Mendelssohn, Kant and the Postulates of Reason.

The purpose of this essay is to assess the place of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason in relation to his Critique of Pure Reason and the historical circumstances governing the developments between these two texts. In undertaking this assessment, I will show that the figure of Moses Mendelssohn is of primary importance for any attempt to understand the development of Kant's critical pro ect. In so doing, I will illustrate that not only are there strong correlations between the two thinkers, but that the central arguments of the second Critique, particularly those in the '!ialectic', are developed and crafted primarily as a critical response to, and in significant ways a defence of, Mendelssohn's contribution to the ongoing public debate with "acobi. It was Mendelssohn's hope that theoretical reason could provide absolute knowledge and could thereby ground all religious beliefs and moral principles. #e held that, in theory, all metaphysical beliefs can be ustified through analysis of analytic udgements. If the sub ect term is given, then one need only to analyse the sub ect in order to derive complete knowledge of its predicates. Thus, from a simple analysis of such sub ect terms as perfection and first cause, religious beliefs can be established on the firm foundation of reason. $here we go astray, i.e. where rational metaphysics fails, is not due to any fundamental limitation of reason itself, rather it is the fault of the finite individual. Mendelssohn explained that false conclusions are an outcome of two possible causes% illusion of the senses and&or faulty reasoning.' Illusions arising from the senses are an ever present stumbling block of finite beings such as ourselves( but such illusions can nonetheless be corrected by reasoning( and reason itself, though it often falls prey to careless logical deductions, la)y use of induction and so on, can be gradually perfected by close attention and regular exercise. In his Phaedon *'+,+-, Mendelssohn submitted the argument for his so.called 'rational psychology' which attempted to establish the truth of the immortality of the soul through an analysis of the concept of the irreducibly singular principle of the conscious sub ect, which he held to be a simple substance that cannot be sub ect to division. / #e reasoned that only that which is composed of parts can be divided into other parts, and that it is only through such a division that a thing can be destroyed or degraded( and because the
' Mendelssohn, Morning Hours, pp. '+./' / Mendelssohn, Phaedon, pp. '0+.1

'

conscious self *the soul- is not composed of parts, it is, he concluded, immortal. Mendelssohn's deductions from the concept of simple substances were sound enough, but where he went astray was in the assumption that the mere concept of an irreducible principle of consciousness denotes the material existence of a corresponding property. Kant understood precisely this problem when he attacked Mendelssohn's 'proof' in the first Critique. There Kant argued that%
rational psychology owes its origin to a mere misunderstanding, where one takes the unity of consciousness underlying the categories to be an intuition of the sub ect as ob ect, and applies to it the category of substance. 2ut this unity is only the unity in thought; through it alone no ob ect is given, and hence the category of substance, which always presupposes given intuition, cannot be applied to it. This sub ect, therefore, cannot be cogni)ed at all.0

The analytic method employed by Mendelssohn was inherently faulty insofar as he failed to consider that a priori analysis of concepts alone in no way assures the empirical actuality of the sub ect term in udgement. 3or Kant, the 4I5 which attends to the ob ects of one's conscious awareness is itself not an ob ect for which there can be any corresponding intuition. This is not to suggest that Kant denied the constitutive validity of personal identity. 6n the contrary, he argued in the '7aralogisms' that the 4I5 is a principle which must be presupposed as a transcendental condition of conscious awareness. 2ut from the basis of this transcendental presupposition alone, nothing more can be said about the soul's substantiality( Kant furthermore ruled out any talk of the soul's temporallity on the grounds that time is a predicate only of ob ects in phenomenal appearances. 8s if to only make matters worse for Mendelssohn, Kant went on in the '!ialectic' to lay out and subse9uently demolish the only three possible proofs of :od for ;<% the Ontological, Cosmological, and Physicotheological proofs( 4There neither are, nor can be, any more such proofs.5= 2oth the Ontological and Cosmological proofs proceed according to an unwarranted inference from mere concepts that give nothing in actual experience, and are therefore faulty insofar as they infer actuality for their concepts from the copula 'is' in udgements of the form 'sub ect is predicate.' Kant explained that
0 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason *CPR-, pp. =0=.>& 2 =//.0 = CPR, p. >++&2 ,'?

4Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., it is not a concept of anything that can be added to the concept of a thing.5> The Physicotheological proof takes its 'evidence', not from mere concepts, but from experience. 8ccording to this proof, the world is so composed, it is endowed with such beauty and order, that any explanation of the world which assumes only efficient causes as being in operation in it is entirely inade9uate. Toward this proof, Kant was somewhat more ambivalent. #e stated that 4any attempt to detract from the authority of this proof would not only be hopeless, but also entirely futile.5, @onetheless, Kant argued that such a proof can proceed only according to inductive inferences from the perceived purposiveness of nature to probable and analogous propositions.+ Altimately, whether proof for the existence of a supreme being is drawn from mere concepts or from experiences, 4the ideal of the supreme being is nothing but a regulative principle of reason.51 2y attacking proofs drawn from experience as well as those from the unwarranted use of mere concepts, Kant's attacks applied as much to "acobi as they did to Mendelssohn. Kant explained that all theological arguments are one of two kinds% 46ne kind is based on mere reason; the other kind is based on revelation.5 ? This much was conceded to by both "acobi and Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn argued that whereas the articles of Bhristian belief are established through faith and revelation, those of "udaism are established through a process of rational contemplation and ustification% 4My religion recogni)es no obligation to resolve doubt other than through rational means( and it commands no mere faith in eternal truths.5 'C 3or "acobi, Mendelssohn's diagnosis of Bhristian faith was fair enough, but he challenged Mendelssohn's claim to base his beliefs on reason alone, arguing that 4 f every assent to truth not derived from rational grounds is faith, DEF then conviction based on rational grounds must itself derive from faith and receive its force from faith alone.5 '' "acobi held that all consistent philosophy, when applied to religious belief, leads by necessity to ;pino)ism, i.e. scepticism, nihilism and atheism. *reference 233 an 364) If Mendelssohn would only admit that his supposedly rational belief took as its starting point an irrational leap of faith, then he
> , + 1 ? 'C '' CPR, p. >10&2 ,/+ CPR, p. ,C0&2 ,>/ CPR, p. ,C0&2 ,>/ CPR, p. >?1&2 ,=, CPR, p. ,C?&2 ,>? Mendelssohn, !chriften, III&/, 0C0. Bited in% '2eiser, "he #ate of Reason, p. +?' "acobi, "he Main Philosophical $ritings, p. /,>

would either renounce reason and embrace faith, or renounce religion completely and dive head.first into the 4mechanistic5 abyss of ;pino)istic scepticism G there is no middle option. The philosophical drive to know and explain everything leads only to 4mechanism,5 according to "acobi, because only that which is mediated by something else within a chain of efficient causes can be a theoretically distinct ob ect of cognition.'/ Mendelssohn absolutely denied the charges "acobi lays against him, and while he shared "acobi's concern with the problem of ;pino)ism, which Mendelssohn saw as leading to 4materialism5, he was e9ually concerned with the problem of 4fanaticism.5'0 The threat of 4fanaticism5 was a serious one indeed for Mendelssohn, given the ascendency of the 4thoroughgoing reactionary5 3riedrich $ilhelm II.'= 8s for 4materialism5, the problem for Mendelssohn was that if moral and religious belief could not be firmly grounded in reason, then the case for reason would be lost. :iven the only apparent options, it is easily seen how Mendelssohn and "acobi viewed Kant's first Critique as offering only scepticism. 2oth saw no middle ground between reason on the one side, and revelation or faith on the other. Kant was, of course, on the side of reason, but for Mendelssohn this was no consolation given that 4the all.9uashing Kant5'> appeared to have stripped reason of all its powers and authority. 3or Mendelssohn, Kant's strictures on metaphysical insight amounted to a concession to "acobi that the consistent and extended application of reason led necessarily to ;pino)ism. Indeed, "acobi enthusiastically declared Kant's Critique to be a document written 4entirely in the spirit of ;pino)ism,5 ', and he took Kant's denial of rational insight into the existence of :od as a triumph for the cause against reason. Kant, for his part, was perplexed at the charges being laid against his critical philosophy, stating in a footnote to his Orientation essay *'+1,-, his only official contribution to the dispute, that 4It is hard to comprehend how the scholars ust mentioned DMendelssohn and "acobiF could find support for ;pino)ism in the Critique of Pure Reason,5 and he was likewise concerned that 4another scholar5 had found 4scepticism in the Critique.5'+ $hile it is unclear who 4another scholar5 refers to, '1 it is clear that a number of thinkers
'/ '0 '= '> ', '+ '1 "he Main Philosophical $ritings, pp. 0==.> Morning Hours, p. xx Israel, ". %emocratic &nlightenment, p.1>> Morning Hours, p. xix "he Main Philosophical $ritings, p. /'1 Kant, $hat %oes it Mean to Orient Oneself in "hin'ing( *Orientation-, p.'> The translator of the essay speculates that this may refer to either of 4the popular Hnlightenment philosophers5 3eder and Tittel, 4or the target may be Bhristoph Meiners5 *<eligion and <ational

