Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, GLENDA A. VARGAS, MA. SOCORRO S.

GUANHING, in their capacities as Dean and Assistant Dean, respectively, of the College of Nursing of the University of Santo Tomas, and RODOLFO N. CLAVIO, in his capacity as Registrar of the University of Santo Tomas, Petitioners - versus - DANES B. SANCHEZ, Respondent. This case began with a Complaint [3] for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondents Transcript of Records (ToR). The case was raffled to Branch 5 of the RTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan. respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2, 2002 with a Bachelors Degree of Science in Nursing. He was included in the list of candidates for graduation and attended graduation ceremonies. On April 18, 2002, respondent sought to secure a copy of his ToR with the UST Registrars Office, paid the required fees, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation UST refused to release his records, making it impossible for him to take the nursing board examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living. The respondent prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for damages. petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss [4] where they claimed that they refused to release respondents ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not been enrolled. further, petitioners filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss, [7] alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a lettercomplaint dated January 21, 2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the instant case was premature. WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable? No. Held: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the courts. [12] Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action. [13] In this case, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that recourse to the CHED is mandatory or even possible in an action such as that brought by the respondent, which is essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions, [14] one of which is where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present case. [15] Petitioners liability if any for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the

interpretation of the Civil Code. [16] As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. WON rule on primary of jurisdiction, as allegedly belong to CHED, is applicable. NO. In addition, the rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. [18] Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. [19] However, petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions. [20] Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 [21] otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of judicial or quasijudicial power. CONTENTION: Petitioners also claim that even without any express grant of quasi-judicial power by the legislature, the CHED is authorized to adjudicate the case filed by respondent on the strength of the following provisions of the Manual of Regulations of Private Schools, Section 33, which authorizes the CHED to cancel or revoke the graduation of any student whose records are found to be fraudulent, Section 72, which permits the school to withhold students credentials under certain specified circumstances, and authorizes the CHED to issue a students credentials in case these are unlawfully withheld by the school The most cursory perusal of these provisions shows that they are inapplicable. Section 33 concerns the conditions and authority of accredited schools to authorize the graduation of students without the prior authority of the CHED. Corollarily, the CHED may cancel or revoke the graduation if it is found to be fraudulent. We are not aware that the CHED has taken any action to revoke the respondents graduation, though it is free to do so. As regards Section 72, it refers to a schools right to withhold t he release of credentials due to suspension, expulsion, or non payment of financial obligations or property responsibility. None of these circumstances is present, and there has been no intimation that respondents ToR has been withheld on any of these grounds. In any event, even if we were to assume that these provisions were applicable, the CHED remains without authority to adjudicate an action for damages.

LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (Ret.) vs. JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, CDO Nature: complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City Facts: the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping

container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected and discovered the undocumented forest products Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt. No one claimed these products In a complaint [7] dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him damages. On 29 March 2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin [8] ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest products In a motion to quash the writ of replevin, [9] the defendants DENR, CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside, among others, because Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies Judge Paderanga DENIED the motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit. Hence the complaint against him for gross ignorance the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that Judge Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter WON the said doctrines were violated. YES! Held: The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys natural resources.The Forestry Code states that possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned. In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies.

In Factoran, "The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. " In Dy "This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invo cation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. " In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy, [23] the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency not the courts. Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENRs Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. Hence,Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. In tabao, "Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. XXX Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. XXXFailure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge."

CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner, - versus - LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.

These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit [9] for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as FChinese. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, [10] averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings and Jimmy presented various documents to prove otherwise. February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. MalenabHornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy. On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9) [19] in relation to Section 45(c) [20] of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Pasig challenging the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings Trial ensued disfavorly to Carlos and Jimmy, and so the Board issued a warrant of deportation [30] which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. The CA held that the Board has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine their citizenship. whether the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage Held: While they concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear cases against an alleged alien, they insist that judicial intervention may be resorted to when the claim to citizenship is

so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct (as to how they were raised, etc) There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. However, this Court, following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board [61] wherein we stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. [62] Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. the same should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in proper proceedings. [64] After all, the Boards jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of citizenship. [65] Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings. The decision of the Board on the question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts. We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of whether substantial evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of fact which is beyond this Courts power of review for it is not a trier of facts. [68] None of the exceptions [69] in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the evidence they presented once again, the same conclusion will still be reached. As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what we are called upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of the same. And we are of the opinion that said proceedings should not be enjoined. Note: Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. [81] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [82] As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. Although Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present controverting evidence

