3C SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS

Arts. 774 777 1. Bonilla v. Barcena

are adults and when there are no debts against the estate. 4. 'eirs o# t(e )etro*an+ ate Do!in%o N. Nicolas v.

In this case, the action to quiet title instituted by the late Barcena while she was still alive was dismissed by the lower court saying that the heirs had no legal capacity to sue. The SC held that the deceased can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case at bar. The records of this case show that the complaint was filed while Barcena while still alive and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. rt. !!! provides that "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the testator.# $hen Barcena died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was not e%tinguished by her death but was transmitted to heir heirs upon her death. 2. i!"oco v. Intestate o# $ra%ante

Surviving spouse (osefa mortagaged their conjugal property to )etroban* which was later foreclosed. The SC held that petitioners, as children and therefore compulsory heirs of deceased +omingo, acquired ownership of portions of the lots as their legitime upon the death of their father or prior to the foreclosure of mortgage and the filing by the respondent ban* of its petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. They should not be deprived of their legitime by the enforcement of the writ of possession thus such should not include parts of the two lots pertaining to petitioners. ,ote that in this case, as shown by the records, the estate of +omingo has not been judicially or e%tra-judicially settled. Arts. 77, - 7,2 .. A&stria v. /e0es

In this case, &ragante applied for a certificate of public convenience. fter his death, the certificate was issued to his intestate estate, to which petitioner opposed contending that substitution of the legal representative of the estate should not have been allowed. The SC held that such certificate would be certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death. 3. $&le v. $&le

The heirs &ule in this case opposes the appointment of an administrator upon the ground that the deceased left no debts and that his property had already been partitioned among his children during his lifetime. The SC held that in the absence of debts e%isting against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death' in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they

.etitioners in this case pray for the annulment of the will of the deceased alleging its intrinsic validity. They are contending that had the deceased *nown that the adoption of .erfecto was spurious and was thus not a compulsory heir, she would not have instituted him. The SC held that the will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The Civil Code provides that the words of the will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every e%pression some effect, rather than once which will render any of the e%pressions inperative. Testacy is favoured and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case. 1. D2C 'ol3in%s v. CA

The question in this case is whether or not the Contract of /ease with 0ption to Buy entered into by the late Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her death or w1n it binds her sole heir even after her demise. The SC held that as a general rule, heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-terest e%cept when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by 23 their nature, 43 stipulation or 53 provisions of law. In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision ma*ing the rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible. There

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is no personal act required from the deceased Bartolome apart from the obligation to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the e%ercise by the latter of its option to lease the same which may very well be performed by her heir. Articles 7,,-74. 7. Dionisio vs. Dionisio

from his mouth. ;owever, he retained the use of his right hand and was able to write fairly well. The question is whether or not the testator was of sound mind. SC ruled that the presumption of a sound mind was not rebutted. $itnesses testified that the testator wrote the disposition in pieces of paper' he was as*ed whether they were indeed dispositions to which he nodded his head in affirmation' and the will was read to him out loud. 11. ;a< T&a v. ;a< Ca 2&an It was shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. $hile the rule is absolute that one who ma*es a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one ma*ing the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will. 12. Sanc(o vs. A*ella 0pponent alleged that the testator6s mental faculties were not functioning normally anymore' that she had poor eyesight1hearing' that she urinated without *nowing' that she had very poor memory. SC ruled that senile debility, blindness, deafness, or poor memory is not by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person from ma*ing his1her will. In this case, the records showed that the testator6s mental faculties were functioning well. lso, the fact that the testator included in her dispositions property that she had already donated does not indicate mental insanity. t most, it is merely forgetfulness. 13. Gon7ales vs. Gon7ales 3e Car&n%con% Two alleged wills were presented for probate to which the petitioner opposed presenting an instrument revo*ing the said wills allegedly e%ecuted by the testator. The family physician who attended to the testator during her last illness and saw her on the day the said instrument was allegedly e%ecuted, testified that during that time the testator was in a comatose and unconscious state. SC upheld this testimony as against the testimony of attesting witnesses tending to imply that the testator was of sound mind. Arts. ,9. - ,91

The will was in Tagalog and was translated in Spanish by the oppositor as well as by the official court interpreter. If the oppositor6s translation was correct then the attestation clause would not have been made in accordance with the law. The members of the court held that the interpretation of the court interpreter is correct and in conformity with the idiomatic usage of the Tagalog language. !77 8 in case of doubt, interpretation that will ma*e the disposition operative shall be preferred. !92 8 4 modes of interpreting, the one that will prevent intestacy will be preferred. ,. In re 5ill o# /iosa

The will was e%ecuted prior to the enactment of an act which required additional formalities. The question is which law will govern: SC ruled that the law at the time the will was e%ecuted will govern. ;ence the additional formalities need not be complied with. !9< 8 validity of a will as to its form depends on the law in force at the time of e%ecution 4. Enri6&e78 et al. vs. A*a3ia8 et al.

