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Strategic Analysis
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Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?

Ashok K. Behuria , Smruti S. Pattanaik & Arvind Gupta Published online: 12 Mar 2012.

To cite this article: Ashok K. Behuria , Smruti S. Pattanaik & Arvind Gupta (2012): Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?, Strategic Analysis, 36:2, 229-246 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.646440

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Strategic Analysis Vol. 36, No. 2, March 2012, 229246

Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?

Ashok K. Behuria, Smruti S. Pattanaik and Arvind Gupta
Abstract: The article argues that India does not have a well-dened neighbourhood policy. It makes a historical survey of the approaches of different Indian leaders to the neighbourhood and examines the reasons for the prevailing negative perceptions about India in the region. It argues that these negative perceptions have come about because India has largely adopted an ad hoc and bilateral approach vis--vis its neighbours and has allowed its policy to be guided by an overarching concern for security. In recent years, Indias approach has changed considerably. However, it needs clearer articulation. The article suggests that India must effectively communicate its vision of regional integration to its neighbours, enable them to participate protably in its growing economy, spell out its non-negotiables in matters concerning its security and national interest, maintain linkages at the highest political level, open multiple tracks of communication and take a leadership position in multilateral forums like SAARC and BIMSTEC to bring peace and prosperity to the region through greater cooperation in diverse areas. This will prove effective in improving its relations with its neighbours.

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Our rst priority should be to devote ourselves to building a structure of cooperative and mutually benecial relations with our neighbours. This is the basic objective of our policies. . . . We have to remain alert about aberrations, strategic ambitions and geo-political motivations in their policies, which can militate against our security and our vital interests. (Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs address at the Combined Commanders Conference, October 26, 2004, New Delhi)

ndia is the pre-eminent country in South Asia in terms of size, population, economy and military power. Acclaimed as the largest democracy in the world, it accounts for three quarters of the population as well as the geographical area of South Asia, 80 per cent of the total GDP of the region, and spends ve times more than the rest of the countries put together on its defence. Since the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the Indian economy, India has come to be seen as a regional power on course to emerge as a global power in the next four decades. There is an increasing realisation in India that a peaceful neighbourhood is mandatory for the realisation of [Indias] own vision of economic growth.1 Keeping this in mind, India

Ashok K. Behuria and Smruti S. Pattanaik are Research Fellows at IDSA, New Delhi. Arvind Gupta holds the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA, New Delhi. The views expressed are those of the authors. The authors express their gratitude to I.P. Khosla, Sujit Dutta, Kanwal Sibal, Rajiv Sikri and the anonymous referees whose comments and suggestions have helped them immensely in modifying an earlier version of this article.
ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online 2012 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.646440 http://www.tandfonline.com

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Figure 1.

has invited countries in the region to acquire stakes in Indias economy and contribute to regional growth and prosperity.2 In this context, India should ideally have emerged as the natural leader in the region. This has not happened. The response from the neighbours to Indian invitation to participate in its economy has not been too encouraging. Many of these countries perceive India as interfering, non-accommodative, selsh and overbearing. There is a tendency to countervail India through overt or covert strategic relationships with extra-regional powers. Indias relationship with its neighbours is marked by recurring tensions. Does this mean India has not accorded sufcient attention to this neighbourhood? Or is this because of Indias inability to evolve a well-dened neighbourhood policy? Objectives and hypotheses There are concerns in India today, more than ever before, that Indias neighbourhood will become increasingly unstable and pose a critical challenge to its economic growth and security.3 This calls for serious analysis and introspection. The Indian prime minister has, indeed, on many occasions expressed his concerns about the developments in the neighbourhood.4 In his address at the Combined Commanders Conference in September 2010, he brought it out forcefully:
Some of our toughest challenges lie in our immediate neighbourhood. The fact is that we cannot realise our growth ambitions unless we ensure peace and stability in South Asia.5

His governments new years resolution for the year 2011 was to focus on the immediate neighbourhood.6 Against this backdrop, this article seeks to identify key elements of Indias overall policy towards its neighbours, examine whether they have

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been adequate and fruitful, and suggest policy measures to overcome the challenges in an integrated manner. The basic hypothesis here is that India has chosen the bilateral route to relate to its neighbours. However, there are certain common elements/strands which guide its approach towards each of them. This article attempts to examine the evolution of Indias neighbourhood policy since the time of the British, and compare and contrast the different phases to understand the fundamental drivers of Indias neighbourhood policy. Views on Indias neighbourhood policy The political leadership in India has dened Indias strategic neighbourhood as the area extending from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait. However, the ministry of external affairs (MEA) has traditionally deemed countries bordering India as neighbours in its annual reports. It is interesting to note that, initially, countries such as China, Iran and even Indonesia featured in the section on neighbourhood. By the mid-1960s, China was shifted to the East Asia section and Iran to West Asia. This article makes use of the MEAs denition of Indias neighbourhood. India has undoubtedly emphasised its relationship with its neighbours in its foreign policy pronouncements, which emerge in the shape of repeated statements on neighbourhood as the rst circle of Indias foreign policy, prioritisation of it in the annual reports of the MEA and the appointment of senior diplomats as ambassadors to neighbouring countries, etc. However, no conscious attempt has been made to conceptualise the problems confronting Indian diplomacy in the neighbourhood and evolve a comprehensive framework to deal with them. A glaring example of the lack of attention to the neighbourhood has been the absence of regular high-level bilateral visits to the neighbouring countries, which creates an impression of neglect. The result has been obviousIndia has focused more on managing [its] relationships with [its] neighbours rather than shaping it and giving direction to it with a long term objective and vision in mind.7 Moreover, this has given rise to negative perceptions about India as a selsh hegemon, seeking to maximise its power at the cost of others in the neighbourhood. A brief survey of the sparse literature available on the theme (mostly in the form of comments in the media) reveals the disturbing fact that Indian foreign policy is often taken to be a tool to project Indias dominant status at the regional level. Many of the writings on Indias approach towards the region are predicated on the presumption that India is a hegemon and whatever it does (including granting concessions to neighbours) is aimed at augmenting its power, capability and status in the region and the world, basically driven by its superpower ambitions.8 Indias neighbourhood policy has not received much attention outside the region. However, in the post-Cold War period there have been some assessments of Indias regional policy. Schaffer and Schaffer,9 for example, argue that in spite of Indias emphasis on economics in its foreign relations, its neighbours feel extremely vulnerable to Indian political, military, and economic pressures [and] perceive their domestic economies as [being] vulnerable to Indian whim, and none of them would wish India to assume the role of the regional policeman. However, they acknowledge that India has not fully exploited its powerful position vis--vis its neighbours to develop a regional base for its own ambitions to play a major role on the global stage and it has never tried to establish full-blown Indian regional hegemony (emphasis added).

