Algeria vs. Fanon

University of Utah Western Political Science Association
Algeria vs. Fanon: The Theory of Revolutionary Decolonization, and the Algerian Experience Author(s): Paul A. Beckett Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1973), pp. 5-27 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/446648 . Accessed: 27/11/2013 14:56
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ALGERIA vs. FANON: THE THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY DECOLONIZATION, AND THE ALGERIAN EXPERIENCE
AhmaduBello University, Zaria, Nigeria
cance as a theoristof revolution in general and revolution in colonial contexts in particular. The tendencyat present to see decolonization as a more useful process concept than "modernization," "political development," "integration," etc.,2 suggests that continued interestin Fanon is not misplaced. In terms of decolonization Algeria stands alone among the previouslycolonized Africancountries that are presentlyindependent, in that in the Algerian case alone was formal independence the product of prolonged and general revolutionarywar against the colonial power. Fanon's "chronicle" of the Algerian war, in turn,must certainlybe considered the boldest and one of the most important theoretical disquisitions on aspects of decolonization to have emerged fromAfrica.3 While frequently presented in the language of universals Fanon's most important work was rooted in the circumstancesof the Algerian war. It seems surpristhat his theoryof revolutionarydecolonization and its consequences ing, therefore, has not heretoforebeen systematically studied in juxtaposition with the facts of the after case before and independence). Such a juxtaposition is the Algerian (both
PAUL A. BECKETT
HE GROWING literature on FrantzFanon' reflects his continued signifi-
1Three book-lengthtreatmentshave appeared recently: Renate Zahar, L'Oeuvre de Frantz Fanon (Paris: Maspero, 1970; originally published in German as Kolonialismus und Entfremdung); David Caute, Fanon (London: Fontana, 1970); and Peter Geismar, Fanon (New York: Dial Press, 1971). Zahar's book is the most useeful; it and Caute's book provide bibliographic guides on Fanon. The most systematicattempt to relate elements of Fanon's thoughtto problems and concepts of comparative politics is Martin Staniland, "Frantz Fanon and the African Political Class," African Affairs,68, 270 (January 1969), 4-25. An attemptto evaluate the present-daysignificanceof Fanon for post-colonial Africa is P. A. Beckett, "Frantz and Sub-Sahara Africa: Notes on the ContemporarySignificanceof His Thought," Africa Today, 19, 2 (1972), 59-72. in S. F. Huntington's own re2 The attacks on the use of "modernization" are well-reflected evaluation, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics, 3 (1971), 283-322. The most theoreticallyambitious attack on customaryuses of the modernizationconcept (and related ones) is that by C. S. Whitaker, Process of Political Change," World Politics, 19 (January 1967), 190"A Dysrhythmic 217. See also, "Theoretical Context and Setting" in his The Politics of Tradition (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1970), pp. 3-34. See also R. Sklar's "Political Science and National Integration: A Radical Approach," Journal of Modern African Studies, 5 (1967), 1-11; and J. S. Saul and G. Arrighi,"Nationalism and Revolution in SubSaharan Africa," Socialist Register (London), 1969. For what is (in my opinion) the most interestinguse of the decolonization theme see Roger Genoud's Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana (New York: Praeger, 1969). The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1966). Unless otherwisenoted, page 3 numbers in the text and footnotesreferto this book in this edition. It is perhaps more than coincidental that the most interestingtheoretical work in a radical vein which is emergingfromAfrica is likewise rooted in one of the rare cases of prolonged currently anticolonial insurrection. I referto Amilcar Cabral; see Revolution in Guinea; an African People's Struggle (London: Stage One, 1969). Particularlyon the question of spontaneityand with respect to social class analysis,Cabral's work is in sharp and interesting contrast to Fanon's. No systematiccomparison of their theoreticalwork seems to exist at present. 5
THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY
purposeof thisessay. The aim is notso muchto see whatFanon can tellus about as to see whatAlgeriacan tellus aboutFanon (i.e.,thestrengths and weakAlgeria, nessesof his theory). By thusexploring thenatural(Algerian) context of Fanon's and "elucidation"of text,we can hope to move beyondthe uncritical summary Fanon's thought ofmuchofthewriting on himso far. whichhas beencharacteristic Underneath thesomewhat jumbledappearancepresented of by The Wretched the Earth,withits bewildering shifts of tone and perspective, lies a singletheme which gives coherenceto the whole. This themeconcernsthe long-term consepaths to formalindependence.Leaving aside otherscatquences of contrasting and sharply tered Fanon givesattention to twoprincipal references, opposedmodes: that of revolutionary decolonization by Algeria),and thatof "bour(represented The geois nationalism"(represented by mostotherFrench-speaking territories). maindistinguishing use ofclassterms)their basis factor is not (despitethefrequent in social class rigorously but rather the degreeof violenceand the extent defined, and qualitative The interest terms)of popularparticipation. (in bothquantitative of Fanon's distinction arises fromhis argument that the mode by which indeis achieved for decoloniwillhavecrucialconsequences pendence post-independence zation. In whatis perhapshisbestknownpassageon thesubjectFanon says:
Violence alone, violencecommitted and educatedby its by the people,violenceorganized makesit possible forthemassesto understand socialtruths and givesthekeyto them. leaders, of action, thatstruggle, thatknowledge of thepractice there's but a Without without nothing savea minimum ofreadapThere'snothing fancy-dress paradeand theblareof thetrumpets. a fewreforms at the top,a flagwaving: and downthere at thebottom an undivided tation, in themiddle time.4 living marking mass,still ages,endlessly
of thispassageis bothwarning The Underneath and hypothesis. the rhetoric decade of thewarning, the African statesafterthefirst as one surveys significance of independence, is all too obvious. Frequently one encounters, along with dison the with the results of independence(or lack of them), regret appointment of nationals of African that in countries Azikiwe's part independence phrase, came, of the sub-Saharan countries cannotbe "on a platterof gold." While the history ofFanon'shypothesis seems confirmed. theinterest reversed, Fanon is asserting that mass participation in violent Stated more precisely,
decolonization - revolutionarydecolonization - lays the basis for true- revolu-
- decolonization after We wishto explorethis hypothesis by independence. tionary case thatgave riseto it. To do so, we mustask initially an examination of thevery two questions: - viewednow from the distance war forindependence (1) Did the Algerian of a decade and more- fitFanon's pictureof people's anticolonial revolutionary war? oftheAlgerian followed lines evolution system (2) Has thepost-independence and revolutionary in terms of a Fanonist bothpositive whichcould be considered mustthenbe dealtwith, thisinvolving therelation value position?A third question and those to the to thefirst second. ouranswers between question
4P. 117.
ALGERIA vs. FANON
To anticipate, I willarguethat (1) theAlgerian war in itsgeneral characteristicsdid fit Fanon'sportrait ofanticolonial war; but (2) Algeria's post-independence evolution has notbeenrevolutionary in Fanonist terms.Of mostinterest is thethird is for here the be to made that the most question, argument significant post-indeare relatedprecisely to the"Fanonian" character pendencefailures of thestruggle forindependence. The inquiry will proceedin three it will be necessary to major sections.First, in moredetailFanon's theory of violenceand revolutionary decolonization. explore of the Algerian reviewed. war forindependence will be briefly Second,the history a of the action" of the review Third, post-independence periodmust "revolutionary be undertaken. A final section willsuggest conclusions.
THE THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY DECOLONIZATION
The Theoryof Violence in positive one a treatment whichrepresents terms is provided, ing... ." Elsewhere, and to politicaltheory. of Fanon's mostimportant to revolutionary contributions of colonization of violencein the context instrumental terms."Fanon's treatment
and decolonization, on the other hand, is remarkableboth for its emotional impact and for its multidimensionalcharacter. First,violence is the essence of the colonial Without violence, Fanon argues in the passage cited above, "there's noth-
Historically, violence has been seen, even by revolutionarythinkers,primarilyin
in a peculiarly remain colonialsystems Established situation. dependent byviolence, nakedfashion on violence:

