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People vs. Maceren G.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977 Aquino J.

Facts: On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aqu ino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the m unicipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrativ e Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the m orning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric c urrent which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to th e detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the compl aint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fi sheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and t he Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating th e Fisheries Commission is valid. Held: No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resour ces and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisher ies Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warrant ed under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing . As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penaliz e it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing elec tro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administra tive regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole pu rpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of co urse, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory require ments or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez G.R. No. 139813 January 31, 2001 GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Facts: The petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Muni cipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the o ther hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, P alawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsa ysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executi ve Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provi ncial Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candid ate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest w ith the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on Au gust 25, 1997. Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petit ion for Review of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palaw an and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dis miss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed tha t the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Bar angay election of officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed

that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election iss ued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, provid ing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of l aw is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in excess of ju risdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exerc ise of control over the Liga's internal organization. On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onon's motion to dismiss. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence th is petition. Issue: Whether or not QUESTIONED PROVISION IN MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 97-193 WAS ISSUED BY THE DILG SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY. Held: The court held that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it aut horizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the reg ular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitution ality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in autho rizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINE S promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Boa rd. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of sup ervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does no t have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, r egulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To m onitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of su pervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to chec king whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. **take note of the meaning of power of supervision and power of control.. The President's power of general supervision over local government units is con ferred upon him by the Constitution.14 The power of supervision is defined as "t he power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their fu nctions in accordance with law."15 This is distinguished from the power of contr ol or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinat e officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgme nt of the former for the latter." GMA Network Inc. vs. Movie and Television Review and classification board G.R. No. 148579 February 5, 2007 CORONA, J.: Facts: Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EM C Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a p ermit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.3 The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 19984 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a va lid permit from the MTRCB. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same ti me, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by goi ng off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protes t which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the mot ion for reconsideration and letter-protest. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed

in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto. Hence, this recourse. Issue: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on peti tioner Held: The court held that while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memor andum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not bindi ng on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereo f, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Admini strative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three c ertified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.9 Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, s econd and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit , has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000.10 Hence, the sam e is yet to be effective.11 It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and shou ld not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder. Pesigan vs. Angeles G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984 AQUINO, J. Facts: Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Is uzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination . They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinaria n of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidentia l Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transpor t large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) t hree certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting tha t the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable an imals; one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot. In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos , while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulf o V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miran da, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Ex ecutive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeitu re by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersa l as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" Issue: Whether or not Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, pr oviding for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transp orted from one province to another is enforceable before publication in the Offi cial Gazette of June 14, 1982 Held: The court held that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation pu blished more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circular

s and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties bindi ng on the persons affected thereby. In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agr iculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order. It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. Th e summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should r eturn them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batan gas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they rec over damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the fo rfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.

Araneta vs. Gatmaitan GR Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957 Felix, J. The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, betwee n the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to pet ition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the P resident issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Boa rd of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typho on season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction pr aying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fi sheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid. ISSUES: 1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80 2. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President HELD: 1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of th e Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of A griculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can e xercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decr ees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are v alid and issued by authority of law. 2. YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, C ongress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deple te our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agricultur e and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he de emed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines

Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issue s of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law . Metropolitan Traffic Command West Traffic District vs. Gonong GR No. 91023, July 13, 1990 Cruz, J. Atty. Dante David claims that the rear license plate of his car was removed by p etitioner while his vehicle was parked in Escolta. He filed a complaint in the R TC of Manila. He questioned the petitioner s act on the ground that not only was t he car not illegally parked but that there was no law or ordinance authorizing s uch removal. The lower court ruled that LOI 43, which the defendant (petitioner) invoked, did not empower it to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates or motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of t raffic on streets and highways. Moreover, the said LOI had been PD 1605. ISSUE: W/N petitioner is authorized to penalize traffic violations as such HELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruc tion, which is an altogether different offense. LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that stall on streets and highways and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. In the case at ba r, it is not alleged or shown that private respondents vehicle stalled on a publi c thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. The charge against him is tha t he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The act, if true is a vi olation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD 1605, wh ich does not include removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicl e among the imposable penalties. Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board GR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990 Sarmiento, J. The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the se parate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for the Bo ard to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. Petitioners s ubmit that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to la ck of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing. ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion HELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce o r increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing . Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority t o increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcom e of the proceeding. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation GR No. L-59234, September 30, 1982 Melencio-Herrera, J. Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed t he petition seeking to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of t he Bureau of Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum order provides for the

phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis o f Model 1971 and earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land Tr ansportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capit al Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out o f vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of poli ce power HELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportatio n the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, p ractices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and follo wed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the BOT circ ular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding publi c from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercis e of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health ,safety and general welfare of the people. Balbuna,et. al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Education, et. al. GR No. L-14280, November 29, 1960 Reyes, J.B.L., J. The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s. 1 955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations fo r the conduct of compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republi c Act No. 1265. Petitioners, who are members of the Jehova s Witnesses, contend th at the said Department Order denied them freedom of worship and of speech, among others. They also contend that the Order is not valid for it was not published in the Official Gazette as required by law. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Department Order is invalid 2. W/N RA 1265 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power HELD: 1. NO. The contention that assailed Department Order has no binding effect, not having been published in the Official Gazette is without merit. The assaile d order being addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools and educational institutions under their supervision, cannot be said to be of genera l application, requiring previous publication in the Official Gazette before it could have binding force and effect. 2. No. The requirements of the law constitute an adequate standard. SAADO vs. CA The Philippine Fisheries Commission issued petitioner a fishpond permit. Thereaf ter, petitioner and private respondent Nepomuceno executed a contract which stip ulated that Nepomuceno would undertake to develop an area or 30 hectares out of the 50 hectares covered by the permit issued to petitioner. In 1979, the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to the Mi nistry of Natural Resources to convert the fishpond permit issued to petitioner into a 25-year agreement which covered a reduced area. The lease agreement was then issued to petitioner. In 1980, private respondent waived his rights, interests and participation over the fishpond area in favor of Edgar Chu. Private respondent then informed BFAR o f his development contract with petitioner and that the fishpond was almost full y developed at his expense. In 1981, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent and Chu with th e RTC for recovery of possession and damages. During the pendency of the case, t

he Minister of Agriculture and Food cancelled petitioner s fishpond lease agreemen t. The matter was elevated to the Office of the President but was dismissed. Meanwhile, the court rendered a decision in the civil case ordering the defendan ts to restore possession and control of the fishpond area, among others. ISSUE: W/N the decision of the Office of the President in cancelling petitioner s lease agreement should be given weight HELD: YES. The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public co nvenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. A decision of the O ffice of the President is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi -judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land, and it thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive depart ment which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice.

RCPI vs. Board of Communications In GR No. L-43653, Diego Morales daughter sent him a telegram while he was in Man ila, informing him that his wife has died. The telegram was sent through petitio ner RCPI. The telegram, however, never reached Morales. Because of the failure o f the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered incon venience and additional expenses and prays for damages. Meanwhile, in GR No. L-45378, complainant Pacifico Inncocencio claims that his s ister, Lourdes, sent him a telegram on July 13 through petitioner for the purpos e of informing him of the death of their father. However, the telegram was never received by Pacifico but the sneder, Lourdes, was never notified of such failur e. Because of this failure, Pacifico claims to have suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences and thus prays for damages. After hearing, respondent board in both cases imposed upon petitioner in each ca se a disciplinary fine. ISSUE: W/N the Board of Communications has jurisdiction to take cognizance of co mplaints for injury caused by breach of obligation arising from negligence HELD: NO. As provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, the BOC has the power to issue certificates of public convenience. But this power to issue certificates of pub lic convenience does not carry with it the power or supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of the certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. T he Board of Communications has power to impose fine only where public service vi olates or fails to comply with terms and conditions of the certificate of public convenience or the orders, decisions or regulations of the board. Moreover, the proper forum for complaints of injury caused by breach of obligation should be in the courts.

Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was tra nsmitted to Manila. The message, however, was not delivered to the addressee. A fter being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service

Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability but questioned PSC s jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing, the PSC foun d petitioner responsible for the unsatisfactory service complained of and ordere d it to pay a fine. ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon petitioner HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other prop erties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under which pet itioner was operating, limited respondent Commission s jurisdiction over petitione r only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence impute d to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of v ery limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

BOISER vs. CA Petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbiliran City and other mu nicipalities in the province of Bohol under the name of Premiere Automatic Telep hone Network. Petitioner and private respondent PLDT entered into a contract whe reby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facil ities. Without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a circuit auth orization order to its co-respondents to terminate the connection of PLDT s relay s tation with the facilities of the petitioner s telephone system. Petitioner then instituted with the CFI a petition for injunction and damages. T he court issued a temporary restraining order. Five months after the issuance of the TRO, the private respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the restrai ning order. Three years after the filing of their motion to dissolve the TRO, th e private respondents elevated the case to the CA on the ground that the CFI jud ge had no authority to issue the restraining order. ISSUE: W/N the CFI has jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising fro m the operation of telephone systems or the interconnection of communications fa cilities HELD: NO. PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by PD No. 1 to t he Board of Communications, now NTC. There is nothing in the Commission s powers w hich authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award mo ral and exemplary damages.

Philippine Lawyer s Association vs. Agrava Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to pra ctice as patent attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office, the said examinat ion to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to said circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified. Petitioners contend that one who has passed the bar exams and licensed by the Su preme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice bef ore the said office.

On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training. ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included in the practice of law HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office , the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prose cution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforc ement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before the Patent Office inv olves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles. Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-ju dicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the said office, without further examination or other qualification.

CARMELO vs. RAMOS The Mayor of Manila created a committee to investigate the anomalies involving t he license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of the said office. He named Jesus Carmelo as chairman. The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos requiring him to appear before i t in connection with an administrative case but Ramos refused to appear. Claimin g that Ramos refusal tended to impede or obstruct the administrative proceedings, petitioner filed with the CFI a petition to declare Ramos in contempt. The tria l court dismissed the petition. It held that there is no law empowering committe es created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand witnesses testify u nder oath and that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right agai nst self-incrimination. ISSUE: W/N the said committee is empowered to subpoena witnesses and ask for the ir punishment in case of refusal HELD: NO. The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed aga inst administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said c ontempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.

GUEVARA vs. COMELEC Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punishe d for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending. The article pertained to the contracts entered in to by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground, among others, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as cont empt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which to elev ate the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceed ings HELD: NO. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relat ion to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on t his matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judic ial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nat ure.

PEFIANCO vs. MORAL Former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria filed a complaint which charged respondent Maria Luisa Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vault of the Filipiniana and Asian Division of the National Library which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief. The DECS Secretary found responde nt guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best in terest of the service. She was ordered dismissed from the government service. Respondent did not appeal the judgment but she filed a petition for production o f the DECS investigation committee report, which was, however, denied. She reite rated her request but likewise denied. She then filed an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Sec. Gloria praying that she be fu rnished a copy of the DECS investigation committee. Secretary Gloria moved to di smiss the mandamus case for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the CA imputing grave abuse of discret ion, which was dismissed as well for lack of merit. Motion for reconsideration w as likewise denied. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari HELD: YES. The challenged order of the trial court falls short of the requiremen ts prescribed in Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. The Order merely discus sed the general concept of mandamus and the trial court s jurisdiction over the ru lings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis by petiti oner s motion to dismiss was being denied. NOTE: There is no law which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respon dent with a copy of the investigation report. A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any i nvestigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him.

Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank Petitioner Bienvenido Batongbacal started his banking career as a manager of the Second Rizal Development Bank. He then transferred to Citizens Bank and Trust C ompany and was appointed as assistant vice-president and concurrently, as acting manager of the personnel department. Subsequently, Citizens Bank merged with As sociation Banking Corporation and later became known as Associated Bank. In the new bank, petitioner resumed his position as assistant vice president. Years later, he found out that his salary was very much below the standard remun eration of the bank s other assistant vice presidents. He asked for the board to g

