The Limits of Silence:

Descartes, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Ordinary Language Narve Strand
De quo consultus, an esset tempora maturae visurus longa senectae, fatidicus vates si se non noverit inquit. (Ovid, Metamorphoses, iii, 344-46)

1 !ntroduction To affirm the decisive impact of the linguistic turn has, it seems, become a commonplace these days. Certainly, a broad consensus prevails among both Analytic and Continental philosophers: the turn initiated at the beginning of the last century by Heidegger and Wittgenstein is simply irreversible, comparable, perhaps, to the impact the Copernican Revolution had on modern philosophy. Individual thin ers may disagree on !hat conse"uences this !ill have for the status of philosophy and its relationship to the everyday. There can be no doubt, ho!ever, that traditional conceptions of rationality are greatly affected once the turn to language is made.i #efore the linguistic turn, philosophy usually dealt !ith language by either ma ing it ancillary to philosophical analysis or by completely ignoring it. $escartes is a pivotal representative of this line of thought. It !as thought the matter at hand al!ays too precedence over
% &riginally published in Descartes and Cartesianism 'Cambridge (cholars )ress, *++,-: .//0.,1. This version has been lightly edited, mostly for clarity and focus 'material has been cut or rearranged-.

considerations of language. After all, language is merely a means to an end. It2s only a passive e3pressive medium of consciousness, thought or mind, barred from playing a constitutive role, and not at all of decisive importance in settling "uestions of meaning, reference or truth. If the matter could not be pursued !holly in isolation from language, then one could at least use language as a vehicle to e3press and communicate one2s findings44let us call this e3pressive use of language 5communicative intent.6 &n all interpretations it !as someho! thought possible to argue one2s case 'settle the quaestio juris- prior to all communication. As a result, the tradition ultimately sought a grounding of rationality outside the public, discursive sphere. 7o !onder traditional philosophy had such a lo! vie! of communicative pra3is8ii With the linguistic turn, a concerted effort !as made to overcome the traditional, and specifically Cartesian, disparagement of the ordinary. To!ards this end both Heidegger and Wittgenstein ta e their departure from everyday language. Insofar as philosophy not only ma es its appearance !ithin our common language, but also aims to share its findings therein, it cannot avoid getting caught up in it. Ho!, then, can it altogether refuse to heed the strictures of communicative language9 It may still be possible, of course, to mount a reasoned defense of extra0 ordinary discourse. Ho!ever, merely appealing to the primacy of reason or mind is bound to be a "uestion0begging e3ercise. We might :ust as !ell undercut this primacy altogether by denying the instrumentalist vie! of language outright. #arring a reduction to total silence, therefore, philosophy needs more than communicative intent. 7eedless to say, this !ill have far0reaching conse"uences for the status of philosophy itself. If meaning and truth can no longer be gauged prior to ordinary language, then traditional philosophy has effectively lost its un"uestioned preeminence. The real "uestion is !hether this spells the end of philosophy itself. If philosophy can never leave ordinary language entirely behind, then is philosophical discourse not simply dissolved into it

'Wittgenstein-9 &r is there a !ay, perhaps, to integrate ordinary language into a more comprehensive account 'Heidegger-9 7ot!ithstanding the recent disagreement over the specifics of this ne! rapprochement bet!een philosophical discourse and ordinary language, the quaestio juris must still be faced in the end. (pecifically, can ordinary language be genuinely affirmed !ithout sacrificing, in the process, the :ustificatory force of one2s o!n claims9 If this cannot be done, then are Wittgenstein and Heidegger not at bottom involved in a similar evasion9 And if so, e3actly ho! much progress has really been made vis0;0vis Cartesian philosophy9 This paper aims to problemati<e the relationship bet!een philosophical discourse and ordinary language !ith a vie! to the issue of :ustification. Heidegger and Wittgenstein do, I submit, constitute an advance insofar as they, unli e $escartes, are !illing to e3plicitly discuss the strictures of communicative language. Ho!ever, neither a simple dissolution of philosophical discourse 'Wittgenstein- nor its further aggrandi<ement 'Heideggerseems !arranted if ta en as a comprehensive vie!. #oth, in fact, are rather unconcerned !ith providing discursive :ustification for their respective positions. The issue is either deemed incommunicative 'Heidegger- or it is simply dismissed out of hand, being turned bac addition 'ba on the interlocutor herself 'Wittgenstein-. to settle the issue interlocutorily in $iscursive :ustification arguably re"uires 'a- communicative intent, and in !illingness language itself. The procedure of this paper !ill be to sho!, by a philosophical reenactment, !hat follo!s from ind of and Heidegger2s

Wittgenstein2s philosophical positions44on their o!n terms. In both cases the outcome is inconclusive, suggesting that the "uestion of :ustification has not been ade"uately resolved by either philosopher in "uestion. It is in this sense, I thin , that the "uestion of the Cartesian legacy remains an open one.

" Silent Thin#ing The imaginary scenario con:ured up for the benefit of the reader at the beginning of the first =editation is characteri<ed by maturity, solitude, and the absence of speech. The one !ho addresses us, !e are told, has left his childhood behind. He is alone in his study, silently meditating, engaged, presumably over a period of several days, in the tas of progressively rethin ing his o!n thoughts !ith a vie! to scientific truth '=editation I: C(= II, .* > AT ?II, .@0.AB =editation II: C(= II, ., > AT ?II, **0*/B =editation III: C(= II, **0*/ > AT ?II, /C0/,B =editation I?: C(= II, /@ > AT ?II, ,*0,/B =editation ?: C(= II, CC > AT ?II, D/0DCB =editation ?I: C(= II, ,+ > AT ?II, @.0@*-. At first blush, nothing essentially ne! or out of the ordinary is ta ing place here. )lato, too, con:ures up various imaginary dialogical scenarios, the second best thing in his opinion to oral communication. And Augustine, !ell ahead of $escartes, not only depicts his life as an in!ard narrative, but also dramati<es !ith great acumen reason2s interior monologue !ith itself.iii (till, there is a sense in !hich Cartesian discourse is predicated on a more radical incommunicability. Eirst of all, no interlocutors are ever found conversing !ith each other. In fact, nothing is ever spo en out loud by anyone. (econdly, the interior solilo"uy of the thin er is from the very outset aimed at systematically suspending any veridical or semantic force that communicative language may possess44 including, one may assume, !ritten communication. The reason for this unprecedented insulation on the part of the author is, as is !ell no!n, that $escartes !anted to provide an absolutely infallible source for scientific no!ledge ' scientia-, something !hich he thin s must be established by conceptual thought in the privacy of the individual, thin ing mind. This is not to say that the language of the community is inherently incapable of meaning or truth, of course, nor that perceptual or imaginative discourse cannot have a role to play in the search for it. The narrative form and the use of the imaginary scenarios