the policerate the exploited fromthose in power. In the colonial countries,on the contrary, man and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their frequentand direct action mainand napalm not to budge. tain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle-butts It is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force. The intermediary does not lighten the oppression,nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringerof violence into the home and into the mind of the native.6
5 Thus
and "bewilderers" of moralteachers, counsellors a multitude In the capitalist countries sepa-
nicians." See "Reflections on Violence," Journal of International Affairs,23 (1969), 1-35; On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 9 especially. Chalmers Johnson puts the traditional view of violence within revolutionarythought when he writes that true revolution"is the acceptance of violence in order to cause the systemto change when all else has failed... ." See Revolutionary Change (New York: Little, Brown, 1966, p. 12. Harry Bienen puts it that "What Mao, Debray, and Lenin are gettingat is that under conditions of a specifiable kind, well-organized violence is the shortestdistance between two points..."; see Violence and Social Change (Universityof Chicago force including violence as the Press, 1968), p. 46. Marx and Engels, while identifying "midwife of every societypregnant with a new one" endorsed it only in termsof either inevitabilityor necessity; if these came in doubt (the U.S., Britain, Holland), then the acceptance of force was automatically brought back into question. On the other hand, precedentsfor Fanon's considerablymore positive view of violence can be seen in certain of the anarchists (Malatesta and Kropotkin in particular), and, of course, in Sorel, 6 P. 31.
mustbe left"to the techand thatits discussion hencenon-theoretical; is "speechless,"
Hannah Arendt argues that violence and (political) power are opposites; that violence
The violence of the colonial regime is balanced7 by the "autodestructive" violence of the "native" and "native society." Thus the eventual development of anticolonial counter-violencedoes not amount to a new factorin the colonial situation, but to the redirectionof violence: We have seen thatthissameviolence, all through the though keptverymuchon thesurface colonialperiod,yet turnsin the void. We have also seen thatit is canalisedby the emoof dance and possession we have seen how it is exhausted tionaloutlets in fratriby spirits; is to lay hold of cidal combats "native"groupsand individuals]. Now theproblem [between it was appeasedbymyths thisviolence whichis changing direction. Whenformerly and exermasssuicide, nownewconditions ciseditstalents fresh in finding willmake waysofcommitting a completely newlineofaction.8 possible of thecolonialregime of thenative The violence and the counter-violence balanceeach other in an extraordinary and respond to eachother reciprocal homogeneity.'
in Fanon's ofthecolonial It can be suggested that relations situation, picture are as much relations areforMarx. Already, ofviolence theessence as economic treatment ofviolence thesimple notion ofa condiFanon's therefore, goesbeyond to of colonialism resort The essence instrumental violence. violence, tionally being ButFanonaddsanother is found in counter-violence. itscontradiction dimension; notonly in hisviewthecolonized manfinds hisfreedom violence through (thetrathat in violence a but also is the "native" becomes ditional in it. It conception), "I struck and ends: the blood Fanon thus the man; passagequotedby C&saire In Fanon's own I remember words: that that istheonly today."10 baptism spurted; thenative from is a cleansing force.It frees violence "Atthelevelofindividuals,
his inferiority complex and fromhis despair inaction; it makes him fearlessand restoreshis self respect."1 The colonized man findshis freedomin and throughviolence.?2 Such a transformationis, it is implied, not only of "qualitative" character, but permanent. At the social level an analogous transformation occurs, as the nation is formed (or : is sometimes as rediscovered, implied)
theironly becauseit constitutes ... it so happensthatforthe colonised people thisviolence, and creative withpositive theircharacters qualities. The practiceof violence work,invests forms linkin thegreatchain, a violent as a whole,sinceeach individual bindsthemtogether to thesettler's in reaction of violence whichhas surged a partof thegreatorganism upwards nationis already each otherand thefuture The groups violence in the beginning. recognize indivisible."
- and this point is crucial for the present exercise- that It is violence, finally guarantees a positive (democratic, popular, and participatory) content to the new nationhood. Thus a new and genuine culture emerges to underpin and maintain the collective identity,e.g., a "fightingliterature,a revolutionaryliterature,and a
and the the violenceof the colonialregime out the idea of balance between Fanon brings in an "extraordinary of the native- the two interacting counter-violence responsive - at a number of points;see pp. 30, 31, 33, 40, 48, 69. homogeneity" reciprocal
8
9P. 69. loc. cit.,p. 69. "Les armes miraculeuses," C6saire, 0 Aim6 f"P. 74. ' P. 67. added. P. 73. Emphasis
P. 46.
ALGERIA vs. FANON
national literature."14 "Native" institutions such as the professional story-teller find newfunctions in theprocess of thestruggle while traditional cul193-94), (pp. turalartifacts, suchas female out of with the new which are tune seclusion, particifrom are sweptaway or redefined. Most important, the narculture-to-be, patory is the argument and thatthespontaneous, voluntaristic rowly politicalstandpoint, unbureaucratic of the struggle will be projectedinto the post-indeorganization pendenceperiod:
When the people have taken violent part in the national liberation theywill allow no one to set themselvesup as "liberators." They show themselvesto be jealous of the results of their action and take good care not to place their future,their destinyor the fate of their country in the hands of a livinggod. Yesterday theywere completelyirresponsible;today theymean to understand everything and make all decisions. Illuminated by violence, the consciousnessof and the people rebels against any pacification. From now on the demagogues, the opportunists the magicians have a difficult task. The action which has thrownthem into a hand-to-hand struggleconfersupon the masses a voracious taste for the concrete. The attemptat mystification becomes in the long run,practicallyimpossible.""
can be seen in terms in the arguments so far summarized What is important we can in turn of violence. Within thislevelof discourse, of thefunctional analysis is terms in instrumental of violence view two the traditional levels. First, distinguish to the instrumental seen as of rebellion is in form armed the Here violence present. The presof independence. and theachievement of thecolonialregime overthrow no the ence of thisviewofviolencein Fanon's treatment requires comment; instruin everybody of revolutionary and inevitably mentalview is necessarily present theory. on the otherhand, sees it of violence, The secondaspectof the functionality in a of its solution as carrying terms itself.Thus at the level of the effects) (in for a or in violence individual, may permit providethe conditions participation the of elimination to the amounts which of elements perreorganization personality violence. At the and objectless of "native,"with its sense of inferiority sonality - the results are summed social level- thatto whichFanon givesmostattention three more This of the nation. in the things. means, specifically, emergence up nation of the the members of violence is redirection There by accomplished (1) and to an end divisions this comes with its social toward object; collectively proper achievefor itself nation The to "collective autodestruction." goal organizes (2) unitcapable of actionwithin a political in other becomes ment. The nation, words, the from and collective is universal, whichparticipation purposeemanatesdirectly unit a cultural the nation makes culture and national An integrated people. (3) in thecruciof cultural as well,as a variety together are,so to speak,fired sources, revolution. ble of anticolonial the outlineof the would seemto represent takentogether, These dimensions, violence whichbegan thisessay: thatwithout side to the quotedassertion positive above. listed results there are thepositive "there's nothing...." Thus,withviolence
14 P. 179. 15 P. 74.
10
The Description WarEffort oftheRevolutionary The empirical war againstthe referent forFanon's "violence"is revolutionary of colonialpower. We mustattempt to draw from Fanon a "picture"description themainpatterns of thestruggle forindependence. This description can be framed in terms of threeproblems of which are alwaysrelevantto the characterization instances of popular revolution:the inception of the revolution; the organization and leadership of the revolution; of the revolution and the politicaldevelopment in terms ofideology and post-takeover program. of 1. The inception versions Two not completely of the revolution. disparate the source of the revolutionary outbreakare apparentin The Wretched of the Earth. In the first, "illegalists" figure.They are radicalsforcedout of the urban and pursued bourgeoisnationalist politicalpartiesby the nationalist leadership, intotheruralhinterland in with contact the come colonialist There by they police.16 the peasantry, in In this the of terms "violence." version, illegalalreadythinking istsperhapsperform a necessary role as catalyst and to some extentas educators, a theoretical to the of colonialsituation natural the giving peasants' understanding and means of on technical grounding(besides providing expertise organization urban to into the seen filter The once revolution is the warfare). aroused, peasants that sectors of the colonial society of the portion by way "lumpen-proletariat" oftheurbansector withthepeasanwhichretains and socialconnections itscultural and whichhas notbeenassimilated to thecolonialist machine. try - whichis perhapsmorefeltbythereaderthanprecisely The secondversion intellectual eliminates the factorof illegalist action, expressed by Fanon- simply as "spontaneously described us "class" is with itself. This the leaving peasantry Violence" it is most of the long essay "Concerning Throughout revolutionary." of from benefit to without see the as catalysts possible peasantry rising spontaneously to thecolonialsystem. outside itself and itsrelationship inteand can be largely These two viewsare, in fact,not widelyseparated, of of relation the Fanon's reference to grated through psychology colonization, of revolution seemsnot to have been fully which to the description appreciated. materials Here we see thatthepsychoanalytic providethe basisof a psychological model of revolutionary to colonialism.The "native"is a psychologically response as to be nearly artificial so affected repressed being, heavily bythecolonialsituation tension" is its as a humanbeing. The society this: "muscular of "natives"reflects and resolved is tension dance, myth, through generalcharacteristic; imperfectly of "natives" thesociety "collective as theviolencepentup within autodestruction" is nota stableone; is releasedupon itself.The psychology of thecolonizedsociety and the situation is unbearableand at some pointwill findits climax,conversion colonial the and unified solutionin a collective system.Thus, this risingagainst an of toward leads model revolution explosionimage,and confirms psychological one. thatFanon's revolution is emphatically a popular and basically spontaneous The presenceof illegalist elements onlymakesthe situation amongthe peasantry do not createthe intellectuals more imminently explosive(p. 102); the illegalist