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. . . [It] has never attempted to organise a South Asian Warsaw Pact-like structure under its control. Despite this, India has won little gratitude from its neighbours who continue to focus on the occasions when it has cracked the whip rather than on the times it has refrained.10 Interestingly, there is a vast body of literature on Indian foreign policy. The more recent literature focuses on the policies India should adopt to become a legitimate stakeholder in global affairs.11 Among these, only Malone deals with Indias neighbours in some detail and suggests that India has transited from an idealist foreign policy to a hard-nosed realpolitik and later to economic diplomacy. However, its efforts to outgrow the region have not succeeded, primarily because it has not paid sufcient attention to its neighbourhood. It has to use either some charm or strength to make its natural pre-eminence acceptable to its neighbours. In sum, Indian neighbourhood policy has received scant scholarly attention, but Indias bilateral relationship with each of its neighbours has been widely written about. Among the most notable books are an edited volume by Bajpai (1986),12 a practitioners perspective by Dixit (2001),13 a compilation of views expressed at a seminar by the Association of Indian Diplomats (2003),14 a collection of articles edited by Khosla (2008),15 a contrarian perspective offered by Sikri (2009),16 and a thoughtprovoking analysis of democracy promotion as a factor in Indias policy towards the neighbourhood by Muni (2010). Apart from this there are quite a few analytical articles on the theme by Muni (1993),17 Muni (2003),18 and Raja Mohan (2007).19 Among these works, Sikri (2009) puts forth the view that India has to maximise its economic potential to sustain its rise as a global power, and for this it has to take its neighbours along, appeal to their self-interest, keep the door open for dialogue, and take absolute care not to appear boorish, overbearing and condescending. It is imperative therefore for India to evolve a coordinated and coherent strategy vis--vis its neighbours.20 Jagat Mehta, Indias former foreign secretary, in his memoirs, argues forcefully that Indian diplomacy needs to learn to adjust to small country nationalism,21 address others fears of Indian hegemony, and take a long-term view of bilateral relations through a sensitive diplomacy of equality to overcome the reality of inequality.22 Muni identies the contradictions in the Indian approach and argues that there are ve problem areas in Indias approach towards the neighbourhood: (a) the lack of balanced political perspective; (b) the power differentials; (c) Indias economic clout; (d) extra-regional powers; and (e) mindsets, diplomatic styles and personalities. He argues that undue insistence on (or even encouragement of) bilateralism evokes avoidable fears and suspicions of Indian dominance and allows anti-Indian forces to exploit them to their advantage. Bilateral goals can be best achieved through a multilateral route especially because neighbours feel more comfortable in a regional design that incorporates bilateral priorities and concerns.23 Indias neighbourhood policy began to receive greater attention following the articulations of senior foreign service ofcials like Kanwal Sibal24 and Shyam Saran.25 In one of his two important addresses, Saran dwelt on the very theme that this paper focuses on. Sibal and Saran isolate the challenges confronting Indian foreign policy in the overall context of the changes taking place at the regional and global levels and argue the need for India to engage its neighbours more meaningfully. Sibal is pessimistic and holds that given the temptation of the political classes in the neighbourhood to project India as a threat to legitimise their position, India will not

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be able to shape its immediate environment optimally for its interests in the foreseeable future even by offering non-reciprocal unilateral concessions.26 He echoes the view of K. Subrahmanyam that it is natural and perfectly normal to expect our neighbours [especially Pakistan] to build up or rely on forces that countervail India.27 Saran reiterates the familiar argument that the logic of geography is unrelenting and a stable, friendly and peaceful, neighbourhood would help reduce . . . political, economic and military burdens on India. Instability in the neighbourhood is likely to provide an opportunity for external powers to interfere [in] and distort local relationships. In line with the neo-liberal thinking that characterises Indian foreign policy today, he emphasises the need for India to stop looking at border areas or states as buffer zones, and use them as connectors and transmission belts to allow the uninterrupted ow of goods, people and ideas in order to bring India closer to its neighbours and create a stake in its economic prosperity. Saran also advocates use of culture as a tool of foreign policy.28 In the light of these comments, it will be useful to critically analyse Indias policy towards its neighbourhood since independence, to discover how it has evolved through different phases under the leadership of different political actors in India. This is necessary for a better appreciation (both achievements and limitations) of Indias neighbourhood policy.

Foreign policy of India since independence The neighbourhood policy of a country is usually regarded as a subset of its foreign policy. Indias leadership in the years following independence advocated a foreign policy that was a natural and organic outgrowth of the principles of non-violence and peace that informed the Indian freedom movement. It had a moral basis that was projected into the international sphere by Jawaharlal Nehru, who was not only the prime minister and the foreign minister of India, but was also the main architect of Indias foreign policy. Long before Nehru became prime minister, in his rst speech on foreign policy in December 1927 at the annual convention of the Congress party, he stated that the people of India have no quarrel with their neighbours and desire to live at peace with them.29 Again on 7 September 1946 he outlined the basic principles of Indian foreign policy, which emphasised Asian solidarity, non-alignment, decolonisation and pursuit of international peace. His outlook was more global than local; he asserted that India would no longer be a passive spectator of events and a plaything of others but would make a history of [its] own choice.30 Nehrus policy has been hailed as a balanced blend of idealism and enlightened self-interest,31 which combined anti-imperialism, liberal internationalism, neutralism, neo-Marxism and Gandhism.32 Nehru held his practical idealism to be superior to crass realism.33 Interestingly, when his own party-men criticised him for diluting his position on neutrality in the mid-1950s and tilting towards the communist bloc,34 he resolutely defended his stance and held that it was a step in keeping with the reality. Remarkably, the foreign policy framework fashioned by Nehrumarked by autonomy and independence in strategic decision-making,35 preference for democratic socialism, strengthening of defence without compromising on the principles of non-alignment, and universal nuclear disarmament as a means to world peacehas survived to this day despite the changes in Indias economic policies, termed the neoliberal impulse by some observers.36 Since