ive him the accrued salary withheld from him but to no avail. Thereafter, as pa rt of its streamlining measures, the management required all bank officers to su bmit their courtesy resignations. Petitioner did not submit his courtesy resigna tion. As a result, he received a letter from the Bank informing him that his res ignation was accepted. Petitioner made repeated demands for the reconsideration of the bank s decision to terminated his employment. He then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages in the arbitration branch of the National Labor R elations Commission. The NLRC ordered petitioner s reinstatement with full backwag es. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the bank appealed to the NLRC which ruled in favor of the legality of petitioner s dismissal. ISSUE: W/N respondent bank legally dismissed petitioner for refusing to tender h is courtesy resignation HELD: NO. Petitioner s dismissal was effected through a letter accepting his resigna tion, even if petitioner did not actually submit such letter. It is clear from private respondent s pleadings that it terminated petitioner for insubordination i n view of his failure to comply with the order to submit his letter of courtesy resignation. However, the Court held that insubordination may not be imputed to one who refused to allow an unlawful order. Moreover, the Court held that the re cord fails to show any valid reasons for terminating the employment of petitione r. NOTE: The SC remanded the case to the NLRC for determination of factual issues. It noted the impracticality of the position paper method of disposing labor cases . As exemplified by this case, there are instanced wherein claims of parties are not properly ventilated because they agree to dispense with the hearing not kno wing that more often than not both of them suffer adverse consequences.

Civil Aeronautics Board vs. PAL PAL is granted a legislative franchise to provide domestic and international fli ghts. In 1970, it required Flight 213 (Tug-Mla) to pass Baguio to pick up 20 pas sengers. No airline was affected by the flagstop. Thereafter, the CAB Chairman filed a complaint against PAL contending that the l atter should have first obtained permission from CAB. The Board then resolved to impose a fine against PAL. PAL filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the power and authority to impose fines is a judicial function and does not bel ong to the CAB. Subsequently, the Board resolved to reduce the fine imposed upon PAL. ISSUE: W/N CAB possesses the necessary legal authority to impose a fine HELD: YES. RA 776 provides that the CAB has the power to review, revise, reverse , modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order of the Civil A eronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of the said Act or rules and regulations issued thereunder. In the case at bar, the fine imposed on PAL is that fine or civil penalty contemplated in the relevant provision of RA 776 a nd not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in the RPC. It i s an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impos e without criminal prosecution.

Bautista vs. Board of Energy

MERALCO filed with the BOE an application for an upward revision of its rates. I n the same petition, MERALCO prayed for an ex parte provisional approval of the proposed rates. Subsequently, petitioners filed an opposition to the application and prayed that no provisional approval be granted by the BOE. They claim that the increases in rates is exorbitant and unreasonable. In an order, the BOE provisionally approved MERALCO s revised rate schedules witho ut hearing. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration stating that they were no af forded the opportunity to be heard. Without setting for hearing, the BOE denied the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: W/N the BOE committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the provisio nal increase of MERALCO rates HELD: No. When BOE provisionally authorized private respondent s application witho ut hearing, it merely exercised a prerogative granted to it by law. Under simila r circumstances, the Court has upheld the authority of regulatory boards like th e Energy Regulatory Board , to grant provisional relief upon the filing of an ap plication, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter, and without need of prior hearing, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafte r for the determination of its final decision. The order granting such provision al relief, however, must be based upon substantial evidence supporting papers du ly verified or authenticated, and is without prejudice to rendition of a final d ecision after hearing. DELFIN vs. INCIONG The 136 petitioners herein are former employees of private respondent Atlantic C ontainer Corporation, organized themselves into Atlantic Container Employees Org anization (ACCO) and affiliated with the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions ( FEDLU). Claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent Roberto Jacin to, refused to implement the Collective Bargaining Agreement, petitioners and FE DLU held a strike. Thereafter, ACCO and FEDLU filed a case in the Court of Indus trial Relations. The CIR found Atlantic Container Corporation and Jacinto guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to cease and desist from further com mitting the same and to reinstate complainants striking members. They filed mot ions to reconsider the said decision, presumably for the reinstatement of all th e petitioners, but the CIR denied the motions. The petitioners again filed a charge with the CIR alleging that the named respon dents established a corporation which was an alter ego of Atlantic and which was allegedly organized to engage in the identical business as Atlantic Container, absorbing all the assets including the facilities and machineries. When the CIR was abolished, the case was transferred to NLRC which ordered the r einstatement of complainants. Only 86 out of the 136 petitioners were ordered re instated. The appeal was dismissed, based on the ground of res judicata. Petitio ners appealed to the Minister of Labor through respondent Deputy Minister Incion g who affirmed the NLRC decision. ISSUE: W/N the cause of action was barred by the principle res judicata HELD: YES. While it is true that the complainant in the first charge was the uni on, in reality it had no material interest in the outcome of the case. The real party who stands to be benefited or defeated by the case brought in the name of the union are the union members themselves. Since the judgment therein had becom e final and executor, the subsequent filing of another charge against Atlantic f