alone suggest this. Then again, since ordinary language so easily misleads us, it must nevertheless be regarded as necessarily meaningless or false, at least for theoretical purposes:
I am thin ing about these matters !ithin myself, silently and !ithout spea ing ' apud me tacitus et sine voce considerem-, nonetheless the actual !ords bring me up short, and I am almost tric ed by ordinary !ays of tal ing ' decipior ab ipso usu loquendi-. We say that !e see the !a3 itself, if it is there before us, not that !e :udge it to be there from its color or shapeB and this might lead me to conclude !ithout more ado that no!ledge of the !a3 comes from !hat the eyes see, and not from the scrutiny 'inspectione- of the mind alone. #ut then if I loo out of the !indo! and see men crossing the s"uare, as I :ust happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, :ust as I say that I see the !a3. Fet do I see any more than hats and coats !hich could conceal automatons9 I judge 'judico- that they are men. And so something !hich I thought I !as seeing !ith my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of :udgment 'judicandi facultate- !hich is in my mind 'in mente-. Ho!ever, one !ho !ants to achieve no!ledge above the ordinary level ' supra vulgus- should feel ashamed of having ta en ordinary !ays of tal ing as a basis for doubt 'ex formis loquendi quas vulgus invenit dubitationem quaesavisse - '=editation II: C(= II, *. > AT ?II, /.0/*-iv

It !ould therefore be facetious to claim that the logical coherence or argumentative force of Cartesian discourse is !holly negated by the fact that it is communicated in the form of !riting, as it !ould to merely point out that $escartes uses !ith a vie! to truth !hat he regards as necessarily false. Eor if charged !ith either ta ing poetic license or committing a communicative fallacy, $escartes could al!ays fall bac on a mentalist or essentialist defense in the strict sense. According to $escartes, !e all have to reflect in!ardly and independently on !hat !e read. The matter at hand may be translated into the form of communication or !riting, but it is never reducible to it. In fact, if confronted !ith opposing vie!s the thin er can al!ays dispense !ith communication altogether.v If I thereby reduce myself to silence, so much the !orse for ordinary language8

What can be thought to be other!ise must be doubted. Whatever is inseparable from the sensible can be thought to be other!ise. Therefore, it must be doubted. This is perhaps the main posture deployed by $escartes in the first t!o =editations. He does this in order to brac et not only the unreliable veridical 'or semantic- force of both the senses, but the imagination as !ell. It is clear, namely, that the vagaries of the imagination are even more inherently deceptive than are the testimony of the senses. Eor not only does the imagination point bac to the senses, but also, unli e sensation, it is produced manifestly at !ill. #oth must be made transposed if infallible truth is to be countenanced. What remains, strictly spea ing, is a class of residual ideas altogether beyond the pale of common sense, vi<. the clear and distinct ones 'C(= II, .., .A, /@, and ,+ff. > AT ?II, .,, *@, ,/, @*ff-. The 5lo!er6 or 5!orldly6 parts of consciousness is !holly infected !ith ordinary language. &nly !hen the mind 'mens- or reason 'ratio- has overcome its plasticity and deceit !ill truth be seen !ith complete certainty. Therefore, !e should not let ourselves be mislead by the seeming alignment !ith communication. Eirst of all, the sensible and the imaginary are inessential modes of reason. (econdly, e3ternal, public or communal language is presumed to be e3pendable. It is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of truth for $escartes. (o the Cartesian remains !here he began: in silence.vi $ The %eaning of Silence It might be said that $escartes is the father of modern philosophyB that philosophy, in fact, really only came of age !ith himB that subse"uent philosophy has been merely a variation of a themeB that Heidegger, along !ith Wittgenstein, finally overcame this !hole tradition by turning to languageB that Heidegger, nevertheless, in the end merely !anted to provide this tradition !ith a deeper grounding.

Whatever the relative !orth of these claims, the fact remains that Heidegger did pro:ect a reconte3tuali<ing ' Destruktion- of the philosophical tradition as early as in Sein und Zeit '.1*@-. The modern ideal of philosophy as science is retained in this !or ' SZ G@-, as is the claim that neither representation 'Vorstellung- nor communication 'Mitteilung- is sufficient for truth in its essential sense ' SZ G/C, .D*0D/-. It cannot be denied, either, that the human being ' Dasein- still retains its age0old privilege of being the point of reference here. Hven so, fundamental ontology aims to subvert the Cartesian claim that ordinary language is methodologically and materially dispensable. Eirst off, communicative language is obviously not reducible to theoretical or assertoric speech 'apophansis-. Iust thin of the great variety of !ays in !hich !e discourse !ith others: assenting, refusing, demanding, !arning, pronouncing, consulting, interceding to name a fe! 'SZ G/C, .D.0D*-. 7o!, it could be ob:ected this claim is hardly controversial or, for that matter, ne!. As far bac as Aristotle in fact, language !as being submitted to a similar ta3onomy. This e3ercise may be useful of course in setting off the theoretical or the epistemological from the everyday. The latter may still be e3pendableJat least for philosophical purposes. Heidegger !ould not necessarily disagree !ith this, but he !ould !ant to point out that this ob:ection already presupposes as self0 evident the basic coincidence of philosophy !ith theoretic 'or noeticdiscourse. #ut is it9 If !e choose to ma e it so, are !e not then forced to abandon every pretension of providing a comprehensive, philosophical account of language9 'SZ G/C, .D*0D/- What if !e !ant to pursue this line of in"uiry9 Are !e not forced to give up the fundamental status of the theoretical and mental9 It is interesting to note that Heidegger is trying to turn the tables on the Cartesian here by phrasing his account in the interrogative mode. Eor Heidegger, "uestion0begging is a fait accompli. The salient point is

