Wednesday, 04 December 2013 12:52

Iran's Geopolitical Priorities in South Asia

By Stratfor

South Asia, second only to the Middle East, is the most geopolitically important region to Iran. Tehran cannot project power on its western and southern flanks if its eastern borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan are not secure. Western forces have helped secure Afghanistan for the past decade, but their withdrawal in 2014 will force Iran to take a more active security role there. On Dec. 3, the Iranian government said it opposed the bilateral security agreement that Washington has been trying to finalize with Kabul. According to the agreement, residual American forces would be allowed to remain in the country until 2024. An Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson said the agreement was not "useful for the long-term expedience and interests of Afghanistan," adding that it would have "negative effects" on the region. This statement comes as tensions mount between Washington and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who has refused to sign the agreement despite its endorsement from Afghan elders and officials. Karzai, who will hand over power to a successor sometime in mid-2014, is trying to extract concessions from the United States, many of which could remain relevant after he leaves his post. But the Iranian opposition to the agreement is interesting for its timing; currently, the United States and Iran are trying to restore bilateral relations. Indeed, they have worked together before when their interests aligned. Tehran endorsed the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq, which allowed the United States to remain in Iraq until the end of 2011. Moreover, in Afghanistan, the United States and Iran jointly ousted the Taliban regime after the 9/11 attacks and cooperated in establishing the Karzai regime. So the question is: Why would Tehran oppose a U.S.-Afghan security arrangement? The answer pertains to the ongoing U.S.-Iran talks. After having reached a preliminary deal on the nuclear program, Washington and Tehran are now moving on to issues that really matter. Among them is Afghanistan, where neither side wants to see renewed jihadism. Thus, by opposing the bilateral security, the Iranians are

showing their American counterparts that they can help achieve U.S. goals in Afghanistan in exchange for concessions on other issues. In addition, Iran knows that the residual U.S. force that will remain in Afghanistan will not fill the resultant power vacuum in the country. This means the Iranians will have to protect their interests more assertively, especially since Saudi Arabia will try to use its influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan to counter Iran. Riyadh knows that Tehran is able to project power on its western flank relatively easily, given the region's heavy Shia population. Therefore, it wants to use the Sunni majorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan to prevent Iran from projecting power so easily to the east. But geopolitically, Afghanistan is very complex, so there are limits to how far the Saudis can go in their efforts to curb Iranian influence. The mostly commonly spoken language in Afghanistan is Dari, or Afghan Persian, which has conferred on the Iranians a great deal of influence. The Iranian sphere of influence includes Karzai, who has received money from Tehran; regional warlords, including those who oppose the Taliban; and even the jihadist movement, over which Iran has gained some influence in recent years. Moreover, Iran will cooperate with India -- a country that has also become more influential in Afghanistan over the past decade -- to counter any Saudi-Pakistani alignment. Other factors also benefit Iran in securing power on its eastern flank. Islamabad has lost some of its clout with the Taliban. Like its regional neighbors, Pakistan does not want to see the rise of the jihadist movement in post-NATO Afghanistan. The Saudis cannot rely on Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan because such a reliance runs the risk of empowering al Qaeda -- which runs counter to Saudi interests. But despite Iran's advantages, we expect that Riyadh and Islamabad will not stand idly by as Tehran secures its eastern frontier. Thus, South Asia is likely to become the second-largest geopolitical sectarian battleground after the LevantineMesopotamian landmass.

Washington (AFP) - The White House warned Congress that passing new sanctions on Iran -- even with a delayed launch date -- would give Tehran an excuse to undermine an interim nuclear deal.

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Kuwait City (AFP) - Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif assured Gulf Arab states Sunday his country's nuclear deal with the West is in their interest and also announced plans to visit Saudi Arabia.

Iran's nuclear deal: Costs and benefits

At long last, after three rounds of Geneva talks, the Iranian leadership has clinched a deal with the West on 24th November, claiming that it had come just a few hours before the new regime of President Rouhani completed 100 days in office. So Rouhani has pulled off a diplomatic triumph that his predecessor either could not or would not. As Rouhani wrote in his letter to the Supreme Leader, he has forced the West to see the folly of its policy of sanctions and that the path of negotiations in which Iran is treated with respect and dignity has won the day.