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the 1990s, India has shown greater interest in strengthening its economic power and has adopted a more exible approach to global affairs. However, the basic tenets of Nehruvian foreign policy remain largely unchanged. Nehrus successors in the Congress party (Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, P.V. Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh), quite expectedly, stuck to Nehruvian principles while articulating the foreign policies of their governments. Even during the years when the non-Congress governments were in power (19771980, 19891991, 19962004) Nehruvian principles were invoked regularly to legitimise their stance on many tricky international issues. Morarji Desai sought to practise genuine non-alignment by also warming up to the US37 and later the governments of V.P. Singh, Chandrasekhar and I.K. Gujralall ex-Congressitesconformed to the Nehruvian values. Even Atal Bihari Vajpayee, leader of a right wing coalition, stated in 1978: Continuity is more pronounced and the change is more subtle,38 borrowing heavily from the Nehruvian paradigm.39 Approach towards the neighbourhood It is commonly acknowledged that there was an obvious contradiction in Nehrus foreign policy when he and his successors applied it to Indias immediate neighbourhood. While Nehru rejected all vestiges of colonial policy and made freedom from the colonial yoke the leitmotif of his policy, he largely followed the British policy towards its immediate neighbours.40 His idealism became hard realism when it came to dealing with the neighbours. The Nehru era Nehru had to deal with an unstable and ill-dened neighbourhood right from independence. He was confronted with the problems of Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad, which had a bearing on Indias neighbourhood policy. The Kashmir issue remains unresolved to this day. Nehru had concerns about both an assertive China (in relation to the Himalayan states) and intrusive Western powers (in relation to Pakistan and Sri Lanka) during the Cold War. Himalayan states: concern for security The British colonial policy of ensuring tranquillity along the borders through treaties with neighbours to protect its security and commercial interests was retained by Nehru in his approach to the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.41 This was followed by his successors with minor exceptions. Nehru was aware of the contradiction and acknowledged that [m]uch as we stand for independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security.42 Some analysts hold Indias friendship treaty with Nepal in 1950 as a unilateral guarantee offered by India against any external attack on Nepal.43 In the wake of the Chinese incursion into the north-eastern part of India, Nehru declared in parliament that India was responsible for the protection of the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan44 and any aggression against [them] would be considered aggression against India.45 As the Chinese threat grew in the 1950s and 1960s, India became increasingly involved in building up the defence capabilities of both Nepal and Bhutan,

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specically in training and equipping their armies. The headquarters of the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) were established at a strategic location in the Ha District of Bhutan, adjacent to the Chumbi Valley of Tibet, at the tri-junction of Bhutan, India and China. Policy towards other neighbours Nehrus approach towards Pakistan was partially coloured by his experience of the political tussle between the Congress and the Muslim League and the communal polarisation in the subcontinent in its wake. Even then, he demonstrated exibility in matters concerning minority rights and refugee rehabilitation. He held fast to his stand of the popular ratication of Kashmirs accession to India until he realised that Pakistan was entering into a military alliance with the big powers, who were in turn weaving Kashmir into the Cold War power politics by 1949. Even if he turned away from the UN and unilaterally held elections in Kashmir in 1951 to ascertain the popular view on accession, he remained open to discussions at all levels and hoped that Pakistan will see reason at last.46 In his numerous deliberations on the IndiaPakistan question, he underplayed the problem, referring to it as not too serious, a family issue and even a domestic quarrel.47 In the case of Sri Lanka, Nehru showed some interest in the people of Indian origin (PIO) in the island nation, and was somewhat concerned about Western inuence there. However, the geo-strategic importance of Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the overall context of the Indian Ocean did not nd much mention in his articulations. He advocated friendship with the people of Afghanistan and Burma and emphasised old and civilisational contacts. As regards Burma, true to his anti-colonial stance, he worked actively with General Aung San and U Nu and even mobilised military and international support for Burma. He did not dwell much upon the maritime dimensions of Indias security, although leading historians of his time, such as K.M. Pannikar,48 considered it to be Indias natural zone of inuence. The post-Nehru period India continued with the Nehruvian paradigm even after Nehrus demise and the seeming failure of his policy in the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Indias approach to the smaller Himalayan neighbours remained largely unchanged. India secured, in some cases, through unilateral concessions, commitment from these states to respect Indias security interests. For example, when King Mahendra warmed up to China, India entered into a bilateral understanding with Nepal in 1965, which went beyond the terms of the 1950 treaty and obliged India to supply arms, ammunition and equipment for the entire Nepalese Army. However, this understanding was annulled in deference to the popular sensitivity to the issue in Nepal in 1969. Lal Bahadur Shastri, who succeeded Nehru as prime minister, had to confront a direct military assault from Pakistan in 1965. He led the country successfully out of the war, but did not live long enough to effect any changes in Indias foreign or neighbourhood policy. Nevertheless, he proved through words and deeds that national security interests would be paramount while dealing with Pakistan and China. Given Indias economic and defence vulnerabilities, Shastri was pragmatic enough to accept Soviet mediation in Indo-Pak relations. In the aftermath of Chinas nuclear test in 1964, he continued with the policy of keeping Indias nuclear option open while

