The Ontological Foundations of Knowledge in Spinoza - Yiu Hung Tsap

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The Ontological Foundations of Knowledge in Spinoza by Yiu Hung Tsap
November 2002
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Dissertation Committee: Dr. D. Nikulin Dr. Y. Yovel Dr. A. Heller
UMI Number. 3109779
Copyright 2002 by Tsap, Yiu Hung All rights reserved.
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2002, Yiu Hung Tsap
Abstract
The Ontological Foundations of Knowledge in Spinoza Tsap, Yiu Hung
This dissertation deals with Spinozas notion of adequate ideas. From Spinozas perspective, the adequate idea as God essence entails absolute certainty. To know an idea adequately, one must
reach the infinite and eternal aspects of Gods essence. Only by doing so can one fulfill the criteria of truth, namely truth as coherence and truth as correspondence. A true idea is one which satisfies all the internal marks, and its ideatum as the physical image corresponds to every aspect of the thing. I argue that the body plays a constitutive role in cognition. For Spinoza, the body is not subservient to the mind; mind and body are two sides of the same coin. Affects and conatus can both be attributed to the body. The late Descartes believes that imagination cannot reach Gods infinity. I contend that on account of conatus as the strife
for freedom and infinity, the Spinozistic body is capable of perceiving different modes of space and eventually attaining
virtue infinity. Thereafter, the intellect can intuit actual infinity as substance. As for eternity, I reconstruct Spinozas theory of belief with the intention to redeem its validity. A belief becomes true when it
is objectively real and subjectively veracious. Moreover, I discuss the two laws of association. Conceiving ideas fortuitously and inadequately, the mind follows the natural law of association. As conatus intelligendi and active affects take shape at a later point, the mind relates ideas with necessity and follows the universal law of association. I further claim that in the third kind
of knowledge the mind is in touch with two kinds of reality, one temporal and the other eternal. The eternal existence of
the thing grounds its temporal existence. Knowing Gods eternal essence and existence involves grasping the things common notions and intuiting its concrete essence. The intuition at issue is an unconditional positing. As such, it
grounds all subsequent propositional and conditional positing. I identify this intuition as the experience of Gods eternal existence. The problems of eternity and infinity being solved, the knowledge entails absolute certainty.
Table of Contents
Abbreviations / vi
Chapter One / Introduction / 1 The Problems of the Cartesian Body / 7 The Problems of Certainty / 23 The Problems of Adequate Knowledge of things / 40 Chapter Two /Skepticism, Error, and Ideas / 59 Cartesian Skepticism / 61 Overcoming Skepticism / 68 Descartes' Misconceptions of Doubt and Error / 81 The Formation of Error / 90 Error as the Privation of Knowledge / 97 The Removal of Error / 111 The Nature and Formation of Ideas / 118 Ideas as the Objective Contents of Gods Essence / 123 A True Idea / 129 Certainty and Ideas of Ideas / 134 Concluding Remarks / 149 Chapter Three / Corporeality / 152 Imagination - the Legacy of Descartes 1 154 Imagination as a Virtue / 161 Causation as Applicable to both Inadequate and Adequate Ideas / 168 Determination and Active Involvement / 175 The Theory of Affects / 181 Conatus and Conatus Intelligendi / 189 Personal Identity / 196 Concluding Remarks / 207
Chapter Four/ Infinities and Spatiality / 210 Descartes on the Infinite I 212 The infinite of Imagination and Reason / 218 Resolution to the Problems of Infinity / 225 Conatus : the Striving for the Infinite and Freedom / 232 Physical Space: the Iceberg or the Tip of the Iceberg / 237 From Conatus to Spatial Perception / 243 Imagination, Memory, and Spatial Perception / 251 The Perception of Different Modes of Space / 256 Part and Whole relationship: Spinoza's Analogy / 267 Spinoza's Incarnation of Clear and Distinct Ideas / 278 Concluding Remarks / 284 Chapter Five / Belief and Existence / 287 Humes Theory of Belief / 289 Problems Concerning Existence and Belief / 299 Ideas as Beliefs / 302 Memory and the Laws of Association / 314 Objective Reality of Belief / 321 Affirmation, Veracity, and Feeling / 327 Temporal Existence and Eternal Existence / 336 Immanent and Transitive Causalities / 349 Concluding Remarks / 356 Chapter Six / Common Notions, the Third Kind of Knowledge, and Self-Knowledge / 358 Hume's Paradox of Personal Identity / 360 Sense Perception: the First Kind of Knowledge / 369 Common Notions and their Genesis / 377 Common Notions: the Relations between the Body and External Bodies / 391 The Perception of Common Notions / 397 The Third Kind of Knowledge / 402 The Mind at Work / 411 The Intellectual Love of God / 413 Self-Knowledge and Self-Awareness / 419 Concluding Remarks / 438 Conclusion / 442 Notes / 448 Bibliography / 454 v
Abbreviations
Descartes Works AT CSM The standard edition of Descartes writings, CEuvres de Descartes, Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds. 13 vol. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, trans., 3 vol.
Spinozas Works Ethics, Edwin Curley trans. The Collected Works of Spinoza vol. 1. Cited by part and subdivision(s), e.g. E II pp.44 c1, for part 2 proposition 2 corollary 1 TdlE Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Edwin Curley trans. Cited according to the section number found in many editions, e.g. TdlE 38, for section 38 Letter The Letters Samuel Shirley trans. Cited according to the letter number, e.g. Letter 12 Principles Descartes Principles of Philosophy, Edwin Curley trans. Cited by page no. Parts of Works ax aff c def d exp L p s Axiom Affect Corollary Definition Demonstration Explanation Lemma Proposition Scholium E
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Introduction
Therefore, however stubbornly a man may cling to somethingfalse, we shall still never say that he is certain o f it. F o r by certainty we understand something positive, not the privation o f doubt. But by the privation o f certainty, we understandfalsity. Spinoza
There is a distinctive character in Spinozas notion of adequate ideas that I find most thought-provocative. Knowledge for Spinoza must be,
strictly speaking, knowledge of God. As Gods knowledge, it must entail absolute certainty, perfection, and completeness. Any intermediate forms of knowledge, such as inadequate knowledge or knowledge which in volves no contradiction, do not count at all. One either has the adequate idea as truth, or one has the inadequate idea as falsity. Since knowledge of God involves his eternal and infinite essence, one must conceive an idea in its most perfect form so that it can be equated with Gods knowledge. In general, the human mind is However, Spinoza says, The
capable of forming only inadequate ideas.
human Mind has an adequate knowledge of Gods eternal and infinite essence.(E II p47) Explicitly, Spinoza avers that humans can attain
knowledge of God. The knowledge of Gods eternal and Infinite essence that each idea involves is adequate and perfect. (E II p46) If one can
form the adequate and perfect idea, then absolute knowledge of God is viable. For Spinoza, to conceive an idea in its most adequate form, the mind needs, first and foremost, to undergo a long and strenuous process of self-transformation, the aim of which is to render itself
adequate to the infinite intellect. Thereafter, the mind is able to intuit the concrete essence of a thing as Gods knowledge. Gods essence is eternal and infinite. By contrast, human knowledge
is temporal and finite. To reach Gods knowledge, the human mind must transcend itself to the extent that it grasps Gods eternity and infinity. On knowing Gods essence, humans are, to a certain extent, as infinite and eternal as God is. In what ways can humans know the infinite
and eternal aspects of Gods essence? Insofar as one knows the first causes of things, one understands the infinite of Gods essence as substance. illuminating. Such formulation is not very
How are the first causes of things related to the infinite Even if infinity is tantamount to the first
aspect of Gods essence?
causes of things, how can one practically experience actual infinity so as to comprehend Gods essence? Spinoza suggests two kinds of
infinity, the infinite of imagination and the infinite of reason. Presumably, the two infinities are related: one has to grasp, say, the infinite of imagination before proceeding to the infinite of reason. I consider the
issue of infinity the key to Spinozas notion of absolute knowledge. Without solving the problem practically, it is pointless to claim that the mind has direct access to Gods knowledge. Even if the problem of infinity is resolved, one has to face the other aspect of Gods essence, namely eternity. At the outset, Spinoza defines eternity as existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow from the definition a lone of the eternal thing. (E I def 8) Eternal existence is conceived to follow from the essence of the thing. Gods essence ne cessarily involves his existence; to know a things essence as Gods knowledge entails grasping its eternal existence as well. exist and endure in time. enjoy his eternal existence? exist. Humans
How can they know Gods essence and As finite modes, things are caused to
Things subsist in time; they come into existence and go out
of existence. Through conceiving ideas, humans know things as ac tually existing. What does it mean that things exist eternally and finite
humans can experience them as eternally existing? Spinoza claims that things may be conceived by humans in two ways, either under duration or under eternity. (E V p29) The essence of a thing can be conceived as given in duration, subsisting through its interactions with other things. Owing to their finite nature, humans cannot know the entire cau sal history of things. They are incapable of comprehending the essence of the thing under duration. If humans are to know the essences of For Spinoza, one
things, they have to conceive things under eternity.

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conceives essence as eternal in two ways.
One knows essence either We feel
discursively through reason or intellectually through intuition. and know by experience that we are eternal.
For the mind feels those
things that it conceives in understanding no less than those it has in the memory. For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and ob
serves things, are the demonstrations themselves. (E V p23 s) The mind is aware of its body through sensing or feeling; it intellectually sees or feels the eternal thing in the way it senses its body. Spinoza seems to be suggesting that the mind visualizes eternal things. Admittedly, eternity has nothing to do with time or duration. Interestingly enough, Spinoza maintains that it is easier to account for eternity in terms of duration. (E V p20 s) Using its intellectual power, the mind per ceives eternal things in time. At the end of her essay, Spinozas Theory of Knowledge, Margaret D. Wilson writes: The third kind of knowledge, as we have seen, involves grasping the inmost essence of singular things in relation to the essence of God.... We are told, of course, that the third kind of knowledge (and to a lesser extent the second), in virtue of presenting things under the aspect of eternity, renders the mind itself (or a part of it) eternal. Such understanding carries with it the intellectual love of God, and feeds the mind with unmixed joy. Much of this language suggests a transformation of the mind in relation to God that might
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be construed as mystical. At the same time, the theory of what is common to all, or the fixed and eternal things, especially as developed in the Treatise on the Intellect, seems to suggest some kind of intellection in terms of causal laws, closer to what we now think of as scientific understanding....What is it, exactly, to come to perceive the inmost essences of singular things as they follow from the necessity of the divine nature? A good solution to this riddle would be, I think, a more fundamental contribution to understanding Spinozas position on knowledge than even the best commentaries on his response to Cartesian hyperbolic doubt, or Descartes theory of judgment. But, unfortunately, I know of none.1 In the following thesis I suggest a solution to the riddle raised above. As Wilson reveals, Spinozas thought is marked by a gap between the mystical and the scientific. My endeavor then, is to offer a more
comprehensible basis for understanding Spinozas theory of knowledge. Particular attention is given to the transformation of the mind as well as to that of the body. Contrary to what Wilson suggests, it is important, I think, to stress Spinozas reaction to Cartesian philosophy in general, particularly his response to Cartesian theories of doubt and judgment. Spinozas theory of knowledge develops a dissatisfaction with the central claims of Cartesian knowledge, such as the will, error, doubt, and certainty. By reacting to these, Spinoza gradually beats his distinguished style of philosophizing.
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Descartes bifurcation of mind and body into two separate substances appeals to S pinoza. Nonetheless, t he separation is n either complete n or radical enough. Descartes still allows some interaction between the two. Spinoza radicalizes the Cartesian project, raising the bifurcation of thought and extension to the level that no causal action between the two is possible. Every causal action, he argues, should be located and ex Epistemologically, the mind and the
plained within the same attribute.
body a re a utonomous a nd distinct entities: one is a mode o f thought and the other of extension. Ontologically, mind and body are not two separate and distinct substances; rather, they are two sides of the same coin. The same entity is now explained under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. As the father of modem philosophy, Descartes inaugurates the turn to subjectivity. temology. ground. project. His philosophy is characterized by its emphasis on epis-
Descartes project is to found knowledge on an indubitable The strict dualism of mind and body is closely related to this On the one hand, Descartes emphasizes the immortality and
simplicity of the soul, claiming that the soul is the source of indubitable knowledge. On the other hand, he depreciates the body and regards the senses as the source of error. On Spinozas view, Descartes a-symmetrical treatment of body and mind is a perversely idiosyncratic move. By getting rid of all the sensible qualities of a thing, Descartes cannot even know the concrete thing, let alone its indubitable knowledge.
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Spinoza would agree that Descartes approaches to the notions of the body and certainty are the defective, if not fatal, points of his epistemology. A large portion of this introduction is devoted to the
discussions of these problematic issues in Descartes, the clarification of which will help us understand Spinoza's position as a reaction to Descartes' theory of mind. Moreover, the discussion of Spinozas central concern, namely adequate knowledge of things, will become more enlightening if we bear these problems in mind.
The Problems of the Cartesian Body
In his mature works, Descartes wants to lead the mind away from the senses. By doing so, Descartes can argue for a case that truths are
innate in all of us. His aim is to reach certainty: to cast aside the loose earth and sand in order to reach rock or clay. (AT 6:29) In the First
Meditation, Descartes undermines the authority of the senses through the device of hyperbolical doubt. To achieve this aim, Descartes sweeps aside all everyday beliefs in order to clear the mind for the reception of those truths that lie behind appearance. Once pure intellectual truths have been laid bare in their refined and purely geometrical nature, everyday matters will be reinstated in a merely practical role. Sensible appearances are not only secondary, they are also dan gerous because very often they are unreliable.
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To reach indubitable
knowledge, one must follow a difficult and circuitous path and suspend any trust in appearances. Consequently, things like colors, tastes, sounds, and s melis will d isappear from things themselves. D escartes attempts to guide common people away from the everyday claims of sensible experience, leading them to a reflective level at which pure reason can give them secure knowledge of things. In what way can one bypass sensible experience and have adequate knowledge of matter? This leads to Descartes famous wax argument in the Second Meditation. His discussion of wax in the Second Meditation
illustrates his assertion that the mind is better known than the body. My reading of the wax example stresses the judgmental activities of the mind through which one knows the essence of a piece of wax. Descartes begins by considering the things which people commonly think they comprehend most distinctly of all; that is, the bodies which He takes a piece of wax assomething
we see and touch. (AT VII, 30)
in particular in order to argue against the commonly-accepted opinion that the senses give accurate knowledge of bodies. To begin with, the philosopher vividly depicts the sensory appearance of a piece of wax: its taste, color, shape, etc. (AT VII, 30) He specifies all the sensory
faculties that he uses in the experience of the wax. When wax is met with fire, all of its sensory properties disappear. In spite of the drastic modifications , the wax does change.
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not undergo
any substantial
Despite the sudden disappearance of its sensory
properties, the
objects essence remains recognizable. Obviously, the grounds with which one posits the same object cannot be found in sensory contents. That means, what actually determine the identity of the piece of wax are not its sensory contents. I agree with Jorga Secada 2 that a distinct
perception of the wax is closely connected with the minds capacity to re-identify it. In his words, [f]or a mind to be aware of its object as a
determinate something or other is for it to be capable, in principle, of identifying the same object in other circumstances.3 The universality
of an object is what instantiates the object. If the sensory contents change under different circumstances, it implies that dental, but not essential, properties of the object. In the wax example, Descartes treats mechanistic and sensible qualities alike. Descartes notes that color, hardness, and shape do not He con they are acci
pertain to the formal concept of the wax itself. (AT VI1175)
cludes that matter is not known by the senses, but by the intellect. In what way, according to Descartes, do the senses fail to know the essence of the wax? In the Principles (AT VIII 1, 45), Descartes distin Space is to a body as genus is
guishes between bodies and space.
to an individual. Bodies involve motion, but space does not. Space has generic unity, and bodies move and fill space. For Descartes, there is no empty space. All space is filled with matter, whose principal attribute is extension. The senses do indicate some knowledge of the sensory
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qualities of bodies.
In the case of the wax example, one might con
front a space from which nothing can be sensed; but it does not follow that it is empty space. As noted, every space is filled with matter. By holding that the essence of matter is pure extension, Descartes successfully argues against the claim that empty space exists. By means of its intellect, not its senses, the mind knows the
essences of bodies. The intellect is superior to the senses in identifying the essences of bodies. The senses frequently mislead one into be lieving that the bodies contain sensible qualities. Claiming that empty space does not exist, Descartes thereby argues against the empiricist who claims that all knowledge comes from sensible experience. In her book, Descartes, Margaret Wilson says, The point that Descartes is beginning to try to get across in the wax discussion is the conclusion required (as he sees it) for his physics: that it is the nature of any body at all (just) to be something extended, flexible and movable. And he thinks in recognizing this we must necessarily
recognize at the same time that it is the mind rather than sense that perceive the nature of body. 4 According to Wilson, common-
sense empiricist and scholastic assumptions are incompatible with the principles of of mind. D escartes physics a nd h is i mmaterial c onception Descartes intends to
By means of methodological doubt,
undermine
those assumptions. The discussion of the wax example
highlights this intention.

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The senses do not offer any distinct knowledge of the wax. Under a certain situation, the senses draw ones attention to this shape, this color, and this size of the wax. The particular sweetness, fragrance, color, figure, etc. are not the real properties of the wax; they are merely modes by which the wax could be perceived at a given time and place. Descartes is concerned about the real properties of bodies, which are compatible with the principles of his physics and idealistic conception of mind. By removing all the sensible properties of the wax, Descartes observes that the wax is nothing other than something extended, flexible, and mutable. (AT VII, 31) Even imagi nation cannot fully grasp the essence of the wax. Though imagination
can conceive different appearances that the wax might assume, it cannot embrace all the indefinite and possible variety of shapes. The only alternative left is the intellect, through which the mind knows the nature of the wax. The wax is essentially extended, flexible, and changeable. properties of the wax designate the fact that it can All these potentially
assume an indefinitely large number of different shapes. From its seemingly infinite variety of shapes, the shapes of the wax could not be given in sensation, nor could they be grasped by imagination. Of all the powers of the mind, only the intellect is capable of conceiving the unity of the wax through all its appearances and possibilities.
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In this respect, the intellect transcends the powers of the senses and imagination. According to Descartes, the intellect alone apprehends an object as a determinate object. If the waxs essential properties can be known only by the intellect, then the same applies to all objects in general. How does the intellect apprehend an object in general? After discussing the wax, Descartes generalizes his claim. The perception of an object as determinate involves the subsumption of a given content under a concept. In other words, the perception of a determinate object presupposes an act of judgment. Descartes maintains that the essence of an object consists not in the sensible features reached by sensory observation, but in their underlying geometrical structures - the attribute of being extended in physical space. Accordingly, the essence of an object can only be grasped by abstract mathematical reasoning. For Descartes, it is the subject matter of pure
mathematics to achieve clear and distinct knowledge of material things. Having eliminated ail the sensible data of an object, Descartes knows the nature of matter as something which is extended in length, breadth, and depth. (AT VIII, 42) by mathematical reasoning. The essence of an object can be obtained As noted, the nature of an object can be
known first by eliminating its sensible qualities and then by sub suming a given content under a concept. Knowledge of a thing eventually calls for the judgmental
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activities
of
the
mind.
So
conceived,
perception
becomes
the
thought
of
perception.
One
mediately judges the
object through
concepts or some cognitive
activities instead of immediately perceiving it. John Cottingham argues against Descartes that the senses have some role to play in the perception of the wax. He writes, Descartes seems correct in his claim that our conception of the wax as an
object that can be extended in indefinitely many ways goes beyond what we can actually observe, or even picture in the imagination;
but this does not at all license the inference that a clear and distinct conception of the wax is based on purely intellectual scrutiny that the senses play no role at all. Descartes seems to overreach
himself here and in fact his eventual conception of scientific inquiry will allow a considerable role for sensory observation.5 Cottingham thinks that Descartes overestimates the intellect as the only means
by which one knows the essence of an object. There are many instances in the Principles, Meditations, and Dioptrics in which Descartes discusses the perception of primary qualities of objects such as size, shape, motion, and position. Descartes maintains that those qualities can be apprehended, but only generally or abstractly. Knowledge as such does not indicate any specific, determinate qua lities of actual bodies. Moreover, general qualities are grasped by the
intellect, not by the senses. It explains why those characteristics are understood as general and abstract, for they are known through
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the intellect. Instead of knowing those qualities in an empirical way, one knows them by means of judgment: ....inasmuch as we perceive, or rather stimulated by sense we apprehend clearly and distinctly a matter which is extended in length, breadth and depth, the various parts of which have various shapes and motions, and give rise to the sensations we have of colors, odors, pains, etc. (AT VII, 1,40) Descartes introduces the notion of resemblance between ideas and external objects. We appear to discern very plainly that the ideas of it is due to objects outside of ourselves to which it is altogether similar. (AT VIII, 1, 41) The senses do not perceive the true qualities of external objects; rather, they suggest or occasion the ideas by which the mind apprehends or judges the resemblance. In a similar vein, Descartes writes in the Dioptrics: ....that size, distance, and shape can be perceived only by reasoning out one from the others. The only difference is that those things which we now judge for the first time because of some new observation, we attribute to the intellect; but those which we have judged, or even inferred by reasoning, from our earliest years, in exactly the same way as now, concerning the things that affect our senses, we attribute to sense. This is because we carry out the reasoning and judging concerning the latter at great speed on account of habit or rather we remember the judgments we have long
made about similar things; and so we do not distinguish these operation from simple sense perception. (AT VII, 438) Judgments of distance are implicit in every perception, even though people are not conscious of the judgmental activities of the under standing which are at work. Despite its anti-empirical character, is extremely interesting.
Descartes approach to sense perception Quite convincingly,
Descartes argues that all sensible experiences established by the under
have their structures and frameworks
standing long before the objects are being perceived.
What one
perceives at the moment is nothing but the work achieved long ago by the intellect; the perceiving mind simply carries over the
things which it experienced and judged, and remembers them at great speed. In the wax argument, Descartes is concerned with the essence of matter in general. The particular essence of an object is understood as a particular mode of extended matter; it is a modification of the extended substance, understood geometrically. Thus, all the es sences of individual matters can be converted, through mathematical reasoning, into something purely extended. As far as the essence of
an object is concerned, Descartes tells us nothing more than a certain geometrical configuration. The very essence of a particular thing is understood as a variation of the essence of the extended
substance. Since all the sensible qualities of the object have been
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removed, the mind, by means of its intellect, knows the essence of an object in an abstract and general manner. The mind-body dualism as advocated by Descartes entails the problem of interaction. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes attributes to
bodies an active faculty for causing sensuous ideas in the soul. Ideas are produced by corporeal things.... I do not see how God
could be understood to be anything but a deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from a source other than corporeal things. (CSM II, 55) Descartes seems to hold a straightforward causal picture that external bodies act as the direct efficient causes of mental ideas. active In the in
Principles II. 1, Descartes no longer speaks of an bodies for causing ideas in the soul.
faculty
Rather, he uses the term
occasion to indicate the causal relationship between body and mind, ....it seems to us that the idea we have of it forms itself in us on the occasion of bodies from without. (AT IX 2, 64) The mind
has all the true ideas which are innate; sensible experiences merely occasion the occurrence of some of the ideas. For Descartes, the causal relationship between body and mind cannot be like that between body and body. The latter involves impact and motion. Nothing like into the mind. mind itself. motion or impact passes from the body
The efficient cause of an idea can be attributed to the As an active substance, the mind inherently has the
causal power to produce thoughts through its faculties. It can produce

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ideas voluntarily in thinking ideas involuntarily.
and imagining. Moreover, it can produce
In the presence of an external object, the senses
are at work, producing involuntarily sensations and ideas of ima gination. The motions communicated to the brain by the object are the occasional cause of the idea. (AT VIII 2, 360) The mind simply
interprets messages as presented in the pineal gland and conceives them as ideas. The ideas so conceived are occasioned by the corporeal motions from without. (AT IX 2, 64) The mind acts as the
immanent cause of its own ideas, and the object is the occasional cause of the ideas. In spite of the radical dissimilarity between mind
and body, Descartes can explain why bodily motions could occasion the mind to produce ideas. (AT XI 143-144) Descartes a-symmetrical treatment of body and mind is reflected in his discussion of the interaction between the two. Descartes seems to Mind and body
allow for some interaction between mind and body.
enact effects on each other even though they are of different natures. It is comprehensible that the mind causesthe body to act, for the mind as spiritual substance possesses more perfections than the body. God, as infinite substance, creates and sustains finite substances of bodies and minds. as knowledge and All perfections come from God either eminently as number and formally length.
power or
(CSM II, 55, 99, 118-119)
Because of the affinities between finite
thinking substances and the infinite substance, the human mind bears
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a likeness to God.
On the other hand, God is the cause of matters
not because he possesses formally the various perfections of bodies, which is impossible; rather, he contains eminently the perfections of As God
shape, motion, and other physical qualities. (CSM II 55, 99)
is not the formal cause of bodies, he does not resemble bodies. (CSM II 132) It follows that the idea of God could not be a copy of
material things simply because he does not formally contain length, size, etc. Now any elements in our thought which do not resemble
external objects manifestly cannot have originated in external objects, but must have come from the cause which produces this diverse in our thought. (CSM II 132) perfections only formally On Descartes view, bodies can contain II 55), and they cannot contain
(CSM
eminently the perfections of the idea of God. Geoggrey Gorham argues that for Descartes, thinking things (God and humans) are capable of eminent causation.6 Bodies can cause perfections in minds or other bodies only if they actually possess those perfections. With respect to the ontological hierarchy of reality, God possesses the highest reality and he can eminently contain the perfections of minds and bodies. In addition, as thinking substances,
minds are capable of eminent causation - they can eminently cause bodies. (CSM II 31) This explains why minds produce motion in the Formally, minds do not possess motion.
pineal gland. (CSM I 340)
However, as substances, minds can eminently contain motion and all

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other modes of material things. (CSM II 31)
Hence, Descartes would
admit that minds are extended in virtue of their powers. Ontologically, bodies are lower than minds; they do not contain any of the perfections that minds have. Bodies do not think, under stand, imagine, and so on. Bodies can only cause minds formally. If there is any causation from bodies to minds, minds must possess objectively the perfections which are found in bodies formally. In the
Sixth Meditation, Descartes argues that things cause ideas in the mind - they contain formally the objective perfections in ideas. (CSM II, 55) Right after that, Descartes then questions whether things actually contain the perfections that sensory ideas possess objectively. The failure of resemblance between sensory ideas and things applies to both the ideas of primary and secondary qualities of things. (CSM II, 57) More explicitly, there is nothing in sensory ideas which resembles colors, sounds, and so on; distant objects do not have the same size as in the sensory ideas of them. The conflict can be resolved if one rejects the idea that sensory ideas are directly caused by external objects. In a letter to Mersenne,
Descartes writes, Although I think those which involve no affirmation or negation are innate in us; for the sense organs do not bring us anything which is like the idea which arises in us on the occasion of their stimulus, and so this idea must have been in us before. (CSMK, 187) Sensory ideas are not caused by external things which
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stimulate the sense organs; those ideas arise in us on the occasion of that stimulation. Obviously, the argument of occasionalism is at work here. Sensory ideas do not originate from external bodies because sensory ideas and things are so different. Rather, sensory ideas are
all innate; external objects serve to give rise to those ideas in the mind. Because of the dissimilarities between sensory ideas and
external things, Descartes resorts to innateness to explain the origin of sensory ideas. That is to say, adventitious ideas in general and sen sory ideas in particular all have their origin in innate ideas. cannot be the total and efficient cause Bodies
of sensory ideas, for they
cannot possess any genuine features of the sensory ideas that they cause in the mind. It should be noted from the above analysis that
on the one hand, Descartes downgrades the body, assigning to it an insignificant role in cognition; on the other hand, he attributes all the cognitive functions to the mind. Of all the problems concerning the body in Descartes, dualism of mind and body arouses the most rigorous discussions among com In a letter to Elizabeth (AT IV, 665), Descartes mentions
mentators.
three primitive notions, namely mind, body, and the union of the two. Each notion has a principal attribute. Descartes assigns thought to
mind, extension to body, and sensation to the union. By means of these three categories, man understands the world. Given Descartes dualism, sensations stand in an ambiguous position; they are recalcitrant to
20
classification as modes of thought or modes of extension. as a distinct category is irreducible to thought or extension.
Sensation The union
of body and mind creates a problem in Descartes system, for sensation is recognized as a third category to which no subject can be assigned. Apart from mind and body, Descartes cannot admit another primitive substance, which could serve as a subject to sustain sensations. Descartes is aware of the distinctive character of sensory experience, which differs from thought and extension. Indeed, Descartes needs to On the one hand,
account for the ontological status of sensations.
it is Descartes conviction that the mind is immaterial, essentially distinct from the body; on the other hand, Descartes admits that the mind is closely connected to the body. Cottingham raises the sticks to his
problem of Cartesian trialism, arguing that if Descartes
official dualistic framework, he is not able to do justiceto the com plexities involved in sensation.7 Marleen Descartes. Rozemond thinks that trialism is not a problem in in
He claims that it is Descartes interest which lies
keeping certain type of qualities or states out of the physical world. 8 By assigning sensation either to mind or the union of mind and body, Descartes would not have a problem with either alternative. Instead of stating that the union of mind and body is a single substance with one attribute, Rozemond suggests that the human being, for Descartes, has three attributes, each with its own kind
21
of modes, namely thought,
extension, and sensation. The union of
mind and body is a single principal attribute by which Descartes can unify the human being. According to the real distinction argument
that substances are separate and distinct from one another, the substance of the union of mind and body, if it existed at all, would be independent from both mind and body. Apart from body and mind, one cannot think of another substance that is independent of them. At bottom, Rozemond intends to argue that modes of the union can be taken as a special subset of modes of thought due to the union, and that those modes can account for the interaction between mind and body. However, sensations presuppose the existence of the body and they cannot be classified as modes of thought in virtue of the union. In the final analysis, the occurrence of sensations presupposes the intermingling modes of thought and extension. It is true that apart In
from mind and body substance of another kind is unthinkable. this sense, trialism is absurd. the trialism insight that
Nevertheless, it makes sense to keep cannot strictly be taken as
sensations
modes of thought.
Rozemond confesses at the end that from a philo
sophical point of view, each interpretation does so only superficially and not in a genuinely satisfactory way. 9 All in all, sensation as attri bute of the union of mind and body constitutes an insurmountable problem in Descartes dualism.
22
In order to argue for the immortality of the soul and the purity of knowledge, Descartes has to distance himself from everything
sensible and imaginative, which is closely linked to the sensuous body. Descartes project is to found scientific knowledge on an indubitable ground. By holding a position of strict dualism, Descartes hopes that
he can assign all the cognitive work to the immaterial mind, relegating the body to aminor position. of God, can grasp The cognitive mind, with the guarantee
truth in every clear and distinct perception.
Descartes claims that by strictly following the methodological doubt, all humans are capable of attaining knowledge with absolute certainty. Deprived of all sensible qualities, the thing is known by the intellect in an abstract and general way. For Descartes, sense perception The essence of the
serves to occasion the innate idea in the mind. thing is strictly immaterial and non-sensible.
The Problems of Certainty
For Descartes, ideas mediate the mind and the external world. The mind is immediately acquainted with ideas, through which alone it
knows God, the eternal truth, and the external world. (AT III 474) Ideas are known in two ways, namely their formal essences and their objective essences. Formal essences designate the material aspect of ideas; ideas are taken as modes of thought.
23
Ideas represent things;
the objective
essences
of
ideas
are
concerned
with
the
repre
sentational value of ideas. Descartes classifies ideas into three kinds, namely, innate,
adventitious, and fictitious ideas. (CSM II 26) substance, extension, and God are innate.
For Descartes, ideas of These ideas are said to
be clear and distinct even when they are not actually perceived. Sensations or empirical ideas are ones which can be clear only when they are sensed. The idea of a pain sensation is clear and
distinct when it is immediately apparent and the mind does not make false judgment about the sensation. In contrast, an innate
idea is clear and distinct for any reflective mind; it contains the grounds for making judgments about the idea. Can the notion of clear and distinct ideas be a satisfactory
criterion for truth?
Obviously, a clear and distinct idea can be false. beings can only have complete knowledge.
For Descartes, finite
Only God possesses adequate knowledge. There might be cases in which clear and distinct perceptions turn out to be false.
Empirically, one can doubt the validity of any clear and distinct idea. E. J. Ashworth argues that Descartes is committed to the belief that clear and distinct ideas are true because they are indubitable. By indubitable, Descartes means psychologically impossible; it is
impossible to doubt an idea which is clearly and distinctly perceived. Clear and distinct ideas do not refer to logical truths, whose denials
24
involve logical contradiction. Moreover, Descartes is not interested in logical truths; he is concerned with metaphysical truths such as
knowledge of God, the cogito, and the external world.1 0 Alan Gewirth argues, on the contrary, that clear and distinct ideas are not psychological. The clearness and distinctness of ideas tell us
a logical relation between direct content and interpretative content. In any act of perception, the mind perceives nothing but an idea as its direct object. (AT VII, 181) it knows nothing about the What the mind knows are its ideas, properties of things. In other
physical
words, the mind has direct access to its ideas, through which it conceives things. (AT III, 476) It implies that there is no knowledge As far as the clearness discussions should be
of correspondence between ideas and things. and distinctness of ideas are concerned,
confined to ideas themselves and perceptive acts; the clearness and distinctness of ideas are not properties of the correspondence be tween ideas and things. Descartes defines clear and distinct per ceptions as follows: A clear perception I call that which is present and open to the attending mind; just as we say that those things are clearly seen by us which being present to the regarding eye, moves it sufficiently strongly and openly. But that perception is distinct which is not only clear but is so precise and separated from all others that it plainly contains in itself nothing other than what is clear. (ATVIIIA22)
25
A clear idea is one which is present and open to the mind.
To
perceive an idea as such, the mind must be attentive to what is being perceived. Being attentive allows the mind to recognize the object-an idea is open to the mind.1 1 Gewirth makes a distinction pretative content. between direct content and inter
The direct content of a perception refers to the
passive apprehension of a content; interpretative content designates the minds interpretation of a content. Gewirth holds that the clearness
and distinctness of an idea in sense perception should be found in the relation of direct and interpretative contents. In every perception, some (direct) content is present to the mind, but the content need not be an integral and complete perception of the thing. (Principles I, art 34) What one directly perceives may be something other than what one interprets. A clear and distinct idea is one in which the two contents For example, one clearly understands that the square
are identical.
of one side of a triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides of the triangle when it is in the case of a right angle triangle. One does not have a clear idea of that proportion unless
what is essential to the proportion is included in the direct content of the idea that such a proportion is inherent in a right angle. (AT VII, 225) So conceived, the clearness and distinctness of ideas
become normative characters.1 2
26
What one An idea can
takes to be clear and
distinct is in the
minimal sense.
become clearer whenits direct content includes more A clear and distinct idea is
attributes of the same thing. (AT VII, 33) integral and
complete when it satisfies the minimal requirement of
clearness and d istinctness. Then the idea is certain. However, the idea can be more clear and distinct when more attributes of the same idea are included. So the idea becomes more and more certain. The One
certainty of clear and distinct perceptions is a matter of degree.
is more certain when the idea becomes more and more clear and distinct. The limit of such increase is an adequate idea, the knowledge of which is accessible only to God. knowledge. Humans are incapable of adequate
Only God can know absolutely all the properties which For Descartes, a complete
are in the thing known. (AT VII, 220)
knowledge of a thing is all one needs; an adequate knowledge of it is both impossible for humans and unnecessary. The clearness and distinctness of ideas are characters that ideas must possess. Interestingly enough, the representational value of ideas refers, not to the correspondence between ideas and things, but to the identity of direct and interpretative contents. The clarity and distinctness of ideas turn out to be a logical relation, not a
psychological one.
Granted this, there still exists a gap between the
clear and distinct idea and the thing it claims to represent. The mind is confined to its own ideas; a clear and distinct idea by itself
27
does not guarantee any correspondence between the idea and the thing. with There is no way by which the mind can compare its ideas external things. To ensure that the idea matches reality,
Descartes calls forth the role of God.
In brief, the divine guarantee
is needed in order to ascertain that the idea matches reality. The divine guarantee adds nothing to the content of a clear and distinct idea; it merely approves the decisions already made. Once the divine guarantee is introduced, the notion of certainty in knowledge becomes a metaphysical issue.13 To maintain that every clear and distinct perception is true, Descartes has to prove first the existence of the cogito and then the existence of God. As Gods existence is ascertained,
Descartes is sure that every clear and distinct idea must be true. However, while attempting to prove that God exists, Descartes gets involved with the notorious Cartesian circle, the overcoming of which requires tremendous efforts. whether the proofs valid and sound. As stated before, Descartes aim is to found science on an of Besides, commentators are still debating offered by Descartes are
Gods existence
indubitable ground. logically certain
The clarity and distinctness of ideas as psycho the immediate awareness of the
refer more to
perceiving subject than to the content of the idea being perceived. Without having proved the existence of God, one can even doubt a logical truth that two plus two is equal to four.
28
To assure the truth of clear and distinct perceptions, Descartes adopts a strategy, using skepticism as a means. In the First Meditation,
using the technique of methodological doubt, Descartes pushes skep ticism to the extreme and obtains a piece of knowledge, i.e. the cogito, which survives all kinds of doubt and exemplifies the truth criterion. The cogito serves to validate the criterion of clear and distinct perceptions. Using the same criterion, Descartes then proves Gods
existence. The guarantee from God will subsequently assure that all other clear and distinct perceptions are true. Thus Descartes proves the existence of the external world. This move of ascertaining the
validity of clear and distinct ideas is ingenious; however, it involves the notorious Cartesian circle, which jeopardizes the validity of the criterion itself. Besides, Descartes proofs of Gods existence are
far from convincing. If Gods existence is questionable, the criterion of truth would become empty. In short, the attempt to demonstrate the
validity of the criterion involves enormous and insurmountable difficulties. Leaving aside the general criterion of truth, I turn to a particular case, i.e. the cogito, in which Descartes proclaims to discover a piece of knowledge which is absolutely indubitable. No doubt, the cogito is a piece of incontestable knowledge. It is
knowledge o f the self. I n the First Meditation, even though mathematical truths are clear and distinct, they are still subject to doubt. Under the
threat of metaphysical doubt, clear and distinct ideas are no longer

29
the sign of truth.
Every time this previously conceived opinion of the
supreme power of a God presented to my mind, I am constrained to confess that it will be easy for him if he wishes to do things in such a way that I am mistaken even in the things I think I know with a very great degree of evidence. There is a reason to doubt simple and easy things such as mathematical truths. Using the hypothesis of the decei ving God, the meditator raises doubt about things which are clear and distinct. According to Descartes, apart from the cogito, nothing can
survive the hypothesis of the deceiving God. The cogito is claimed to be absolutely certain, much more certain than simple mathematical truths. There must be some other reason, besides the criterion of clear and distinct ideas, with which Descartes considers knowledge of the cogito indubitable. In other words, the certainty of the cogito must be derived from something that clear and distinct perceptions lack. But there is some unknown deceiver, maximally powerful and clever, who by his industry always deceives me. Without doubt therefore I still am, if he deceives me; and deceive as much as he can, nevertheless he could never make it the case, that I am nothing as long as I think that I am something. (AT VII 24-5) The moment I am thinking, I am conscious of something. No m atter how the deceiving God cheats me, he can never bring it about that I am nothing. I can doubt the existence of my senses and my body. I can doubt the existence of the world.
30
Under no circumstances can I
doubt my existence. In this light, the existence of the cogito is an ex ception to doubt. The recognition of my existence is the precondition
of my doubt. I can doubt only if I exist; I cannot think or doubt at all if I am not thinking. Clear and distinct ideas cannot survive the hypothesis of the deceiving God. Owing to his will and power, the deceiving God can
create truths at will, for instance, he can make two plus two equal to five instead of four. Thus a clear and distinct perception of two plus two is equal to four does not guarantee any truth. For
Descartes, eternal truths, such as the mathematical ones, depend on Gods will. For this reason, the mathematical truths cannot
resist the hypothesis of the deceiving God who is supposed to be omnipotent. far more certain. is in doubt. By Compared with the mathematical truths, the cogito is The cogito can redeem its certainty whenever it reiterating the process of thinking, the cogito
re-activates its certainty.
In contrast, the
mathematical truths are
incapable of reasserting their certainties under the threat of the de ceiving God. However, the proof of the cogito can do nothing to the deceiving God, who is still threatening the truth of all clear and distinct per ceptions, including that of the cogito. Descartes is anxious to prove
Gods existence. As soon as Gods existence is established, Descartes can straightly infer f rom his conception of God that God is n ot
31
deceiving. A non-deceiving God, once his existence is ascertained, can relieve the cogito from the threat of the deceiving God. The certainty
of the cogito is achieved through persuasion; the certainty of a non-deceiving God is grasped through affirmation. (AT III, 65, II, 3-8) Not only does the true God get rid of the hypothesis of the deceiving God, he also becomes the foundation of true science. God guarantees
that all clear and distinct ideas without exception are true. The discovery of the cogito serves another function: it instantiates the truth of c lear a nd d istinct i deas. B efore o ne p roves t h e e ogito, c lear a nd distinct perceptions are always felt to be certain. The moment one de
clares the truth of the cogito, it is also a clear and distinct perception, the experience of which is absolutely indubitable. Indeed, the cogito By virtue of
is an instance of clear and distinct ideas par excellence.
the indubitability of the cogito, Descartes asserts that all other clear and distinct ideas are indubitable and, therefore, true. In sum, the truth
of the cogito is beyond question; it is a piece of self-knowledge. Nevertheless, the knowledge at issue is not stable, for it is still under the constant threat of the deceiving God. is not a piece of absolute knowledge. Furthermore, the cogito
Only when God's existence is
demonstrated and his veracity is shown to be beyond question can Descartes assure himself that every clear and distinct idea, including the one of the cogito, is absolutely certain, for by then the truth of a clear and distinct idea has the divine guarantee.
32
Strictly speaking,
before Gods existence is proved, knowledge of the cogito is not absolutely certain. In what sense is the cogito certain to Descartes? As far as certainty is concerned, Descartes has three kinds of certainty in mind, certainties. citly label it. namely psychological, moral, and metaphysical
As for psychological certainty, Descartes does not expli Descartes writes, I am of such a nature that, so long
as I perceive something very clearly and distinctly, I cannot but believe it to be true. (AT VII, 69) The certainty that Descartes has in mind is psychological. Elsewhere, Descartes cites examples of
propositions which are so clear and at the same time so simple that we can never think of them without believing them to be true, e.g., that I, while I think, exist, that what is once done cannot be undone....(AT VI1,145) Some propositions are psychologically certain in their own right; others are psychologically certain, for they follow from some other psychologically certain propositions. Apparently, for Descartes, all clear and distinct perceptions are, in the first place, psychologically certain. Descartes does label and distinguish moral and metaphysical cer tainties. At the end of the Principles, Descartes says that his physics I shall distinguish here two kinds of certainty. The
is morally certain.
first is called moral, i.e. sufficient to guide our practices or as great as that of things we are not accustomed to doubt regarding the conduct of life, although we know that it could happen, absolutely speaking
*
JO
that they are false. (AT IX 2, 323) practice, custom, or habit.
Moral here means, for Descartes, Moral certainty
It is connected with action.
induces or prompts action. Though there might be grounds to doubt the proposition in question, the evidence is quite strong, at least at that moment, that one believes it. Of all, the most certain one is
metaphysical certainty, for it has the guarantee of God. The other kind of certainty is when we think that it is not at all possible that the thing should be other than we judge it And it is founded on a very sure principle of metaphysics, which is that God being supremely good and the source of all truth, since it is he who has created us, it is certain that the power or faculty he has given us to distinguish the true from the false is not deceived at all when we us it well and it shows us evidently that a thing is true. (AT IX 2, 324) If metaphysical certainty has the highest certainty for Descartes, one would ask where Descartes exemplifies metaphysical certainty. In the Second Meditation, Descartes says that it must be
maintained that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true, as far as I express it, or conceive it in my mind. (AT VII 25) is certain that he exists. in mind at this point? Many Descartes
What kind of certainty does Descartes have Is it metaphysical or psychological certainty? cogito is metaphysically certain for
people think that the
Descartes. That the proposition is indubitable is beyond question. The
34
point is whether one can assign metaphysical certainty to the cogito at this point. In the Third Meditation, Descartes claims that unless he knows that God exists and cannot be a deceiver, he cannot be completely certain of anything else. (AT VII 36-37) True enough, Descartes cannot doubt
the existence of the cogito. However, as noted, the cogito is not yet a stable piece of knowledge. That is to say, before Descartes proves
the existence of God and assures that God is not a deceiver, the certainty of his own existence is still at stake. Descartes can persuade
himself that the cogito exists; however, without Gods guarantee, its existence is still not affirmed. metaphysically certain. Indubitable as it is, the cogito is not yet
Metaphysical certainty has the highest certainty In the absence of the divine
because it has the divine guarantee.
guarantee, the existence of the cogito is not absolutely certain. In the Second Set of Relies, Descartes identifies metaphysical certainty with a firm and immutable conviction. For we are supposing a persuasion so firm that it cannot be removed in any way, which persuasion therefore is absolutely the same as the most perfect certainty. But it can be doubted whether there is any such certainty, or firm and immutable conviction.... (AT VII 145) As noted earlier, all clear and distinct perceptions are psychologically certain. Even if one has a clear and distinct perception of God, the
35
perception in question is still psychologically assured.
