Issue No.

03 February 2007

February 2007

Issue No. 03

From the Editor

E-JETS NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical items. This newsletter, compiled by EMBRAER Fleet Technical Center (EFTC), brings the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance best practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization and efficiency in daily operation. E-JETS NEWS addresses Operators concerns dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It shared with the technical departments, such as Recipients are encouraged to distribute this Customers. with maintenance support and has relevant information to be Engineering and Maintenance. newsletter within EMBRAER

Earlier editions of E-JETS NEWS publication can be found at CIS / Aerochain at

http://www.aerochain.com

- Login (enter username and password); - Select Technical Services and then EMBRAER Customer Services; - Select Maintenance Support; - Select E-JETS NEWS; - Click on desired E-JETS NEWS. If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-JETS NEWS is needed, please contact the local EMBRAER Field Service Representative. General questions or comments about the E-JETS NEWS publication can be address to:

E-JETS NEWS Tel: Fax: +55 12 3927 5762 +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: ejets.news@embraer.com.br

PROPRIETARY NOTICE The articles published in E-JETS NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third party without EMBRAERs written consent. Also, no article published should be considered authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.

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February 2007

Issue No. 03
No modification to the NLG shock strut is necessary to install the new seal. However, to conform the seal cap to its original shape inside the groove of the lower cam, it is necessary a specific GSE. Another GSE is also required to prevent damage to the internal seals of the lower cam during its installation on the sliding tube. A Temporary Revision of ITEM has been issued to present the GSEs required to install the new seal: GSE N 411 - INSTALLATION TOOL MANDREL (EMBRAER 170/175 = PN 2370-T200-001 / EMBRAER 190/195 = PN 190-T010-001) GSE N 412 - INSTALLATION TOOL BULLET (EMBRAER 170/175 = PN 2370-T201-001 / EMBRAER 190/195 = PN 190-T011-001) Due to the difference of installation between the current and new seal, an AMM Temporary Revision has been issued to show the instructions of installation for each seal model (AMM task 32-21-04-400-801-A Nose-LandingGear Shock-Strut Seals Installation) The man-power required to install the new seal has no substantial difference from the current seal. PIL 170-32-0030 and 190-32-0018 have been also issued to present the new seal Part Number: Old PN EMBRAER 170/175 295-34000161-3440, or 295-34000161-3891 EMBRAER 190/195 295-34100161-3440, or 295-34100161-3893 The current and new seal are two-way interchangeable.
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New NOSE LANDING GEAR Shock Strut / Sliding Tube Dynamic Seal
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 EMBRAER has received in-service reports about leakage on the NLG shock strut / sliding tube interface. During the replacement of the seals, technicians found out that the leakage condition was related to the dynamic seals (main and / or spare seals). Examination of the removed seals has revealed that the primary reason for their removal is related to the incompatibility between the current model (ACT type ring) and the surface finish of the NLG sliding tube. Following this, another type of seal (ACGT type ring) has been introduced to minimize the possibility of leakage. The ACGT seal has a PTFE cap component as the primary sealing element and is resistant to damage caused by the self-lubrication nature of the PTFE.

New PN 265-34073161-9751

265-34171161-9751

February 2007
Introduction of the new seal is a minor modification and the top assembly PN will not change. For more information, see SNL 170-320020 and 190-32-0015 - EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF OIL IN THE NOSE LANDING GEAR SHOCK STRUT / SLIDING TUBE INTERFACE. Regarding the implementation plan of the new seal, the SNLs mentioned above state that the number of ship sets reserved for each operator to do a retrofit campaign can be obtained through the respective EMBRAER Customer Account Manager.

