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UNCLASSIFIED
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AIRCRAFT AS WEAPONS
Assessing
 the elationship of
 Intelligence
 to
 Policy
(U)
 Intelligence
 and
 policy
 are
 inextricably linked
 -
 indeed,
 two
 sides
 of the
 same
national
 security policymaking
 process.
 In ideal form, the Intelligence Community (1C)
provides
 information to policymakers concerning looming threats, and policymakers
adopt
 policies to remedy vulnerabilities and preempt threats. Yet the intelligence/policy
nexus is
 fraught
 with practical difficulties.
 The
 1C
 faces
 the
 challenge
 of
 identifyingcredible terrorist threats
 from
 among
 the sea of
 ambiguous
 and
 fragmentary
 information.
In
 turn, policymakers
 face
 the
 challenge
 of
 implementing policy solutions costly
 forgovernment
 and industry to threats that are largely hypothetical.
(U)
 The intelligence/policy relationship is at the center of the U.S. Government sreaction
 to the
 threat
 of
 aircraft
 as
 weapons
 because
 countering that threat required
 the
 1C
to
 identify
 the threat and policymakers to institute the necessary policies despite the costs.Faced with
 a
 host
 of
 other priorities, policymakers would have
 no
 need
 to
 focus
 onpreventing
 aircraft
 as
 weapons unless
 the
 1C
 proved a
 clear
 and present danger. And
 only
policymakers
 - not the
 1C
 - had
 authority
 to
 adopt policy responses
 to the
 aircraft-as-
weapons
 threat.
(U)
 Set
 forth
 below is a short narrative designed to stimulate discussionconcerning the role of the intelligence/policy relationship in
 pre-9/11
 U.S. vulnerability.
The
 narrative
 first offers
 questions
 to
 guide
 the
 Commission s analysis.
 The
 narrative
then
 sketches the history of relevant terrorist attacks, aviation security policymaking, andthe
 IC s
 counterterrorism
 activities.
 A classified
 summary
 of the
 IC s
 information
concerning
 aircraft
 as
 weapons
 and a
 classified timeline
 are
 attached.
(U)
 Key
 Questions
 for
 Assessing
 the
 Intelligence/Policy
 Relationship.
(U)
 The
 following questions
 set
 forth
 a
 framework
 for
 assessing
 the
intelligence/policy relationship concerning aircraft as weapons:
 When should
 the
 1C
 have perceived
 the
 threat
 of
 aircraft
 as
 weapons?
 When should
 the
 1C
 have alerted policymakers regarding
 the
 threat?
• How
 should policymakers have reacted
 to
 such
 an
 alert
 from
 the
 1C?
• How
 much warning should have been necessary
 for
 policymakers
 to
 adoptpolicies of varying costs to counter the threat?
(U)
 Aviation
 Security,
 Intelligence,
 and
 Terrorism.
(U)
 Prior to
 9/11,
 both aviation security policymaking and the IC scounterterrorism activities faced structural challenges. Policymakers wrestled with
dividing
 the
 costs
 for
 aviation security between
 the
 government
 and the
 airline industry
and
 devising a security regime that avoided unduly burdening passengers and crew.
Concomitantly,
 terrorism presented
 the
 1C
 with
 a
 target vastly
 different
 from
 the
 Soviet
Union:
 Terrorists were a non-geographically limited target, unlike the Eurasian-centered
Warsaw
 Pact, meaning that
 effective
 counterterrorism required pooling expertise
 from
UNCLASSIFIED
 / COMMISSION
 SENSITIVE
 
UNCLASSIFffiD
 /
 COMMISSION SENSITIVEacross
 the
 IC's
 geographically-focused
 bureaucracy.
 And
 counterterrorism
 was
interdisciplinary,
 requiring information-sharing between
 the
 1C
 and
 federal
 agencies
responsible for law
 enforcement, border security, transportation,
 and
 financial services.