From the above
passage, Descartes seems to be saying that such certainty, or firm and immutable conviction does not exist, for all clear and distinct perceptions including the perception of God have their psychological elements - that is to say, they can be subject to doubt. impossible for finite humans to change a proposition, It seems which is
psychologically certain, into an immutable conviction. It is understandable that in the case of Descartes, the mind has direct access to itself; but it lacks an immediate experience of God mediately through his idea. the mind knows God
In the strictest sense, whatever knowledge
humans have concerning themselves, God, and the external world cannot be a firm and immutable conviction, a conviction which they are incapable to grant because of their finitude. It has been noted by commentators that in the Meditations,
Descartes makes use of quite a number of rhetorical devices to prove his philosophical categories. Descartes uses the themes of dreams, madness, and the evil genius to prove the existence of the cogito. Gueroult o bserves t hat t he hypothesis of the evil genius is based, not on natural reason of doubt, but on a metaphysical opinion which is contrary to our nature.1 4 People are inclined to believe in the intrinsic objective value of clear and distinct ideas. Even the dream argument cannot It is the
shake the belief in the validity of clear and distinct ideas.
hypothesis of the evil genius, which attacks what the dream argument
36
could not shake.
The task of the evil genius is to deceive the But the evil genius is itself a fiction, one
meditator systematically.
that extends the meditators capacities to deceive himself. Descartes uses the hyperbolic doubt as the ultimate figure of indubitability. making use of this rhetorical and metaphorical figure, By
Descartes
succeeds in proving the existence of the cogito. In commenting on Descartes use of rhetorical devices in the Meditations, Dalia Judovitz writes, considered to be Descartes most metaphysical text, the Meditations is also that work in which metaphysical content relies most extensively on literature - metaphorical and rhetorical structures of language in the form of hyperbolic doubt and the evil genius, to name but two....Descartes contribution in the Meditations lies in his
redefinition of the cogito and its reduction to a self-verifying utterance I am, I exist. But this interpretation is a theoretical construct, not
to be confused with its author, Descartes, the historical, psychological individual.1 5 The cogito is merely a theoretical construct, if not a fiction. This charge is not a minor one, given that Descartes project is to found science on an indubitable ground. Dennis Sepper notes the importance of imagination in cognition in Descartes early works. Sepper thinks that Descartes interest in the cog nitive function of imagination is confined to his early works.1 6 Because of the problems of autonomy and infinity, Descartes, according to Sepper, has to dismiss in his mature works the cognitive power of
37
corporeal imagination. In contrast, Peter Schouls argues in his book, Descartes and the Possibility of Science, that Descartes is obsessed with career. the notion of imagination throughout his whole philosophical It is true that corporeal imagination is withdrawn in the
Meditations. But imagination as an important tool for Descartes is still at work in the Meditations. Schouls argues that besides doubt, it is intellectual imagination that leads one to the first metaphysical principle, i.e. the cogito.'7 Schouls maintains that corporeal imagination, because of its bodily nature, disappears at the beginning of the Meditations. I find in myself
faculties for certain special modes of thinking, namely imagination and sensory perception. Now I can clearly and distinctly understand myself According to Schouls,
as a whole without these faculties. (AT VII, 78)
in the First Meditation, apart from doubt, intellectual imagination is the only power of the mind, which helps attain metaphysical certainty. device used must be intellectual because anything corporeal The is
stipulated as nonexistent. In raising the hypothesis of the deceiving God, is it not reason that does the job? Schouls holds that reason cannot
make mistakes; reason can grasp what is clear and distinct. The hypo thesis of the deceiving God, like any hypothesis, has the character that one does not yet know it to be true or false. Hence reason is
incapable of proposing the hypothesis. In general, hypotheses are pre judgments; as such they cannot be the work of reason.
38
Memory
cannot be the source either because it cannot be the origin of anything. Memory as a repository of received items, needs validation
from other sources. Finally corporeal imagination is discarded because neither the deceiving imagined. (AT VII, only power left that hypothesis to God or the true God can be corporeally the
181)Therefore, intellectual imagination is can raise the hypothesis. the metaphysical
Descartes needs the for science.
establish
foundation
As noted, reason and memory are so trustworthy that they are not suitable for the job. How do I know that he (God) has not brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape no size, no place, while at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to exist just as they do now. (CSM 11,14) As Descartes does not know the true nature of God at this point, he is free to bring in the hypothesis. I will suppose therefore some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his en ergies in order to deceive me. (CSM 11,15, emphasis added) Suppose here refers to an act of imagination. Hence, without the use of
intellectual imagination, it is impossible for us to come to expe rience and aver the certainty of the cogito. Schouls concludes that
for Descartes, truth is reached through fiction, and that in Descartes use of imagination we see the common root of literature and
philosophy, of humanities and science. 1 8
39
I agree with these commentators that the move of hypothesis of the deceiving God is
raising the
beyond the nature of reason.
Contrary to what Descartes believes, the certainty of the cogito is achieved, not by means of reason itself, but by means of intellectual imagination and other rhetorical devices.
The Problems of Adequate Knowledge of Things
With respect to knowledge, the central contention between Descartes and For Spinoza is the issues of complete and adequate Descartes, the human intellect can attaincomplete They are not the same. knowledge. knowledge,
but not adequate knowledge.
For Spinoza, The human
complete knowledge consists of adequate knowledge. intellect is capable of achieving adequate knowledge. For Descartes, an adequate idea is complete.
But a complete idea
is not necessarily adequate. (AT VII 221) The complete idea of an object includes within the idea all the defining characteristics of the object in question; or it includes those characteristics which cannot be denied; the denial of them will involve contradiction. When all the defining characteristics are included, the object is considered complete be cause the object can exist as an independent entity. Incomplete or inadequate ideas result from abstraction.
40
As for adequate knowledge, it requires, according to Descartes, that it must contain absolutely all the properties which are in the thing which is the object of knowledge. (AT VII 220) Only God possesses
absolutely adequate ideas and he is aware that he does. [Ojnly God can know that he has adequate knowledge of all things. (AT VII 220) The human mind could have achieved such knowledge. A created
intellect, by contrast, though perhaps it may in fact possess adequate knowledge of many things, can never know it has such knowledge unless God grants it a special revelation of the fact. In order to have
adequate knowledge of a thing all that is required is that the power of knowing possessed by the intellect is adequate for the thing in question, and this can easily occur. (AT VII 220) The human intellect
could have the potential to have adequate knowledge, but it never knows it has the power unless God grants it a special revelation of the fact. God not only knows all the properties of all things, but In short,
also knows them reflectively because he constitutes them.
to know a thing adequately, one needs to know all the properties of the thing and have reflective consciousness of this adequacy. God has adequate knowledge; the human mind, Only
because of its
limited power of knowing, cannot arrive at such knowledge. Descartes maintains that it is impossible for humans to achieve adequate knowledge (AT VII 220), but such knowledge is not re quired for humans. What one needs is complete knowledge, the
41
sort of knowledge that we have not ourselves made inadequate by an abstraction of the intellect. (AT VII 221) further on this point. Descartes elaborates
Even though truly adequate knowledge is im
possible for humans, it is still possible for us to attain knowledge that is adequate enough to enable us to perceive not rendered it inadequate by an abstraction of that we have the intellect.
(AT VII 221) In other words, it is true that adequacy cannot be verified; one can validate knowledge of sufficient adequacy, the adequacy
which does not involve contradiction. So long as no contradiction is involved, the knowledge can be validated as non-inadequacy. In a letter to Gibieuf, Descartes writes, So, to tell whether my idea has been made incomplete or inadequate by an abstraction of my mind, I merely look to see whether I have derived it intellectual abstraction from some other, idea which I have in myself. (AT III 474) ....by an
richer or more complete In the act of abstraction,
two ideas, which are being separated from each other, are in reality inseparable. The idea of figure can be abstracted from the idea of
substance or extension. T he idea o f figure so abstracted is bound to be inadequate, for a figure cannot stand on its own in reality without substance or extension. But the idea of substance can separate
itself from the idea of figure by distinguishing itself from the idea of figure. Hence, the idea of a substance with extension and shape
is a complete idea, because I can conceive it entirely on its own,

42
and deny of it everything else of which I have an idea. (AT VIII 475) In sum, an idea is complete for Descartes not in virtue of its ade quacy, but in virtue of its non-inadequacy. One follows some control procedures o f falsification, which m ake s ure t hat t he i dea i s n ot inadequate. On the one hand, Spinoza agrees with Descartes that the human mind cannot arrive at adequate knowledge. On the other hand, he
admits that the human intellect somehow can render itself adequate to the infinite intellect. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza does not allow any
intermediate position between truth and falsity. Spinoza holds that ideas of God are adequate or true ideas. are related to God, are true. (E II p32) All ideas, insofar as they Once the human mind has
access to Gods idea, it possesses adequate knowledge. For Spinoza, adequate ideas and complete ideas are one and the same. To have a complete idea is to know the idea adequately. However, the object of the human mind is its finite and incomplete body. The finite body of the mind is determined by an infinite series of external bodies. (E II p11) Inadequate ideas are a function of this incompleteness. (E II p29 c) Besides, human knowledge is finite; Gods knowledge is infinite. knowledge. (AT VII 47) Humans cannot actually possess Gods infinite Descartes ascribes actual infinity to the tran Spinoza suggests that the complete
scendent God, not to nature.
knowledge of God is in nature. The idea of God is infinite. Gods

43
knowledge as infinite is the ground of human salvation.
How can
humans transcend their finitude so as to possess knowledge of God? Spinoza defines the mind as the idea of a singular thing which actually exists." (E II p11) The human mind is a set of ideas, or And
a complex idea which is constituted by other ideas. (E II p15)
the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the human body. (E II p13) An image is a modification of the body; it is a mode
of extension, not a mode of thought. The idea of an image is a mode of thought. In the Ethics, Spinoza writes, ....to retain the customary
words, the affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things, though they And when the
do not reproduce the [NS: external] figures of things.
mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines. (E II p17 s) The ideas of the images represent the external objects. The images are the products of the interaction between external bodies and the human body; they are modes of extension. And
to imagine is to form ideas of images. As modes of thought, ima ginations are ideas of images, which are the results of the interaction. Imaginations as ideas of images are not necessarily false even though they might be the cause of error. For an imagination is an idea which
indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of an external body - not distinctly, of course, but confusedly. This is how it happens that the mind is said to err....And so it is with
44
the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate t he n atural c onstitution o f t he b ody, o r t hat i ts p ower o f a cting i s increased or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence. (E IV p1 s) An imagination is merely a mode of thinking; it is not intrinsically true or false. To imagine is just to reflect the present state of the body and to form an idea of an image. An image is a figure, an affection of a thing in the body. At the early stages of perception, the body is both affected by external bodies and at the same time affecting external bodies. The mind has a confused idea, for the perception involves the natures of the body and the external bodies. The natures are so mixed that the mind is incapable of disentangling one from the other. (E II p16) By E I ax 4, the knowledge of an effect depends on that of its cause. The mind does not associate the idea of its body with the idea of the external body. Rather, it associates the ideas of the natures of
the two. The ideas thus conceived imply or indicate, but do not ex plain, the natures of the body and the external body. knowledge, for it does not explicate the nature It is confused of a thing
through its cause.
As a result, the mind can neither perceive the
nature of its body, nor can it perceive the nature of the external body. The mind perceives the idea of the affection of its body through which it makes reference to the nature of the external body. Alternatively put, through the affections of the body, the mind has
45
some vague and confused ideas of external bodies. It follows that the idea which we have of external bodies indicate the condition of our own (E II p16 c2) In spite of its confused character, the perception does not exclude the nature of the external body. (E II p17 d) Interestingly, the existence body more than the nature of the external bodies.
of the nature of the external body as perceived by the mind does not refer to the actual existence of the external body. Instead, it reveals
the virtual presence of an external body; it might be the case that the external body does not exist. (E II p17 c) The presence of the object
is an imagination. The spontaneous affirmation of the object in ima gination has nothing to do with the real existence of the object. That is to say, what the mind actually perceives is not the object, but the image of the object. The image as purely corporeal impress-
sion does not necessarily refer to the real existence of the object. In E II p17 s, Spinoza cites an example to illustrate this point. In
conceiving the idea of Peter, Paul takes Peters existence as present - it is merely an affection of Pauls body. That means, the idea of
Peter, in this case, reflects more a certain state of Pauls body than that of Peters body. Paul simply associates the idea of Peter and Such a perception of Peter affirms nothing On the other hand, considered the
posits Peters existence.
about the essence of Peter.
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essence of Peter by itself, the idea of Peter affirms his existence on the condition that he actually exists. For Spinoza, to imagine something as existing is nothing but to have the idea of that affection. The representation as such does not The Sense
take into consideration whether it conforms to the objects. image does not reveal the complete nature of the object.
perception is similar to imagination; the experience of the thing in sensible perception reveals more about the nature of the body than that of the external body. The mind is simply hallucinating the thing as existing instead of perceiving the actual thing. The only way the mind can perceive external bodies is through the affections of its own body. The mind perceives changes brought about All
in the body by the external bodies that interact with the body.
modes by which a body is affected by another body follow both from the nature of the body affected and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body.... (E II p12 A1) It follows that the nature of the body and that of the external bodies are causally relevant. The causal maxim says that knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of the cause, and involves it. (E I ax4) That means, knowledge of these changes involves the nature of both the body and the external bodies. The mind perceives external bodies indirectly
and derivatively through the affections of its own body.
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Spinoza
makes a distinction
between involving the nature of
something and explaining the nature of something. (E II p 18 s) Imagination produces ideas of images, which are affections of the body as the result of the interaction between the body and the external bodies. Insofar as the mind imagines, the perception as such involves,
but does not explain, the natures of its body and the external bodies. As the perception of the external bodies mingles with the nature of the body, the knowledge so obtained is confused and therefore inadequate - it is not the knowledge of the external bodies pure and simple. (E II p26 c) Adequate knowledge of things relies on the connection of ideas which happens according to the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives things through their first causes.... (E II p18 s)
However,
the causes of things and the ideas of those causes are beyond
the reach o f human u nderstanding. It is impossible fo r the finite m ind to know the full causal history of things. The human mind has only inadequate knowledge of the duration of its own body and of the external bodies. T he duration o f all bodies depends on a whole array o f external causes (an infinite series); it depends on the common order of nature (E II p29 s) and the structure of the universe. As an infinite series, the whole array of external causes can be understood by Gods intellect, which is also infinite. Only God can have complete
knowledge of things understood in relation to the full causal history.

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So
considered,
adequateknowledge
of
things
involves temporal
elements - one knows the causes of things only when one knows the causal history of things. If things whose entire causal history can only be understood by God, it follows that true knowledge of things is inaccessible to humans. The causal history of a thing involves the problems of time.
Finite humans are by definition unable to know the full causal history of things, which explains their essences and existence. Instead, the
mind can have adequate knowledge of things by knowing their first causes. In what way can Spinoza avoid the infinite series of causal
actions of things and know the essences of things in terms of the first causes? Additionally, ideas are conceived by the mind in time. It is true that common notions
Gods essence is eternal and infinite. as ideas of properties of
bodies can proxyfor the eternal essence
of God; all temporal elements are eliminated with respect to common notions. Accordingly, the second kind of knowledge has nothing to do
with time. Nevertheless, in the third kind of knowledge, one is supposed to know the concrete essence of the thing as its innermost essence. It takes place in time; the temporal character is reasserted. Interestingly enough, the innermost essence of an object involves Gods essence as eternally existing. How can temporal ideas refer to some eternal things.
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In addition to the problem of an infinite series of causal history, the notion of actual infinity is inherent in the idea. An adequate idea
represents Gods eternal and infinite essence; an idea as complete is infinite. Humans are confined to forming inadequate ideas, which are How can humans actually know the infinite aspect
by definition finite. of an idea?
For Descartes, the problem of infinity is purely theoretical; As far as human know
it deals with the absolute perfection of God.
ledge is concerned, humans, in the case of Descartes, are not supposed to know the idea as adequate; it is sufficient for them to have complete knowledge of the idea. Accordingly, the problem As for Spinoza, the
of infinity is merely a metaphysical speculation.
issue of infinity is a practical, not theoretical, concern. Actual infinity concerns the essence of God as substance. Infinity as substance is different from infinity as indefinite progression. elucidates in his major works the problems of infinity. As stated earlier, the mind, by the order of the intellect, perceives things through their first causes, and which are the same in all men. (E II p18 s) Spinoza is talking about the human intellect, not Accordingly, humans Spinoza Spinoza never
the infinite intellect, which is the same in all men.
know things adequately by virtue of the order of the intellect.
seems to say that through the intellect, one can know things in terms of the order and connection of ideas of things, not in terms of the order and connection of the ideas of affections.
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In the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza holds that true knowledge differs from false knowledge not only by an extrinsic but chiefly by an intrinsic denomination. (TdlE 69) A true idea is defined by adequacy that consists of all the intrinsic denominations of the idea. A true idea is without relation to other things and it has no other sign than itself. (TdlE 35) Similarly, Spinoza says, in the
Ethics, By adequate idea I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all the properties or intrinsic denominations of a true idea. (E II def 4) definition of true idea maintains the self-sufficiency of truth. Spinoza gives another definition of truth. with its object. (E I ax 6) This
Elsewhere,
A true idea must agree
It is this axiom to which Spinoza links For all ideas which are in
the possibility of relating all ideas to God.
God agree entirely with their objects and so they are all true. (E II p32 d) Granted what Spinoza says about truth, the definitions
do not show how one can have access to truth or the idea of God. Spinoza simply assumes rather than proves that humans are capa ble of attaining adequate knowledge. As far as Spinozas position is
concerned, is this a paradox or simply an inconsistency of human knowledge and adequate ideas? In his essay Aporia and Spinozas Theory of Adequate Ideas, Jean Luc Marion lays out succinctly the problem of adequacy in Spinozas theory of knowledge.
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Marion maintains that Spinozas
thesis involves positing two adequacies,
namely the adequacy of
ideas and ideata, and the adequacy between the human mind and God.1 9 The fact that ideas are related to God (E II p32) presupposes that the mind can attain adequate knowledge. According to Marion,
adequate knowledge must be accomplished in two stages, namely epistemological adequacy and theological adequacy. Marion argues
that Spinoza does not succeed in demonstrating the two stages. The problem concerning E II p32 is whether one can regard ideas in God and ideas in us as identical. Spinoza posits an adequate idea A in God, insofar as God is explained through the nature of the human mind. (E II p34 d) Marion contests that Spinoza merely posits If one ascribes ideas in the mind to
the idea without proving it.20
ideas in God, then the ideas in question, according to Marion, must change in nature. Spinoza fails to justify the reference o f the finite mind to the infinite intellect. know himself as infinite. In order to conceive adequately, God must However, given the boundaries of the mind, it In fact, Spinoza concedes
can only understand the idea inadequately.
that there is a difference between the finite and the infinite intellects. Marion says, In his juxtaposition of these two aspects of God (the finite and the infinite), Spinoza fails to explain how the idea passes from one to the other, just as he fails to demonstrate that an idea that is adequate in God is also adequate in us, or to explain how the reference of our ideas to God is possible.2 1
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As for the theological adequacy, the mind suffers the same fate. Marion argues that E II p47 is a bold claim in the Ethics - it involves some logical faults. First, ideas in the mind are affections of its body.
They are bound to be inadequate, for they are more about the nature of the body than about the nature of the external body. Second,
from E II p19, one can infer that adequate ideas depend on ideas of affections. But Spinoza never attempts to correct inadequate
ideas and transform them into adequate ones. Finally, it is obvious that an infinite intellect conceives everything adequately. Nevertheless, Spinoza does not discuss how the human mind can conceive ideas as adequately as the infinite intellect does, and how the human mind can adequately conceive Gods infinite essence. Marion concludes
that Spinoza simply takes the existence of adequate knowledge for granted and that he cannot offer any substantial proof of this con troversial point.22 I agree with Marion that Spinoza does not explicitly demonstrate the existence of adequate acquired knowledge. It might
be the case that any particular proof of this controversial point is, in fact, inaccessible. Nonetheless, even if adequate knowledge cannot be shown, it does not imply that adequate knowledge is practically inaccessible to humans. Descartes, in his inquiry of scientific knowledge, simply neglects the role of the body. The body is understood by Descartes as passive, sensible, purely extended, and dumb. B y all means, the body should be
53
excluded from the realm of scientific knowledge.
What one knows
through the body is confined to daily matters, which serve practical interests. In contrast, Spinoza assigns a high position to the body.
In cognition, the role of the body is considered as important as that of the mind. the mind. The mind is the idea of the body; the body is the object of Humans can know things in terms of ideas of the mind or in
terms of affections of the body. They are two sides of the same cognitive process. Well aware of the deficiency of Descartes theory of knowledge, Spinoza is determined to radicalize Descartes project. From the above
analysis, Descartes is contented with knowledge that is indubitable and free from contradiction this is all that finite humans can reach.
In comparison, Spinoza is more ambitious. He is not satisfied with these characterizations of knowledge, claiming that knowledge as true must be Gods knowledge. Furthermore, Spinoza contends that finite humans Insofar as humans know ade
have access to absolute knowledge.
quately and perfectly, they have absolute knowledge. As knowledge of God, adequate knowledge must be complete and self-explanatory. It is absolutely certain because the mind has an immediate experience of Gods idea which is known in the most perfect way. Spinoza suggests that without any acquaintance with its body, the cogito is forever trapped in the realm of immanence. has immediate contact with God or external objects.
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The cogito never Descartes relies
on the innate ideas in the mind as the only source to know God and the external world. Spinoza argues that unlike the mind, the body Both the
holds an immediate relationship with the extended world.
body and the external world belong to the same attribute of extension. Because of this intimate relationship between the body and the world, the mind can know the world through the affections of its body, which are caused by their physical interaction. It is Spinozas conviction that
without resorting to the affections of the body the mind can never have knowledge of any kind, let alone absolute knowledge. The body
is the key with which we can open the door to the external world. Initially, the mind can only have inadequate knowledge - imaginations of physical images. To have adequate knowledge as Gods knowledge, both the mind and the body must transform themselves to the
extent that they perceive as God perceives. Having gone through the tough journey of self-transformation, forming adequate ideas. In chapter one, I discuss the development and transformation I argue that his early humans are then capable of
of Spinozas conceptions of truth and certainty.
position on truth is based on the immediate recognition of clear and distinct perceptions, a position very similar to that of Descartes. His later position on truth, in contrast, stresses both the corresponding and coherent aspects of truth. In addition, the notion of the body is introduced and discussed throughout the Ethics.
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On account of these
changes, Spinoza has to modify his early conception of truth. I n chapter two, I delineate how Spinoza leams from the early Descartes the cognitive function of imagination and integrates it into his theory of knowledge. I reconstruct the notion of corporeality in light of Spinozas theories of affects, conatus, and personal identity. The reconstruction aims to explain how humans can cross over from the finite to the infinite. In particular, I give tribute to the cognitive function of the body. In chapter three, I expound Spinozas two conceptions of infinity. I argue that through their co-operation, the mind and the body practi cally succeed in attaining Gods essence and knowing actual infinity as substance. I further claim that spatiality is a promising candidate, through which the body can virtually reach Gods infinity. four, I reconstruct Spinozas theory of belief. In chapter
The point is to redeem
the validity of belief. A belief is true when its content has objective reality. Ideas as beliefs are adequate only when they agree with their
ideata. I designate the subjective features of belief such as affirm ation, veracity, feeling as the internal denominations of a true idea. Moreover, I discuss the two conceptions of existence, one temporal and the other eternal. As humans can conceive existence in two
ways, I maintain that in the third kind of knowledge the mind is in touch with two kinds of existence. I argue that a subjective belief can become absolutely true and certain only when the tem poral experience of the things existence can ground itself on the
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experience of its eternal existence.
How the mind experiences the
things eternal existence is the subject matter of the last chapter. In chapter five, I discuss Spinozas notion of self-knowledge in the
hope of solving Humes paradox of personal identity and the infinite regress entailed by all claims to knowledge. The key to the issues lies in the fact that knowledge of things and the self can ulti mately be grounded on self-awareness. Having grasped all the
things common notions as its ontological grounds, the body virtually reaches infinity and the mind is in the position to intuit the concrete essence of the thing and grasp actual infinity as substance. The intuition as the unconditional positing is the bottom line on which all conditioned knowledge is based. The mind knows Gods essence in its entirety as substance. On reaching the absolute ground, the mind is aware of its eternal existence. Descartes tries to separate the mind from the body so as to isolate the cogito from all sensible experience. Absolute knowledge, for Descartes, is exclusively an intellectual enterprise. There is no p lace for the senses and the body as far as pure knowledge is concerned. Of all the distinguished philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Spinoza is the only one who pays particular attention to the notion of the body. From start to end, Spinoza is concerned about All
how the mind comes to have true knowledge of its own body.
knowledge that the mind has derives from the affections of its body.
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For Spinoza, it is totally absurd to claim that the mind can exist on its own; without its functional union with the body, the mind simply knows nothing, not to mention its existence. In his mature works,
Descartes attributes an insignificant role to the body in all cognitive activities. In contrast, I argue that the Spinozistic body holds a con cognition. It is through the corporeal image of the
stitutive place in
thing, which is perceived by the body, that Spinoza can argue for a case that the image and the thing will eventually match each other. Owing to this corporeal aspect of perception which takes place on the side of the body, Spinozas theory of truth supersedes other theories way that the correspondence between the image
of truth in the
and the thing stands on a solid ground. If that is the case, the correspondence and coherence of truth are both important to Spinoza, for they are complementary aspects. A true idea is properly so called when all the internal and external marks are obtained. corporeal affections constitute the subject matter of all Indeed, cognitive
activities of the mind. external bodies, God,
Adequately or inadequately, the mind knows and itself through the bodys affections.
The moment one knows the the essence of and existence.
essence of onesbody, one comprehends Gods eternal essence
the thing and experiences
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2
Skepticism, Error, and Ideas
Skepticism is not irrefutable, but certainly nonsensical when it tries to raise doubts where no question can be asked. Wittgenstein: Tractatus This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically curd, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes may seem entirely free from it. Errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous. Hume: Treatise
In the Meditations,
by meansof methodological doubt,
Descartes
pushes skepticism to such an extreme that it turns against itself and in the end cannot but give way to truth. am thinking, I am sure that I exist. As long as I
Atthat moment, 1 can no
longer be skeptical about my
existence. True enough, skepticism
is kept at bay for the moment and the existence of the cogito is beyond doubt. Nevertheless, skepticism revives and becomes
intractable when Descartes comes to prove the existence of the external world. Similarly, in order to build science on a solid foundation, Descartes is anxious to avoid 59 errors whenever possi-
ble. Error cannot be attributed to God because of his omnipo tence an veracity. Instead, the will judgment on something perceived. which is not is to blame for passing
yet clearly and distinctly
Error is a cognitive sin for Descartes, a creation of before one can have repre
the mind which needs to be rectified
access to truth. As for ideas, Descartes stresses their
sentational value. By means of the natural light of reason, the mind intuits the content of an idea, the clarity and distinctness of which assure us that we possess a true idea. A clear and
distinct idea is necessarily true because it is guaranteed by God that the object of the idea must exist in the external world. The objectives of this chapter are to elucidate how Spinoza eliminates skepticism from his principles and to show how he formulates a new interpretation of error. I delineate Spinozas early
position on skepticism, showing that in his early conception of truth he is still under the influence of Descartes. Spinoza contends in his theory of error that error is not a creation of the mind owing to a judgment of the will; rather, it is a natural phenomenon, something which takes place in nature. To be more precise, the mind is led astray because of the privation of knowledge. So long as the mind is capable of framing the adequate idea, it has complete knowledge of the object. Error will automatically
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dissolve. Not d issatisfied w ith t h e e riterion o f c Iear a nd d istinct ideas, Spinoza develops his own conception of truth, namely truth as adequacy. He holds that an adequate idea is an idea of God which entails absolute certainty. By considering the development of his conceptions of skepticism, error, and ideas, I want to show how Spinoza changes his position on truth. Truth as conceived by the
late Spinoza is not the immediate experience of clear and distinct ideas; rather, conceiving truth involves a long process of strenuous activities in which the mind and the body transform themselves to the extent that they both perceive the thing adequately.
Cartesian Skepticism
Cartesian skepticism is adopted
by the
mind as a method to
liberate itself from prejudice and discover something firm and lasting in the sciences. After explaining to Gassendi the serious ness of skepticism in the First Meditation, Descartes notes: For when it is a question of the regulation of life, it would surely be foolish not to trust the senses....When, however, we inquire what can be known most certainly by the human mind, it is completely alien to reason, not to be willing to reject them as doubtful, indeed as false, in order to discover that certain
61
others, which cannot thus be rejected, are by this fact more certain , and actually better known by us. (AT VII 350-1) From the passage, one has a feel for Descartes unwavering interest in the search for certainty. He aims at seeking absolute certainty of knowledge so as to ensure the foundations of the sciences. To achieve this, he must refrain from giving assent to beliefs which are subject to doubts of all kinds. People believe Yet the
that the senses are the most reliable source of beliefs.
senses sometimes deceive us - this makes them unreliable. In fact, Descartes endorses the statement that, the entire testimony of the senses must be considered to be uncertain, nay, even false.... (AT VII 350) Descartes doubts all things about which there can be the slightest uncertainty. Instead of checking each belief to see if it admits of doubt, he examines the foundations on which all beliefs depend. To found This is what Descartes sets out to do in the Meditations. science on an indubitable ground requires that all be
liefs, not some, must be certain. For Descartes, all sciences form a unified whole that can be held in the mind. (AT X, 215) Descartes is committed to the idea that all scientific beliefs form a system; the system either holds up or collapses as a whole.(AT VII, 531)
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Hence, he makes it a point to search for a principle which, as indubitable, can be applicable to all sciences. In order to attain knowledge of absolute certainty, Descartes follows, in the Meditations, two different stages of doubt. The first stage of skeptical arguments serves to get rid of all his du bious ideas, which he held in the past. Thereafter, Descartes intro duces the dream argument and the hypothesis of the evil genius as the second stage of skepticism. The point is to correct his natural bias toward taking dubious ideas as certain. Doubts like
the hypothesis of the evil genius and the dream argument are de signated by Descartes as hyperbolic or metaphysical. (AT VII 37) Even though these suppositions are improbable, they serve to cure the mind of excessive reliance on the senses. Descartes first denies all sense experience as the source of certainty in belief about the physical world. He discards the argument of insanity as improbable, for as the meditator, he cannot identify himself with a madman. Otherwise, the project will be selfdefeating. Instead, he uses the dream argument. It turns out that
the mathematical sciences have an element of indubitable certainty that no argument seems to shatter. The simple and general objects in mathematics are true under all circumstances. Whether I am awake or asleep, two and three add up to five, and a square has
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only four sides; and it seems impossible
for
such obvious truths
to fall under a suspicion of being false. (AT VII 21) The dream argument leads only to a modest skepticism. It calls into doubt all particular sense beliefs and the existence of com posite o bjects. 111 eaves i ntact s imple a nd u niversal truths like those of mathematics, which are real and true. In raising the hypothesis of the evil genius, Descartes pushes skepticism to such an extreme that even mathematical truths are not immune from doubt. The evil genius is so powerful that he deceives the meditator even in regard to things of which one is most certain. For example, perhaps there are no extended bodies, no shape, size, or place. The evil genius makes the meditator go wrong whenever he adds two and three or counts the sides of a square. (AT V II24) Under the threat of the evil genius one can be deceived, not only in sense perception of earth and sky, but also in the understanding of simple natures and mathematical proposi tions. Indeed, all simple natures and mathematical truths are nonempirical; they are beyond sensible experience. They are simple truths par excellence. All the same, they Margaret Wilson maintains that the are called into doubt. deceiver Hypothesis is
introduced to severe all truth-conveying connection between per ceptions or beliefs and their causes.... 1 She further argues that
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all the
arguments
in the
First
Meditation go against different
versions of one principle; they are set up by Descartes to shatter the faith in truth-conferring nature. It is this truth-conferring nature that Descartes calls into doubt in his skeptical arguments.2 In this respect, Descartes is not far from Hume. With his theory of belief Hume successfully gives a psychological account to all knowledge claims. Instead of calling such claims into doubt, Hume regards
this truth-conferring character as human nature. The proof of the existence of the cogito is a success: its validity is beyond question. Yet, having proved the existence of the cogito, Descartes still has to show the existence of the external world,
which is his main concern. If the proof of the existence of the external world fell flat, one would be forever trapped in the
realm of consciousness - nothing would exist besides the cogito. in that case, it would be impossible to found all sciences. It is futile to talk about sciences unless the external world is real and its existence is indubitable. Thus, having proved the cogito, Descartes needs to prove the existence of God and show that
he is not a deceiving God. This move is crucial: the existence of a non-deceiving God would guarantee the validity of every clear and distinct perception. Unfortunately, in proving Gods existence, Descartes gets involved with the notorious circle. The circula-
65
rity of his arguments makes the proofs of Gods existence less convincing, if not invalid. In circle, means thatthe cognitive the eyes of Spinoza, the Cartesian subject never has direct access
to God. Insofar as we know Gods existence through the idea of God, we do not know God in a direct way. As for Descartes, the idea of God is so clear and distinct that one simply infers is not intuited,
that God exists. In other words, Gods existence but deduced.
By virtue of this vicarious experience of God and his existence, it is impossible to ascertain ones origin. Cut off from God, one is completely out of nature, gives rise of place.Separated from God and the rest
the cogito tends to get lost from time to time. This to the Cartesian malady that the cogito is always
in doubt. Descartes intends to use methodological doubt as a tool to acquire true knowledge. Skepticism in the form of doubt turns out to be a symptom philosophy. engendered by the core of Descartes
Despite the strenuous
efforts Descartes has been
putting to curb all kinds of doubt, his philosophy of subjectivity ironically itself induces skepticism. As one is not sure of ones
origin, one is always trapped in therealm of immanence. Suspi cion always returns even though ones perceptions are clear
and distinct.
Gods endorsement of clear and distinct ideas that
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they must have their corresponding objects is no guarantee at all. This is because the cogito never has immediate experience of God and his existence. There is always a veil that separates God and the cogito. As Gods existence is not intuited but demon strated, the existence of the external world is even further from our g rasp. T he m ind o nly k nows G od and the external world mediately through its ideas. With no direct comprehension of the existence of God and the external world, the cogito could be
skeptical about the reality of anything except itself. The proof of the cogito is not an unqualified success. Before Gods existence is assured, the cogito is under the constant threat of the evil genius. Descartes has to reactivate the proof to show that he exists. In all other perceptions Descartes cannot assure himself that clear and distinct perceptions are true
when the hypothesis of the deceiving God is not yet removed. Descartes cannot simply dismiss the idea of a deceiving God; he can forget about the hypothesis i f a nd o nly i f h e i s ab solutely certain that there is no such being. Without showing the
absurdity of a deceiving God, he is unable to know anything apart from the cogito. The methodological doubt, Cartesian circle, and
existence of a deceiving God are the problems Spinoza has in mind when he attempts to address Cartesian skepticism in the
67
Principles.
Overcoming Skepticism
Some commentators like W. Doney and Richard Mason feel that by the time Spinoza writes the Ethics he has already overcome
Cartesian skepticism. This is not the case. In fact, philosophical skepticism is a life-long concern and involvement for Spinoza.
At different stages of his philosophical career, Spinoza devotes much attention to Cartesian skepticism and comes up with
different ways to cope with the issue. In what follows, I attempt to depict the different stages at which Spinoza struggles with skepticism. To begin with, Spinoza thinks that if Descartes can overcome skepticism by proving that clear and distinct ideas are all true, the proof must rely on the clarity and distinctness of its pre mises so as to claim that they are true. In that case, the proof must appeal to its own conclusion in order to maintain that its premises are true. This is the notorious Cartesian circle. In the Principles, Spinoza sketches Descartes attempt to evade the circle.3 To Spinozas understanding, Descartes solution is the following. One has to cite the clarity and distinctness of an
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idea if one remembers having perceived it clearly and distinctly. Alternatively, one can be assured by others that the idea is clear and distinct. As for the present clear and distinct perceptions, the criterion of truth is not needed because one is actually having a clear and distinct perception. Without making use of the clarity and distinctness of the premises in the proof, one has clear and distinct perceptions of the premises. Consequently, Descartes can avoid the circle. On Spinozas view, in the attempt to validate
clear and distinct ideas, Descartes arbitrarily confines the range of skepticism to conclusion reached in the past. Spinoza attributes a position to Descartes that clear and distinct perceptions in the
past are liable to doubt; whereas, present clear and distinct per ceptions are immune from doubt. Since Descartes does not pro vide an answer to this question, this attempt to overcome skep ticism cannot claim to be successful. This is not an accurate presentation of Descartes position. With the exception of the cogito Descartes does raise radical doubts about everything that seems evident, including past and present perceptions. Despite the inaccuracy, Spinoza pinpoints a problem
in Descartes that immediate unsupported perception cannot gua rantee knowledge. Not satisfied with the answer offered by Descartes that present
69
clear and distinct perceptions can curb all kinds of doubt, Spinoza offers his own alternative. Spinoza agrees with Descartes that
the existence of the cogito is indubitable, ....wherever we turned our attention, .... we came upon no reason for doubting that
did not by itself convince us of our existence. 4 Indeed, our existence is certain; and other things i n t he world enjoy th e same kind of certainty asthe cogito does. Even if a deceiving
God exists who deceives me down to every de tail, I can doubt the validity of everything, but not that of my existence. as I think, I am certain that As long
I exist. However, I cannot attribute Even if we
the same kind of certainty to other perceptions.
have a clear and distinct perception of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles, we cannot infer the perhaps we are deceived
same thing from [the supposition] that
by the author of our nature. 0 The same supposition allows us to infer our existence, but not that of other things. As long as one lacks the idea of God, there are always grounds for doubting, even in the case of clear and distinct perceptions. Anyone who does not have a true idea author is a deceiver of God might as easy to as to think think that his
that he is not a deceiver."6 a triangle might is equal to
Similarly, one who does not have any idea of or might not think that the sum of the
angles
70
two
right angles. As a result, nothing exists fo r sure except A clear and
the cogito. At this point, Spinoza makes an analogy.
distinct concept of G od a ffirms t hat G od i s v eracious; a nalogously, a clear and distinct idea of a triangle assures that its
three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Apparently, what is crucial for Spinoza is a true idea of God. Anyone who has an idea of God is sure that he is veracious and that all mathematical truths are beyond doubt. Gods exis tence being assured, all mathematical truths are as certain as
our existence. Having known the idea of God, one will never worry about the idea that God might be a deceiver. Nor will one doubt that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Here, all of a sudden, Spinoza twists his argument. To under
stand the intricacy of his argument, it is worthwhile to quote the passage at some length: And just as we can form such an idea of a Triangle, even though we do not know whether the author of our nature deceives us, so also we can make the idea of God clear to ourselves and put it before our eyes, even though we still doubt whether the author of our nature deceives us in all things. And provided we have it, however we have acquired it, it will suffice to remove all doubt, ....We can be certain of nothing - not, indeed, so long as we are
71
ignorant of Gods existence (for I have not spoken of this) - but as long as we do not have a clear and distinct idea of him.7 In this passage, Spinoza seems to be saying that we are certain of nothing, not because we are ignorant of Gods existence, but because we do not have a clear and distinct idea of him. God for Descartes is a transcendent God; we need knowledge of God to guarantee the validity of every clear and distinct perception.
In contrast with the Cartesian God, the Spinozistic God is imman ent in nature. Everything in nature expresses Gods power and essence. Hence, to have a clear and distinct idea of anything in nature, say the idea of a triangle, suffices to avow Gods
nature as veracious and his existence as certain. There is no need to worry about whether a deceiving God exists. T o r we have a clear and distinct idea of a Triangle, although we do
not k now w hether t he a uthor o f o ur n ature d eceives us; a nd provided we have such an idea....we will be able to doubt neither his existence, nor any mathematical truth. 8 The above argument shows how Spinoza avoids the Cartesian circle based on the implicit everything is in God. premises that God is in nature and
Solely by making use of the criterion of
clear and distinct perceptions, Spinoza proves the existence of the external objects.
72
W.
Doney argues that
once we
are
ignorant of our origin,
doubt will arise. A clear and distinct perception can be doubtful because we can be a creature of a deceiving God.9 To have knowledge of ones origin is crucial to validate all subsequent clear and distinct perceptions. The obscure idea that one can be a creature of a deceiving God will be replaced by a clear and distinct idea of ones origin. Thus, there will be no reason for doubt.1 0 Doney seems to be saying that once we know our origin and have a clear and distinct idea of God, all clear and It is
distinct perceptions are true because they are God-given. clear that takes the Doney first
misses the second partof the argument and part ofthe argument as comprising Spinozas
entire argument. Richard Mason makes a similar charge against Doney that it is the origin of our clear and distinct ideas that matters.1 1 Mason holds that the idea of a triangle suffices to proxy for the idea of God. Knowledge of a clear and distinct idea is sufficient to
eliminate all possibilities of doubt. Mason further claims that with in the Spinozistic universe everything is in nature. For Spinoza, sense perception can be doubtful, but for the lacks reason that one
a coherent explanation of sensible experience. Descartes of the demon can be ignored; Descartes uses this
hypothesis
73
artificial device there
to doubt
what
is beyond
reason.
For Spinoza,
is nothing beyond nature. Hence, supernatural suppositions position in Spinozas s ystem.
like a deceiving God have no
Clear and distinct ideas are the best means for the detection of truth. And suspensions of realm of reason. Extreme belief have to be operative within the
doubt like the hypothesis of the evil
genius is out of place in the construction of the Ethics. Within the context of the Ethics, perception, imagination, conception, doubt, and the like have their place in nature.1 2 Douglas Odegard makes a mistake similar to Doneys. He
(Spinoza) does not try to limit the role of extemalism in dealing with scepticism, needed since he in any thinks that a suitable conception of
God is
situation in which the demon hypothesis
is not self-refuting. Rather he maintains categorically that we can form the required idea of God that without already having to know
such a God exists. But his reply is no less ad hoc than he does not explain without the how we Gods can form the And
Descartess, for required if we idea of
God prove
proving latter, we
existence.
have to
cannot
accept the its
proofs premises on external grounds
without
presupposing
conclusion.1 3 Odegard concludes that in the Principles, Spinoza does not successfully avoid the c ircle. S pinoza, a ccording t o
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Odegard, is still using the criterion of clear and distinct ideas and treating God as a transcendent God. In a second attempt to argue against Cartesian skepticism
(TdlE 77-79), Spinoza maintains that one should not doubt ideas that are clear and distinct unless one has reason to doubt.
The question of whether God may be
a deceiver becomes
one of whether there is ground for doubting that God may be a deceiver. The point is that if I have a ground for accepting an idea as true there is no metaphysical ground for suspecting that I may be deceived. As the perception is clear and distinct, it suffices to show that what I am immediately aware of is true. In that case, one posits premises independently the clarity and distinctness of the of theproof. One needs
of the validity
not presuppose the conclusion in order to have a ground for claiming that the premises are true. According to of the Cartesian Odegard, this move doesescape the difficulty
circle, but it doesnot stop all kinds of doubts. be empirical, not necessarily metaphysical. perception; a clear false. An a priori
General doubt can Empirically, I and distinct
can doubt a clear and distinct perception may turn out to be
proof that all clear and distinct ideas must be true does not entail that any clear and distinct ideas are actually true.
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Even though Spinoza can avoid the circle in this case, there are still questions from the skeptic that remain to be answered. In his Ethics, Spinoza offers a more comprehensive answer to the questions raised by the skeptic. The mind , insofar as it perceives things truly, is part o f th e infinite intellect o f God;
hence, it is as necessary that the minds clear and distinct ideas are true as that Gods ideas are. (E II p43 s) In a way similar to Descartes approach that clear and distinct ideas are true because of Gods guarantee, Spinoza attempts to show that as the mind is part of Gods intellect, clear and distinct ideas must agree with their ideata. Elsewhere, Spinoza defines adequate ideas as follows. By adequate ideas I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all the
properties or intrinsic denominations of a true idea. (E II def 4) As adequate, an idea must be illuminative in such a way that it allows us to identify it as true. That an idea is true if and only if the cognitive subject knows adequately. By truth is its own standard, Spinoza means that there is an internal (subjective) reason to accept the idea as true. As far as
truth is concerned, whether the idea belongs to a class of ideas which must agree with their ideata is irrelevant. The conceiving subject has an internal reason that marks the idea as true.
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The natural light of reason suffices to assure the mind that the idea under consideration is true. In brief, an idea is true for me only if I have internal reason to accept it as true. Since I do not have to defer to external reasons to validate the truth of an idea, the idea, whose truth is its own standard, must be self-evident. This metaphysical proof of true ideas can escape circularity without difficulty. Since the reason to accept an Idea as true is internal, there is no need to appeal to the clarity and distinctness of its premises. Empirical reasons for doubting the validity of the idea do not work either. As long as I have an internal reason to accept the idea as true, it is not necessary that the idea belongs to t he c lass o f c lear and distinct ideas. The truth of the idea does not depend on the same criterion that validates ideas of the same class. Even if ideas of the same class turn out to be false, that does not affect the validity of the idea in question.