FELICITAS M. MACHADO and MARCELINO P. MACHADO, Petitioners, vs. RICARDO L. GATDULA, COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, and IRINEO S. PAZ, Sheriff IV, Office of the Provincial Sheriff The dispute involves two adjoining parcels of land located in Barangay San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, one belonging to the Machados, and the other belonging to respondent Ricardo L. Gatdula (Gatdula). On February 2, 1999, Gatdula wrote a letter [4] to the COSLAP requesting assistance because the Machados allegedly blocked the right of way to his private property by constructing a twodoor apartment on their property. Acting on Gatdulas letter, the COSLAP conducted a mediation conference on February 25, 1999; the parties then agreed to have a verification survey conducted on their properties and to share the attendant expenses. Thereafter, the COSLAP issued an Order directing the Chief of the Survey Division of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRODENR), to conduct a verification survey Engr. Arellano submitted a report to the COSLAP finding that the structure built by the Machados encroached upon an alley found within the Gatdula property. Engr. Arellanos findings corroborated the separate report of another Engr. Machados contested these reports: 1. alleged that Gatdula had no right of action since they did not violate Gatdulas rights 2. assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP, stating that the proper forum for the present case was the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna. COSLAP directed directing the Machados to reopen the right of way in favor of Gatdula. In so ruling, the COSLAP relied on the verification survey made. The COSLAP declared the Machados estopped from questioning its jurisdiction to decide the case, since they actively participated in the mediation conferences and the verification surveys without raising any jurisdictional objection. WON COSLAP had jurisdiction. No. Held: A review of the history of the COSLAP and an account of the laws creating the COSLAP and its predecessor, the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP), is in order (OH MAH GAHD). The COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. [22] Thus, under EO 561, the instances

when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants. In the case at bar, the properties are private lands owned by private parties, none of whom is a squatter, a patent lease agreement holder, a government reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a member of any cultural minority. [24] Moreover, the dispute between the parties can hardly be classified as critical or explosive in nature that would generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation that would require immediate and urgent action. The issues raised in the present case primarily involve the application of the Civil Code provisions on Property and the Easement of Right of Way. As held in Longino v. General, [25] disputes requiring no special skill or technical expertise of an administrative body that could be resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts. The Machados cannot invoke Section 3, paragraph 2(e) of EO 561, which provides that the COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over complaints involving other similar land problems of grave urgency, to justify the COSLAPs intervention in this case. A dispute between two parties concerning the right of way over private lands cannot be characterized as similar to those enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2(a) to (d) of EO 561. In Davao New Town Development Corporation v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems [27] where we ruled that the COSLAP does not have blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it we made it clear that its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the government has a proprietary or regulatory interest. Note: CA cited Banaga case. SC said Baaga involved two contending parties who filed free patent applications for a parcel of public land with the Bureau of Lands. Because of the Bureau of Lands failure to act within a reasonable time on the applications and to conduct an investigation, the COSLAP decided to assume jurisdiction over the case. Since the dispute involved a public land on a free patent issue, the COSLAP undeniably had jurisdiction over the Baaga case. Machado's are not ESTOPPED just because they participated in mediation proceedings. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties action or conduct. [29] Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by law, exists. In this case, the COSLAP did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by Gatdula, yet it proceeded to assume jurisdiction over the case and even issued writs of execution and demolition against the Machados. The lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties participation in the proceedings before the COSLAP. [31] Under the circumstances, the Machados can rightfully question its jurisdiction at anytime, even during appeal or after final judgment. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (CID), ET AL. vs. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, ET AL. Held: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]. It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed. LLphil In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases. Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. Long story short, Gatchalian is a Filipino Citizen.