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Mediterranean Historical Review


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Russian consuls and the Greek war of independence (182131)


Lucien J. Frary
a a

Department of History , Rider University , Lawrenceville , New Jersey

To cite this article: Lucien J. Frary (2013): Russian consuls and the Greek war of independence (182131), Mediterranean Historical Review, 28:1, 46-65 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518967.2013.782671

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Mediterranean Historical Review, 2013 Vol. 28, No. 1, 4665, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518967.2013.782671

Russian consuls and the Greek war of independence (1821 31)


Lucien J. Frary*
Rider University, Department of History, Lawrenceville, New Jersey Russian consular dispatches contain vivid descriptions of life in the nineteenthcentury Ottoman Balkans. Besides war and diplomacy, Russian archival materials provide historians with insight on nationalism, religion, and society. The long-lasting struggle for Greek independence (1821 31) created unprecedented challenges for Russian ofcials in Ottoman domains. Tsarist envoys played a mediating role in issues over territories, prisoners of war, religious conversions, and refugee relief. In the context of Russian Ottoman nineteenth-century relations, this article shows that Russian agents worked to protect the rights of Orthodox Christians and promote commercial, cultural, and political connections. It reveals the sometimes contradictory nature of tsarist policy, based on legitimism and reactionary conservatism, yet supportive of movements for independence among Orthodox Christians. Keywords: Eastern Question; Greece; Ottoman Empire; Russia; Balkans

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Manuscripts and archives from Russian consulates in the Ottoman Balkans broaden our perspective on the history of the Eastern Question (the dilemma of what to do with the resilient Ottoman Empire) in the rst half of the nineteenth century. Largely untapped sources from consular posts such as Thessaloniki (Angelo Mustoxidi), the Aegean archipelago (Ioannis Vlassopoulos), northern Greece (Ioannis Paparrigopoulos), and Patras (Ioannis Kallogerakis) present abundant rsthand testimony on the Greek revolt, the problems inherent in Ottoman society, and the rivalries among European powers in the Near East.1 The testimonies of Russian consuls provide rich snapshots of the turmoil of the times. Communications, registers, personal letters, pamphlets, newspaper clippings, and other ofcial and private documents (in a variety of languages) provide multi-faceted reections on a diverse range of ethnic and religious issues, adding depth to what is often portrayed as a military and diplomatic affair. By relating anecdotes, travel impressions and personal encounters, the copious correspondence of Russian consuls casts tful beams of light upon conditions within the Ottoman Empire, and provides historians with a treasure-trove for the study of the Eastern Question. Russian diplomatic activity in the Balkans and Near East was rst established during the reign of Peter the Great (1696 1725). By the early decades of the nineteenth century, Saint Petersburg had created many contacts in the main commercial and political centres of the Ottoman Empire. The responsibilities of Russian consular agents were wideranging. Daily duties included the inspection of passports and regulation of commerce, the maintenance of naval registers, and the collection of data on military affairs. Less frequently, consuls were expected to intervene when Orthodox Christians, Russian ge s, and merchants were treated unfairly. Consular les contain unique records on prote judicial procedures and social practices in cases involving Muslims and Christians. Perhaps the most vexing (but also advantageous) consular task concerned the functioning of the capitulation and berats (deeds of protection) systems. The notorious

*Email: lfrary@rider.edu
q 2013 Taylor & Francis

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capitulation system granted European powers special commercial, judicial, and political ge s (holders of berats) privileges.2 The right to hire talented Ottoman subjects as prote enhanced Russian contacts with the local elite and provided information from remote locations. By the nineteenth century, the employment of Greeks at consular posts in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean had become a special Russian tradition.3 Talented individuals were invited to Saint Petersburg, where they received an education and government salary before returning to Levantine posts as accredited Russian ofcials. Greek Russian agents witnessed dramatic events, interacted with eminent personalities, and left vibrant s reporting their encounters. Their writings illuminate the hopes and dreams, communique hazards and hardships of transitional regions along the Ottoman periphery. They exhibit the nuanced sympathies of the native, and offer intimate insights into lifestyles and practices that often escaped the purview of Western envoys.4 Russian subjects of Greek ancestry constructed a proud sense of identity based on allegiance to the tsar, their Greek homeland, and the greater Orthodox world. Promoting Russian interests and ambitions proved satisfying to these Greeks, who spoke in the name of the tsar. As prominent representatives of Orthodox Christianity, Russian consuls detailed the confused religious realities that constituted the core of the Greek-Ottoman confrontation. The religious connection between Russia and the Orthodox people of the Balkans served as a strong binding element. Russias Orthodox sentiments were extremely important in a society where religion had traditionally dened divisions in the state and dictated the culture of each division. Common Orthodoxy meant common culture, and Saint Petersburgs practice of employing Greeks reinforced the image of Russia as the ultimate liberator and the great benefactor.5 Deep-seated sympathy for Orthodoxy meant that the extensive coverage of the sectarian violence by Russian envoys tended to portray the Greeks in a positive light. Witnesses of numerous attacks by the non-Orthodox, the Russian agents could be very hostile to Turks and Albanians. Yet they were not biased against all Muslims; they even showed sympathy to Muslim leaders. Consular narratives are also excellent sources on Russian Orientalism, a subject of recent interest among historians.6 This article focuses on Russia and the last phase of the Greek revolution based on hitherto neglected Russian consular documents.7 It demonstrates that Russia aimed to maintain commerce and friendship with the Ottoman Empire, safeguard the rights of Orthodox Christians, and develop contacts in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. Whereas the Russian Foreign Ministry professed an attitude of neutrality towards the Greek revolt, on many occasions Saint Petersburg was willing to intervene. An examination of Russian entanglements in near-eastern affairs illuminates the dual character of tsarist policy, which aimed to secure a special position among the Orthodox Christians, while categorically condemning revolutionary disorders and nationalist insurrections against legitimate sovereigns. The Greek revolution broke out in a variety of different places in February as well as March 1821. In February, along the Danube, the dashing Russian general Alexander Ypsilantis and a small force of volunteers marched into Moldavia and proclaimed independence from Ottoman rule. In March, the raising of a Greek ag and the swearing-in of armed men took place in important towns and villages throughout the Peloponnese. In April, according to the traditional account, Archbishop Germanos called for insurrection in Patras and other leaders soon assembled. The numerous movements were not coordinated, and the offensive launched by Ypsilantis was soon crushed. In the Peloponnesus and the mainland, however, concerted attacks by Turks on Greeks or by