Empirical arguments for doubting the validity of the idea fail.1 4 All things said, Odegard seems to have some reservations about Spinozas project that it can embrace all questions raised by the skeptic. It seems to me that Odegard puts a lot of em phasis on Spinozas internalism, claiming that it is the only
means by which Spinoza can combat skepticism. True
enough,
internal reason as adequacy is the only means on which the mind
77
can rely in identifying an idea as true. A true idea is defined by an adequacy that is intrinsic (TdlE 69); an adequate idea is without any relation to other things.(7c//E71) In E II def 4, Spinoza stresses once again the importance of adequacy as a true idea. the internal mark of
In my opinion, it is incompleteto rely solely on an needs
internal reason to claim that an idea is true, for one still a metaphysical ground for saying that the
idea is true. More
over the definition of an adequate idea is preceded by the extrinsic definition. (E I ax6) On account of this axiom, Spinoza can establish the possibility of relating the minds ideas to God. In
fighting against skepticism, Spinoza relies on both the Internal adequacy of the idea and the external correspondence between the idea and its ideatum such that a true idea in the mind is in perfect accord with the idea in God. Apart from the internal reason, the idea is true because it must be in the infinite intellect of God and therefore it must be clear and distinct. As such, correspond to its ideatum. One should bear in
the idea must
mind that in elaborating his theory of error, Spinoza stresses the correspondence between an idea and its equal object. weight and To my
understanding, the aspects of
late Spinoza gives internal
to both external
ideas, i.e. the
adequacy
correspondence
of ideas. Granted this, the external and internal
78
reasons serve to give an all-around answer to questions raised by the skeptic. It should be noted that the early Spinoza stresses the i im mediacy of clear and distinct perceptions. The immediate experience of clear and distinct perceptions suffices to claim that they are
Gods knowledge, which is absolutely certain. There is no need to worry about the existence of a deceiving God. Moreover, one can leave the Cartesian circle behind. To meet his conceptual scheme, the late Spinoza needs to modify his notions of truth and cer tainty. For an idea to be absolutely certain it must be both true and adequate. Both the internal and external marks are needed to assure one of the truth of the idea. As the idea is abso by the
lutely certain, one keeps at bay all questions leveled skeptic.
According to Y. Yovel, intuitive knowledge can be understood under two headings, namely, clear and distinct ideas and the third kind of knowledge. As the foundations of knowledge, clear and distinct ideas are the beginning and the third kind of
knowledge is the end of the inquiry.
As far as knowledge is However, there
concerned, they are both immediate and intuitive. is a contextual difference between the in his early works, i.e. the Korte
two. Yovel claims that the TdlE,
Verhandeling and
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Spinoza does not clarify this contextual difference. This might be the r eason w hy people consider his early account of intuitive knowledge mystical and ordinary. Yovel argues that for the early Spinoza clear and distinct ideas are made certain by their clarity, simplicity, and light. As for clarity, the logical necessity of clear and distinct ideas compels the mind to give assent to them. In the case of Spinoza, the logical and mental aspects of ideas are complementary to each other. There is no causal link between the two, for they have the same onto logical reference. With regard to simplicity, ideas as clear are
simple truths. The mind can intuit ideas as true because they are simple and logical. For Spinoza, simplicity also means selfevident and immediate. The idea is directly intuited as without any mediation of another idea. also designates the overwhelming true
The natural light of reason
power of the immediacy of
truth. It is a power shared by all rational minds. With a proper method, all humans can have access to this power.1 5 Following in the footsteps of Descartes, the early Spinoza
believes that all rational minds can directly intuit logical laws, mathematical axioms, and even particular essences. In some cases, the mind can even intuit the truths step by step the need for mentioned without following
deductive chains. Descartes needs
80
the
divine
guarantee
to make
sure
the
truth
of
clear and
distinct ideas. The Spinozistic mind ignores the
divine guarantee,
proclaiming that it can by its own power intuit the essences of things. In light of this, Spinozas early conception of intuitive
knowledge is all the more
mystical. Furthermore, still under the his notion of
influence of Descartes, the early Spinoza conceives
intuitive knowledge in a way not much different from Descartes conception of clear and distinct ideas. Both stress the logical and immediate characters of truth which compel the mind to assent. In this respect, Spinozas early conception of intuitive knowledge is considered ordinary and banal.
Descartes Misconceptions of Doubt and Error
The Cartesian method of doubt is meant to lead the mind to truth, which is absolutely certain and fecund. Spinoza acknow ledges the importance of doubt in Descartes philosophy. In the
Principles, Spinoza praises
Descartes that he sought to call all
things into doubt, not as a skeptic would, who has no other end than doubting, but to free his mind from all prejudices, so that discover firm and unshakable foundations
in the end he might
of the sciences.16 Moreover, Spinoza agrees with Descartes that
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knowledge derived
from the senses is liable to error. Granted
all these considerations, Spinoza does not consider the method of doubt a useful tool in the inquiry of metaphysical truth. Spinozas rejections of Cartesian methodological doubt and the bifurcation of the mind into will and intellect are closely related. For Spinoza, suspension of judgment is not an act of free will; rather, it is caused by an inadequate perception. The Cartesian mind is free to give assent and denial to ideas perceived by the intellect. itself from In addition, the Cartesian mind is free to extricate any situation in which it finds something doubtful.
Spinoza deplores Descartes immaterial conception of mind, which allows Descartes to doubt and judge precariously. By contrast,
Spinoza advocates a materialistic conception of mind. Spinozas account of the physiological basis of imaginative cognition moti vates his view that ideas are necessarily affirmations. Accordingly, it is the inadequate perception based on imaginative cognition that accounts for suspension of judgment. The mind perceives the external world only through the modifications of its own body. (E II p12) The idea of the external world so perceived indicates more the constitution of the perceiving body than the nature of the world. (E II p16 c1) Instead of having a clear and distinct idea of the world, the mind imagines the external world as
82
present. For
when
we say that someone suspends judgment, he sees that he is not adequately judgment is really a an
we are saying only that perceiving the thing.
So suspension of
perception, not free will.
(E II p49 s) Solely
by considering
idea, the mind will not end up in doubt. Doubt regarding the object of an idea occurs through another idea. Only after the
mind has been led by experience or something else to consider the deceptiveness of the senses is it inclined to doubt the former idea. In the above passage, doubt as suspension of judg ment is identical with the inadequate perception of a thing. The methodological doubt in the Meditations culminates in a state in which the meditator can deny the existence of everything in the world, including the meditators own body. (CSM II 16) The Spinozistic mind can never achieve such a state. Whenever the mind perceives, it perceives the modifications of its own body.
(E II p19) For Spinoza, all ideas are ideas of bodily modifications. The mind imagines something as existing and believes in its
existence. It might be the case that the thing does not exist. Conceiving the same idea in a clear and distinct manner, the mind realizes that it was an inadequate idea. To know that what we imagine does not exist is simply to have another idea, in addition to the idea we imagine, which excludes the existence of
83
the thing that we imagine. (E II p17) There must be something as modification of the body that the mind thinks or perceives.
Hence, there will never be a state in which the mind can detach itself from its body and the external world, proclaiming that In other words, the mind can never have an its ideas
they do not exist.
idea which excludes the existence of its body, for all are ideas of the modifications of its materialistic own body. as
Spinozas
conception of mind link between
the idea
of
body asserts an essential
mind and
body. This the mind as
conception stresses the abilities and
limitations of
a function of its bodys abilities and limitations. What the mind can think relies solely on the ways in which its body can
be affected. In the case of Spinoza, it will never happen that the mind can imagine the nonexistence of its body. Descartes
stresses the importance of the method of doubt, by which he is able to detach himself from the sensible world and grasp
all pure and metaphysical truths. In the eyes of Spinoza, metho dological doubt is more a hindrance to reach the metaphysical truths simply because it is far-fetched. In a similar vein, Spinoza criticizes Descartes conception of error. How can error arise if all the minds cognitive faculties are endowed by God? Descartes attributes the occurrence of error to
84
the malfunction of the will. Knowledge for Descartes is the result of the judgmental activities of the will and precisely, the intellect perceives an idea the intellect. More and the will judges
what the intellect perceives as true or false. For Descartes, the power of the intellect infinite. Because of of the will and is finite, whereas the power of the will is this discrepancy in power, the co-operation intellect accounts for the occurrence of
the
error.
Error arises when the intellect imperfectly grasps a propo
sition to which the impetuous will precipitately gives its assent. Error is a construct, a creation of the will is the culprit and it should hold error. To avoid error, the cognitive mind. The free
responsibility for causing
mind has to check the power of the
will so that it keeps pace with the intellect and gives assent only to whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived. The mind uses its willpower to check the working of the will; the will has to be stagnated in order that one has access to truth. Whether the free will exists is a contentious issue I. In the eyes of Spinoza, Descartes approach to the will is redundant.
On the one hand, Descartes has to assert at all cost the exis tence of human free will such that humans are absolutely free to judge and choose. On the other hand, in the presence of truth, the same will has to limit its own power such that the mind
85
can have access to truth. Spinoza rebukes Descartes, accusing him of not understanding the nature of error. The first and
most important error is this, that they (Descartes and Bacon) have g one f ar a stray f rom k nowledge of the first cause and origin of all things. Second, they have hailed to understand the
true nature of the human mind. Thirdly, they have never grasped the true nature of error. (Letter 2) It is a wrong move to assert the existence of free will. At bottom, Spinoza's critiques of in a different
Descartes' theories of error and the will originate conception of the nature of mind.
In the Ethics, Spinoza gives the example of a boy who believes in the existence of a winged horse. (E II p49 s) As a matter o f f act, the boy lacks the adequate knowledge which
can rule out the possibility of a winged horse. Thus, the boy really believes in the explains that the existence assent of a winged horse. Spinoza
comes
naturally
and
automatically.
It does not require an act of will
to give assent to what the Assent comes from the
subject is entertaining at the moment.
entertaining of a proposition and the absence of any reason to doubt it. In Spinoza's terms, every idea is already an affirma
tion or a negation. If assent is not an act of will, it is not an act of free will either. In the above example, even though the
86
perception is wrong, the
boy believes wholeheartedly that
winged horse exists. If the will really exists,
it is in and by
itself an affirmation or a denial as manifested in each individual act. ( E II p48) will the and that can For Spinoza, there never exists a supervening or denial to
extricate itself and giveassent at issue. (E II p49) one and the
perception the
Spinoza holds that the will same capacity of the
intellect are
mind. (E II p49 c) Even if one grants the bifurcation of the cognitive mind into the will and the will is intellect, it is still wrong to is finite with hold that the
infinite and the intellect
respect to their
power. By denying that the intellect is infinite, Descartes means that however many judgments it can make, there will always be some others that it cannot make. Spinoza rebuts this argument, maintaining that if one cannot formulate to oneself certain ideas, one is equally not capable of affirming or denying them. Every perception claims that of the mind involves thebodys affection. the Descartes
intellect provides content on which the will argues that for any judgment to
passes judgment. Spinoza
take p lace t here m ust b e s omething t hat is judged. To claim that the will is infinite and the intellect is it might happen in some cases that finite the implies that judge
will can
87
without
any
ideas
or perceptions
conceived
by
the
intellect.
That is absurd! Hence the will and the intellect, if they were two faculties of the mind, should be co-extensive in scope and power. In short, Spinoza's conception of the will or the intellect is substantial and materialistic in the sense that there must In particular,
be something actual to be perceived and judged.
whenever the will is at work, there must be something concrete to be judged. Contrary to what Descartes asserts, Spinoza avers that it is an illusion to claim that the human will is infinitely free. Suspension of judgment is advocated by Descartes as an act of will. The will is infinitely free; because of this capacity, it can withhold from judgment any perceptions which are not clearly and distinctly perceived. It is also due to this ability of the mind that Descartes can assert that the will is distinct fromthe intellect.
Spinoza rejects the idea that suspension of judgment is an act of will. The very act of suspending judgment is for Spinoza
itself a judgment. Without actually counting a group of people, one cannot tell just by browsing whether the number of that group is odd or even. There is not enoughevidence for deny if the
of people making a
decision. One can
neither affirm nor
number is even or odd. attitude as an act
This indicates that
it is not a mental
of will that accounts for the suspension of
88
judgment; rather, the very attitude of suspending judgment is a perception itself. In Spinozas terms, affirmation or denial belongs to the essence of the idea. Descartes painstakingly makes a distinction between the intel lect and the will such that he could attribute both truth and
falsity to the function and malfunction of the faculties of the mind. As t he i ntellect i s p urely p assive a nd h omogeneous i n forming ideas, a greater power of the mind for giving assent to a true proposition must come from another faculty, namely
the w ill. S pinoza a rgues a gainst D escartes t hat even an act of affirmation is homogeneous to other acts of idea formation. Any affirmation by itself does not denote truth. Truth does an not
dependon the operation of the will. How real is relies on the content of an idea. Descartes
affirmation that
maintains
the criterion of clear and distinct perceptions prompts the will to is give assent, thus guaranteeing that what the will affirms is the affirma
true. Spinoza agrees with Descartes that it
tion of the mind that explains truth. Nevertheless, the affirmation is not an act of free will. Rather, it is the mind considered as a whole that is capable of forming adequate ideas. This capacity of the mind that it can frame adequate ideas explicates the occurrence of truth. On forming an adequate idea, the human
89
mind it
is
at
the same Strictly
time
prompted in the
to act
believe of
in
what an the the
perceives.
speaking,
forming
adequate idea, the same thing.
belief and
the assent are one and by the content of
Thus, truth is determined
idea; it is not a function of the minds judgmental activities.
The Formation of Error
For Descartes, God, as perfect
and infinite, is exonerated from
error. Error as a cognitive sin is attributed to the malfunction of the minds faculties. Spinoza contends that error is a natural phenomenon; strictly speaking, nobody is to blame for the
occurrence of error. Error is a necessary stage one needs to go through before one attains truth. To begin with, Spinoza holds that error is a natural
phenomenon; error needs to be explained causally within nature. Spinoza writes: Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we 90
say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately. (E II, p11, c) This is an elliptical passage. Whenever God thinks, he must think adequately. This is not always the case in human thinking. What happens to the mind when it perceives inadequately? The mind has mutilated and confused perception in the sense that it only perceives part of the idea. In contrast, God always has the whole picture of the idea; that is why he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea Between the idea in Gods mind there absolute. exist degrees are mind of and that of another thing. in from the human relative to
determination, fully
Gods ideas
always
determined, whereas
the ideas in the human mined. Humans err
mind are very often relatively deter hold a relatively determined
when they
idea (inadequate).When we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect, we say, in other words (II xi corott), that the idea is adequate and perfect in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of our minds. (E II p34 d) Once the human mind becomes part of the infinite intellect, it can relate its ideas to God. The
91
idea is fully determined in the human mind when it is tanta mount to Gods idea. By means of the infinite intellect, God
objectifies himself as ideas. As an infinite mode, the infinite intellect is a product of God. Its function is to manifest Gods power in nature. As Gods power is manifested simultaneously
both in the attributes of thought and extension, the orders and connections of ideas and things are in perfect accord. That is to say, the ideas of the infinite intellect must correspond to their ideata. Gods ideas are necessarily true. Insofar as the ideas in the human ideas as well. intellect can be related to God, they are true
The infinite intellect never commit error; it always by the human
perceives adequately. Even false ideas conceived mind are true ideas in Gods intellect. humans.
Falsity never happens to the mind
God, but it occur for perceives inadequately. Sensuous obscures images
Error arises when
come to
the
mind
in
an
order which
the true connection of their occurrence. The order of
imagination is haphazard because of the following reasons. First, imaginative ideas come fortuitously. Second, the mind tends to associate some ideas that happen to occur simultaneously or contiguously, and some other ideas that are superficially similar. The order of imagination is simple association of ideas, which
92
is
not a
logical
order, i.e.
one
based
on
necessary causal
connections. In short, by the natural law of association, the mind associates the perceived ideas with other related ideas. Spinoza insists that all ideas involve affirmation or denial. In imagining, not only does the mind contemplate imaginative ideas passively, it also unites the various images, say horse and wings, through psychological association. The following is what actually happens in imagination. First, there must be some associative in fluence. When the association has been made there is some affirmation involved, even though what is affirmed is not the case that the object actually exists, ....no one is said to be deceived insofar as he perceives something, but only insofar as he assents
or dissents. For example, someone who feigns a winged h orse does not on that account grant that there is a winged horse,
that is, he is not on that account deceived unless at the same time he grants that there is a winged horse. (E II p49 s) Purely by imagining something without getting involved with any assent
or dissent, we cannot be deceived. The mind is still functioning properly when it can separate reality from imaginative appearance. Even at this level, there is some affirmation that the imaginations of the involved. I grant in themselves,
mind, considered
involve no error.
But I deny that a man affirms nothing insofar
93
as he perceives. For what is perceiving a winged horse other than affirming wings of the horse? (E II p49 s) When the mind imagines something, it must, at the same time, affirm the thing as existing. Let me call this imaginative existence; the child affirms wings of
the horse such that a winged horse exists in its mind. However, when the mind is incapable of forming another idea which
replaces the existence of the present one, the mind is stuck. The mind is said to err, for it grants the existence of the object at issue. Not functioning properly, the mind is liable to make mistakes. in E II p35 n, Spinoza gives some examples to illustrate the difference between error and ignorance. People fancy that they are free. They think they have free will, but it is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto. By this, Spinoza means that the mind cannot form an idea of freedom with the corres ponding affection in its body. When the mind is ignorant of mind has not taken
something, it is not to blame. Since the any action,
it is innocent The notion of freedom or free will People simply have a fancy idea that they
is j ust a f ancy.
have free will, but they are completely ignorant of the causes of their actions. As for the true distance between the earth and the sun, the error might happen out of pure ignorance. It so happens that
94
the m ind d oes not know the true distance between the two. However, even after it the sun and has learned the true distance between
the earth, it commits the same error. Every time brains, they still is distant from
people see the sun, owing to their scattered succumb to the same illusion that the sun
us about two hundred feet.
In the p roof o f t he p roposition,
Spinoza writes, There is nothing positive in ideas, which cause them to be called false; privation mistaken), (for minds, not neither can but falsity cannot consist in simple bodies it are said in to err and to be
consist
absolute
ignorance....
(E11 p 35 d ) W h a t does it mean that minds, said to err and to be mistaken? the object is missing in the
not bodies are
When something concerning perception, the mind
corporeal
has the mutilated, confused, and inadequate idea. The mind simply misunderstands the object at issue. There are some missing pre mises, which account for the misunderstanding of the mind. The mind will remain and all in the the wrong until are in the body is properly then
affected perceives
premises this
place. The mind
adequately. With
clarification , the recurrenceof when the mindsees the sun,
error makes sense.
Every time
it associates and affirms the mutilated idea. Spinoza explains the recurrence of error in the following way.
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While the body is perceiving the sun, the affection of the body involves the essence of the sun but only to the extent that the perceiving body is so affected by the sun at that time. In
seeing the sun, the body involves, but does n ot e xplain, t he essence of the sun. Because of some missing data, each time
the body is affected in the same way. Alternatively, the body perceives partly the essence of the sun. In order to know
adequately the distance of the sun, it is not knows the distance, i.e. the data of the sun.
enough that one One needs to
know as well the cause of the affections of the body. Unlike the Cartesian mind, the mind for Spinoza is closely by things
connected with its body, which is constantly affected in the external world. The mind cannot move at is a
part of nature; it simply Inadequate way by con
will because it is a set of ideas.
perception causes an error in the mind. There is no which the mind can stay away from the
error which
stitutes its essence at that time. Accordingly, if a part of nature, so is phenomenon for distance cannot
the mind is
error. That is why error is a natural the true at issue. in
Spinoza. Themere fact of knowing rectify see the once andfor sun, all the error are
Every time we
our bodies
affected
the same way as usual; consequently, our minds are
still in
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a perturbed state. As long as the body is affected in the same way, the mind makes the same mistake. Only when sticks to it,
the mind shifts the say from imagination
apparatus of cognition and
to reason, will it remain imperturbable
through the most trying experiences.
Error as the Privation of Knowledge
Initially, the S pinozistic m ind c annot t ell w hat i s what which is false. The mind does not have the
t rue a nd criterion, with Otherwise,
it can distinguish the true from the false.
the mind can skip the errors and go straight to truth. The distinctive characteristic of inadequate knowledge is confusion. Confronting error, the mind is confused because of the lack of
any criterion of truth at the beginning. The mind is in error as long as it misconceives something to be true. Spinoza discusses error in proposition 32. All ideas, in so far as they are related
to God, are true.(E II p32) As all ideas are related to God, they follow from in every respect ideas God God with in a necessary manner. They agree their objects. The global conformity fact that
between ideas in
and their ideata accounts for the must be true. As Gods
power of thinking is
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equal to his actual power of acting (E II p7 c), the necessity of parallelism knowledge in God is What the condition that governs all true from Gods infinite
claims.
follows
formally
nature follows objectively from Gods ideas in exactly the same order and connection. (E II p7 c) As total and perfect, the ideas of God involve no privation. On account of Gods nature, all
ideas in God are necessarily true. -A s far as the form of error is concerned, it cannot inhere in the ideas of God because Gods ideas are all true ideas.
There is nothing positive in ideas, on account of which they can be called false. (E II p33) Considered in themselves, ideas
must be true. God cannot conceive a mode of thinking which is false. It is absurd to conceive of anything beyond God
which can be called false. Falsity is merely a relative concept, not an absolute one. It is due to the occurrence of another idea which has the same or similar one idea content that the mind
becomes confused, taking
for another. This confusion
gives rise to error. The relation
between truth and falsity is other.
not exclusive; truth and falsity are not opposed to each
Rather, falsity can be integrated into truth, or falsity is just a mode of truth. Between truth and falsity there exists an false.
intrinsic relation.
There is no idea which can be called
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What presents itself in Gods intellect must be true. Deprived of passions, God always sees the world aright. On the contrary, humans always fall prey to passions. As long as imagination holds sway, humans continue to commit errors. While delineating Gods ideas, Spinoza is concerned with the issue of conformity that ideas and their ideata must agree. Since ideas in God
are all true, they must conform to their objects. Whenever the infinite i ntellect c onceives a n idea, the idea must correspond to its ideatum. Ideas in the human mind are not necessarily true. Whileconceiving an idea, one might have in mind an
other ideatum which is different from that conceived by God. The Gods human mind is finite; it intellect does before needs to it can think in the way ideas. as Right
attain true
from the beginning, truth as correspondence does not directly apply to human cognition. Because the mind is confined to
its ideas, Spinoza needs to consider another character of truth, namely truth as adequacy. Spinoza has to relate adequate ideas in the case of human cognition. Under what condition can the mind haveadequate ideas?Spinoza answers that the mind
possesses an adequate idea when God directly constitutes its essence. (E II p33 d) idea.While forming By then the adequate idea is also a true an idea which is adequate, total, and
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perfect, t he m ind f unctions i n t he s ame w ay a s the infinite intellect does. Unconditionally, God constitutes the essence of the mind; the idea is given to the infinite intellect. The order and connection of ideas follows the same order and connection of things; they both follow the necessity of God. As regards the nature of the human mind, one cannot assign the same necessity to the order and connection of the ideas in th e mind. When the mind imagines, it relates ideas fortui tously. Imagination reflects the confused order of the fortuitous encounters of things. The order and connection of the ideas in the mind refers to the affections of its body. Hence, the ideas in the mind are always inadequate. Nevertheless, it does not imply that the mind can only form the inadequate notion of ideas. In mind like the one to the
proposition 34, Spinoza
introduces
adequacy.
The proposition reads, Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate a nd p erfect, i s t rue.(E 1 1 p 34) Spinoza says in us, not in God. That means, humans are capable of framing ideas which are as adequate as Gods ideas. Adequacy is the internal mark of a true idea. (E II def 4) For Spinoza, adequacy, abso luteness, and perfection are equivalent terms. An adequate
idea is a perfect or absolute idea.
Once the mind conceives
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an idea adequately, it becomes a true idea . In E II p35, Spinoza says, Falsity consists in the privation
of knowledge which inadequate, that is, mutilated and confused, ideas involve. Separated from the full causal order, ideas become mutilated and confused. The mind acquires ideas through causal encounters with relatively few of their effects; it is impossible for the mind to have knowledge of the full causal order. Thus, error occurs a s I ong a s the minds knowledge of those causal en counters is confused and mutilated. Furthermore, error is not a complete lack of knowledge, but the temporary shadowing or absence of knowledge in a subject of a particular sort. So long as the mind possesses an inadequate idea, it is determined from without. The mind does not know all the causes of the idea. The majorities of the causes of the idea lie outside and remain inaccessible to the mind. Consequently, it perceives in a partial and inadequate manner. Spinoza maintains that error cannot consist of absolute pri
vation. (E II p35 d) Despite the falsity, error refers to knowledge of something. No matter how little the mind knows about the thing, the error designates some knowledge of the thing. True enough, knowledge is incomplete at this point; all the same, it is know ledge of the thing. Therefore, it is not complete privation. Error is
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not absolute ignorance either. (E II p35 d) If the mind is ignorant, it knows nothing about what is going on and therefore it is clear from blame. by the mind. But error designates that a mistake is being made The occurrence of error is always related to the
singular mind of somebody. Spinoza comes to the conclusion that error is the privation of knowledge which involves the inadequate ideas. What exactly does Spinoza mean when he claims that error is the privation of error? In Letter 21, Spinoza says that privation is
simply to deny of a thing something that we judge pertains to its nature, and negation is to deny something of a thing because it does not pertain to its nature. It belongs to the very nature of the mind to form adequate ideas. As long as the mind is deprived of this capacity, it commits errors. As for ideas, all ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true. The infinite intellect always conceives ideas in their entirety. Every idea in Gods intellect is absolute, adequate, and perfect. Gods ideas do not involve any
privation. Insofar as ideas are related to a particular mind which conceives them inadequately, errors occur. incapable of encompassing As finite, the mind is
the full causal history of the idea. in its totality.
Simply put, the mind cannot conceive the idea
Since some nature of the idea is missing in the mind, the idea
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so conceived is false. Spinoza further explicates the nature of error. "... .it is nothing more than simply a state of want, which in itself is nothing. It is only a construct of the mind or a mode of thinking which we form fromcomparing things with one
another. (Letter 21)
By itself, error is a non-being; it does not
correspond to anything. It is a state of want, for the idea in the mind is inadequately conceived; something is lacking in the idea. Error is a pure construct of the mind. There is nothing positive in ideas which can be called false. Spinoza says that there are no inadequate or confused ideas
except insofar as they are related to the singular mind of someone. (E II p36 d) Error originates in the singular mind of someone. The mind at issue does not function properly; the malfunction of the mind accounts for the occurrence of error. As far as the mind is concerned, something which belongs to its nature is missing. account of this, themind cannot but conceive On
inadequately.
In E II p17 s, it is stated that the mind does not err from the fact it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea which excludes the existence of those things which it ima it.... The incapability of the mind to form existence of the present ones
gines to bepresent to
another idea which excludes the
gives rise to error, ....falsity cannot consist in an absolute privation
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(for it is minds,
not bodies, which are said to err, or be Again, the mind is to blame, for its
deceived)...."(E II p35 d)
intellect is not at work. The mind simply lets imagination hold way. In contrast, the body is doing its own job; nothing seems to be wrong with the body. In the example of the distance know
between the earth and the sun, the mind is deprived of
ledge of the actual distance and of the affections of its body. Even having learned the actual distance between the sun and the earth, the mind still lacks the adequate knowledge of its bodys affections. Hence, it commits the same error time and again. In the inquiry of knowledge, the mind has to go through different stages of error before it attains truth. The occurrence of error is perfectly natural. At the early stages of the inquiry it is common for the mind to commit errors, for the mind does not function properly. In fact, the mind has to undergo numerous stages of self-transformation before it renders itself adequate to Gods intellect. Determined by the fortuitous encounters of things, the mind freely associates and interprets imaginative ideas. The mind follows the contingent order of the affections of its own body.
Following the law of reason, the mind starts to see things aright; things so conceived follow the necessity of God. Perceiving
things adequately, the mind explains the nature of God. The mind,
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insofar as it is at work, sees things as they really are. Error as an illusion or the privation of knowledge (non-being) dissolves itself as the mind stays away from the influence of imagination and regains its proper cognitive power. In brief, error as the privation of knowledge is not an inherent nature of the idea; rather,
it is caused by the singular mind of someone by virtue of its inefficiency. The malfunction constitutes the error as such. Spinoza, in proposition 36, concludes the discussion of falsity by claiming that ideas, adequate or inadequate alike, follow the
same necessity. Ideas w hich a re i n G od a re n ecessarily t rue. Truth and falsity happen only with respect to a particular human mind. Spinoza holds that falsity is conclusion with some missing premises. Without finding the missing premises which support
the conclusion at issue, one is always in the wrong. It is like the example of dipping a rod at an angle in a glass of water. The rod always looks bent. Under the influence of imagination, the mind is naturally induced to commit the same error time and again. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same neces Inade
sity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas. (E I I p36) quate and adequate ideas are not two sets
of ideas; they
are one and the same set of ideas, following the same laws of nature. Macherey says, Les idee inadequates senchamement
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necessairement, ainsi que le font aussi les idees adequates; mais il est manifestement impossible de faire apparaTtre entre elles un veritable ordre.1 7 Inadequate and adequate ideas refer to the
same content; therefore, they follow the same necessity. In the chain of cause and effect, they refer to the same set of ideas. Therefore, they necessarily follow one another in the same order. With respect to inadequate ideas, necessity has another meaning. It means that an inadequate cause necessarily implies an inade quate effect. On account of some missing data, the mind is at the moment unable to render explicit the real order of the whole chain of ideas. Spinoza says that these ideas of the affections, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are like conclusions w ithout p remises, t hat i s, t hey a re c onfused ideas. (E II p28 d) The cause instantaneously and necessarily follows by the effect, (a la Hume) Necessity applies both to adequate and inadequate ideas. In the case of inadequate idea, one is doomed to expect and see the phenomenon as such. As some premises are still missing, the conclusion (error) must follow in that way. Owing to its finitude, the mind is incapable of conceiving all the premises. The mind cannot help jumping to the conclusion even though some premises are missing. As some premises are mis sing, the conclusion is not adequately understood. Accordingly,
106
the mind necessarily commits the same error time and again. In contrast, ideas are always adequately conceived by God. God knows all the premises and the conclusion of any particular idea. The cause follows necessarily by the effect. Thus, adequate and inadequate ideas follow the same necessity. Despite the falsity, an inadequate idea still represents the
object; it gives some information about the object, even though the information is incomplete. Considered in itself, an idea has a content which represents something. The idea is false simply be cause the mind interprets it in the wrong way. For Descartes and Spinoza alike, ideas represent things. True ideas refer either to the actual existence of things or to their eternal essences (or existence). (E I p25, E II p8) designate nonbeing with regard False ideas
to their existence or essences.
In the case of Descartes, an idea is materially false if it repre sents a nonbeing; it is true if it represents an actual thing. (AT VII 44/34, 66/6-20) By the same token, Spinoza holds that a
true idea agrees with its object. (E 1ax 6). To say that a true idea agrees with its ideatum means that the ideatum as an object must be a being, not a nonbeing. There is nothing positive in an idea that makes the idea false. (E II p33) Since the order and connection of ideas and that of
107
things are the same, every element of an idea must have its corresponding part in the thing. Positive means something real.
A proposition can be true or false; but an idea as affirmation must refer to something - it must affirm something which actually exists. An idea considered in itself cannot be false; nor does it involve negation. A true idea, therefore, must involve everything that is affirmed in the idea. As everything in an idea has reference, there
is no room for error. There is nothing in an idea which can be called false. Insofar as ideas are related to God, they cannot be materially false. How does Spinoza account for error in terms of material falsity? In Letter 17, Spinoza relates a dream of a scabby Brazilian. When one morning just at dawn I awoke from a very deep dream, the images which had come to me in the dream were present before my eyes as vividly as if they had been real
things, in particular the image of a black, scabby Brazilian whom I had never seen before. This image disappeared for the most part when, to make a diversion, I fixed my gaze on a book or some other object; but as soon as I again turned my eyes away from such an object while gazing at nothing in particular, the same image of the same Ethiopian kept appearing with the same vividness a gain a nd a gain u ntil it gradually disappeared from
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sight. Spinoza vacillates between a materially true object and a materially false one. As long as he fixes his gaze on an object, the idea of the scabby Brazilian (which is materially false) dis
appears. The dream illustrates that an idea can be false even though there is nothing negative in the idea. When one sees
more clearly, some elements in the false idea do not corre spond to the ideatum (say the book), or a true idea pops up in the mind, which matches the ideatum. In that case, the false idea gradually disappears from sight. If both ideas, namely the true and the false ideas, involve af firmation, how can one idea exclude the other and take its place? An adequate idea for Spinoza is one which has all the intrinsic denominations of a true idea. (E II def 4) Owing to these intrinsic subject comes to believe one
marks of the idea, the conceiving
idea as true because it has a stronger claim and to reject the other as false. As regards the essences of things, how can Spinoza account for the fact that ideas of essences can be false? An idea can be considered as a complex idea whose elements are all materially true and each can represent a thing. Nevertheless, as far as the complex idea is concerned, elements of the idea it might be be the case that all the
cannot
put together and
assigned
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an ideatum which corresponds to them all. The complex idea is materially false simply because it involves a contradiction. For
instance, the complex idea of a square inscribed in a circle is materially true in the sense that we can draw a square inscribed in a circle. But a rhombus (an equilateral quadrilateral whose interior angles are not right angles) cannot be inscribed in a in a circle is
circle. Accordingly, an idea of a rhombus inscribed
materially false because the idea of a rhombus excludes that of a circle circumscribing it. Simple ideas are always materially true. Very often, the mind combines simple ideas, forming a com plex one. This way of combining ideas might be the cause of error. A winged horse is another example, which involves an essence that is materially false. Owing to the laws of nature, one element of the idea excludes another element of the idea. Say, for example, that the when t he ideas of a bird and a horse are both materially true;
ideas of wings and a horse are put together, the
complex idea becomes a false idea. Logically, the bone structure of a bird and that of a horse are mutually exclusive. Hence the complex idea of a winged horse is materially false. The con stitutive contexts. elements of a confused idea originate in different out of its
A mutilated idea is A confused
a complex idea taken
natural context.
idea is formed by taking elements
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from different contexts and formed
putting them together. The idea so
is materially false because its ideatum is not in accord
with the laws of nature, which are logically necessary.
The Removal of Error
Finite humans are doomed to commit errors. As part of nature, error cannot be totally eliminated either by reason or by intuition. Error is an inadequate perception; it is a mode of thought. For
Spinoza, both thought and extension are attributes of the same substance. An attribute is what the intellect perceives of a
substance, as
constituting its essence. (E I def 4)
A mode of
thought must have its corresponding mode of extension. Ideas are thoughts about things. The human mind does not perceive external bodies as actually existing except through the ideas of the affecttions of its own body. (E II p26) The mind knows external objects through the affections of its body. Nevertheless, the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate know ledge of an external body. (E II p25) Since an affection as a finite
mode of extension always has innumerable causal relationships with other modes, the mind perceives only partially these causal relationships. As a result, the mind has inadequate ideas. And
111
all inadequate ideas are errors. Because of its finite nature, the mind cannot necessary and but perceive inadequately. Hence, errors are The occurrence of error is closely
inevitable.
related to human existence. In Letter 2 to Oldenbury, Spinoza complains about Bacon that the human intellect (for Bacon) is by its very nature liable to
error.... like a mirror presenting an irregular surface to the rays it receives, Spinoza mingling its own nature with the intellect nature of reality. be an even
believes that the human
should
mirror, accurately reflecting the world. In fact, the mind can shoot a true picture of the world, reflecting accurately the motions of the body. There are important passages in the TdlE where Spinoza relates how error can be removed. [T]he less the mind understand and the more things it perceives, the greater its power of feigning is; and the more things it understands, the more that poser is di minished. (TdlE 58) Instead of wandering from one phenomenon
to another, the mind needs to focus on one or a few things at a time. It is a process through of the confused character of ideas. enlightenment, people need to think which we become conscious
To arrive at this level of and reflect on ideas that
they uncritically acquired. [Wjhen the mind attends to a fictitious thing which is false by its very nature, so that it considers it
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carefully, and order the
understands
it, and
deduces
from
it
in
good
things to be deduced, it will easily bring things can be
its falsity to
light. (TdlE 61) When
deduced, they follow a
necessary order. Otherwise, things are simply wrong. According to Yovel, errors can be removed if one can perceive uniformities which lie underneath phenomenon but structure the actual world.1 8 I shall discuss common notions in detail in a latter chapter. A few words about common notions will suffice for pre sent purposes. Common notions are the foundations of reason.
(E II p44 c2 d) They are the epistemological counterparts of the fundamental laws of nature.1 9 By means of ratio, the mind can draw the ideas (common notions) from nature. It is Spinozas con viction that the mind can directly perceive common notions
by means of ratio, without going through the process of inducting or abstraction. Common notions are notions of what all things agree in, and without which things cannot be adequately thought of. (E II p38 c) Common notions as essences are individuals, not
universals. Yet, common notions discharge some of the functions assigned to universals. So although these fixed and eternal things
are singular, nevertheless, because of their presence everywhere, and most extensive power, genera of the definitions they will be to us like universals, or of singular, changeable things....
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(TdlE 101) Thus one can perceive these uniformities directly, with out going through particulars. The causal impact of the external
world affects the body and furnishes the mind with latent inform ation about the laws of nature. When the mind is free from
external influence, it grasps the information clearly and distinctly, shaping it into common notions. Yovel argues that error is due to a mismatch between ideas and things and to fragmentary and m utilated c ontexts. I n d aily life, false ideas appear in confused combinations and match other objects instead of their own. The mind needs a true idea, the intrinsic qualities of which will help remove the error involved. Hence, error can be removed nitive process. Inadequate within a natural and causal cog as errors are the result of
ideas
interaction between an external object and the body. Spinoza calls it image. The image both represents the object (partly) and
reflects the actual state of the body. Error so generated is a mismatch between the idea and its object. This kind of mismatch usually takes place in sense perception, for example, the per ception of the sun and ceeding to remove its distance from the the error by earth. While idea pro to
reassigning
each
its proper object, one needs to know beforehand the different natures of these objects. By mean of ratio, one studies the
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sciences
and
laws of nature,
which
pertain
to those objects.
Following an explanatory scheme, one seeks more precisely in formation concerning the objects. case that a great deal At this point, it might be the the objects is still
of knowledge about
lacking, and one does not possess the precise explanation of the cause. Nevertheless, one is in a position to effect the change. As the nature of sensation and the intentional falsification are known, one can correct all these affects and reassign ideas to their proper objects. Error means
20
incomplete
knowledge.
After having
matched
ideas to their proper objects, one can consolidate knowledge of those objects. The more the mind knows, the better it under The
stands its own powers and the order of nature. (TdlE 40) mind is
more adapted to the natures of things and the powers
of its understanding. Yovel stresses the objective and theoretical aspects of common notions, through which the mind can effect, at a certain point, the necessary change, assigning ideas to their proper objects I want to supple
and accordingly removing the errors involved.
ment this theory of removing error with the functional aspect of the body, which, I think, will strengthen the power of the mind. The perception of common notions does help remove errors.
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The subsequent explanatory scheme serves to consolidate know ledge of the different objects involved. Given that there is nothing positive in ideas which can be called false, how is error possible? Spinoza is interested in explaining the occurrence of error. In addi tion to that, Spinoza is also concerned with the practical side
of error that it addresses to humans as an existential problem. As noted earlier, error not just happens once, but recurs again and again. A theoretical understanding of the nature of an error does not help much: the same error keeps recurring. Indeed, a knowledge of the order of nature satisfies the need of reason and serves as a means for becoming master of emotions. also true that while actually subject It is
to the turmoil and distur
bances which stem from emotion, people are unable to form a conception of the order of nature that Therefore it is important for them to would make sense of it. become free from the
bondage of passions, at least to a certain extent, so as to form or reactivate the conception. The tie to passive emotions means that people lack the capacity to prevent them from being caught up in disturbances. Even after having formed the common notions required, it does not guarantee anything. If people are not master of their emotions, they are unable to sustain and maintain the conception in their thoughts. As a result, the same error
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keeps coming back. In spite of finitude, humans can adequately cognize the essences of their bodies. Cognition is determined in ternally, from the fact that the mind regards a number of things at once, to understand their agreements, differences, and oppo
sitions. (E II p29 s) External determination from fortuitous encounters with things is the kind of inference based on free association of past experiences. It is this kind of free association that accounts for the recurrence of error. Each time it is in the same situation that the body is affected in the same way; confused association prompts the mind to judge precariously. The mind thinks func
tionally when the parts of its body communicate motions to one another in a certain fixed manner, (def afterE llp13) The body will discharge the function that constitutes the body is well adjusted its essence. As soon as
to the environment, it will be in
harmonious relation with external bodies. Under such condition, the mind will have an adequate idea of that which is common it. (E II p39)
to the body and the external bodies which affect
The therapeutic effect will be achieved when one forms common notions by means of reason. Consequently, error is kept at bay, if not eliminated for good.
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The Nature and Formation of ideas
Spinoza says, Man thinks. (E II ax 1) He also says, Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing. (E II p1) Both man
and God think, but in different manners. The infinite intellect is a mode produced by God. God thinks by using the infinite intellect. An infinite
The infinite intellect has its object as the idea of God.
intellect comprehends nothing except Gods attributes and his affections. (E 1 1 , p4 d) In thinking o f his eternal essence, God objectifies himself as ideas. An idea is a mode of thought. As mode of thought, an idea can objectify in the sense that it knows another mode whose essence is different from it own, say a mode of extension. The infinite intellect objectifies things as ideata and understands things as they are. Gods intellect can objectify things that follow from all attributes. By contrast, the human mind can objectify extended things because it is related only to its body. The human mind is an idea; it has its body as its object. We
feel that a certain body [NS: our body] is affected in many ways. (E II ax4) Unlike the infinite intellect which thinks only of eternal
things, the human mind conceives its body as actually existing. The actual being of a human mind is the idea of a singular thing which actually exists. (E II p11) In other words, the nature of the
118
human mind is
transitory; it is temporal in nature. As finite, man
knows things which exist in time. However, as a mode which de rives from God, man has an eternal essence coming from God. Nonetheless, the content of mans essence must be determined by himself, otherwise it is empty. Insofar as the mind knows, it knows something of its body which actually exists. On the other hand, man has his essence which exists eternally. mine his essence by knowing things adequately. Ideas and things are modes issuing from God. Like thought and He can deter
extension, ideas and things are two sides of the same coin. In that sense, they must correspond to each other. idea is an objectifying mode. As noted before, an
Both the human mind and the in Human knowledge
finite intellect objectify things in terms of ideas.
is marked by duration: ideas in the human mind exist in time. As ideas are objectifying modes, there must be something eternal in ideas. Analogously, there must be something eternal in things that the ideas represent. Once the human mind perceives things adequately, it becomes part of the infinite intellect. (E II p43 s) Human thinking is a mode of the infinite attribute of thought. Ideas are by themselves acts of apprehension. As acts of apprehension,
ideas carry affirmations or denials in themselves. There is no other faculty in the mind which does the judging. For Spinoza the sole
119
function of the mind is to produce ideas. of the mind is a complex formal
In fact, the actual being
idea. The idea that constitutes the
being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of As a complex idea and a thinking In encountering nature, the
a great many ideas.(E II, p15)
thing, the human mind produces ideas.
mind produces ideas as mental representations of external objects or states of affairs. With respect to their representational value, ideas have specific contents. Since the mind is a thinking thing and thinking involves action, ideas can be taken to be the minds active constituents, the production of which signifies a deter mination of the minds thinking activity. As an expression of acti vity, an idea actualizes the minds power of thinking. Spinoza says that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God (E II, p11c), and that our mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God. (E II, p43 s) the infinite intellect, the human mind has the As part of potential to
possess adequate knowledge.
The mind always thinks in terms
of ideas. The formation of an idea terminates the thinking pro cess of the mind in a determinate form. An idea so engen dered actualizes the minds power of thinking. From the potential
thinking power to the actual realization of its power in the form of an idea, the mind transforms itself on and on. Eventually, when
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the mind becomes part of the infinite intellect of God, it is cap able of forming an adequate idea. The genesis of an idea, for Spinoza, involves causal entailment. An idea, adequate or inadequate, follows from another idea in a logical s ense. A n i nadequate i dea follows from an inadequate one. Similarly, an adequate idea follows from an adequate one.