had begun to rally to Mendelssohn's cause, declaring Kant a sceptic and arguing that he merely reiterated 2erkeley's idealism G to which Mendelssohn whole.heartedly concurred. 8ccording to Mendelssohn, if Kant argued that all that we have access to is representations, then his entire critical philosophy can be little more than a reiteration of 2erkeley's solipsistic idealism. Kant's things.in.themselves, i.e. :od and ob ects existing independently of thought, then, can be little more than abstract postulations. The problem of refuting idealism had more than merely high.flown philosophical importance for Mendelssohn, in that if everything we perceive is only a product of our own representations, then there appeared to him to be no grounds on which to establish moral obligations in relation to other people and, indeed, in relation to :od. 3urthermore, according to Mendelssohn's understanding of what Kant laid out in the 'Banon of 7ure <eason', the basis on which Kant attempted to establish the validity of religious belief was on our moral duty to believe in :od. $hile Mendelssohn's arguments in Morning Hours on this point were directed specifically toward the education theorist 2asedow, it is fairly inferred by 2eiser that his arguments were implicitly aimed at Kant.'? Mendelssohn holds that the articles of religious belief cannot be a moral duty, because we cannot be morally responsible for whether or not our beliefs turn out to be true or false, and because the ac9uisition of a given belief on the basis of some evident fact is 4not an ethical, but a physical necessity.5/C If something is evidently true to us, then we simply have no choice whether to believe it or not, and so the only duty we can have in relation to beliefs is the duty to seek the truth through reason. It is, however, only on the assumption of :od's reality that we can act morally. 3or Mendelssohn, it is the nature, and obligation, of the moral will to strive for happiness and to avoid what is opposed to it. Therefore, if the existence of a supreme being capable of ensuring the possibility of the attainment of happiness is not presupposed, then the moral obligation falls away. :iven the assumption of such a being, we are then entitled to take as given that reason's instrumental endeavours will correspond with the theoretical, on the basis of our moral obligation to attain happiness. <eiterating an argument he had developed in his Phaedon,/' Mendelssohn argued in Morning Hours, that%
7hilosophy p.=>>'? "he #ate of Reason, p. ?+ /C Morning Hours, p. >o /' pp. '1C.'

>

If it is true that an all.benevolent and all.wise being has produced us, then, by virtue of its immutable properties, it cannot have predetermined us to anything else but happiness. If this happiness cannot exist unless human beings are called to endure endlessly, then their annihilation conflicts with the recogni)ed properties of :od and one has legitimate grounds to consider the souls of human beings immortal. 8nd so it will be for the make.up of every truth of which we can demonstrate that, without it, human beings would not be capable of happiness and :od would not be able to have the properties of whose reality we are convinced. 6nly in this case can the reason for approving also become the reason grounding knowledge.//