1
See pp. 53 and 102 especially.
ALGERIA vs. FANON
11
and culturalconditions that forrevolution.It mightbe suggested psychological theseillegalists the same role as propaganda,partyactivities, play approximately of revolution: etc.,in the Marxisttheory theymay have crucialimpact,but only whentheunderlying conditions forrevolution are already present. and leadership. It is considerably to classify more difficult 2. Organization Fanon's arguments and organization of withreference to thequestion ofleadership becontrast the revolutionary from the The arises struggle. principally difficulty to the role of leadership and organization, tweenthe occasionalspecific references and leaderless and themoregeneralmood suggesting thatthespontaneous quality of therevolution's thecourseof the remains itscharacteristic throughout inception armedstruggle. Thus, on the one hand, thereis the repeatedmessagethat the people know ofthepeople, and understand all, and are thetruth(p. 39). The perfect solidarity and is as once therebellion seen based on culture, sharedobjecbegins, psychology, of functhanon organization. Fanon opposesthedevelopment tiveinterest rather of the condemns the bureaucratic thus he tendency tionally organization; specific, of specialized to introduce "intellectual" "the idea of specialdisciplines, functions, machinewhich stonecrusher, the fierce of departments the terrible within mixing whichis a popularrevolution of organisation" (p. 87), the"fetish is."17 Elsewhere is condemned. of (bourgeois)nationalist leaders characteristic party On the otherhand, thereare (mainlywithinthe essay "Spontaneity:Its to theneed to organize therebelof references and Weakness") a number Strength in fact, in it.1sAt one point, educatethemassesthatparticipate lion and politically thespona distinction between whichis Maoist,drawing Fanon reachesa position and theconscious, directed revolution. taneous peasantrebellion
it intoa revolutionary and to transform a peasantrevolt, mentin so faras it can be termed clear objectives, a definite that the successof the struggle war. They discover presupposes thattheir and aboveall theneedforthemassofthepeopleto realise unorganized methodology - maybe evenfor can onlybe a temporary efforts dynamic.You can hold out forthreedays - on the strength of the admixture of sheerresentment contained in themass threemonths the terrible of the people; but you won'twin a nationalwar,you'llneveroverthrow enemy to raise the standardof conmachine,and you won't changehumanbeingsif you forget are enough." norfine of therank-and-file. Neither stubborn sciousness slogans courage
areled to renounce themoveTheseleaders intocertain controlled and directed channels.
need to be cometo see thatevenvery The leadersof therebellion large-scale peasantrisings
can be drawn fromFanon's comconclusions Only two not-very-satisfactory mentson the questionof leadershipand organization.First,one mustconclude on thepoint. Collationof nevermanagedto clarify histhought thatFanon himself tension between the leavesus withan unreconciled thewidely separatedreferences and complete withinitself, whichis both spontaneous ideal of peasant revolution and control. But second, direction and the sense of the need for organization, in the lattercategory, thatone attachesto references it is of the weight regardless
I
P. 40. See pp. 47, 105-8, 110, 145, 148 especially. SP. 108. Note that a few pages later, the theme of peasant sufficiency re-enters;p. 114: "... the peasants, who are all the time adding to their knowledge in the light of experience, will come to show themselvescapable of directingthe people's struggle."
18
12
safeto saythatFanon givesrelatively attention to organization little bycomparison withothermajor theorists of revolution. thereseemsto be an Almost everywhere, will be forthcoming, that the necessary as if by implicit organization assumption itself.It is similarly of toomuch truethatFanon is at leastas aware of thedangers in the fragmentation of the "people" both vertically and organization (resulting an authoritarian and in thedangerofcreating "leader") as he is ofthe horizontally, dangersof too littleorganization. Finally,we may note thatFanon saysremarkmusttake. Strikingly, the long essay ably littleabout the formthat organization Violence" does not referto the revolutionary partyat all - party "Concerning withthe pre-revolutionary figures organization (and counteronlyin connection leaders. ofthe"nationalist" efforts revolutionary) bourgeois 3. Programand ideology. On thispoint one encounters the same anomaly. and On the one hand, at severalpointsthe need forcoherence(p. 47) ideology a On the other and is affirmed. "definite program(p. 162) methodology" (p. 108) do not add up to muchwithin the book as a whole. More hand, thesereferences of program and ideology. is of the content there little indication important, very in the Fanon is to be discussed Like the SoummamPlateforme, stronger presently, can be in the that negative showing post-independence development ways and fragvitiatedand perverted.On the positiveside, one findsonly scattered elements of a post-independence mentary program:Fanon advocates"newsystems ofmanagement" to take capitalwhichis advantageof "thatrevolutionary designed shouldbe placed at the service thepeople" (p. 122); he affirms thattheeconomy sectormustbe nationalized of the nation (p. 124) ; he saysthatthe middleman's will be decentralized which he endorses democratic "bygetcooperatives (p. 144) ; of in the mass of the interested the ordering publicaffairs" (p. 145) ; he people ting industries of tourism condemns regions (p. 125); he saysthepoorest development shouldbe favored(p. 149) ; and he optsfor"socialism"(p. 78). But theseand a would seem to represent whichcould be mentioned few otherspecifics relatively in whichis leftimplicit a from coherent thrown out theory fragments unimportant Fanon's It is that the Earth. the powerful flowof The Wretched inescapable of of the his examination was withtheviolent phase of decolonization; preoccupation to had revolution of post-independence beyondthe onlybegun progress problems of stage critique.
THE ALGERIAN WAR
witha less be brought Can Fanon's visionof ThirdWorldrevolution together We maymakethe war forindependence? of theAlgerian vividfactualdescription ofthewar and thenthecourse first theinception in twosections, examining attempt it took. Warfor The Inception oftheAlgerian Independence is there forFanon's picmustbe askedhere: (1) whatsupport Two questions tureof the immense impacton the "native"by the colonialsystem? psychological of a largely forFanon's picture is there and (2) whatsupport peasant spontaneous rising?
ALGERIA vs. FANON
13
Withrespect to thefirst That can be suggested. question, onlya partialanswer theFrenchcolonialsystem in Algeriahad an unusually heavyimpact(by reference to othercolonialsystems in Africa, especially)cannotbe doubted. The size of the European settler population(nearlyone million) and above all the fact thatthe settler extentdispersedin farming populationwas to an important occupations a personalimpacton a largeproportion itself of the Muslimpopulation. suggests Muslimshad been effectively of nearly all land whichcould be profitdispossessed forcash crops. By 1954,whentheanticolonial half war began,nearly ablyfarmed of Muslimmales of working annual per capita incomefor age wereunemployed; Muslimswas less than a tenth of thatforAlgerians of Europeanstock. About 70 of Muslims wererural, a minissector percent yettheMuslimagricultural produced cule portion of Algeria's of cash crops. Stillmoreimportant theeconomic position the mostnumerous to have group of AlgerianMuslimsseems,on close analysis, forinactuallyworsened duringthe twentieth century.Thus Favrod has shown, on the average, stance,that the amountof grain disposedof by each individual, was nearlythreetimeshigher in 1870 than in 1950,and thatsheep averagedtwo in 1954.20 The longduration and deep per personin 1911 and one per 1.8 persons of colonialpoliticalruleis likewise to be noted. Finally, there was the penetration destructive and stifling in thecultural of theFrenchsystem effect realm.21 These and otheraspectsof thecolonialsystem in Algeriawhichmight be cited do not in themselves Fanon's psychoanalytic of and confirm the "native" picture colonized ofFanon'sworkis to point indeed,one ofthemajorcontributions society; out thatvirtually no workon thepsychological has been impactofcolonialsystems done. It is unquestionable, is known the that what of material and political however, of colonizedAlgeriadoes contribute of Fanon's own conditions to the credibility ofindividual dehumanization and cultural dislocation. description a factualhistorical lends With respectto the second question, view likewise to of revolt. One in Fanon's view of the violent support index, fact,of beginning the culturaland social impactof the Frenchcolonialsystem is the tardydevelopment of organizedexpression of Algeriannationalism(whether"bourgeois"or of themostprominent As late one as 1936 otherwise). bourgeois politicalleaders an to "discover" foundhimself after search, unable, Algeriannation.22 thorough in elite did the "nationalist" World II War Only during begin factto talkof the a of to articulate Ferhat and "Algerian message anticolonialism.2s people" vigorous Abbas' parties(AML and, after1947,UDMA) developedlargeclaimedmember2
See Favrod's analysis, Le F.L.N. et l'Algirie (Paris: Plon, 1962; a revised edition of La Re'volutionalgerienneof 1959), pp. 172-81. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians (Boston, Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 190-91 especially; = David C. Gordon, North Africa's French Legacy, 1954-62 (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1964). SFerhat Abbas, L'Entente (Abbas' newspaper), 23 February 1936. Quoted in Lacouture, Cinq hommeset la France (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1961), p. 274. * This may be dated from Ferhat Abbas' "Manifesto of the Algerian People," issued on 10 February 1943. The Manifesto contains demands for immediate and effective participation of Muslims "in the governmentof their people," and compares colonialism to the it shows the of the likewise of But French cultural continuingstrength slavery antiquity. mold, and condemns colonization in the Algerian case because it is one imposed "on a white race of prestigiouspast."
