UNCLASSIFIED
/
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
AIRCRAFT AS WEAPONS
Assessing
the elationship of
Intelligence
to
Policy
(U)
Intelligence
and
policy
are
inextricably linked
-
indeed,
two
sides
of the
same
national
security policymaking
process.
In ideal form, the Intelligence Community (1C)
provides
information to policymakers concerning looming threats, and policymakers
adopt
policies to remedy vulnerabilities and preempt threats. Yet the intelligence/policy
nexus is
fraught
with practical difficulties.
The
1C
faces
the
challenge
of
identifyingcredible terrorist threats
from
among
the sea of
ambiguous
and
fragmentary
information.
In
turn, policymakers
face
the
challenge
of
implementing policy solutions costly
forgovernment
and industry to threats that are largely hypothetical.
(U)
The intelligence/policy relationship is at the center of the U.S. Government sreaction
to the
threat
of
aircraft
as
weapons
because
countering that threat required
the
1C
to
identify
the threat and policymakers to institute the necessary policies despite the costs.Faced with
a
host
of
other priorities, policymakers would have
no
need
to
focus
onpreventing
aircraft
as
weapons unless
the
1C
proved a
clear
and present danger. And
only
policymakers
- not the
1C
- had
authority
to
adopt policy responses
to the
aircraft-as-
weapons
threat.
(U)
Set
forth
below is a short narrative designed to stimulate discussionconcerning the role of the intelligence/policy relationship in
pre-9/11
U.S. vulnerability.
The
narrative
first offers
questions
to
guide
the
Commission s analysis.
The
narrative
then
sketches the history of relevant terrorist attacks, aviation security policymaking, andthe
IC s
counterterrorism
activities.
A classified
summary
of the
IC s
information
concerning
aircraft
as
weapons
and a
classified timeline
are
attached.
(U)
Key
Questions
for
Assessing
the
Intelligence/Policy
Relationship.
(U)
The
following questions
set
forth
a
framework
for
assessing
the
intelligence/policy relationship concerning aircraft as weapons:
•
When should
the
1C
have perceived
the
threat
of
aircraft
as
weapons?
•
When should
the
1C
have alerted policymakers regarding
the
threat?
• How
should policymakers have reacted
to
such
an
alert
from
the
1C?
• How
much warning should have been necessary
for
policymakers
to
adoptpolicies of varying costs to counter the threat?
(U)
Aviation
Security,
Intelligence,
and
Terrorism.
(U)
Prior to
9/11,
both aviation security policymaking and the IC scounterterrorism activities faced structural challenges. Policymakers wrestled with
dividing
the
costs
for
aviation security between
the
government
and the
airline industry
and
devising a security regime that avoided unduly burdening passengers and crew.
Concomitantly,
terrorism presented
the
1C
with
a
target vastly
different
from
the
Soviet
Union:
Terrorists were a non-geographically limited target, unlike the Eurasian-centered
Warsaw
Pact, meaning that
effective
counterterrorism required pooling expertise
from
UNCLASSIFIED
/ COMMISSION
SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFffiD
/
COMMISSION SENSITIVEacross
the
IC's
geographically-focused
bureaucracy.
And
counterterrorism
was
interdisciplinary,
requiring information-sharing between
the
1C
and
federal
agencies
responsible for law
enforcement, border security, transportation,
and
financial services.
(U)
Moreover,
the
history
of
both
aviation security
policymaking
and the
IC's
counterterrorism
activities
is
intertwined with
the
record
of
terrorist attacks against
Americans
beginning
in the
early 1980s.
The
U.S. Government's strategies
for
both
aviation
security
and
counterterrorism evolved over time
and in
response
to
terrorist
threats and
attacks.
(U)
Terrorist attacks against
the
United States prior
to the
1980s aimed
at
political
rather
than mass-casualty objectives. Indeed,
from
the
dawn
of
commercial aviation
to
the
mid-1980s,
the
main threat against
U.S.
aircraft arose
from
hijackers. While there
e
134
domestic
air
aboard domestic commercial aircraft between 1955
and
1976,
the
first
clearly terrorist
attack
against
a
U.S.
aircraft
did not
occur until 1976.
In
that year,
a
group calling itself Fighters
for
Free
Croatia
hijacked
an
aircraft
and
eventually surrendered.
(U)
The
first
major
mass-casualty terrorist attack against U.S. personnel occurred
in
1983 with
the
vehicle-bombing
of the
U.S. embassy
and the
Marine barracks
in
Beirut,[BOTH?]the latter
by a
suicide bomber. Hundreds
of
Americans were killed. Terrorists
did
not
begin targeting
aircraft
for
mass-casualty attacks
until 1985.
To be
sure,
traditional
hijackings continued.
The
1985 hijacking
of TWA
Flight
847
from
Athens,
Greece,
produced
a
17-day
standoff
during which
the
hijackers killed
a
U.S. Navyserviceman.
In
response
to the TWA
hijacking, Congress enacted
the
International
Security
and
Development Cooperation
Act of
1985
to
establish security standards
and
procedures concerning foreign
air
transportation. Also
in
1985,
an
EgyptAir
flight from
Athens
was
hijacked,
and
two-thirds
of the 96
passengers died when Egyptiancommandos stormed
the
plane.