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Greeks on Turks lasted for the next decade. There were many victories and defeats of the revolutionaries at sea as well. The Greeks, disorganized and prone to inghting, often came near to complete defeat. The intervention of the European great powers proved crucial in resolving the OttomanGreek encounter. The decisive moment came at the Battle of Navarino in October 1827, when a coalition of European warships annihilated the Ottoman eet and stranded thousands of the sultans troops in hostile territory.8 The period from Navarino to the assassination of President Ioannis Kapodistrias in 1831 underscores the violence that characterized the Greek Ottoman clash and illuminates the process of transition from empire to nation state. Among the studies of this period, the emphasis is on British and Greek sources, although Russian consuls reported directly and regularly about a wide range of issues.9 Subjects of concern included piracy, banditry, boundary disputes, and instances of sectarian violence. The storming of fortresses, mountain ambushes, naval barrages, and hand-to-hand skirmishes is vividly described. The Russian envoys possessed high responsibilities, and their interventions affected the lives of thousands. Ypsilantiss ill-fated revolt in the Danubian principalities created one of the most intense diplomatic exchanges in the history of the Eastern Question. After months of negotiations in 1821, the Ottoman Divan refused to accept a Russian ultimatum regarding the treatment of Orthodox Christians. Reprisals against rebel fugitives and the prolonged occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia by Ottoman troops led to the departure of the Russian envoy to the Sublime Porte, Grigorii Stroganov, an act formalizing the break in Russian Ottoman relations.10 In the following years, Matvei Minchaki (Minciaky) served daffaires of the Russian embassy. In 1825, the Foreign Ministry sent Alexandr as the charge Riboper (Ribeaupierre) as the primary plenipotentiary (he became ambassador in 1826) to the Sublime Porte. Riboper and Minchaki wrote copious memoranda on the Greek revolution based on intelligence from agents throughout the Aegean, the Morea, and the Ionian Islands.11 In 1828, the London Conference sanctioned Greek independence, and Saint Petersburg revived consular stations in Ottoman lands and sent a variety of missions to Greece. Eyewitness reports from the bustling city port of Thessaloniki provide vivid snapshots of the embattled lands of the Ottoman East during the nal years of the Greek revolution.12 Political independence and confessional status became uid in this area of unrest. Thessaloniki les present rst-hand evidence of the exible communal identities, ambiguous confessional ties, and shifting political loyalties characteristic of borderland communities in transition. An educated polyglot native of the Ionian Islands, Angelo Mustoxidi enjoyed a fruitful career as a Russian envoy in the Ottoman Empire for more than 40 years.13 While serving as the Russian vice consul at the Dardanelles during the diplomatic showdown in the summer of 1821, Mustoxidi and his family departed in perilous circumstances. During the following to the Russian mission in years, he visited Trieste, Venice, Naples, and Malta as the attache Turin.14 In September 1827, he resumed his functions as the vice consul at the Dardanelles. When the Russian-Ottoman War (1828 29) began, Mustoxidi joined the Russian otilla in the Mediterranean under the command of Vice-Admiral Login Heyden.15 The Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) that ended the war conrmed Russian privileges in the Danubian principalities and opened the Dardanelles to commercial vessels.16 The peace settlement facilitated trade and created opportunities for determined individuals with knowledge of languages and commerce. Mustodixis experience qualied him well for a busy trading hub like Thessaloniki. He arrived in August 1830 aboard the Russian brig Telemakh, with instructions to supervise various matters in Russian Ottoman and

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Ottoman Greek relations. His tasks included overseeing Russian commerce with the Ottoman Empire, safeguarding the rights of Orthodox and Muslim refugees, and adjudicating in disputes that might cause violence between Ottoman Turkey and the Greek state. Mustoxidis gift for languages and his native familiarity enabled him to establish contacts with informants throughout Rumelia (the southern Ottoman region of the Balkans) and develop close relations with the Turkish elite. The Russian vice consuls rst forays into the messy realities of the Ottoman East brought unforeseen challenges. A specic duty concerned the whereabouts of soldiers missing from the recent Russian Ottoman war. Late in 1830, he learned through his informers that the Turkish authorities were holding four Russian soldiers, including two ofcers, as prisoners in Trikala, a Thessalian town about 100 miles south-east of the sancak (sub-province) capital of Ioannina in central Epirus. Mustoxidi ordered his dragoman (interpreter) Sergei Bogdanov to travel to Ioannina and meet with the Turkish Pasha Mehmed Res  id.17 After a physically demanding journey through brigand-infested, war-torn terrain, Bogdanov was to obtain buyurldi (invitations) from the pasha, make reclamations for Russian merchants, arrange for the deliverance of Christian slaves, and nd a suitable agent among the local elite. In a letter to Nikita Panin, the Russian plenipotentiary in Aegina, Mustoxidi indicated that he had informed the grand vizier of the mission.18 In December 1830, a few hours outside Thessaloniki, Bogdanov witnessed dozens of human heads on pikes along the roadside. His rst dispatch describes a theatre of war and horrors replete with tortured and imprisoned Christians (reaya), villages reduced to cinders, and the complete absence of commerce and agricultural activity due to the massacres committed by Ottoman troops.19 Bogdanov (a graduate of the School of Oriental Languages in Saint Petersburg and competent in Turkish, French, and Italian) was relieved that his travelling companion (a Greek named Georgios) had found them shelter in Katerini, a town in central Macedonia.20 Reaching Ioannina in early January, Bogdanov held a short meeting with the pashas representative, who gave him letters guaranteeing safe travel and the right to obtain the release of the four prisoners. Days later in Trikala, Bogdanov learned that six Russian soldiers had at one time resided in the town. One of them had died months ago, three had ed, and the other two had become members of the community and enjoyed life in Trikala. These six men were not war captives but in fact deserters from the Russian army, and none was an ofcer. According to Bogdanov, these bad subjects (named Pavel, Andrei, Grigorii, Ivan, Garasim Grigoriev, and Iakov Nikolaev) had embraced Islam. The two who remained in Trikala (Garasim and Iakov) now insist on being called Hussein and Mustafa. They had married local women and had no desire to return to Russia. Bogdanov wrote:
In vain I employed all methods of persuasion to convince them to abandon this foreign soil. In vain I tried to reassure them than they had nothing to fear from their Turkish governors. Yet all my efforts failed before a rm conviction that they would not repent as Muslims.21

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The Ottoman authorities were willing to enforce the Russian request and secure the safe passage of the supposed captives. In the end, however, the perplexed dragoman decided not to force the matter, and left the men to their fate. The acceptance of Islam by Hussein and Mustafa reects the uctuating situation on the margins of the Ottoman Empire during the turbulent 1820s. The consulate in Thessaloniki was among several points in the central battle zones where tsarist agents reported on the complexities of the Greek-Ottoman encounter. In Patras, Russian vice consul Ivan Kallogerakis was among the rst authorized by the Foreign Ministry to communicate directly with the independent Greek state. A prosperous, educated merchant