;olographic will was e%ecuted before the enactment of the ,ew Civil Code. .rior to the said code, holographic wills were not allowed. SC ruled using !9<. =ationale for !9< 8 although the will operates after the death, the wishes of the testator was nevertheless given solemn e%pression at the time the will was e%ecuted >provided of course it complied with the formalities then required3 lso, SC added that if a will was void under the law during its e%ecution and a subsequent law is passed which does away with certain formalities, the will does not become valid. Articles 741-,93 19. Ba%tas vs. :a%&io Testator6s body was paraly?ed on the left side, his hearing was impaired, he had lost his power of speech, his head fell to one side, and saliva ran

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14. :a0a3 v. Tolentino +eceased placed her thumb mar* on every page of the will. ;er lawyer wrote her name under it. ,othing was noted on the attestation clause that the deceased directed the lawyer to write her name. ;eld@ Aalid. not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the testatri% requested the lawyer to sign her name inasmuch as the testatri% signed the will by her thumb mar*. 1.. Ta*aoa3a v. /osal =14,2>

clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. They should sign below it. Issue of not properly ac*nowledged@ contrary to rt 7BC. c*nowledgement is the act of one who has e%ecuted a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. )oreover, will must be ac*nowledged and not merely subscribed and sworn to. notarial will that is not ac*nowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. 17. G&errero v. Bi(is =2997>

0n the first page >which contained the entire testamentary dispositions3, the testatri% signed at the bottom, while the witnesses signed at the left-hand margin. 0n the second page which contained the attestation clause, the testatri% signed at the left hand margin, and the witnesses signed below the attestation clause. The attestation clause also did not state the number of pages. ;eld@ Aalid. The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatri% but also the due e%ecution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied when the witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contained all the testamentary dispositions. The failure to state the number of pages would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really composed of only 4 pages duly signed by the testatri% and her instrumental witnesses. 11. A7&ela v. CA =2991> $ill was two pages long. The number of pages were also not stated in the attestation, only a blan* was there. The will was not properly ac*nowledged. >",ilagdaan *o at ninotario *o ngayong 2B ;unyo, dito sa )anila.#3 The witnesses also did not sign under the attestation clause but on the left hand margin of the page. ;eld@ Invalid will. Issue of number of pages@ no substantial compliance in this case because no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere else in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. Issue of witnesses not signing under the attestation clause@ the signatures to the attestation

The will was ac*nowledged by the testatri% and the witnesses at the testatri%6s witnesses in DC before a notary public who was commissioned for and in Caloocan City. ;eld@ Invalid. ,otary public was acting outside the place of his commission, and this did not satisfy rt 7BC. ,o notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. 1,. De Gala v. Gon7ales Testatri% signed using a thumb mar*. In the attestation clause, it is not mentioned that the testatri% signed by thumb mar*. But, in the last paragraph of the will, she mentioned that she signed it using her thumb mar*. ;eld@ Aalid. It appeared in the attestation clause that the signature was affi%ed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently described and e%plained in the last clause of the body of the will. It may be conceded that the attestation clause does not, standing alone, quite meet the requirements of the statute, but ta*en in connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent. 14. C&evas v. Ac(acoso The attestation clause in this case was signed by the testator, but signed below his name by the witnesses. The clause was made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental witnesses. ;eld@ Aalid. It substantially complies with the statue. The apparent anomaly is not serious to invalidate the will, it appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of the 5 witnesses. Arts. ,97 - ,94

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29. Testate o# t(e ate A*a3a vs. A*a"a lthough the attestation clause does not indicate the number of witnesses a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it. The question of the number of the witnesses is answered by an e%amination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. Arts. ,19 - ,14 21. A"ero vs. CA =equirements under rt 725 and 72E on the authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions refer only to the validity of the dispositions, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Arts. ,29 - ,27 22. Unson vs. A*ella will can be admitted to probate, notwithstanding that one or more witnesses do not remember having attested it, provided the court is satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will has been e%ecuted and signed in the manner prescribed by law. s a general rule, the attesting witnesses must be produced when there is opposition to the probate. But there are e%ceptions to this rule, for instance, when the witness is dead, cannot be served with process of the court, or his reputation for the truth has been questioned, or he appears hostile to the proponent. Arts. ,2, ,37 23. )olo vs. )olo subsequent will, containing a clause revo*ing a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not e%ecuted in conformity with the formal requirements as to the ma*ing of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation . It is the intention of the testator that the revocation of previous will is dependent upon the validity of a subsequent will. The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the

revocation of the original will. The operation of the doctrine depends upon the intention of the testator at the time of the revocation of the first will. 24. Ga%o vs. )a!&0ac The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. $here a will which can not be found is shown to be in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that it was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. 2.. 'eirs o# /osen3o asa! vs. U!en%an The purported last will and testament of testator could not properly be relied upon to establish petitioner6s right to posess the subject lot because, without having been probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. rt 757 is e%plicit when it says "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the =ules of Court.# Arts. ,34 - ,34

26.