The production of an idea is the result of the causal interaction between the mind and nature. The mind, in its encounter with nature, aims at the acquisition of knowledge. An idea so formed designates a causal activity of thought. While continuously inter acting with nature, the mind forming new ideas. Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to per severe in its being. (E III, p6) It makes no exception to the mind. The continuous thinking activity of the mind is its consistent en deavor to persist in its being. Through forming ideas and acquiring knowledge, the mind struggles for its existence in time. In Elll p10, actualizes its power of thinking in
Spinoza says, [sjince the first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of an actually existing body, the first and principal [tendency] of the striving of our mind is to affirm the existence of our body. What is affirmed is the content of an idea because any idea for Spinoza involves an affirmation. The mind
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affirms the existence of its body through ideas, which represent the affections of the body. So an idea both affirms the existence of the body and represents the singular thing which causes the affection. The conatus of the mind involves the existence of its
body and at the same time the knowledge of singular things. The mind strives to persist in its being. Similarly, the body en deavors to persevere in its being. The causal interaction between the body and the world is achieved in the form of corporeal affections. In a way similar to an idea, an affection refers to an Whereas an idea
interaction between the body and the world.
actualizes the minds potential power to think, a modification sub stantiates the bodys power to act. To persevere in its being, the body is actively, not passively, involved with the external world,
forming corporeal modifications accordingly. and
By E III p7, both mind
body strive to actualize their essences, which turn out to And the strife is a continuous and indefinite To attain
be the same thing.
process for both the mind and the body. (E III p8)
adequate knowledge, both mind and body are actively involved in the strife. The mind as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the bodys power of acting. (E III p12) The minds power of imagination and the bodys power of
affection go hand in hand. The more active the body is, the better
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the mind imagines.
Adequate knowledge is the result of a co
operative effort of the mind and the body. There is a parallel between the formation of an idea and that of an affection. In both processes, they involve acquaintance with nature, either in the form of thought or in the form of extension. The processes take place in time; they are actual events in nature, affirming the actual existence of singular things. Additionally, the striving to actualize ones essence and the desire to have ade quate knowledge of things are one and the same endeavor. By
virtue of these aspects, ideas and affections are charged with ontological significance : t hey r espectively a ctualize p art o f t he power of thinking and acting.
Ideas as the Objective Contents of Gods Essence
In what way can
ideas
in the
human
mind
be related to
the ideas of God? Man thinks because he is a thinking thing. God as nature does not think in the way as the human mind does; nor does he have ideas. God is a thinking thing that thought constitutes the essence of God. implies
On the other hand,
God understands himself by producing the infinite intellect. God objectifies himself through the infinite intellect. And the infinite
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intellect is the idea of the nature of God and of what neces sarily follows from this nature. (E II p3) think The insofar as infinite he modifies and the In this sense, God the infinite have can
himself in finite
intellect. substance
intellect
intellect
as their common cause. As noted earlier, the infinite and the finite intellects objectify things as ideas. defined contents. They cannot be As modes, ideas have from the structure
derived
of God. Instead, ideas are the products of the intellect. The infinite intellect conceives only things which are eternal. The human mind, in contrast, thinks under temporal conditions. The empirical fact that man thinks determines the content of one of the attributes of God, namely thought. Ideas are modes of
thought; when they are adequately conceived, they are related to God as true ideas. According to S. Paul Kashap, an idea has content; it is a con cept. An idea as a thought content is independent of the act of thinking. For instance, the mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation in volves the concept, or idea, of the triangle, that is it cannot be conceived without the idea of the triangle. (E II p49 d) The con cept of a triangle as conceived by the mind is independent of the a ffirmation of the mind.2 1 More precisely, even though the
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affirmation belongs to the idea of the triangle, the concept o f the triangle, as far as its content is concerned, is independent of any activity of the mind. An idea has both its subjective and objective aspects. As
subjective, an idea refers to the act of thinking; as objective, it designates its content. The content of an idea is what the mind is conceiving when it thinks of an idea. While thinking of some
thing, the mind is thinking the content of an idea which is not a physical entity. Whenever people think of a physical entity, they have the objective idea in their minds. Objective here refers to the content of the idea which is independent of the act of
thinking. Accordingly, the content of an idea is something think able. It is a mode of thought.22 I do not quite agree with Kashap. He is right in claiming that the content of an idea does not have the characteristics of
a body. However, even though the thought-content of an idea is nothing physical, the mind is the idea of the body. The mind
always reflects what is going on in the body as the idea of the bodys affection. In this sense, the content of an idea is related to something corporeal. An objective idea can be a tree, a unicorn, a winged horse or a square circle. As noted in the previous section, the formation of an idea in the mind goes hand
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in hand with the constitution of an affection in the body. On account of Spinozas parallelism, the thoughts in the mind must have the corresponding affections in the body. Whenever the mind has a thought of something, say a tree ora unicorn, one can at the same time posit the corporeal affection of a tree or that of a unicom in the body which matches the content of the thought. However, so long as ideas are related to God, they are true ideas. As true, they should not involve any logical contradiction. This is because both ideas and things follow necessarily from the nature of God. (E II p3) Therefore, when the mind thinks of the content of a triangle, there must be a corresponding affection of a triangle in the body, which is clear and distinct in the sense that the image logically corresponds to the ideal triangle. On both sides of the mind and the body, there is no logical contra diction involved. What happens when the mind thinks of content of a unicom? There must of a unicom in the body. the
be a corresponding affection image of
However, the corporeal
the unicom is blurred, vague, and imprecise; one cannot identify the image of the unicom. The idea of the unicom is a complex and confused idea. Hence, it is impossible to form a clear and distinct image of the unicom. As the image itself involves logical contradiction.
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Being the idea of the objective thought of God, a true idea manifests the nature of God, or the mind explains the nature of God as a true idea. For whatever happens in the object of any
idea, the knowledge of that thing is necessarily in God, insofar as he is considered to be affected by the idea of the same object, that is, insofar as he constitutes the mind of something. (E II p12 d) While the mind knows adequately, it has the objective content of an idea, which is related to God. God is said to be affected by the idea of the object. The mind is conscious of the thought content, which can be ascribed at the same time to God. other words, the mind expresses the In
nature of God through
conceiving his idea. If the mind conceives in the same way as the infinite intellect does, the idea under consideration must be true. That means, the idea agrees with its ideatum and it has its corresponding object. (E II p7) Ideas and things have one and the same order of explanation. a circle Kashap grasp illustrates this the conditions point that with the concept of make the concept
.We
to be that of a circle. If the circle really exists , the same set of conditions explains the nature of the circle. Say we draw a circle on a piece of paper, we us the same set of conditions.2 3 I contend further that the same set of conditions is satisfied
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with respect to the corporeal affection of the circle in the body. Instead of drawing a circle on a piece of paper, one uses the same set of conditions in the course of forming a corporeal image of a circle. The image of the circle so formed embodies the conditions which make it a circle. The conditions are numerically
the same, though they are qualitatively different with respect to the attributes of thought and extension. The conditions, which
determine the things in the external world and the affections in the body (for they are both extended and they correspond to one another if the ideas are conceived adequately), are the same conditions which explain the ideas of the things in thought. A true idea must agree with its ideatum. The moment the mind conceives a true idea, there must be an object in the external world which corresponds to the corporeal affection as conceived by the body. If the object does not exist in the external world, it exists eternally in the attribute of extension. A well-thought-out machine
exists in the attribute of God even though it does not exist in reality. Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting
the human mind must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in the mind; that is, if the object of the idea constituting a human mind is a body, nothing can happen to the body which is not perceived by the
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mind. (E II p12, emphasis added)
The situation, which Spinoza
relates here, is applicable to both adequate and inadequate ideas. In the case of inadequate ideas, they refer to the affections of the body. The mind perceives the affections of the body and regards the thing as actually existing even though the thing might not exist in reality or the affection and the thing do not match. In the case of true ideas, ideas adequately represent their objects in the sense that the in the affections of the ideas
correspond to the objects objects must exist.
external world.
Hence the
A True Idea
According to Spinoza, the nature of an idea is different from that of its ideatum. An ideatum is a modification of extension, It is in and through
whereas its idea is a modification of thought.
its idea that an ideatum is thought of as it really is in itself. In using objective reality and formal meanings of those terms used essence reality, Spinoza follows the
by the Scholastics. The formal the objective essence of
of a thing is its real essence;
a thing is the presentation of the thing's formal reality in the mind, i.e. its idea. The idea of a thing is a reality in its own
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right. The mental characteristics of the idea are different from the physical characteristics of the thing. Though the two realities
are different, they are closely related to each other because their orders and connections are the same. (E II p7) through the mental presenting its ideatum whole reality of the It is precisely
characteristics that the idea is capable of in thought. Being the presentation thing in thought, the idea is true of the in the
sense that it possesses all the intrinsic marks which correspond the qualities of its ideatum. As far as human cognition is concerned, humans are confined to the ideas in their minds. Epistemologically, an idea cannot be compared with its object. Therefore, the mind does not have the More
slightest idea of how its idea corresponds to the object.
precisely, ideas and objects cannot be compared on the ground that they belong to different attributes. There is nothing in common between an idea and its object. Since there is absolutely no comparison between an idea and its object, Spinoza has to
resort to the adequacy of the idea while talking about truth. An adequate idea is defined as an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, the properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true has all idea.
(E II def 4) Insofar as the mind has direct access to its ideas,
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an idea can be identified as true only through its internal marks. How does one recognize the internal denominations, which con stitute the adequacy of the idea? In E II p36, Spinoza equates In TdlE 68, Spinoza says,
adequacy with clarity and distinctness.
For the ideas of things that are conceived clearly and distinctly, are either most simple, or composed of most simple ideas, i.e., deduced from simple ideas. But that a most simple idea cannot be false....
One can extrapolate from these passages that adequate ideas are either most simple ideas or deduced from most simple ideas. Simple ideas are true ideas because of their clarity and distinctness; these qualities can be taken as the subjective, but not psychological, characteristics by which one recognizes the internal denominations of an idea. Moreover, an idea which is composed of most simple Alternatively, a complex idea
ideas is also a true idea. (TdlE 64)
can be formed from an axiomatic system of most simple ideas. It follows that the adequacy of an idea can be taken as the internal coherence of the axiomatic system of most simple ideas. Within the system, every idea follows necessarily from another. An idea, insofar as it is true, has properties which denote being or reality, whereas a false idea has no such properties, ....the true is related to the false as being is to nonbeing. (E II p43 s) As far as representation is concerned, false ideas have nothing positive
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in themselves; they indicate nothing real in things.
By contrast, true
ideas have properties which represent the reality of things. Errors occur because of the defect of knowledge. mind accounts for the occurrence of errors. The malfunction of the But the formation of
errors is merely a temporary shadowing of the nature of the mind. It belongs to the true nature of the mind to form adequate ideas. (E II p47) As soon as the mind is working properly, it will discover the positive properties of things in its intellect. (TdlE 110) To know Truth, one needs to possess adequate ideas. When
one knows all the internal marks of an idea, one has an adequate idea. To form an idea in its most adequate form, one needs to
begin with the first true ideas. According to Spinoza, human beings possess the inborn power to form the first true ideas. The intellect, by its inborn power, makes intellectual tools for itself, by which it acquires other powers for other intellectual works, and from these works still other tools, or the power of searching further until it reaches the pinnacle of wisdom. (TdlE 31) Presumably, the first true ideas are most simple by virtue of their clarity and distinct ness. While forming the first true ideas, the mind intuits the
truth of those ideas in the form of clarity and distinctness. That is to say, the mind recognizes at the same time all the internal denominations of those ideas. By reflecting on the structure of
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those true ideas, one can proceed with the inquiry of truth.
For
once we have acquired this, we shall have the foundation from which we shall deduce our thoughts and the way by which
the intellect, according to its capacity, will be able to reach the knowledge of eternal things.... (TdlE 105) A single idea does not make truth; an idea i s a sensation of a certain kind. (TdlE 78)
By itself, an idea does not denote any truth, falsity, or doubt. For Spinoza, truth is a function of the relation of ideas. From one set of true ideas, one deduces another set of true ideas. (E II p44) Following this reflective method, man can actualize the power of his intellect and deduce complex ideas from most simple ideas with absolute certainty. On account of his understanding of the
order and connection of ideas, man knows the order and con nection of things.(E II p7) As noted, truth for Spinoza is the exclusively with ade
relation of ideas. The intellect is concerned
quate ideas - the perfect linkage of objective essences. And method consists in reflecting on the intellect, on the linkage of objective essences. (TdlE 106) The internal denominations can be taken For Spinoza and Descartes, the
as the natural light of reason.
natural light of reason has its force which compels the mind to give its assent. Or they can be identified with the affirmation of the idea. For Spinoza, the affirmation belongs to the es-
sence of an idea. (E II p48, p49)
In particular, the intellectual love
of God is an internal denomination par excellence. The love at issue can be taken as the global summation of all the internal marks of the idea that the mind feels all at once when it intuits the concrete essence of the thing in the third kind of know
ledge. As soon as all the internal denominations of an idea are felt, the mind possesses the idea in its most adequate form. Meanwhile, it perceives all the properties of the thing. The idea
at issue is related to God; it becomes a true idea as it agrees completely with its ideatum. (E II p32)
Certainty and Ideas of Ideas 24
According to the early Spinoza, so long as one has a clear and distinct idea, say the idea of a triangle, one knows the exist ence of God by grasping the nature of the idea of God. immediately intuits the essence of the object. objects essence as clear and distinct idea, the The mind
On grasping the mind knows God
and the object at the same time. Nothing whatsoever mediates in the process of acquiring truth. A clear and distinct idea is a complete idea. As complete, it is an idea of God. With no
reservation, Spinoza is absolutely certain that a clear and distinct
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idea is an idea of God. Having formulated his theories of error and ideas in his later works, Spinoza comes to consider anew his conception of truth. What is the nature of certainty for the late Spinoza? in what way
does it differ from his early conception? Does it refer to a reflective experience or an immediate experience? By reflective experience, I mean an idea of an idea; by immediate experience, I mean the direct experience of an ideatum, i.e. the physical object of the idea. In TdlE 34, Spinoza says, ....in order for me to know, it is not necessary to know that I know, much less necessary to know that I know that I know, no more than it is necessary to understand the essence of a circle in order to understand the essence of a triangle. Indeed, in these ideas the opposite is the case. I know, I must first know. For to know that
This is one of the most cryptic pass Spinoza seems to be saying that
ages in all Spinozas writings.
to know something is an immediate experience. It is not necessary to reflect on the same thing that one already knew so as to know more of the thing. Spinoza makes an analogy to illustrate the absurdity and redundancy of reflection. The essence of a circle is quite different from that of a triangle. The knowledge of a circle has nothing to do with the knowledge of a triangle. Similarly, the knowledge derived from a reflection of an idea does
135
not offer a better understanding of the idea. When people have an idea which is clear and distinct, it suffices to claim that they have a complete knowledge of the thing. Further reflections on the same idea will add nothing to the knowledge of the idea. In the same section, Spinoza adds, From this it is clear that cer tainty is nothing but the objective essence itself, i.e. the mode by which we are aware of the formal essence is certainty itself.... for the certainty of the truth, no other sign is needed than having a true idea. idea? Why does certainty lie in the idea, but not the idea of the Chronologically, an idea comes before an idea of the idea.
Let us assume that the certainty is posited on the second level, i.e. an idea of the idea. On reflecting the idea, one knows some thing for sure and obtains the certainty thereafter. something is added to what one knew. It implies that
However, the ideatum of
an idea of the idea is no longer a physical object, but the idea the ideatum of which is the physical object. If certainty really lies on the second level, it follows that one knows something more about the idea of the object without resorting to the object i tself. T his i s a bsurd, fo r k nowledge ultimately refers to the physical object. In more explicit terms, everything one needs to know about an object is already given in the idea of the object. Therefore, certainty should be located on the first level,
136
not the second. In E II p43, Spinoza offers another case which might involve chronological order. He who has a true idea at the same time
knows that he has true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing. Here, Spinoza seems to assign certainty to the first level as well as to the second level. There is a true idea of a true idea; that idea is also certain. But in the scholium to the proposition,
Spinoza explains w hat a n i dea o f an i dea i s. For the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to the object. (E II p21 s) If there is certainty in
an idea, the certainty of the reflective idea is identical with the certainty of the idea itself. In that case, the certainty of the idea might lose its privileged position. Spinoza continues in the scholium. true idea For no one who has a true idea is unaware that a involves the highest certainty. For to have a true
idea means nothing other than the best way.
knowing a thing
perfectly or in
And of course no one can
doubt this unless picture on a
he thinks that an idea is something mute, like a
tablet, and not a mode of thinking, namely, the very [act of] understanding. (E II p43 s) A true idea is a complete idea. For
Spinoza, a complete idea is an idea of God.
Gods idea is per-
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feet and infinite. So to have a true idea means knowing a thing perfectly and in the best way. nothing else can be added. As the knowledge is perfect,
By means of its intellect, the mind If this is an act of understanding
knows a thing in the best way.
and the thing is understood in the best way, it is impossible to doubt it. The upshot is that the mind is active in conceiving an adequate idea. The idea so formed is known perfectly and in the best way, for the mind, being active, is the formal cause of the idea. Unless what is so conceived is something mute, thenone has a reason to doubt.
like a picture on a tablet,
Spinoza here is referring to the Cartesian ideas. The Cartesian intellect passively perceives ideas, like a picture on a tablet. So long as the mind is passive in conceiving idea, Spinoza has a reason to doubt the idea so formed. Unlike the Cartesian mind, there the will, which allows the mind to is,for Spinoza, nofaculty of extricate itself from the
situation and judge what is being perceived.
As truth for Spinoza not through
is determined through the intrinsic denominations,
the extrinsic denominations, truth is its own standard. (E II p43 s) What can there be which is clearer and more certain than a true idea, to serve as a standard of truth? As the light makes both of itself and of the false.(lbid) Psychologically, one can
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doubt the nature of the idea or the way one knows the idea perfectly. one. The point is to make sure that the idea is not a mute reflect the idea
It implies that chronologically one can
and doubt the validity of it, wondering if the psychological order of ideas corresponds to the logical order of things. After some
examination, the implicit knowledge of a true idea is rendered explicit. The mind confirms that the idea is true. The empirical doubt about the validity of the idea disappears. The psychological One is
order of ideas coincides with the logical order of things.
convinced that it is a true idea. Still the certainty of the reflective idea offers nothing more concerning the knowledge of the thing. This is because the certainty of the reflective idea is derived from the idea of the thing. All things considered, one should
assign certainty to the idea, not the reflective idea. The immediate experience of a thing or its formal essence is the objective essence of the idea of a thing. If the idea turns out
to be a true idea, i.e. the idea of God, certainty is the object iv e essence. One knows the objective essence of the idea of the thing when one grasps in the best way the nature of the thing. The mind knows the objective essence of the idea as the body grasps the affect as the formal essence of the thing. Given that
the objective essence of a true idea is equal to the formal
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essence of the thing, the idea represents in full its ideatum, i.e. the affect of the body. The ideatum at issue must be posited at the
first level, but not the second or the third and so on. Certainty must then be assigned to the immediate experience of the
object and therefore located at the first level. It follows that the ideatum must be a physical ideatum (an affect of the body), not an idea. In brief, absolute certainty of an idea consists in the immediate awareness of a thing. At the beginning of this chapter, I posed the question of immedi ate certainty derived from intuitive knowledge. I contended that the kind of intuitive knowledge as advocated by the early Spinoza is banal and mystical. The late Spinoza develops a more sophisticated theory of ideas, which involves inadequate and adequate ideas and the three kinds of knowledge. In addition, Spinoza elaborates in
his Ethics the intricate theories of error and common notions. In spite of these considerations, Spinoza still regards intuitive knowledge as the most certain and the best form of knowledge. Obviously, intuitive knowledge as conceived by the late Spinoza is mediated by the first kind of knowledge (which entails errors) and the second kind of knowledge (which entails common notions). Compared with his early position on truth, the immediacy of the third kind of knowledge is not considered the essential character,
140
but a feature of the intuitive knowledge that it achieves in a single glance. In the TdlE, Spinoza allows for a direct intuition of particular es sences, which can even bypass the deductive chain of reasoning. Accordingly, the mind is capable of intuiting spontaneously the essence of a thing. It is no more the case in his mature work. In the Ethics, to achieve the supreme kind of knowledge, the mind has to go through different stages of error. In the course of removing errors, the mind enters into the realm of scientific reasoning. One perceives axioms and simple truths by mean of intuition. The perception of
common notions by means of reason involves intuition as well. The task of reason is to intuit general truths such as logical laws, mathematical axioms, and common notions. Having going
through all the intermediates stages, the mind is in the position to intuit the concrete essence of the thing. So conceived, scienti
fic intuition (scientia intuitiva) is neither simple nor spontaneous; rather, it presupposes an elaborate content, which makes intuittive knowledge as such possible. True enough, the mind intuits the essence of the thing in a single glance. Knowledge as imme
diate refers to the immediate relationship between the idea and its ideatum. In this section, I contrast this immediate relationship with the reflective idea (the idea of an idea) and show that
141
the highest degree of certainty is derived from the first level. The highest degree of certainty is attributed to the third knowledge, in which the mind comprehends all the kind of internal
denominations of the idea.
Truth is its own standard signifies
that the mind is in direct contact with the thing. In the third kind of knowledge, the knower and the known are one. At the supreme level of knowledge, the mind relates its idea to the idea of God; meanwhile, it is aware of the affect of the body as the ideatum of the idea. (E II p 22) At this point, I want to discuss other readings of Spinozas theory of ideas so as to clarify my position. In her paper,
Spinozas Theory of Ideas, Daisie Radner stresses the nature of representation in Spinozas theory and makes a distinction between the object of the idea and what the idea represents: The term the object of the idea is not synonymous with the term that which is represented by the idea, although in some cases the two terms have the same reference. The object and the thing represented stand in two different relations to the idea. The relation between the idea and its object is explicated in terms of the distinction between objective and formal reality. The relation between the idea and what it represents is explicated in terms of the resemblance of the thing represented to the object of the idea.
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The object of the idea and the idea are related as formal reality to objective reality.25 Radner thinks that for Spinoza as it is for Descartes, mind and body are of two different realms, and the mind has direct access to its ideas. Man knows external bodies through his ideas which
represent them26 Ideas have objective and formal essences. An idea has formal reality as its object. For Radner, what the mind knows are its ideas, and ideas represent things. If ideas re
present things other than their ideata, this is the cause of error. In the above passage, Radner argues that an idea differs
from its formal reality and also from what it represents. Radner suggests that the objective essence, the formal essence, and representation are different from one another and they same only under a species of eternity. In his C. paper Truth and Adequacy in Spinozistic Ideas, but are the
Thomas
Mark agrees with
Radner on some
points,
disagrees on others. Mark agrees with Radner that ideas have objective and formal essences 27 and that the idea is true when it agrees with its ideatum. If there can be true ideas only when
we have idea and ideatum immediately present, and grasp their identity.28 According to Mark, the mind knows ideata because
the idea and its ideatum are identical when one possesses a true
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idea.
For Radner, ideas represent things, whereas for Mark ideas Thus the major difference between the two
are the things known.
interpretations is that for Radner the mind knows things through ideas which represent them. On Marks interpretation, Spinoza
invokes a two-level analysis in which there is no intermediate entity between the mind and what is known and in which what apprehended is not the representation of something else which is inaccessible29 For Mark, it is true that the formal essence of the idea is an ideatum which can be either a physical thing or
an idea. And if one considers the representational aspect of the idea at the first level, what is represented is a physical thing. Then, if it is a true idea, one can identify the objective essence of the idea with its referential aspect. In brief, the idea and its object are one when the idea is true. When they come to knowledge of the human body, they disagree on a crucial point. For Radner, all ideas are represen tational, whether they are ideas of bodies or other ideas.
However, for Mark the epistemological role of representation is very restricted. Mark writes, Representation has to do only with those ideas which represent to us external objects (i.e. finite physical objects other than our own bodies). Spinoza calls
these ideas images of things (E II p17s) and they are neces-
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sarily inadequate. (E II p26 c). Thus, knowing by means of representation entities is confined to what Spinoza calls the first kind of knowledge, which is necessary false. (E II p41) ....in those forms of knowledge involving truth - the second and third kinds of knowledge knowledge is analyzed as a two-term relation
between the mind and what is known, and what is known is not a representation but the thing itself.30 Mark argues
against Radner that if the
mind were only aware of ideas, The human mind not body, but also the
E II p22 would be incomprehensible. only perceives the modifications
of the
ideas of these modifications of the body.
(E II p22) Mark asks,
Is Spinoza speaking with uncharacteristic imprecision, intending to say that the human mind not only perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body, but also the idea of the idea of these modifications. 3 1 What is at issue in E II p22 is the minds know ledge of the body, not knowledge of external bodies. I agree with Mark here that the mind is directly aware of its own body. Nevertheless, the minds awareness of its bodys affections does not necessarily imply that it has true knowledge of the body. At this point (E II p22), Spinoza is relating inadequate know ledge of the mind. In direct awareness, I perceive my innermost self as the affections of my body. This is far from adequate know-
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ledge of the self or the body; it is just a distorted idea of the affection caused by external bodies. body is merely a form of imagination. The direct perception of ones Only after all distorted ideas
are eliminated does one possess true self-knowledge. One has self-knowledge by referringit to the body and by referring the
self and the body to the entire causal order of nature. In the third kind of knowledge, knowledge of the body is not the idea of the bodys affections, but its essence. This is the point whereAlan Hart joins the discussion. Hart
follows Radners reading of E II P22 and substitutes perceives the affections of the body with perceives the ideas of the affections of the body.3 2 His reason for the substitution is that the mind can be acquainted with ideas, but not with extended things. Affections as images are extended. Hart says, ....E 2,
proposition 22 is uncharacteristically imprecise for Spinoza unless one keeps in mind that to perceive is to have an idea
of an image.
Evidently,the intervention of ideas is required
in order for one to have knowledge of ones own body as well as other bodies.33 For Hart and Radner, under all circum
stances, the intervention of ideas is necessary in order for the mind to know anything. For Spinoza, ideas of images are inadequate. The mind knows
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its body only through ideas of affections. (E II p19)
In sense
perception man always has inadequate knowledge of the body. In contrast, God has an adequate idea of the affection of the body because God can analyze the image into its causes and constituents. (E II, p13) Harts contends that it is only through acquainting with the ideas of God that one can have adequate ideas of things. His argu
ment can be briefly put as follows. The ideatum of an idea can be an idea, not a thing. Ideas in God are causally related and deducible from one another, which explains why Gods ideas are adequate. Gods ideas must represent their ideata. an idea can be adequate and An idea of any
it has nothing to do with
image, for its ideatum is an idea. And ideas of ideas are related intrinsically within the same attribute of thought. All ideas, insofar If I have an
as they are related to God, are true. (E II, p32)
adequate idea, I can relate this idea to God since Gods ideas are all adequate and related intrinsically to one another. My knowledge of a finite extended mode is always inadequate because it comes from the affections of the body. of the body and To skip the affections
have all the same an adequate idea of
a finite mode of extended thing, I need to have an adequate idea whose ideatum is an idea. Otherwise put, I need an idea
147
whose o bject is a n idea and which represents an idea in God. That idea is one which is related to God. knowledge of any finite modes. God has adequate
Ideas in God must have the finite
extended modes as their objects and representations, for Gods idea and its ideatum must agree. idea must be adequate and So conceived, the idea of an its corresponding extended
has
object insofar as it is an idea which is related to God. 34 Harts argument is both interesting and intricate: it avoids the troubles of bodily affections without losing the claim to adequacy. By relating an adequate idea to God, the idea must be true because it is deducible from God and it must agree with its object. I have, however, some reservations about Harts reading. According to this reading, the mind and the body are not quite the same. Only the mind is actively relating ideas to left behind as in the case of the God, the body is All along, I
Cartesian body.
have been stressing the cooperation of the mind and the body in the course of acquiring adequate knowledge. In the case of
Spinoza, to achieve absolute knowledge, one needs the active involvement of both the mind and the body. Following Harts
reading, one cannot have immediate knowledge of ones body. All adequate knowledge is the idea related to God, i.e. the idea of the idea. Under a species of eternity, the mind and its body
148
are one and
the
same. If there are always ideas mediating
between the mind and the body, as Hart and Radner maintain, one would come to the absurd conclusion that the mind knows its body mediately through the idea of the body in God.
Lastly, knowledge as ideas of ideas, with their ideata as ideas but not things, loses its i mmediate c ertainty i n t he s ense t hat one derives certainty from the ideas of ideas, and that truth is posited on the level of reflection. The above discussion on cer
tainty has shown that the knowledge which has the highest certainty is the most perfect and immediate knowledge. Knowledge as such is a direct acquaintance with the thing, not the idea. Absolute knowledge is certain in the highest degree when the knower and the known are one.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I discussed first Spinoza's early attempt to over come skepticism. Under the influence of Descartes, the early Spinoza takes truths as clear and distinct perceptions. One is certain that
one possesses truth in the presence of clear and distinct ideas. The immediate experience of truths as clear and distinct perceptions entails absolute certainty, for it involves the essence of God. This
149
immediate recognition of truth is a distinctive character of his early position on truth. In his mature work, the Ethics, Spinoza develops
the refined theories of error and ideas; he comes to realize the de ficiency o f h is early conception of truth. In the course of discussing
Spinozas theory of error, I highlighted the role that the body plays in forming and removing errors. Moreover, I delineated how the malfunction of the mind gives rise to error. With the clarification of the cognitive function of the body, one recognizes that truth is no longer the immediate experience of clear and distinct ideas; in conceiving truth, one needs to take into consideration numerous intermediate steps, in which corporeal addition to this, I emphasized the affections are involved. In correspondence
importance of
between the idea and its ideatum in Spinozas theory of error. It is on account of these changes that Spinoza has to reconsider his early conception of truth; clarity and distinctness are replaced by adequacy. Nonetheless, Spinoza puts equal emphasis on the
traditional extrinsic definition of truth, namely truth as correspon dence. While putting stress on both adequacy and correspondence as the internal and external marks of truth, Spinoza can indicate the way, if not argue for a case, by which one can relate the ideas in the mind to God. Consequently, they become true ideas. In the following chapters, I am going to show that to achieve this
150
state of truth, both the body and the mind have to undergo various stages of self-transformation before the idea becomes
adequate and agrees with its physical ideatum. Thus, the formation of true ideas is not an instantaneous and immediate experience; rather, it is mediated by a long process of error formation, through which the cognitive subject actively transforms an inadequate
idea into an adequate one.
At the supreme level of knowledge,
one has an immediate, complete, and perfect experience of truth, which entails absolute certainty. The immediate experience of the adequate idea designates the direct consciousness of its ideatum that having gone through all the mediate steps of
inadequacy, the mind knows all the internal denominations of a true idea. Since the mind possesses the idea of God, the
idea must agree with its ideatum. The idea becomes perfect, complete, and infinite, for it qualifies all the internal and external marks of truth.
3
Corporeality
The human mind has no knowledge of the body,nor does it know it to exist, except through ideas of the affections by which the body is affected. The mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives ideas of affections o f the body. Spinoza: Ethics II There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical. Wittgenstein: Tractatus
The notion of body in Spinoza is rarely discussed, if not altogether neglected, in the literature. As far as Spinoza's theory of knowledge
is concerned, one might consider the issue marginal. Actually, Spinoza does not formulate the issue into a theory though he proclaims that the mind and the body are on a par. In his book, Introduction a IEthique de Spinoza (La deuxieme partie), Macherey writes, "La question du corps est, dans Iensemble de la philosophie de Spinoza, marquee par cette ambivalence: cest comme si Spinoza ne cessait doublier Iexistence du corps, pour toujours en redecouvrir Iimportance, et ainsi la valorizer dans le contexte meme de sa permanente devalorization, ce qui explique quelle soit ainsi mise en reserve1 Macherey thinks that Spinoza always has the notion of body in mind even though he does not articulate the notion and put it in focus. The reason might be that few things 152
can be attributed to the body in conceptual terms except that it is extended; it is always in a certain proportion of rest and motion; and it is the object of the mind. Spinoza even admits that no one knows clearly about the mechanism of the body. body functions and works is Greek to everybody. Indeed, how the In this chapter, I
attempt to articulate the notion of body and reconstruct it into a theory. In my understanding, the role of the body is far more important in Spinozas theory of knowledge than many commentators would admit. Within Spinozas theory of knowledge, there is a polemic that remains a subject for speculation. how can the ideas? nature Given Spinoza's theory of ideas, inadequate ideas to adequate human mind, ideas, which is by in
mind cross over from
In what way can the finite only capable of forming
inadequate
succeed
overcoming its own nature and forming adequate ideas?
By ex
pounding the notion of corporeality, I hope to shed some light on the problems. Indeed, Spinoza would say that Descartes' project does not go far enough. The itinerary of the quest fortruth is
only half way done in Descartes. great lengths
It is true that Descartes goes to such that it attains a state
to illuminate the self
of self-transparency. But the body is still left
in the dark. Spinoza
makes it a point to complete the Cartesian project, illuminating the body as well. Time and again, Spinoza claims that under a
species of eternity, the essences of the mind and the body are 153
one and the same.
From Spinozas perspective, it is workable that
both the body and the mind can, in their own ways, reach the level of self-transparency.
Imagination-the Legacy of Descartes
For the early Descartes, imagination is active and powerful: it plays a crucial role in cognition by virtue of its analogical relationships among all things. In the Regulae, Descartes tries to specify the principle of the analogical structure of things by means of geometrical proportions. In his mature works, Descartes is aware of anatomical fact and problems of infinity; imagination no longer plays an autonomous position in cognitive activities. In his early works,2 Descartes discusses very often imagination and images. In the acquisition of knowledge, imagination and images are
essential factors. Through resemblance, the mind can associate lower things with higher things. possible the assent: As imagination makes use of figures to conceive of bodies, so intellect makes use of certain sensible bodies to figure spiritual things, such as wind and light: by which, philosophizing more profoundly, we can draw our mind by cognition to the heights. It may seem remarkable that there are more weighty judgments 154 Imagination as a powerful instrument makes
in the writings of poets than of philosophers. The reason is that poets write with enthusiasm and the force of imagination: there are within us, as in flintstone, sparks of the sciences which are deduced through reason by philosophers but which are struck forth by poets through imagination. (AT 10, 217) Descartes stresses the principle of analogy. gination makes the bodies conceivable. By using figures, ima
Thereafter, the intellect uses In the first
the bodies as figures to reach higher intelligible things.
part of the passage, imagination is subsumed under the intellect; in the second part, imagination surpasses reason; it comes in
direct contact with higher things such as art and poetry. In his early writings, Descartes assigns to imagination both the powers of
image-making and artistic cognition. (AT X 217)
The power of image-
making designates the ability to form and divide images of corporeal things, whereas the power of artistic cognition refers to the synthetic power of producing new images and insight. In the Regulae, these two aspects are present in the notion of imagination. (In the Meditations,
Descartes withdraws the poetic aspect from the notion of imagi nation.) In addition, Descartes notes a more comprehensive aspect of In the Regulae,
imagination that it is fundamentally mathematical.
it is through this mathematical aspect that the notion of universal mathematics is conceivable: owing to its mathematical character,
imagination allows the mind to experience simple natures and ideas. 155
In the Compendium musicae (published in 1618), Descartes describes imagination as an active power of synthesizing the discrete parts of a song into a whole. (AT X 94) Imagination functions at each moment
of the song, recollecting elements of the song which passed and synthesizing them one by one into a unique whole. Imagination In
fuses the past with the present and even anticipates the future.
the discussion of rhythm, Descartes remarks that it is imagination by which we can more easily perceive all the parts of a song and be delighted by the proportion which must be in these.
(AT X 94) The proportion among parts constitutes their unity. Because of this proportion conceived by imagination, the mind is able to grasp the whole in all its parts. At this point, one should have a glimpse of the cognitive function of imagination for the early Descartes. By effecting mathematical
analysis and synthesis and by identifying proportionality, imagination understands things through analogy and proportion. that imagination, for the early Descartes, Sepper holds functions.
serves two
First, imagination is the ability to form and divide images. This function memory. is at work in sensation, reproductive imagination, and
Another function of imagination is its generalizing power
of using one kind of appearance so as to understand another. This function of imagination is productive, for it leads to cognitive production and understanding of new images.3 156
In Rule 12 of the Regulae, Descartes defines imagination by explaining the passage of external impression from the sense
organs to imagination. Descartes relates imagination as a true part of the body.... of such magnitude that its different parts can take on many distinct figures one after another and usually retain these for a long time. (AT X 414) Sense perception takes place in the
same way in which wax takes on an impression from a seal. (AT X 412) By analogy, one can take the external figure of the
sentient body as being really changed by the object, in exactly the same way as the shape of the surface of the wax is altered by seal. (AT X 412) Having explained how imagination might induce
motions to effect locomotion of the whole body, Descartes intro duces the cognitive power of the mind: In all these functions the cognitive power is sometimes passive, sometimes active, sometimes resembling the seal, sometimes the wax. But this should be understood here by analogy, for nothing at all like this power is to be found in corporeal things. And one and the same is this power, which if it applies itself along with imagination to the common sense is said to see, touch, etc.; if to the imagination alone when the latter is vested with various figures, is said to remember; if to the imagination in order to form new figures, is said to imagine and conceive; and lastly, if it acts on its own, is said to understand.... According to 157
these different functions, then, the same power is called either pure intellect, or imagination, or memory, or sense perception. But when it forms new ideas in the corporeal imagination, or concentrates on those already formed, it is properly called ingenium. (AT X 415-16) The power of cognition is purely non-corporeal. All the same, it can
apply itself to the other organs so as to sense, imagine, and remember. In addition, the distinction between the purely cognitive power of the intellect and the mechanical body foreshadows Descartes
dualism of mind and body in his later works.
Similarly, the corporeal
imagination reminds us of the pineal gland. The term ingenium is noteworthy as well. Ingenium is defined as action of the understanding when it forms new ideas in the corporeal imagination or concen trates on those already formed. Ingenium is the power of making
and attending to images. It has both the powers of imagination and memory. It acts as the general faculty of imaging and conceiving, dependent solely on the operations of the cognitive power. In his later works, Descartes holds the strict dichotomy of mind and body. It is not so in the early Descartes. Ingenium is hailed as a cog nitive power which is capable of recognizing the forms and relations of images and arranging them accordingly. According to Sepper, ingenium as intellectual powers suggests some sort of individualization of those 158 powers because of the
corporealization
of spirit.
Ingenium as
the
embodied
mind
has
access to principles of knowledge on account of its duel nature and mind and body. In brief, ingenium and spirituality.4 Apart from its relation to the intellect, ingenium, for Descartes, undertakes projects; it invents or discovers things; it remembers and so on. Like imagination in the later Descartes, the exercise of ingenium requires effort. It has all the physical or physiological reflects both corporeality
states. It can, for example, get exhausted at times. Sepper says, [Ijmagination has become the center of gravity of the mind, and the comprehensive modality of the practical man; it is active in all circumstances, both conscious and nonconscious, except when the cognitive power acts on its own. Yet on its own, the
cognitive power can accomplish very little; it can do hardly more than recognize difference and sameness. Descartes explicitly points out that intellectual abstraction leads to error when it treats natures that are composite or common to corporeal and intellectual realms as though they were purely intellectual (AT,10:445-46; CSM, 1:61) To understand truly, it is necessary to think these things imaginally and even to call on the direct aid of the senses through drawings and symbols. 5 Pure intellectual activity might even lead to error. It implies that to understand truly, cognitive power should cooperate with imagination and act in the power of ingenium. 159 Rule 1 of the Regulae
states that the goal of our studies ought to be the direction of the imagination to producing solid and true judgements about all things that occur to it. (AT X 359) What is new in the Regulae, when compared to Descartes early works, is the correlation of imagination and ingenium, which makes possible sensing, imagining, acting, and thinking. On Seppers view, imagination in the later Descartes is something in eclipse. The function and power of imagination become hidden from view. It is due to Descartes increased awareness of anatomical fact
and problems of infinity that he has to abandon his earlier project of placing imagination in the center of his theory of knowledge. For present concerns, I want to highlight the problems of infinity. Descartes comes to know that the problems of infinity present a challenge for the relationship between imagination and intellect. In a letter to
Mersenne (15 April 1630), Descartes says that it would be rash to think that our imagination reaches as far as his (Gods) power. (AT I 146) In responding to Mersennes question about the infinite, Descartes notes that finite reasoning cannot lead one to the infinite. Between the finite and the infinite, there should not be any pro portionality. In other words, analogy and proportion do not work when it is a matter of the infinite.6 It is perfectly understandable that Descartes ends up withdrawing imagination for the simple reason that imagination cannot reach the infinity of God. By means of the innate idea of God, the mind happens to know God as infinite; but 160
it does not know what the Gods infinity really is. Accordingly, Gods infinity is far beyond the reach of imagination, which is in every aspect related to the body. In the Second Meditation, it is not by the senses or imagination that the mind knows the wax as something determinate. The wax can assume infinitely many shapes. Neither the senses nor imag ination can embrace all the indefinite and possible variety of
shapes. (AT VII 30-32) Only the intellect is capable of knowing the wax as something determinate. In the Sixth Meditation, the intellect can understand a thousand-sided figure. It is beyond the power of When one
imagination to think of such a figure. (AT VII 72)
imagines a pentagon and then a hexagon and continues to imagine larger figures, one experiences each time a discrepancy in power between the intellectual power to know the figure and the ability to imagine it. All these show that there are insurmountable difficulties for imagination to reach the indefinite, let alone the absolute infinite.
Imagination as a Virtue
In the Meditations, Descartes excludes imagination as a necessary constituent of the mind. ....I consider that this power of imagining which is in me, differing as it does from the power of understanding, is not a necessary constituent of my own essence, that is, of the essence of my 161
mind. (AT VII 75) To be sure, imagination for Spinoza is a part of the cognitive mind. know the truth. Spinoza concedes that the aim of the intellect is to The real task of imagination is to translate (in a con
fused manner) the affections of the body into mental images, i.e. inadequate ideas. As far as this task is concerned, imagination is doing a great job. In the case of error, imagination is not to blame; the mind is responsible for the fault. On account of the privation of knowledge, Errors are Spinoza
the mind misinterprets the data, causing the error as such. not imaginations themselves; they are caused by the mind.
notes that the imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, contain no error, or that the mind does not err from the fact that it imagines.(E II p17 s) The occurrence of error is due to the malfunction of the mind that it is incapable of conceiving an idea which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines to be present to it. (Ibid) On this line of reasoning, there is nothing wrong with the nature of imagination. Imagination is not a vice at all. The cause of
error has nothing to do with imagination; rather, it is the lack of an adequate idea in the mind that prefigures the false interpretation. In contrast with Descartes, Spinoza praises the power of imagining as a virtue. For if the mind, while it imagined nonexistent things as present to it, at the same time knew that those things did not exist, it would, of course, attribute this power of imagining to a virtue of its nature, not to a vice - especially if this faculty of imagining depended 162
only on its own nature, that is, if the minds faculty of imagining were free. (E II p17 s) There must be something essentially positive in imagination that makes Spinoza regard it as a virtue. Imagination, for Spinoza and the early Descartes, manifests itself as the cognitive power of the human mind. For Spinoza, imaginations are confused
ideas of corporeal images. As the body is disposed to affect external bodies in many ways (E II p14 d) and the mind perceives everything which happens in the body (E II p12), there is a surplus, not a lack, of reality at the beginning of the cognitive itinerary: the mind per ceives itself, its body, and external bodies through the affections. It is a natural consequence that the idea so derived must be inade quate and confused. the mind in asserting However, imagination expresses the endeavor of the existence of its body. Without imagination,
the mind will lose contact with the external world, its body, and itself. In possessing the power of imagining, the mind knows the existence of all things, including itself. mind has the It is only through imagination that the inadequate, experience of the
immediate, though
external world. Since the affections involve the nature of the body, it is perfectly natural that the idea derived from imagination confused. the is
By virtue of the affections which mingle the natures of body, the mind can have knowledge
body and the external
of its body, the thing, and itself.
163
Variety and stimulation are something good for the mind and the body. Owing to the diverse contacts with the external world, we are [0]ur intellect
more apt to know things in a comprehensive way.
would of course be more imperfect if the mind were alone and did not understand anything except itself. (E IV p18d) For the early If one
Descartes, the intellect can achieve little when working alone.
is able to approach the thing from different perspectives, one is more likely to apprehend the nature of the thing. good when one is at tune with their natures. Moreover, things are Whatever so disposes
the human body that it can be affected in a great many ways....is useful to man; the more it renders the body capable of being affected in a great many ways....the more useful it is.... (E IV p38) Spinoza is fond of using the structure the more...the more.
Here the quantitative change of the images of things, as being perceived in many different ways, leads to the qualitative change of the perceptions of them that they become more and more
clear and distinct. By putting things of the past and the present right in front of the mind (E II p17, p18), imagination makes possible that the mind can consider a vast number of things at the same time, discer ning their agreements, Through mind is noticing capable the of differences, and oppositions. (E II p29 s) similarities and forming common differences notions of things, the
and conceiving
164
things is
clearly and the
distinctly.
From
imagination to
reason,
there
a continuity:
perceptions
of imagination
involve
common
notions, which the mind spontaneously conceives.