Issue No. 03

Firewall Hydraulic Shutoff Valve Inspection Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 The inspection of the firewall hydraulic shutoff valve, published in E-Jets NEWS No. 2 of January 2007, has been updated in accordance with ANAC AD 2007-02-01 (EMBRAER 170) and ANAC AD 200702-02 (EMBRAR 190). The FAA has not yet proposed any plans regarding this subject. The compliance established was not exactly the same ANAC had previously in mind. Instead of 200 FH as the first inspection after the effective date of the AD, the document was issued considering the first inspection at 600 FH. Find below ANAC AD as it was published for the EMBRAER 170. For the EMBRAER 190, the SB number is 19029-0008. The P/N is the same for both: APPLICABILITY: This Airworthiness Directive is applicable to all Embraer ERJ-170( ) aircraft models in operation, equipped with firewall hydraulic shutoff valves part number (P/N) 975287-3. CANCELLATION applicable. / REVISION: Not

CF34-10E Thrust Reverser (T/R) No Stow Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 The two previous editions of the E-JETS NEWS reported some T/R no stow events that the EMBRAER 190 fleet had experienced. After one of these events, the T/R was removed from the engine and was sent to Middle River Aircraft Systems (MRAS), where some tests were performed to investigate events root cause. The root cause has been identified as the combination of the increased coefficient of friction of resin and the force required for moving the slider at low temperatures, which exceeds the actuators capability. As a result, EMBRAER and GE/Goodrich suggest the following: 1. Apply the recommendations in the GE CF34-10E SB 78-0005 (NACELLE (78-30-01) Fan Reverser Track Liner Lubrication) and Follow, when necessary, EMBRAER 190 FIM Temporary Revision 73-21-00-810-992-A (Failure of DCU in deployed state)

REASON: Periodic operational check of the firewall hydraulic shutoff valves, made during routine maintenance, has revealed that the failure rate of that component is significantly higher than expected. Such a dormant failure, when combined with further possible failures, such as engine fire, may lead to an unacceptable reduction of safety margins. Since this condition affects flight safety, a corrective action is required. Thus, sufficient reason exists to request compliance with this AD in the indicated time limit. REQUIRED ACTION: Additional operational check of the firewall hydraulic shutoff valves. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated below, unless already accomplished. Within the next 600 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals that do not exceed 600 flight
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2.

February 2007
hours, perform an operational check in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin No. 170-29-0013 for proper operation of the firewall hydraulic shutoff valves P/N 975287-3. If necessary, replace the faulty hydraulic shutoff valve with another one bearing the same P/N. NOTE 1: For the purpose of this AD, an operational check is: A task to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task. NOTE 2: The above procedures are considered an interim solution until a final action is identified, at which time the ANAC may consider the issuance of a further rulemaking. The detailed instructions and procedures to accomplish this AD are described in the Embraer Service Bulletin No. 170-290013 original issue, or further revisions approved by the ANAC. Record compliance with this AD in the applicable maintenance log book. a RAT FAIL message.

Issue No. 03

AMM TASK 31-41-00-910-801-A (MAU Maintenance Safety Procedures), FIM TASK24-51-00-810-816-A (Disagreement between TRUEC Enable Relay (EICCK6) Status and Command) and FIM TASK 24-23-00-810-806-A (Failure of the RAT System) were revised to include this information which will be available in the next scheduled revision of these publications.

CF34-10E Cycle

Air

Starter

Duty

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 Long engine start cycles, which are being observed mainly in high altitude airports, are resulting in unnecessary commanded aborted starts, due to misinterpretation of the AOM Starter Limits. The Air Starter Limit of 90 seconds mentioned on page 2 of Section 2-40 was being interpreted as an Engine Start Duty Cycle limit, leading some crew members to abort possible successful start attempts when the N2 speed did not reach IDLE during the 90 seconds cycle. Due to the high altitude effects, the CF34-10E engine start attempt may be longer and the 90 seconds limit .This must be considered as the maximum time that the engine may take to accelerate from 0 to 50.5% of N2.