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with roots in Odessa, Kallogerakis had the task of promoting Russian interests in the Ionian Islands, Epirus, the Gulf of Corinth, and the Morea.22 In November 1828, Mark Bulgari, the Russian plenipotentiary in Aegina, ordered him to employ your zeal to protect the commercial interests of Russian subjects, and by this you will acquire new titles of the benevolence of the Foreign Ministry.23 Kallogerakis reported from Patras on shipping, health conditions, and the status of Russian subjects. Of interest to historians on a wide range of issues, his dispatches (led several times a month in French, Russian, Greek, and Italian) include exchanges with Ivan Vlassopoulos, a sort of wandering Russian agent in the Archipelago.24 Arriving in October 1828, Kallogerakis and his large family adjusted well to the people of s describe the regions topography, Patras and their new conditions.25 His rst communique demography, industry, and commerce and commented on its history and antiquities. Kallogerakis praised the advantages of the city port and its resources, and emphasized the potential for economic and cultural development. Patras and its environs would be among the best and strongest in free Greece, averred Kallogerakis: The public places, columns, and straight roads all well aligned gave the external appearance of a European city.26 The Russian consul visited farms, orchards, and artisan establishments throughout the Peloponnesus and the Gulf of Corinth and established contacts with local Greeks, including doctors, merchants, lawyers, and politicians. He intervened in the affairs of Russian merchants, while highlighting the loyalty of the Greeks to the tsar. Although his enthusiasm later mellowed, Kallogerakis ens were the best Greeks around.27 boasted that les Patre When the Greek state was created, the location of the capital remained undecided. Rather than Nafplion, the de facto centre of authority, Kallogerakis favoured Patras for its suitability for regulating trade between Malta, France, the Ionian Islands, the Adriatic Gulf, and the Levant.28 The regions main cash crop, the Corinthian currant (popular among the British who use the little berries in scones, Christmas cake, mincemeat, and much else) promised to benet merchants, sailors, and skippers,29 although Kallogerakis lamented that the long and destructive conict had dealt devastating blows to the orchards and farms:
A mournful and majestic silence reigns all around. The depopulation, the solitude, and the vivid memories of recent times cannot but cause shivers. The absence of agriculture and labour in these beautiful lands that in the past were the roof of so many people! Pray the vineyards, which produce the beautiful fruit of Corinth, have been miraculously spared the destruction of the barbarians and the sorrows of numerous campaigns.30

Patras, observed Kallogerakis, must rival in beauty the most attractive city in Italy, if only due to its happy and charming physical situation.31 The city itself consisted of two parts: an elevated old town with a fortress, and a lower new town with squares, wide streets, a government building, hospital, prison, and slaughterhouse. Yet these days are fraught with troubles, Kallogerakis warned, entangled by so many foreign adventurers, speculators, and men without faith.32 In order to present a positive message to the people, Kallogerakis wrote, I display myself in all affairs as a zealous co-religionist who sincerely admires the government for its virtuous and humane principles.33 Violence and uncertainty characterized life in the Morea, as the Greek government struggled to survive. A vexing problem concerned the large contingent of Arab and Egyptian troops (at one time as many as 50,000) under the leadership of Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt (the son of Muhammad Ali), that had been terrorizing the Morea and trouncing the divided Greek forces since 1824.34 Kallogerakis claimed that, as long as these soldiers remained in the Morea, any Greek action north of Corinth was impossible. He urged the Russian Foreign Ministry to pressure the Ottoman authorities to recall the Arab-Egyptian

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expedition and send a squadron to Navarino Bay as a show of strength. To hasten their departure, Kallogerakis facilitated the efforts of the French forces in the region to occupy the Morea. He also encouraged the government to create roads and hospitals and he opened the consulate (his home) to French generals.35 The nal battles for fortresses in western Greece in 1828 29 underscore the tenacity which years of bloodshed had inspired the adversaries. Claiming to be a faithful son of the fatherland, Kallogerakis compared the Greek campaign to the valiant experience of Russia in 1812.36 In January 1829, he received word from his agent in Mytika (the headquarters of the Greek army under the British General Sir Richard Church) that the Turkish-held city of Vonitsa, across the Gulf of Corinth, was under blockade, and the Ottoman leader was bound to capitulate at any moment.37 One week later Kallogerakis learned that the Albanian portion of the garrison was ready to evacuate for the sum of 6,000 Turkish tallaris, and that another 30,000 would sufce to open the doors of nearby Preveza.38 Greek troops occupied the spot in December, but Ottoman forces held rm in the castle. Kallogerakis was exasperated that the Greek captains ordered the burning of the town, despite its probable future importance.39 In March, Kallogerakis claimed that the Turks inside the fortress were eating their horses; he hoped that neither side would suffer longer.40 When the citadel nally fell, his emotional report gushes with Greek heroism and celebrates the triumph over tyranny: prayers are being chanted in all the churches and the people of Patras rejoice in the streets.41 The Greek armies next turned their attention to the acropolis at Nafpaktos (Lepanto), which they besieged by land and bombarded by sea. The Ottoman garrison suffered a fate similar to the one in Vonitsa. The Albanian irregulars departed, and the Turkish commander refused to surrender without orders from the capital. There is no other nation like the Turks, wrote Kallogerakis, who are able to endure with greater steadfastness all the horrors of a siege. It is tenacious.42 Although rmly committed to the Greek cause, Kallogerakis condemned the blockaders mutinous spirit and vindictiveness. Meanwhile, he wrote moving descriptions of the ight of Muslim families and the assault on refugees by brigands.43 In early 1829, President Kapodistrias was beginning his second year in power.44 The nal battles in western Greece underscore the challenges facing the government. Uncertain about the loyalty of the generals and the discipline of the army, Kapodistrias sent his brother, Agostino, as lieutenant plenipotentiary to oversee operations in the north, with far-reaching authority to control pay, rations, and supplies.45 According to Kallogerakis, Agostino inspired condence among the Greek palikaria (brave young men). In March, Agostino took direction of the Nafpaktos siege, ignoring the authority of generals Church and Demetrios Ypsilantis. By overstepping these two popular generals, Agostino opened the door to criticism, but Kallogerakis supported the centralizing tendencies and pro-Russian sympathies of the presidents brother: The troops under the orders of the lieutenant plenipotentiary steadfastly and faithfully occupy the important parts of Thermopoly and Boundounitsa. Boeotia and Livadia are free from the presence of Ottomans, thanks to the actions of Count Kapodistrias.46 The formal demonstration of the presence of the Greek government in western Greece, Kallogerakis declared, created auspicious circumstances: never before since the outbreak of the revolution had there been an epoch more favourable to the Hellenes to advance their armies into Epirus and push their conquests all the way to Ioannina.47 Whereas Western observers generally condemned Agostino, the Russian vice consul praised his energetic and authoritative manner.48