So considered, the
power of the mind to perceive things clearly and distinctly is a function of the diversity and richness of imagination. And the
multiplicity of imagination in turn depends on the body.
the complexity of
In the causal interaction with the external world, the body reacts both passively and actively. external bodies. It is true that the body is affected by
At the same time, the body can move around, The human body can a great many ways.
disposing external bodies and affecting them. move and dispose external bodies in
(postulate 6 after E II p13) Since the human body is affecting external bodies and is affected by them, the affection involves both the natures of the body and external bodies. The idea so conceived reflects both the natures of its body and external bodies. The succession of affections and that of ideas are two processes of the same event. From inadequacy to adequacy, the transformation of the affections corresponds strictly to that of the ideas of those affections. The following passage is noteworthy as it reveals the natures of the human mind and the human body: However, we also cannot deny that ideas (as minds) differ among themselves, as the objects (as bodies) themselves do, and that 165
one is more excellent than the object of the other and contains more reality. And so to determine what is the difference between the human mind and the others, and how it surpasses them, it is necessary for us, as we have said, to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body.... I say this in general, that in proportion as a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, so its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once. And in proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself alone, and as other bodies concur with it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of understanding distinctly. (Ell p13s) The passage relates how a mind (body) is superior to other minds (bodies). The body can move and dispose external bodies in a great
many ways, ....in proportion as a body is more capable than others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at
once. Insofar as the mind is more capable of perceiving many things at once, it is more capable of knowing things through their common properties. Consequently, the mind can form common notions and have adequate knowledge of things. The ability of the mind to form common notions can be traced back to the activity of its own body. Owing to its activity, the body becomes more and more complex. And the more complex the body becomes, the
166
more common
properties the body will share with external bodies.
As the mind is
the idea of the body, the mind is capable of perceiving those common properties and forming common notions of them. In short, the complexity of the body is a function of its activity. The more active the body is, the more complex it becomes and the
less it is determined by other bodies. A superior mind is endowed with a great amount of imaginative power, which is directly
related to the complexity of its body.
When the body is passive,
it is determined from without. Because of the passivity of the body, the mind forms confused and mutilated ideas. Insofar as the
body is active, it moves around and disposes external bodies in many ways. As the body becomes more and more autonomous, has more in common with external of external bodies become more
it is determined from within. It bodies. Accordingly, the ideas
and more adequate. the objects (common activities of its body.
It turns out that the minds knowledge of notions) increases because of the diverse
Considered as a virtue, imagination allows the mind to come in contact with the external world. Through the activity of the body, the
mind can have immediate experience of what happens in the outside world. The more capable the body is, the more things the mind can perceive. On account of this diversity of corporeal activities, the mind conceives more and more adequately. 167
Causation as Applicable to both Inadequate and Adequate Ideas
Descartes dualism cannot satisfactorily explain the causal relation between the body and the mind. As the mind and the body are two
distinct substances for Descartes, it is impossible to explain the causal interaction between the two. Since mind and body are two different substances, by definition there should not be any efficient cause between them. As regards Spinoza's conception of causality,
the following is a well-known passage: ....from God's supreme power or infinite nature....all have necessarily flowed forth, or always follow with the same necessity in the same way, as from eternity and to eternity it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. (E I pi7 s) Causal relation in Spinoza is often understood as the relation of logical entailment of ground and consequence. Commentators attribute causation exclusively to adequate knowledge in Spinoza. Gueroult says, I'Axiome 4 et le parallelisme qu'il implique entre I'ordre des idees et I'ordre des causes, ne sauraient valoir pour les idees inadequates .... I'Axiome 4 ne concerne. ...que les idees vraies. 7 Axiom 4 refers to Ethics /, Axiom 4 which reads, Knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of the cause, and involves it. Such restrictive reading of the axiom
168
is not tenable.
I agree with Margaret D. Wilson that the axiom is
applicable to all forms of ideas, adequate and inadequate alike.8 The terms involved in axiom 4 should indicate that the cause is conceptually included in the effect. (I shall discuss what kinds of cause are involved here at the end of this section.) Instead of deducing effect from cause as some commentators understand the axiom, one can say that it is an entailment of the cause by the effect, or simply the cause entails the effect. Such reading will avoid construing the axiom as an
expression of causal rationalism that implies logical necessity, i.e. knowledge of adequate ideas. If this reading of the axiom holds, it
implies that causation in Spinoza is not confined to adequate ideas. It is applicable to inadequate ideas as well. For Spinoza, substance can be conceived without modes; but modes cannot be conceived without substance. This is a scholastic principle, dating back to Aristotle. In the Categories, Aristotle states
that a substance is not predicated of anything, but all the other categories are predicated of a substance. Spinoza holds that all knowledge things is of God's essence But through of knowledge effects of particular through is
adequate.
knowledge
(modes)
which one attains adequate knowledge of cause (substance) not itself adequate. Alternatively put, the human mind's
ideas,
from which it perceives itself, its own body and.... eternal bodies as actually existing (E II P47 d), claim the possession of adequate 169
knowledge
of
God's
essence.
However,
such
ideas
are
not
themselves adequate in the human mind. The mind has confused knowledge of its body. (E II, P13 s) In both cases, namely know
ledge of God's essence and knowledge of the body, they both involve the causal axiom. Spinoza makes a distinction between immanent cause and transient cause. Immanent cause is self-affection (causa sui) of God. it refers to the self-causation of a law of nature. Causation of this kind is conserved and immanently self-caused, and it definitely refers to adequate ideas as God understands himself in the form of causa sui. The causation itself does not involve time because it is not meant to account for the exis tence of finite things, which involves coming to be and passing away; rather, it aims at explaining the essence of God. By contrast, finite
modes exist as distinguishable. Transient cause serves to explain the existence of finite beings. Finite things at rest or in motion are deter They either remain in those states or Every
mined by the laws of motion.
communicate them to other finite things contiguous to them.
transient cause is an effect of another transient cause; there is an infinite series of temporally prior transient causes and effects. transient causes and effects considered by themselves Hence, involve
inadequate ideas. In the end, transient causation can be traced back to its origin (immanent causation), for the laws of transient causation
170
determine the succession of finite states of motion and rest, and these states are derived from the laws of immanent causation. As far as the nature of perception is concerned, the causal axiom applies to inadequate ideas as well. In E II P16, Spinoza says that the
mind perceives the nature of external bodies together with the nature of its own body. That is to say, the ideas of such a mode will involve the nature of both the human body and the external bodies. Mani
festly, the ideas of the affections of the perceiving body and the ideas of the external bodies form the inadequate idea as such. Spinoza writes, The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. (E II p25) In contrast, God God not only has adequate knowledge of any external body.
knows the idea of the bodys affection , he also
has an idea of something which causes the affection. (E II p n c) Since the ideas of external bodies involve the natures of the body and external bodies, perception of external bodies must be inadequate, (cf E II p25, E II p26) Spinoza maintains that adequate ideas of external things need knowledge of them through causes prior in the order of nature, i.e. Gods knowledge, but not merely through their effects. The mind perceives external bodies through the affections of its body; the ideas of external bodies are contaminated. In terms of causal language, the nature of the perceiving body, together with the nature of the external body, constitutes the effect as such. (E II p16) 171
On account of the interaction between the affecting body and the affected body, the two bodies communicate their motions to each other in a certain fixed manner. (def after Ell p13) By E I ax4, the The
knowledge of an effect involves the knowledge of its cause.
inadequate knowledge of the external body is partly due to the impinging of the external body and partly due to the affections of the perceiving body. The internal states incorporate both the affections of the human body and the impinging of the external body. It is not the internal states that reflect the external entity as conceived by
Descartes. Sensible perception, for Spinoza, takes into consideration both the impinging of external bodies and the self-affection of the perceiving body. The efficient causes coming from both the human body and external bodies constitute sensible perception as such. In
sensible perception, one incorporates external bodies through the affections of ones body. Thus Ethics I Axiom 4 applies to adequate ideas as well as inadequate ideas. 9 Indeed, Spinozas causal principle is applicable to both inadequate and adequate ideas. How does one understand the principle in terms
of the traditional classification of the four causes? Inadequate ideas as imaginations involve both the natures of the body and the external bodies. (E II p16) The affections consist of the mingled natures of both the body and the external bodies. The imaginations reflects the mixed natures in terms of ideas, which accounts for their inadequacy. 172
The causation of inadequate ideas involves the efficient and material causes. The interactions between the body and the external bodies give rise to the affections. It is on account of those mingled affec tions that the mind imagines things as such. In the case of To anticipate,
adequate ideas, other kinds of causes are involved.
the third kind of knowledge deals exclusively with adequate ideas. Spinoza says, The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as on a formal causal; insofar as the mind itself is eternal. (E V p31) The essence of the mind consists of knowledge. (E V p38 d) The
mind can form adequate ideas of individual things because it is already in possession of such ideas. Therefore, it is the formal cause of all things. In forming adequate ideas, the mind actualizes a part Thus the causal principle, as far as the the mind as the formal cause
of its power of thinking.
adequate ideas are concerned, involves of those ideas.
On the other hand, one takes pleasure in the third
kind of knowledge and the pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as a cause. (E V p32) Here Gods idea is involved as the cause of the pleasure. Again, because the essence of our mind consists only in knowledge, of which God is the beginning and foundation, it is clear to us how our mind, with respect both to essence and existence, follows from the divine nature, and continually depends on God. (E V p36 s) Humans as finite modes are not self-caused;
they rely on God for their essences and existence. God is the 173
efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence. (E I p25) Apart from the material cause, God is the
efficient cause of both the essence and existence of finite modes. In the third kind of knowledge, the mind knows the essence of God through adequately conceiving an idea. God constitutes directly the essence of the mind. The essence of God involves his existence. On
knowing Gods essence, the mind experiences Gods eternal existence. Whatever is in God; nothing can be or be conceived without God. (E I p15) Interestingly enough, at the supreme level of understanding, other finite modes are the efficient cause of the affect at issue. Whether one conceives adequately or inadequately, other finite modes are still considered as the efficient cause which cause the affection to exist. I shall come back to this point in a latter chapter. In sum,
the causal principal, insofar as Gods idea is concerned, involves God as both the material and the efficient causes. Otherwise put, in the third kind of knowledge, the idea of God is the material The
and efficient causes of ones eternal essence and existence.
mind is the formal cause of the (adequate) idea. Last but not least, other finite modes are the efficient cause of the idea, whether it
is adequate or inadequate.
174
Determination and Active Involvement
Spinoza never uses the term determination in his works, nor does he ever articulate explicitly this concept. I have been arguing that
the body plays a crucial role in the quest for knowledge. This concept of determination is very enlightening in this respect. In one way or another, the same conception is used by Hegel and Husserl. In Hegels Phenomenology of the Spirit and his Logic, an abstract idea needs to be fully determined before it becomes concrete and
absolute. Similarly, in his theory of perception, Husserl makes use of the same idea when he discusses the notions of intention and fulfillment. An empty intention needs to be fulfilled in each profile
before it can be claimed as knowledge (partial, but not absolute). To begin with, the concepts of causation and determination in Spinoza are closely related. Leaving aside immanent causation which
involves solely adequate ideas, I consider transient causation with respect to the notion of determination. In E I P28, Spinoza states
that finite things, which are at rest or in motion relative to one another, either remain in those states or transmit those states Given the fact that under
to other finite things contiguous to them.
the same attribute different mode affect (cause) one another, in per ception the body is the only means through which one perceives the external world. As the body and the external world are both 175
extended, they can affect each other. Simply put, I take the thing perceived as the cause of the perception. The thing transmits its states to the perceiving body. Then the perceiving body, in which lies the effect of the states so transmitted by the thing, is claimed to be affected or determined. The affection of the body is conceived At each state of perception, the Put it otherwise, there is an
by the mind as an inadequate idea.
affection refers to a state of the body.
affection or a determination going on in the body. The determination at issue should be understood in the physical sense that there is a corporeal change in the body. Because of this physical alteration, the mind as the idea of the body changes accordingly. The change gives rise to the knowledge of the thing. At this point, the knowledge is still inadequate. From inadequate ideas to adequate ideas, the inquiry for true knowledge is a long and tough journey. The body must go through
infinite changes before it reaches the realm of absolute knowledge. The mind, on the other hand, has to go through similar changes before the idea at stake is fully determined (adequate). By the time the mind
is capable of perceiving clearly and distinctly, the idea, which has been fully determined, becomes concrete, complete, and absolute. Right from the beginning, Descartes is suspicious that sensi
ble experience might give him a false picture of reality. Descartes believes that the sentient body is the culprit, which induces him 176
to all kinds of error.
To attain truth with absolute certainty, Descartes He claims that the cogito is
has to discard all sensible experience. the site where truths dwell.
By means of the natural light of reason, Whatever the
the cogito is capable of attaining truths on its own.
mind clearly and distinctly perceives is definitely true for Descartes. The body, together with all its sensible experience, is relegated. In his early works, Spinoza, as a Cartesian, still uses the language clear and distinct ideas. Later on, he discards the terms clearness Spinoza uses instead the This is not a
and distinctness as the marks of truth.
concept of adequacy as the sole criterion of truth.
change in terminology; nor is it a change by accident. Spinoza defines adequate idea as an idea which has all the intrinsic denominations of a true idea. (E II def 4) Apart from this official definition of
adequate idea, I tend to think that there is another meaning which is implicit in the term. In restoring the role of the body and the importance of sensible experience, I concede that the extent of adequacy goes hand in hand with the degree of determination. As error is the privation of knowledge, error is still an idea, though an inadequate one. There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false. (E II p33) At each stage of per ception, something is determined within the idea. What is deter mined has being which corresponds to the object. the idea at stake is not yet fully determined; 177 True enough, therefore, it is
still
inadequate
and
false.
Having
gone
through
countless
changes, the idea becomes adequate - the adequacy of the idea is known in its entirety. What is stressed here is the process, of full determination, through which
rather than the completion,
the idea finally reaches its adequacy. The notion of determination is not operating in a random way. Otherwise, it will lead nowhere; absolute knowledge will still not be viable. There determined. must be a telos according to which an idea is
Despite the fact that teleology is explicitly denounced
by Spinoza as metaphysical, in one way or another, he surrep titiously makes use of the notion. Following the law of reason, the Eventually, the idea
mind conceives more and more adequately. becomes fully determined and adequate. The Chinese term for words like
smart, intelligent is composed
of two characters. Each character has its own meaning. One character means sharp in eyesight; the other means good at hearing. Put
them together, it means that one is smart and intelligent, for one has good eyesight and hearing, and vice versa. It implies further
that a sharp and alert mind has its sentient and material foun dations. The more often one uses the senses, the better they function. The more often one uses the senses, the more active the body is. Generally speaking, one can designate Spinozas theory of per ception as dynamic. Perception demands not just corporeal movements 178
but also active involvement of the perceiving body. Through the body andits affections, the mind external world. In actual perception, the body is like performing a task. The senses are called for to accomplish must be the task. What is more, the body A comes in direct contact with the
agile, active, fast to react, and quick to take action.
body, which is dormant and inactive, cannot accomplish anything. As for the senses, they must be in good shape so that they are all keen at perceiving sense data. Accordingly, the body, together
with all its senses, should be as smart and alert as the mind in the course of acquiring knowledge. To accomplish a task, the body needs special training for a particular purpose. A musician has to train his/her ears well to A pianist needs to practice the fingers feel com
distinguish sounds of different qualities. thousands
of fingering exercises before all
petent to run across the keyboard and hit the keys with accuracy and refinement. Generally speaking, with respect to playing the piano,
all the fingers of a beginner are clumsy, awkward, and dormant. They cannot move dexterously and gracefully. While playing, they are not playing in beats; in the course of playing a piece of music, they cannot help coming to a halt every now and then. The qualities of the sounds are bad, and the notes are not clearly and distinctly articulated. In brief, each finger, 179 while playing, is so maladroit
that very often
it cannot accomplish
the task.
Special
training
for each finger is required before it can move skillfully and gear to the musical spaces inscribed in a piece of music. To understand a foreign language well, one needs to train ones ears. Listening to the language conscientiously, one instantaneously understands the meanings of all the sounds heard. When asked to speak the language, people need to use and train a different set of muscle such that every sound is clearly and distinctly articulated. Even in the case of ones native language, constant practice is re quired. A good speaker is familiar with all the structures of the
spoken language. He or she can go to different areas and freely express himself/herself, without ever fumbling with words and thoughts. Perception for Spinoza is not purely an intellectual exercise. As
noted, without using the body and imagination, the intellect by itself will achieve very little. Spinoza uses the example of the Buridans
ass to illustrate this point. Between twochoices which carry equal weight, the ass will be in a state of equilibrium. It cannot decide
which way to follow. As a result, it will either die of hunger or thirst. (E II p49 III.A. iii) The example shows that active participation is far more important than intellectual scrutiny. The paramount decision is taking action, not standing still and thinking. Stunned by intellectual but skeptical thoughts as in the case of Hamlet, the mind will end up in a deadlock. Error formation is another example to explicate the 180
point. One commits an error when the mind regards the same external body as actually existing. The error remains as long as there is no other affection, which takes its place. Once the body
can be affected by another affect which excludes the presence of the previous body, the mind can move on to another idea. (E II p17) Switching from one idea to another, perception as such is a practical undertaking; it involves the body, which must be affected in a certain way. At the preliminary stages of removing error, it is due to the body which is capable of being affected by another affect that the mind can avoid committing the same mistake. Without the formation of affect through the forever be stuck. In short, at each stage of the undertaking, there is a degree of adequacy to be achieved. Very often, the accomplishment of a task body, the mind will
relies to a great extent on the activity of the body. And the excel lency of a body is determined by the kinds of activity it can perform. (E II p13 s) In general, the more active the body is, the more adequate ideas the mind can acquire.
The Theory of Affects
Spinoza defines action as something that happens in us of which we are the adequate cause; passion is that we are acted on when some181
thing happens in us or something follows from our own nature of which we are only a partial cause. (E III def 2) One has an
adequate cause of something when the effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through the cause. An inadequate cause is one
through which, by itself, its effect cannot be understood. (E III def 1) Strictly speaking, action follows only from the complete
understanding of the cause of action.
One suffers when one does
not know the cause of action. Spinoza defines affect as follows: By affect I understand affections of the Body by which the Body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections. Therefore, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I understand by the affect an action; otherwise, a passion. (E III def 3) The term affect is applicable to both the mind and the body. As
regards the body, it designates the affection of the Body by which the Bodys power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained. With respect to the mind, affects are ideas correspon
ding to events in the body, in which the power of the body is affected either positively or negatively. If one can be the adequate
cause of an affect, one acts; otherwise, one suffers. The mind can be the adequate cause of something when it conceives an adequate idea. Conversely, the mind undergoes some
thing when it conceives an inadequate idea. (E III p1) To understand 182
something adequately is to possess the idea fully such that the mind is independent of any external cause. Having an adequate Man does not
idea, the mind is the adequate cause of its status.
act passively when he is the adequate cause of his action. The activity of the mind does not entail any power of the body directly. By the same token, the action of the body does not exert The body cannot determine the mind to
any power on the mind.
thinking, and the mind cannot determine the body to motion, to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else). (E III p2) For Descartes, the mind can influence the body through the will. The essence of the body is extension; everything coming from the body can be explained in purely mechanical terms. Things, which
cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived as belonging to the body, can be attributed to the mind. In other words, the mind can understand everything that cannot be explained in mechanical terms. In the eyes of Spinoza, this approach to the body is too superficial. But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes, each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinite modes. (E I p16 d) The body as a complex mode in the attribute of extension can by its nature produce many things. Owing to the limitation of our under
standing, we only know the body as something extended, capable of motion and rest, and nothing else. 183 Maybe there are other functions
of the body, of which we have no knowledge. else. (E III p2)
if there is anything
In the scholium to the proposition, Spinoza stresses
again the role that the body plays in producing affects. ....no one has yet determined what the Body can do, i.e. experience has not yet taught anyone what the Body can do from the laws of nature alone, insofar as nature is only considered to be corporeal, and what the body can do only if it is determined by the Mind. For no one has yet come to know the structure of the Body so accurately that he could explain all its functions....This shows well enough that the body itself, simply from the laws of its own nature, can do many things which its mind wonders at. (El 1 1p2 s) At first reading, the passage seems to suggest that one knows little about how the body works. Admittedly, one cannot articulate in Nevertheless, the body works
explicit terms how the body functions.
and it performs a lot of miracles. Without the slightest idea of how the body can perform all those miracles, the mind cannot help wondering at those accomplishments. The formation of affects of the body is one about which one knows very little. In fact the formation of corporeal affects is a paradigm case in which the body can work on its own, demonstrating its intellectual power and cognitive function. In his paper, Can an Affect in Spinoza be of the Body , Jean-Marie Beyssade argues that affect as a reality can be defined at the level of 184
the body alone, just as it can be defined at the level of the mind.1 0 It is worth the while to go into his argument at some length. Termino-
logically, affectus, like conatus and appetitus, is applicable to both the mind and the body. 1 1 ting affect to the body. Beyssade gives a substantive reason for attribu He argues that the term passion has two
meanings in Descartes - it refers to the physiological mechanisms as well as to obscure thought in men. Like sensation and imagination,
passion denotes two different senses, namely the sense of a purely corporeal phenomenon and that of its effect in the mind which is united to the body. Since Spinoza studies attentively the Passion of the Soul, Beyssade defends that affect for Spinoza is constituted at the corporeal level as a physiological reality.1 2 Beyssade further argues that the phrase and at the same time (et simul) in E III def 3 is equivocal. Understood conjunctively, affect
requires the combination of a physiological aspect and at the same time a conscious aspect. In this sense, there is no corporeal affect
pure and simple. However, one can also interpret the phrase in a distributive sense that affects, according to Spinozas parallelism, are formed at the same time both in the mind and in the body. Beyssade
remarks that the definition that closes the appendix of Ethics III does not provide ground to interpret the phrase ef simur of the initial definition as implying that there is no affect of the body alone, that all affect requires the concurrence of the mind. 1 3 185
Beyssade attempts to find the answer in the demonstration E ill p14, which reads as follows: If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once, then afterwards, when the mind imagines one of them, it will
of
immediately recollect the other also (by II P18). But the imaginations of the mind indicate the affects of our body more than the nature of external bodies (by II P16C2). Therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind (see D3), has once been affected by two affects [NS: them, it will added) Beyssade notes the change in words between E II p16 c2 (indicate the condition of our own body) and E III p14 d (indicate the affects of our body) and pays tribute to the expression the affects of our body. In addition, Beyssade highlights the shift of the et simul into a consequently and contends that the meaning is clear. He infers from at once], then afterward, when it is affectedby one of also be affected by the other. (E III p14 d,emphasis
the above analysis that [t]he affect and the chain of affects are perfectly constituted at the level of the body, without any need for the addition of the unifying dimension of the mind or consciousness. Onthe contrary, it is through a kind of derivation that the affectivity
already constituted at the level of the body transmits itself to the mental event, which reduplicates the corporeal event. 1 4
186
According to Beyssade, the body knows the external world imme diately; whereas the mind knows the world mediately. Elsewhere,
Spinoza stresses that to know the mind adequately, one has to know the body adequately in the first case. (E II p13s) Spinoza puts in focus the physical aspect of cognition. The mind is the idea of its body. The affects of the body are reflected in the mind as imaginations. Again in E ill p14 d, Spinoza says that the imaginations of the mind indicate the affects of our body more than the nature of external bodies. Therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind, has once
been affected by two affects,.... when it is affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other. Beyssade argues that the affects are constituted first at the level of the body without any need for synthetic work of the mind. And imaginations here
indicate the affections of the body.
First, one has the affects formed
in the body, and consequently one has the imaginations in the mind. Spinozas parallelism can be expressed as one object and
the idea of the object. The mind is parallel to the thing that serves as its object. There is a logical priority of the formal reality The essence of the
of things over the objective being of ideas. Spinozistic body is potentiality.
The body can internalize its poten
tiality both as force (conatus) and standard for its varieties of power (affectus). 1 5 As the essence of the body is its power, every affection of the body is in a broad sense an affect. Joy and 187
sadness are a function of increase and decrease of the power of acting. The body is passive when it forms affects which
decrease its power. Conversely, the affects which increase its power.
body is active when it forms
in the common order of nature, the imaginations are formed in the mind according to the order of the affections of the body. (E II p18 s) At a certain point, one can form active affects in which one knows So long as we are not torn by affects
the cause of ones action.
contrary to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. (E V p10) The power of ordering and connecting the affections of As potentia, the body can
the body refers to the bodys own power.
internalize its energy and reprocess its affections such that they are ordered and arranged according to order of the intellect. To what extent can the body constitute by itself adequate
knowledge? This might be an issue for speculation.
However, I think
that as far as the formation of active affects is concerned, the body does play a constitutive role in cognitive activities and manifest its intellectual power. above analysis. Two things can tentatively be claimed from the First, the affects of the mind can be derived from Second, the formation of active affects involves
those of the body.
both the body and the mind.
188
Conatus and Conatus Intelligent
The conatus of a thing is its effort to persist in its own being. For Spinoza, this effort belongs to the nature of all finite modes.
Humans are conscious of such an effort; conatus then becomes the desire for self-preservation. The desire for self-preservation constitutes the very essence of human beings. To understand Spinozas conception of conatus, let me begin with his definition of the essence of a thing: I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing. (Ell def 2) The real definition of a thing expresses its adequate idea. The adequate idea of a thing relates the intrinsic nature of the thing, which is identified with its essence. Put it otherwise, the definition
of a thing affirms its essence. Since the essence is the intrinsic nature of the thing, the thing is necessarily given when the
essence is given. Conversely, its essence thing disappears.
being taken
away the
No thing can be destroyed except through an external cause. (E III p4) All contrary properties, which go against the being of 189
a thing, cannot be its inherent nature. nature of and rest. excludes
For instance, the inherent motion
a body is constituted by a certain proportion of The all the definition of the body, properties which are
which expresses thisnature, incompatible with the
maintenance of this proportion. the thing tends to destroy it. the
Everything that is incompatible with Things are of a contrary nature, that destroy
is, cannot be in the other. (E III p5)
same subject, insofar as one can
If things act, they act in the way which is compatible with their nature. The action cannot be contrary to their nature. Thus, Spinoza
defines conatus as
Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, Spinoza further clarifies
strives to persevere in its being. (E III p6)
his concept of conatus. The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing. (E III p7) As long as the thing endeavors, the striving will continue indefinitely. (E III p8) According to Curley, conatus has a two-fold meaning. It suggests trying and making an effort. 1 6 The thing trying has some conception of an aim it wants to achieve. In the sense of making an effort, it refers to the tendency that a body has to persist in a state, either of rest or of motion. The mind as a collection of modes of thought
affirms the existence of the body, and it strives to keep affirming its bodys existence. The conatus of the body, on the other hand, 190
strives to maintain the same proportion of motion and rest. applicable to both the mind and the body.
Conatus is
The mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas. As the conatus of the mind constitutes its essence, it must be reflected in all its ideas. On the one hand, the mind knows itself through percei ving the ideas of the affections of the body. (E II p23) The mind is As
conscious of its body on account of its bodys modifications.
long as these ideas are related only to the mind, they are con fused ideas. (E II p28) On the other hand, in light of its conatus,
the mind is conscious of its own effort to persevere in its being. In short, the mind is always conscious of its epistemological content and its existential endeavor. Both insofar as the mind has clear and distinct ideas, and insofar as it has confused ideas, it strives, for an indefinite duration, to persevere in its being and it is conscious of this striving it has. (E III p9) As regards inadequate ideas, conatus is understood as a passive re sponse to external stimuli based on imagination - it is an expression of the effort of the individual to persist in its own being. Desire is mans very essence, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something. (E III after p58 def 1) Conatus
can be taken as a desire to act, for both conatus and desire are concerned with mans essence. The conatus of an organism does 191
not act blindly; rather, it acts with an aim, namely to enhance its being. As noted in the previous section, an affect, by virtue of the
body, refers to the affections of the body by which the bodys power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained.... (E III def 3) The endeavor of an organism to preserve its existence
is its effort to increase its perfection, power of acting, or level of vitality. Anything that decreases decreases its ability to an organisms power of acting its being, and anything that
preserve
increases its power of acting increases its ability to preserve its being. The mind is the idea of the body. The minds basic endeavor or Moreover, [t]he mind
desire is to affirm the existence of the body.
as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the bodys power of acting. Error is the privation of truth. At all
levels of error formation, some premises are missing. ideas, errors are truths, though not the complete ones.
As inadequate If one takes
truth in Spinoza as a function of coherence, then adequacy as internal coherence of the idea is a task to be accomplished.
(E III p12)
The body tends to reject any change contrary to its na
ture. Similarly, the mind tends to reject the idea of anything contrary to the well-being of the body. (E III p13) When the mind has an inadequate idea, the bodys power of acting is diminished. As long
as the mind has an adequate idea, the mind is active and the 192
bodys power of acting is increased.
The mind understands the cause
of its action. There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct concept. (E V p4) strife for the well-being transition possible. from of both the mind ideas to Through the existential and the ideas body, is the made
inadequate
adequate
To recapitulate in a few words, the mind is conscious of
both its corporeal affections and its endeavor to persist in its being. The body strives to increase its power of acting, and the mind persists in attaining this idea of the bodys well-being. knowledge, the striving is an endeavor to transform In light of inadequate
ideas into adequate ideas. According to Yovel, conatus does not aim at mere survival; rather it strives for higher levels of existence. The theory starts as a theory of self-preservation. As long as it unfolds, conatus demands not only
self-preservation, but also eternity. Once rationality is introduced in the course of striving, conatus turns out to be the finite mode's striving for its finitude and its link onto the eternal. For Spinoza, the
theory of conatus entails two concepts, namely prolonging ones existence and enhancing ones power to exist. enjoys, the more active ones being is. thing is to strive for infinite existence. The more power one
The essence of a singular Conatus intelligendi as the
striving for understanding aims at knowledge of God as its ultimate goal.1 7 193
How is it possible that conatus switches from mere survival to the acquisition of understanding and finally to infinite existence? Unlike God whose essence necessarily involves existence, the con crete existence of a finite thing is determined by other finite modes in an endless chain of causation. Yet a finite mode is a conatus,
a finite determination of Gods essence or power. It is for sure that the essence of a finite thing does not involve existence. tingly enough, as an expression of God's powerful Interes the
nature,
essence of a finite thing somehow involves existence. existence will necessarily come about when the chain
Eternal of finite
causes is such that the essence gets instantiated. Spinoza defines conatus as the striving by which each thing endeavors to persist in being. a finite thing. Conatus is the actual essence of
With respect to the body, conatus consists in the As mentioned
maintenance of a certain ratio of motion and rest.
before, conatus does not only aim at mere and indefinite survival. It is working toward the enhancement of its own being as well. Working tenaciously, the conatus of a finite human works toward temporal essence. survival and actualization of his or her innermost
For Spinoza, destruction of a being comes from outside. In order to
The conatus of a being serves to prolong its existence.
counteract destruction from without, the conatus of a being has to enhance its being, striving 194 to turn passions into actions,
inadequate ideas into adequate
ideas. At a certain point of
the
struggle, conatus intelligendi as the striving for understanding takes shape. Destruction comes from outside. A body will cease to exist when the intrusion of external forces disrupts the bodys specific ratio of motion and rest. The capacity of the body to act and react may be
increased or diminished. The body's interaction with other external bodies can either impede or enhance its own power and activity. The conatus of the mind is expressed in the effort to imagine those things that increase the body's power of acting (E III pi2) - the
enhancement of the body. The superiority of a body over other bodies is manifested in the by external bodies, fact that it is affected in a great many ways and is disposed to affect external bodies
in a great many ways. (E II p u d) body together with its well-functioning
That is to say, the active mind can maintain its
individuality throughout a wide variety of changes. The existence of conatus as a compelling urge from within impels a finite human to actualize his or her essence. The striving (conatus)
by which the body and the mind endeavor to persevere in their being turn out to be their actual essences. (E III p7) course of striving, bothbody and mind are transformed In the from
simple beings to more complex beings.
Meanwhile, their identities will
change accordingly, ....this idea, which expresses the essence of the 195
body under a species of eternity, is a certain mode of thinking, which pertains to the essence of the mind, and which is necessarily
eternal. (E V p23 s) The finite mode attains the status of eternity as soon as it actualizes its essence which involves eternal
existence, (cf. E V p23) By virtue of conatus and thereafter conatus intelligendi, the finite mind will ultimately grasp its eternal existence, even though the essence of a finite mode does not involve its existence.
Personal Identity
Why is the mind never satisfied with its inadequate knowledge of the external world? What motivates the mind to move forward until it
reaches the realm of adequate knowledge? Hume is not interested in proving the existence of personal identity, which he regards as an illusion. Hume is concerned with the genesis
of the idea. In the case of Spinoza, the cogito is not a given from the beginning, rather it is an achievement. Spinoza needs to explain On Spinozas view,
the occurrence of the I think in human nature.
only when one reaches the level of the I think can one deal with the problem of personal identity. For Descartes, a man consists of mind and body. Mind and body as two substances are distinct from one another. 196 It follows that they can
exist apart. Mind and body are united causally. Like Descartes, Spinoza holds that a man consists of mind and body. However, as long as the
body exists, the mind is aware of its existence. (E II p13 c) The mind, for Spinoza, cannot exist apart from the body. An idea that excludes
the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it. (E III p10) Mind and body are united essentially, not causally; they ....the mind
are united in the same way as an idea and its ideatum.
and the body, are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, extension. (E II p21 now under the attribute of particular case
s) The unity of mind and body is a
of the unity of an idea and its ideatum. ways of expressing the same thing. (E II p7s)
Body and mind are two
Conceptually, mind and body are different, for they belong to two different attributes - one is a mode of thought and the other a mode of extension. But the orders and connections of the two modes turn out If they are the same, it implies that even How does the union of
to be the same. (E II p 7s)
tually they should have the same identity.
the mind and the body lead to the same identity of the two? After E II pi3, Spinoza introduces a series of lemmas and axioms which deal with the have adequate nature of bodies. Heexplains that one needs to
knowledge of the nature of the body before under The
standing the nature of the mind and its union with the body. human body is an aggregate of the simplest bodies. 197
The simplest
bodies consist of motion and rest. (L1 after E II p13)
They are the First, the
ultimate units from which complex bodies are constituted.
simplest bodies are distinguishable from one another in respect of motion and rest. Second, individuals, which are composed of these
simplest bodies, are distinguishable from one another by their hardness and softness. These qualities arise from the way of compounding the Lastly, composite individuals are composed of bodies
simplest bodies.
of the second order. They are distinguishable from one another by the complexity of the way in which the individuals are combined and by the efficiency with which they maintain their unity. The human body is a complex body; it consists of many composites and many simplest bodies. (Postulate I after E II p13) composite body, all the parts are related in two ways. lies upon another. Within a
First, a part
Second, "they communicate their motions to each With these
other in a certain fixed manner. (def after E II p13)
remarks concerning bodies, one has the criteria of the individuation of bodies. So long as an individual keeps a constant proportion of motion and rest, it continues to exist. An individual ceases to exist
if all its parts disperse or there is a change of the constant pro portion of motion and rest. identity when Accordingly, a body has the same First, it must be
it satisfies these two criteria.
spatially continuous, i.e. the same body from beginning to end; second, it keeps a constant ratio of motion and rest. 198
Like the body, the mind consists of many ideas.
The mind cannot
imagine anything or remember past things, except while its body endures. (E V p21) exists. So long as the body endures in time, the mind The mind
When the body ceases to exist, so does the mind.
is conscious of the existence of the body. takes its body as its object. (E II p12)
Whenever it thinks, it
Thus, the unity of the mind
is the same as that of the body because it is conscious of its body. If one takes this unity as identity, man keeps the same
identity from childhood to adulthood. What does personal identity mean for Spinoza? The human body maintains its proportion of motion and rest. The body can be called
the same body even though its elements are changing from moment to moment. Between birth and death, the human body maintains its So long as the
proportion of motion and rest despite the changes.
proportion remains the same, it is the same body. The question is whether individuation of the human body claim personal identity. by itself is sufficient to
At this point, the similarity between Spinoza's It should ring the
and Humes theories of personal identity is striking.
bell about Humes famous analogy of a common wealth in his dis cussion on personal identity: In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than a republic or common wealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and 199
subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same individual republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner, the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains and pleasures.1 8 From start to end, personal identity is not real for Hume. By virtue of
the work of memory and imagination, people come to believe that they have a subsisting self, which is identical through time.
Nevertheless, the identity so felt is purely psychological and there fore fictional. Spinoza would agree with Hume that personal identity For Spinoza, the body maintains a
is still a fiction at this stage. precarious unity of parts.
It is not identical through time; it is only a
unity of its present parts in which they move together. In a similar way, the mind as the idea of body is an unstable unity. the illusion of being self-identical. One has
For the most part of ones life,
200
one is leading a dreamy existence.
As far as imagination holds sway,
man lives in error; his life is not so different from those of animals. Indeed, the individuation of the body, which maintains the same proportion of motion and rest, does not designate personal identity. In what way can one claim to possess personal identity? The above analysis is a complete account of the way in which the description of men as physical beings can be reached from the basic level. True enough, the unity as an extended being or a thinking being is not sufficient to claim personal identity. The unity so attained
is still spatial and temporal. It is the unity which one sustains during ones life span. At bottom, it is more a physical unity than a personal identity. The conatus of the body, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being. (E III p6) existence. Because of its conatus, the body persists in
As noted, the body keeps a constant ratio of motion and
rest. Hence, to persist in existence means to keep the constant proportion of motion and rest. As for the mind, the conatus is the ....the first and principal
consciousness of the bodys striving. [tendency] of the striving our body.(E III p10 d)
of our mind is to affirm the existence of It means that the collection of ideas as
the mind, which is parallel to the body, affirms the existence of the body. Moreover, it keeps affirming the existence of the body. The mind tends to preserve this property of affirming the existence 201
of the body.
The striving of a singular thing turns out to be nothing It follows that both and that
but the actual essence of the thing. (E III p7)
the mind and the body strive to actualize their essences, the striving will continue indefinitely.(E III p8)
As far aspersonal
identity is concerned, E III p9 can be understood in the following way. The proposition summarizes the whole life of the conatus of a singular thing. Whatever the mind conceives, it is conscious of its body and whatever happens to it. As long as the body strives to
maintain a certain ratio of motion and rest, one remains the same person with respect to the unity. The body strives to persist in existence; it strives at the same time to actualize its essence. Whether the the same mind conceives adequately orinadequately, it has object
identity with
respect to this
unity. When the
is inadequately conceived, stimuli
it is a passive response to external imagination. When the object is
based on impulse and
adequately conceived, it is an act of the mind, a rational decision based on an adequate idea. In both cases, it is an expression of the effort of an individual to strive for its being. But in the latter
case, the individual can claim to have achieved its personal identity. Spinoza says that man thinks. (E II ax 2) This is the first appea
rance of the full concept man. One can claim personal identity when one thinks. The word think means that men can follow through an argument. Men consider what is proposed to them and draw 202
consists in knowing the idea that expresses the essence of this or that human body, under a species of eternity. (E V p22)
That which expresses the essence of the body is also the essence of the mind. Under a species of eternity, the mind and the body are the same.(E V p29) The idea, which expresses the essence
of the body under a species of eternity, is a certain mode of thinking, which pertains to the essence of the mind, and which is necessarily eternal.(E V p23 s) The moment man knows the essence of his body, he is thinking eternally. That part of the mind, which is the intellect, is eternal simply because whatever it knows is eternal. Morrison further holds that we are eternal in so far as we become one with what we know. 2 1 In the third kind of knowledge, the knower and the knownare one. Every idea known is with its object. completely identical
It follows that self-knowledge is not only knowledge As the knower and with God who is eternal
of the body, but knowledge of God as well. the known and are one, the mind isunited
immortal.
Therefore, one is then eternal and immortal as well,
for one is fused with something which is eternal and immortal. Man is not satisfied with theinadequate knowledge he has at
the present time simply because he cannot live by that kind of knowledge. At the bottom of his heart, he has the desire to know Like the
his personal identity, which is knowledge of his essence. analogy of
the cave in Platos Republic, man is tired of living in 204
out its implications. In other words, the conclusion must necessarily follow from the premises. the whole system. What man thinks should be a part of
Man can claim to possess personal identity if
and only if he thinks in an eternal manner. Man is eternal as he thinks adequately. Thinking belongs to a part of the whole system called, If the
of Gods knowledge. Manis self-identical, and properly so as soon as he is aware of himself as a part in thewhole.
above argument is tenable, personal identity is no longer a whim sical fiction as in the case of Hume. Personal identity in the hands
of Spinoza turns out to be an achievement of mans striving, a striving for knowing his own essence. Morrison argues that an individual human being cannot be
immortal.1 9 Yet there is a part of the mind which is eternal. That part is the essence of the mind, and we can know our essences as eternal within time. In part V of the Ethics, Spinoza distinguishes between The present life refers to the
the present life and the eternal life.
passion and the love of mutable things. This life is dominated by the body; it is the life of passion, sense, and imagination. The eternal life, in contrast, is concerned with clear and distinct know ledge, which begets a love toward a thing immutable and eternal. (E V p20 s) Morrison notes that by eternal life, Spinoza does not
mean the life after death. Rather, by eternal life Spinoza means that it is something which can happen in time. 20 The eternal life 203
the cave. men
His life is composed of opinions, zest to leave the cave,
not knowledge. All beliefs and
have the
forsaking
acquiring knowledge. Locke initiates the issue of personal identity. His account of the issue dispenses with sameness of substance (soul or body) and
concentrates instead on psychological continuity. For Locke, personal identity extends as far as consciousness goes. Memory is the main characteristic of personal identity. Recollection of past thoughts or actions is the only source of continuity recognized by Locke. It is out of moral interest that Locke raises the issue. Man as having personal identity is responsible for the actions done in the past Like Locke, Spinoza wants to argue for a case that personal identity does exist and his discussion of the issue is also out of moral interest. sential Spinoza's avowed aim is to present the es one achieves human blessedness.
stages through which
Knowledge is the most important element in this progression. By means of adequate knowledge, man can attain ness. The issue of personal identity is then human blessed with
charged
metaphysical significance. in which does.
Man attains the status of a quasi-god infinite intellect given
man thinks in the same way as the Spinoza would accept all the
Lastly,
arguments
by Hume concerning personal identity is
the issue of a fiction so 205
personal identity. In a nutshell, long as one is under the
sway of imagination.
However, Spinoza will have the last word
about the issue when he can refute Hume and restore the validity of personal identity. Personal identity does exist according to the law of reason. An example given by Spinoza will illustrate this point. ....We when one thinks
clearly understand what is the difference between the idea of, say, Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peters mind, and the idea of Peter which is in another man say in Paul. For the former di
rectly explains the essence of Peters body, and does not involve existence, except so long as Peter exists; but the latter indicates the condition of Pauls body more than Peters nature.... (E II p17 s) Implicitly, I have made a distinction between false identity (the unity of the body) and true identity (the actualization of an individuals essence). For present purposes, true identity refers to the idea of. Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peters mind, and false identity to the idea of Peter which is in another man say in Paul. Considered as an act of the mind, the idea of true identity (Peter) constitutes the essence of Peters mind and explains the essence of his body. As for the case of false identity, it indicates the state
of ones body (Pauls body); in particular, it refers to the unity of the body as identity. (Peters essence). It has nothing to do with ones essence
Peter is Peter when he possesses his true iden
tity: he knows the essence of his mind and that of his body.2 2 206
He acts according to the demand of reason, which is his real nature. Peter is being authentic to himself. Paul when Peter knows himself through Conversely, Peter is the gaze of another
person.
(Here, I identify Peter with Paul.)
His mind is under the
sway of imagination; still, he possesses a precarious identity - the unity of his body. Peter then is inauthentic to himself.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I began with the discussion of the cognitive function of imagination as articulated by the early Descartes. Well versed in
Descartes philosophy, Spinoza integrates this particular aspect of imagination into his theory of knowledge and makes imagination an indispensable part in his theory of knowledge. Before moving from
imagination to the body itself, I discussed the causal principle (E I ax4), arguing that the principle is applicable to both inadequate and adequate ideas. In addition, I explicated the notion of determination
that an idea needs to be fully determined before it becomes ade quate. The discussion of this notion runs parallel to that of the causal principle. These conceptions serve to account for the process of continuous striving for adequacy. I then stressed the importance of the active involvement of the body in the course of acquiring ade quate knowledge. The attainment of absolute knowledge as a task 207
is a practical undertaking. It calls for the strenuous efforts of the mind and the body. Then I focused exclusively on the notion of the
body, considering the body with respect to the theories of affects, conatus, and personal identity. By itself, the body can form its own corporeal affects without the aid of the mind. It can actively
form affects on its own. The conatus of the body, from start to end, perseveres in maintaining a certain ratio of motion and rest so as to assert its present existence and strive for a higher level of existence. its content can While keeping the same ratio, the body can change (affections) modify its from time to time. It implies the that the
body
identity
without
interrupting
principle
of individuation. This allows the body to move on and transcend itself into God as nature, searching for its true identity - its essence. These three aspects of the body are different ways of expressing the same motive of the body, namely actualizing its own essence. Working independently, the body is consciously heading toward this goal. All along, I emphasized the cognitive function of the body.