or the same violations committed during its existence, is barred by res judicata . The bringing of the same action in the name of the individual members of the u nion will not take out the case from the ambit of the principle of res judicata.

Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. vs. NLRC Private respondent Juanito Collado was employed by petitioner as security guard. In the course of his employment, 4 crates of lawanit boards were stolen. He was implicated in the theft and thereafter placed under preventive suspension. NALC O then filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor for clearance to dismiss Collado. The application was approved was approved by O fficer-in-Charge Rey Seneres. The said officer certified the case to the labor a rbiter who, after a perusal of records (position papers submitted by the parties ), returned the case to the Regional Director, who recommended that the case be elevated to the Secretary of Labor. The acting Secretary of Labor affirmed the d ecision of Seneres granting petitioner s application for clearance to dismiss Coll ado. Collado then filed a complaint before the District Labor Office for unjust dismi ssal and reinstatement with backwages and benefits.NALCO filed a motion to dismi ss upon the ground that the order of the Acting Secretary had become final and e xecutory, making the issue of illegal dismissal res judicata. The Labor Arbiter ordered NALCO to reinstate Collado without backwages. Both Parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter s decision adding backwages. ISSUE: W/N the principle of res judicata applies HELD: NO. The principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations pr oceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulat ions Implementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are non-litigiou s and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in cour ts of law. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judici al proceedings and not to exercise of administrative powers.

G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931 MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG Ostrand, J Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50) FACTS: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Mani la for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, St anton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner an d for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Ac t No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign co untries into the Philippine Islands. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state fact s sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reas ons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, t he petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from givi

ng the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, ther efore, valid. The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of th e failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismis sal, the petitioner appealed to this court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent as cause of action HELD: Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting t he public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are object s within the scope of the police power. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutiona l grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the b est that might have been adopted. Garments and Textile Export Board vs. CA Glorious Sun was a recipient of a substantial number of EQ allocations from the GTEB. Glorious Sun was charged before the GTEB and was found guilty of, misdecla ration of values of its imported raw materials resulting in dollar salting, and other related frauds, in connection with its importations in 1983. Its export qu otas were thereafter given to two newly-formed corporations the De Soleil Appare l Manufacturing Corporation (De Soleil) and the herein petitioner American Inter -Fashion Corporation (AIFC). The cancelled EQs of Glorious Sun which were given to AIFC are the subject of dispute between GTEB and petitioner. Glorious Sun con tinues to claim its right over the aforementioned EQ. AIFC was able to maintain its EQ from 1984 up to the time of the filing of this petition. With the establishment of a new government in 1986, Glorious Sun filed an appeal with the Office of the President, which, in turn, set aside the GTEB decision a dverse to Glorious Sun and remanded the case for genuine hearings where due proc ess would be accorded both parties. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Cour t. After further proceedings were conducted concerning Glorious Sun's alleged viola tions and frauds, the GTEB adopted a resolution providing that the disqualificat ion of Glorious Sun and its principal stockholders and officers from engaging in the garments export business is lifted. AIFC, on the other hand, prior to the Supreme Court denial of its petition for r eview of the cancellation of its registration, requested the GTEB to release its EQ allocation for 1993. This request was, however, refused by the GTEB. The RTC denied AIFC s petition for injunction. AIFC's subsequent motion for reconsiderati on was likewise denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: Whether or not GTEB have the power and authority to grant or cancel expo rt quotas or authorizations HELD: YES. The Court held that that the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of AIFC's entitlement to the export allocations subject of the abov e-entitled petitions (be they export quotas or export authorizations), which inc ludes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export allocations, belongs so

lely to the GTEB, and not to the regular courts. On the basis of EO 537 and EO 9 52, which amended the former, the power to adjudicate on the question of an enti ty's entitlement to export allocations was expressly granted to the GTEB, or at the very least, was necessarily implied from the power to cancel or suspend quot a allocations, is beyond cavil.