RAT FAIL message caused by a MAU2 circuit breaker reset

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 (EMBRAER 170 with 'MAU2 PWR2 PRI' circuit breaker on DC ESS BUS 2 and all EMBRAER 190). A feed modification was implemented on the Relay K0063 due to Rotor Burst requirements, and as a consequence, a RAT FAIL message appears every time the MAU2 PWR2 PRI circuit breaker is open. The TRUEC ENABLE RELAY is usually commanded by the MAU2 through the Generic I/O module, whenever the airspeed is above 160 knots. If the MAU2 PWR2 PRI circuit breaker is open, the K0063 relay de-energizes and a ground signal is sent to energize the TRUEC ENABLE RLY. If the airspeed is still below 160 knots, the MAU2 finds a discrepancy between the relay command and the aircraft status, which induces the SPDA to trigger

Water freezing under cargo compartment

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 EMBRAER has received a report of an EJet 190 with binding ailerons during FCS check. Further inspections showed water freezing accumulated under the forward cargo compartment in the middle along aileron cable routing. During a visual inspection in the forward water pressure lines, a clamp (Ref. AIPC 38-11-03, Item 110) out of its proper position was found. Other water and
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February 2007
drain lines were inspected and no further evidence of water leak was detected. The water accumulation and consequent freezing was in view of the blankets being installed with tapes all around them with no gaps to allow the drainage to fuselage drains. Therefore, on February 16th, 2007 EMBRAER released the SBs 170-500007 and 190-50-0007 for reworking of the insulation blankets. Another cause of water leakage identified by the investigation based on reports from the operators and their findings is the cracking of the T-fitting (AIPC 38-1103, Item 90). Cracking may occurs because of frozen water inside the line during long flights (more than 3 hours). In order to avoid such possibility, EMBRAER is preparing an SB to replace the hoses of that region with heated hoses. The SB is expected to be released by the end of March, 2007. The water leakage through either a cracked T-fitting or a loose clamp was caused by the freezing of the water in the line. In addition to that, EMBRAER issued SNL170-30-0002 and SNL190-30-0002 to inform about the potable water system draining.

Issue No. 03

Det. A - Suspected Clamp/T-fitting

Correct blanket and adhesive tape installation

Suspected Clamp

Fuel Leakage in Flight

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190

Det. A

Recently (February 07), EMBRAER received the first confirmed report on an EMBRAER 190 aircraft. This report told the fuel leaked through the left NACA inlet installed underneath the wing, having the aircraft taken off with full tanks. The leakage happened while the aircraft was climbing from 22 KFt to 32 KFt with a speed above 300 KIAS, after proceeding directly from airfield elevation to the cruise altitude. The leakage stopped without any pilot action after a certain amount of fuel had been lost. Analysis and tests pointed that at high speeds, the NACA inlet air flow pattern
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February 2007
may alter its performance in keeping a positive pressure. The pressure inside the surge tank is suddenly reduced, which forces a high air flow from wing tank to the surge tank through the float vent valve that jams it closed. Once the line between the wing tank and the surge tank is closed, the pressure inside the wing tank remains constant. As the airplane climbs, the outside pressure decreases generating a difference of pressure between the wing tank and the atmosphere. In this condition, if the fuel level inside the wing tank is above the main vent line end, located at the wing root, fuel is boosted out of the wing tank to the surge tank and leaks to the atmosphere through NACA inlet. The leak stops automatically after the main vent line becomes uncovered. For the EMBRAER 190 and EMBRAER 195 fleet it is recommended the operational procedures (OB 170-001/07) to keep IAS 290 KIAS during climb when fuel quantity in any tank is above 11000 lb. EMBRAER expects to provide a schedule of engineering development and production & field implementation by March 07.

Issue No. 03

Skew Sensor Chafing

Slat

Harness

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 Technicians have observed evidences of chafing between the Skew Sensor Slat Harness and the bolts of the Skew Sensor 3/4. This chafing has happened because of an incorrect position of the slat harness. It is important to note that this event can occur just on the slat harness of the skew sensors on the position 3/4 between slat panels 3 and 4 of the LH/RH Wings. See the figures. A SNL will be issued to inform operators about this scenario. EMBRAER also emphasizes that AMM TASK 27-83-07/4 covers the correct installation of the Skew Sensor Slat Harness.