(U)
 Moreover,
 the
 history
 of
 both
 aviation security
 policymaking
 and the
 IC's
counterterrorism
 activities
 is
 intertwined with
 the
 record
 of
 terrorist attacks against
Americans
 beginning
 in the
 early 1980s.
 The
 U.S. Government's strategies
 for
 both
aviation
 security
 and
 counterterrorism evolved over time
 and in
 response
 to
 terrorist
threats and
 attacks.
(U)
 Terrorist attacks against
 the
 United States prior
 to the
 1980s aimed
 at
 political
rather
 than mass-casualty objectives. Indeed,
 from
 the
 dawn
 of
 commercial aviation
 to
the
 mid-1980s,
 the
 main threat against
 U.S.
 aircraft arose
 from
 hijackers. While there
 e
 134
 domestic
 air
aboard domestic commercial aircraft between 1955
 and
 1976,
 the
 first
 clearly terrorist
attack
 against
 a
 U.S.
 aircraft
 did not
 occur until 1976.
 In
 that year,
 a
 group calling itself Fighters
 for
 Free
 Croatia
hijacked
 an
 aircraft
 and
 eventually surrendered.
(U)
 The
 first
 major
 mass-casualty terrorist attack against U.S. personnel occurred
in
 1983 with
 the
 vehicle-bombing
 of the
 U.S. embassy
 and the
 Marine barracks
 in
 Beirut,[BOTH?]the latter
 by a
 suicide bomber. Hundreds
 of
 Americans were killed. Terrorists
did
 not
 begin targeting
 aircraft
 for
 mass-casualty attacks
 until 1985.
 To be
 sure,
traditional
 hijackings continued.
 The
 1985 hijacking
 of TWA
 Flight
 847
 from
 Athens,
Greece,
 produced
 a
 17-day
 standoff
 during which
 the
 hijackers killed
 a
 U.S. Navyserviceman.
 In
 response
 to the TWA
 hijacking, Congress enacted
 the
 International
Security
 and
 Development Cooperation
 Act of
 1985
 to
 establish security standards
 and
procedures concerning foreign
 air
 transportation. Also
 in
 1985,
 an
 EgyptAir
 flight from
Athens
 was
 hijacked,
 and
 two-thirds
 of the 96
 passengers died when Egyptiancommandos stormed
 the
 plane.
 T
5
.
 In
 
U)
 Yet
 1985 also inaugurated
 the era of
 mass-casualty
 aircraft
 bombings1985,
 Air
 India Flight
 182
 from
 Toronto exploded in-flight, killing
 329
 passengers,
 and a
bomb detonated
 at
 Tokyo's
 Narita Airport
 in
 checked
 luggage being transferred
 to an AirIndia
 aircraft.
 In
 1986,
 a
 bomb detonated
 on TWA
 Flight
 840
 from
 Rome, Italy,
 but
failed
 to
 cripple
 the
 aircraft.
 Also
 in
 1986,
 the
 Federal Bureau
 of
 Investigation (FBI)
 andCanadian
 authorities disrupted
 a
 plot
 to
 bomb
 an Air
 India
 aircraft
 in the
 United States.
(U)
 The
 IC's organized response
 to
 terrorism began
 in
 1986
 as
 well. Early
 in
1986,
 President Reagan signed
 a
 policy directive
 on
 terrorism.
 A few
 weeks later,
 the
 1C
created
 the
 Counterterrorist
 Center (CTC), answering
 to the
 Director
 of
 Central
Intelligence and
 designed
 as an
 all-source
 fusion
 center
 to
 drive
 the
 U.S. Government's
counterterrorism
 activities.
 CTC was the
 IC's
 chief organizational response
 to
terrorism s
 geographic
 and
 interdisciplinary challenges.
 A
 host
 of
 federal agencies sentliaison
 officers
 to
 CTC,
 and an FBI
 official
 served
 as a CTC
 deputy director.
(U)
 hi
 1987,
 a
 bomb destroyed Korean Airlines Flight 858, killing
 all
 aboard.