With the aid of this specific power of the body, the human mind is able to cross over from the finite to the infinite. Imagination and the body assist the mind to relate its ideas to God; the conjoined effort will prove to be successful in achieving absolute knowledge. The point of this chapter is to circumscribe the con voluted problem of the body. In contrast to Descartes, I tried to 208
argue for a case that the of the body will absolute knowledge.
recognition of the cognitive function quest for
make significant contributions to the
209
4
Infinities and Spatiality
At times we think we know ourselves in time, when all we know is a sequence of fixations in spaces o f the beings stability - a being who does not want to melt away, and who, even in the past, when he sets out in search of things past, wants time to suspend its flight. In its countless alveoli space contains compressed time. That is what space is for.
Bachelard - The Poetics of Space

For no one has yet come to know the structure of the Body so accurately that he could explain all its functions.
Spinoza: Ethics
Upon first glance, the term spatiality seems to be an unexpected non sequitur. Spinoza hardly mentions the term space in his
Ethics, not to mention its relation to the body in particular and knowledge in general. Like the notion of corporeality, spatiality However, as one
seems to be a peripheral issue in Spinoza.
proceeds to lay out its significance, spatiality turns out to be a hidden but important dimension. Indeed, the launching of the
notion of spatiality is the sine qua non, through the inquiry of which one will find the way out of the labyrinth of Spinozas epistemology.
210
I am heading toward a solution to the problem of the relation between the finite and the infinite in Spinoza. Simply put, Gods
ideas are infinite; humans are confined to forming finite and inadequate ideas. and infinite ideas? How does the mind come to form adequate It is a problem inherent in Spinoza's system.
Unfortunately, Spinoza never explicitly articulates the problem. In the absence of a practical solution to the problem, it does not make much sense to maintain that humans have access to absolute knowledge. Not satisfied with Descartes treatment of infinity, Spinoza approaches the issue from another perspective. that despite the difficulties Spinoza holds
present, the mind can
know the
infinite by means of its intellect.
In the second part of this chap I want to argue that
ter, I attempt to overcome these difficulties.
spatiality is the condition for the possibility of absolute know ledge. Whether or not one can have access to the infinite
relies on whether or not one is capable of experiencing the infinite. Spatiality is a promising candidate: on the one hand,
it is closely related to the perceiving body; on the other, it is directly linked to matter as extended. Presumably, knowledge
of the essences of things can be expressed in spatial terms. The body is not only a spatial entity, but also an agent who perceives space. It is through the body that one has imme211
diate contact with the external world. Having worked on the notion of corporeality, which seems, in every respect, to
keep track with Spinozas thought, I make this a propitious time for launching an inquiry into the issue of spatiality.
Descartes on the Infinite
The extension of the world, the divisibility of matter, the series of numbers, and so on, are characterized by Descartes as in definite. They are not finite, for each of them is unlimited in
some respect. And we shall call these things indefinite rather than infinite; first so that we may reserve the name of infinite for God alone. (AT VIII 1,15) For Descartes, God deserves to
be called infinite, for he is unlimited in all respects. By infinite substance I mean a substance which has actually infinite and immense, true and real perfections.... I never use the word infinite to signify the mere lack of limit (which is something negative, for which I have used the term indefinite) but to signify a real thing, which is in- comparably greater than all those which are in some way limited. (AT V 355-356) God
exceeds the world and other unlimited things in perfection; God is eminently greater than anything.
212
For Descartes, the mind is finite; but there is a faculty of the mind which is unlimited, namely the will. infinite as Gods will. of willing. The human will is as
Finite as it is, the mind has infinite power
It might be on account of its will that the mind can More precisely, the mind,
possess ideas of indefinite things.
because of its will, has an ontological status higher than in definite things. However, it turns out that the human mind lacks complete knowledge of these things. How does one know the indefinite things such as extension, the series of numbers, and so on? or infinite? Are those things not limited
To claim them as indefinite, Descartes must have a
reason for holding that they are neither limited nor infinite: ....we can say that a thing is indefinite simply if we have no reason which proves that it has bounds. Now it seems to me that it is impossible to prove or even to conceive that there are bounds in the matter of which the world is composed.... Having then no argument to prove, and not even being able to conceive, that the world has bounds, I call it indefinite. But I cannot deny on that account that there may be some reasons which are known to God though incomprehensible to me; that is why I do not say outright that it is infinite. (AT V 51-52) It is not certain that indefinite things are as infinite as God. Humans do not have adequate knowledge of indefinite things 213
to demonstrate that they are infinite.
Nor is it possible to It is
conceive indefinite things like matter as having bounds.
true that one cannot prove that indefinite things have bounds; it might even be absurd to conceive them as having bounds. Granted this, one cannot assert outright that they are infinite. God is omniscient and he has adequate knowledge of all things. God knows things as they really are; he knows that things are bounded or infinite. are bounded or infinite. Moreover, God knows why things
Human knowledge of indefinite things
cannot be compared with Gods knowledge of them. Humans have only partial knowledge of those things, but God knows them inside out. For things like extension, the series of numbers, and matter, it is not a matter of affected modesty, but of necessary cau sation, to say that some things are indefinite rather than infinite. (AT V 274) It is a good move not to designate those things as infinite because one simply lacks knowledge of them. I confer
I do not know whether they are absolutely infinite. (AT V 274) Let me leave aside, for the time being, the metaphysical grandness of God, i.e. he is eminently and ontologically higher than anything in the universe. Epistemologically speaking, other things can be as infinite as God is. In the case of Spinoza,
extension as an attribute of God is co-extensive with Gods 214
infinity.
That means extension is as infinite as God is.
In
contrast, extension is characterized by Descartes as indefinite, but not infinite, in virtue of the lack of complete knowledge of extension. But as far as God is concerned, maybe he
conceives and understands certain limit in the world, number, quantity and understands something greater than the world, number and so on; and so for him these things may be finite.
As for us, we see that the nature of these things is beyond our powers, and since we are finite, we cannot comprehend them and so with respect to us they are indefinite or
infinite. (AT V167) In short, finite humans are incapable of having adequate ideas of those things. It is wrong to assert that those things are infinite. In what sense is knowledge of God unlimited? In the first
place, the idea of the infinite is incomprehensible to humans. The idea of the infinite, if it is to be a true idea, cannot be grasped at all, since the impossibility of being grasped is contained in the formal definition of the infinite. (AT VII 368) Nor can humans understand the infinite through the negation of a limit. (AT II 426). Descartes makes a distinction between
the formal concept of the infinite and the thing which is infinite. As for the concept of infinity, even if knowledge of it is positive in the highest degree, the way in which one 215
understands it is still negative because one does not notice any limitation to the thing. In regard to the thing which is infinite, the understanding is positive in the sense that one has a clear and distinct idea of it. Despite the clarity and
distinctness of the idea of the object, it is still not ade quate knowledge. The mind does not have a complete grasp
of everything in the thing that is capable of being understood. (CSM II 81) As the mind has a whose essence clear and distinct idea of God idea of Gods infinity
entails infinity, the
is innate. The idea of the infinite must be in the mind prior to the ideas of all other finite things. In the Third Meditation, Descartes writes: And I must not think that, just as my conceptions of rest and darkness are arrived at by negating movement and light, so my perception of the infinite is arrived at not by means of a true idea but merely by negating the finite. On the contrary, I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite one, and hence that my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my perception of the finite, that is myself. (AT VII 45) The idea of Gods infinity is not derived from negating the finite. Rather, a clear and distinct idea of God entails Gods God is unlimited by nature. (AT IX 2)
216
infinity and perfection.
Finite beings cannot be the cause of the infinite.
Nor can Light
humans derive Gods infinity by negating their finitude.
is the absence of darkness; cold is the privation of heat. These ideas are materially false. Nevertheless, the idea of the infinite substance is not the negation of the idea of an
finite substance. Otherwise, the idea of God would be mate rially false. Moreover, the fact that humans always doubt As long as they are aware of their
shows that they are finite.
own finitude and defects, it indicates that they have know ledge of the infinite. Everyone must have the idea of God
as perfect and infinite before he/she is conscious of his/her deficiency. Thus perception of the infinite must exist prior to perception of the finite. In sum, one has positive knowledge of a God who is ab solutely infinite. The idea of God, together with the idea of his infinity, is innate. One innately knows God as infinite, even though one does not know what God is. In contrast, humans have some negative knowledge of things like matter, extension, and the series of numbers. The knowledge is negative because it is impossible to conceive or to prove that matter has bounds. Man does not know why it cannot be bounded. cannot positively assert that matter
Because of this, man
217
is infinite. Thus it is more appropriate to designate matter, extension, and the like as indefinite.
The infinite of imagination and Reason
In the Third
Meditation,
Descartes
writes,
....even
if my
knowledge always increases more and more, I recognize that it will never actually be infinite, since it will never reach the point where it is not capable of a further increase; God, on the other hand, I take to be actually infinite, so that nothing can be added to his perfection. (CSM II 32) This
is the bone of contention between Spinoza and Descartes. For Descartes, Human the absolutely can infinite is inaccessible actually to
humans.
knowledge
never be
infinite
because of human finitude.
Actual infinity is in God, who is
supremely perfect. This implies that human knowledge at most can be indefinitely infinite; knowledge as such cannot be com pared with Gods knowledge, which is absolutely infinite. By
contrast, Spinoza believes that adequate knowledge as Gods knowledge, which is absolutely infinite, is not confined to Gods intellect. Despite its finite character, the human intellect can somehow render itself adequate to the infinite intellect. In
that case, the human intellect can have access to Gods 218
knowledge, which is absolutely infinite. Nature as extension is understood by Descartes as a system of infinite mechanism, the indefinite in Cartesian terms. Nature is not understood by Spinoza as extension pure and simple. It consists of
rest and motion; and it may contain something else, which Spinoza does not know for sure. (E III p2) Accordingly,
Spinozas conception of nature is much more complicated than that of Descartes. Like Descartes who distinguishes between the indefinite and the infinite, Spinoza understands true infinity as substance
and false infinity as the multiplication of parts. Substance as a whole is indivisible. (E I p13) As self-caused, substance is determined to exist by itself. (E I p7) Finite modes are divi
sible and they are determined to exist by other finite modes. Laura Byme designates true infinity as the infinite of reason and false infinity as the infinite of imagination.1 He contends
that Spinozas ethical teaching relies on a distinction between the two infinities. ....Spinozas ethical teaching rests on the
distinction between these two infinities, with the serial infinite of imagination being that of bondage and suffering, the
absolute infinite, that of freedom and activity. 2 According to Byme, an infinite series of finite causation is nothing but a imitation, negation, and determination 219 by another. Time,
measure, and duration are characterized as modes of ima gination. As a series of indefinite limitation, the infinite of
imagination implies bondage and suffering. The causal net work of the existence of finite modes is characterized as one mode caused by another mode and then by another and so on ad infinitum. (E I p28) is an indefinite progression. negating. (E I p8 s ) 3 By contrast, the infinite of reason is equated with substance. The existence of substance follows from its essence. Sub The kind of infinity at issue
Finitude as limited is partly self-
stance is infinite because of its nature; it is indivisible and eternal. 4 God is causa sui and he is absolutely infinite. .... but if something is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence. (E I def exp) Admittedly, nothing can be denied of God. God
as substance is infinite on account of Gods nature. lutely infinite, God is indivisible. (E I p13)
As abso
Therefore, he is not
composed of parts. God is eternal, or necessary existence in himself. (E I p19) As self-caused, God is determined to exist
by himself alone. (E I def 8) Accordingly, true infinity under stood as substance implies freedom and action. The exis tence of God involves no negation and no relation to others simply because he is self-caused. 5 220
Finite beings are determined by others.
How can humans
reach the adequate idea if they are condemned to inadequate knowledge? The object of the human mind is its finite and
incomplete body. The body is determined by an infinite series of eternal bodies. (E II p11) of incompleteness. Inadequate ideas are a function
If humans are capable of adequate know
ledge, they need to transcend their finitude and limitation in the first place. Spinoza holds that man can have access to
adequate ideas, but he does not explicitly explain how to attain them. God is absolutely free because he is self-determined. If
freedom is viable for humans, presumably they need to exert an effort to overcome their limitation and their infinite series in a causal determination. Reason is the prerequisite for
adequate knowledge. By means of reason, the mind attains knowledge of properties that all (E II p40 s2) bodies have in common.
The discussion after E II p13 is about the It explains some properties which are
natures of bodies.
common to all modes. Intuition takes the mind a step further than reason; it deals with knowledge of how things follow from God. It involves immanent, but not transitive, causality which is an infinite series of mechanical causation. Immanent causality is closely linked to conatus By existence here I 221
do not understand duration, that is, existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly....! am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. For
even if each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one per severes in existing follows from the eternal necessity of Gods nature. (E II p45 s) ration is imaginary. Existence understood in terms of du As noted before, time and duration are
modes of imagination: they deal with indefinite progression. This is one kind of existence. Another kind of existence, which is related to conatus, follows from Gods nature
(E III p7), and concerns Gods eternal essence and exis tence. As Gods essence is absolutely infinite, his existence is concerned with absolute infinity, the understanding of which calls forth reason. By taking in the divine nature and attaining one is on the way to freedom and
knowledge of God,
blessedness. (E II p49 s) In Ethics III & IV, Spinoza links the concept of selfdetermination to virtue and emotion. In part IV of the Ethics, By virtue and
Spinoza relates virtue to conatus. (E III p7)
power I understand the same thing, that is, virtue, insofar as it is related to man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the 222
laws of his nature alone. (E IV def 8) The force by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but
the actual essence of the thing. (E III p7)
Virtue is the power
to actualize ones essence and persevere in ones being. (E IV p20) As discussed in the last chapter, emotion a function of joy and sorrow.(E III p56) power of acting is The mind is joyful when its when decreased.
increased, sorrowful
(E III p11 s) (E II p18)
Freedom as activity accords to ones own nature. So long A
As active, one is determined from within.
as man is free, he can escape from mechanical causation.
man is virtuous only when he acts; he acts only when he has adequate ideas. (E IV p23) A man cannot be said abso lutely to act from virtue insofar as he is determined to do something because he has inadequate ideas, but only insofar as he is determined because he understands. (E IV p23)
Without adequate knowledge, there is no freedom or virtue. So long as the mind is occupied with inadequate ideas, it is determined from without. It does not completely understand the cause of its action. Man is virtuous and free because he has adequate knowledge of things and understands the cause of his action. For Spinoza, the absolutely infinite is a self-determining activity. It cannot be understood and expressed in terms of 223
numbers. (E I p12)
Knowledge of good and evil is the minds
awareness of joy and sorrow. (E IV p8) Good and evil are facts corresponding to the nature of ones being. a composite of mind and body. A mans being is
The more perfect and virtuous Under the
one becomes, the closer one is to Gods nature.
species of eternity, the mind and the body are one; they become part of Gods nature. Earlier I made a distinction between the infinite of imagi nation and the infinite of reason. ation can be linked to Roughly speaking, imagin
the bodyandreason to the mind.
Accordingly, the infinite of imagination can be related to the body and the infinite of reason to the mind. Adequate know ledge for Spinoza is a practical undertaking, not a theoretical one. As knowledge of God is absolutely infinite, adequate Grasping the
knowledge does not occur all of a sudden. adequate idea is an endless striving.
Granted that human
knowledge begins with inadequacy and ends in adequacy, the quest for Gods knowledge will start with indefinite infinity (the infinite of imagination) and terminate at true infinity (the
infinite of reason).
I concede that the two kinds of infinity are If one infinity
not disjunct; rather, they are in some sense related. starts the inquiry of knowledge and links up to
(indefinite),
this process of striving 224
can be expressed as the
indefinite striving (conatus) for survival or passive emotions (passive affect). At a certain point, there is a change in which
the infinite of imagination switches to the infinite of reason. Parallel to this modification, there are similar changes with respect to conatus and affects that conatus takes the shape of conatus intelligendi and passive affects become active
affects.
Having gone through all the sufferings and limitations,
the mind becomes free and active: it is determined by its own nature. Consequently, the mind knows nature in its totality and grasps true infinity.
Resolution to the Problems of Infinity
In E I p15 s, Spinoza spells out the problems of the infinite and offers his solution to them. This is the place where Spinoza I agree
expresses his thought on infinity in its mature form.
with Richard Mason that Spinoza finally comes to realize the complete difference between the infinite and the multiplicity of parts.6 People who deny the corporeal nature of God claim that the nature of God is different from the principle that constitutes corporeality, and that God is absolutely immaterial. They
argue that corporeal substance is finite and subject to division. 225
As finite and divisible, corporeal substance is composed of parts. (E I p15 s IV) They also believe that God is supremely perfect, and that poreal substance, (E I p15 s II) To show that God is an extended thing (E II p2), Spinoza needs to discuss the issue of infinity in light of extension, he cannot be acted on.In contrast, cor because of its divisibility, can be acted on.
explaining that infinity as a nature of God is the same in the part as it is in the whole. How can one reconcile the (divisible) finite with the
(indivisible) infinite and reassign extension to of his attributes?
God as one
On Spinozas view, it is a wrong move to
conceive extension as constituted by parts. Spinoza acknow ledges the infinite nature of extension; nature as extended is not composed of parts extra parts. identify the infinite with the indefinite. Spinoza cites three counterexamples to show that if one regards extension (E I p15 s) as infinite, one will end up with absurdity. Moreover, he does not
In the first example, Spinoza claims that if infinitely
extended substance is divided into two parts, those parts are either finite or infinite. If they are finite, there is an infinity composed of finite parts. If infinite, there is one infinite twice as big as another. Both cases are absurd. 226
In the second example, Spinoza supposes that infinity as extension is measured by units of one foot. There would be an infinite number of such parts. Spinoza further supposes
that each unit can be divided into twelve parts, each one inch in length. For each one-foot part, there are twelve parts, each of which would be an infinite number. The number of
one-inch parts would be an infinite number twelve times the infinite number of the one-foot part. This is absurd! In the last example, Spinoza supposes two finite lines AB and AC drawn at an angle from point A. Points B and C
will be at a determinate distance from one another. As the lines are extended to infinity, the distance between B and C becomes indeterminable. That is also absurd! From Spinozas perspective, these examples lead to
absurdities because they rely on the supposition that infinite quantity is measurable. Absurdities follow from the presupposition that infinite extension is divisible, ....all those absurdities .... from which they wish to infer that extended substance is finite, do not follow at all from the fact that an infinite quantity is supposed, but from the fact that they suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and composed of finite parts. So from the absurdities which follow from that they can infer only that infinite quantity is not measurable and it is not 227
composed of finite parts. (E I p15 s) Accordingly, to avoid such absurdities, one has to take extension as both infinite and indivisible. Spinoza agrees with Descartes that a vacuum does not exist. Since, therefore, there is no vacuum in nature, but all its
parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows also that they cannot be really distinguished, that is, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance, cannot be divided.
(E I p15 s IV) Spinoza thinks that quantity can either ab stractly or substantially conceived. Considered abstractly, matter This is achieved by
is finite, divisible, and composed of parts.
using our imagination, which we do often and more easily. (E I p15 s V) Conceived and indivisible. substantially, matter is infinite, unique, difficulties, the mind can conceive
With great
matter as such only in the intellect. By means of imagination, the mind understands reality in a spontaneous manner; it begins from the parts to the whole. In
this manner, one can never understand nature in its totality. At most, the mind can grasp nature as indefinite; it cannot reach true infinity. Spinoza characterizes this way of con ceiving things as abstract and superficial. He means that
imagination is incapable of comprehending the true nature of things. Through imagination, the mind conceives matter to be 228
affected in many ways.
But the parts of matter so conceived
are distinguished only modally, but not really. Spinoza takes water as an example to illustrate the point. Conceived as substance, water is indivisible; it cannot be destroyed or gene rated. Taken as parts, water can be measured, destroyed, and generated. Only the intellect can seize things globally, understanding them from the viewpoint of totality. A substance is prior in
nature to its affections. (E I p1) It is necessary that one reasons from substance to its affections, but not the other way around. It is only through the intellect that the mind grasps extension as an infinite whole. understood In sum, nature as extension can be conceives ex
extensively by imagination, which
tension as parts extra parts; or it can be intuited by the intellect, which grasps extension in its totality. In his book, The God of Spinoza, Richard Mason argues that for Spinoza, finite modes as individuals constitute infinite modes. The relationship between infinite modes and finite modes is constitutive. Adding finite modes indefinitely will end up with Put it otherwise, finite modes constitute
an infinite mode.
aggregates, which may be imagined as infinite. And if we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, 229
vary in infinite way, without any change of the whole in dividual. (E II Lemma 7 s) Mason holds that the relationship
between infinite modes and substance is quite a different story. In Spinozas universe, the same reality may be considered in two ways, i.e. as Natura naturata or as Natura naturans. As
Natura naturata (cause or potentiality), nature is substance. As Natura naturans (effect or actuality), it is the infinite mode. As noted, nature understood as substance (say, water as substance) is indivisible. Taken modally, the same nature can be divided; Based on imagi
it can come into existence or pass away.
native ideas, one understands nature as composed of corporeal contents. However, nature as a whole cannot b terms of those contents. nature in its totality.7 Infinite modes go between finite modes and substance. grasped in
It calls for reason to understand
As a kind of hinge, infinite modes mediate the two kinds of infinity. Considered as false infinity, aggregations of finite modes. infinite modes are the
Taken as true infinity, infinite In par
modes are infinite by virtue of being caused in nature.
ticular, the infinite intellect is taken by Spinoza as example of an infinite mode. Lastly, the example you ask for the first kind are: in the case of thought, absolute infinite intellect; in the case of extension, motion and rest. 230 An example of the second
kind is the fact of the whole universe, while, although varying in infinite ways, yet remains always the same, see scholium to Lemma 7 preceding Prop. 14, II. (Letter 64) In E V p40 s,
Spinoza says that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another mode of thinking, and this again by another and so on to infinity; so that together, they all constitute Gods eternal and infinite intellect. That means, the mind, together with other minds as eternal modes of thinking, makes up and constitutes the
infinite intellect.
Spinoza seems to have in mind that the
infinite intellect can be imagined as composed of an infinite number of finite minds, each of which is an eternal mode of thinking. The finite mind becomes part of the infinite intellect because it understands adequately. As part of the infinite intellect, the finite mind understands God as substance; it
grasps nature as a whole and has adequate knowledge of true infinity. In short, if one starts with finite modes, one reaches, by means of corporeal imagination, the infinite (indefinite) modes. Imagination, understood here in a positive sense, i.e. as a virtue, paves the way to true infinity. With the help of active affects
and intellectual conatus, the mind, at a certain point, grasps the infinite modes caused by nature. 231 The mind, insofar as it
understands, becomes an eternal mode of thinking.
This is the
way through which the finite intellect renders itself adequate to the infinite intellect. As part of the infinite intellect, the mind considers things in the same way as the infinite intellect does. Eventually, the mind is capable of intuiting the essence of the thing and grasping true infinity as substance.
Conatus: the Striving for the Infinite and Freedom
Freedom and infinity are two distinctive characteristics attri buted only to God. However, to a certain extent, humans can
appropriate Gods power, achieving similar states of freedom and infinity. As the endeavor that constitutes ones being, conatus strives for indefinite existence. Indefinite here can be understood as In the beginning, conatus
indefinite time, therefore longevity. strives to exist indefinitely.
At a later stage, conatus aspires
beyond indefinite existence toward the transcending of inde finite, measurable units of time (the infinite of imagination) and finally to the attainment of some form of eternity (the infinite of reason). 8 Imagination, reason, and intuition deal respectively A parallel can be drawn Conatus
with the three kinds of knowledge.
concerning conatus and its relation to time in general. 232
goes through three similar stages, namely, from measurable units of time to sempiternity and finally to eternity. The three stages should not be understood as temporally continuous. From temporal flow of measurable time, one can In Letter 12, Spinzoa writes, So it is madness, to hold that extended
never reach the eternal. nonsense, bordering on
substance is composed of parts or bodies really distinct form one another. It is as if, by simply adding circle to circle and
piling on top of another, one were to attempt to construct a square or a triangle, or any other figure of a completely different nature. Similarly, one cannot reach true infinity by adding numbers indefinitely. As discussed before, there must
be a fundamental change from indefinite infinity to absolute infinity. Living indefinitely cannot be the sole object of conatus. According to Yovel, ones resistance to external causes can be taken positively as the enhancing of ones being. In this sense, conatus can be conceived as seeking ontological
expansion and power.
At the preliminary stage, conatus is a Humans
striving for indefinite existence, a kind of infinity.
desire to overcome their finitude and strive for the infinite. Infinity at a lower stage means indefinite existence, it is false infinity because it implies some negation at a certain point. 233
It is a struggle for indefinite survival. but conatus ends up facing death.
The aim is longevity, this kind
Heading toward
of infinity as indefinite existence is doomed to failure; it even tually fails to satisfy ones quest for true infinity. Instead of cherishing an everlasting life which is impossible, one strives for a qualitative infinity which can both happen in this life and satisfy ones desire for infinity. One grasps true infinity by transcending time and heading toward eternity.9 It is impossible to attain the lower kind of infinity as living everlastingly. The desire to overcome finitude in terms of everlasting is doomed to failure. Nonetheless, man can conquer his finitude and attain infinity of another kind.
While bypassing the infinite as indefinite duration, one reaches the infinite of Gods essence as substance. infinity as eternity is open to all humans. The higher kind of Rational knowledge Conatus must
is needed to attain the higher kind of infinity. take the form of conatus intelligendi.
Following reason, the
mind forms common notions; at a certain point, conatus will take the shape of conatus intelligendi. As reason conceives all
things in light of eternity, the mind possesses adequate ideas, which are eternal. Once the adequate idea is formed as part of the mind, the mind possesses something which is eternal and infinite.1 0 234
Spinoza defines conatus of a thing as follows: as
Each thing,
far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its Curley renders the Latin phrase quantum in se e sf A more literal trans insofar as it
being.
as as far as it can by its own power.
lation is rendered by Elwes (Spinoza 1909) as
is in itself 1 1 The notion of something being in itself should ring the bell about Spinozas definition of substance By
substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself. (E I def 3) And Spinoza defines modes as the
affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived. (E I def 5) What is in itself is self caused (causa sui). God as substance is self-caused. All
modes are in God and are caused by God. Gods essence involves his existence (E I def 8); singular things have de terminate existence (E II def 7), and involve existence. Despite their finitude, singular things have characteristics that only God possesses absolutely. to God, for Gods Absolute freedom applies only necessarily from his their essences do not
existence follows
essence and he is determined by himself only.
Humans can
be comparatively free even though their essences do not involve existence. Insofar as humans are free, their behavior God is absolutely in
is determined by their own nature. 235
himself
and
is
completely can exist
self-sufficient. in themselves
To and
some be
extent, causally
singular things self-sufficient.
Having an essence is the defining characteristic of a singular thing. (E II def 2) It is through its essence that a singular thing can be conceived. Ontologically, so long as its essence is given, the thing is necessarily posited. (E II def 2) In the demon
stration to the definition of conatus, Spinoza says, For singular things are modes by which Gods attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way, that is, things that express, in a certain and determinate way, Gods power, by which God is and acts. (E III p6d) For Spinoza, Gods essence is Gods
power. (E I p34) The striving by which a singular thing strives to persevere in its being is the actual essence of the thing. (E III p7) Insofar as it is in itself, a singular thing strives to
persevere in its being. As all modes are in God, singular things are in God too. It follows that insofar as they strive, singular in themselves when they The more they strive, the
things are in themselves. They are actualize their essences. (E III p7).
more they are in themselves and the more they are in God. Singular things are in God insofar as God constitutes their essences. In other words, singular things express Gods
power or essence while actualizing their own essences. As 236
a singular thing strives, more properties will follow from its essence. That means, a singular thing becomes more and more conceptually and causally self-sufficient. Being more and more autonomous, a singular thing possesses power in itself. Whatever power a singular thing has is also Gods power. God is absolutely free; in striving to be more and more in itself, a singular thing is more and more in God. Insofar as
our mind knows itself and the body under a species of eter nity it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God. (E V p 30, emphasis added) When one is in God and is conceived through God, Knowing the cause of action, one I say that we
one is as free as God is.
has adequate knowledge and acts accordingly.
act when something happens.... of which we are the adequate cause. (E III def 2) becomes a free man. Once man knows adequately and acts, he
Physical Space: the Iceberg or the Tip of the Iceberg
Bodies are not parts of extended substance; they are modes of it. And indeed it is no less absurd to assert that corporeal substance is composed of bodies, or parts, than that a body is composed of surfaces, the surfaces of lines and the lines, 237
finally of points. (E I p15 s) as composed of bodies.
It is absurd to conceive substance
By the same token, it is absurd to
take a body as composed of solids, planes, lines, and points. Substance is different from bodies; it is not an aggregate of bodies. Similarly, a line is not an aggregate of points; a plane is not an aggregate of lines; and a solid is not an aggre gate of planes. But a line is conceived through a point, a plane through a line, and a solid through a plane. A moving point makes up plane, andso on. The
a line and a moving line makes up a generation of a solid by the motion of a One does
plane presupposes a point threeThus
three-dimensional space. and work up to a
not start with starts with
solid;
rather, one
dimensional space as solid and work down
to a point.
it is more appropriate to say that a point is conceived through a line, a line through a plane and so on. can always limit it at a plane. Given any solid, one
A plane is defined as the limit
of a solid. The same analogy can be applied to a plane, a line, and a point as well. By the same token, substance as exten
sion is not an aggregate of bodies and it cannot be divided into bodies. Instead of conceiving substance through bodies, one conceives bodies through substance as extension in the sense that bodies are modes or limits of extension. 238
In Spinozas metaphysics, there are only substance and modes. Substance follows by immediate infinite modes, then As
by mediate infinite modes, and finally by finite modes.
modification of extension, a finite mode is a limit of extension. It expresses Gods nature in a determinate way. There is no
vacuum in Spinozas universe. Individual bodies as finite modes take up space; spatially conceived, they are three-dimensional. This analysis of a figure shows that a point is a limit of a line, a line a limit of a plane, and a plane a limit of a solid. solid as a finite mode is a limit of extension. As noted, substance as extension is indivisible. The point of the examples (E I p15 s) is to show that infinity of extension cannot be understood as infinite in extent. An extension without A
terminus, i.e. infinite in extent, is an extension with parts beyond every part. To say that beyond every part there are further parts is to suppose that extension is divisible. In Letter 12 (the Letter on infinity), Spinoza says, From all that I have said one can clearly see that certain things are in finite by their own nature and cannot in any way be con ceived as finite, while other things are infinite by virtue of the cause in which they inhere; and when the latter are conceived in abstraction, they can be divided into parts and be regarded as finite. In virtue of its cause, extension is 239
considered abstractly. as finite.
It can be divided into parts and viewed
Hence, to speak of extension as infinite in the sense
of unlimited in extent is to regard extension as mode, not a substance. Substance as extension is infinite in the sense
that it is indeterminate, unqualified, and undifferentiated. Strictly speaking, it is wrong to regard extension (understood as
substance) as homogeneous, for homogeneity is subject to division into parts. Physical space as three-dimensional is homogeneous space - it is subject to division into parts. physical space; they are divisible. a limit of extension. Individual bodies take up Moreover, a finite mode is
From finite modes to mediate infinite
modes and immediate infinite modes, and finally to substance, it stands to reason that the process involves infinite levels of limit. At each level, the modification is different in kind. Extension as mode can be expressed in terms of physical space, which is homogeneous and divisible. However, exten
sion as substance cannot be expressed in terms of physical space. Extension as such is heterogeneous and indivisible; it
is understood as infinite substance. Theoretically the body is capable of knowing the external world, for both body and world are extended. the body know the essence of a thing? 240 In what way can
As the essence of
matter is extension and extension is equivalent to space, one knows the essence of a matter through the knowledge of space concerning that matter. This proposal of solving the problems of matter is not a kind of mathematization of nature as Descartes would understand it. Treating nature in mathe Descartes' under
matical terms is a dead-lock to nature.
standing of space or extension is exclusively geometrical and physical. dead matter. one, In It is for this reason that Descartes universe is a containing only physical, rigid, and inanimate
contrast, Spinoza's universeis an animate universe: It is my conviction that extension, in the
it abounds with life.
hands of Spinoza, is not restricted to physical and geometrical space. Physical and geometrical space is divisible. God as an absolutely infinite substance is indivisible. (El P13) God is absolutely infinite because he possesses infinite I
attributes and each attribute is infinite in its own kind.
contend that infinite in its own kind can be understood in two ways. Quantitatively, thought as an attribute is infinite in the sense that there is no boundary within the attribute of thought. Qualitatively, thought as an attribute consists of infinite and each modification is infinite.
number of modifications
Thus, will, judgment, imagination, feeling, etc. are modifications of thought. And modifications of thought are infinite in number. 241
Within its own scope, each modification is infinite.
Similarly, the
attribute of extension is infinite quantitatively; qualitatively, it is infinite in number. So physical and geometrical space can at most be taken as an modification of the attribute of extension. Presumably, there are infinite modifications of space apart from the geometrical one. The following propositions from the Ethics will support the above argument: From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways - that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect. (E I P16) Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily and as infinite. (E 1 P23) Physical space is just a modification under the attribute of extension. In other words, there exist infinite kinds of space
apart from the physical space and each kind of space is infinite. If these considerations about space are tenable, physical space is no longer the whole iceberg, but only the tip.
242
From Conatus to Spatial Perception
For Spinoza and Descartes alike, there is no empty space; extension and space are equivalent terms, which I use
interchangeably from now on. I take it for granted that time is not an exponent of truth for Spinoza because measurable time is a product of imagination. By contrast, space and the experience
experience of space are closely related to the
of truth. First, an object is extended and therefore purely spatial. On knowing the essence of an object, one is, supposedly, required to perceive and know all the spatial configurations of the object, which make up its essence as such. In the
Second Meditation, Descartes claims that by means of the intellect, the mind knows the essence of the wax as purely extended. According to Descartes, the wax as extended can
be expressed in geometrical terms. Second, the body is the only sentient means through which one is affected by external bodies. As both the body and external bodies are extended and spatial, there is nothing which blocks the communication between the two. inadequate perception gurations. at the True enough, knowledge of an object is beginning, for one has all an inadequate confi
concerning
the object and
its spatial
Because of its conatus which drives it to know its 243
essence, the body strives to know more and more about the object, perceiving and knowing more about its spatial con figurations. Eventually, there comes the time when all the The mind
spatial configurations of the object are perceived.
then is in the position to know the essence of the object. On account essence. As noted earlier, conatus as striving normally suggests the meanings of trying and making an effort. The thing trying of conatus, eventually one knows the objects
has some conception of a goal which it wants to achieve. The goal in question is simply the essence of an object, which is at the same time ones essence. (E III P7) Spinoza identifies the individuals striving for self-preservation with its power. The conatus of an individual is an expression of Gods infinite power in a finite being. One is active when
the cause of action comes from within, passive when the cause of action comes from without. (E III p1, P3) The mind is joyful
when it is active and perfect; it is sad when dominated by external causes. (E 1 1 1def of Affects 1 1 ,1 1 1 ) Both mind and body strive to persevere in their being. The
idea of anything which serves to increase the bodys power of acting increases the minds power of thinking. Such changes in its power of thinking are felt as joy. (E III 244 p11, p53) Similarly,
the idea of anything which serves to decrease the bodys power of acting diminishes the minds power of thinking as well. The changes are experienced as sadness. (E III p55) The body, so long as it is active, is capable of moving around and perceiving more spaces. The more active the body is,
the more space it perceives and consequently the more joyful the mind is. In terms of conatus, the body strives to be more
active so as to maintain a certain ratio of motion and rest and enhance its being. As long as one has an inadequate idea
of a thing, one is both physically and mentally confined by that thing. to perceive By virtue of its conatus, the body exerts an effort more spatial configurations of an object. The
manifestation of the bodys power in being active and in con ceiving more space concerning the object is felt in the mind as joy. With respect to his mind and body, man feels powerful
when he expresses Gods essence. The conatus of the body, in keeping a constant ratio of motion and rest, can change its corporeal contents, i.e. it can strive to grasp more and more spatial configurations of the object. As more spatial configurations are perceived by the body, the image of the object so per ceived will change accordingly, say from a confused image to a more clear and distinct one. The mind will keep track which becomes
with the change, forming an idea of the object 245
more and more adequate.
In addition, [t]he mind as far as
it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the bodys power of acting. (E III p12) The mind and the
body, in perceiving an object, co-operate with each other so as to achieve a better result. Hence, the conatus of the body
is related to the perception of the object. In particular, the conatus of the body can be linked to the notion of spatiality. One is joyful when perceiving clearly and distinctly; one knows more about the object in perceiving rations of the object. One feels more spatial configu and sad when
confined
ones body is passive; the mind and the body are restricted by an object when the objects nature is incomprehensible to them. Ontologically speaking, as more and more spatial configu rations are acquired, the body is undergoing the corres
ponding physical changes. The body which leams more and more about the spatial configurations of an object is no longer the same body as it was. going on in the body. There is a kind of transformation
The physical changes of the body are
registered in the mind as ideas (inadequate and adequate alike). There is a long note note is telling: For of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which 246 which comes after E II P13. The
God is the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus, whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than another and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea and containing more reality. At first glance, it seems that Spinoza is talking about ideas and objects, which have respectively different realities, one idea (object) being more excellent than another. Analogously,
one can compare different minds according to the reality they possess. Since a mind is a set of ideas, a mind is more excel lent than another mind simply because the former has more reality than the latter. bodies. Similarly, one can compare different
A body is an object or a collection of objects; it can
be more excellent and containing more reality than another body. In grasping the spatial configurations of the same object,
the former body, which is more active, acquires more space than the latter does. The note continues; Wherefore, in order to determine wherein the human mind differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is of the 247
human body....that in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for forming many simultaneous perceptions, and the more the actions of one body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind, of which it is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others.... One body is superior to another body because it can perform more actions and perceive more impressions. it is more agile and active than the other. In other words, In doing many
actions or receiving many impressions at once, the body is prone to perceive more space and thus understand better the object than other bodies do. On the other hand, the
same mind is capable of forming many simultaneous per ceptions. Lastly, when more actions are coming from within,
the mind is more capable of forming distinct perceptions as it is under the sway of adequate idea of the object. He who has a body capable of a great many things has a mind whose greatest part is eternal. (E V p39) As man becomes selfHe
sufficient, he is determined from within, not from without. is free, acting according to the law of his nature. 248
So long as
we are not tom by affects contrary to our nature, we have the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. (E V p10) The body becomes strong and powerful; fewer other bodies concur with the body in action as more actions come from within. The more power the body and the mind possess (which is at the same time Gods power), the better they perceive the object. They become more perfect in the course of acquiring more of the objects reality. I claimed earlier that conatus will take the shape of conatus intelligendi when one acts according to reason and starts to conceive common notions. As argued before, a finite thing as Finite things endeavor to
conatus is an appropriation of God.
be as free as God. To be free, humans need to be determined from within. The striving to preserve itself is nothing but the essence of the thing itself, which, insofar as it exists as it does, is conceived to have a force for persevering in existing and for doing those things which necessarily follow from its given nature. But the essence of reason is nothing but our mind, insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly. Therefore but under
whatever we strive for from reason is nothing standing. (E IV p26 d)
In their own ways, both mind and body
249
strive to understand. Indeed, their essences consist of this striving to understand and nothing else. With respect to the body, it strives to be in itself and free. To be free, the body must be active and powerful. The more active and powerful the body is, the less it is acted on. Indeed, the body cannot be as free as God. Functionally, the body is Hence, the more
active and capable of perceiving many bodies.
spatial configurations of an object the body can perceive, the less the body is bounded by the object. [Ejach of us has - in part, at least, if not absolutely - the power to understand himself and his affects, and consequently, the that he is less acted on by them. with God, man can be relatively free, power to bring it about (E V p4 s) Compared at least, in the sense
that he has the power to understand himself and his affects. When affects are acting on him, he is not free because they are unknown to him. Those incomprehensible affects enslave him. For present purposes, corporeal affects are understood spatially. It follows that man is spatially confined by those affects, which he does not understand. Conversely, [t]he more an affect is known to us, then, the more it is in our power, and the less the mind is acted on In terms of spatial perception, the more one configurations 250 of an object (here
by it.(E V p3 c) perceives
the spatial
understood as an affection), the more the object is in ones power and the better one knows the object. For every
affection of the body, whether it is considered an image or an emotion, the mind can form a clear and distinct concept of it. (E V p4) In the demonstration to this proposition, Spinoza
says, Those things which are common to all can only be conceived adequately and so there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct
concept. (E V p4 d) Since the body and external bodies belong to the attribute of extension, their natures have much in common. External bodies as extended can be expressed
and understood spatially. Adequate ideas here refer to the common notions of those bodies. As extended, the body is
capable of perceiving external bodies immediately (directly) and spatially. The mind then conceives the common notions of those bodies as their essences and knows them adequately.
Imagination, Memory, and Spatial Perception
In perceiving an object, one starts with an image as an affection of the body and imagines accordingly. An image, since it is a modification of the body, is a mode of extension. It follows that it is something spatial. At the very beginning, imagination as 251
an idea of a spatial image is an inadequate idea.
The
essence of an object can be expressed in terms of spatial configurations. Having grasped all the spatial configurations
of the object, one knows the essence of the object. Having an inadequate idea implies that some spatial configurations of the object are still missing in us. While perceiving an external body, the body is affected by the external body. The mind imagines and regards the exter And the image will stay in the body
nal body as existing.
until the body is affected by another affect which takes the place of the previous one. (E II p17) proposition, affected In the corollary to the mind has been external
Spinoza claims that once the body, the traces
by an external
of the
body (coporis extemi vestigia) will be inscribed in the mind. Interestingly, and again, the mind can reactivate those traces again
forming the
same
image as
actually
existing.
This means that whether the object is present or not ,the mind can imagine the object at any time and perceive it as actually existing. (E II p17 coll) In fact, the same impression
can constantly be reactivated by the internal movements of the body in a spontaneous manner, which accounts for the occurrence of free association of the mind. (E II p17 cd)
252
The same situation occurs when one perceives two or more bodies instead of one. Actually, the mind seldom perceives one
thing; very often it perceives or imagines several things at a time. Once perceived, the traces of the external bodies remain On seeing or imagining one body, the mind Note here
in the mind.
automatically associates the images of other bodies.
that the relation among those representations can be purely contingent; they are not logically linked to one another when the mind associates one with the other. The traces, once inscribed in the brain, are like pieces of information stored on a computer disc; they are subject to reactivation time and again. Merely one single element of the bodies will trigger the For Spinoza, this is what actually happens when
whole scene.
one remembers. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind subsequently imagines one of them, it will immediately re collect the others also. (E II p18) Spinoza uses the term
immediately (statim) to designate the automatic character of association. There is no lapse of time between one affection and the other. Both are instantaneously present in the mind.
Memory, for Spinoza, does not rely on the consciousness of duration. spatially. The process of memory is treated, not temporally, but Memory projects and presents instantaneously in 253
the mind what happened
in the
past.
Representations
so
presented are related to one another spatially.
As noted before,
imagination can effect and reactivate the traces it once per ceived, presenting them in the mind as if they were actually existing. In recalling what happened in the past, memory does the same thing. Thinking retrospectively, memory projects in a spatial manner all the representations involved which were
inscribed as traces in the brain. C. D. De Deugd claims that for Spinoza, imagination and memory are identical concepts. His memory at any rate, determines his imagination and the same time the source of memory. tually dependent. 1 2 imagination is at the
They are, in a word, mu
I agree with Deugd that imagination and
memory refer more or less to the same power of the cogni tive mind. However, Deugd further claims that whereas ima gination is experienced as something instantaneous, in the
case of memory man is conscious of duration, that is, the factor called time is involved. 1 3 Contrary to what Deugd says, I contend that in perceiving anything imagination and memory are working in a similar way, i.e. their power is spatially-oriented. Whenever they perceive, they perceive some thing spatially. In his comment on proposition 18, Pierre
Macherey writes, "....la memoire n'est pas dependente de la 254
conscience de la duree, qu'elle precede et meme prepare, car son processus s'effectue non pas dans le temps mais dans I'espace, proprement en rapport avec la configuration spatiale du corps qui fixe une fois pour toutes en les enregistrant toutes les traces de son histoire passee." 14 To recall some thing in the past, one revives the spatial experience one had, which was registered as traces in the brain. In the scholium, Spinoza says, From this we clearly under stand what memory is. For it is nothing other than a certain
connection of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body - a connection which is in the mind according to the order and connection of the affections of the human body. (E II p18 s) Memory projects the order and
connection of the affections of the body, not the order and connection of the things. Memory as a special case of ima
gination does not explain, but involves the nature of things. (E II p18s) That is to say, memory, like imagination, reflects more the nature of the body than the nature of things.
(E II p16c2) Indeed, imagination and memory conceive things fortuitously, for they reflect more the nature of the body than the true nature of the thing. The mind, from the thought of one thing, immediately passes to the thought of another, which has no likeness to the first. (E II p18s) 255 Association as such relies
on culture, language, and other contingent factors. A soldier will relate the traces of a horse to the thoughts of a horseman and a war. A farmer, on seeing those traces, will associate
the ideas of a plow and a field. (E II p18s) The analysis of memory indicates that it is a particular case of imagination. All that happened in the past will be spatially projected by memory. In recalling, memory presents the same
order and connection of the affections of the body. At this point, both memory and imagination contribute little, if any, epistemological value. It should be noted that their function is spatially oriented.