Affected Skew Sensor Slat Harness Location

AMM TASK 27-83-07/4 - SLAT HARNESS REMOVAL/INSTALLATION Page 6

February 2007

Issue No. 03
computer processors has created a compatibility issue with RT software versions 17.1 (which is used with Load 17.5/4.5) and prior RT, when installed on a computer that has SMT or Hyperthreading enabled, will shut down during operation or navigation database software loading. For more information, see Honeywell TNL A23-9999-054.

Correct position of the Skew Sensor Slat Harness

Thrust Reverser CF34-8E Core Cowl UV Degradation: Data Collection Survey

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 EMBRAER has recently been informed about a wear over the bronze mesh of the composite material located on the structure of the engine core cowl. After analysis, it was discovered that this kind of wear is a consequence of Ultra Violet radiation. This radiation degrades the superficial epoxy resin that covers the mesh. Thus, the resin is eroded by the airflow and the mesh becomes exposed. In order to collect data for this issue, Aircelle has issued a Technical Instruction (TI-00068) that gives inspection guidelines for collecting data on core cowls. This TI-00068 will be used by Aircelle and GE Technical Representatives on field to collect data. This data collection campaign will finish by mid March 2007. Although it is an initiative by Aircelle and GE, a possible assistance or support provided by EMBRAER Tech Reps will be very important to ensure a better perception of the fleet condition and, consequently, achieve an effective field action plan. The final solution is under development by Aircelle. It will consist in adding a protective paint layer on the exposed area of the core cowl. The final test results are expected by March 2007 and a field plan, which will be supported by the survey information, is expected to be issued by April 2007.

Incorrect position of the Skew Sensor Slat Harness

Skew Sensor Slat Harness damaged due to incorrect installation

Compatibility issue with Remote Terminal software

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Honeywell has released TNL A23-9999054 to inform customers about a change to the equipment requirements to use the Remote Terminal (RT) software. Computer manufacturers have designed processors that utilize Simultaneous Multi-threading (SMT) which is also referred to as Hyper-threading when used on Intel processors. SMT allows computer applications to simultaneously utilize the processor for faster performance. The utilization of SMT or Hyper-threading in current and future

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February 2007

Issue No. 03

Temporary Revision (TR) of FIM Task released for AVNX ASCB FAULT
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 FIM TASK 31-42-00-810-807-A - Failure of the ASCB Buses - was revised to include 3 different scenarios according to the ASCB status summary page indication. FIM TASK 31-42-00-810-814-A covers the T/S on the PRI #1 and/or BUP #1 buses. The associated modules as a probable cause and a reset procedure to determine the faulted module were included.
Inspection points in the RH Core Cowl

FIM TASK 31-42-00-810-815-A covers the T/S on the PRI #2 and/or BUP #2 buses. The associated modules as a probable cause and a reset procedure to determine the faulted module were included. FIM TASK 31-42-00-810-816-A covers an issue with current load version 17.5/4.5. This issue could create the condition where the ASCB status summary page shows all boxes in green. The associated T/S procedures were included.

Inspection points in the LH Core Cowl

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February 2007

Issue No. 03

Acronyms
AD = Airworthiness Directive AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog AOM = Airplane Operations Manual AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual ANAC = Agncia Nacional de Aviao Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority) BUP = Back-up DCU = Direction Control Unit FH = Flight Hours FIM = Fault Isolation Manual FOL = Flight Operations Letter FWSOV = Firewall Shutoff Valve GSE = Ground Support Equipment ITEM = Illustrated Tool and Equipment Manual MAU = Modular Avionics Unit NLG = Nose Landing Gear OB = Operational Bulletins PIL = Parts Information Letters PN = Part Number RAT = Ram Air Turbine SB = Service Bulletin SN = Serial Number SNL = Service Newsletter T/R = Thrust Reverser Note: All abbreviations used in EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

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