14
shipsbut failed,as Fanon so effectively pointsout,to developa messageof revolubased more clearly on the tionarynationalism. Anothernationalisttradition, bothin Algeriaand France,was thatof Messali Hadj, whose Algerian proletariat as a radicalnationalist credentials all theway back to theearly1920s. By extended the late 1940s,however, Messaliwas considered new generapasse byan emerging tion of nationalists, a member as Ben Bella, nominally of Messali's MTLD, later moreand moreconstitutional, and beexplained: "Messali,in fact,was becoming lieved that thanksto the elections the situation would evolveand thatwe would be able to make ourselves heardand gradually obtainmoreconcessions eventually from thecolonialadministration." 24 Two otherpotentialorganizers of radical anticolonialaction (the Algerian Communist contributed littleto the actual course partyand the Ulema) likewise ofdevelopment oftherevolutionary effort. The triggering of the revolution, was accomplished more instead, by scarcely thana handful of youngradicals, as a secret organized group (called theOrganisationSpiciale) within the MessalistMTLD. These organized to force" "theresort whichbeganon 1 November, 1954. The widelyscattered incidents of 1 November resulted in onlysixFrench killedand a dozenwounded. It is significant thatneither theFrench, of nor some in the 70,000troops Algeria, disposing principal "bourgeois" nationalist the declarationof rebellionby this leader, Ferhat Abbas, considered smallgroupof "illegalists" of muchimportance.25 The rebels'action, in fact,drew the immediate of of none the established Yet the disorder support parties. spread and tookshapeand, it soonbecameapparent, was able to drawon theruralmasses of thefellahin a way thatnoneof thenationalist had been able to do. The parties established leaders were forced to that theirstrategies had been political recognize transcended as the French were forced to that were byviolence,"just recognize they far more than outlaw dissidents. revolution for The fighting Algerian independence had begun, and was notto ceasefornearly eight years. The Character ofthe War ratherthan organized If, then,thiswar seemsin factto have been triggered (and thus to fitFanon's model), did it retainits characterof "Fanonian sponafter? Put in olderterms,27 did thisrevolution remainone "from taneity" below," or was it subsequently takenover,managed,directed and turnedinto revolution "from above" by an eliteoligarchy?We will findthatthe answerto thisquestion would seem to be both "yes" and "no," withthe lattermore significant forour purposes.
the "autobiography" preparedby RobertMerle,Ben Bella (London: Michael Joseph, 1967), p. 77. to support theactivists, that"violence will 1954,Abbasrefused reiterating 25 On 12 November solvenothing." his earlierwords,announcing his adherenceto the revolutionary effort (from 2 Abbas ate Communist Cairo) on 26 April 1956. The bulk of the Algerian party(neverlarge) somedelay,on thebasisof individual after adherence. effort, joined therevolutionary
27 Lenin,
4 In
in the process of a refutationof an article by Plekhanov, gives a general review of the problem in his 1905 article, "Only frombelow, or fromabove as well as frombelow?"
Moscow: Progress (Republished; 1966). Publishers,
ALGERIA
vs. FANON
15
The revolutionary effort of an official was formalized by the establishment withan official of theFLN (Frontde Libiration party leadership.The formation in rather diffident terms in November1954. The Nationale) had been announced first and programoccurrednearly meetingto democratically develop structures two yearslater,in August 1956, when adherents in the valleyof met in secrecy Soummanin Algeria. This meeting bodiesand developed providedforgoverning a statement of policiesin the formof a Plateforme. The latter, whichwas to be the onlyformal program producedduringthewar years, managedto say remarkits main thrust, in fact, ably littleabout the long-range goals of the revolution; seemedto concern what the revolution was not.28Perhapsthe singlemostimportantelement of policyto emerge of politicalover was the principle of precedence and "interior" over "exterior."In fact,the opposite was to prevail, with military, over exterior over milimilitary takingprecedence interior, political, and, finally, overthe military of theinterior. Thus official taryof theexterior politicalleaderthe form of the Conseil National de la Revolution ship (in Algirienneand the ComitJ de Coordination after and, Executif, 1958, the Gouvernement September Provisoire de la Revolution soon shifted and reoutside the country Algirienne) mained verymuch a leadershipof the "exterior" the war. throughout Military structures were likewise bifurcated effective Frenchbarrages. by the increasingly The bulk of the Armde de LiberationNationale (ALN), under Houari Bouwas basedin Tunisiaand Morocco- developing in size (to about40,000 medienne, and but men), equipment, discipline, ideologicalcommitment, reducedin military to relatively terms acrossthebarriers and back. Meanwhile, the insignificant forays of theinterior, forces which (according to figures whichhave no solidbasisbutare between fiveand ten thousandactivefighters, cargenerally accepted) numbered ried on thewar in increasing isolation from theexterior and evenfrom each other. The French resettlement policy accentuatedthis isolationof the active fighters was and its towardthe end the Frenchwere successful in markedly (which aim), of the flow arms and into the interior. reducing equipment In themeantime, a succession ofthree provisional governments (GPRA) spoke forthe revolution abroad (fromTunis,Cairo, and Tripoli), and eventually negotiatedthe peace withthe de Gaulle government. The generalacceptanceoutside rootsin a party(the FLN) connecting them Algeriaof the politicalleadership's withthe massesin Algeriaseemsironicin retrospect. ArslanHumbaraci,a close of the war, asserts observer that the politicalleadership nevertackled"the probThe claimedmembership of onlyone to two hundred lem of the FLN itself."29 thousandhad indeed the characteristics of a "Front"- in Ben Bella's phrase,"it likea zoologicalgarden.""3Structures was a little werepoorly and the articulated,
E.g., that the Algerian Revolution was not aimed at throwingAlgerians of European origin "into the sea"; that the Revolution was neither civil nor religious war; and that the Revolution was "bound in feudal relationshipneitherto Cairo, nor London, nor Moscow, nor Washington." See Andr6 Mandouze, ed., La Re'volution algerienne par les textes (.Paris: Maspero, 1961), passim,forthe textof the Plateforme. ' Arslan Humbaraci, Algeria: A Revolution that Failed (London: Pall Mall, 1966), p. 67. " Le Monde, 8-9 September 1963. Boumedienne has given a similar descriptionof the FLN (grouping all elementsfromleft to right,and "burstinginto pieces" with the end of the war) ; Le Monde, 4 April 1968. '
16
mostbasic decisions of the party(e.g., whether it was "mass" about the character or "cadre") remained tobe made after independence. and superficial of the revoAlongwiththe fragmented politicalorganization to developa clear statement wentthe failure of therevolution's lution, ideological and its post-independence character program.The inadequacyof the Soummam has beennoted. Throughthecourseofthewar there was,as Mandouze Plateforme - a continual has said,a continual and programmatic flux on theideological levels ideas thrown out bythevariousleadersand elitegroups, therevodialoguebetween was El Moudjahid), theradio lutionary publications (of whichthemostimportant ("Voice of fighting Algeria"), with,at the same time,a constantbalancingof One as friendly to the revolution as Francis ideologyand practicalnecessity.3' to remarkon this nearlytotal failureto definethe Jeansonfound it necessary of the Algerianpeople.32Interviews of fighters of the revolutionary requirements interior founda striking absenceof developedideology; journalist by an American enlisted men tendedto feelthatthewar was a job to be done,thatit was directed towardindependence, and that independence was associatedwith freedom and of thenew society, to theform "it would be better Withrespect thanit is liberty. now."3 On the heelsof the Accordsof Evian and the ceasefire, a faction amongthe to filltheideological nationalist leadershastened void. This group,meetAlgerian de Tripoli,"designedto serveas the ing in June,1962,adopted the "Programme of theindependent from Algeria. Scarcelyan emanation "ideologicalinstrument" in a fewdaysby as fewas four thepeople,theProgramme was reportedly written leftist set forward The document intellectuals.34 clearlythe idea of post-independence revolution will be the democratic ("succeedingthe battleforindependence and "collectivization a socialist of the popularrevolution");"35affirmed perspective and so forth.More called for"perfect democracy"; largermeansof production"; the showsa modernist orientation, significant, perhaps,the Programme affirming whichhas forso longperthejob ofwipingout the "feudalspirit need to complete and gives hintsof a hard-headedapproach meated the life of the Maghreb,""36 in permanent in theprocess Fanon'sfaith transformation whichperhaps contradicts of to bewareof moralism, of revolutionary violence: "It is important thereflection which consists of wantingto transform the the idealisticand infantile intellect, withtheaid ofmoralvaluesalone."37 and solveitsproblems society
See Mandouze, op. cit., introduction. ' Francis Jeanson,La Revolution Algerienne (Milan: Feltrinelli,1962). ' See Herb Greer, A Scattering of Dust (London: Hutchinson, 1962), pp. 94-96, 122, and passim. ' Gerard Chaliand says that the Programmewas writtenby Mostefa Lacheref, Ridha Malek, Mohammed Harbi and Ben Yahia. See L'Algerie, est-elle socialiste? (Paris: Maspero, 1964), p. 18. See also Humbaraci, op. cit.,p. 67. ' Le du Parti Communiste Programmede Tripoli (Published by the Tendence r6volutionnaire Frangais, 1962), p. 15. 38P. 10. " P. 17. Simone de Beauvoir with the decisions taken by the reportsthat Fanon "was satisfied C.N.R.A. at Tripoli. ...." But it should be noted that by this time Fanon was approaching the last stage of his illness; Beauvoir notes his "obsession with disaster" which she thinkswas largelyexplained by consciousnessof impendingdeath. See Force of Circumstance (Penguin, 1968), pp. 608-9, and passim.
ALGERIAvs. FANON
17