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During the Russian Ottoman war, Ottoman governor Mehmed Res  id Pasha was forced to leave mainland Greece and Epirus without troops. The power vacuum provided the Greeks with an excellent opportunity for expansion into Boeotia and Phocis, and then into Thessaly. The liberation of lands by the Greeks, extolled Kallogerakis, would mean an imminent end to the suffering of thousands of Orthodox Christians. Critical of the Turkish-Albanian soldiers level of courage, Kallogerakis claimed the Greeks owed their success to their religious fervour, ardent patriotism, and determined leadership.49 Unfortunately, according to the Scottish historian George Finlay, the anarchy that still prevailed among the Greek chiefs prevented the numerical superiority of the Greek forces from being available.50 Ivan Paparrigopoulos, one of the great Greek veterans in Russian service (the dragoman of the vice consulate in Patras before the outbreak of the Greek revolt), was another important tsarist envoy in newly independent Greece. He became a key mediator in deciding the fate of the fortresses still under Ottoman command, although historians have under-appreciated his accomplishments.51 A practised diplomat with an intimate knowledge of local society and politics, Paparrigopoulos engaged in direct discussions with joint Turkish Greek committees. His verbal skills (he spoke Turkish, as well as Greek, French, Russian, and Italian) and experience made him a particularly suitable emissary. He nearly singlehandedly negotiated a peaceful solution to several crises, although his talent engendered the jealousy of the other European consuls.52 Since the garrison majority at Nafpaktos consisted of Turks from Constantinople and Anatolia, the struggle for the citadel continued for weeks. Kallogerakis reported that the besieged Turks refused to give up without orders from the military leadership in Istanbul.53 Fortunately, Paparrigopouloss judicious intervention and the desperation of the garrison persuaded the Turks to cooperate. The pasha suggested an immediate end to hostilities and insisted upon the right to send a courier to Ioannina to ask for further orders. Agostino (backed by a force of 3000 troops of the line) rejected this proposition, but negotiations under the guidance of Paparrigopoulos continued.54 Despite days of cannon bombardment and a desperate lack of supplies, the Ottoman commander remained resolute. Finally, in April, Paparrigopoulos negotiated the surrender in exchange for amnesty and guaranteed safe passage to Ottoman territory. The city had not been in Greek hands since Byzantine times, and the shores of the Gulf of Corinth were now rmly under Greek control. For his efforts in nalizing the negotiations, the pasha awarded Paparrigopoulos two splendid stallions.55 Thus a Russian agent of Greek extraction was the crucial link ending a long and bitter struggle. Not without considerable effort, he persuaded the Turkish commanders to depart peacefully, while reining in the ambitions of Greek captains. He owed at least some of his success to Agostino, whom he singled out as a balanced and intelligent individual. By the summer of 1829, the successful campaigns in Rumelia enabled the Greek government to incorporate valuable territory into the Greek state.56 How far the Greeks aimed to push their territorial claims into Ottoman lands was a matter of some perplexity to Russian agents. Messolonghi was among the last major outposts of Turkish power in the western mainland. The site of the legendary yet tragic Greek resistance (and the death of Lord Byron), the town was an irresistible target for independence, as rumours circulated of potential horrors against Christians if it was left under Ottoman control. Led by the British Captain Frank Hastings, Greek forces laid siege to the fortress by the end of April. The Turkish-Albanian population inside began to show signs of despair as the Greek ship Karteria made a prolonged assault on the coastline and

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the nearby fortress at Anatoliko.57 Once again, Paparrigopoulos offered his services to resolve the encounter, and the commandant of the citadel invited the Russian agent to his headquarters to discuss an armistice.58 After numerous meetings, Paparrigopouloss efforts resulted in a peace treaty signed on 2 May 1829.59 According to the agreement, Turkish civilians inside the fort were free to leave with their movable property at the expense of the Greek government. Once the noncombatants evacuated, the treaty promised Ottoman troops safe passage overland with their animals. Such a peaceful resolution contrasts with the violent exchanges along the Greek Ottoman border in later years. Overall, an incalculable number of Turks undertook an exodus from the land where they had lived and prospered for centuries. Predictably, the religious factor was never far from the minds of the adversaries: clause six of the peace agreement negotiated by Paparrigopoulos stipulated that the Turks were to hand over to Greek families all children under the age of four, even if they were Muslim. The Greek leaders warned that any future remonstrance on this or other matters would indicate breech of the agreement.60 As conditions appeared to become calmer, the Greek governments inability to collect revenue and command allegiance rekindled the res of protest. In the wake of nearly 10 years of constant warfare, many of the Greek irregulars grew restive as their government failed to live up to its promises. President Kapodistriass centralizing tendencies generated resentment among the military chieftains, and his choice of personnel remained consistently unlucky. A good example of the presidents unpopular behaviour was his decision to visit the disgruntled Greek camps, where, instead of making concessions, he criticized the captains for incompetence.61 Clamours for back pay and allowances for food inspired mutinies among the Greek troops in Nafpaktos and Messolonghi. In June 1829, Kallogerakis wrote to Panin, the Russian representative in Argos, that the irregular Hellenic troops stationed at Nafpaktos began by chasing all troops of the line and artillery from their posts. They have seized all the batteries of the fortress, where they post their black and red banners. The insurgents demand their outstanding pay.62 In response, the Greek government asked for 20 days to raise the funds, and this prevented bloodshed. At this point, Kallogerakis expressed sympathy for the rebels, who elected representatives, composed lists of grievances, and displayed general prudence. Yet he feared the tide of rebellion would swell and recommended paying the troops (national heroes).63 Weeks passed and the mutinous garrisons began to suffer from a lack of supplies. Once again, Paparrigopoulos led the negotiations, which centred on payment, retention of ranks and munitions, and a subsidy for food. The government tried to foment dissension between the various insurgent captains, although by November the movement had died down and the irregular troops surrendered.64 By the end of 1829, the Greeks had overwhelmed their enemies and conquered the last fortresses of the mainland. Further north, hostilities continued as Albanians revolted against their Turkish commanders. Unrest in Epirus raged as Russian agents took hasty measures to ensure the livelihood of Christians. Consular reports contain vivid, gruesome tales of massacres of Christians by renegade Albanians. Kallogerakis wrote:
My pen falls from my hands from trying to expose all of the horrors and cruelties that the Albanians commit in the district of Zaghori (near Ioannina) that is composed of forty villages of only Christians. Havoc, pillage, the violation of virgins as young as twelve, mutilations and tortures in boiling water are inicted on the bodies of the unfortunates who are forced to give up their gold and jewels. Other horrible acts are committed with impunity.65

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Kallogerakis lamented of the need to rely on intelligence from unofcial sources and called for the posting of Russian agents in Preveza and Ioannina. In Thessaloniki,

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Mustoxidi seconded the appeal for a Russian agent in Epirus and Albania. He warned of the weakness of the Portes authority, and described the plight of numerous deserters, refugees, women and children slaves who have escaped massacre and wish to become naturalized citizens in Greece.66 A common theme in the Russian consular reports is the unrest in Albanian territories, an understudied subject that illuminates the development of Balkan nationalisms and the destabilization of Ottoman society. While a vital component of the sultans striking force, the Albanians could be ckle if left unpaid or exposed to undue risks. The degree to which Albanians were friends or foes of the Sublime Porte was never clear, and captains and their troops frequently changed sides in the middle of a campaign. Russian reports indicate that the Albanians retained their own unique esprit de corps, which separated them from the Turkish commanders. At Nafpaktos, for example, the Albanian portion of the garrison was the rst to surrender (in exchange for an indemnity), underscoring the precariousness and unpredictability of the sultans multi-ethnic armies. Albanian unrest deserves emphasis, for it weakened Ottoman ghting power and divided local authorities.67 When the Greek Ottoman war came to an end, the boundaries of the new state and the extent of its sovereignty remained unsettled. The debate was outside the control of the Kapodistrian government. Rather, the London Conference (which consisted of the French and Russian ambassadors as well as the British foreign secretary) determined these issues, while the fate of the Ottoman Empire hung in the balance.68 A turning point occurred in March 1829, when the Allied Powers agreed to assign to Greece northern borders extending on a line from Volos to Arta, plus the island of Evvia, which had a Greek majority. The Peloponnesus, naturally, was assured, since Ibrahim Pasha and his army had withdrawn. Russian diplomacy aimed towards a viable frontier that would induce peaceful relations, whereas the British leadership favoured a truncated state consisting of the Peloponnesus and Cyclades Islands. Although not entirely successful, Russian pressure helped the Greek state retain hard-won territories. Once the sultan submitted to the daffaires to Greece, Mark Bulgari, was convinced that it negotiations, the Russian charge was Russias special ability to convince the Ottoman Porte that had led to the establishment of strong Greek borders. Fortunately, the positions that the Greeks occupy in the north of the continent dont call for new efforts or new conquests to maintain.69 The boundary settlement did not satisfy everybody. President Kapodistrias was bitterly disappointed about the decision to keep the islands of Crete and Samos under Ottoman rule.70 He repeatedly lobbied Saint Petersburg, and sent vivid letters regarding the potential dangers to Christians.71 Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode did his best to guarantee the livelihood of Christians. Saint Petersburg contributed 50,000 pounds sterling to the Greek government in 1829, and made plans to educate hundreds of young Greeks in Russian military academies.72 Unfortunately for Greek patriots, later diplomatic negotiations reduced the northern frontier to a line running from Aspropotamos to Volos, thus leaving predominantly Greek-speaking regions within the sultans territory. By 1830, much remained undecided on the mainland. One troublesome question concerned the Turks demand for an indemnity. The legal rights of Muslim Turks, who were forced to abandon territories that had been in their possession for centuries, consumed the attention of the Russian consular staff. They who worked diligently to disentangle this thorny problem, which encompassed family inheritance, religious foundations (waqfs), mosques, convents, and Christian slaves. Since the Greek government had no funds with which to meet their demands, Ottoman troops rode roughshod over regions along the demarcation line in the summer of 1830.