GSIS vs. CSC According to Asuncion Salazar s service record filed with the CSCS, she was employ ed by the GSIS as a casual laborer. She became permanent with a designation of s tenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Ai de. Salazar's GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was appointed to the po sition of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. She was then promo ted to Technical Assistant III, the position she held when her services were ter minated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was co-terminous with the term of the appointing autho rity. Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, bu t reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsiderati on of the denial with the Review Committee, which referred the same to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the CSC. In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with ba ck salaries. The Board however affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the Commission alre ady resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988. the Board set asid e its previous Order affirming Salazar's dismissal in view of the Commission's p rior resolution of the case. The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the board and stated that the CSC is a higher administrative appellat e body on matters concerning the removal of officers and employees from the serv ice. Hence, the Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the determinations an d actions of the Civil Service Commission. The GSIS appealed but the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case HELD: No. Presidential Decree No. 1409, creating the Merit Systems Board provide s that the Merit Systems Board has the function to Hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reass ignment and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses arising from personnel actions of the thes e officers or from violations of the merit system. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the sam e jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Bo ard shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appo inting officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which dir ectly gives it such power, to wit: SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administ

er the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and function s: j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal; In the case at bar, the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee t o both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision in favor of Salazar and all s ubsequent resolutions of the Commission in this case are void. Likewise, the Ord er of the Board setting aside its previous order upholding the termination of Sa lazar in deference to the Commission's final appellate jurisdiction over the mat ter, is null and void. Jurisdiction is vested by law and is not lost nor be lega lly transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such jurisdiction. G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINI STRATION, respondents. GRIO-AQUINO, J.: FACTS: as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino house maids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Or der No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private em ployment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE it self, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. Pursuant to the DOLE circular, POEA issued a Memorandum providing guide lines in the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers t o Hong Kong and accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hir e Filipino domestic helpers. POEA administrator also issued a Memorandum circula r on processing employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. Petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforemention ed DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the followin g reasons: 1. That the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in exce ss of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; 2. That the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constituti on, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and 3. That the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the N ational Administrative Register were not complied with. ISSUE: Whether or not petitions are with merit HELD: There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict an d regulate recruitment and placement activities. Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restri ct and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.) The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bod

ies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recru itment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as d elegated to the executive branch of Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Regist er as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and S ections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SP ORTS Gancayco, J. Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit cor porate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines Respondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet memb er who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of th e President of the Philippines. FACTS: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the follow ing courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in sc hool fees for the SY 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report and issued an Or der authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Tas k Force. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the increases. Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court an d filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Pe tition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in vi olation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitione r was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issu ed. In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is a uthorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees. Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parent s are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing be fore school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questio ned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees HELD: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the powe r to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the

authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and d uties under the law. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a le gislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the gr ant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exer cise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to t he validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administr ative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout th e country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of f act, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum s chool fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schooly ear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to t he validity of its issuance.

Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of Transportation GR No. L-39655, March 21, 1975 Fernando, J. FACTS: Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporatio ns. The former has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility auto-truck service from Cebu city to Mactan Interantional Airpor t and vice versa. Private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of private respondent filed a petition with th e respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to op erate a similar service on the same line. Without the required publication, the Board issued on order granting it provisional permit to operte on the line appli ed for. A motion for reconsideration was filed and for the cancellation of such provisional permit but without awaiting final action, this petition was filed on the ground that the issuance of provisional permit was patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy is ripe for judicial determination HELD: YES. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed, there was p ending with respondent Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resol ution should be awaited. The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the con troversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue raised b ut also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled. Tiangco vs. Lauchang GR No. L-17598, September 30, 1963 Padilla, J. FACTS: These are petitions for a writ of certiorari to review an amended judgment rende red by the Court Appeals holding Faustina Lauchang is entitled to acquire by pur chase whole of Lot No. 10, Block 2, of the Tambobong Estate. It appears that Lot No. 10, Block No. 2 of the Tambobong Estate in the municipal ity of Malabon, Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, was formerly leased by th e Archbishop of Manila to one Matea Suarez. Matea Suarez sold her leasehold inte rest in the land to Anacleto Lauchang, father of the plaintiff-appellee and appe llant Faustina Lauchang. When Anacleto died in 1923, his daughter, the plaintiff , took over and since then has been occupying said property paying rents therefo