on the need forideology is one of theprincipalthemes of Although emphasis the Programme, an It the document is itself establishes "ideology." aptly scarcely called "Programme," forthisis what it is- a listof the policyrecommendations of a small group of socialistintellectuals, in aware that the Algerianrevolution had no positive and very to prescribe one for it. 1962 content, willing The Warand Fanon Fanon's style, in the first of theEarth, chapterof The Wretched particularly is "apocalyptic" and his description decolonization is usuallypreof revolutionary sentedas applicableto situations Yet of colonialism and decolonization generally. thissurvey has shownthat thereis a generaland significant between congruence Fanon's "picture" ofrevolutionary decolonization and thefacts of theAlgerian war forindependence, so faras those facts can be known. in its inception morethan seemsto have been triggered First,the revolution it must an be considered Fanon's While organized. oversimplification, general picture of "illegalists," unable to workwithinthe framework of the above-ground nationalist who are forced intocontactwithruralmassesreadyforviolent parties, revolt seems tobe supported known the facts. by this and the Second, spontaneous prevailedthroughout "popular" character war period. The insurrection was not effectively and controlled from organized above. The FLN, createdafter therebellion thana began,was lessan organization sharedconviction. The military was with the conventionorganization fragmented, and equippedportion of it confined to theexterior. allyorganized Inside,themilieffort was carried autonomous tary by increasingly groupsdrawingsupportfrom In rural"masses." the main of thrust Fanon's is to arguethat thought 38 myopinion, a colonial can of insurrection take with a minimum prolonged regime against place on hierarchical instead the readiness for of rural revolt organization relying - and thisin factseemsto be themost massespreparedby oppressive colonialism feature of the war. prominent Algerian measures can be no morethan suggestive, the war Third,while quantitative - by the extent ofitsviolenceand disruptive seemsto have fulfilled impacton the Fanon's conditions for cultural permanent changebrought Algerian population rather thanpeacefuldecolonization. violent about through The figures are ofquesin version indicate duration tionableaccuracy,39 both and they yet any intensity, of 1962: 1954and thesummer November e.g.,between
- 42,000 recorded acts of terrorism are said to have caused 10,704casualties amongEuroto Muslim 43,284casualties pean civilians, civilians; - 4,300 Muslimsare said to have been killedin Franceitself(manyin internecine fighting between FLN and Messalist adherents);
of this support is shown by the magnitude of the French resettlement significance effort, of contact with the civilian peoples. designed to deny the active fighters * It is notable that the post-independenceregime (in 1967) has revised downward the prefor independence (for a summary viously accepted figureson casualties among fighters see Africa Report, June 1967). In part, this presumablyreflects of the new figures, the pressure on governmentrevenues representedby pensions and survivors'benefits. See Humbaraci, op. cit., pp. 62-3, on the problem of post-independence inflationof the number of self-declared"maquisards."
8 The
18
- The ALN is said to have lostsome 141,000menkilled, whilethe French are said to have lostsome12,000regulars killed."
of all is thefactthatsome 1.8 million Muslims wereforced Perhapsmostsuggestive to leave theirhomes,eitherthrough fromthe fighting or by the flight voluntary Frenchprogramof resettlement In designedto isolate the nationalist fighters.4' more"qualitative"terms thewar was an unusually cruelone,withtorture becomof warfare(as Fanon's own case histories ing a standardinstrument testify).An of permanent culturalchangeresulting fromthisconflagration would expectation seemreasonable.A Frenchsociologist whoseinterpretation ofthewar is nototherwise similarto Fanon's presents on thispoint a conclusion which is remarkably "Fanonian": "There is no doubtthatthewar,by reasonof itsform, its duration, and the significance which it has taken in the conscienceof all Algerians, has abouta truecultural mutation."42 brought
AFTER INDEPENDENCE
A Survey of RevolutionaryAction
1. Introduction:I shall take it thatin Fanon's terms, the post-independence revolution mustbe "about" the solutionof social problems("backwardness" and in particular)through the collective nationalpoverty actionof thepeople. Three themselves as logicaltargets of major aspectsof Algeria's"social problem"suggest revolution. Most obviousis theextreme thepost-independence in distriinequality of the ancien regime.Second (and rebutionof wealthwhichwas characteristic of Algeria'sruralmasses,engagedin lated to the first)was the extreme poverty on tiny subsistence methods. plotsofpoorland using agriculture essentially primitive in boththeruraland urbansectors. Thirdwerethemassesof unemployed of a problem and also of the (revoIn Fanon's terms theseare bothdescriptions meansof its solution.Wealthcould be redistributed. More important, lutionary) and underemployed in thelongrun,theunemployed masses couldbe mobilized in a ofeconomic nationalrevolution development. strenuous, 2. Policies of the revolution:In accomplishing revolutionary change in the of a socialistand participatory direction achievesociety, Algeria'smoststriking ment has been the creationof an economicsectorcharacterized by autogestion in thatit purports is interesting to givereality not Autogestion (self-management). of the meansof production, but also to Fanon's visionof onlyto social ownership and people. Autogestion control had itsorigin trueand direct in the bytheworkers ofindependence. sixmonths Withthedrawing ofthefirst to a closeofthe confusion ownersleftor fledAlgeria.43 of Europeanproperty The prewar, large numbers
4oThese figuresare drawn fromE. O'Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection (Hamden, Conn.:
41
42
Ibid.
Archon Books, 1967), pp. 200-201.
'
Pierre Bourdieu, "De la Guerre R6volutionnairea la R6volution," in F. Perroux, ed., ProblImes de l'Alge'rieindipendante (Paris: PressesUniversitaires,1963), p. 8. In 1961 nearly one million Europeans had remained in Algeria. By the end of 1962 this number had dropped to an estimated 150,000. See O'Ballance, op. cit., pp. 200-201. which initiallyestimated The exodus took place despite the pleas of the new government that some 500,000 would remain. See Dorothy Pickles,Algeria and France (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 167.
ALGERIA vs. FANON
19
- leavingapartments, - created houses, cipitatedeparture lands,etc.,unoccupied the problemof the biens vacants a problemwhich, largely,was solved by individualAlgerians who movedintovacant apartments and possessed themselves of automobiles Fanon's visionof redistributive (thus fulfilling justiceforthe "envious" native). In rural areas, seemingly spontaneously, peasants organizedto harvest rather thantheprocropson abandonedestates.It was thisphenomenon, which createdautogestion.44 The governgram and action of the government, rolewas one oflegitimation morethaninitiative. ment's original The government took the initiative, however,extendingand subsequently the autogestion was roundedout bynationalThe ruralsector structuring system. sectorcomprised izingdecreesby the fall of 1963. By 1964 the ruralautogestion some 32.5 percentof cultivated lands,producedthe bulk of exportcrops (grapes and citrus)and nearly halfof totalcereals.45 The significant factis thattheautothe old "European" agricultural sector. gestionsectorverycloselyapproximated "thetotalmodern Thus,theautogestion comprised sphere nearly agricultural sphere, and that only."46 Autogestion has left the pre-independence realm of Muslim untouched.It does not amount,in otherwords,to a revolupeasant agriculture to solution the tionary problemof Algerianagrarianpoverty.Thus about seven millionAlgerians live in the agrariansector outsidetheautogestion sector.Within one-half million thisgroupthereare nearly who peasantproprietors own and farm of land whichis, on the average,much less fertile less than ten hectares than the lands.47 previously European the permanent to the otherrural sectors, workers on the selfBy reference less than an estates island of relative 200,000men) represent (somewhat managed and economicsecurity.The situation was summedup succinctly well-being by africaine: Rdvolution
and havinglost theirqualityof wage earners, the employment Disposingof a permanent sector of agriculture of the self-managed remain in spiteof everything workers privileged by of the population, withthe majority thatis to say,by comparison withpeasants comparison work." land and without without
"The Algerian leadership has used the spontaneous origin of autogestion to draw a flattering comparison with the autogestion of Yugoslavia, by saying that Yugoslavian autogestion and not, as in Algeria, by the workersthemselves. See was promoted by the government, D. C. Gordon, The Passing of French Algeria (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 154. Note that one radical economist has criticizedpreciselythe spontaneous and uncoordinated character of autogestion, i.e., the feature of "uncoordinated substiincomes previouslyearned by the colons to tution" which had the effectof transferring groups of Algerians rather than to the state where they could have contributed to financingdevelopment. See Samir Amin, The Maghreb in the Modern World: Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970), p. 139 and passim. * See officialdata reproduced in Jean Teillac, Autogestion en Alge'rie (Paris: Centre des sur I'Afrique et I'Asie modernes, 1965), p. 18. See also Hautes Etudes Administratives Thomas L. Blair, The Land To Those Who Work It: Algeria's Experiment in Worker Management (New York: Anchor Books, 1969). * Teillac, op. cit., p. 11. 4 Chaliand, op. cit., p. 66. a 2 November 1963. Blair, op. cit., calls the result of autogestion capitalisme du groupe, a new group of exploiters. Amin, op. cit., points out that the various "vested interests" that are now established constitute a major obstacle to rapid economic development, p. 141.
20
