Philosophy 160C Fall 2008 jayme johnson

Handout 4: Rachelss The Elements of Moral Philosophy: Chapters 5 & 6

The principle of utility, as John Stewart Mill sees it, is the foundation of utilitarianism. POU: Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. One can see that the POU is an egalitarian principle if one considers the formulation of the principle which Bentham and Mill called the greatest happiness principle. GHP: Those actions are right that produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Lets assume, like both Mill and Bentham did, that happiness is measured in terms of pleasure, and unhappiness in terms of pain. This kind of view is called hedonism. Five Assumptions about Pleasure and Pain: i. Pleasure and pain are feelings, or sensations. ii. Pleasure and pain come in "episodes" which are events that consist in someone's feeling pleasure or pain at some time. iii. Every episode, e, of pleasure or pain has a duration -- a measure of how long it lasts. iv. Every episode, e, of pleasure or pain has an intensity -- a measure of how "strong" the feeling is. v. The amount of pleasure or pain in an episode is determined by multiplying intensity by duration to yield "hedons" (in the case of pleasure) or "dolors" (in the case of pain). 1 hedon is equal to negative 1 dolors The total hedonic utility of an act token a1 =df. the total number of hedons produced by a1 minus the total number of dolors. AU: An act token A is morally right if and only if A maximizes (universal) hedonic utility. MAU: An act token A is morally right, if and only if A maximizes (universal) qualified hedonic utility. Consider the following example:

Suppose a child is born with severe impairments to John and Judy. John is laid off from his job at a local factory, and Judy is school teacher. The child has an open spine, severe brain damage, and dysfunctional kidneys. John makes very little in unemployment, and Judys health insurance does not have a clause in its policy for extended care of a child in this condition. What should be done? (For now we leave aside the question of who should decide). a1. Give the child the kind of ordinary medical treatment a normal child would receive. a2. Give the child special treatment for its problems. a3. Dont treat the child: allow it to die. a4. Put the child to death in a painless way. total hedons 0 150 0 100 total dolors 3500 2150 3000 2000 HU -3500 -2000 -3000 -1900

a1 a2 a3 a4

In this example we have supposed we know values that each of the alternatives will bring about. But in real life, we seldom know all the factors, or can successfully predict An objection to AU: unforeseen consequences 1. If we cannot accurately predict what the consequences of a given alternative will be, then AU is not a practical theory for making practical decisions. 2. We cannot accurately predict what the consequences of a given alternative will be. 3. Therefore, AU is not a practical theory for making practical decisions. An AU response: the argument is unsound. Premise 1 is false. We need not be omniscient. We need to make a reasonable effort to get relevant information, and we can predict the probable consequences of our actions. Acting morally does not require anything more than this. Another (stronger) objection to AU: Consider the following HU a1 500 a2 500 Without knowing anything about the case, you know that on AU both are morally right, both a1 and a2 are equally permissible. Now suppose that this decision is being made by surgeon: a1 is breaking a promise to perform a surgery for a particular patient and missing a

golf outing, and a2 is handing the case over to one of his residents and catching and hitting the course. The patient will never find out. 1. If AU is true, then a1 is morally permissible. 2. Its not the case that a1 is morally permissible. 3Therefore, AU is not true. The same argument slightly reframed: HU 500 501