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seeking international guarantees against a nuclear China. He made a modest attempt to institutionalise foreign policy making by setting up a policy planning division in the MEA. However, he continued with the Nehruvian approach towards Indias neighbours. India doctrine: no to external inuence Indira Gandhi, who succeeded Shastri, lived up to her character as the boss-lady,49 and her policy towards the neighbouring countries was certainly more assertive than that of her predecessors. She was more concerned than Nehru about external inuence in the region. She took note of the changes taking place in the regional security environment, especially the Sino-Pakistan strategic relations since the early 1960s and the Sino-US rapprochement which started in 1971, and signed a strategic agreement with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in August 1971 to counter these challenges. She felt that India did not dilute its strategic autonomy in any manner through this treaty. She sent the Indian army into East Pakistan (after being attacked on the western front) in December 1971 and was under great pressure from the West not to intervene in East Pakistan. Subsequently, she engaged Pakistan and signed the Shimla agreement in July 1972, which emphasised bilateralism in the IndiaPakistan relationship. She went ahead and conducted the nuclear tests in 1974. Her assertive policies provoked more fear than respect among the neighbours.50 Although she made it clear in 197251 that India did not want to carve out any spheres of inuence or erect any cordon sanitaire around itself, political analysts at home and abroad interpreted her policy as the India doctrine (some even called it the Indira doctrine),52 a Brahmanic framework of power53 or a regional Monroe doctrine.54 Interpretations aside, Indiras image as a tough and unbending politician sometimes makes analysts overlook the pragmatic side of her personality her show of exibility at Shimla in 1972, her position on the Kachativu islands in 1974 and her readiness to deal with Zia-ul-Haq, the military dictator. She also helped the Sri Lankan government in putting down a Marxist rebellion in 1971. Indira was caught up in the whirlpool of domestic politics and lost much of her shine in foreign policy matters during 19741977. The Janata government, which came to power in 1977, advocated a friendly and accommodative policy towards the neighbours. India signed a ve-year river water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh in 1977. Vajpayee, the then foreign minister, visited Pakistan in 1978 and revived bilateral contacts. Agreements on trade, cultural exchanges and communication were signed. India also showed its readiness to accept the Nepalese demand to sign separate treaties on trade and transit in 1978. Indira Gandhi, then out of power, took exception to such policies and held that the Janata government was so craven that even small states like Bhutan demanded a revision of the treaty it had signed with India. After coming back to power in 1979, Indira went ahead with her policy of assertion on one level and readiness for bilateral negotiations on the other. Rajiv Gandhi: dealing with deance? After Indiras assassination, her son, Rajiv Gandhi, rode a sympathy wave to secure a brute majority in the 1984 elections. He took the India doctrine forward towards the close of the Cold War years. Interestingly, despite Indias relative prominence in the region following the 1971 war with Pakistan, both Nepal and Bhutan demanded a

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review of their respective treaties with India and asserted their independence in several ways during the 1970s and 1980s.55 Nepalese deance prompted Rajiv Gandhis government to take measures which hurt Nepal immensely. India refused to renew the 1978 trade and transit treaties with Nepal in 1989 and closed all but two of its 17 border transit points, leading to shortages of fuel, salt, cooking oil, food and other essential commodities imported from India. In addition, this policy strengthened the popular movement against the King and acted as a catalyst to Nepals transition to democracy in 1990. Rajiv wanted to make a new beginning with Pakistan and China. His visit to China (1923 December 1988), the rst by an Indian prime minister in 34 years, marked a new beginning in IndiaChina relations. He made attempts to improve the IndiaPakistan relationship, but a routine exercise by the Indian army (November 1986March 1987), code named Operation Brasstacks, led to a lot of bilateral tension as Pakistan responded by mobilising its forces close to the international border. Rajiv and Zia-ul-Haq defused the crisis through the famous cricket diplomacy. It was around this time that Pakistan strategically leaked the information about its nuclear capability. After Zias death in a crash in August 1988, Rajiv sought to improve India Pakistan relations by closer engagement with the democratic dispensation headed by Benazir Bhutto, and in December 1988 went to Islamabad and signed an important bilateral agreement on non-attack of nuclear installations. The beginning of militancy in Kashmir around this time came in the way of sustaining the process of normalisation. Rajiv deviated from Indiras approach towards Sri Lanka and tried to work with Jayawardane on the ethnic issue. When the latter insisted on a military solution to the ethnic problem, Rajiv decided to intervene in May/June 1987 and forced Jayawardane to sign the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord to resolve the ethnic issue in Sri Lanka. Such a muscular neighbourhood policy led analysts to argue that he was a Bonaparte in the making.56 Rajiv was also concerned about foreign military and intelligence presence in Sri Lanka and through an exchange of letters preceding the accord, Sri Lanka pledged to take care of Indias security concerns and prohibit the military use of its territory by any country in a manner prejudicial to Indias interests. Subsequently, India acted promptly to avert a coup in Maldives in November 1988, which in a way established Indias status as a regional superpower.57 The post-Rajiv period Following a change of government in India and the success of the democratic movement in Nepal in the early 1990s, the relationship between the two countries improved. The non-Congress coalition government of V.P. Singh (especially his foreign minister, I.K. Gujral) adopted a relatively moderate policy towards Nepal and normal trade relations were restored. However, in view of Nepals reluctance to be sensitive to Indias security concerns, Indias approach largely remained the same, i.e., tighten the screws if Nepalese policy ran counter to Indian interests, and create and nurture pro-India constituencies within Nepal. The coalition government of V.P. Singh did not last long. The Congress-led coalition came to power in the 1991 elections. Sufcient attention has not been paid to the fact that Rajiv fell to LTTE assassins because of his policy on the ethnic issue in Sri Lanka. The LTTE was paranoid that Rajivs return to power could lead to a more aggressive policy vis--vis the LTTE. The subsequent Congress-led coalition government, under the prime ministership of P.V. Narasimha Rao, adopted a policy of more

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or less benign neglect with regard to Pakistan and sought to bring about signicant shifts in Indias overall foreign policy orientation. Rao was the rst prime minister to establish diplomatic ties with Israel and build on Rajivs overtures to China, and he fashioned his Look East policy to establish ties with the fast developing economies of South East Asia. Gujral doctrine and beyond The successive coalition governments of Deve Gowda (June 1996April 1997) and I.K. Gujral (April 1997March 1998) had short stints but they introduced signicant changes in Indias neighbourhood policy. I.K. Gujral, who had generated some trust among the neighbours during his earlier stint as foreign minister in V.P. Singhs government (19891990),58 served as foreign minister in the Deve Gowda cabinet. He handled the water issue with Bangladesh and Nepal with caution.59 Gujrals policy of non-reciprocal accommodation led to the signing of a 30-year treaty between India and Bangladesh on December 12, 1996. He even ensured Bhutanese consent for the digging of a canal from a Bhutanese river to augment the ow of water into the Ganga and revised the controversial Mahakali treaty, which was well received in Nepal. This policy of accommodation was termed the Gujral doctrine by some analysts.60 In his famous Chatham House address in June 1996, and later at the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), Colombo, on January 20, 1997, Gujral laid out ve points that dened his policy towards the neighbours and in a way reected the persisting security concerns of India.61 Much of what the Indian foreign ofce has to say about Indias neighbourhood policy later was contained in this particular address, where he said:
A peaceful, stable and constructive environment in our neighbourhood is vital for us as we pursue the goals of accelerated development for ourselves and the region . . . I would stress that our hand of friendship will always be stretched out to our neighbours. We are ready to work to build up condence and establish cooperation in all facets of our relationships.