of thepreoccupations of thisarticle, is thereal problem This, fromthe standpoint with rural autogestion.A strikingly "Fanonian" solutionto the problemof the a newsituation biensvacantscreates acquiseto be defended byitspossessors against The politicalpotential of the autogestion workers egalitarian pressures. operating as a defensive of been enhancedbythetendencies pressure grouphas undoubtedly withintheserelatively government, partyand armyelitesto inserttheirprot6g6s attractive situations.Even though, the periodof independence, there throughout has been a higheconomiccost to the autogestion neither has felt system,49 regime it possible to eliminate thesystem, noreventhoseindividual whichhave enterprises failed to break even. In the meantime, consistently verylittlehas been done to introduce"revolutionary" seven change into the situationof the approximately million thatis,outsidethecash crop "modsector, peasantsoutsidetheautogestion inherited from theancienrigime. ern"sector Since the installation of autogestion in the formerly European agricultural theonlyotherchangesof greatsignificance in theeconomic fieldhave consector, of the statesector.In this,there has been a smooth, cernedthe extension progressive continuity the changeof regime in 1965. Thus, starting from the overlapping nationalization of the biensvacantsin 1962-63,thegovernment has brought under its ownership and management the whole of the "modern"large-scale virtually from and import, finance economy, ranging manufacturing through export through and insurance, to publishing and advertising. The culmination was providedin 1971 withthenationalization of theFrenchoil producing companies.Thus,in the sensethatis frequently to "socialism," (and wrongly) given Algeria's post-independence regimes have been socialist.Yet one mustbe careful not to overestimate the of this establishment of in of terms the social condition impact "public"ownership of the nationas a whole. State ownership and control has manifest and tangible of for the the in state for its leaders. The and, advantages apparatus particular, benefits to the nation,on theotherhand,are at bestmuchless tangible and much is an economic costto nationalization lessimmediate.If there would ("statization" to be moreaccurate), thenit is likely be the rural sector that bears that precisely cost. One can be all too certainthatneither industrial nor workers will managers be made to bear it. And whilenationalization "closesthedoor"to thedevelopment of an Algerian based on ownership of largeindustry, it helpsinevitably bourgeoisie to strengthen anotherdeveloping that bourgeoisie: comprised by the managerial, and administrative elites within state the sector. technical, ofthestatesector Asidefrom theprogressive within theeconomy, enlargement have triedrelatively the Algerianregimes and have achieved less. I have little, - in thatthe indicesof Algeria'seconomicand social problems arguedpreviously of themale working theclose-to-half bothruraland urban,which force, particular - could be viewedas representing is un- or under-employed a potential(revolu* See Humbaraci, op. cit., pp. 120-24; Teillac, op. cit., pp. 30-33, 55; Gordon, op. cit., pp. 155-56; Jean-FrangoisKahn, Le Monde, 12-13 January 1964. Boumedienne's major on the past, present and future of autoaddress of 19 June 1968 included information gestion,including the fact that aftertwo years of acclaimed progress (1966-68) less than half of the autogestionfarmsachieved positive results. See translation,Journalof Modern AfricanStudies, 6, No. 3 (1968), 425-39.
ALGERIA vs. FANON
21
to socialproblems.Mobilizedto collective effort towardnational tionary)solution theempirithesemillions ofmenand womencould represent words, goals,in other cal manifestation of Fanon's "revolutionary capital that is the people." In fact, of thisformof actionhave been broached. plans fora partialand statist variety from Involvedwould be thecreation of statechantiers, workers theslums drawing whichwould build buildings, resurface roads,com(Fanon's lumpen-proletariat) bat soil erosion, and so forth.5" We need not followtheseplans in detail; forthe and some chantiers plain fact is thatwhilesome monieshave been appropriated of unemployment thebasic problem has notbeen touched, and thecontricreated, bution is insignificant from a development standpoint. In otherareas,thegovernment has progressively articulated of obligasystems service the coercive of the stateis substituted forthe revotory whereby potential and advocatedbyFanon. Thus in 1966 and 1967 voluntarism described lutionary midwivesand lawyers were broughtunder the physicians, pharmacists, dentists, control of the civilservice, and obligatedto servethe nationforat least a yearin locationsand capacitiesdesignated.51 In March 1968, it was announcedthat a nationalservice foryouth was to be instituted, aimed at obtaining "an compulsory and entireparticipation effective by youth"in projectsof nationalinterest." In - an increasingly one sense,such mobilization of the state the structures through - can be regardedas an commonfeaturein the more "radical" Africanstates of the abstractprincipleof self-sacrifice for the community "operationalization" as a whole. But in another contradicts Fanon's sense,thisformof "mobilization" basic assumptions about theeffect of revolutionary in that violence, (anticolonial) voluntarism to moralappeal alone is acknowledged not to have been a responsive ofthepost-independence feature society. A generalpattern becomesclearin theforegoing one pages. In a literalsense, of element Fanon's revolution has been At fulfilled. Fanon major multiple points of theAlgerian the problem revolution to a stark modelof redistribution simplifies between two social categories."The last shall be first"; the "envious"nativeshall take what has belongedto the settler.In thissense,the Algerianrevolution has the Fanonist have the colons and the French solution; produced Algerians replaced theAlgerian statehas replacedtheFrench colonialsystem. This has now personnel; becometruethroughout and theeconomic thepolitical systems. Yet thisobservation leads us immediately to the fallacywhich,all along,has lurkedwithinFanon's redistributive revolution.The social categories werevastly in number. some realize could their "dreams of unequal Only possession." 5 The in themain,theverygroupwho weresupresthave not. And therestcomprises, of therevolution. Thus themasses of thepeasants posedto be at thecenter have,to in all appearances, neither nor benefited from the participated post-independence to understand to attempt how thishas happened. "revolution."It is important This questionleads us to the final category withinwhich we shall surveythe
" For detailsof the 23 January 1964. plan announced 1964,see Le Monde, 24 January
51
* P. 32.
See Le Monde, 13 April 1966; 8-9 October 1967. * Le Monde, 23 March 1968.
22
ofparticiof thestructures an examination post-independence experience: namely, since1962. pationwhichhavebeendeveloped FLN 3. Structures We have statedalreadythatthewartime of therevolution: was more a slogan than an organization.As was acknowledged openlyby the after constructed the that to in remained to be came the clique party power 1962, of in direction took under the Mohammed The first effort this aegis place war.54 of thewar and one of the "historical chiefs" Khider,theparty's general, seceretary an of liberation.During the first Khider constructed monthsof independence of At the time he of same cadres chosen elements. apparatus composed carefully of new a within the state. and developed expounded theory partypredominance the Algerianpopulation. Khider's The FLN was to be a mass party, enveloping into conflict on of him with Ben Bella and the role the position partybrought of an both to the idea Boumedienne, "avant-garde" party. In April 1963, partial Ben Bella. The latter,it a showdowntook place with Khider publiclydefying became clear,had a powerbase whichKhider'shastily organizedcadresdid not into out and of the was forced Khider exile,withBen Bella succeedparty provide. demonstrated the extreme diffiwas Thus him as initially ing secretary-general. and inevitable a and its of vital with major implipopularparty, culty constructing of an established within thecontext cationsforthelocus of politicalpower, regime on a different whichrests powerbase. of the party'sfirst As partyhead, Ben Bella proceededto the organization in (and so far,only) Congress.This, held April 1964,producedan "ideological a measureof de Tripoli; accomplished to replace the Programme instrument"55 to establish of elites;and mostimportant, and integration reconciliation attempted oftheFLN itself. thetangible reality however. Partymembership were deceptive, The apparentaccomplishments of the from the remained mission, party's revolutionary Worse, standpoint small.56 Chaliand quotes MostefaLacheref'sharsh was the nature of the membership. of falsecadresand truenotables") and adds his own: formula("a party
in Algeria. There is one, but it is not revoluto affirm thatthereis no party It is incorrect the massesbecause it does not represent ... The partyhas not mobilized them.... tionary. evenfeudalmentality." of clansofpetit-bourgeois The F.L.N. is no morethancoalition
oftheparty becameapparnature thecoup ofJune19, 1965,theinsubstantial After to have failed. seems of the in at reconstruction ent. A first party 1965, attempt, underKaid Ahmed,began at the end of 1967 and continues A second attempt, - including a requirement thateach activity up to thepresent.Despitesubsequent elecvarious his renew "member" reorganizations, staggered membership, existing oftheparty and itsmilithattheinfluence and affirmation tionsin the 15 districts, tantsshould"hang likea swordof Damocles" overtheagenciesof thegovernment ofitsown. Whileit - it seemsclearthattheparty has failedto acquirea dynamic whenhe said that his feelings was speaking thatBoumedienne seemsquitepossible
Le Monde, 8-9 September 1963. See Ben Bella's remarks, as the "Charter of Algiers." "Known thereafter " Estimatesat thisperiod range fromabout 100,000 to about 150,000. SChaliand, op. cit., pp. 107-8.
ALGERIA vs. FANON
23
"forthesuccessof therevolution, thesituation dependson theparty,"58 everything remained thatof theimmediate post-independence period. All along,the attempt has necessarily been to construct, a vital and dynamic fromthe top downward, without of relations and situations on which thenetwork party, seriously disturbing the regimerested.59 is therefore, By definition post factumpartyconstruction withseriouscontradictions. the weightof the first fraught By 1968,furthermore, ofcontheinitialproblems.A pattern post-independence yearsservedto reinforce flict aroundexpertise had derivedfrom educationversus war experience centering in the organsof the state,youngdegree-holders were developed. Concentrated the electrified barricadeeverynight ready to assertthat havingbrokenthrough "does not assurecompetence to judge a plan of industrialization." '6 Thus when, in 1966,an attempt was made to bringtheparty intogovernment decision-making - themore of coordination, committees was often through open hostility apparent of conflict and it is supposed because "the possibility was not foreseen, paralyzing a priori, can always be arranged 'on a basisoffraternal understandthat, everything has developedan old-guard, "club" image, whichmakesit diffiing.'"61 The party cult to recruit the younger of educated elitegroupswho would make generation theparty better able to playmoreimportant and economic roles.62 Finally, political reform the partymustnecessarily throughout dependon the actionsof thosevery menand structures thatare thesource oftheparty's weakness. The persistent of theparty is reflected in itsinability weakness to developauxwhichare at once vitaland subservient to theparty leadership. iliaryorganizations in viewofFanon'scomments Of particular on theproletariat, has beenthe interest, roleplayedby the tradeunioncentral, UGTA.63 UGTA was founded duringthe nationalcontexts, of war years, and as in other definition necessitated independence therelation theunionorganization between and the"revolutionary" A party. signed in December 1962 (afterconsiderable agreement sparring)seemedto settlethe to respectthe essentialautonomy of UGTA. question,with the FLN promising theparty leadersproceeded to pack UGTA's first This promised, national however, with own and its the debates elections militants, Congress influencing unfairly.64 of the succeedin ensuring the future The FLN leadersdid not,however, docility and in has with both the the since UGTA differed union, years openly partyand on a number of issues. The dilemmaposed to regime the government leadershas