/e0es v. CA

The natural children of the deceased in this case are questioning the intrinsic validity of the will on the ground that his compulsory heir cannot be one, as theirs was an illicit relationship. SC held that as a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the e%trinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because "practical considerations# demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful legality. In this case however, There was never an open admission of any illicit relationship. Thus, there was no need to go beyond the face of the will.

2 .

Balana0 v. )artine7

The basic issue in this case was whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic

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validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void. The SC held that in view of the unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the willFs intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. But the probate court erred in declaring, that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that it previously gave effect to the surviving husbandFs conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate. The rule is that Gthe invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been madeG.

allegedly convert paraphernal property into conjugal3. $hat is more decisive is that duress being merely a vice or defect of consent, an action based upon it must be brought within four years after it has ceased' and the present action was instituted only after 47 years after the intimidation is claimed to have occurred, and no less than 9 years after the supposed culprit died. 0n top of it, appellant entered into a series of subsequent transactions with appellees that confirmed the contracts that she now tries to set aside. Therefore, this cause of action is clearly barred. Arts. ,49 - ,.3

3$.

:ecson v. Coronel

2".

)aca! v. Gat!aitan

/eonarda and (uana reciprocally assigned their respective property to one another conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other depended. This contract, as any other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as /eonarda had died before (uana the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the same manner as /eonarda would have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if (uana had died first. (In this case, the court essentially sustained the validity of survivorship agreements.)

0ppositors essentially question that validity of the will on the ground that it would have been too impossible that they, as relatives, would be left with nothing as this was not normal in .hilippine customs. The SC held that there is nothing strange in the preterition made by +olores Coronel of her blood relatives, nor in the designation of /oren?o .ecson as her sole beneficiary. &urthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se. In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to ma*e a will, and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Arts. ,.4 - ,.1

2#.

/o3ri%&e7 v. /o3ri%&e7

$hen +omingo =odrigue? died intestate, he was survived by his widow, Concepcion &eli%, his children grandchildren. The widow, children and grandchildren of the deceased entered into an e%trajudicial settlement of his estate, consisting of onehalf of the properties allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership. The widow later on questioned the validity of this e%trajudicial partition, saying that she entered such contract under duress, violence and intimidation. The SC agreed with the trial Court that the evidence was not convincing that the contracts of transfer from the widow to her daughter, and from the latter to her mother and stepfather were e%ecuted through violence or intimidation >this was done to

31.

Non v. CA

.etitioners in this case are asserting coownership of the property while respondents claim that they are the absolute owners by virtue of a deed of donation e%ecuted in their favor. The SC ruled for respondents. $hen Airginia .. Aiado died intestate in 2974, her part of the conjugal property was transmitted to her heirs H her husband (ulian and their children.. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Ivery act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a

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sale, an e%change, a compromise, a donation or an e%trajudicial settlement. The Court found the instruments e%ecuted showing donation were validly e%ecuted. Articles ,.7-,79 32. ?3a. De Aranas vs. Aranas .etitioners were assailing the stipulation in the will which provided that the testator6s nephew shall have usufructuary rights and be the first administrator of certain properties' and that upon his death or refusal to continue to act as usufructuary1administrator, the administration shall pass to the anyone of the sons of his brother. .etitioners contended that this violated rt. 7!B, CC. SC ruled that there was a limitation to the right of the nephew, namely his death or his refusal. The disposition must be respected J given effect. Kpon the death or refusal of the nephew, the property can be disposed of subject to the limitations provided in rt. 7C5 concerning fideicommissary substitution. Articles ,71-,,. 33. /a!ire7 v. ?3a. De /a!ire7 The deceased was survived by his spouse, 4 grandnephews, and his companion. The administrator submitted a partition to the court which divided the estate into 4@ one-half would go to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime' the other half, which is the free portion, would go to the grandnephews' however, 215 of the free portion is charged with the widow6s usufruct and the remaining 415 with a usufruct in favor of the companion. The grandnephews opposed the substitution on the ground that the 2st heirs are not related to the substitutes within the 2st degree. SC ruled that the fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes >grandnephews3 are not related to the companion within one degree. In effect, the SC ruled that "one degree# means "one generation# and not "one designation.# So, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the 2st heir. 34. )iciano vs. Bri!o Testator is a Tur*ish national who stated in his will that the institution of legatees therein is conditional insofar as the said legatees must respect the testator6s will to distribute his property in accordance with the laws of the .hilippines. SC ruled that this condition is void because it is contrary to