!hether or not !e go on to clarify the limits of language from the right presuppositions 'SZ G/C, .D*0D/-. Regardless, the problem !ith the tradition is that both human e3istence (Dasein- and discourse ' ede- have al!ays been made co0 e3tensive !ith entities being merely present0at0hand ' Zuhandensein-. Conse"uently, the many senses of #eing have al!ays been reduced to one only, vi<., presence ' ousia-. This interpretation of logos underlies all traditional logicJthe primacy of assertion and>or intuition ' noein- in fact both presuppose it 'SZ G*@, .*1B G*1, ./AB G/., .C@B G//, .,1B GCCb, **,B and GD1b, /D/-. In order to "uestion this 5logical6 or 5theoretical6 interpretation of language, !e need to adopt a ne! starting point. Heidegger proposes that !e ta e as our point of departure the !ay !e discourse factically, i.e., pro3imally and for the most part in our average everydayness '!llt"glichkeit-. A complementary hermeneutic of language or discourse 'logos> ede- !ill serve as our methodological guide 'SZ, GGD, @b, .+-. If this is attempted !e !ill soon come to reali<e that ordinary discourse in the sense of being ready to hand as !ith e"uipment and tools 'Vorhandensein- and being0!ith as in communication 'Mitsein- are genuinely closer to us than noetic, presentational discourse 'Zuhandensein-. $o !e not first have to 5vie!6 something as something, as something practically understandable and communicable, before !e can go on to regard it !ith a 5blan stare6 'i.e. vie! it as something merely present at hand-9 If so, should theoretical discourse not be relocated to, fitted !ithin hermeneutic discourse9 Although the theoretical is al!ays ine3tricably bound up !ith the hermeneutical, the hermeneutical is certainly not reducible to the theoretical 'cf. SZ G/., .CA0C1-. It !ould seem it is really only an unnecessary accretion of the hermeneutical. The Cartesian, in fact, is living in a !orld turned upside do!n. Ta e a piece of e"uipment, for instance. $o !e ordinarily comport ourselves to!ard it indicatively, restricting the artifact to a mere ob:ect

!hich !e go on to ma e theoretical assertions about9 7o, in an everyday setting it2s not really present at hand at all. In this mode, it simply is not articulated as a thing consisting of properties that !e gauge in either a symbolic or intuitive fashion. Instead of representing it, !e regard it 5practically6 as something that can be produced and>or used !ith a specific purpose in vie!: it is discursively organi<ed as something ready to hand. This basically entails that a thing sho!s itself to us only as something in relation to something else . This occurs !ithin the essentially non0ob:ectified conte3t of our involvement !ith tools or artifacts in general. Eor rather than relating to a piece of e"uipment in an isolated, presential !ay, its being ready to hand implies that the artifact is intrinsically relational, fitted !ithin a larger practical conte3t of our circumspective concernJ!e use the hammer to drive in the nail into the board in order to ma e a house, for instance 'SZ G.,, DAB GD1a, /,/ff.-. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for our deportment to!ard other human beings. Eor rather than relating to other human beings as ob:ects, my everyday discursive comportment to!ard them, and theirs to!ard me, is mutually implicated44characteri<ed by solicitation ' SZ G/C, .D.0D*-. This is not to say, of course, that !e cannot ob:ectify human beings, reducing them, say, to automata in the !ay $escartes does. &ntologically spea ing, therefore, !e discourse in more !ays than one 'ready to hand, present at hand, and being0!ith-. And Heidegger calls the structural totality of this hermeneutic involvement the 5!orld6 ' #elt-. &rdinary language, in fact, is inseparable from being in the !orld ' in$der$ #elt$Sein-. This implies that the !orld is shared rather than being merely private or sub:ectiveB relational rather than thing0li eB historical and dynamic rather than static or formal: richer than revealed by either 5consciousness6 or 5logic6 or 5representation6. The human being and the !orld are 5entangled6. $iscourse is a native possession of human e3istence, as being0in0the0!orld. Assertion or intuition are :ust contingent accretions 'SZ% GG/.0/*, .CA0,+ and GGC.0C/a, .1,0*+/-.

This line of attac seems to carry !ith it a certain necessity for dialogue bet!een philosophy and communicative language. &nce ordinary language is deemed indispensable to philosophical discourse, the "uestion of ho! to negotiate the t!o becomes an issue, especially since private 'noetic- discourse has been sho!n to be inseparable from the public or communal. Will Heidegger2s account not have to face the burden of discursive :ustificationJon its o!n terms9 This, of course, assumes that the limits of language coincide !ith communicative discourse, !hich !as never the case for Heidegger. When stretched to its limits, !e find that hermeneutic discourse is suggestive of something altogether transcending the ordinary. The realm in "uestion comes not only before the theoretical, but the !orldly as !ell. This, Heidegger thin s, is because human e3istence is prone to an3iety. And !hen !e2re in the throes of an3iety, communication recedes !holly into the bac ground and a solilo"uy of the human being !ith herself ta es center stage. An3iety isolates the human being from the !orld of things, relations, other human beings. 7ot that this !orld completely drops out of vie!, but it certainly pales in comparison. If she no! listens in silence to the voice of her o!n conscience, she !ill reali<e that being human in the real, authentic or proper sense ' eigentlich- means being0to!ards0death 'Zumtodsein-44one2s o!n. $eath is the limit, !hich thro!s into ultimate relief the temporal finitude of the human being, and so language itself. Kpon sounding the depths of language, !e !ill come to see that logos is at bottom e3traordinary 'SZ, GG/C, C+, ,@, D,, DA-. (o even if Heidegger turns the tables on the Cartesian by turning the relationship bet!een the theoretical and the communicative on its head, an unresolved tension bet!een philosophical solilo"uy and ordinary language still remains in force. Heidegger could never fall bac on the Cartesian2s resolute appeal to noetic silence. After all, ordinary language is a necessary condition of ontological discourse. What is more, !hatever sense can be made of the latter !ill al!ays have to stand in an internal,