r to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila up to August 31, 1927 when further payments of rents was suspended because the Archbishop of Manila sold the Tambob ong Estate to the Government of the Commonwealth of Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Rizal should have dismissed the case for lack o f cause of action, in view of respondent s failure to exhaust all administrative r emedies HELD: NO. The contention of the petitioners that the action brought in the Cour t of First Instance of Rizal should have been dismissed for lack of cause of act ion, in view of respondent's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is u ntenable. It is well to recall that the lot, subject of the litigation, is not a part of the public domain, but of private ownership acquired by the Government for resale to private persons, and for that reason any aggrieved party may bring an action in court without the need of exhausting all administrative remedies.

Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. GR No. L-17860, March 30, 1962 De Leon, J. FACTS: Petitioner was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank. He was charged in an administrative case resulting in his suspensi on by the Monetary Board and the creation of a three-man committee to investigat e him. After conducting hearings, the committee recommended petitioner s reinstate ment. The Monetary Board, however, adopted a resolution stating that petitioner is deemed resigned as of the date of his suspension. Subsequently, respondent Ma riano Marcos was appointed to replace petitioner. Petitioner then filed a petiti on for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto. After several hearings, the court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all adminis trative remedies. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should have exhausted all administrative remedi es HELD: NO. The doctrine of administrative remedies does not apply where, by the t erms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such r emedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislative intende d to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not bee n exhausted. Tan vs. Director of Forestry GR No. L-24548, October 27, 1983 Makasiar, J. FACTS: The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for a certain tract of forest land in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land consists of 6 ,240 hectares and located within the former US Naval Reservation comprising 7,25 2 hectares of timberland. Petitioner submitted his application in due form along with nine other applicants. Thereafter, President Carlos P. Garcia issued a dir ective to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to draft a proclamation establi shing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and that the bids received for the issuance of timber license be rejected. The Secretary of Agri culture and National Resources sustained the recommendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest if th e area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions. Finally, the area was awarded to petitioner. Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry . Ravago appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which l ater on, declared the license issued to petitioner by Director of Forestry as nu ll and void. Petitioner s motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies

HELD: YES. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner to ta ke that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. Fr om the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing to the Chie f Executive. Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again, i t being a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial red ress, a party must exhaust the administrative remedies available. KBMBPM vs. Dominguez GR No. 91927, January 13,1992 Davide, Jr., J. FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos, e ntered into a contract with petitioner for the latter s management and operation o f its New Muntinlupa public Market. The contract provides for a 25 year term ren ewable for a like period unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agr eement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio Bunye, Mayor Carlos successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the agreement, c ontrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, and the patently inequitable rental, directed the review of the contract. Conse quently, the Municipal Council approved a Resolution abrogating the contract. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, spec ific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The writ applied for was denied, the KBMBPM offic ers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. The ma tter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was remanded to the Court of Appea ls. Thereafter, Amado Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taki ng over the management of the public market. On October 1998, respondent Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye and the latters heavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of pet itioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking over and disbanding the incu mbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. Petitioners claim that the Order served on t hem was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere Xerox copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition praying that respondents refrain, cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and th at the order be declared null and void. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid 2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available HELD: 1. NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and o fficers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process i s respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even wi thout said provision , petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. The procedu re was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to rem ove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 w hich grants him the authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An adm inistrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and tho se necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be exten ded by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable ex ecution. 2. NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the Pres ident, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by h

im. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the cou rts when most needed. There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the do ctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is t he claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.