* Speech to partycadres, 12 December 1967; see Le Monde, 15 December 1967. * Two recent studies cast light on the complex relations between elite groups; see William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1960 (Boston: MIT Press, 1969); and David and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of Socialist Revoluof California Press,1970). tion (Berkeley: University 60 See J. Ben Brahem's reportof interviews during the 1965-66 attemptto revitalizethe party; Le Monde, 21 June 1966. 1 Ibid. ' In view of Fanon's strictures on "closing the door" to the nationalistbourgeoisie it is ironic that Kaid Ahmed complains preciselyof the failure of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to participate in the party,despite plentifulappeals. See Africa Research Bulletin, 7, No. 10 (1970), 1901. ' Union Ge'ndraledes Travailleurs Algeriens. " Francois Buy, La Republique Alge'rienne De'mocratique et Populaire (Paris: Librairie Francaise, 1965), p. 73.
24
has been made the moredifficult by thefactthatin mostcases UGTA's criticism been leveledfrom of theregime's has not subsided into defense left. Thus, UGTA theinterests of a limited of permanent but has repeatedly clientele embarworkers, rassedbothregimes and ofthepoor thegrievances oftheunemployed bysponsoring thetraditional UGTA has, at every sector.65 peasantswithin publicconfrontation, ended by makingformal of obeisanceto the FLN as symbolic institution supreme the Algerianrevolution, and has not questionedthe basic legitimacy of either lack ofa popularbase has made theparty's hand,theparty's regime.On theother assertions of preeminence fallen UGTA's role has consistently essentially symbolic. - thatofsyndical twomodelpatterns between on theone hand,and independence, of auxiliary a massmovement, on the otherhand. The other within organization to regime auxiliarysectors(students, women) have likewisebeen disappointing leaders. The women's organization (the UnionNationaledesFemmes Algeriennes) has provided no challenge to theparty's butneither has it accomplished supremacy, mobilization and social change. The student union,on the otherhand, has disbut has consistently resisted therolesand status estabplayedconsiderable vitality, lishedforit bythestateleaders, theperiodof theBoumedienne particularly during nor seduction, to substitute norattempts a new organiregime.Neither repression zation (withthe unpromising the partyto draw FEMP) have permitted acronym on theenergy and support ofmorethana smallproportion ofthestudents. For the of theparty future is significant in that,in thelate 1960s,fully thisfailure 85 percent of the students of the University of Algiers expectedto take up employment in theadministration ortheenterprises ofthestate." Thus the structures of the Algerian(post-independence) revolution remain - theoretically the party the connecting linkbeunderdeveloped.In particular, - has tweenthepeopleand thestateand thebasisofpopularcontrol overthestate since independence. Characterundergonelittle change and less development the only apparentprogress in expandingstructures of participation has istically, comewithin thesphere underthe direct control of thestate. I refer to thedevolu6
The union has consistently taken stands which are "purer" in termsof an egalitarian premise than those of the party or the regime. E.g., in 1964 UGTA opposed the decision to distributeprofitsback to workersin the self-managedsector, arguing (quite correctly) that these workerswere already privilegedby comparisonwith the majorityof Algerians, and that the money should be used to benefitthe unemployed. See Le Monde, 8, 9-10, 11, 12 February 1964; Buy, op. cit., 75-6. In 1966, on the other hand (but again, correctlyin termsof revolutionaryprinciples) the union successfullytook up the cause of workers on a self-managed estate which the regime proposed to turn back to private enterprise (the "affaireBouthiba"). In April and December 1967, UGTA issued widethat UGTA "is concerned by all ranging critiques of the regime's policies and affirmed the aspects of the political, economic, social or cultural life of the country." See Le Monde, 9-10 April 1967; 21 December 1967. See Le Monde, 12 January 1967, for results of a student opinion surveyconducted at the Universityof Algiers. At that time, 80 percent of studentssurveyedpronounced themselves dissatisfiedwith the education they were receiving, and the same proportion thought the army and administrationhad too much influencein the government. On the other hand, relativelyfew are thought to be irremediablydisillusioned, and only a handful to support the leftistundergroundopposition formation,the Parti Avant-garde Socialiste (PAGS). Students were arrestedand the UNEA dissolved because of alleged connections with the PAGS in January 1971. The most complete examination of the role of students in postwar Algeria is by David B. Ottaway, "Algeria," in Donald K. Emmerson, ed., Students and Politics in Developing Nations (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 3-36.
ALGERIA vs. FANON
25
tionof powersto the "commune"administrative units (numbering 691) whichis a National to providethe basis for electoralrepresentation eventually including Assembly.07
CONCLUSIONS
At thebeginning ofthisessay, twoquestions wereposed: the Did war for fitFanon's pictureof people's independence (1) Algerian war? anticolonial revolutionary in termsof a period been "revolutionary" (2) Has the post-independence Fanonist value position? the answerto the first Put mostbriefly, questionwould seem to be "yes"; to It the second,"no." This second,answer, some qualification. obviously, requires as "a revolution case flatly to label theAlgerian does not seemto me to be correct be called a thatfailed.""68 what might carriedthrough Algeriahas, in particular, revolution" in the decade sinceindependence.In 1954 Algeriawas "nationalizing - politically, - theone ofFrance'scolonial and juridically culturally, economically, territories whichwas mostclosely bound to themetropole.Since 1962 bothAlgerto reduceher dependenceon ian regimes have moved steadily and purposefully and the in the nationalization of theoil producing France,culminating companies This of at Evian. in view end most of the relationship" "special apparent designed involved(Algeria's"natural"dependence on France) and in relaof theproblems of otherformer coloniesin Africa,is trulyno small tion to the achievements achievement. Yet thepresent oftheevolution ofthepost-independence review system emphaWithexception sizedthatthesuccesses sincetheend ofthewarare compartmental. are thoseof thestate. A in itsinception, the successes beingmade forautogestion shrewdand cautious measure of has been achieved independence through greater to nationalize attribute of of the state's but determined manipulation sovereignty in turn, in The of French the success economy. this, holdings foreign mainly and thuson the to managewhatit takes, of theregime has dependedon theability of the managerial, bureaucratic and technicalelites. That what "revostrength about by the "new has been brought has there been accomplishment lutionary" and "technocrats" national of elite""' administrators, sugmanagers, privileged the cenFanon has underestimated Fanon's the weakness of class analysis. gests to accept- the cenof this "class" because he failed to see- or refused trality to of the state the of change. question post-independence trality on theother ofthemodemstate, Outsidethe"compartment" hand,thissurvey herewould seemto be muchmoreimporfoundfailure.Significantly, the failures sector. tant froma Fanoniststandpoint than the relativesuccessesof the statist themassesof thepopulation there are twoaspectsof failure.First, Viewedoverall,
to the691 "People'sCommunal Elections Councils"havebeenheld (on a "Tanzanian"comof 1967 and of 1971. Wilaya (regional) elections petitive basis), twice,in February elections has yetto be speciwereheld in May 1969. The date forNationalAssembly fied. ofHumbaraci's book,op. cit. , The subtitle op. cit.,p. 141. , Amin,
26
who livedlivesof deprivation are economically underthecolonialregime deprived now.70 This includes theunemployed above in all sectors, and all Fanon'speasants of the "Muslim" agricultural sector. For thesepeople "nationalization" of the modernist bothagricultural can have onlythemostabstract and industrial, sector, theeconomic facts of poverty are immediate and finite. value,whereas The second aspect of the failurehas been that mass participation within Fanon's "nation"has simply notbeen realized. The masseshave notbeen brought - perhapsthemostimportant "unto the stageof history" part of Fanon's revoluhas onlybeen partially and segtion. The "manicheism" of the colonial system eliminated. The Algerian"nation" (like the other new "nations" of mentally in theapparatusand entercentered minority Africa) is a nationof themobilized time." of thepeasantshave been left"marking prisesof thestate. The majority of the Fanonist are of crucialimportance fromthe standpoint These failures these thisstructure ofvalues,write structure ofvalues. One cannotpossibly, within in theprocess of a moreimporfailures offas unfortunate but acceptabletrade-offs tantstatist revolution. for the survey of the postYet here we are broughtto a strangeposition, which are unacceptablefroma that these results period suggests independence of the war period in thosecharacteristics Fanonistviewpoint are rootedprecisely oflargely Fanon'svision mostto resemble whichseemed peasant-based spontaneous, popularstruggle againstcolonialrule. calls intoquestionsome of Fanon's mostbasic assumptherefore This survey It is evident of decolonization-by-violence. tionsabout the long-run significance withinthe of mass socialization the depthand permanence thathe overestimated of culturaland social transformation. war experience and thusof thepermanence are cultural thatneither The results, changenormassinvolvement suggest instead, - are - above all, mass politicalorganization unlesssteps to be permanent likely fearsexpressed takento make it so. This is to confirm by NguyenNghe on the basisoftheVietnamese experience: revolutionary that thearmed truth: a fundamental is led]to neglect struggle, namely revolutionary [Fanon
a phasein therevolutionary no morethana moment, is however whileof capitalimportance, is first and fundamentally which movement political. or in Vietnam, as in Algeria and endsvictoriously, lastsforyears ... Whenthearmedstruggle of incomparable abouttransformations thenational it modifies magbrings truths, profoundly their of thesetransformations, But theprofundity liberates perenergies. unsuspected nitude, the armed workwhichhas prepared is in the measure of the political, ideological manence, thisstruggle." continues and which, peace returned, struggle
Fanon's mistakewas to assume the politicalworkand ideologicaldevelopment.

