other in such a way that, in the course of natural causes, certain sensible effects &ay be pro uce V an we will be able to acco&plish this Muite as well by consi ering the series of certain causes thus i&agine , although false, as if they were the true, since this series is suppose si&ilar as far as regar s sensible effects!R8*rench!5 )n lest it shoul be suppose that )ristotle i , or professe to o, anything &ore than this, it ought to be re&e&bere that he hi&self e%pressly says, at the co&&ence&ent of the seventh chapter of the first boo# of the Aeteorologies, that, with regar to things which are not &anifest to the senses, he thin#s to a uce sufficient reasons an e&onstrations of the&, if he only shows that they &ay be such as he e%plains the&!

4*ootnote9 wor s in Gree#5 CCB! That nevertheless there is a &oral certainty that all the things of this worl are such as has been here shown they &ay be! "ut nevertheless, that ' &ay not wrong the truth by supposing it less certain than it is, ' will here istinguish two #in s of certitu e! The first is calle &oral, that is, a certainty sufficient for the con uct of life, though, if we loo# to the absolute power of Go , what is &orally certain &ay be false! 4Thus, those who never visite Ro&e o not oubt that it is a city of 'taly, though it &ight be that all fro& who& they got their infor&ation were eceive 5! )gain, if any one, wishing to ecipher a letter written in (atin characters that are not place in regular or er, bethin#s hi&self of rea ing a " wherever an ) is foun , an a C wherever there is a ", an thus of substituting in place of each letter the one which follows it in the or er of the alphabet, an if by this &eans he fin s that there are certain (atin wor s co&pose of these, he will not oubt that the true &eaning of the writing is containe in these wor s, although he &ay iscover this only by conjecture, an although it is possible that the writer of it i not arrange the letters on this principle of alphabetical or er, but on so&e other, an thus conceale another &eaning in it9 for this is so i&probable 4especially when the cipher contains a nu&ber of wor s5 as to see& incre ible! "ut they who observe how &any things regar ing the &agnet, fire, an the fabric of the whole worl , are here e uce fro& a very s&all nu&ber of principles, though they ee&e that ' ha ta#en the& up at ran o& an without groun s, will yet perhaps ac#nowle ge that it coul har ly happen that so &any things shoul cohere if these principles were false!

CCB'! That we possess even &ore than a &oral certainty of it! "esi es, there are so&e, even a&ong natural, things which we ju ge to be absolutely certain! 4)bsolute certainty arises when we ju ge that it is i&possible a thing can be otherwise than as we thin# it5! This certainty is foun e on the &etaphysical groun , that, as Go is supre&ely goo an the source of all truth, the faculty of istinguishing truth fro& error which he gave us, cannot be fallacious so long as we use it aright, an istinctly perceive anything by it! ?f this character are the e&onstrations of &athe&atics, the #nowle ge that &aterial things e%ist, an the clear reasonings that are for&e regar ing the&! The results ' have given in this treatise will perhaps be a &itte to a place in the class of truths that are absolutely certain, if it be consi ere that they are e uce in a continuous series fro& the first an &ost ele&entary principles of hu&an #nowle geV especially if it be sufficiently un erstoo that we can perceive no e%ternal objects unless so&e local &otion be cause by the& in our nerves, an that such &otion cannot be cause by the fi%e stars, owing to their great istance fro& us, unless a &otion be also pro uce in the& an in the whole heavens lying between the& an us9 for these points being a &itte , all the others, at least the &ore general octrines which ' have a vance regar ing the worl or earth 4e! g!, the flui ity of the heavens,

Part (((:, "ection 1-V(:;, <ill appear to

be al&ost the only possible e%planations of the pheno&ena they present!

CCB''! That, however, ' sub&it all &y opinions to the authority of the church! 3evertheless, lest ' shoul presu&e too far, ' affir& nothing, but sub&it all these &y opinions to the authority of the church an the ju g&ent of the &ore sageV an ' esire no one to believe anything ' &ay have sai , unless he is constraine to a &it it by the force an evi ence of reason! 2n of Project Gutenberg's The Principles of Philosophy, by Rene Descartes Principles of Philosophy, by Rene Descartes ) free eboo# fro& http9DD&anyboo#s!netD