In taking happiness to be a moral obligation, reason, for Mendelssohn, is thus instrumental in the pursuit of one's moral purpose and is at the same time necessary for the uncovering of religious truth. 2ut Kant, in denying rational insight into thing in themselves, while at the same time denying instrumental reason any role in morality, appeared to Mendelssohn to exclude reason from having either a theoretical or an instrumental role in determining moral action. Kant's Critique had thus come under attack from all 9uarters on the grounds that the critical philosophy invoked scepticism and undermined all bases of moral action. In addition, Kant could see that the cause for reason itself was being severely, yet inadvertently, compromised by Mendelssohn. In Morning Hours, Mendelssohn argued that it is necessary to orient one's speculative use of reason by means of appeal to 'common sense'./0 That is, the tendency of reason to indulge in the kind of speculation that would contradict our most important beliefs could be kept in check by by maintaining those beliefs as a point of orientation in reasoning. The path was, then, opened for the 4acute author of the Results,5/= $i)enmann, to argue that whereas "acobi's leap of faith stemmed from his grounding all beliefs in the will, Mendelssohn took ustification for his theoretical postulations from an immediate appeal to common sense( it was Mendelssohn, and not "acobi, who was the real irrationalist. /> "acobi's faith was unlike Mendelssohn's common sense, according to $i)enmann, in that faith was
// /0 /= /> p. >' p. ,C Kant, Orientation, p.1 $i)enmann, Resultate, pp. ',/.0. Bited in% 42eiser, "he #ate of Reason, p. ''/5

not a claim to knowledge but a practical demand, and so could not be sub ect to the same criticism from reason as that which should be directed toward common sense knowledge claims. Thus, $i)enmann at the same time acknowledged Mendelssohn's criticism toward Kant that reason cannot make any claim about what one ought to believe. 3or $i)enmann the task of reason is to draw relations between facts, not to create them./, $ith Mendelssohn's death shortly after the publication of Morning Hours, and the tides 9uickly turning in favour of 'enthusiasm', Kant intervened. In the Orientation essay, Kant addressed the problems of Morning Hours head on, though in manner sympathetic to Mendelssohn, and with the implicit purpose of meeting $i)enmann's ob ections. The explicit purpose of the essay was to critically appraise, and at the same time defend, Mendelssohn's 4maxim that it is necessary to orient oneself in the speculative use of reason.5/+ 3or Kant, insofar as reason is employed as a speculative, or theoretical, faculty, to orient oneself in reason is to employ reason to guard against contradictions within reason itself and to stop reason from making unwarranted incursions beyond its field of urisdiction./1 $i)enmann had been correct, according to Kant, that theoretical reason cannot have any urisdiction over what ought to be the case. 2ut that "acobi's *and hence $i)enmann's- practical faith should thereby avoid answering to reason was little but a sleight of hand which relied on an ambiguity in the notion of a practical demand to make claims to immediate knowledge( and that such arguments should be directed towards Kant's own claims in the 'Banon', was likewise disingenuous, but revealing of the fact that the first Critique had been ubi9uitously misunderstood. The following year Kant wrote in the preface to the second edition of the first Critique that he
had to annul 'no)ledge in order to make room for faith. 8nd the true source of all the lack of faith which conflicts with morality G and is always highly dogmatic G is dogmatism in metaphysics, i.e., the pre udice according to which we can make progress in metaphysics without a DpriorF criti9ue of pure reason. /?

/, /+ /1 /?

$i)enmann, Resultate, ',/.0. Bited in% 42eiser, "he #ate of Reason, p. ''/5 Orientation, p. + Orientation, p. 1 CPR, p. 0'( 2 xxx