law. Knder the old civil code, the national law of the testator should govern his testamentary dispositions. Articles ,,1-493 =e@ce<t ,41> 3.. /osales vs. /osales .etitioner was the widow of the son of the deceased. In other words, the deceased is the motherin-law of the petitioner. Issue here was w1n a widow is an heir of her parent-in-law: SC ruled that the widow is neither an intestate nor a compulsory heir. There is no law which entitles the widow to inherit from her mother-in-law by her own right or by the right of representation. lso, rt. 77! refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law where the surviving spouse is considered a 5rd person. 31. Barit&a vs. CA The deceased died while driving a tricycle which collided with a bus. The widow e%ecuted a release of claim and an affidavit of desistance discharging the owner of the bus from all actions1claims arising from the accident for a certain sum of money. The parents of the deceased thereafter filed a claim for damages against the bus owner. SC ruled that the widow and her son are the successorsin-interest authori?ed to receive payment. The parents shall only succeed when the decedent leaves no legitimate descendants. $hile the surviving spouse is a concurring compulsory heir. 37. De A<aricio vs. :ara%&0a .etitioner was the love child of a priest and her mother. The mother was married to another person to avoid ridicule. In the will of the deceased father >hehe3, he ac*nowledged petitioner as his natural daughter and also designated her as his only heir. .etitioner filed an action against respondent claiming parcels of land which she allegedly inherited from the deceased. =espondent contends that the petitioner is the legitimate child of the mother and the person to whom she was married. SC ruled that the issue of paternity is immaterial considering that the deceased died without any compulsory heir and that he instituted the petitioner as his lawful heir in his will. 0ne who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will all of his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. Art. ,41

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3,. De :a<a v. Ca!ac(o .ropositus died. The uncles and aunts want the property for them. The niece wants the property for herself. $here does the property go: ;eld@ To the niece. The uncles and aunts are e%cluded from the succession by the niece, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. $hy: Because the reversion of the reservable property is governed by the rules on intestate succession, wherein the nieces1nephews succeed ahead of the spouse, and only in the absence of the spouse will the uncles and aunts succeed. 34. $rias C(&a v. C$I The propositus inherited property from his father. In the intestate proceeding where he got the property, the Court ordered upon the propositus and his mother an obligation to pay a 5 rd party arising from an obligation. Is the first transfer still gratuitous: ;eld@ Les. The transmission is gratuitous when the recipient does not give anything in return. It matters not whether the property transmitted is subject to any prior charges. $hat is essential is that the transmission by made gratuitously, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient. It is evident that the transmission of the property was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. The obligation was imposed by the Court, and not by the propositus6 father. s long as the transmission was free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. 49. De los /e0es vs. :aterno The right of a reservatario is a reservable right and may be noted in the certificate of registration as a valid lien against the property. ;owever, this right may be lost by his failure to present any opposition to a petition for registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens system and his subsequent failure to oppose such registration within the period prescribed by law. 41. S&!a0a v. IAC The reservista registers the property with the =+, but the titles do not show the that the property was reserved for anyone. ;owever, the affidavit of the reservista stating that the property was reserved under reserva troncal was registered with the =+.

She sold the property to 5rd persons. $hen she dies, the reservatorios wanted the property bac*. ;eld@ ccroding to .+ 2<49, the registration of the affidavit of the reservista was constructive notice to the world, so the 5 rd persons could not rely solely on the clean title. It also appeared that the 5rd persons *new of the reservable property. )oreover, the Court also stated that it was the duty of the reservista to both reserve the property and annotate it accordingly as well. 42. /iosa v. /oc(a The reservista refused to register the property and annotate it accordingly. The reservatorios want the reservation be noted in the =+. ;eld@ =egister it. The reservista is bound to register the reservation within 9B days from the date of the adjudication of the property to the heirs by the court. fter this period, the reservatorios have the right to enforce compliance with the obligation. $here a reservable property is sold by the reservista, without having registered its reservable character, the obligation to registere the same is transferred to the purchaser, when, in ma*ing the purchase, the latter *new the facts which give the property the reservable character. 43. ?3a. De T&<as v. /TC mong the assets listed in the will of the deceased were several lots, admittedly his private capital. ;owever, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before to the Tupas &oundation, Inc. TupasF widow brought suit against Tupas &oundation, Inc. to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible. ;eld@ The fact that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made to a stranger >to the donor3 it is, by law chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the donorFs estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not e%ceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the e%cess and must be reduced by the amount of said e%cess. In this case, if any e%cess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased.

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3C Succession Case Digests (Midterms) Diaz, Garcia, Ingles, Machuca "