From this standpoint, it was precisely the violence of this decolonization which seems to explain the weaknesses. The easiest way to maintain the wartime Front
outbreak of theAlgerian revolution's On theoccasionof the 17thanniversary (1 November so
Bourelativeto the new agrarianreform the Ordonnance program, 1971) in signing mostforindependence" that"thosewho had suffered medienne (the poor acknowledged of it. See JeuneAfrique, benefited fromthe advantages peasants) stillhad not fully No. 57, 11 December 1971,pp. 13-14. " La Pensde, No. 107,February de l'Ind6pendence," Nghe,"F. Fanonet les probl~mes Nguyen 1963,pp. 23-30.
ALGERIA vs. FANON
27
the future.It was likewisethe wartime situation to specify was to avoid trying bothdifficult and seemingly and whichmade masspoliticalorganization irrelevant; inevitable.Finally, of the military thatmade the postwar predominance virtually elitesthathave recently of Algerian we can see now (and thetwostudies appeared of thewar- whileit willundoubtedly function confirm 72) thattheexperience this as a unifying in the long run- has added to ratherthan experience symbolic divisions ofAlgerian thecomplex society. simplified
72 Quandt,
op. cit.; D. and M. Ottaway, op. cit.

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University of Utah Western Political Science Association

HE GROWING literature on FrantzFanon' reflects his continued signifi-

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ALGERIA vs. FANON

Historically, violence has been seen, even by revolutionarythinkers,primarilyin

in a peculiarly remain colonialsystems Established situation. dependent byviolence, nakedfashion on violence:

and "bewilderers" of moralteachers, counsellors a multitude In the capitalist countries sepa-

mustbe left"to the techand thatits discussion hencenon-theoretical; is "speechless,"

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ALGERIA vs. FANON

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

See pp. 53 and 102 especially.

ALGERIA vs. FANON

areled to renounce themoveTheseleaders intocertain controlled and directed channels.

need to be cometo see thatevenvery The leadersof therebellion large-scale peasantrisings

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ALGERIA vs. FANON

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Moscow: Progress (Republished; 1966). Publishers,

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Archon Books, 1967), pp. 200-201.

ALGERIA vs. FANON

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ALGERIA vs. FANON

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ALGERIA vs. FANON

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ALGERIA vs. FANON

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Fanon's mistakewas to assume the politicalworkand ideologicaldevelopment.

outbreak of theAlgerian revolution's On theoccasionof the 17thanniversary (1 November so

ALGERIA vs. FANON

op. cit.; D. and M. Ottaway, op. cit.

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