The source of the widespread misinterpretation of the first Critique as a sceptical treatise, was the failure of its readers to distinguish between Kant's treatment of speculative reason and practical reason as distinct faculties, and and a corresponding failure to grasp the implications of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves G i.e. phenomena and noumena. If reason is only a faculty of knowledge, then Mendelssohn, along with "acobi and $i)enmann, would have been correct to view Kant as simply denying faith. Kant thus realised that reason in its practical use had to be given a separate and exhaustive explication independently of its treatment in the first Critique. The problem of ';pino)ism', Kant explained in the '8nalytic of 7ure 7ractical <eason', only arises if one assumes that the world as we perceive it is how it actually is independently of our perception.0C The chain of causality is something that only occurs in time, but time is not something that exists in the world independently of our perception, rather time is something contributed by us in order to make sense of the world for theoretical reason. The causality of things existing in time dictates that every event is conditioned by an event in a previous moment in time. Thus, if time is a feature of the world, rather than merely a feature of thought, then everything must appear to be mechanistically determined. 2ut, as "acobi had recognised, if the world is to be an ob ect of philosophical knowledge, then it must be explained strictly in terms of the material relations between ob ects existing in space and time. Thus, if :od is to be held as an ob ect of philosophical knowledge then the philosopher will naturally arrive at a conception of :od along the lines of ;pino)a's infinite substance, and :od's causality and creation will appear as an infinite chain of efficient causes. $ith this Kant was in complete agreement, and it was for this reason that he denied theoretical access to the existence of :od. The problem for Mendelssohn, as Kant saw it, was that his entire rational enterprise was predicated on the assumption that :od and the other articles of faith could be determined theoretically in the realm of appearances. 0' Thus, in order to avoid the slide into ;pino)ism, Mendelssohn was forced to make an irrational appeal to 'common sense' as a counter.weight to the materialistic speculations of reason. 8s mentioned above, both Mendelssohn and "acobi mistakenly interpreted Kant's
0C Kant, Critique of Practical Reason *CPrR- p. //C.0&>%'CC.0 0' CPrR, p. //'&>%'C/

reason as a faculty of knowledge. 2ut knowledge, for Kant, was only one ob ect, or 4interest,5 of reason, namely, that of reason in its speculative use, whereas the 4interest5 of reason in its practical use was to determine the will to moral action%
The interest of its speculative use consists in the cognition of the ob ect up to the highest a priori principles( that of its practical use consists in the determination of the )ill with respect to the final and complete end.0/

The 4interest5 of reason in general is to seek the totality of conditions for a given condition, that is, to complete its task of attaining the ultimate principle in a series of contingent ob ects or principles. In speculative reason, this task can never be completed because ob ects of theoretical knowledge can only ever pertain to appearances of things existing in space and time, and so speculative reason is denied positive theoretical access to noumenal principles such as :od, immortality and freedom. 2ut because the infinite regress of ob ects and principles results in logical absurdity, and because the assumption of first cause and basic principles must necessarily be presupposed, speculative reason cannot deny their existence outright( rather speculative reason must simply admit the impossibility of ever attaining its final goal, and acknowledge the problematic possibility of noumenal ob ects. Thus, it was shown in the '!ialectic' of the first Critique that reason runs into contradictions and falsehoods if it attempts to establish the existence of such ob ects in the phenomenal world. 2y contrast to the 4interest5 of speculative reason, the 4interest5 of practical reason is to bring about the 4highest good.5 2ut in similar vein to that of the first Critique, Kant showed in the '!ialectic' of the the second Critique, that contradictions and falsehoods arise when we believe that we can reach the end point of our moral striving within the period of a lifetime, or that the highest good can be brought into existence in the sensible world of appearances. "ust as noumenal ob ects cannot be ob ects for theoretical reason, nor can an unconditioned moral end be realised in the sensible world. The existence of :od, immortality and freedom are, for Kant, 4postulates5 of practical reason, but they are not thereby ob ects of theoretical knowledge. #owever, Kant argued that the need of reason in general is extended by practical reason, insofar as practical reason is capable of completing the task of finding the unconditioned in a series of
0/ CPrR, p. /0,&>%'/C