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Interestingly, Pakistan did not feature in the list of countries Gujral identied in his later speech as being t for non-reciprocal treatment. Noorani, a perceptive analyst of South Asian politics, terms such measures cosmetic and deceptive62 and says that the Gujral doctrine excluded Pakistan and was thus not a wholehearted effort to generate trust with the neighbours. Some analysts hold that Gujral was unable to bring about any change primarily because of his inability to convert the foreign policy bureaucracy, which was rmly wedded to the principles of security, national interests and major power status at the global level, to the basic art of friendliness. It was alleged that mandarins of the foreign ofce were more comfortable with Rajiv Gandhis language of hegemonic power than Gujrals language of friendship and dtente.63 The Vajpayee government The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government (19982004),64 headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, pledged to work towards a strong India that was recognised as an autonomous power centre in the world and to stop bending under pressure to neighbouring countries and big powers. In the ofcial pronouncements of this time one detects echoes of the Gujral doctrine urging neighbours to shed their inhibitions

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and participate in Indias economy, rather than be apprehensive about it65 and work towards a South Asia unshackled from historical divisions, and bound together in collective pursuit of peace and prosperity.66 Vajpayee spent more energy in shaping Indias relationship with Pakistan than with any other state in the neighbourhood. He undertook his famous bus journey to Lahore in February 1999 and visited the Minar-e-Pakistan, which had tremendous signicance in the sense that it was interpreted as the right-wing BJPs acceptance of Pakistan as a sovereign entity. His Lahore initiative suffered a setback due to the Kargil misadventure in MayJune 1999. Later, he initiated talks on Kashmir with Musharraf who came to power in October 1999 despite his role in Kargil and the terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament in December 2001. In fact, he called off almost a year-long massive army deployment along the Indo-Pak border (Operation Parakram), which had followed the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, in October 2002 to start the process of a structured dialogue with Pakistan from January 2004. The activation of a back channel by this government was also an innovative way of approaching the outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. The NDA government could perhaps not devote as much attention to other neighbours because it was preoccupied with other issues. Nevertheless, it tried to extend the hand of friendship to the government of Khaleda Zia in Bangladesh, overlooking the post-electoral violence committed against the Hindu minorities in 2001. It was during this period that the neighbourhood received its due attention from the strategic community. The UPA government The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government led by the Congress party, since May 2004, has continued with the policy of inviting the neighbours to share the economic prosperity of India. It has laid emphasis on connectivity and the building of mutually benecial relations with neighbours and showed its enthusiasm to deepen intra-regional trade and to enhance the prosperity of the South Asian region through social development and regional economic integration.67 The rst ve years of the UPA government were marked by efforts to deal with the neighbours in a prudent manner. The government adapted the peace process with Pakistan and took it forward despite grave provocations by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists. It also dealt with the longstanding demand of the Bhutanese government for revision of the 1949 treaty and duly revised it in 2008 with the Bhutanese commitment to remain mindful of Indian security concerns. It also played a role in the process of political transformation in Nepal and facilitated the comprehensive peace agreement of 2006 which brought the Maoists into the political mainstream.68 The UPA governments decision to enter into framework agreements with Bangladesh and the Maldives, as well as an important strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan in 2011, is indicative of its intent to smoothen its relationship with most of its neighbours at the bilateral level. The areas of engagement identied in these agreements indicate Indias interest in economic, developmental and security cooperation with its neighbours. The neoliberal turn? The regional political and security dynamics have changed considerably since the early 1990s. These have brought about visible changes in Indias foreign policy. Raja Mohan,

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in his much acclaimed book Crossing the Rubicon, analyses this transformation of Indias world view since the end of the Cold War and explains how India took the path of economic liberalisation, shed its anti-West, Third World outlook and repositioned itself in the world as an important global actor.69 Today, a more self-condent India no longer considers American or Western inuence in the region as detrimental to its interests. The neo-liberal emphasis on building mutual economic interdependencies has become the hallmark of Indias foreign policy. This is reected in Indias neighbourhood policy as well. India has overcome its earlier inhibitions about SAARC and sought to use it effectively to promote regional economic cooperation/integration. Without being upset by the negative role played by Pakistan within SAARC, India has encouraged other regional and sub-regional initiatives (BIMSTEC, IORC etc.). At the bilateral level, it has also entered into economic cooperation agreements with other countries in the region like Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh. However, this change in Indias approach has largely gone unreciprocated and unnoticed. While it is true that India is less sensitive to Western presence in the region, in recent years there has been a growing concern in the country about Chinas efforts to establish closer political and economic ties with Indias neighbours. Even if China dismisses such concerns, its reaction to the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal indicates that it will seek to expand its relationship with all countries in the region (including India), without bothering about Indian sensitivities. While India has agreed to increase bilateral trade with China from $60 billion in 2010 to about $100 billion by 2015, it is faced with a challenge to convince its neighbours that it is in their interest to work together to bring collective prosperity to the region through greater cooperation rather than waste their energy in playing the China card against India. It is a challenge that Indian diplomacy has to grapple with in the coming days if it wants to retain its pre-eminence in the region and protect its security interests. Concluding observations The broad inferences drawn from the above discussion suggest that India has dealt with its neighbours in an ad hoc fashion, allowing the relationship to be conducted on a country-by-country basis. It has to evolve a long-term, forward-looking vision for the region and adopt a strategy spelling out its priorities and concerns clearly and openly declaring its expectations from its neighbours. This will help India in engaging its neighbours more meaningfully. Security concerns have dominated Indias policy towards its neighbours. That is why India has followed a realistic policy vis--vis its neighbours, which is often contrary to the ideals enunciated by its leaders in the realm of foreign policy. This has been occasioned by its experience of direct military conicts in the past, the existential threat of terrorism directed against it from within its immediate neighbourhood as well as its sensitivity to external inuences in the region. Indias presence is so huge that it is likely to evoke fear among its neighbours unless India adopts a proactive diplomacy vis--vis its neighbours. Its diplomacy has not so far matched its size, capability and intentions and has failed to inspire the necessary condence in its neighbours to deal with India as a friend and not as a power eternally planning to subjugate them. India has to make use of its soft power and devise an innovative as well as cooperative economic agenda to convince its smaller neighbours of the advantages of