 In
1988,
 Pan Am
 Flight
 103 was
 downed over Scotland
 by a
 bomb, killing
 270
 people.
 The
Pan Am 103
 attack
 led to the
 most
 significant
 policy changes
 in
 U.S. aviation securityUNCLASSIFIED
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 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 
UNCLASSIFIED
 /
 COMMISSION SENSITIVEsince the 1970s. These changes centered on the prevention of bombing rather
 thanhijacking.
 Most
 significant
 was the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, whichstrengthened the government's role in aviation
 securityCtThe
 Act established the position
of
 Associate Administrator
 for
 Civil Aviation Security
 in the
 Federal Aviation
x
Administration (FAA)
 to
 issue
 and
 enforce security standards.
 The Act
 also
 
FAA's
 Office
 of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence to compile intelligence concerningthe threat to civil aviation in order to trigger the application of security measures and theissuance of security directives, information circulars, and threat assessments. Finally, the
Act
 increased research
 and
 development
 (R&D)
 concerning security,
 and the FAA
 spentover
 $200
 million on R&D between 1990 and 1996.
(U)
 From 1989 to 1994, bombs shattered three foreign
 aircraft
 and killed over 300people. Yet terrorism against Americans in the 1990s witnessed a renewal of terrorismagainst ground targets. In
 1992,
 a Yemeni hotel that had housed
 U.S.
 servicemen enroute to Somalia was bombed
 after
 the servicemen
 left.
 Nor was the U.S. homelandimmune. The World Trade Center was attacked in early 1993, and in
 mid-1993
 the FBIarrested eight individuals and thwarted attacks on New York City landmarks.
(U)
 In late 1994, a bomb on Philippine Flight 434
 from
 Tokyo killed one person.Subsequently,
 the
 Philippine
 police
 discovered
 the
 Bojinka
 plot
- a
 scheme
 of
 1993World Trade Center bombing suspect Ramzi Yousef to bomb multiple U.S.
 aircraft
 in theAsia-Pacific region. Yousef was eventually arrested and extradited to the United States.Also in late 1994, terrorists hijacked Air France Flight 8969 and threatened to crash the
aircraft
 into the
 Eiffel
 Tower; French commandos stormed the plane. Tom Clancy'snovels Debt of Honor and Executive Order, both
 featuring
 terrorists crashing an
 aircraft
into the [?], were published in 1994 and 1996 respectively. And in the
 fall
 of 1994, asmall plane crashed into the White House grounds.
(U)
 Land-based terrorism continued in the mid- and
 late-1990s.
 In November1995,
 five
 Americans were killed in the bombing of the Saudi Arabian National Guard
facility
 in Riyadh. In June 1996, the Khobar Towers were bombed, killing U.S.servicemen. In August 1996, Usama Bin Ladin publicly signaled his objectives byissuing
 f tw
authorizing attacks on Western targets in the Arabian Peninsula; indeed,earlier in 1996 the CIA had created a special
 unit
 to focus on Bin Ladin. In 1997,
 African
authorities arrested individuals plotting to attack the U.S. embassy in Nairobi.
(U)
 While no U.S.
 aircraft
 was hijacked or bombed by terrorist in the 1990s,policymakers continued to
 focus
 on aviation security. In
 1997,
 the White HouseCommission
 on
 Aviation Safety
 and
 Security, chaired
 by
 Vice President Al Gore, issued
 .^y-
a
 report concerning aviation security.
 Federal
 Aviation Reauthorization
 Act of
 1996^81^
 M|'
 
attendant appropriations legislation implemented many of the
 report's
 recommendations,
including
 [WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS WERE
 IMPLEMENTED?].
(U)
 In
 February 1998,
 Bin
 Ladin publicly
 called
 for
 jih d
 against
 U.S.
 civilians
and
 military personnel world-wide. In a May 1998 press conference, Bin Ladindiscussed bringing the war home to America. During that same month, President
Clinton
 signed policy documents on counterterrorism and national
 infrastructure
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