conditions, thereby attaining a satisfaction of reason's in9uest. Kant posed the 9uestion as to whether speculative reason must accept the propositions of practical reason and to try and unite them with its own suppositions, even though they are insights that are beyond the bounds of speculative reason, or whether it is ustified in re ecting everything that is not demonstrable in experience and theoretical cognition. Kant claimed that speculative reason would only be ustified in re ecting the postulates of practical reason if it were found to step outside of the domain of the faculty of reason in general. 2ut practical reason does not do this, as has been shown throughout the Briti9ue G the moral law re ects all empirical principles and instrumental needs. 2ecause the findings of both practical and speculative reason stem from the same faculty of reason, it should be found that they accord with one another. Thus, speculative reason must accept the insights of practical reason, even though they cannot thereby be made into determinate theoretical cognitions. 2y showing the postulates of practical reason to have primacy over their postulation in speculative reason, Kant showed that whereas in regards to knowledge the postulates were only problematic, that is, they were unverifiable yet not impossible, in practical reason they are given ob ective validity in the overall critical pro ect. The 4supreme good,5 Kant explained, is virtue in conformity with the moral law. 2ut this is not yet the 4complete good.5 3or, to be virtuous is to be worthy of happiness, and to be worthy of happiness but not to attain happiness in proportion to what is deserved is inconsistent with the idea of morality's completion. Thus, the 4complete good5 is 4happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality.500 <eason commands that we seek to realise the highest good. Thus, the possibility that the highest good is actually achievable is also a necessary idea for all rational beings. The problem for Kant, however, was to explain how this relation can come about. #e argued that, on the one hand, happiness cannot be the cause of virtue because the moral law is the sole determining ground of virtue *as it was shown in the '8nalytic', happiness cannot be the ground of the moral will-( and on the other hand, virtue cannot be the cause of happiness because, though we can determine the will and thereby act in the world, we are not thereby the producers of nature, and so being virtuous is no guarantee that nature will conform with our will such that happiness will necessarily be granted in this life. The problem, then, is that there does not appear to be any way that the connection between
00 CPrR, p. //?&>%''/

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virtue and happiness can be a necessary connection. 2ut this problem only arises insofar as we consider this causal relation to operate in the sensible world. The possibility of the highest good is, then, not a possibility in the sensible world of appearances, rather it is only possible in the noumenal world. 2ut, complete conformity with the moral law, which Kant called 4holiness5, is a perfection that no rational being is capable of in the sensible world( and since this completion is a necessary command of reason, we are compelled to seek it through an endless progress( and because endless progress is only possible on the assumption of an endless existence of the rational being, the possibility of the highest good rests on the presupposition of immortality. Thus, immortality is a necessary idea for us given our assumption that we can complete the task of morality. The highest good, though, includes not only complete moral conformity, but also the possibility that happiness be apportioned in accordance with morality( and this presupposes the existence of a first cause of nature, but which is distinct from nature, and which contains the ground of the connection of morality with happiness. #ence the moral law and the possibility of the highest good also leads to the necessary presupposition of the existence of :od. The correlation between Kant's arguments for the 4postulates5 of practical reason and Mendelssohn's arguments in Phaedon*+ and Morning Hours*, concerning the supposition of :od and immortality is a strong correlation indeed. 2oth thinkers sighted an endless striving to complete the task of morality as the basis on which :od and immortality could be valid ob ects of reason. 2ut for Mendelssohn, the role of reason in determining the end of morality was instrumental and theoretical. :iven the theoretical assumption of :od's existence, reason is instrumentally efficacious in determining moral action toward the end of immortality and, subse9uently, happiness. 8gain, Mendelssohn had falsely assumed that the merely analytic relation between concepts of possible ob ects could thereby affirm the existence of those ob ects for theoretical reason. 3rom the Kantian perspective, Mendelssohn was correct, however, in identifying the fact that theoretical knowledge of :od and immortality could not be grounded in a duty to believe in their existence. 2ut in failing to recognise Kant's distinction between instrumental and theoretical reason on the one hand, and practical reason on the other, Mendelssohn, along with $i)enmann, falsely viewed Kant as grounding theoretical
0= pp. '1C.' 0> p. >'