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cooperating with India. The economic content of Indias foreign and neighbourhood policy has increased substantially over the last decade. However, the complex interdependencies being built up by the growing economic ties among the countries have not dispelled the fear of India in the neighbourhood. Each country in the neighbourhood has a constituency that is opposed to the idea of friendship with India. The perception of India as a bully and as a hegemonic power dominates the discourse. Due care has to be taken to disseminate relevant information relating to the benets of cooperation, and especially Indias initiatives in this regard. Unresolved political issues (border disputes, differences over sharing/managing the global commons, connectivity promotion, energy cooperation, etc.) tend to vitiate the atmosphere of good neighbourliness in the region. India has managed to establish sound economic ties with Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (especially under the present Hasina regime) but basic suspicions about Indian intent and popular antipathy towards India remain in each of the states, mainly due to unsettled political issues. India has to take proactive steps (through active diplomatic engagement) to minimise such areas of divergence and potential conict and resolve less contentious ones. Indias neighbours have felt more comfortable dealing with non-Congress governments than Congress governments in the past. The dynamics may change only if the latter makes an effort to generate a domestic consensus on Indias approach to the neighbourhood and fashions a policy in active consultation with all political parties. It has to be recognised that Indias immediate geographical neighbours pose particular problems because of the cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious overlaps between India and its neighbours, with the same ethnic groups straddling political borders and sharing a common history. Tackling these problems is not just a foreign policy issue for India. As the governments experience on the Teesta water-sharing agreement with Bangladesh showed recently, it has important domestic dimensions as well. The demographic pressures, i.e., the youth bulge and urbanisation, are compelling states to look for external help to build infrastructure, augment economic activity and boost development at all levels. This will naturally provide an opportunity for extraregional powers to enter the neighbourhood on the pretext of development and extend their strategic inuence. In order to retain its inuence, India has to think seriously in terms of investing in developmental projects in the neighbourhood to convince others of its intent to bring peace and prosperity to the entire region. India must play a proactive role in multilateral regional bodies like SAARC, BIMSTEC and IORC to generate regional consensus on issues of common concern which will involve security and economic development and help change negative perceptions about India in the neighbourhood. At the political level, the neighbourhood has not received the kind of response it deserves in India. There is a need to sustain linkages at the political level, both with inuential political parties and personalities in the neighbourhood. High-level visits from the Indian side must take place on a regular basis, as without these the neighbours naturally feel neglected. By appointing a special envoy to focus on neighbourhood issues and undertaking a periodic review of Indian diplomacy in the neighbourhood, India can highlight its benign intentions in a sustained manner. Indian interest in the neighbourhood has been rather sporadic, driven either by critical internal developments in neighbouring countries or the growing inuence of some external power. In the absence of any innovative measures, the existing problems encountered by India in the neighbourhood may worsen, given the persisting antipathy

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towards India in almost every country in the region. Therefore, there is a need to evolve an overarching policy framework to guide Indias relationship with its neighbours. This will necessitate a clear and unambiguous articulation of its non-negotiable positions in matters concerning its security and national interests. Simultaneously, it must nd ways of enabling its neighbours to participate protably in Indias economy. Indias vision of an integrated South Asian economic union needs to be eshed out and made an important constituent of its neighbourhood policy. Enabling measures towards this end, such as improved communication, physical connectivity and people-to-people contacts, must be unilaterally promoted and catered for. In all this, India has to move beyond rhetoric and prove that it really means what it says.
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Notes
1. Address by Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at Harvard on Indias Global Role, September 20, 2010, at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=550316512 2. See Annual Report 20042005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, p. 1. 3. Already, Afghanistan (ranked 6th), Pakistan (10th), Myanmar (16th), Bangladesh (24th), Sri Lanka (25th) and Nepal (26th) are seen as fragile or even failing states in global surveys (Failed States Index Scores 2010 by Fund for Peace). 4. This was done most recently on June 29, 2011, when he stated that the . . . neighbourhood worries me a great deal, quite frankly. For details, see http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle. aspx?277433. 5. Excerpts of Address by the PM at the Combined Commanders Conference, September 13, 2010, in New Delhi. For details, see http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=957 6. As reported in the Times of India, December 30, 2010, at http://articles.timesondia.indiatimes. com/2010-12-30/india/28244159_1_maoists-foreign-minister-political-understanding. 7. Association of Indian Diplomats, Indias South Asian Neighbours: The Options for Comprehensive Engagement, Printocraft, New Delhi, 2003, p. 19. 8. Such a view is offered by Manisha Gunasekera, Geostrategic Neoliberalism and Indias New Neighbourhood Policy: Examining the Geopolitical Drivers of the Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 2007, at http://oaithesis.eur.nl/ir/repub/ asset/7182/Manisha%20Gunasekera%20IPED.pdf. 9. Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, Better Neighbors?: India and South Asian Regional Politics, SAIS Review, 18(1), 1998, pp. 109121. They say that generations of diplomats of other South Asian countries have complained in private to outsiders that their Indian counterparts act as if they were the inheritors of the British raj. 10. They go to the extent of arguing that Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives have been free to independently pursue their own international roles and project their own identities, provided they did not offer to outside powers an opportunity to play a signicant political or security role. They were otherwise under no obligation to toe Indias line in either foreign or domestic policy. Ibid. 11. David Malone, Does the Elephant Dance: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Rajiv Kumar and Raja Menon, The Long View from Delhi, Academic Foundation, Delhi, 2011; Rajiv Kumar and Santosh Kumar, In the National Interests: A Strategic Foreign Policy for India, Academic Foundation, Delhi, 2010; Teresita Schaffer, India and the US in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership, CSIS Press, Washington, 2009. 12. U.S. Bajpai, India and its Neighbourhood , Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986. 13. J.N. Dixit, Indias Foreign Policy and Its Neighbours, Gyan Books, New Delhi, 2001. 14. Association of Indian Diplomats, Indias South Asian Neighbours: The Options for Comprehensive Engagement, Printocraft, New Delhi, 2003. This makes a plea for developing a framework for neighbourhood policy. However, the discussion in the book takes up individual countries and identies the issues affecting their bilateral relations with India. 15. I.P. Khosla (ed.), Spotlight on Neighbours: Talks at the IIC , Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 2008. This provides a useful discussion on Indias bilateral relationships with all countries.