T
5
.
In
U)
Yet
1985 also inaugurated
the era of
mass-casualty
aircraft
bombings1985,
Air
India Flight
182
from
Toronto exploded in-flight, killing
329
passengers,
and a
bomb detonated
at
Tokyo's
Narita Airport
in
checked
luggage being transferred
to an AirIndia
aircraft.
In
1986,
a
bomb detonated
on TWA
Flight
840
from
Rome, Italy,
but
failed
to
cripple
the
aircraft.
Also
in
1986,
the
Federal Bureau
of
Investigation (FBI)
andCanadian
authorities disrupted
a
plot
to
bomb
an Air
India
aircraft
in the
United States.
(U)
The
IC's organized response
to
terrorism began
in
1986
as
well. Early
in
1986,
President Reagan signed
a
policy directive
on
terrorism.
A few
weeks later,
the
1C
created
the
Counterterrorist
Center (CTC), answering
to the
Director
of
Central
Intelligence and
designed
as an
all-source
fusion
center
to
drive
the
U.S. Government's
counterterrorism
activities.
CTC was the
IC's
chief organizational response
to
terrorism s
geographic
and
interdisciplinary challenges.
A
host
of
federal agencies sentliaison
officers
to
CTC,
and an FBI
official
served
as a CTC
deputy director.
(U)
hi
1987,
a
bomb destroyed Korean Airlines Flight 858, killing
all
aboard.
In
1988,
Pan Am
Flight
103 was
downed over Scotland
by a
bomb, killing
270
people.
The
Pan Am 103
attack
led to the
most
significant
policy changes
in
U.S. aviation securityUNCLASSIFIED
/
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
/
COMMISSION SENSITIVEsince the 1970s. These changes centered on the prevention of bombing rather
thanhijacking.
Most
significant
was the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, whichstrengthened the government's role in aviation
securityCtThe
Act established the position
of
Associate Administrator
for
Civil Aviation Security
in the
Federal Aviation
x
Administration (FAA)
to
issue
and
enforce security standards.
The Act
also
FAA's
Office
of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence to compile intelligence concerningthe threat to civil aviation in order to trigger the application of security measures and theissuance of security directives, information circulars, and threat assessments. Finally, the
Act
increased research
and
development
(R&D)
concerning security,
and the FAA
spentover
$200
million on R&D between 1990 and 1996.
(U)
From 1989 to 1994, bombs shattered three foreign
aircraft
and killed over 300people. Yet terrorism against Americans in the 1990s witnessed a renewal of terrorismagainst ground targets. In
1992,
a Yemeni hotel that had housed
U.S.
servicemen enroute to Somalia was bombed
after
the servicemen
left.
Nor was the U.S. homelandimmune. The World Trade Center was attacked in early 1993, and in
mid-1993
the FBIarrested eight individuals and thwarted attacks on New York City landmarks.
(U)
In late 1994, a bomb on Philippine Flight 434
from
Tokyo killed one person.Subsequently,
the
Philippine
police
discovered
the
Bojinka
plot
- a
scheme
of
1993World Trade Center bombing suspect Ramzi Yousef to bomb multiple U.S.
aircraft
in theAsia-Pacific region. Yousef was eventually arrested and extradited to the United States.Also in late 1994, terrorists hijacked Air France Flight 8969 and threatened to crash the
aircraft
into the
Eiffel
Tower; French commandos stormed the plane. Tom Clancy'snovels Debt of Honor and Executive Order, both
featuring
terrorists crashing an
aircraft
into the [?], were published in 1994 and 1996 respectively. And in the
fall
of 1994, asmall plane crashed into the White House grounds.
(U)
Land-based terrorism continued in the mid- and
late-1990s.
In November1995,
five
Americans were killed in the bombing of the Saudi Arabian National Guard
facility
in Riyadh. In June 1996, the Khobar Towers were bombed, killing U.S.servicemen. In August 1996, Usama Bin Ladin publicly signaled his objectives byissuing
f tw
authorizing attacks on Western targets in the Arabian Peninsula; indeed,earlier in 1996 the CIA had created a special
unit
to focus on Bin Ladin. In 1997,
African
authorities arrested individuals plotting to attack the U.S. embassy in Nairobi.
(U)
While no U.S.
aircraft
was hijacked or bombed by terrorist in the 1990s,policymakers continued to
focus
on aviation security. In
1997,
the White HouseCommission
on
Aviation Safety
and
Security, chaired
by
Vice President Al Gore, issued
.^y-
a
report concerning aviation security.
Federal
Aviation Reauthorization
Act of
1996^81^
M|'
attendant appropriations legislation implemented many of the
report's
recommendations,
including
[WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS WERE
IMPLEMENTED?].
(U)
In
February 1998,
Bin
Ladin publicly
called
for
jih d
against
U.S.
civilians
and
military personnel world-wide. In a May 1998 press conference, Bin Ladindiscussed bringing the war home to America. During that same month, President
Clinton
signed policy documents on counterterrorism and national
infrastructure
UNCLASSIFIED
/
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