The Perception of Different Modes of Space
For Descartes, the essence of matter is extension. space filled with matter.
Extension is
Accordingly, space for Descartes is Spinoza holds that extension as Understood as substance, exten
homogeneous and indefinite. an attribute of God is infinite.
sion as infinite is indivisible. Understood as mode, extension as infinite is indefinite. Homogeneous space as parts extra parts is subject to division. For this reason, Descartes understands space as purely physical and geometrical. the issue of space. Spinoza does not address
But if Spinoza takes extension as an 256
attribute of God, it is infinite and indivisible.
Furthermore, if
space can proxy for extension, space would be understood by Spinoza not as something homogeneous, but heterogeneous. Physical and geometrical space as homogeneous and divisible cannot fully express the nature of extension. Given Spinozas
conception of extension as an attribute of God, one can infer that there might be other modes of space which are different from physical and geometrical space. Together, they form a global and heterogeneous space. Nothing about the nature known
of all the other modes of space (if they really exist) is at this point.
The understanding of an object is proportionate to the clear perception of the object. One knows an object when one
grasps all the spatial configurations of the object. In Heideggerian terms, the perception of space is designated as de-distancing (iEntfemung).1 5 The wild space is at first unknown to one;
once one has traveled through that space and lived it, the space becomes familiar. One understands that space as lived. Man becomes oriented as he grows familiar with a space
which was initially new to him. One perceives and understands the physical shape of an object as one moves around the object. The physical space is
lived and understood through the movement and coordination 257
of
the body.
This is analogous to going on a vacation or
making a field trip. One feels refreshed when returning from the trip. The body, bounded for a while, discovers a new environment and perceives new things. As the body perceives and understands more space, the sense of restriction that it has felt with respect to physical boundary is relieved. fore, one feels more free and refreshed after the trip. There The
descriptions above these spatial experiences show that spatial perception carries both cognitive and affective values. As previously mentioned, there are other modes of space other than physical space. Physical space is not the whole story of spatial perception. There are other spatial experiences which are not physical and three-dimensional in the strictest sense. Yet the other modes of space have all the characteristics of space in general; they need to be understood as such. Since all modes of space have the general character of space, I take all the other modes of space as derivatives of physical space. There are numerous examples which illustrate modes of space other than physical space. Bachelard, in his book, the
Poetics of Space, relates many instances and events in which people have different spatial experiences other than the actual physical experience. Through memory and imagination which record, create, and re-create all the spatial experiences one 258
actually has in daily life, spatial confined to physical space.
experience is no longer
For Bachelard, man perceives
spaces concerning the houses, the drawers, the comers, the shell, etc. These are spaces which have been stored in
memory and are revived by imagination. How the body perceives and understands this variety of space? In the first place, the agility of the perceiving body is a One has to move around
crucial factor in understanding space.
an object so as to get a grip on the object. Moreover, one needs to familiarize oneself with the surrounding of the object. The more active the body is, the better an understanding one has of the object. The modifications are stored in the brain as traces. (E II p18 d) When the body comes across a similar
setting next time, it will immediately reactivate those traces. (E II p17 d2) As the mind associates freely (E II p18 s), it restores, recalls, transforms, and creates corporeal images.
Later on, when knowledge of the object increases, the order and connection of the affections of the body will change accordingly. Like Hume, Spinoza asserts that imagination is the source of all fictitious, false, and dubitable ideas. Fiction, falsity, and
doubt are confused ideas. The mind is confused when it
259
mingles all the objects; it is unable to attend to their fine distinctions. In Ell P13, Spinoza claims that the mind can have the idea of its body only insofar as it has the idea of an actually existing body. The mind knows its body only through the ideas of the affections of its body. They are ideas of bodily sensations and To a certain extent, bodily sen The
what follows from such ideas.
sations are a prerequisite for having intellectual ideas.
mind can have adequate ideas only if it succeeds in perceiving bodies in a certain way. This presupposes that external bodies are first perceived in the ordinary way, i.e. through imagination. Imagination is closely related to the function of the body. (E V p21) The more active the body is, the better the mind
works. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be disposed in a great many ways. (E II p14) Whether the mind
is imagining or reasoning, its power of thinking is directly related to the activity of its body. Being capable of perceiving
many things, the mind can perceive a broader range of spatial objects and configurations of those objects. On the other hand, the mind tries what it might to facilitate the working of its body. The mind strives to imagine only those things which posit its power of acting. (E III p54) At a certain point, the mind does 260
not imagine fortuitously. positing its
Rather, it imagines and works toward As a result, the body has more Thus the mind,
power of acting.
power: it is more efficient in perceiving things.
while imagining, enhances the function of its body, keeping it active all the while in perceiving objects. Spinoza discusses memory in both the TdlE and the Ethics. The following passages taken from the two texts deal with the cognitive aspect of memory: What, then, will memory be? Nothing but a sensation of impressions on the brain, together with the thought of a determinate duration of the sensation, which recollection also shows. For there the soul thinks of that sensation, but not under a continuous duration. And so the idea of that sensation is not the duration itself of the sensation, i.e. the memory itself. (TdlE 83) I say, first, that the connection is only of those ideas which involve the nature of things outside the human body, but not of the ideas which explain the nature of the same things. For they are really ideas of affections of the human body which involve both its nature and that of external bodies. I say, second, that this connection happens according to the order and connection of the affections of the human body in order to distinguish it from the connection of ideas which 261
happens according to the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men. (E II p18 s) Deugd, in his comments on the first passage, cites the phrase together with the thought of a determinate duration of the sensation. He holds that memory recalls something in time and
so memory is temporal in character.1 6 But the phrase actually suggests that it is the thought of a determinate duration, not the duration itself, which is in question. Spinoza further says that the soul thinks of that sensation, but not under a continuous duration. And so the idea of that sensation is not the duration The content of
itself of the sensation, i.e. the memory itself.
the sensation has nothing to do with time even though the sensation takes place in time. In the second passage, Spinoza distinguishes between two kinds of association. One is the association of the modifications
of the human body; the other is the association of ideas, which concerns the intellect. In TdlE 81, Spinoza says, Memory is strengthened both with the aid of the intellect and also without its aid. For regarding the first, the more intelligible
a thing is, the more easily it is retained; and conversely, the less intelligible, the more easily forgotten. intellect, the mind functions 262 properly; it Aided perceives by the things
through their primary causes and recalls them in the perfect order. The ideas so perceived reveal the logical and necessary order and intelligible, connection of things. As the ideas are logical it is easy for memory to retain them. In and
TdlE 82, both
Spinoza points out
that memory can be strengthened
with the aid of the intellect and without its aid. It follows that considered in itself, theintellect has nothing to do
with memory. As far as the act of keeping track with the order and connection tributes nothing. of the object is concerned, memory con
The intellect does all the work; it relates the
true order of things. In contrast, memory as a special case of imagination, involves the order and connection of the affections of the body. In brief, insofar as the intellect is at work, the mind addresses the order and connection of things. The pro cess does not concern memory at all. ....concerning the intellect consideredin itself there is neither memory (TdlE 82) nor forgetting. ideas. Butthe
Psychologically, the mind associates
mind, in following the order of the intellect, is governed by the universal law of association. Memory is also strengthened without the aid of the intel lect, by the force with which the imagination, or what they call the common sense, is affected by some singular cor poreal things. (TdlE 82) When aided by imagination, memory 263
associates ideas which involve the nature of things outside the human body, but not of the ideas which explain the nature of the same things. In recalling things in thisway, the mind false, and the
does not function properly. [T]he fictitious, the other ideas have their origin in
the imagination, i.e., in certain
sensation that are fortuitous, and disconnected; since they do not arise from the very power of the mind, but from external causes, as the body receives various motions. (TdlE 84) Spinoza characterizes the mind as acted on while it remembers or imagines in this way; those activities by which imaginations
are produced happen according to other laws, wholly different from the laws of the intellect, and that in imagination the soul only has the nature of something acted on. (TdlE 86) Associating freely, the mind blends several confused ideas
of diverse objects or actions. This way of imagining has little epistemological value. Let me take an example to illustrate how memory relates on the one hand to spatiality and on the other hand to the laws of association. Having stored ail the information in a disc, we turn
on the computer and insert the disc to see what we have done. As we click on one of the items we want to check, No
instantaneously we see the whole thing on the screen.
matter how long the material is, it shows up in no time. 264
Words, paragraphs, and pages are arranged in exactly the same way as before; they follow one another in the same and perfect order. Everything is there; nothing is missing. However,
when there is a virus in the disc, things look completely different. We might have difficulties in opening the item. times, it simply does not open at all Some
it has a jam. Even if
we manage to open the item we want to see, things fall apart. To be sure, things are still spatially connected; but they are in a mess, completely out of order. For regress. Spinoza, a true method does not involve infinite In
Spinoza makes an analogy to explain this point.
order to make certain tool A, say a hammer, one always needs another tool B. C and so on. Nevertheless, to make tool B, one needs tool This method will involve an infinite regress. Spinoza answers that man
How can one ever get started?
possesses inborn tools, which are the origin of even more complicated tools. reason). Man has inborn power (the natural light of
The fundamental tools in Spinoza are analogous to The main difference is
Descartes clear and distinct ideas.
that the simplest truth for Spinoza is an idea of the modifi cation of the body. Alternatively put, it is the simplest physical
space as affected by the body and recorded in the mind as a simple idea. Starting with the simplest truth, one deduces 265
more complicated truths and so on.
Though Spinozas method
is regressive in character, it does not involve infinite regress. There must be an end from which the system originates. The inquiry of truth starts with the real affection of the body in the simplest manner and from there onward it accumulates more and more complicated affections (spaces). If one takes knowing an object as perceiving all the spatial configurations of the object, one begins by perceiving the simplest physical space, and continues perceiving and grasping all the modes of space in relation to the object. Having grasped all the intuit
spatial configurations of the the essence of the object.
object, the mind then
can
The Spinozistic system can be taken as an infinitely com plicated series and expressed in computer terms. To move
from one step to another, one needs a password to log on. The passwords allow one to move onward until one attains absolute knowledge of the thing. On hitting the correct
password, one knows for sure that one is on the right track. No further justification is needed. The Humean law of association is purely psychological. There is no internal necessity which connects the ideas. In contrast, the universal law of association, which follows the order of the intellect, is universal and
necessary in the sense that one idea (or thing) strictly follows
266
another.
This process of association for Spinoza is analogous
to the working of a password; both follow strictly the law of logical necessity.
Part and Whole Relationship: Spinoza's Analogy
Ideas insofar as they are related to God are true ideas. (E II p32) As true ideas, they represent the eternal and infinite essence of God. Given that true ideas are infinite because of Gods nature, their ideata must be infinite as well. All the things which follow the absolute nature of any of Gods attributes have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite. (E I p21) infinite because Gods idea is infinite. A true idea is
The ideatum of a true
idea is also infinite, for a true idea and its ideatum are two ways of expressing the same thing. Earlier I made a distinction between the infinite of imagi nation and the infinite of reason. The exact relationship between the two kinds of infinity is not very clear in Spinoza. think that they are closely related to each other. I tend to
The infinite of
imagination is related to the body and its affections, and the infinite of reason has something to do with the power of the mind or the intellect. [T]his power of conceiving things under a 267
species
of eternity
pertains
to the
mind
only
insofar as
it conceives the bodys essence under species of eternity. (E V p29 s) On knowing the thing under a species of eter
nity, the mind knows the essence of its body under that species of eternity. Both the mind and the body strive to
persevere in their being and actualize their essences. Under a species of eternity, the essences of the thing, the mind, and the body turn out to be the same thing. If the infinite of
imagination clings closer to the side of the body and the infinite of reason to that of the mind, the two kinds of infinity must be related. To be sure, only the intellect can know the essence of God as infinite and eternal. Spinoza says that if we attend to it (extension) as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is a substance, which happens [NS: seldom and] with great difficulty, then it will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible. (E I p15 s V) seldom happen? reasons. Why is this difficult? Why does it
It is difficult and rare for the following
First, the mind as finite is theoretically incapable of
forming adequate and infinite ideas. The human mind can know the infinite idea only if it renders itself adequate to the infinite intellect. Indeed, it is an enormous task! Second, given
the intellect alone, the mind can never know the infinite idea. 268
Without the aid of imagination and the body, the mind
can
never render itself adequate to the infinite intellect. Simply put, the intellect by itself is incapable of knowing the in finite. The mind needs the preparatory groundwork laid down by imagination and the body before it can use the intellect to grasp the infinite. The road to true infinity is open to all; one just has to divide the journey into two stages. The first stage consists
of grasping the virtual or potential infinity, which is to be achieved cessfully second by imagination and the body. goes through stage. The Only if one one enter necessary suc the and
the first stage can stage is both
first
prerequisite.
As for the second stage, the mind intuits actual Evidently, the Having gone idea as
infinity as substance by means of the intellect. whole process involves an endless striving. through all the hard work, the mind adequate, complete, absolute, and perfect.
knows the
There is another problem left unsolved in the previous sec tion. For Spinoza, as Ihave been arguing, space heterogeneous. should be
Homogeneous space is supposed to be inde
finitely divisible. Heterogeneous space involves different modes of space. Accordingly, the spatial configurations of an object For example, the five
might involve different modes of space. 269
senses involve different modes of space, namely visual space, tactile space, olfactory space, auditory space, and gustatory space. To know an object well, very often one needs to call five senses. spatial Each
forth not just one, but two, three, or even sense involves a special sensory and
experience.
Descartes would contend that all the sensory experiences do not count: only matter as pure extension counts. That explains This is
why Descartes conception of space is homogeneous. not the case for Spinoza.
Since the five senses are different
in nature, the spatial experience of each sense must be dif ferent from the others. However, as they all involve space,
the sensory experiences of the five senses have something in common. Granted these, one mode of space to another must involve a paradigm shift. shift possible. which One wonders what makes such a
Spinoza would answer that everyone has a body spatial. As sentient, the body has it is the body that
is extended and
access to all modes of sensuous space, makes the shift possible.
At this point I need to discuss at It is of great im
some length Spinozas notion of analogy.
portance to understand thoroughly Spinoza's use of analogy, which provides themethod whereby it makes possible the
paradigm shifts of
the diverse modes of space.
270
There is a detailed discussion of the relationship between part and whole in Letter 32, Spinoza's correspondence with Oldenburg. I shall cite some key passages from the letter and comment on them. In the meantime, while explicating Spinozas use of analogy, I draw a parallel between the notion of I contended earlier that spatial
analogy and spatial perception.
perception involves different modes of space and potential infinity. By applying the notion of analogy to spatial perception,
one will see how the paradigm shifts among different modes of space work. Using analogy as a tool, Spinoza means to delineate the dynamic structure of nature. In principle, within the same attribute, the method can be carried out again and again and so on ad infinitum. With Spinozas notion of perceiving
analogy, I can argue for a case that the body, in
an object in terms of spatial configurations, is capable of making the shift from one mode of space to another and so on to infinity. Eventually, the body can perceive all the
configurations as inscribed in the object and reach poten tial infinity. At the beginning of the letter, Spinoza defines whole and part as follows: On the question of whole and part, I consider things as parts of a whole to the extent that their natures adapt themselves to one another so that they are in the closest possible 271
agreement. In so far as they are different from one another, to that extent each one forms in our mind a separate idea and is therefore considered as whole, not a part.1 7 Part is characterized here as being mutually adapted to
others of a like nature. Things are parts when they agree with one another. The natures of parts will adapt themselves to one another such that they are in the closest possible agreement. This point needs some explanation. All bodies
agree in certain things. (L2 after Ell p13)
Since all bodies
belong to the same attribute of extension, they all involve motion and another. rest. In some respects, bodies agree with one
Furthermore, if one takes parts as bodies, they rest. Some bodies move fast; others move can communicate their motions to one
involve motion and slower. And they
another, (def after E II p13) All the parts involved constitute a continuous whole. conatus of The whole forms a composite body. The
the composite body strives to
persevere in its
being in the way
that it keeps a constant ratio of motion But all the parts within the whole To keep a constant ratio, the parts If no agreement
and rest within the body. move with different speeds. must be in
theclosest possible agreement.
is reached, the whole will disintegrate. Things are of a contrary nature, that is, cannot be in the same subject, insofar as 272
one can destroy the other. (E III p5) Since all the parts are in the same subject, it follows that the parts are in the closest agreement. In contrast, the whole is defined as being diverse. Because of the diversity of natures among wholes,
wholes are always in conflict or at war. [N]o thing can be destroyed except through an external cause. Considered as
discrete wholes, bodies are at war with one another, all the time causing destruction. Spinoza cites an example to iliustrate the definition: ....when the motions of particles of lymph, chyle, etc. adapt themselves to one another in accordance with size and shape so as to be fully in agreement with one another and to form all together one single fluid, to that extent only are the chyle, lymph, etc. regarded as parts of the blood. But in so far as we conceive the particles of lymph as different from the particles of chyle in respect of shape and motion, to that extent we regard them each as a whole, not a part.18 Agreement consists in mutual adaptation in respect of mag nitude and figure; difference is in respect of figure and motion. Asregards spatial perception, thing the perceiving body and the
to be perceived are two separate wholes.
Initially, the
two wholes are very different in respect of figure and motion. They are so alien to each other that there is no com273
munication between the two. Spatial perception takes place gradually because of the mutual adaptation in respect of
magnitude and figure. The diverging wholes become some agreeing parts. What one mistakenly thought as different At bottom, the wholes
wholes turn out to be according parts.
are made of the same stuff. Spinoza further complicates his use of analogy by introducing the worm: Now let us imagine, if you please, a tiny worm living in the blood, etc. - and of intelligently observing how each particle, on colliding with another, either rebounds or communicates some degree of its motion, and so forth.1 9 Like humans, the worm is endowed with the faculties of sight and reason. At first, the worm takes itself and all the particles as wholes. The worm and the particles are then in conflict The worm is in collision, rebounding with Later, the worm finds out that it agrees in
with one another. other particles.
nature both with the particles and with the nature of the blood. It should be noted here that whole and part suggest am bivalent positions and that there is paradigm shifts of part and whole with respect to the status of each individual. I take the worm as the perceiving body and the particles as the objects to be perceived. The collision and rebound
between the worm and the particles refer to the interactions 274
between the body and the external bodies. the body perceives inadequately the
At the beginning, bodies. The
external
mind has an inadequate idea of those bodies.
In order to
perceive and know the bodies better, both the body and the mind have to be active and alert. The body needs to move Both the a
around; the mind needs to perceive attentively. body and the mind
have to exert an effort to attain
better perception. Only after some effort has been made can one attain a better perception of those bodies. The collision and rebound between the worm and the particles suggest that work has to be done. In terms of spatial perception,
one has to make an effort so as to grasp more spatial configurations of the objects. worm turn out to Later on, the particles and the parts, which implies that For
be agreeing
the body incorporates all the spaces of a certain mode.
present purposes, to make the comparison fit, I regard the body as the worm. And all the spaces (within a mode of
space) of a thing to be perceived and the body are discrete and diverging wholes. Spatial perception takes place when one perceives individual spaces. Then I take the blood as a whole, regulating lymph, chyle and worm. Being an infinite
whole, the blood accords in organic fashion with other parts regulated by bodily nature. Hence, the worm, the particles, and 275
the blood are shown to be harmonious in nature.
Owing to
this homogeneous nature, no only can the worm see and understand individual particles, the worm can observe and Similarly, not only can the body it can also comprehend all the
grasp the blood as a whole. perceive individual space,
spaces as a whole. By means of analogy, I can argue for a case, at least mode of in principle, that the crossing over from one
space to all others is possible. Theanalogy is suggest ambivalent positions on
viable, for whole and part a shifting scale.
That worm would be living in the blood as we are living in our part of the universe, and it would regard each individual particle of the blood as a whole, not a part, and it could have no idea as to how all the parts are controlled by the overall nature of the blood and compelled to mutual adaptation as the overall nature of the blood requires, so as to agree with one another in a definite way.20 The body as a part of the other parts; it is governed physical universe harmonizes with by the same universal laws of In other words, all bodies are Since the
nature as are the other parts. forced to
obey the same physical laws of nature.
bodies are common in nature and they are all subject to the
276
same laws, there is no dividing line between the finite and the infinite (understood as indefinite). The analogy of the part and whole relationship does not stop here. The function of a whole of the universal nature It is is a the For and
of blood has been modified by an unexpected shift. the presumption that theuniversal and nature of blood
self-contained
system
there is
nothing outside
system. This presumption is Descartes, there are physical no space
sharedby Descartes as well. is of aself-contained space, space other than
other modes
physical
space. This is not the case for Spinoza. Thus the blood would always have to be regarded as a whole, not a part. But since there are many other causes which do in a definite way modify the laws of the nature of the blood and are reciprocally modified by the blood, it follows that there occur in the blood other motions and other changes, resulting not solely from the reciprocal relation of its particles but from the relation between the motion of the blood on the one hand and external causes on the other. From this perspective the blood is accounted as a part, not as a whole.2 1 The fact is that there are other wholes which impinge the blood as a self-contained whole. Similarly, there are other
spaces which lie beyond physical space. Thus, there are other 277
spaces which are as self-contained as physical space.
At
this point, the same story of the part and whole relationship repeats itself on a larger scale there are conflicts in the
beginning and there is adaptation and agreement in the end. The different self-contained respect to wholes, their instead nature, of may conceiving now be
themselves
with
conceived through law of a different kind. This is due to the law which governs the different self-contained wholes The
that they become agreeing parts within a bigger whole.
same analogy can be made again and again and so on ad infinitum. Spatial perception is not confined to physical space. Rather, the perceiving body is capable of leaving physical space and perceiving other modes of space, which are not strictly physical. Accordingly, by means of the body and ima
gination, one can potentially reach the infinite.
Spinozas Incarnation of Clear and Distinct Ideas
Within the Cartesian System, the notion of clear and distinct ideas is the password with which Descartes can log on and go anywhere he wants to. Some commentators complain that Descartes notion of clear and distinct ideas is the most problematic and ambiguous part in his philosophy.22 278 Clarity
and
distinctness with
as
criteria and
of truth
are,
by
themselves, in that
tainted
subjective
psychological
factors;
sense, clear and distinct ideas cannot be immune from error. According to Gilles Deleuze, by means of the criterion of clear and distinct ideas, one can recognize some positive
traits in ideas, which are still inadequate. At its most, the Cartesian idea as clear and distinct gives us an indeterminate knowledge.23 Using object. the criterion, one only recognizes an
The idea does not reveal anything
about the es
sence of a thing; nor does it relate the cause from which the properties of a thing follow. It implies that a clear and
distinct idea by itself does not constitute knowledge in the absolute sense. To have absolute knowledge, one needs to go beyond the insufficiency of clarity and distinctness. sure, Spinoza does not much use the language To be clear
and distinct ideas in his later writings. ideas instead. By adequate idea,
He uses adequate Spinozameansthat an as ade
idea expresses its own cause.In addition, an idea quate is explained by the power of thinking. the mind has adequate ideas when one
In other words, knows the first
causes of things; in conceiving adequate ideas, one explains the nature of things by its power of thinking. Deleuze further
remarks that Descartes, in his conception of clear and distinct 279
ideas, confines himself to the representational content of ideas. Descartes ignores the infinitely expressive content of ideas. As far as the form of ideas is concerned, Descartes goes no farther than the form of psychological consciousness in ideas.24 In contrast, of ideas. which Spinoza pays attention to the infinite content
Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing necessarily involves an eternal and with
actually exists,
infinite essence of God. (E II p45)He is also concerned
the logical form of ideas by which they are connected to one another. (E II p40) The infinitely expressive content of an idea must be fully articulated and determined before the idea becomes adequate. An adequate idea is a true idea; the formation of an adequate idea must instantiate the eternal and infinite essence of God. When an idea is fully articulated, it becomes an adequate idea. An adequate idea is a true idea, an idea in God. Then a clear
and distinct idea in its most rigorous sense is, for Spinoza, an idea which is fully articulated and determined; the internal es sence of the idea is objectively materialized. In light of infinitely expressive content, how does an
adequate idea
manifestitself as such?
Inwhat sense do
the spatial configurations of a thing correspond to the in finite content of the idea of the thing? 280 I can illustrate the
answer to these questions by using the example of piano playing. If one opens a book on fingering exercises for piano
playing, one usually finds directions in that book which guide players to play the pieces correctly. Very often one finds the words to be clear and distinct. To play a scale, for example,
the player is required to hit the keys evenly with the printed time interval. While actually playing the scale, one, as beginner, very often hits the keys in a rough and totally uneven way. As anatomical evidence, the third and fourth fingers are
closely governed by the same nerves so that when one tries to raise one finger, the other finger will automatically rise as well. As a result, scales are badly and unevenly played. In
addition, one is required to hit one key and lift the preceding one when playing the scale. But very often the finger is still touching the another one. preceding key when another finger is hitting
Consequently, the sounds coming from the scale
are not clear and distinct; they become mingled and con fused. To correct this, the beginner needs to have patience
and train each finger to move very slowly at the beginning. The purpose of fingering exercises is to train each finger such that it becomes autonomous. Only after years of conscientious Eventually one can
practice can all the fingers move at will.
vary the speed of playing to the extent that each finger feels 281
at ease while playing.
While playing at different speeds, Generally speaking, fin clarity, and distinctness;
the fingers gear to different spaces. gering exercises aim at accuracy,
they are techniques that the fingers need to acquire as a prerequisite for more sophisticated musical pieces. exercises are primarily about the mechanical and Fingering physical
spaces as inscribed in the notes; they themselves carry little, if any, artistic value. Mechanical as they are, the technical exercises are crucial and fundamental steps through which beginners enter the artistic world of piano music. Attempting to tackle some musical pieces, one enters
into the musical world.
Besides following strictly and conscien
tiously the mechanical laws which are the fundamentals for piano playing, one pays attention at the same time to another type of regularity, namely the musical language. One learns how to phrase a piece of music. One follows the moods of
the pieces and tries ones best to interpret them, whether joyful, sad, blissful, or religious. One uses the pedal at the
appropriate places to create the resonance, tone, and atmo sphere of the piece. While playing, one listens not only
with ones ears, but also with ones fingers and body, such that all the sound qualities are taken care of. Along with the
physical spaces which strictly match with the time intervals 282
among the
notes, all the figurative spaces of the aesthetic piece. studies One the
idea of the music are implicitly inscribed in the explores them one by one in the way one
mechanics of the piece. For example, in Renaissance polyphony, the most famous master of which is are at least two or even J.S. Bach, usually there present at the
more melodies
same time. Besides handling the physical spaces as inscribed in the two lines of notes for both hands, the pianist needs to play due attention to the two (or more) independent,
but concurrent, melodies and their figurative spaces, which complement and harmonize one another. The player can
accomplish virtuoso performance when he/she is capable of gearing to all the spaces, illuminating the aesthetic idea of the piece all at once. As a consummate musician, a pianist His
is the bridge between the audience and the composers.
task is to convey the aesthetic idea of a piece of music to the audience as the composer conceives it. performance, ideally, At the end of the idea, under A clear and
all should have the same
standing the piece of artistic work in its entirety.
distinct idea of the musical piece, properly so called, appears when spatial the essence of that of all piece, expressed kinds, in terms of
configuration
is completely materialized
283
in
live
performance
and
actualized
in
the
form
of
an
aesthetic idea.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I discussed Descartes thought on infinity as an introduction to the topic. Descartes makes a distinction between In general, Descartes denies that
the indefinite and the infinite.
finite human beings can have access to the knowledge of infinity. Not satisfied with Descartes treatment of infinity, For Spinoza, it
Spinoza considers anew the issue of infinity.
is one thing to know the infinite as indefinite multiplicity; it is quite another to know the infinite as substance. Spinoza
makes a distinction between the infinite of imagination and the infinite of reason. The former is false infinity, which only leads to indefinite progression. As false, the infinite of ima In terms of Spinoza's The infinite of reason God's
gination entails negation and limitation. ethics, it implies suffering and bondage.
is true infinity, which probes into the nature of God.
nature as infinite involves no negation, limitation, and relation to other things. Ethically speaking, grasping true infinity as It is only by means
God's essence entails freedom and action.
of the intellect that the mind knows true infinity. The idea of 284
God is eternal and infinite.
If humans are capable of forming
adequate ideas which are ideas of God, it implies that they practically can have Gods infinite knowledge. To reach true infinity as substance, one needs to reach in the first place false infinity, i.e. the infinite of virtual Potential infinity infinity through once the imagination. body the in One can attain
spatial can
perception. intuit true
achieved,
mind
infinity as substance.
The analysis of the notion of conatus
shows that one is heading toward actualizing true infinity as ones essence. True enough, adequate ideas as infinite and
eternal are not given in principle; one can form adequate ideas only after a tough and long journey. In other words, an idea needs to go through all the steps of inadequacy before
it becomes adequate. With the aid of imagination and the body, one can reach potential infinity; thereafter, the mind can proceed to the infinite of reason (actual infinity), intuiting the concrete essence of the thing infinite essence. as Gods eternal and
The discussion on spatiality is meant to
illuminate in a practical way how one can reach, step by step, the virtual infinity of Gods idea. First and foremost, I As parts
argued that space for Descartes is homogeneous.
extra parts, space is divisible. By contrast, space as mode in the case of Spinoza is heterogeneous, indefinite, and divisible, 285
and space (extension) as substance is infinite and indivisible. Within the attribute of extension, there are numerous, or even infinite, modes of space, each of which is infinite (indefinite) in its own kind. From a mode of space to another, it involves
different ways of conceiving space. To cross over, one needs to make paradigm shifts. While explicating Spinozas notion of analogy and applying it to spatial perception, I argued that
as a spatial entity which is capable of perceiving space, the body makes possible the paradigm shifts of different modes of space. Through spatial perception, the body can know the
essence of the object in terms of its spatial configurations. By applying the notionof analogy time and again in the
course of perceiving space, the body can perceive space of all kinds. Crossing over from one mode of space to another
and so on ad infinitum, the body can, in principle, grasp all modes of space as all the spatial inscribed in of the object. On acquiring the object, one reaches
configurations
potential infinity as God's essence. place in the
(The same process takes By then, the
perceptionof common notions.)
mind is in the position to intuit the innermost and concrete essence of the thing. Hence, one has access to true infinity.
286
5
Belief and Existence
He who has a true idea knows at the same that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt its truth.
Spinoza: Ethics
If by eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present.
Wittgenstein: Tractatus
The subjective turn of Cartesian philosophy marks a new stage in the history of philosophy. In the Meditations, Descartes goes to great lengths to argue for something, the existence of which is absolutely indubitable. The cogito is identified as the first principle, on which The subjective turn marks the
Descartes grounds the sciences.
intimate relationship between knowledge and the cognitive mind. Indeed, the proof of the cogitos existence is a success. Nonethe
less, the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter makes it difficult to claim any knowledge of the external world. Turning inward, the mind h as n othing b ut i deas, w hich a re e vanescent. H ow can one be sure that the minds ideas correspond to the external
287
world? More explicitly, does the object of an idea really exist in the external world? Hume explains away all kinds of existence by means of his theory of belief. The beliefs in the existence of the mind, the body, God, and the external world are all psychologically based. The beliefs in their existence indicate a subjective feeling, which trig gers the occurrence of those beliefs. Because of this subjective
nature of belief, one cannot be sure that the content of the belief has its corresponding object in the world. ledge demands objective validity. True know absolute can
Hume thinks that
knowledge is beyond the reach of humans.
At most, they
argue for some probable, but never absolutely certain, knowledge. How does Spinoza confront all these difficulties? First and
foremost, Spinoza is sure that absolute knowledge is viable. Humans are capable of knowing God's ideas. Spinoza argues that the adequate idea as true belief goes far beyond the kind of subjective commitment as advocated by Hume. Rather, affirmation Not only does
belongs to the very essence of the adequate idea.
Spinoza anticipate Humes ideas in many ways, he also provides a further challenge to Humes theory of belief. For Spinoza, on
grasping a true idea, one is committed to the belief that what one adequately perceives must have its corresponding object, which
288
either exists in the external world or exists in the attribute of God.
Hume's Theory of Belief
Like Kant, Hume's concern is to offset all claims about metaphysics. For Hume, the mind is no longer a substance with its principal atribute as thought. It is just a bundle of perceptions. So viewed, the mind cannot serve as the ground for all knowledge. All claims about absolute knowledge become dubious. it is impossible to Hume suggests that because it is
reach absolute knowledge
practically unattainable for humans.
One can attain only probable
knowledge. To purge the common belief that there exists ab solute knowledge, Hume sets out to shake all the foundations of knowledge, including the beliefs in them. Humes genetic
account of the idea of existence serves to dismantle the logical necessity of all claims to knowledge. The point of the account
is to show how people come to believe in the validity of each knowledge claim. Armed with his theory of belief, Hume audaciously undermines all knowledge claims about God, the mind, the body, and the external world. Causal reasoning as the
exponent of truth in the tradition turns out to be the villain in the hands of Hume. Presumably, the validity of absolute knowledge
289
relies on
the
notion of
necessity
in causal relation. not
Hume's
project is to
show that causality does
exist in reality,
and that the necessity of causal relation is nothing but a sub jective feeling, which is projected by the mind onto the world. Humes theory of belief is the coreof his epistemology. Once causality is dismantled, any claims about objective and valid knowledge become untenable. possibility of true knowledge, If Spinoza wants to assert the he should be able to answer Despite their are, in
the challenge from Hume and defend his position.
diverse interests in validity, the two theories of belief
some respects, very similar. Both theories are so overwhelming that they cover almost everything; both trade on a subjective feeling and commitment. As far as his theory of belief is concerned, Hume's originality lies in his emphasis on rationally inexplicable, unwarrantable
beliefs, which are rooted in human nature.For Hume, beliefs have their occurrence found in two forms, natural beliefs disguised as the beliefs of the immediate data of sense experience. nature and authority; one in the form of reason, the other in Both have the same
they are beliefs, which are caused by idea-
enlivening imagination. All beliefs engender the same feeling of vivacity, which dominates all humans.
290
....the belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and....this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory.1 All beliefs without exception are a feeling of vivacity. Because of
this feeling, people believe in the real existence of the content of an idea or an impression. But Hume's notion of belief should not be equated with affirmation; rather, it should be understood as believe to be real. Hume is not concerned with affirmation or denial, which are traditionally characterized as the traces of
rational animals. Hume's major interests are reality and fantasy, which are shared by humans and animals alike. It should be noted that belief as a feeling of vivacity is not the content of an idea or an impression. Perception per se is
about the object of immediate consciousness - the content. Belief is not about the content of perception. Rather, belief as a feeling of
vivacity is something superimposed on those objects. The Human belief is phenomenological in the sense that consciousness adopts various attitudes toward the objects like the feelings of love, hate, or joy. Such feelings are usually found in the contemplation of
291
perceptions. found in
The same kind of phenomenological attitude is also ease of transition from one idea to another
the
associated with it. A belief is closely related to the existence of an object. One distinctive feature of vivacity of belief is immediacy, which makes a belief as directly evident as colors or pains. The force of its Another
occurrence is immediately felt as the pains in the body. characteristic feature of vivacity is verisimilitude.
Again, vivacity
as verisimilitude is not a quality of the perceptions themselves, but a quality of consciousness, an intentional attitude regarding those perceptions as real or unreal. The mere presence of a perception before consciousness does not suffice to take it as real; in addition, the feeling of vivacity is needed - the belief -
which convinces the mind of its real existence. Imagination as a faculty in the Humean mind is responsible for enlivening ideas as beliefs. Because of this function of
imagination, ideas can acquire the vivacity of belief. Without imagination, there would only be those perceptions, which are immediately present to our consciousness. 2 In the Treatise, Hume mentions three principles of association, namely resemblance, contiguity, and causation. They are relations by which the human mind is naturally affected in such a way that
292
they move easily from one object to another when the two are so related. When an impression (or an idea) occurs in the mind, it
will attract into the mind an idea that is related to it by means of one of the three natural relations. For Hume, impressions and They share the
ideas differ only in vivacity and not in content.
same content, but the content at issue is different in vivacity. An impression which occurs in the mind not only attracts related ideas into the mind, but also transfers to them a share of its vivacity - it enlivens the associated enlivening is done by imagination. ideas. And the work of
Because of this feeling, the
idea becomes as vivid as the impression. Thus the idea be comes a belief. The three principles o f a ssociation serve to account for the origin of belief. The impression and the en
livened idea are on a par by virtue of their verisimilitude. To the perceiving subject, they are both real. The three principles of association do not serve equally well to explain the origin of belief. Hume singles out causation as the
major force; contiguity and resemblance are subservient to causa tion in accounting for the origin of belief. This is because in cau
sal relation, there is always a one-to-one correspondence from one particular impression to one particular idea. It is not the case in contiguity and in resemblance. Nevertheless, contiguity and
293
resemblance as natural relations can serve to strengthen the belief by making it more vivacious. There are three distinct and separable relations which are involved in causation, namely contiguity, priority in time, and neces sary connection. And Hume regards necessary connection as the
most important element in causation. The reason is that causation enables the mind to go beyond the senses. The other components, i.e. contiguity and priority of time, cannot do the job. connection does allow one to Necessary
make an inference from the
existence of the perceived object to the existence of another unperceived object. Granted the importance of necessary connection in grounding inference, Hume confronts a difficulty. In any case of causal relation, one never finds any impression of necessary connection. The copy principle states that every idea must be a copy of its impression. If the impression of necessary connection is missing, it is im possible to have the corresponding idea of necessary connection. Hume takes great pains to find the impression of necessary con nection, from which the idea of necessary connection is derived. In section 6, Book one of the Treatise, Hume argues that obser vation of any simple event will never offer any basis for belief that some other specific type of event will follow. Though past ex-
294
perience is necessary to provide the foundation for causal inference, the mind has no reason to expect that the future should resemble the past. Thus, Hume concludes that it is not reason that convinces people of the necessary connections between particular causes and particular effects. How does it come about that people have the idea of necessary connection if there is no necessary connection between objects or events, which are causes and effects? All these show that the idea of necessity does not come Hume concludes that the idea of neces
from the external world.
sary connection must originate in the mind as a result of past experience. Necessity is something that exists only in our minds,
not in the objective world. The mind is the site where the impresssion of necessary connection takes place. Causes and effects are distinct events. be conceived without the other. rely on the existence of effect. As separable, one can
The existence of cause does not This shows again that causal in What triggers the transition in
ference is not justified by reason. the mind from cause to effect?
Constant conjunction is an undeniable characteristic of causal relation. From past experience, one remembers having frequent
instances of the existence of one particular event and the same frequent instances of the existence of another particular event
295
which always attended the former ones. fire, one feels the same sensation of heat. to mind
Every time, on seeing Meanwhile, one calls Auto
the constant conjunction in all past instances.
matically, the mind takes one as the cause and the other as the effect. At the subconscious level, one infers the existence of
one from that of the other. Apparently, constant conjunction is not the whole story of necessary connection. With numerous occurrences of the same event followed by another, the Humean mind is so habitually trained that it automatically recalls the one on seeing the occurrence of the other. With this constant con junction of the same events, the ease transition from cause to effect is made possible. Hume jumps to the conclusion that
inferential practices are not the products of reason. Rather they are the products of imagination: When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determined by reason, but by certain principles which associate together the ideas of these objects and unite them in the imagination.3 For Hume, people can have an idea of something, say a unicorn, without believing in its existence. the same content. A belief and an idea can share
They differ in the way that a belief induces in
the mind the notion of existence, and this notion of existence is
296
lacking in an idea. The difference between merely entertaining a thought and actually believing in it can only be a difference in the manner of conceiving the same content. One can verify the
degree of force or vivacity of an idea without changing it into another idea. In brief, a belief does vary the manner in which the mind conceives an object. Hume defines belief as an enlivened All
idea related to or associated with a present impression.4
things considered, belief is a feeling, a u je ne sais quor feeling which accompanies an idea, enlivening the idea and charging it with verisimilitude. With all these make-ups, the idea appears as real as its impression does. The observation of repeated instances of a causal link is related to the origin of the idea of necessary connection in the following way. True enough, observation of several resembling
instances does not produce any new quality in the object, yet it produces a new impression in the mind. This new impression is an impression of reflection. The occurrence of this impression of reflection in the mind is an accompaniment of the move ment which takes place after an observed constant conjunction, from the idea or impression of the cause to the idea of the effect. In other words, having repeatedly observed event B
following event A, one naturally expects event B on seeing event
297
A again. In addition to this expectation, a feeling of determination is produced which accompanies the transition to the belief in event B. This is the impression of reflection. And this feeling of
determination, which makes possible the ease transition from one event to the other, is what accounts for the prominent feature of necessity in causal relation. The necessity at stake is not in the object; rather it is something felt in the mind. It
is a feeling of psychological commitment, a compulsive feeling that prompts the mind into action. Humes theory of belief quite convincingly explains the origin of causality, which is nothing but a projection of the mind onto objects. Causality helps explain the genesis of the belief in the existence of the external world. Reason, which is subservient
to the wishes of passion, has a subordinate role to play in the explanation. All the while, by its cunning and artifice, imagination convinces people of the existence of the external world. hands of Hume, reason becomes the slave of passions. In the With
the falling apart of all causal reasoning, the mind is nothing but a bundle of perceptions, one chasing another. True know Humes
ledge claims are illusions in spite of all human efforts.
devastating attack on the validity of all knowledge claims is so overwhelming and powerful that all efforts to restore the proper
298
function of reason seem to be futile.
Problems concerning Existence and Belief
God is causa sur, as self-caused, Gods essence necessarily involves his existence. (E I, def 1) God as the substance in the universe necessarily exists. to exist. (E I, p7) existence. It belongs to the nature of substance
And Gods essence necessarily involves his
By eternity I understand existence itself, in so far as it
is conceived to follow necessarily solely from the definition of an eternal thing. (E I, def 8) As eternal, God's existence cannot be
explained by duration or time. (E I, def 8 expl) Humans, by contrast, are modes. They are not self-caused and their essences do not imply their existence. Their existence is caused by other modes
which in turn are caused by some other modes and so on. The idea of God is the objectification of God. The infinite intellect The infinite
objectifies the essence of God in terms of ideas.
intellect conceives things under a species of eternity; accordingly, the ideas that the infinite intellect conceives are eternal. contrast, the human mind conceives things in time. In
The nature
of the minds ideas is temporal even though they can be related to the ideas of God. In short, God exists in eternity and humans exist in time. Gods ideas exist and they exist in eternity as 299
God does.
As far as true ideas are concerned, they are about
eternal existence. An adequate idea is Gods idea, which exists eternally. As finite beings which exist in time, how can humans
know the eternal existence (the ideatum) of an idea which is not in time? Apparently, it is difficult to know the eternal existence of Gods ideas. It is impossible to conceive an eternal idea A true belief de
in time, for nothing might be conceived at all.
signates true knowledge. To have a true belief implies that the thing so perceived really exists. Is it possible to justify a belief by certain procedure and hence to show that the belief is true? Under what conditions can a belief be true in the strictest sense? Hume offers some hints in his theory of belief, even though his theory is meant to argue against any possibilities of truth. Hume stresses the character of reality as the prominent feature of belief. A perception needs to be real such that one believes in the existence of the thing perceived. By Teal, it means
that the perception is lively and vivid. The verisimilitude of per ceptions should be as real as the pain of a finger cut. A belief
as an enlivened idea, false or true alike, needs to be real to the perceiver; otherwise, it cannot be considered as belief. Reality, though important, cannot guarantee that the belief is true. that seem real can turn out to be false. Things
Thus reality is the
300
sufficient condition, which a true belief needs to qualify.
By itself,
reality cannot make a belief true. Apart from subjective reality, a belief must be valid before it becomes a true belief. concerned with truth and falsity. has a corresponding object. corresponds to its ideatum. Validity is
A belief is valid when its content
That is to say, an idea (a belief) Accordingly, the objective reality of When
a belief can be designated as the necessary condition. both the
necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied, a
belief is true. In sum, a belief is true in the following sense. First, it must be absolutely real to the must be objectively valid. Hume's theory is concerned condition of belief. exclusively with the sufficient perceiver. Second, it
A belief is at bottom a subjective feeling, a
feeling which is so overwhelming that the subject is automatically induced to believe in the existence of what is being perceived. The perception is so real and veracious that the perceiver Simi
promptly commits to the belief in the existence of the thing.
larly, verisimilitude is merely the fantastic subterfuge of imagination which helps trigger the belief. Spinoza, in the third kind of know On attaining the
ledge, talks about the intellectual love of God.
supreme level of knowledge, one is filled with joy and happiness. What is at issue here is also a feeling, a subjective and joyful
301
feeling of an unprecedented kind. Assuming that both the sufficient and the necessary conditions are satisfied and that one knows what is being perceived exists, what is the nature of existence? Knowing a true idea implies that
its ideatum necessarily exists and it exists in an eternal way. However, as far as consciousness is concerned, it is purely tem poral awareness. As the only content of the mind, ideas are characterized by their temporal elements. How can the mind have a grip of the eternal existence of a thing? The veracity and verisimilitude of a perception at most ascertain that the thing exists, but in a temporal sense. Is it intelligible to claim that the mind experiences the eternal existence of a thing?