a1 a2

1. If AU is true, then a1 is morally obligatory. 2. a1 is not morally obligatory. 3. Therefore, AU is not true. Consider the Medicaid program: Medicaid pays physicians for services provided to those poor enough to qualify for the program. Now consider the following point about Medicaid: MP: The program would collapse if nearly all physicians were not honest in billing Medicaid for their services, the result would be that many poor people would suffer needlessly, and physicians themselves would lose a source of income. Dr. Cheater believes that the Medicaid is too restrictive, and that by being dishonest with her billing, can treat many patients that would have gone untreated because they couldnt afford the treatment, but didnt meet the Medicaid requirements. Now consider the following story: Patty the Patient was denied Medicaid. She has an uncomfortable medical condition that is very treatable, non-life threatening, but painful and uncomfortable. She will not die if she doesnt receive treatment, but she will get a lot of dolors if it is not treated. Dr. Cheater knows that Patty the Patient cannot afford the treatment, but knows also that she could get away with lying to Medicaid and help Patty get her treatment. Patty need not find out about Cheaters dishonesty, she only knows that her treatment is affordable from Cheater, but not from other doctors. Dr. Cheater has two choices: a1. rip off Medicaid, and treat Pattys condition: HU 1500. a2. be honest, and not treat Pattys condition: HU -1000. If AU is true, then Dr. Cheater should perform a1. But consider again point MP: The program would collapse if nearly all physicians were not honest in billing Medicaid for their services, the result would be that many poor people would suffer needlessly, and physicians themselves would lose a source of income.

Thus it seems also that if every doctor acted like Dr. Cheater, then it would cause more harm than good. 1. If AU is true, then its not the case that every doctor should rip off Medicaid. 2. If AU is true, then some doctors (like Cheater) should rip off Medicaid, but not all doctors should act the same way. 3. If some doctors (like Cheater) should rip off Medicaid, but not all doctors should act the same way, then its okay for some people, but not others, to break rules. 4. Its not okay for some people, but not others to break rules. 5. Therefore AU is not true. Some think that this does not mean that utilitarianism is sunk; it just means that it needs to be revised, so that it includes some kind consideration to abiding by rules. So consider a rule based kind of utilitarianism which is called Rule Utilitarianism. RU: An act token A is morally right if and only if A conforms to some rule R such that following R will produce at least as much HU as any other applicable rule. As you can see, the rule utilitarian does not assess the utility of act tokens to determine their moral status, but instead assesses the utility of the rule that the act conforms to. 2 problems for RU as it is stated: the way RU is stated, it is possible for the rule utilitarian to formulate a large number of rules and establish them all separately. This leads to two problems: 1. Rules are likely to conflict when they are applicable to the same case. back to Pattys plight R1: Always be honest R2: Provide care to any patient who needs it. 1. If RU is a good theory for making practical decisions, then Dr. Cheater can adopt both R1 and R2. 2. Dr. Cheater cannot adopt both R1 and R1 (indeed, no doctor could). 3. Therefore RU is not a good theory for making practical decisions. 2. Establishing rules to cover so many different circumstances and circumstances results in such an abundance of rules that it becomes nearly impossible to remember them all, and to implement the theory.

A way to avoid these problems is to switch to a evaluating the HU of closed sets of rules. RU*: An act token A is morally right if and only if A conforms to a set of rules that maximizes HU among the available alternative sets of rules. RU* will most likely get the fraud case right. A problem for RU*: it is either inconsistent, or collapses back into rule utilitarianism. It is clear that on RU*, a set of rule must be adopted: Lets call this set of rules S. 1. Either all of the rules in S will maximize HU, or S will not maximize HU. 2. If S does maximize HU, then RU* is the same as AU. (because otherwise the maximum amount of utility could not result). [So RU* is false]. 3. If not all the rules of S are utility maximizing, then RU* contradicts itself (because it says that it is utility maximizing). [So RU* is false]. 4. Therefore RU* is false. The biggest problem for Utilitarianism in any form: We formulated the principle of utility POU in a variety of ways; one was as GHP, and the other was in terms of maximizing hedonic utility. Perhaps the problem is not with how to formulate the principle, but with the principle itself. The Organ Harvest a1. Kill Digit; transplant organs +5,000 a2. Treat Digit; let five die -5,000 1. If AU is true, then a1 is morally obligatory. 2. It's not the case that a1 is morally obligatory. 3. Therefore, it's not the case that AU is true. 1, 2 MT

Normative Irrelevance of Justice Objection D1. Factor F is normatively irrelevant =df. Factor F has no direct bearing on the moral rightness or wrongness of any action. 1. If AU is true, then justice is normatively irrelevant. 2. It's not the case that justice is normatively irrelevant. 3. Therefore, it's not the case that AU is true. 1, 2 MT