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Meanwhile, Muslim Turks were still in control of the Acropolis in Athens, and continued to resist resettlement.73 Paparrigopoulos (who established residence as the Russian consul in Attica and Evvia in 1831) proved himself an astute observer, and composed extensive reports on the internal affairs of the Ottoman borderlands. One of his primary tasks was to determine the indemnities due to Turks for evacuated properties. Frustrated from the beginning, he openly criticized the Ottoman governor of Attica, Hadji-Ismail Bey, for corruption and avarice, and accused him of appropriating a large portion (up to ten per cent) of the prots when selling waqfs, mosques, and territories owned by Turkish families.74 The Russian consul also blamed Hadji-Ismail for sanctioning a host of disorders in Attica: The fraudulent and deceptive system that he continuously follows makes him appear odious among Greeks and Turks alike.75 The Greek commission petitioned for Russian protection, as Hadji-Ismail continued to ignore the law. Paparrigopoulos complained bitterly:
The Turks continue to put their horses and other livestock in the few churches which remain. Religion and Politics equally impose upon me the need to interfere in this affair, especially since the Christian inhabitants of the city are profoundly affected by this act done on their places of prayer. As the Russian consul, I have demanded that the serasker [commander-inchief] immediately evacuate all the churches.76

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Paparrigopoulos went so far as to write directly to the Greek president to garner support for the protection of Christians and their churches. After meeting with Hadji-Ismail, he was able to ensure their evacuation.77 He informed Panin:
I give good people money to help encourage them to get busy restoring the desolated churches. The cost is only twenty tallaris, but the effect it produces on the hearts of inhabitants, as a sign of the benevolent interest of our August Master [Nicholas I], is considerable.78

Sectarian clashes characterize these tense months of transition in the marginal regions. Receiving alarming news that the lives of Christians were in peril in Elefsina (Eleusis), which was still under Ottoman control, Paparrigopoulos facilitated the evacuation of Greek families. Thanks to his intervention, troops on both sides of the border returned to their positions after several tense days. He recommended that the Greek government issue strict orders to captains of irregular forces to prevent a conict.79 By the spring of 1831, Paparrigopoulos claimed to have protected the lives of more than 6000 Christians still under Ottoman authority in Attica. He intervened personally when Turks and Albanians physically beat Christian locals at midday in the middle of the market.80 He sent agents to Nafpaktos, Amssa, and Galaxidi, corresponded regularly with Kapodistrias, and employed Alexander Vlassopoulos (the son of the veteran Russian agent) as his dragoman.81 Meanwhile, he repeatedly complained to Apolonarii Butenev, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, about his substantial property losses since the outbreak of the revolt.82 In the summer of 1831, attention turned to the north, where Paparrigopoulos reported that the Turks were committing outrageous acts against the Christian inhabitants of Evvia. He petitioned Omer Pasha (the commander of the island), claiming he was using all measures in my power to put an end to the trouble.83 While sanctioning Paparrigopouloss efforts and encouraging him to continue, the Russian Foreign Ministry feared that a general uprising would place the destiny of the country in jeopardy and expose its frontiers to an Ottoman invasion.84 As the Russian delegation in Constantinople pressured the grand vizier, Paparrigopouloss hard-nosed persistence prompted Omer Pasha to do his duty and respect Christians. In the autumn of 1831, Paparrigopoulos wrote from Athens: The Turkish authorities and the Turks in general are taken by the idea, due to the present circumstances, that Attica

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and Evvia will be divvied up in their favour.85 Ties to the land were strongly emotional, especially since ten years of successive devastation had left many areas barren. A sense of nostalgia exudes from an anecdote about a Turk, who, starting on his sad departure from Attica, turns a last time to gaze on the Piraeus: Overcome with emotion, he prostrated himself, and kissed the ground from which he and his fathers had drawn their life. Sweetest fatherland! he cried, I am leaving you, and shall never see you again!86 Both sides suffered from religious and ethnic persecution and forced resettlement.87 Instances of the maltreatment of Christians appear in the dispatches of Mustoxidi in Thessaloniki. He complained that the military exercises in Rumelia resulted in bloodshed, including the massacre of Greek captains and their families. Hundreds of Greeks ed to the mountains, where they were chased by Turks who caused huge disorders, pillaging and killing without any regard. The [Turkish] commanders themselves permitted insults and acts of violence against innocent Christians.88 In response to Greek petitions, Mustoxidi sent letters of protest to the Ottoman government. His negotiations with Mehmed Res  id permitted several hundred families to settle in the Greek kingdom.89 Mustoxidi provided his own funds to cover the exodus.90 An important portion of Russian Ottoman relations during the 1820s concerns the lives of Christians taken as slaves by Ottoman soldiers.91 Kallogerakis, Vlassopoulos, Paparrigopoulos, Rikman, Riboper, and Mustoxidi received scores of letters from the Greek government and common people asking for intervention. As the only independent Orthodox nation in the world, the Russian state and society reacted with determination. The various echelons of the Russian empire engaged in a nationwide relief effort. Russian consuls compiled detailed lists of captives names, location at the time of capture, and status inside Ottoman territory.92 During the revolt, whole families had been relocated from the mainland and islands to places as far as eastern Anatolia and Bulgaria. In the interests of humanity and religion, Russian Ambassador Riboper protested to the highest Ottoman authorities. The response was that the slaves were the legal private property of their owners. After a long correspondence, the upshot was unfavourable for the captives and their families, who remained slaves of the sultan.93 An incident involving a young Turkish girl during Paparrigopouloss tenure in Athens provides an interesting image of the times. According to the Russian consular record, during the opening days of hostilities in 1821, a Greek priest in Athens took possession of a two-year-old Turkish girl. Ten years later, when conditions had stabilized, the priest returned to Athens with the youngster. The girls father, who still resided in the town, learned of her presence and petitioned Mehmed Res  id, asking to take custody of her. When a body of Greek representatives complained, the Ottoman authorities decided to ask the girl where she wished to live. Paparrigopoulos, a participant in the negotiations, helped organize a mixed Greek-Turkish commission to decide her fate. After some debate, the commission resolved to allow her to live with her father for a term of eight days, after which she could make up her own mind. The girl, elegantly clad in gold jewellery and sumptuous attire, appeared in front of the mixed commission and a large crowd eight days later. The commission asked her a series of questions (some of which Paparrigopoulos posed personally). In sum, the girl declared that she only wanted to live with the Christians. Paparrigopoulos concluded: the Turks did not dare complain, and the girl was shipped off to an orphanage on Aegina.94 The case of the Turkish girl and the Russian converts to Islam are just two of the many fascinating stories contained in consular reports during the Greek revolution. Russian consuls helped set the groundwork for political and economic development, and their writings detail the growth of parties and clientele networks, nancial issues and health