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16. Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking Indias Foreign Policy, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2009. 17. S.D. Muni, India and Its Neighbour: Persisting Dilemmas and New Opportunities, International Studies, 30(2), 1993. 18. S.D. Muni, Problem Areas in Indias Neighbourhood Policy, South Asian Survey, 10(2), 2003. 19. C. Raja Mohan, Indias Neighbourhood Policy: Four Dimensions, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 2(1), 2007. 20. Ibid., p. 23. He would suggest that India needs to shun its soft image and rmly and unambiguously, dene for its neighbours the goalposts of Indias non-negotiable national interests. Ibid., p. 285. 21. Jagat S. Mehta, Negotiating for India: Resolving Problems through Diplomacy, Manohar, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 2425. 22. Ibid., p. 25. 23. Muni, Problem Areas, pp. 187188. 24. Kanwal Sibal, address (while he was foreign secretary) at IFRI, Paris, on December 17, 2002, at http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?218365. India and Its Neighbours, Indian Defence Review, 25(1), 2010, at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/India-andits-neighbours-.html. 25. Shyam Saran, India and Its Neighbours, Talk given at India International Centre, February 14, 2005, at http://idsa.in/node/1555; Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?, Talk given at ICWA, September 9, 2006, at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=550311843. 26. He argued that [v]irtually all our neighbours, by choice or default, by acts of commission or omission, compulsions of geography and the terrain, have been or are involved in receiving, sheltering, overlooking or tolerating terrorist activities from their soil directed against India. Kanwal Sibals address (while he was foreign secretary), IFRI, December 17, 2002. 27. K. Subrahmanyam, India and Its Neighbours: A Conceptual Framework of Peaceful Coexistence, in U.S. Bajpai, India and its Neighbourhood , p. 136. 28. Saran, India and Its Neighbours. 29. Nehru, quoted in A. Appadorai, Indias Foreign Policy, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 25(1), 1949, p. 38. 30. Jawaharlal Nehru, Indias Foreign Policy, Publications Division, Delhi, pp. 23. 31. G.S. Bajpai, Ethical Stand on World Issues: Cornerstone of Indias Foreign Policy, The Hindu, 26 January 1950, reproduced in S.P. Verma and K.P. Mishra, Foreign Policies in South Asia, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1969, pp. 9196. 32. Paul F. Power, Ideological Currents in Indias Foreign Policies, in K.P. Misra (ed.), Indias Foreign Policy, pp. 2136. 33. In response to criticism of his policy as idealistic, Nehru stated in parliament: Idealism is the realism of tomorrow. It is the capacity to know what is good for the day after tomorrow, or next year and to fashion yourself accordingly. The practical person, the realist, looks at the tip of the nose and sees little beyond; the result is that he is tumbling all the time, Nehru, Indias Foreign Policy, p. 51. 34. Acharya J.B. Kripalani argued that Nehru set the principles so high that it was difcult on his part to conform to them. To quote Kripalani: There is always a danger in overemphasizing moral and ideological principles in international affairs . . . Moral platitudes can be mouthed by politicians once in a while, but if they are repeated frequently, without appropriate action, their authors cannot escape the charge of hypocrisy. See his article, For Principled Neutrality: A New Appraisal of Indian Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, October 1959. 35. It is fashionable to criticise Indias non-alignment policy today, when the strategic environment has changed signicantly with the end of the Cold War. However, Indian public opinion continues to emphasise the need for India to exercise strategic autonomy in foreign policy, which was a basic element of non-alignment. In fact, the governments of the day have been at pains to stress that the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal did not compromise the strategic autonomy of India. 36. Since the 1990s, especially after the end of the Cold War, when India liberalised its economy and invited foreign capital, the Nehruvian economic agenda has been revised to suit the needs of the changing times. Achin Vanaik wrote about the neoliberal turn in his article Post Cold War Indian Foreign Policy, Seminar, January 2008. Sanjaya Baru, Manmohan Singhs ex-media adviser, dwelt on this issue in his article In a Time of