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knowledge of the postulates in moral duty. Bontemporaneously, 8llen $ood has taken up a form of the refutation levelled at Kant by Mendelssohn and $i)enmann, stating that 4Kant's moral arguments are rather like 7ascal's wager, which tries to show not that Bhristianity is true, but that Bhristian belief would be advantageous to have DEF Kant seems to suggest that he thinks that we have the ability to believe in :od and immortality ust by deciding to.50, $ood continues the tradition of failing to identify Kant's distinction between practical affirmation and theoretical knowledge. Kant argued that the moral necessity of immortality and :od's existence are not beliefs we are duty bound to hold( it cannot be duty to believe in the existence of anything. <ather, :od and immortality are rational beliefs that one will necessarily have if one assumes the duty of attaining the highest good. 8s Kant endlessly tried to make clear to his readers, and as indicated throughout this essay, theoretical speculation into the metaphysical ground of religious and moral conviction is entirely damaging to such conviction, and it is only through denying absolute knowledge that there can be any place for faith and morality at all. Mendelssohn's hope that the truths of religion and morality could be grounded in theoretical reason is one that has continued unabated into contemporary times. <eligious thinkers continue to speculate on the existence of :od, drawing proofs from the necessity of a first cause and from the orderliness and beauty of the natural world( atheists and secular thinkers continue in the 9uest to derive moral principles from scientific data. <egarding such religious speculation, in light of Kant's criti9ue of theoretical knowledge, it is clear that such speculations are inherently futile. <egarding attempts to derive moral principles from science, such attempts are likewise futile, though complex in their implications. 3rom empirical principles, it was shown by Kant, only heteronomy of moral principles can result. 2ut it has been widely claimed by many atheist and secular moralists that universal moral principles can be grounded in theoretical knowledge. The results have not been promising% obvious examples of such universalising pro ects are social.!arwinism and utilitarianism. ;ocial !arwinism has of course had catastrophic conse9uences for vast populations throughout recent modern history. Atilitarianism has also been outed as an inade9uate, and potentially harmful moral doctrine% utilitarianism has formed the foundation of 'rational' self interest models of economics, and has likewise formed the grounding of an ever growing dependency
0, $ood, '<ational Theology, Moral 3aith and <eligion' in Cam-ridge Companion to .ant, p. =C=

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on profit maximisation. The 'is' of theoretical knowledge has, then, formed a ma or stumbling block of rational universalising moral pro ects. In regard to this problem, Kant's postulates of reason are surprisingly instructive% despite our knowledge of a human history governed by perpetual war and realpolitik( despite the nagging spectre of our creaturely self.interest in the pursuit of our lifestyles and occupations( and despite the unaccommodating blank stare of the 'is' in the face of all 'oughts'( despite all our knowledge of the harsh reality of nature, we have, in the seat of practical reason, a principle which postulates with necessity that we can complete our moral striving through an overcoming of that which is merely given. $e are impelled to look beyond, and overcome, that which is given to us in instinct and historical precedent, and to seek new modes of moral engagement grounded in pure will and the ideals of practical reason.

'0

Bibliography 2eiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte *#arvard Aniversity 7ress '?1+Israel, %emocratic &nlightenment/ Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 01,23 0142 *6xford Aniversity 7ress /C''"acobi, The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, /nd ed, translated and edited by :. !i :iovanni *Mc:ill.Iueen's Aniversity 7ress /CC?Kant, 'Briti9ue of 7ractical <eason', in 4Kant, Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by :regor *Bambridge Aniversity 7ress '??,-5 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by 7luhar *#ackett '??,Kant, '$hat !oes it Mean to 6rient 6neself in ThinkingJ', in 4Kant, Religion and Rational Philosophy, translated and edited by $ood and di :iovanni *Bambridge Aniversity 7ress '??,-5 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours/ 5ectures on 6od7s &8istence, translated by !ahlstrom and !yck *;pringer /C''Mendelssohn, Phaedon; Or the %eath of !ocrates, translated by Bharles Bullen *Kondon '+1?$ood, '<ational Theology, Moral 3aith and <eligion in 4:uyer *ed.-, "he Cam-ridge Companion to .ant. *Bambridge Aniversity 7ress '??/-5

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