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standards. The assassination of President Kapodistrias in October 1831 provided a further need for strong avenues of inuence. The rst ambassador to Greece, Gabriel Katakazi (a Greek from Constantinople), arrived late in 1832.95 Russian consular writings enhance our understanding of the historical development of Russian ties to the Christian East. They offer insight into the functioning of Ottoman politics, the dynamics of great power diplomacy, the construction of identities, and the formation of nation states. Beset with conicting tensions, Russian policy-makers aimed for the pacication of the region, yet were willing to resort to aggressive measures when their demands went unmet. Greek-Russian commentators might have made harsh judgements about Ottoman rule, but they addressed certain realities that were undeniable to other observers, and they could pronounce harsh indictments of their coreligionists. While working to protect Christian lives and properties, Russian agents encountered unexpected challenges based on the religious and legal status of Christians in regions on the margins of empire and independence. As intermediaries, Greek-Russian agents played moderating roles by counselling caution and conciliation. They worked to reconcile messy quarrels about personal property, family relations, and confessional status. Both Greeks and Turks urged Russian ofcials to rectify their grievances, although the tsarist ofcials resisted claims that went beyond legal contracts. Often working in concert with their British and French counterparts, Russian consuls proved persuasive thanks to their unique talents. They played pivotal roles in the greater scheme of nineteenth-century international relations. Thanks to cordial relations with the local population and effective interaction with Greek and Turkish ofcials (according to particular assumptions and customs), Greeks in Russian service perpetuated the image of Russia as the supreme guardian of the Christian East. Notes
1. All the documents referred to in this essay come from the Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiskoi Imperii (Archive of Foreign Policy of Imperial Russia, hereafter AVPRI), specically collections 133 (Kantseliariia MID), 159 (Formuliarnye spiski), 165/2 (Any-missiia), 180 (Posolstvo v Konstantinopole). For each source, I cite the exact archival reference, including collection (f.), index (op.), le (d.), and page (l.). The documents place of composition and date (the Julian calendar used by Russia followed 12 days behind the Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century), is followed by the archival reference. Selected Russian archival reports during these years are published in Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Vneshniaia Politika Rossii (hereafter VPR); Lisovoi, Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle. AVPRI holdings are listed in Budnik, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii. Recent monographs based on AVPRI materials include Gerd, Konstantinopol i Peterburg; Lisovoi, Russkoe dukhovnoe i politicheskoe prisutstvie; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia. On the capitulations, see van den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System; van den Boogert and Fleet, The Ottoman Capitulations; Eldem, Capitulations and Western gime des Trade; Prousis, British Consular Reports; Homsy, Les capitulations; Essad, Du re capitulations ottomans; Genton, De la juridiction. On the social and economic setting, see Quataert, The Age of Reforms; Puryear, International Relations and the Levant; McGrew, ge s, see also Kontogiannis, Oi prostatevomenoi. Land and Revolution. On the prote The Russian practice of employing Greeks became a family affair, as fathers found openings in Russian service for their sons and grandsons, widows gained pensions, and daughters became educated. On Greeks in Russian service, see Batalden, Catherine IIs Greek Prelate; Bruess, Religion, Identity and Empire; Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie; idem., Albaniia i Epir; idem, Ioann Kapodistriia; Pappas, Greeks in Russian Military Service; Prousis, Russian Society; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia; idem, 50 let na sluzhbe Rossii; Priakhin, Greki v istorii Rossii; idem., Lambros Katsonis; Muratidi, Greki-admiraly i generaly; Nikolopoulos, Greki v Rossiia; idem, ` propos de luvre des employe s grecs; idem, K From Agathangelos; Papoulidis, A voprosu o deiatelnosti grekov; Katsiardi-Hering, Mythos kai Istoria.

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Accounts of British ofcials are reproduced in Prousis, British Consular Reports; idem, Lord Strangford; Dakin, British Intelligence; Fleming, John Capodistrias. Foreign Ofce archives are described in Prevelakis and Kalliataki, Epirus, Ali Pasha, and the Greek Revolution; Prevelakis and Gardikas-Katsiadakis, Correspondence between the Foreign Ofce and the ritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Gre ` ce introduce French British Embassy. Driault and Lhe foreign ministry les. Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, 102. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism; Tolz, European, National and (Anti-) Imperial; Taki, Orientalism on the Margins; Brower and Lazzerini, Russias Orient; Frye, Oriental Studies. General accounts of the period include Finlay, History, 2: 195 289; Brewer, The Greek War of Independence, 325 51; Petrunina, Grecheskaia natsiia, 147222; Dakin, The Greek Struggle, 238 312. Antonio Sandrini, Russian commercial agent in Zakynthos (Zante), described the elation of the Greek population at the arrival of the Russian frigate Elena after the battle: the crowds of islanders who welcomed the Russian frigate incurred the indignation and the jealousy of the British authorities (who maintained a protectorate of the Ionian Islands): Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zante, 9.10.1827, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 12441 (1827), ll. 270 1. Sandrini left a fresh description of the battle: Sandrini to Nesselrode, Zante, 12.10.1827, ll. 272 3 (VPR, 15: 271 2). His two sons served for the Russian Foreign Ministry (see AVPRI, f. 159, op. 664, d. 2962 4). On Russian participation at Navarino, see Andrienko, Do i posle Navarina; Bronevskii, Navarinskaia bitva; Bogdanovich, Navarin; Rykachev, God navarinskoi kampanii; Daly, Russian Seapower, 9 21; Liakhov, Russkaia armiia i ot, 203 26; Anderson, Naval Wars, 52333. On the Greek revolt and the Ionian Islands, see Wrigley, The Diplomatic Signicance and The Ionian Islands. Vakalopoulos, Istoria, vol. 8; Photiadis, I epanastasi tou eikosiena, vol. 4; Papadopoulou, I epanastasi stin dytiki sterea Ellada; Vakalopoulos, I periodos tis anarhias, draw on Greek archives. British records are featured in Dontas, The Last Phase; Dakin, British and American ritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Gre ` ce, 1: 398 465, utilize Philhellenes. Driault and Lhe French reports. On the Kapodistrian period, see Woodhouse, Capodistria; Petropoulos, Politics and Statecraft, 107 52; Kaldis, John Capodistrias. On the Greek revolt and the Russian-Ottoman encounter, see VPR, 13: 113 9, 132 3, 154 9, 162 8, 176 8, 203 10, 224 7, 637 48; Prousis, Russian Society, 37 8; idem, Russian Ottoman Relations, 27; idem, Lord Strangford. Selected material from the writings of Minchaki and Riboper are published in VPR, vols 13 16. Russian agents reported from Aegina (Ivan Vlassopoulos), Zakynthos (Anton Sandrini), Corfu (S.P. Popandopoulo), Mytilini and Syros (S.L. Svilarch), Santorini (B. Marchesini), Naxos (K. Raftopoulos), Samos (G. Svoronos), Mykonos (Pietro Kordia), Tinos (Ivan Dzhani), Navarino (P. Robert), Cyprus (Mario Santi), and elsewhere. See, Delo ob uchrezhdenii konsulstv, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 78 (1829); AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831); Teplov, Russkie predstaviteli. Russian relations with Thessaloniki began in the eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century, the sancak (sub-province) of Thessaloniki was a valuable centre of Russian commercial, religious, and military enterprise. See, Frary, Russian Interests; Mazower, Salonika; Svoronos, Le commerce de Salonique; Papazoglou, I Thessaloniki. Mustoksitsi, Anzhelo Arsenevich, AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2343; Frary, Russian Interests; Toussimis, Angelos Moustoxydis. Mustoxidi to Kapodistrias, Corfu, 8.09.1821, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 7185 (1821), l. 1; Mustoxidi to Emperor Nikolai, Venice, 10.05.1827, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 7429 (1827), l. 1. Mustoxidis well-known brother Andreas (a historian and later Greek minister of education) also served at the Russian post in Turin. Mustoxidi to Nesselrode, Padua, 14.07.1828, ibid., l. 3. Bitis, Russia and the Eastern Question, 274 425, covers the war using records in the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voeno-istoricheskii arvhiv (RGVIA); Liakhov, Russkaia armiia i ot, 203 26, describes naval operations; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 343 63, provides the Ottoman view; Sheremet, Turtsiia i Adrianopolskii mir examines the peace treaty. Mustoxidi to Rikman, Thessaloniki, 15.02.1831, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 513/1, d. 1295 (1831), ll. 34 5.