inseparable relationship to the former. vii 7evertheless, by insisting on the ultimate priority of solilo"uy over communicative e3change, Heidegger ma es sure that meaning or truth remains silent. H3istential phenomenology is at bottom non0public too. This, I hold, follo!s from the primacy given to the pre0communicative. H3istential phenomenology tries to get at the essence of things, !hich is argued to be non0reducible to communicative discourse. In fact, it is thought to precede communication altogether. Ho!, then, can phenomenology be accountable44correspondJto the ordinary9 (urely, this !ould re"uire the relationship bet!een the e3traordinary and the everyday to be reciprocal and bi0directional rather than unilateral as it is in Sein und Zeit. 7ot!ithstanding the advance made on $escartes, Heidegger2s early !or still comes across as an echo. Interestingly, the methodological issue is among those least developed in the !hole !or . With the e3ception of G@, it is hardly discussed at all. Again, one !onders !hether philosophy is capable of more than communicative intent. Heidegger, it seems, later came to thin that the problematic of his earlier !or had not been broadJdeepJenough. To resist the reduction of language to a presential thing is not enough. In order to pursue language to its very roots, !e need to do more. The basic obstacle to a complete rethin ing of the problematic of language is the fact that it has been conceived in human$centered terms ever since )lato and Aristotle. The many interpretative permutations not!ithstanding, language has al!ays been interpreted as something basically possessed by, and therefore sub:ect to, the human being ' ps&che, anima, mens, 'e(usstsein, etc.-. 7o !onder language has al!ays been seen as merely a means to an end8viii In .1/C thereLs tal about an overcoming ' )ber(indung- of the !hole Western tradition through a historical mindfulness ' 'esinnung- on language 'logos-.i3 Manguage, truth, the human beingJthey2re all

connected. )lato only had to give a specific interpretation of these to effect a lasting transformation of human e3istence as a !hole. (ome!hat simplistically put, priority is for the first time given to the relationship bet!een statement and thing.3 Manguage can no! only bespea meaningfully or truthfully of things. Manguage is rooted in the human beingB that of !hich it spea s is basically made out to be an idea ' idea, eidos- that someho! can only be seen in the privacy of the individual soul 'ps&ch*- or mind 'nous-. Manguage is turned into an e3pressive instrument here, something possessed and used by inner minds to indicate to each other things that are present only to them. )lato, then, is credited !ith introducing both an anthropocentric and noetic bias into human history. This is the basis of the subse"uent tradition2s vie!s, including those of $escartes. This is basically !hat language becomes !ith )lato: A human tool. Erom this time to the end of his career, Heidegger !ill al!ays return to earlier Nree thin ers for inspiration in his attempts to overcome language in this ordinary sense. His hope !as that going all the !ay bac to the beginning !ould facilitate a leap to a 5second beginning,6 reversing the decisive turn initiated by )lato. If language is to be rethought, then )armenides and Heraclitus eminently "ualify. Thin ing is found there in its purest form, i.e., !ithout the constraints later introduced by )lato. Iust thin of the !ay they sharply contrasted the real or the 5deep6 !ith the human0rooted or thing0li e !hen spea ing of 5seeing6 ' noein-, 5spea ing6 'legein-, and 5truth0disclosing6 'al*theuein-.3i The e3tra0ordinary may not be separable from the ordinary, to be sure, but neither are they to be co0 ordinated in a genuinely reciprocal !ay:
In the immediate circle of beings !e believe ourselves to be at home. The being is familiar, reliable, ordinary 'gehauer-. 7onetheless,O PfQundamentally. the ordinary is not ordinaryB it is e3tra0ordinary, uncanny 'un$gehauer- '+#!, /.-

Truth !ill never be gathered from !hat is present and ordinary ' ,e(-hnlichen-O PHQverything ordinary and hitherto e3isting becomes an unbeing ' .nseienden-. This unbeing has lost the capacity to give and to preserve being as measure ' M"ss- '+#!, CC0C,-.

It !ould be "uite futile, therefore, to charge the later Heidegger2s 5thin ing6 !ith merely repeating the gesture of his earlier 5fundamental ontology6. $isdain for the ordinary is almost as old as philosophy itself. =oreover, a good case could in fact be made for Heideggerian discourse eventually beginning to sho! telltale signs of attrition on the issue of the decisiveness of the )latonic turn. 3ii (till, if challenged to :ustify himself, Heidegger could al!ays fall bac on silence in the deep sense:
According to the usual account, language is a ind of communication ' Mitteilung-. It serves as a means of discussion ' .nterredung- and agreement 'Verabredung-O #ut language is neither merely nor primarily ' nicht nur nicht erstlich- the aural and !ritten e3pression of !hat needs to be communicated. The conveying of overt and covert meanings is not !hat language, in the first instance, does. Rather, it brings beings as beings, for the first time, into the openO Manguage, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to !ord and to appearanceO (uch saying is a pro:ection of the clearingO the releasing of a thro! by !hich unconcealment sends itself into beings as suchO )ro:ective saying is poetry: the saying of !orld and earthO The prevailing language 'je(eilige Sprache- is the happening of that saying in !hich its !orld rises up historically for a peopleO Manguage itself is poetry in the essential senseO poesy happens in language '+#!, C,0CD-

The setting0into0!or of truth thrusts up the e3tra0ordinary ' .ngeheure- !hile thrusting do!n the ordinary. '+#!, C@-

Manguage spea s silently: truth sets itself into !or . The Thin ers and )oets "uietly respond. This is the primordial sense of ordinary language. &nly !hen the Nreat &nes have had their say can the many begin their chatter. (hould !e not "uestion ever more in the direction of the most profound silence44is that not ho! it has al!ays been9 3iii

& Silence, Sense, 'onsense There are mar ed convergences bet!een Heidegger and Wittgenstein on the issue of the limits of language. Eirst, both continued to see out a delimitation and transposition of representational discourse from !ithin. (econd, both of them became convinced that this could only be achieved if ordinary discourse !as sho!n to be indispensable to, as !ell as inseparable from, philosophical discourse itself. 'Heidegger in fact anticipated the later Wittgenstein on this score.- Einally, they both came to thin that a transfiguration of the traditional paradigm of philosophy is the eventual outcome of this process. 'Wittgenstein, as !e shall see presently, anticipated Heidegger here.- I do submit, ho!ever, they al!ays disagreed on !hether, or to !hat e3tent, this makes sense. In his first ma:or !or , /ractatus 0ogico$1hilosophicus '.1.1-, Wittgenstein is at pains to dra! limits to the discourse of sense ' Sinn-. (ense is basically coe3tensive !ith the representational language of the natural sciences. A proposition !ith sense is aJnon0mentalJthought saying something definite about ob:ective reality according to the basic re"uirement of bivalence 'being possibly true or false-'TM *..B *..CB *.*.B *.**.B /B /./CB CB C...*.-. This all by itself sounds very traditional. We could be forgiven for thin ing Wittgenstein slips bac into a traditional cast of mind. The ne3t t!o steps in his argument are truly revolutionary. Mogical propositions cannot be representational. This because logical form constitutes the universal condition of the possibility of both language and !orld. Mogical propositions !ill as a matter of fact al!ays fall short of saying something specific. Mogic is tautologousB logical propositionsJ senseless 'Sinnlos- 'TM .../B *.+./B *.+//B *..,B *..D.B *..@*0@CB *..AB C..*-. And then there2s philosophy. What2s left to say !hen symbolic logic and natural science have had their say: is there a mean bet!een saying something and saying nothing at all9 )hilosophical propositions are metaphysical, nonsensical '.nsinn-44including Wittgenstein2s o!n. All