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Wave Change, Indian Foreign Policy Stands, in The Jakarta Globe, March 31, 2009. Kanti Bajpai also advocates this view in his writings and has held that Indias growth in power calls for a rethink of strategic policies. See, for instance, Kanti Bajpai, Indias Growth in Power Calls for a Rethink of Strategic Policies, The Independent, February 26, 2010, at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/professor-kanti-bajpai-indias-growthin-power-calls-for-a-rethink-of-strategic-policies-1911098.html. Desai reportedly criticised Nehrus daughter for not following Nehrus policies: Her father never became subservient to anybody, but she has done so. When she signed a treaty with Russia and not one with America also, this was not proper. This struck favourable chords elsewhere. Carter, for example, said on the eve of his visit to India in the new year of 1978 that it was a country that in recent years has turned perhaps excessively toward the Soviet Union, but under the leadership of Prime Minister Desai is moving back toward us and assuming a good role of, I would say, neutrality, and we have a strong friendship with India (emphasis added). Both Desai and Carter have been quoted in A.G. Noorani, Foreign Policy of the Janata Party Government, Asian Affairs, 5(4), 1978, pp. 216228. Cited in A.G. Noorani, Indias Foreign Policy, Asian Affairs, 6(4), 1979, p. 231. For a detailed discussion, see Sreeram S. Chaulia, BJP, Indias Foreign Policy and the Realist Alternative to the Nehruvian Tradition, International Politics, 39, 2002, pp. 215234. The borders of India were shaped mostly during the British period through a series of treaties, which were signed essentially to safeguard British Indias security and commercial interests. The British signed agreements with Nepal (Sigauli Treaty, 1816), Bhutan, Tibet, Burma and Afghanistan (1893). They were very often compromises of convenience, made in specic geostrategic and regional security environments. Many were continued and have created problems for India. Nehru adopted British policy towards Indias neighbours and in the process inherited the problems associated with them. A perceptive analyst of the British Indian governments policy, Madhavi Yasin, writes: the security of the kingdom [was assured if it were] surrounded by a ring of territories with which powerful neighbours must not meddle. [As per this] principle . . . [for] the security of the Indian dominion . . . border states adjoining India were taken as protectorates whether they desired it or not. For details, see Madhavi Yasin, Indias Foreign Policy: The Dufferin Years, pp. 68117. The IndiaNepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed on July 31, 1950 (on the eve of Chinas attack on Tibet in October 1950) and it was followed by an exchange of letters which dened the security relations between the two. It held that neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. The treaty (Article 2) also obligated both countries to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations . . . between the two governments. K. Subrahmanyam, Asian Balance of Power in the 1970s: An Indian View, IDSA Paper, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 1968, p. 28. It is pertinent to mention here that the friendship treaty signed between India and Bhutan on August 8, 1949 had provisions which mirrored the colonial arrangement whereby Bhutan would be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations (Article 2). Statement in Lok Sabha, August 28, 1959. Nehru, Indias Foreign Policy, p. 339. The talks and exchange of letters between him and Liaquat Ali Khan (19501951), Muhammad Ali (prime minister of Pakistan April 17, 1953August 12, 1955) during JuneSeptember 1954, negotiations with Feroze Khan Noon (prime minister of Pakistan December 16, 19577 October 1958) on September 12, 1958, as well as the seven rounds of BhuttoSwaran Singh talks during 19631964, bear testimony to Nehrus keenness for an amicable solution through dialogue. In his letter to US president John F. Kennedy in OctoberNovember 1962, seeking military help, Nehru indirectly refers to the IndiaPakistan squabble over Kashmir: The Chinese threat as it has developed involves not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this sub-Continent or in Asia. The domestic quarrels regarding small areas or territorial borders between the countries in this sub-Continent or in Asia have no relevance whatever in the context of the developing Chinese invasion. Quoted in Inder Malhotra, Letters from the Darkest Hour, Indian Express, November 17, 2010, at http://www. indianexpress.com/news/letters-from-the-darkest-hour/712359/0. K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1945.

37.

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38. 39. 40.

41.

42.

43. 44.

45. 46.

47.

48.

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49. Life, March 16, 1959, p. 75. 50. When Indira came back to power in 1980, one leading Indian journal titled its discussion on Indiras foreign policy on the editorial page as Nervous Neighbours (Economic and Political Weekly, 15(10), 1980, p. 490). 51. Indira Gandhi, India and the World, Foreign Affairs, October 1972, pp. 6577. 52. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Indian Doctrine, India Today, August 31, 1983. 53. Aniruddha Gupta, A Brahmanic Framework of Power in South Asia, Economic and Political Weekly, 25(4), 1990, p. 712. 54. Analysts like C. Raja Mohan would argue that Nehru was the founder of the regional Monroe doctrine. See his article, Beyond Indias Monroe Doctrine, January 2, 2003, at http:// www.thehindu.com/2003/01/02/ stories/2003010200981000.htm. Also see Devin T. Hagerty, Indias Regional Security Doctrine, Asian Survey, 31(4), 1991, pp. 351363. However, scholars like Surjit Mansingh and Raju G.C. Thomas had contested this view and held that India never articulated her regional policy as a regional Monroe doctrine and its policy was marked by exibility and ambivalence. Surjit Mansingh, Indias Search for Power: Indira Gandhis Foreign Policy, 19661982, Sage, New Delhi, 1984, p. 292; and Raju G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986, p. 14. 55. Nepal violated the 1950 treaty provisions by issuing work permits to Indians (despite its treaty commitments to treat them on an equal footing with the citizens of Nepal), imposing a 55 per cent tariff on Indian products and purchasing arms from China. 56. Bhabani Sen Gupta, A Bonaparte in the Making?, Economic and Political Weekly, 23(1/2), 1988, pp. 1112d. 57. Dilip Bobb, Cautious Optimism, India Today, August 31, 1987, p. 69. 58. A leading political analyst had hailed Gujrals approach during his rst stint as a welcome departure from earlier policies: Gujral is a very friendly person, willing to listen, soft-spoken, and capable of establishing vibrations of give and take with his counterparts . . . [his] language of foreign policy is homespun and . . . he is able to relate global change to thrusts of Indian foreign policy. Bhabani Sen Gupta, Supping with Neighbours, Economic and Political Weekly, March 10, 1990. 59. The 1977 treaty on water sharing (after extensions in 1982 and 1985) had lapsed in 1988 and negotiations could not succeed because of inexibility on both sides. 60. Bhabani Sen Gupta, India in the Twenty First Century, International Affairs, 73(2), 1997, pp. 308309. 61. The ve principles were: (i) with its neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity, but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust; (ii) no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interests of another country of the ; (iii) none should interfere in the internal affairs of another; (iv) all South Asian countries must respect each others territorial integrity and sovereignty; and (v) they should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. I.K. Gujral, Aspects of Indias Foreign Policy, speech at the Bandaranaike Center for International Studies (BCIS) in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on January 20, 1997, at http://as.stimson. org/southasia/?sn=sa20020116302. 62. A.G. Noorani, Of Indo-Bangladesh Distrust, Frontline, 18(17), 2001, at http://www. frontlineonnet.com/1817/18170730.htm. 63. Ibid., p. 477. 64. It had to contend with the after-effects of the nuclear tests of 1998, which had subjected India to international opprobrium. It had to engage with other issues like the Kargil attacks, Operation Parakram, etc. 65. See, for instance, Atal Bihari Vajpayees address at the Third SAARC Information Ministers Conference, November 11, 2003, at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=55037313. 66. Speech by External Affairs Minister Ashanti Sunhat at Harvard University, September 29, 2003, at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=55037013. 67. Opening Remarks by Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at the 38th Session of the SAARC Standing Committee at Thimpu, February 6, 2011, at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart. php?id=550317143. 68. However, critics argue that this trend was sustained during the second UPA government, which could be due to domestic reasons, i.e., the change in the composition of the coalition. Left

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parties as alliance partners in the earlier coalition had played a crucial role in the governments policy. Since they pulled out of the alliance, the governments policies have been less accommodative of the Maoists. 69. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of Indias New Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

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