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Mustoxidi to Panin, Thessaloniki, 13.02.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), l. 146. Bogdanov to Mustoxidi, 30.12.1830, Katarina, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1295 (1831), l. 9. The dragomans service record is contained in Bogdanov, Sergei Ivanovich, AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 386. Bogdanov to Mustodixi, 12.02.1831, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1296 (1832), ll. 36 7. A copy of the letter is contained in AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), ll. 147 9. Kallogerakiss service le is contained in AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 1592. Bulgari to Kallogerakis, Poros, 17.11.1828, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1228 (1830), l. 29. Bulgari was of Greek heritage and served as the Russian plenipotentiary to Greece from 1828 to 1829. See Bulgari, Mark Nikolaevich, AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 497. Bulgari to Kallogerakis, Aegina, 9.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 83 (1829), ll. 1 2; Kallogerakis to Vlassopoulos, Patras, 28.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 190, ll. 11 16. On Vlassopoulos, see Vlasopulo, I.N., AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 693; Stanislavskaia, Rossiia i Gretsiia, 276, 281, 285 7, 310, 321 2, 332 3; Arsh, Albaniia i Epir, 2217; Melnitskii, Tri glavy, 348 9. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 1.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 1. On Patras during this period, see Lazares, Kapodistriaki Patra; idem, Politiki istoria tis Patras, 1: 13 53. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 5.01.1829, ibid., l. 18. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 5.01.1829, ibid., l. 17. Later he complained of an insufcient salary, the climate, and sanitary conditions and begged for transfer to Crete, Chios, and Smyrna. See Kallogerakis to Riboper, Patras, 8.10.1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1228 (1830), ll. 21 2; Kallogerakis to Rikman, Nafplion, 28.12.1830, ibid., ll. 26 7; Kallogerakis to Rikman, Patras, 15.05.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831), l. 50. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 12.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 57, d. 72 (1829), ll. 22 3. The name currant derives from a hybrid Anglo-French expression, raisin de Courantz. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 12.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 22. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 5.01.1829, ibid., l. 18. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 5.01.1829, ibid., l. 18. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 18.04.1829, ibid., l. 237. On the activities of the Egyptian navy, Ibrahim and his army, see Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 293 ` res fre gates; Finlay, History, 2: 47 83, 112 59; Brewer, The Greek War 9; Douin, Les premie ritier, Histoire diplomatique, 1: 409 19. of Independence, 234 46; Driault and Lhe Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 1.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 1. dition de Cre ` te et de la More e; Mangeart, Accounts of the French forces include Driault, Lexpe e; Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics, 12 22; Kremmydas, O Souvenirs de la More gallikos stratos stin Peloponniso. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 4.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 12. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 10.01.1829, ibid., l. 21. On the Vonitsa campaigns and the activities of Church, see Vakalopoulos, Istoria tou neou ellenismou, 8: 109 115; Dontas, The Last Phase, 126 35; Dakin, The Greek Struggle, 230 5, 247 57. For fortress details, see Andrews, Castles of the Morea. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 16.01.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 30. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 6.02.1829, ibid., l. 48. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 2.03.1829, ibid., l. 66. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 9.03.1829, ibid., l. 69. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 9.04.1829, ibid., l. 213. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 17.04.1829, ibid., l. 223; Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 26.04.1829, ibid., l. 240; Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 28.05.1830, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 135 (1830), ll. 65 6. Woodhouse, Capodistria, 435 59. Finlay, History, 2: 207; Vakalopoulos, Istoria, 8: 109 15; Dontas, The Last Phase, 135 9; Woodhouse, Capodistrias, 439. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 25.03.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), ll. 97 8. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 26.03.1829, ibid., l. 97. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 3.04.1829, ibid., l. 210. Woodhouse, The Greek War of Independence, 135, claims Agostinos assertive folly led to the resignation of Sir Richard Church, the one man capable of ensuring that the Greeks enjoyed at least de facto occupation of