metaphysical propositions must ultimately be overcome ' )ber(indet- 'TM C.++/.B D.,/0C-. )hilosophical conceptuali<ation al!ays lead to pseudo0 propositions. After all, philosophical propositions are comprised of general !ords '5concept6, 5ob:ect6, 5thing6, 5fact6, etc.- that defy both truth0 conditionality 'the sensical- as !ell as logical symbolism 'the senseless-. (o !hy shouldn2t they be passed over in silence 'TM @-9 (everal responses are possible here: '.- We could, for instance, ob:ect to this reductio ad absurdum of philosophical discourse, claiming that it is parasitic on the prior acceptance of Wittgenstein2s specific understanding of the relationship bet!een the sensical and the senseless. The "uestion, though, is !hether that is the !ay !e discourse pro3imally and for the most part. What if it can be sho!n that representational language is only a special case of practical, everyday discourse9 If so, then can2t !e go on to ground everyday discourse through a description of its essential structures and so retain the foundational role for thin ing 'Heidegger-9 All by itself, the reductio is "uestion0beggingJnonsensical silence can still be meaningful83iv '*- We might also choose to ta e Wittgenstein at his !ord. The /ractatus, it could be said, favors an 5austere,6 strictly nonsensical vie! of silence.3v Any effort to discursively delimit sense is bound to be nonsensical since a transgression is implied in the very attempt. It2s "ui3otic to imagine one could ma e sense beyond this limit. '/- &r !e could simply say !ith Augustine that an& mention of silence has a self0canceling effect since !e are thereby bound to spea of that !hich !e claim cannot be spo en. Rather than being said, therefore, silence can only be coherently safeguarded in44complete44silence. 3vi !nd the same could be said of nonsense . Hither !ay, !e2re bound to be ta ing leave of the ordinary and to leave the quaestio juris unans!ered.

Whatever the relative strengths of these three, the fact remains that Wittgenstein turns e3plicitly to ordinary language later on. Hven so, he continued to evade the "uestion of :ustification. If anything, the refusal gre! even more star : (ay !e !ant to delimit the term 5language6 ' Sprache-. Eirst of all, it is not self0evident that the concept is closed off by a limit. We can use 'gebrauchen- the !ord more or less rigidly, but only !ith a specific purpose in vie!. We may e"ually deploy it more loosely as !e in fact more often do. The concept is played out differently, all depending on the use !e put it to. Met2s say go !ith this and define language0use as a ind of 5game6 'Spiel-. This concept is not sharply delineated either. $o all games have one thing in common !hich ma es us use the !ord in the same !ay in all of them9 Are all games 5amusing69 Is there al!ays !inning or losing9 =ust they every!here be limited by rules9 What does or does not count as a game9 Can an a priori limit ever be fi3ed ')K GG D,0DA-9
Here !e come up against the great "uestion that lies behind all these considerations44Eor someone might ob:ect against me: Fou ta e the easy !ay out8 Fou tal about all sorts of language0games, but have no!here said !hat the essence of a language0game, and hence of language, is: !hat is common ' gemeinsam- to all these activities. O And this is true.JInstead of producing something common to all that !e call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common !hich ma es us use the same !ord for all,44but that they are related to one another in many different !ays. And it is because of these relationships, that !e call them all 5language6 ')K GD,-

It is interesting to see ho! Wittgenstein turns the tables on the the philosopher here 'his earlier self included-, vi<., by a dogged insistence on the irreducible variety of possible "uotidian uses of !ords. &f course, there is a sense in !hich his descriptions beg the "uestion. His "uestions are rhetorical44hectoring even.3vii Eor Wittgenstein, though, ordinary language is all !e got. The salient point is !hether or not !e go on to

clarify these "uotidian uses !ithout transposing or subliming them in the process ')K GG D,0.+1-. The absence of rigid limits never troubles us !hen !e ordinarily apply !ords. (o !hy create endless "uestioning li e )lato, $escartes 'or Heidegger- does by insisting on depth, in!ardness, fi3idity9 If !ords are al!ays used in more !ays than one, and use is al!ays open0ended, then the only thing gained by an essentialist insistence on the reducibility of ordinary language to something 5e3traordinary6 is !hat he e3plicitly doesn2t !ant, vi<., a loss of breadth and clarity ')K GG .+0.C and .+@-.
We are under the illusion that !hat is peculiar ' 'esondere-, profound '/iefe-, essential '#esentliche-, in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language. That is, the order e3isting bet!een the concepts of proposition, !ord, proof, truth '#ahrheit-, e3perience, and so on. This order is a super0order bet!een44so to spea 44super0concepts. Whereas, of course, if the !ords 5language,6 5e3perience,6 5!orld,6 have a use, it must be as humble ' niedrige- a one as that of the !ords 5table6, 5lamp6, 5door6 ')K G 1@-

It is true that the later Wittgenstein retains the delimiting function of philosophy ')K GG,, 1+, 1*, .*D, and .//-. What has changed is the !ay he conceives of it. )hilosophy is no! purely 5descriptive,6 a piece0meal, multiform investigation of ho! the humble uses of !ords get e3ploited for metaphysical ends. #y holding on tenaciously to everyday language and see ing to bring some measure of clarity to it, a reduction of !ords from their metaphysical to their everyday use is pro:ected, in each case giving philosophy peace ' uhe- ')K GG1+, 1@, .+D, ..D, .**, .*C, .*,, ./*, and .//-. Clearly, the later Wittgenstein2s scruples about the language of essence, as !ell as that of limit, allo! him to "uestion the viability of $escartes2 and Heidegger2s efforts at grounding language 'cf. )K G.*C-. In fact, the very gesture no! appears self0defeating in a deeper sense than the merely logical or semantic, arising as it does out of a

misunderstanding of the !ay our common language really !or s 'GG DDB 1+01/-. That does not mean, ho!ever, that it can be ruled out by fiat. He has reached the conviction that philosophical problems are rooted in deep dis"uietudes rooted in ordinary language itself. His account has simply gained too much in terms of intricacy since the /ractatus to allo! for a comprehensive reductio ad absurdum of philosophical thin ing. Eor if sense 'or meaning- is no longer uniformly conceived then ho! much, e3actly, is gained by roundly re:ecting it as 5nonsense69 A mere appeal to the formal identity of meaning !ith use is bound to be an e3ercise in futility ')K GC/-. The nonsense epithet may ultimately be applicable to philosophy or 5thin ing6 'cf. )K GGC+, ..1, ./C, and CDC-. All the same, Wittgenstein is obliged to apply it in a much more attentive, nuanced !ay. (o it !ould be too metaphysical merely appealing to Wittgensteinian discourse being philosophically phrased as sho!ing it2s guilty of a 5performative contradiction6.3viii A similar response could be made if !e merely point out that his "uotidian vie! of the ordinary smac s of linguistic 5Rousseauism6.3i3 &r !e hold that philosophy is only an e3tension of everyday discourse any!ay and that it may have something of its o!n to contribute. Eor if challenged in these !ays, Wittgenstein could al!ays fall bac on the therapeutic defense in the strict sense. &n Wittgensteinian 5principles6 everyday discourse is a fait accompli. Manguage may seduce us into thin ing !e can do more, of courseJbut have !e ever9 If !e in fact accomplish less that !ay, !e !ould be better off simply dissolving these 5delusions of grandeur6. $enying the disease only affirms the needfulness of a cure. If the philosopher and the 5thin er6 resist, so much the better for the physician8

( The Limits of Silence A response to the foregoing: perple3ity at the unresolved tension bet!een philosophy and ordinary language and the persistent evasion on the part of philosophy 'or 5thin ing6- of the "uestion of communicative :ustification. $escartes believes in the primacy of the mind, !hich basically ma es communication into a mere afterthought. Heidegger impugns this approach !ith being deaf to the ordinary. He claims it2s indispensable to philosophy, being inseparable from it. If so, the problem of discursive :ustification is bound to insinuate itself even more forcefully44as long, that is, as !e don2t aim straight a!ay for an even deeper silence8 Wittgenstein goes even further, adopting a 5no0nonsense6 attitude. He !ould charge both !ith blind condescension to!ard the ordinary, !ith a 5narcissistic6 un!illingness to face anything but their o!n e3traordinary reflection.33 Then again, if evasion is a telltale sign of implication, !ho2s to heal the physician9

R In addition to the standard edition and translations for $escartes used in this volume, I have used the follo!ing '!ith their corresponding abbreviations-: Eor Heidegger, I have consulted the ,esamtausgabe 'Eran furt am =ain: ?ittorio Slostermann-'NA-. I have cited the follo!ing editions and translations of Heidegger2s !or s: NA *, Sein und Zeit '.1*@-'(T-B Der .rsprung des 2unts(erkes in NA ,, 3ol4(ege '.1/,0.1CD-, translated as 5&rigin of the Wor of Art6 ' +#!- in +ff the 'eaten /rack% eds. and trans. Iulian Foung and Senneth Haynes 'Cambridge: Cambridge Kniversity )ress, *++*-: .0,DB 5iet4sche 6 7 66 in NA D..0*B 1latons 0ehre von der #arheit and 5'rief 8ber den 3umanismus9 in NA 1, #egmarken '.1.10.1D.-, translated as 5)lato2s $octrine of Truth6 ' 1D/- in 1athmarks, ed. William =c7eill 'Cambridge: Cambridge Kniversity )ress, .11A-: .,,0A*B !us einen ,esprach von der Sprache (Z(ischen einen :aponer unde einen ;ragenden< , in NA .*, .nter(egs 4ur Sprache '.1,+0.1,1-B Zur Sache des Denkens '.1D*0C- in NA .C, translated as 5Hnd of )hilosophy and the Tas of Thin ing6 ' SDin 'asic #ritings, ed. $avid Earrell Srell '7e! For : Harper Collins, .11/-: C*@0C1B NA /A, 0ogik als die ;rage nach dem #esen der Sprache '.1/C-B NA D,, 'eitr"ge 4ur 1hilosophie (Vom =reignis< '.1/D0 .1/A-. Eor Wittgenstein, I have cited the /ractatus 0ogico$1hilisophicus, trans. #. E. =cNuiness and $. E. )ears, !ith an introduction by #ertrand Russell 'Mondon: Routledge, .11/- 'TM-B 1hilosophical 6nvestigations, bilingual ed., trans. N. H. =. Anscombe '&3ford: #lac !ell, *++.- ')K-. This paper is the product of a course on the later Heidegger given by William Richardson, (.I. '#oston College, Eall *++.and o!es much of its impetus to his mention of Wittgenstein as a 5post0metaphysical6 thin er.
i

The literature on the linguistic turn is vast. Eor an e3cellent anthology, containing contributions from all

the ma:or players in both the Analytic and Continental traditions !or ing in the aftermath of the turn, see !fter 1hilosoph&> =nd of /ransformation? , eds. Senneth #aynes, Iames #ohmann, and Thomas =cCarthy 'Cambridge, =ass.: =IT )ress, .1A@-. (ee also /he 0inguistic /urn>
ii

ecent =ssa&s in

1hilosophical Method, ed. Richard =. Rorty 'Chicago: Kniversity of Chicago )ress, .1D@-. This is, of course, a very broad characteri<ation of Western philosophy from )lato via $escartes,

Hobbes and Sant to Hegel and =ar3. 7ot!ithstanding the individual differences amongst them, they all share, I submit, a rather lo! vie! of everyday language44pra3is. This is ultimately related to the consistent subsumption of everyday language under philosophical rationalityB for it !as thought that philosophical discourse someho! preceded and could be gauged in isolation from ordinary language.
iii

Eor the relationship of orality and !riting in )lato, see the 1haedrus *@Cdff. Raoul =ortley, in ;rom