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the disputed areas. Philips, The War of Greek Independence, 294 5, describes Agostino in highly negative terms and accuses President Kapodistrias of alienating the people by his proclivity for compatriots of the same semi-Venetian Corot aristocracy; Finlay, History, 2: 207, labels Agostino as really little better than a fool and a miserable creature; Lane-Poole, Sir Richard Church, 71, writes, Agostino can only be described as a contemptible fool . . . the puny nonentity who happened to be the brother of John Capodistrias. Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 10.05.1830, AVPRI, f. 165/2, d. 507, d. 135 (1830), l. 58. This attitude coincides neatly with the tsarist policy of Ofcial Nationality. See Riasanovsky, Nicholas I; Whittaker, The Origins of Russian Education. Finlay, History, 2: 206. See Paparrigopouloss service le, Paparigopulo, I.K., AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2565; Nikopoulos, Greki v Rossii, 120 48; Goudas, Vioi paralliloi, 5: 203 48; Arsh, Albaniia i Epir, 315 6; Skiotis, The Greek Revolution, 100 2; Kandiloros, I Philiki Etaireia, 229, 233 5, 315 8, 353; Sphyroeras, O Philikos Ioannis Paparrigopoulos; Pappas, Greeks in Russian Military Service, 301 3. Philips, The War of Greek Independence, 325, describes Paparrigopoulos as a wily Greek . . . who had studied a rude diplomacy in the school of Ali Pasha. Woodhouse, Capodistria, 474, refers to him as only a Russian Commissioner. Greek historians have been more generous. The contemporary Phrantzi, Epitomi tis istorias, 3: 85 90, ascribed the relatively harmonious peace-making process to Paparrigopoulos; Papadopoulou, I epanastasi, 128 30, notes that Paparrigopoulos, well known among Turkish educated men in the area, enjoyed the condence and respect of the Ottoman authorities; Vakalopoulos, Istoria, 8: 120, 347, underscores his pivotal role and longstanding relationship with the Turkish leaders. An exception is William Meyer, the British consul at Preveza, with whom Paparrigopoulos worked closely. In the summer of 1831, the two men made an excursion deep into Ottoman territory in order to persuade Grand Vizier Mehmed Res  id Pasha to protect hundreds of Greek families and captives taken during the rebellion. An extensive correspondence between Paparrigopoulos, Rikman, Meyer, and Mehmed Res  id Pasha is contained in AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831), ll. 32 73. On Meyer, see Prousis, British Consular Reports, 51 98. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 29.03.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), ll. 204 5. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 9.04.1829, ibid., ll. 2123. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 17.04.1829, ibid., l. 223. Vakalopoulos, Istoria, 8: 115 22; Dontas, The Last Phase, 126 42. With the conclusion of hostilities, Mehmed Res  id Pasha left Ioannina and was awarded the rank of grand vizier. Finlay, History, 2: 207; Dakin, The Greek Struggle, 265. Dontas, The Last Phase, 65 85. Paparrigopoulos to Kallogerakis, Patras, 2.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 263. The treaty is available in Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 13.05.1829, ibid., ll. 276 7. See also, Finlay, History, 2: 207; Dakin, The Greek Struggle, 267. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 13.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), ll. 276. On the rising opposition, see Woodhouse, Capodistria, 435 87. Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 12.06.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), l. 299. Panin replaced Bulgari in June 1829. See Bulgari to Riboper, Argos, 17.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1794, ll. 63 4. Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 15.06.1829, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 72 (1829), ll. 303 6. Kallogerakis to Panin, Patras, 2.11.1829, ibid., l. 351. Kallogerakis to Bulgari, Patras, 12.04.1829, ibid., ll. 220 1. Mustoxidi to Riboper, Thessaloniki, 3.10.1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1294 (1830), ll. 81 2. Arsh, Albaniia i Epir, introduces the wealth of Russian archival material on Albania. See also, Anscombe, Albanians and Mountain Bandits; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1889, 237 41; Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 20 7; Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte; Reid, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire; Skiotis, The Greek Revolution; Skiotis, Mountain Warriors. The main literature includes Peppa, Ioannis Kapodistrias; Petridis, I diplomatiki drasis; idem, Neoelliniki politiki istoria, 1: 102 9; Tounta-Phergadi, O Ioannis Kapodistrias; Woodhouse, Capodistrias; Fleming, John Capodistrias; Crawley, The Questions of Greek Independence;

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78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92. 93. 94. 95.

Dontas, The Last Phase. For material on the Russian negotiations (more than 6000 manuscript ` ce a ` pages), see AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 12960 7; Vinogradov, Les discussions sur la Gre ` la question de linde pendance grecque. Londres; Vacalopoulos, Lattitude de la Russie face a Bulgari to Nesselrode, Argos, 17.05.1829, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1794 (1829), ll. 8 9, 16. Panin to Nesselrode, Aegina, 29.08.1829, ibid., ll. 167 71. Perepiska s grafom Kapodistria (1829), AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2623; AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 45. Kapodistrias to Nesselrode, Nafplion, 6.03.1830, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 45, l. 47. Brewer, The Greek War, 306 15; Woodhouse, Capodiastria, 473 4. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, n.d., AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1799 (1830), ll. 21 3. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, February/March 1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), l. 14. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, 5.02.1831, ibid., l. 11. Paparrigopoulos to Kapodistrias, Evvia, 23.02.1831, ibid., l. 21. Although impressed by his zeal and sagacity, Panin reprimanded Paparrigopoulos for engaging in formal correspondence and sharing personal opinions with President Kapodistrias. Panin to Paparrigopoulos, Nafplion, 23.04.1831, ibid., l. 69. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, 5.02.1831, ibid., l. 11. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, 18.04.1831, ibid., l. 32. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, February/March 1831, ibid., ll. 14 5. Paparrigopoulos to Kapodistrias, Evvia, 23.02.1831, ibid., ll. 21 6; Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, 24.03.1831, ibid., ll. 28 9. Paparrigopoulos to Butenev, Athens, 18.04.1831, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1799 (1831), ll. 75 6. Paparrigopoulos to Panin, Athens, 7.05.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), l. 48. Panin to Paparrigopoulos, Nafplion, 9.03.1831, ibid., ll. 58 9. Paparrigopoulos to Rikman, Athens, 29.10.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831), ll. 61 2. Philips, The War of Greek Independence, 342. On the question of refugees, see Vakalopoulos, Prosphyges kai prosphygikon zitima. On the Muslim population, see McCarthy, Death and Exile. Mustoxidi to Rikman, Thessaloniki, 7.01.1831, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1295 (1831), ll. 45. Mustoxidi to Panin, Thessaloniki, 12.02.1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), ll. 140 2; for a petition from Greek captains addressed to Mustoxidi, see ibid., ll. 143 4. The Russian state reimbursed him 25,000 Turkish piasters for his work to save Greek families. See Mustoksitsi, Anzhelo Arsenevich, AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2343. For an assortment of supplications from families and the Russian response, see AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614 (1824 7); AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1796 (1830), ll. 40 52. Studies of Ottoman slavery include Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade; Toledano, Slavery and Abolition; Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War, 348 59; Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman vid and Fodor, Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders; Fisher, Between Empire; Da Russians, Ottomans and Turks. ` ce, AVPRI, For Greek supplications and lists of captives, see Divers papiers concernant la Gre f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2627, which contains 500 pages of statistics, inventories, tables, various memoranda and aperc  us. Ribeaupierre to Panin, Buyukdere, 24.02.1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1796 (1830), ll. 343 6. For the copious communication on this affair, see AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831). Russian minister Rikman was among many witnesses of the assassination. See, Rikman to Nesselrode, Nafplion, 6.10.1831, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 234 (1831), ll. 50310; Woodhouse, Capodistia, 5007; idem., The Greek War of Independence, 1456; Finlay, History, 2: 245-6; Brewer, The Greek Revolution, 3468; Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence, 1978.

Notes on contributor
Lucien J. Frary received his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota, and is now Associate Professor of History at Rider University. He is the author of articles and reviews in Russian Review, Russian

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History, Mediterranean Historical Review, Slovo, Ab Imperio, Kritika, and Modern Greek Studies Yearbook, and he is currently completing a book on Russia and the making of Modern Greece.

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