#ord to Silence, * vols. '#onn: Hanstein, .1AD-, I, 1,, thin s that the (ocratic affirmation of the communicative po!er of oral e3change is opposed to 5the drive to!ards silence, and the suspicion of language.6 )lato, on the other hand, presumably lac ed the same conviction. Eor by arguing for a matter !hich is treated appropriately neither in !riting nor in verbal e3changeJthe primacy of mind ' nous-, I thin , is crucial in this regardJ, he is bound to entertain doubts on the po!er of communicative discourse. These doubts are also implied in /he Seventh 0etter /C.c0d and the S&mposium *+.ff. (till, the Classical period is ultimately characteri<ed, as =ortley argues, by a basic confidence in logos. The drive to!ards silence and the suspicion of language became effective only in late Anti"uity '!ith ( epticism, Nnosticism, etc.- '=ortley, ;rom #ord to Silence% I, ,10D*-. In Augustine2s Soliloquia, an early !or , the device of reason2s interior monologue !ith itself is already deployed. Augustine !as also,

as far as I no!, the first thin er to e3plore human life as an in!ard narrative. Crucial in this regard is the !ay individuality, time, historicity, and language are seamlessly inter!oven in the Confessions. (o even if Augustine !as greatly impacted by these above currents of late Anti"uity, he did not share their radical appeal to silence and the concomitant dissatisfaction !ith logos. '(ee also =ortley, ;rom #ord to Silence, II, .1*0**+ and *C*0,C-.
iv

$escartes, of course, never sub:ected languageJleast of all his o!nJto methodological doubt. In

fact, !ith the e3ception of the passage :ust referred to the Meditations altogether bypasses linguistic or semantic considerations. This is related to his advocacy of the separability of the mind from language 'see n.? belo!-.
v

This seems to be implied in $escartes2 Metter to =ersenne, *+ 7ovember .DC1, and a fortiori in the

polemic against Hobbes in the Third (et of Replies. $escartes2 re:ection of a universal grammar or language in favor of a rational ta3onomy of ideas in the letter to =ersenne merely assumes as evident the primacy and separability of reason and its ideas, vie!ed as essential and common to all men. Actual historical languages, by contrast, are not only seen as coincidental, and so instrumental, to philosophical in"uiry, but they are also thought to be endemically prone to semantic confusion 'Metter to =ersenne: C(=S .+0./ > AT I, @D0A*-. An even stronger indication of $escartes2 un!illingness44hostility even44 !hen it comes to dealing !ith the strictures of communicative discourse is to be found in his replies to Hobbes2 ob:ections. Confronted !ith Hobbes2 doubts about the cohesiveness of the implicit 5a priori6 demarcation bet!een language, imagination, and ideas assumed in the Mediations 'C(= II, .*+0**, .*C0*@, .*A0*1, and ./,0/D > AT ?II, .@*0@/, .@@0A+, .A*0A/, and .1/01C-, $escartes, it seems, merely falls bac on an appeal to self0evidence, to something evident 5to all,6 to all those !ho use reason rightly, vi<., to those !ho use !ords the !ay he uses them 'C(= II, .*/, .*,0*D, .*@0*A, .*A0/+, ./*0 //, ./C0/,, and ./D > AT ?II, .@C, .@@0@1, .A., .A/0A,, .A1, .1.01*, and .1C-. This, of course, only begs the "uestion on a communicative level. This is not to say, of course, that $escartes falls short of communicative intent. The Meditations are obviously !ritten for a reading audience 'as evidenced by the $edicatory Metter to the (orbonne, the )reface to the reader, and the (ynopsis of the !hole !or -. Ho!ever, language, it seems, is for $escartes rooted in the material 'sounds and images-, and as such to the bodily organism 'cf. 1assions of the Soul, G,+: C(= I, /CA > AT UI, /D1-. Ideas, by contrast, are thought to be essentially spiritual, something !holly prior to and separable from the materialJthe linguistic. It !ould seem that meaning and truth !ere !holly disparate for $escartes. Communicative language, !e conclude, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of truth.
vi

There is a sense in !hich Cartesian discourse can be vie!ed as an offshoot of )latonic discourse. Eor

it can be argued that both advocate the primacy of nous over logos 'in the communicative sense-. Cartesian discourse, ho!ever, is bound to entertain more radical doubts about the po!er of communication. 'This doubt is never really themati<ed.- In this it sho!s a closer affinity !ith movements li e 7eo0)latonism, ( epticism, and Nnosticism than !ith )lato 'see n.III over-.
vii

The authentic and the inauthentic, the ontological and the ontic, and the e3istential and the e3istentiell,

even if 5distinct,6 are for Heidegger al!ays 5inseparable.6 (till, the first term holds priority over the second 'cf. SZ GG*0/ A0.,B GC,, */.0/,-.

viii

(ee 0ogik als der ;rage nach dem #esen der Sprache 'I G,c-. This !or , I submit, is the first real

step in that direction. Eor although it could be said that even Sein und Zeit is some!hat tainted by the subsumption of 5language6 under logos, from this !or on!ard they are made co0e3tensive. 'Heidegger himself ac no!ledges this !or as a turning point in his !us einen ,esprach von der Sprache (Z(ischen einen :aponer unde einen ;ragenden< '1/01C-. It has often been remar ed ho! underdeveloped logos is vis0;0vis the other t!o fundamental e3istentials in Sein und Zeit. Cf. Richardson, /hrough 1henomenolog& to /hought , DD0@+ and Ian Aler, 5Heidegger2s Conception of Manguage in 'eing and /ime%6 in Martin 3eidegger> Critical !ssessments, III, ed. Christopher =acAnn 'Mondon: Routledge, .11*-: ./0/A. Although language is no! upgraded to the center of attention from a means to an end, and is even allo!ed to hold primacy over the human being later on 'see, e.g.5 'rief 8ber den 3umanismus9 '.C,01C-, that does not mean Heidegger changed his mind on the issue of the problematic centrality of discourse or logos. If anything, my e3position has sho!n that there are good indications it !as there from the beginning.
ix

In 0ogik als der ;rage '.1/C-, the necessity of overcoming logic is e3plicitly announced. Ho!ever, only

!ith the 'eitr"ge and 5iet4sche 6$66 of .1/D0C, is the appeal to the needfulness of a second beginning e3plicitly dealt !ith. The importance for this turn, of the change from tal ing about reconte3tuali<ing to advocating the need for an overcoming, has been emphasi<ed by $omini"ue Ianicaud in 3eidegger> ;rom Metaph&sics to /hought '7e! For : (K7F )ress, .11,-, especially chs. . and *.
x

)lato discusses language e3plicitly in the Crat&lus. It is true that more than one position is discussed in 'or any other !or that I am a!are of- that does not hold language as relating

this !or , !ith the outcome of the !hole discussion being inconclusive. 7o position, ho!ever, is dealt !ith in this !or essentially to things. $espite the variety of positions and the aporetic outcome, therefore, the unspo en assumption al!ays remains the same. Eor Heidegger this 5reified6 'ontic- vie! of language is ultimately related to the ascendancy of truth as correspondence bet!een mental representation 'and by derivation, assertion- and thing. This indicative or apophantic vie!, Heidegger argues, is decisively e3emplified in the epublic, above all in the so0called allegory of the Cave ',.Ca0.@a- 'see especially 1D/% .DA, .@/0 @C, and .@D0@A-. )lato, therefore, is credited !ith articulating the basic paradigm underlying Cartesian discourse.
xi

There are numerous e3amples of the )armenidean and Heraclitean polemic against Homer and

Hesiod, as !ell as their 5disdain6 for the 5mortal6, the 5many,6 the merely 5political6, and so on. Eor the fragments, see /he 1resocratic 1hilosophers, eds. N. (. Sir , N. H. Raven V =. (chofield 'Cambridge: Cambridge Kniversity )ress, .11,-.
xii

The Heidegger of .1DC, it is true, ac no!ledges that both logos and al*theia had been understood

apophantically ever since Homer. This is especially evident in Zur Sache des Denken, a !or completed after EriedlWnder2s and Tugendhat2s criticisms 'both of !hich Heidegger !as a!are-. (ee )aul EriedlWnder, 1lato, vol. I, trans. Hans =eyerhoff ')rinceton: )rinceton Kniversity )ress, .1D1-, **/0/C and **1B Hrnest Tugendhat, 5Heidegger2s Idea of Truth,6 in /he 3eidegger Controvers&, Richard Wohlin 'ed.- 'Cambridge: =IT )ress, .11*-, *C,0DC. Heidegger doesn2t deny that the notion of truth also had a non0ontic function. (o it2s still possible for him to claim that this isn2t an& less basic than the indicative or

apophantic one. Einally, it has to be admitted that of all of Heidegger2s !or s Der Sache des Denken holds the most promise in lessening the impression of Heidegger as a foundationalist thin er. Eor in this !or he not only recogni<es the basic validity of these criticisms ' SD, CC,0C@-, but he more than everJ for !hat it2s !orthJhighlights the fact that the ind of unassuming thin ing he2s no( in favor of no longer seriously entertains foundationalist hopes ' SD, C/D-. Heidegger seems to be ac no!ledging here that !hat he calls thought is no better off than either traditional philosophy and>or ordinary language 'cf. SD, CC@-. The quaestio juris, though, is not dealt !ith here either.
xiii

If I am right, this e3position has sho!n there2s a continuity bet!een the earlier and later Heidegger,

insofar, that is, as they both conceive the relationship bet!een silence and communication in a hierarchical, asymmetrical, unilateral fashion. If anything, the appeal to silence became even more emphatic !hen the turn !as made from Dasein to Manguage>Truth>#eing. There is a sense in !hich Heidegger2s 5sigetic6 approach is fundamentally 5un0Nree .6 7either the )resocratics nor Classical philosophy seems ever to have thought of silence as the ground of language. As sho!n by =ortley, silence does play some role in Nree tragedyJthe figure of Tiresias is emblematic of a ind of telling silence ';rom #ord to Silence, I, ..*-. 7ot until late Anti"uity, ho!ever, !ith the rise of Nnosticism did silence become fundamental or !as the attempt made to transcend both nous and logos 'in the communicative sense-. When Heidegger appeals to a 5place of stillness6 ' SD, CC,-, he 'li e $escartes before him- might be seen as follo!ing in the footsteps of Nnosticism, say, rather than of either the Classical or the Archaic age 'see also n.III over-.
xiv

It is true that Wittgenstein did tal about the aesthetical, as !ell as about the ethico0religious, as

someho! sho!ing 'Zeigen- itself in the !orld rather than being sayable 'TM, D.C*0D.,**-. )erhaps !hat this means is that art, ethics, and religion, li e philosophy, can no longer have a genuinely veridical or semantic force. Wittgenstein himself seems to have preferred reading the poetry of a Rabindranath Tagore to e3plaining the Tractatus to his logical positivist admirers8 Cf. Ray =on , /he Dut& of ,enius 'Mondon: Random House, .11.-, *C*0C/. It2s also interesting that Wittgenstein, in conversations !ith them, ac no!ledges Heidegger2s thoughts on an3iety as suggestive of the limits of language. Cf. 5&n Heidegger on #eing and $read6, in 3eidegger and Modern 1hilosoph& '7e! Haven: Fale Kniversity )ress, .1@A-: A+0A/. Eor a general bac ground, see Alan Iani and (tephen Toulmin, #ittgenstein@s Vienna 'Chicago: Ivan R. $ee, Inc., .1@/- and #ittgenstein and the Vienna Circle> Conversations ecorded b& ;riedrich #aismann '&3ford: #lac !ell, .1@1-. The problem, though, is that by reducing the sayable to science and logic, Wittgenstein ma es it seem as if philosophy, religion, or art are either altogether un!orthy of speech or sublimely ineffable. '&r are they both perhaps9 7one9xv

This position is urged by Cora $iamond in her boo , /he

ealistic Spirit 'Cambridge, =ass.: =IT

)ress, .11,-, /0C, .A, and /,.

xvi xvii

Cf. De Doctrina Christiana I.D.D. (ee also =ortley, ;rom #ord to Silence, II, *.@0*+. This point has been made by Warren Noldfarb in 5Wittgenstein on Ei3idity of =eaning,6 in =arl& ealistic Spirit6, in :ournal of 1hilosophical

!nal&tic 1hilosoph&, ed. William Tait 'Chicago: &pen Court )ublishing Company, .11@-: @,0A1. (ee also his 5=etaphysics and 7onsense: &n Cora $iamond2s /he

esearch ** '.11@-: ,@0@/.

xviii

This is the position of S. &. Apel in 5Wittgenstein and Heidegger: Manguage Names and Mife Eorms,6

in 3eidegger> Critical !ssessments, vol. I?, ed. Christopher =acAnn 'Mondon: Routledge, .11/-: /C*0 @C.
xix

Hrich Heller, in /he !rtist@s :ourne& into the 6nterior% and other =ssa&s '7e! For : Random House,

.1D,-, **/.
xx

This is pretty much the accusation leveled against Heidegger by (tanley Cavell throughout his boo omanticism 'Chicago: Kniversity of Chicago

/he Auest for the +rdinar&> 0ines of Skepticism and )ress, .11C-.