Ideas as Beliefs
Spinoza distinguishes between conception and perception and stresses the activity of the mind. (E II def 3) In forming an idea,
the mind actively conceives its object. Taking ideas as beliefs, one has a belief when conceiving the idea of a thing. A belief then can be taken as an activity, and ideas are acts of conceiving or believing. The mind affirms or believes in the existence of what it is conceiving. A true belief refers to something which
302
exists either in the world or
in Gods attribute. A false belief
does not correspond to the object. When Spinoza refers ideas to those in God, he is talking about the contents of beliefs, not the actual acts of beliefs. Gods
ideas are necessarily true in the sense that they have their corresponding objects. The infinite intellect conceives ideas as Gods essence. As the ideas so conceived are necessarily true, it does not make much sense to link those ideas to beliefs. First, the infinite intellect thinks in an infinite and eternal manner; there is absolutely no psychological element involved. Second, the problem of corresponding does not arise in the case of Gods intellect. Human cognition, by contrast, takes place in time.
The human mind can conceive ideas inadequately and adequately; but whatever the mind conceives, it regards the thing conceived as true and believes in its existence. As always psychologically oriented, beliefs can be either true or false. The mind is the idea of the body; ideas in the mind
become the mental
correlates of physical states. The object of
the idea is the body. Following Descartes, Spinoza makes the distinction between the formal and objective realities of ideas. The formal reality of an idea refers to the reality of a mental episode; the objective reality of an idea designates its repre-
303
sentationai content. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. (E II p7) Construed as
formal reality or as objective reality, how do ideas as beliefs fit in those cases? In the case of objective reality, it is obvious. As
long as the ideas are true, the order and connection of ideas as grasped in the mind is identical to the order and connection of things. In the case of formal reality, how can the causal se
quence of ideas as psychological reflect the causal sequence of objects? From Spinozas perspective, the human mind can render
itself adequate to the infinite intellect. In that case, the mind conceives ideas in the same way as the infinite intellect does. As regards adequate ideas, the psychological order of ideas in the mind is identical with the logical order of ideas as conceived in the infinite intellect. Consequently, the psychological order of ideas must reflect the causal order of things; and
one has true beliefs. What happens in the case of inadequate ideas? The mind
has nothing but ideas. Taking beliefs as ideas, one can take the mind as the belief of the body. The body, whether actively or
passively affected, reflects itself in the mind as the belief (the idea) of the affected body. Error is conclusion without some premises,
and false ideas follow the same necessity as true ideas do. The
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causal order of the imaginative ideas reflects the causal order of the state of the body, which involves both the natures of the body and external bodies. law of association. Ideas then are governed by the
Inadequate ideas in the mind must follow the
same order and connection as the affections in the body. It implies that an inadequate idea is a false belief. In the case of Spinoza, how do people come to believe in things that they perceive as actually existing? What is the re
lation between imagination and existence? Human knowledge must begin with inadequate ideas, and from there onward one moves toward adequate ideas. The same thing happens to belief if one takes ideas as beliefs. Belief is always related to the idea of existence of the object. Spinoza defines imagination as the affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things, though they do not reproduce the [NS: external] figures of things. And when the mind regards bodies in Imagination The
this way, we shall say that it imagines. (E II p17 s)
represents external bodies as if they were actually present.
idea of any modification in which the body is affected by the ex ternal body involves both the nature of the body and the nature of the external body. (E II p16) Given that imagination involves
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both the natures of the body and the external body, the ima ginative idea is a mutilated and confused idea of the external body. The idea involves or indicates the nature of the external In Ell p16 c, it
body, but it does not explain the nature of it.
is stated that the mind perceives the nature of a great many bodies together with the nature of the body. It does not relate
anything about the idea of existence of the external bodies. Does Spinoza simply infer that the mind imposes the idea of existence on the confused perception of the external body,
even though the idea of the affection does not exclude the idea of existence of the external body? One can observe Spinozas line of thought from proposition 16 to proposition 17. From the idea of the nature of the exter nal body which is immanent in the bodys perception, the mind affirms straightforwardly the existence of the external body. In contemplating the affection of its body, the mind surpasses the limit of what is actually given and asserts the existence of the external object. In the eyes of Spinoza, the result follows strictly from the nature of ideas he proposes. An idea for Spinoza always involves
affirmation. The mind affirms the existence of what is conceived in the idea. Alternatively put, conceiving an idea goes hand in
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hand with affirming the existence of its ideatum. For Descartes, affirming or denying a proposition requires the co-operation of the will and the intellect The intellect perceives
and puts the proposition before the mind, and then the will affirms or denies or suspends judgment on it. In the course of
acquiring beliefs, there is for Descartes an intellectual process in which material comes before the mind and then a voluntary action of making a judgment about it. Judgment (belief) consists
in entertaining a proposition and adding an attitude to it. The prepositional attitude is voluntarily chosen. According to Bennett, a proposition, in the case of Spinoza, comes before the mind as a belief.5 The thesis that all ideas
are beliefs contains the thesis that all ideas are propositionally structured. 6 It is not necessary to have two processes: a cognitive process of bringing a proposition into the mind and another process of judging the proposition. Spinoza rejects the bifurcation A suspension of
of the mind into the will and the intellect. judgment comes from a judgment.
If one takes judgment as
belief, the intellect is responsible for the suspension of judgment as well. Bennett cites some passages to show that all ideas,
in Spinoza, are intrinsically belief-like. In the mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea
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involves insofar as it is an idea. (E II p49) They look on ideas, therefore, as mute pictures on a panel, and preoccupied with this prejudice, do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves an affirmation o r n egation. ( E 1 1 p49 s ) Bennett holds that Spinoza strictly identifies ideas with beliefs and offers no argument for this. Similarly, in the example of the winged horse (E II p49 s III. B ii), Bennett maintains that Spinoza simply goes from imagining some thing as present to regarding it as present. as Imagining something idea of belief; the
present does not necessarily involve the regarding something as present
whereas,
does
involve
concept of belief. Still, Spinoza does not offer any argument for it.7 Because he thought that ideas are ex officio beliefs, Spinoza saw no need for a theory of belief that would explain what marks it off from the other propositional attitudes. This is a serious gap in his
philosophy, and it would still be a gap even if he were right in his weaker thesis that any thought will something prevents that.8 be believed unless
Spinoza does offer support for his
claim. In his whole discussion of ideas as beliefs, it seems to me that Bennett focuses only on the mechanism of the mind and leaves out the function of the body. Spinoza denies that acts of will are distinct from perceptions. (E II p49) The will and the intellect are one and the same. (E II
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p49 d) In arguing for the identity of will and intellect, Spinoza wants to establish two things. First, an affirmation involves an idea. Second, an idea involves an affirmation. The first one is obvious:
one must have an idea of something before one can affirm anything about the thing. The second one is a bit tricky. Can the mind just have an idea of a thing without affirming or denying it? In daily experience, one can suspend judgment so as not to
give assent to what one perceives. But Spinoza holds that sus pension of judgment is at bottom a perception, not an act of free will. (E II p49 c, s) the following example. Spinoza objects to this claim by citing
To understand this clearly, let us conceive
a child imagining a winged horse, and not perceiving anything else. Since this imagination involves the existence of the horse
(by p17c), and the child does not perceive anything else which excludes the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present. Nor will he be able to doubt its existence, though he will not be certain of it. (E II p49 s III.B ii) The subject who perceives the winged horse is a child, not an adult. Pre
sumably, an adult has more common sense than a child does. That is why the child believes all the more the existence of the winged horse when he imagines it. Simply by imagining a winged horse, the child cannot but believe in the existence of
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the winged horse; he is unable to doubt its existence even though he is not certain of it. the child is under illusion. In perceiving a winged horse,
The childs body is affected in the Since it involves an
way as if he really saw the winged horse.
affection of the body, the perception (idea) as such is an affir mation. In this case, the affection of the body constitutes the ground of belief. For Spinoza, imagining is analogous to hallucinating. While
imagining, the mind hallucinates things, taking them as actually existing. Mad people are the extreme cases: they hallucinate all the time and believe wholeheartedly in the existence of the things, which they imagine. For each imagination in their minds, there is a corporeal affection which takes place in their bodies. The image is so vivid and forceful that they immediately believe in the existence of the things so perceived. To a certain extent, people perceive and imagine as those mad people do. The difference is that common
people can come back to reality and see things as they really are, whereas mad people are stuck in their own situations. When one
is in doubt about the existence of the object, it might be the case that either there is another idea which takes the place of the previous idea, or the idea under consideration does not hold because of its inadequacy. Sensible perception is similar
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to imagination. Sensible perception involves the nature of the external body. The mind asserts the real existence of the object
even though the object at issue might not exist at all. The mind perceives the object and takes its existence for granted. Imagination is doing the right job. It pertains to the nature Thus it is
of imagination to conceive things as actually existing.
not correct to claim that the mind simply imposes the idea of existence on the perceived object. Contemplating the affection
of the body is, for the mind, contemplating the existence of the object. As the idea of affection involves the nature of the ex
ternal body, the same idea poses to the mind the existence of the external body. Accordingly, the mind believes in the actual existence of the object. The result follows naturally and necessarilyn in the case of Spinoza as it is in the case of Hume. Humans imagine all the time. As long as the imaginations stay, people believe in the actual existence of the things. Meanwhile the mind perceives the idea of another thing. Other ideas will take the
place of the present ones when the former are phenomenologically more forceful and vivid than the latter. changes its ideas (beliefs). Consequently, the mind
It believes in the existence of the new
objects, the ideas of which are now more appealing. The new ideas might not be adequate ideas; they can be inadequate ideas.
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Apparently, the decisive factor, which triggers the change, is not the truth or falsity of ideas, but their force or vivacity. And so it is with the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body, or that its power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and d o n ot d isappear o n i ts p resence. 11 h appens, o f c ourse, w hen we wrongly fear some evil, that the fear disappears on our hearing news of the truth. But on the other hand, it also happens, when we fear an evil which is certain to come, that the fear vanishes on our hearing false news. So imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true insofar as it is true, but because there occur others, stronger than them, which exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in IIP17. (E IV p1 s) Granted that it is not the truth but the force of the image which determines what the mind actually believes, one wonders whether the same process will proceed on and on indefinitely. If that
were the case, the mind would be forever stuck in the realm of imagination. On account of conatus, one endeavors to persevere in ones being. (E III p6) The mind sticks to its beliefs and perseveres in
keeping the existence of what it perceives. If the body was not affected by other affections, the mind would end up retaining
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the same affections. So long as the present affections agree with its body, the mind will strive to maintain their existence. In cases where other affections come up in the mind which are comparatively more appealing than the present ones, by virtue of the pleasure principles (E III aff def II & III) the mind will naturally replace the present affections with other ones. As a result, the
mind has a new set of ideas even though they might still be inadequate. Accordingly, the same process of changing ideas will By virtue of his conatus, man perseveres in Provided that one has a strong
go on indefinitely.
actualizing his essence. (E III p7)
mind and an active body, one strives to substantiate ones essence. At a certain point of the striving, reason will take office in the mind and conatus will take the form of conatus
intelligendi.
On forming clear and distinct concepts of passions,
the mind is in the position to form active affects. Conceiving the passive affects clearly and distinctly means understanding the cause of ones action. Spinozas conviction is that despite their finite nature, humans are not doomed to form inadequate ideas. Endowed with reason, the human mind can have access to truth as Gods knowledge. In the corollary of proposition 17, Spinoza holds that even if the external bodies, which once affected the body, are no longer pre-
sent, the mind can regard those bodies as if they were present. The fact that the mind conceives the external bodies as actually existing does bodies. not rely on the actual presence of the external
Having once affected the body, the external bodies will In similar situations where recall what actually Then
leave traces of affections in the brain. the brain is stimulated, the
mind will
happened before by reactivating those traces of affections.
it will perceive the same objects as existing without actually seeing the objects. Perception as such takes place in the brain; the mind hallucinates again, taking things as actually present. The same process can repeat again and again. It follows that the
mind believes not just in the existence of the things that it per ceives at the moment, but also in those things which it perceived in the past.
Memory and the Laws of Association
For Spinoza and Hume alike, the natural I aw o f a ssociation governs the mind while it is imagining. For Hume, the sovereignty of ima gination always holds sway with the mind. Reason as the slave of
passions is not autonomous. Hence, the natural law of association suffices to explain everything in the Humean universe. By means
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of the natural law of association, the mind can recall things in the past and expect things in the future. As for Spinoza, it is true that imagination dominates the mind most of the time. For Spinoza and Hume alike, the natural law of association governs the function of the mind all the time. However, the human mind is also endowed with reason, which functions independently. By means of reason,
the mind perceives things as they really are. The mind is not always determined by the natural law of association, which is closely related to the affections of the body. Under the guidance of reason, the mind adequately perceives things. Insofar as it actualizes the
power of thinking, the mind obeys the universal law of association. Memory is considered as a specific case of imagination. (E II p18) Instead of imagining one isolated body, the mind now imagines two or more bodies. In fact, people seldom perceive one body.
Even in the case of imagination (E II p17), the mind perceives the nature of a great many bodies together with the nature of its own body. (E II p16 c1) numerous bodies. The fact is that an object is composed of
A great many bodies can refer to an object When Spinoza discusses memory in
which includes all of them.
proposition 18, he has in mind the order and connection of ideas (or things). If the human body has once been affected by two or more
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bodies at the same time, then when the mind subsequently imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also. (E II p18) Once the body was affected, the affections left traces One had sensations of the external bodies, and sub The
in the brain.
sequently recorded the sensations in ones brain as traces.
connection of the sensations must correspond to that of the traces. Accordingly, each sensation occupies a certain place in On recalling one of the bodies involved, other
the collection.
bodies will pop up immediately inthe mind by virtue of the spatial relation of the bodies. So considered, recalling is not a function One considers exclusively the relation
of time, but of space.
of ideas of affections. From this we clearly understand what memory is. For it is nothing other than a certain connection of
ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body - a connection which is in the mind according to the order and connection of the affection of the human body. (E II p18 s) For Spinoza, the natural law of association is always related to the order and connection of the ideas of the bodys affections.
The idea in question involves, it does not explain, the nature of external bodies. The order and connection of the ideas of affections can be described as either contingent or necessary. It is contingent in the
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sense that the connection does not reflect the real nature of things. The mind associates ideas which originate from fortui tous encounters with things (E II p29 c); from the thought of one thing, (the mind) immediately passes to the thought of another, which has no likeness to the first, (E II P18s) There is no logical necessity which connects the two thoughts. Moreover, the association involves the nature of a particular human body; different individuals, because of the different constitutions of their bodies, will associate different things on seeing the same objects. A Roman will pass from the thought of the word pomum to the thought of an apple. On seeing traces of a horse, a soldier will A
associate them with the thoughts of a horseman and war.
farmer will think of a plow, a field, and so on.(E II p18 s) The association is purely contingent, relying on the specific con stitutions of individual bodies. Insofar as it is a law, there must be some kind of necessity entailed by the law. Having perceived the same phenomenon
several times, the mind becomes so habituated that on seeing one body, it immediately associates the other body or bodies, (a la Hume) Spinoza gives an example of a child who saw Peter for the first time in the morning on a certain day, saw Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening. The next day, the child saw
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the same persons with the same time sequence. The same event happens again and again. The child, on seeing Peter in the morning, will imagine Paul at noon and Simon in the evening. On
seeing Simon in the evening, the child will think of Peter in the morning and Paul at noon. And he will do this more uniformly, the more often he has seen them in this same order. (E II p44 s) For Hume and Spinoza alike, the mind obeys the same law of association when it imagines. Unlike Hume, Spinoza maintains that the necessity as entailed by the law is not purely psycho logical. It has its material base, namely the traces in the brain and the affections of the body. The necessity is grounded in the affections of the body. Hence, in the case of Spinoza, the feeling
of necessity has its origin in the affections of the body. There is another difference between Hume and Spinoza. While discussing his theories of causation and belief, Hume does not care much about things which might happen otherwise. The unex pected occurrence of things will definitely affect the necessity. By contrast, Spinoza is concerned with the vacillation between two ideas, which questions the necessity involved. Spinoza continues
with the above example. But if it should happen at some time that on some other evening he sees James instead of Simon, then on the following morning he will imagine now Simon,
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now James, together with the evening time, but not both at once....His imagination, therefore, will vacillate....he will regard neither of them as certainly future, but both of them as
contingently future. (E II p44 s)
Spinoza would agree with Hume
that the idea of necessity is coming from within and it turns out to be a subjective feeling. However, as long as this idea is not an adequate idea, it is subject to change. The natural law of asso
ciation entails a kind of necessity, which is a subjective feeling. However, if the necessity of the law is subject to change, it does not imply any necessity at all. If there is any idea of necessity whatsoever, it must be located elsewhere. Apart from the natural law of association, Spinoza advocates another law - the universal law of association. This law deals with the order and connection of things, which reflects the real nature of things. The necessity that the law entails must be logical, since the law trades on the true nature of things, which remains the same at all times. The law relates the ideas which explain the nature of the same thing, and association as such is about the connection of ideas which happens according to the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men. (E II p18 s) The natural law of association involves at the same time the natures of
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the body and external bodies.
By contrast, the universal law of
association relates ideas which reveal the true nature of things. In explicating the nature of things, the universal law of association allows the mind to perceive things through their first causes. Knowing things through their first causes, the mind actualizes the power of its intellect, which is the same for all men. Abiding by this universal law, the mind no longer perceives things through fortuitous encounters of things. Imaginative perception reveals In virtue of
more about the nature of the body than that of things.
the different constitutions of bodies, people end up seeing different things. Only when living according to the guidance of reason will Everyone will see things in the
people agree in nature. (E IV p35)
same way insofar as he/she exercises the power of the intellect, which is the same for all men. Under the natural law of association, the mind confusedly associates the ideas of affections of the body. As the order and
connection of affections does not concern the logical order of things, the association is contingent and it reflects more the state of the body than that of external bodies. The association is purely psychological; it has nothing to do with logical necessity. As a
type of association, the universal law of association is entirely psychological. Yet, it reflects the order and connection of things,
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and in that
sense, it entails logical necessity. That is to say, lo Logical
gical thinking is at the same time a psychological fact.
thinking as the product of common notions has its psychological genesis in the mind. It follows that in perceiving common notions the mind is also subject to the law of association. Association as
such is characterized by its uniformity and universality; it is no longer confused and indistinct. The association loses its contin gent character and clings more to universality. ideas in the same Man associates notions from
way as he derives common
things which are equal in the part and in the whole. On enter ing the realm of reason, the mind distances itself from
particular associations and follows the universal ones, which are the foundations of reason.9
Objective Reality of Belief
Here objective is meant in the modern sense of the word, say, an objective world. In the case of Spinoza, the mind does not perceive the world directly; it knows the external world through the affections of its body. When the mind has an inadequate Conceiving an
idea, it possesses a false image of the world.
adequate idea, it has a live picture of the thing that reflects
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its true nature. By E II p17, the body is affected by an affect which involves an external body, and the object exists until the body is affected by another affect that takes the place of the former affect. The mind
imagines objects and regards them as actually existing, for affecttions of the body involve the nature of the external body.
(E II p16) While imagining, the mind mistakenly assumes the existence of the external object. For this reason, the mind per
severes in its being and takes the external body as actually existing. But the idea at issue is materially false; the object
might not exist at all. Adequate ideas must be true in the sense that they corres pond to their ideata. (E I A6) The idea is materially true, and the object must exist. By E II def 2, the essence and existence of a
thing imply each other. Given the essence of an object, the objects existence is posited and vice versa. Generally speaking, an idea
is a c oncept t hat t he m ind forms. ( E 1 1 d ef 3) When one conceives an idea, one posits at the same time the existence of its ideatum. If it is an imaginative idea, one regards the object as actually exis ting; if it is an adequate idea, one knows that the object exists in the external world, for one knows the essence of the object which implies its existence.
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God is self-caused; his essence necessarily involves his existence. (E I def 1) Ideas are all adequate to God, but not to humans. When the mind forms adequate ideas, their essences necessarily involve the existence of their ideata. However, when it has inadequate ideas, the ideata so conceived might not exist in the external world. The winged horse exists in the childs mind; in reality, there is no winged horse. As the mind conceives an inadequate idea,
God constitutes the minds essence together with the essence of another thing. (E II p11 c) Accordingly, one perceives the thing inadequately. Even though it is an inadequate perception, there is a corresponding affection in the body, which gives rise to the idea. The affection involves the nature of the external object, which explains why the mind posits the existence of the object. Imaginative ideas as inadequate ideas are subject to change. They can either be replaced by other inadequate ideas, or by some adequate ideas. In the course of forming common notions, the perception of the thing becomes more and more clear. As the mind perceives more
common notions of the thing, the idea of the thing becomes more and more adequate. Within the realm of reason, the mind isdetermined by its nature, perceiving things according to the laws of nature. The things so perceived follow from the necessary nature
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of God. Hence, on account of the common notions, the affection of ones body modifies itself accordingly. In other words, the image
as the bodys affection becomes sharper and clearer in the sense that it matches the external body. All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true (E II p32); all true ideas agree with their objects. (E I ax 6) The objects here refer to the Ideata (affects) of true ideas. They are no longer
affections of the body, but active affects of the body. The affections transform themselves into active affects as the mind conceives clear and distinct ideas of them. (E V p3 & p4) As noted earlier,
whenever one forms an idea, one posits at the same time the existence of its ideatum. The mind expresses Gods essence in Since Gods essence involves
the form of the objects essence.
his existence, the essence of Gods idea also involves the existence of its ideatum. On grasping the essence of the object, the mind
affirms the objects existence. The mind knows the existence of its body and the external body only through the affections of its body, for the affections involve the natures of both its body and the external bodies. (E II p19 ) The mind is the idea of the body, but the mind never has an adequate idea of its body. Only God knows the minds idea as the idea of its body. (E II p19 d) The mind has access only to
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the affections of its own body.
It is only through the perception of
the affections of its body that the mind knows that its body exists. All the ideas from imagination are inadequate; that means the mind knows its body inadequately even though it knows that its body exists. Only in the third kind of knowledge does the mind By then the mind
have adequate knowledge of its own body. also knows the external object adequately. All bodies agree in certain things. (E II L2)
The mind forms
common notions for two reasons: (1) because of the conatus o f the body, the body strives, in the same way as the mind does, to actualize its essence; (2) the body has something in common with the external body, which is equally in the part and in the whole. (E II p38) While the mind forms the first common notions which
are the less general ones, the body possesses the joyful affections. The body, in encountering the external body, finds something in the external body which agrees with itself. The first agreement between the two bodies explains why the affections are joyful. In order to
actualize its own essence, the body has to keep on finding things which it shares with the external body. The more general the
common notions are, the more difficulties the body has to over come in order to form the notions. As the body succeeds in
overcoming all the difficulties, the mind subsequently forms the
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corresponding common notions.
Ultimately, the mind forms the In the third kind of All
most general common notion of the thing.
knowledge, the mind has adequate knowledge of the object. along, the adequate knowledge consists of all the
common
notions, the ideas of the things which are shared by the body and the external body. Therefore, adequate knowledge of the object is also adequate knowledge of the body. As far as existence is concerned, in the third kind of knowledge the mind not only knows the existence of the external body, but grasps the existence of its own body as well. Insofar as our mind
knows itself and the body under a species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God.... (E V p30) Knowledge of God here refers to the essence of the object. On positing the eternal existence
of the object, the mind perceives the eternal existence of its body. The essence of the idea of God logically implies its existence. And the essence and existence of the object coincide with the essence and existence of the body. The mind perceives the
bodys essence under a species of eternity (E V p29); mean while, it knows the essence of the thing. In sum, the idea of a thing consists of all the common notions of the thing. the body In the course of acquiring all the common notions, essence of the thing by forming
instantiates the
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active
affects.
And the common notions constitute the objective
reality of belief. The belief is valid and true because it refers to the things which the body and the object have in common.
Affirmation, Veracity, and Feeling
Spinoza is strongly against Descartes conception of the will, claiming that a will, which is absolute in power and free from all contents of ideas, does not exist at all. Rather, the mind, in forming ideas, is determined to will this or that idea by a cause, which is also determined by another cause, and so on ad infinitum. (Ell p48) Determined by an infinite series of external causes, The individual acts of willing Hence, an idea involves
the mind forms inadequate ideas.
come along with the formation of ideas. affirmation or negation.
(E II p48 d) Conceived as an act of the More explicitly, idea. The affir
mind, the idea consists of an affirmative power. what the mind affirms is the content of the
mation of the inadequate idea originates in the partial content of the idea with which one identifies the object. According to Spinoza, the same affirmative power can be found in all ideas, adequate and inadequate alike. In the case of imagina tive ideas, we imagine ideas and believe in the existence of their
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ideata. (E II p17)
Even in the case of hallucination, it still involves But I deny that a man affirms nothing For what is perceiving a winged horse For if the mind perceived
some sort of affirmation. insofar as he perceives.
other than affirming wings of the horse?
nothing else except the winged horse, it would regard it as present to itself, and would not have any cause of doubting its existence, or any faculty of dissenting.... ( Ell p 49 s III B ii) Here Spinoza is relating the state of the mind when it is imagining. The child, and
while imagining, affirms the existence of the winged horsed believes in it wholeheartedly.
Believing in the content of the idea,
the mind does not have any cause of doubting the existence of the winged horse; nor does the mind have other faculty to deny what it perceives. The child believes in the existence of the winged horse until he is struck the idea of the winged horse. by another idea which replaces
Or the child becomes wise enough
to recognize the inadequacy of the idea. In that case, he can forget about the idea if he is not under the sway of his own imagination. Similarly, while dreaming, one affirms and believes in everything one sees in the dream. All the images disappear
in ones mind when one wakes up; the mind then occupies itself with other things. Error is the privation of knowledge. As inadequate ideas, errors affirm the existence of their objects.
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Indeed, the affirmation of inadequate ideas does not last simply because they are false ideas; they will somehow be replaced by other inadequate ideas or adequate ideas which have more affirmative power. The affirmative power of ideas is a function of their adequacy: the more adequate an idea is, the more affirma tive power it possesses. In proposition 49, Spinoza discusses affirmation in light of
adequate ideas.
Affirmation as a power belongs to the very The essence of a thing belongs to
essence of an adequate idea.
that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away. (E II def2)
Spinoza takes the idea of the triangle as an example to prove that the affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea. The affirmation involves the idea of the triangle. Without the idea, there is nothing to affirm. The affirmation cannot be or be
conceived without the idea of the triangle. To consolidate the proof, Spinoza refers to E II A3, which reads, There are no
modes of thinking, such as love, desire.... unless there is in the same individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, and the like. The affirmation as a mode of thought cannot be without the idea of the triangle. Like the modes of love and desire,
the affirmation must have the idea of the thing affirmed -
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the idea of the triangle. Conversely, the idea of the triangle must involve the affirmation that its interior angles are equal to two right angles. The essence
of the idea of the triangle is that its interior angles are equal to two right angles. Without this affirmation, the idea of the triangle cannot be conceived. Spinoza concludes that this affir
mation pertains to the essence of the idea of the triangle and is nothing beyond it. (E II p49 d) The affirmation satisfies the requirements of the essence of a thing that it cannot be or be conceived without the essence of the thing. The affirmation is the affirmation of the essential property of the triangle that its interior angles are equal to two right angles. property follows necessary from the idea of the triangle. The
It follows
that the affirmation also follows necessary from the idea of the triangle. Taking belief as affirmation, the mind believes in the content of the idea. A (true) belief necessarily follows from an adequate idea. In forming an adequate idea, the mind exemplifies
Gods power of acting. The way that Gods essence is manifested follows from necessity. If the affirmation belongs to the essence
of the idea, it must carry the same characters of universality and necessity as all adequate ideas do. Considered as the affirmation
of the essential property of a thing, the belief becomes true
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because it designates the essential property of the thing.
Spinoza
concedes that from Gods supreme nature, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things, that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, or always follow from the same necessity in the same way as from the nature of a tri angle follows from eternity and for eternity that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. (E I p17 s) deems the validity of belief. Thus, one re
In the hands of Spinoza, a belief
derived from an adequate idea is no longer psychological and whimsical; a belief insofar as it is true entails universality and necessity. Veracity is another subjective trait of belief. As long as one is
under the influence of imagination, one has confused and muti lated images of external things. One is determined externally and contingently, deriving ideas from fortuitous encounters with things. (E II p29 c) In the second kind of knowledge, the mind perceives
things according to the laws of nature and starts forming common notions, from the less general ones to the most general one. As
more common notions are conceived by the mind through its body, the image as perceived by the body changes accordingly. One observes the common properties of the thing. The thing so conceived loses its sensuous character; it is no longer confined in
ooi
o " > i
a certain place and time. Within the realm of reason, one considers things necessary. The perception becomes stable and always the
same, for the properties of things are so. But an affect arising from reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things, which we always regard as present and which we always imagine in the same way. So such an affect will always remain the same.... (E V p7 d) Like imagination, reason also regards things as present. While imagining, the mind perseveres in the being of the affection; however, the affection is subject to change. When the mind is
affected by another affect, the former affect disappears. Thus, the process of forming imaginations entails the principle of its own dissipation over time. Reason is different from imagination in this
respect, for it regards things as always present and the affect remains the same all the time. Gilles Deleuze argues that reason better than imagination
satisfies the demands of imagination
does.1 0 The active affects from reason are stronger than the passive affections from imagination. By the law of imagination,
the affect becomes stronger when more causes act together to provoke it.(E V p8) By the law of reason, common notions
relate to several things; on account of this, it is easier for the mind to associate images of things with the things themselves. (E V p11-13) Therefore, the image is frequent and veracious.
Deleuze concludes that necessity, presence, and frequency as the characteristics of reason not only reduce the intensity of passive affects, but also enforce the veracity of active affects.1 1 Reason forms images which are clearer and The perception of the object is live and sharp. By the time the mind grasps all the common notions of the object, it synthesizes all the data into a new whole and intuits the concrete essence of the object. The formation of the adequate idea takes place in time. One visualizes the objects concrete essence in time. (E V p23 s) model of belief. This is the limiting case of Humes more veracious.
The image is veracious and vivid to the utmost.
With the affirmation of the idea and all the vivid signs of the active affect, one is absolutely sure that the object exists in the world. Lastly, I consider the subjective feeling of belief. passive affections flow from those inadequate ideas. To begin with, Some affect-
tions diminish the power o f action, b ut some i ncrease it. B y m eans of reason, the mind selects the active affections and leaves aside the passive ones. The first common notions are formed when more and more joyful passions are accumulated. In the second kind of
knowledge, active affects are associated with active joys. In the third kind of knowledge, the intellectual love of God follows from the adequate ideas as concrete essences of things. At each level of
the inquiry of knowledge, a specific kind of feeling is involved. Conatus is a primary affect. The conatus of the mind is the
mind's consciousness of its own effort to persevere in its being. With respect to the body, the conatus in question consists in
maintaining a certain ratio of motion and rest. The individual exists so long as the proportion is preserved. Mere survival is not the Humans
ultimate goal of things; it is really the case for humans.
always aim at a higher level of survival, namely the enhancement of their being and the actualization of their essences. Man seeks to enhance his being so as to counteract the des Alternatively put,
truction of his own being from the outside.
the conatus of the body always has the desire to expand or enlarge its being (in a figurative sense) while keeping constant the ratio of motion and rest. The other two primary affects in Spinoza's psychology are joy and sorrow. Spinoza regards joy as man's passage from a less
to a greater perfection and sorrow as man's passage from a greater to a lesser perfection. Note here that joy and sorrow are feelings. For Spinoza, perfection means the same as reality or existence. The more reality or existence one knows concerning a thing or ones being, the more joyful one is. In terms of power of action, joy an increase in this power and sorrow its diminution.
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In perceiving an object, the body has to undergo a corres ponding dispositional change. As joy is defined as man's passage
from a less to a greater perfection, the increase in perfection is understood on the side of the body as the increase in the incorporation of the reality of an object. That means, the body is more and more in tune with the object as more common notions are formed in the mind. By means of reason, the mind selects joyful passions so as to form the first common notions. Later on, with the help of joyful passions, the mind forms the ideas of things which its body and some external bodies have in common. The mind knows the cause of the affection (E III p58) and understands the cause of its action. The joy that comes along with the active affect is purely active because it follows from an adequate idea. In the third kind of knowledge, the mind grasps the things essence and derives the greatest pleasure. (E V p27) joyful one is. As soon as one fully grasps the internal structure of an object, one has the affirmation of the idea. The mind visualizes The more reality one knows, the more
the object; the utmost veracity of the object as experienced by the mind is a sign, indicating that the body acts out the internal A true belief, in the case of Spinoza, is
essence of the object.
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based on the affirmation of the idea, the veracity of the image, and the utmost feeling of pleasure (the intellectual love of God). On the one hand, the objective reality of the object perceived as common notions vindicates the ontological foundations of
knowledge; on the other, the affirmation, veracity, and feeling so experienced are all internal signs, confirming the truth of the perception. Working concurrently, the mind and the body are in perfect accord. With this theory of belief, Spinoza circumvents the convoluted problem about the validity of belief.
Temporal Existence and Eternal Existence
For Spinoza, God necessarily exists.
As the only one substance, Moreover, God
Gods essence necessarily involves his existence.
is defined as consisting of an infinity of attributes, each of which exists necessarily. Lastly, all infinite modes, whether mediate or God necessarily
immediate, are entailed necessarily by things. manifests his power through infinite modes.
It follows that infinite
modes necessarily exist as well. A problem arises with respect to the necessity of finite modes. mode involves Given that the existence of a finite
the existence of another finite mode and the
essence of a finite modes does not involves its existence, one
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might ask whether the existence of a finite mode is necessitated by Gods nature in an absolute or a relative manner. Charles
Huenemann claims that finite modes are overnecessitated since their existence involves both the nature of God and the nature of another finite mode.1 2 In E II P8, Spinoza writes, The ideas of singular things, or of modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in Gods infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of the singular things, or modes, are contained in Gods attributes. So long as the ideas of things are comprehended in God's intellect, things enjoy virtual existence because Gods attributes contain beforehand the forms of those things. Spinoza clarifies the above proposition by making circle intersect formed by the
ananalogy that whenever two chords within a at a point, the area of the rectangle which is
two segments of the same chord is equal to the area of the rectangle formed by the other chord in the same way. The point of making the analogy is that just as a given circle may be said to contain an infinity of pairs of rectangles of equal area, an infinitely extended region can be said to contain all possible figures undergoing all of possible motion. It implies that the forms
all possible finite modes can be constructed from infinite Note here that the existence of a circle does not
extension.
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logically imply the existence of any rectangle; it is merely a virtual containment. The analogy illustrates the fact that al pos sible forms of finite modes are virtually contained within
Gods attributes.
Proceeding from virtual to actual
existence,
finite modes need Gods power as well to make their actual existence possible. Gods power is displayed in the human in tellect when the human mind conceives an adequate idea.1 3 As a member of the totality, a finite mode follows from Gods nature insofar as it is affected by another finite mode. Spinoza
distinguishes between two ways of conceiving things. (EV p29 s) In the first way, the mind conceives things as existing in a certain time and place; they have accidental and extrinsic properties. In
the second way, the mind conceives things in terms of their formal essences. In the third kind of knowledge, the mind, as the formal
cause of the object, actualizes its power of thinking. (E V p31) On the other hand, the formal being of ideas admits God as a cause only insofar as he is considered a thinking thing. (E II p4) As a thinking thing, God expresses his power and constitutes the essence of the mind. Alternatively, insofar as the mind adequately Under a species
conceives an idea, it explains the nature of God.
of eternity, things so conceived have their formal essences which are necessitated by Gods infinite power. The formal essence of the
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thing is the same structure, for it follows from the total order of nature. At the supreme level of understanding, the mind knows the formal structure of the thing as its eternal or formal essence. These two ways of considering finite things explain why finite things do not follow from the absolute nature of Gods attribute, for the actual existence cannot be divorced from their particular circumstances or their contingent properties. modes can be considered formal essences. Nevertheless, finite As formal essences,
finite modes must exist because God actualizes their existence. It follows that a finite mode is necessary in two ways. is necessary in virtue of its formal essence. First, it
Because of Gods
absolute power, the formal essence of a thing is instantiated through human nature. Second, a finite mode is relatively neces sary in the sense that it exists necessarily in an infinite chain of efficient cause, which is governed by the laws of nature that cause its existence. In brief, only God can cause things to exist.
(E I, p24, c) In this perspective, the existence of a finite mode must be conceived under a species of eternity. On the other
hand, Spinoza maintains that the essence of a finite mode does not involve its existence. The existence in question refers to the actual existence, i.e. in a certain time and place, which is necessitated by other finite modes.1 4
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The actual essence and existence of a thing involves the full causal history of the thing. Only God is capable of explaining the
essence of the thing in this way; the human mind is unable to give a full account of the things actual existence. In E II def 2,
essence is defined as that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be con ceived without the thing. necessarily posited, (ibid) The essence being given, the thing is Spinoza uses the words necessarily
posited instead of necessarily involved." Gods essence neces sarily involves his existence. do As for finite modes, their essences between the
not involve their existence. The connection
essence and existence of a finite mode is contingent. (E IV def 3) It follows that the mind is doomed to know inadequately the existence of a singular thing. For the sake of convenience, I designate this kind of existence as temporal existence. God being causa sui, his essence implies his existence.
Moreover, God's ideas and their ideata necessarily exist and they exist eternally. God's knowledge is eternal knowledge. I
call such existence eternal existence. The mind conceives ideas (things) in time, whereas the infinite intellect conceives things under a species of eternity. When the
mind renders itself adequate to the infinite intellect, it perceives
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thing in the way as the infinite intellect perceives.
One can infer
that in the third kind of knowledge, the mind simultaneously perceives two kinds of existence of the object. passages serve to support the above argument: In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, to that extent it conceives a duration that can be determined by time, and only to that extent does it have the power to conceive things in relation to time. But eternity cannot be explicated through duration. Therefore to that extent the mind does not have the power to conceive things under a form of eternity. But since it is the nature of reason to conceive things under a form of eternity, and since it belongs to the nature of mind, too, to conceive the essence of the body under a form of eternity, and since there belongs to the essence of mind nothing but these two ways of conceiving, it follows that this power to conceive things under a form of eternity pertains to the mind only in so far as it conceives the essence of the body under a form of eternity. (E V p29 d) And when singular things are said to exist, not only insofar as they are comprehended in Gods attributes, but insofar also as they are said to have duration, their ideas also involve the existence through which they are said to have duration. The following
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(E II p8 c, emphasis added) Insofar as man knows, he knows the idea of a body that actually exists. The actual being of the mind is the idea of a thing that Man knows temporally existing beings.
actually exists. (E II p11)
The incontestable fact of human knowledge is that man knows manifoldly affected bodies and his ideas of those affections. (E II p13 d, E II p26) The object of human knowledge is marked by duration. Ideas exist and represent things in time. The mind
asserts things as actually exist. (E II p17)
The mind knows ex
ternal bodies not through the ideas of those bodies, but through ideas of the bodys affections. (E II p19) As a result, the mind inadequately knows things as temporally existing. From the above
passages, one can infer that in the third kind of knowledge, the mind is in touch with two kinds of reality. Under all circumstances,
the mind perceives things in a certain time and at a certain place. In other words, whether it knows adequately or inade
quately, the mind asserts the present object as actually existing. In the third kind of knowledge, the mind conceives the thing as actually existing. Things are said to have duration when the Insofar as those things never conceive them As
mind conceives those things within time. are conceived in time, the mind can
adequately.
They are conceived as actually existing in time.
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such, their ideas must involve temporal elements. By contrast, when things are comprehended in Gods attributes, they are explained under a species of eternity. Conceived under a species
of eternity, the ideas of those things do not include any durational parameters. While actualizing its power of thinking, the mind
becomes the formal cause of the things idea. Insofar as it knows adequately, the mind grasps the formal essence of the thing and experiences the things eternal existence. The two kinds of reality can be explicated in the following way. As noted in the previous chapters, imagination establishes the relation between the external world and the mind. imagination, the mind is simply cut off from the external Without world.
Through corporeal affections and imagination, the mind might gradually eliminate mutilated experiences. Nonetheless, knowledge
derived from imagination remains inadequate. The mind does not represent external bodies as they really are, for they are mediated by the affections and the nature of the body. In E II p45, Spinoza writes, Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God. Spinoza uses the term
things as actually existing in E II p 11 and thereafter. There, he means things as existing temporally in the mind. Here, Spinoza
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repeats the same term different connotation.
thing which explains
actually exists with a the difference in the
Spinoza
scholium to E II p45. Existence in the first sense (E II p11) means temporal existence; the existence in question is some thing about duration. Existence so understood must involve
an infinite series of temporal causation. However, existence in the second sense means "the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. (E II p45 d) Here Spinoza is con cerned with eternal and necessary existence. Eternal existence necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God; it has nothing to do with time. In the second kind of knowledge, by means of reason the mind knows the common notions of the thing. Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately. (E II p38) Common notions are the epistemological counterparts of infinite modes and the laws of nature. These infinite modes and laws are the structures and cement of the universe, by which all things are constituted; they are immutable and eternal. and infinite essence of God. As such they are the eternal
One who knows things adequately
understands these structures and uniformities of things as the essence of God. The ideas are about some general properties
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of bodies; they are ideas of the common things that bodies share. The common element turns things into modes. That is to say, they follow from substance or God. Adequate knowledge of In this sense, it
things is grasped under the species of eternity.
is knowledge of God; as such it is not related to time. Spinoza says that the foundations of reason are notions which explain those things which are common to all, and which do not
explain the essence of any singular thing. On that account, they must be conceived without any relation to time, but
under a certain species of eternity. (E II p44 2d) A s those notions are not about the essence of a singular thing, they have
nothing to do with time. Common notions are the essence of God, they refer to the pure essences of things. Man knows the essence of a thing when he knows the idea
of the thing as his own idea. It implies that he knows himself adequately through comprehending the essence of a thing. To attain such knowledge, he must know a thing intuitively - the third kind of knowledge. Since the actual being of the mind is the idea of a singular thing which actually exists (E II p11), man can only know things as singular and in time. A singular thing
is marked by its existence in time. Common notions as pure essence of God are not related to time. But concrete essence
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of a singular thing must be known in time. sence of a singular thing,
To know the es
man must know the thing intuit
ively making the idea of the thing his own and grasping selfknowledge at the same time. Spinoza asserts time and again that the mind can have an adequate knowledge of Gods eternal and infinite essence.
(E II p47, Ell p46) know God directly.
Spinoza seems to suggest that the mind can Without going through the expression of finite
modes, one can know the essence of God. This is not what Spinoza has in mind. Guttorm Flcpistad argues that one can only know It is true that God is
God by knowledge of a certain finite mode. distinct from any finite mode.
As far as the human mind is
concerned, one cannot conceive God as existing without consider ing the existence of a certain finite mode. E II p47d to support his claim.15 He further cites
The demonstration reads,
The human mind has ideas (by P22) from which it perceives (by P23) itself, its own body and (by P16C1 and P17) external bodies as actually existing. And so (by P45 and P46) it has an
adequate knowledge of Gods eternal and infinite essence.... (E II p47 d) In E II p22, the mind perceives not only the affections In E II p23, it
of its body, but also the ideas of those affections.
is stated that the mind knows itself insofar as it perceives
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the ideas of the affections of the body.
The mind knows itself By E II p17,
and its body through the affections of its body.
one regards, on account of the present affections, the external body as actually existing. In these propositions, time is implicitly implied. As noted, the mind affirms the existence of itself, its Even at the
body, and the object through the ideas it has.
level of supreme knowledge in which the mind knows Gods essence and eternal existence, it is achieved through forming ideas. By existence.... I am speaking.... singular things insofar as they of the very existence of For even if each
are in God.
one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of Gods nature. (E II p45 s) Indeed, the mind understands the eternal essences and
existence of singular things in God. However, those singular things are determined to exist in a certain time and at a certain place. The two the kinds of all at existence once. of things manifest power
themselves to
mind
Moreover,
the
(essence) of God manifests itself in singular things.
As Gods
essence involves his existence, it follows that the mind knows the eternal existence of singular things. of God, one perseveres By virtue of the power involves an
in ones being which
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indefinite time. (E III p8)
Once again, knowledge of Gods eternal
existence is closely related to the temporal existence of things. This analysis further justifies the claim that in the third kind of knowledge, the mind experiences two kinds of existence of the object. Generally speaking, philosophers after Descartes agree that the mind has direct access to its ideas. temporally. time. Ideas represent objects
The mind experiences the existence of the object in
No matter how vivid and veracious the image of the object
is, the mind cannot know for sure that the object exists in the external world. In the case of true belief, the subjective ex perience of the objects existence needs a ground so as to assure the mind that the object really exists. The ground can only be derived from God, whose essence necessarily involves his existence. On actualizing its actual power of thinking, the mind comes to know the other reality of the object, i.e. its eternal existence. That is to say, with this ontological foundation which is
grounds the temporal existence of the object, the mind absolutely certain that the object exists.
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Immanent and Transitive Causalities
By transitive causality, Spinoza means that a thing is produced by other things in an endless causal chain. Every singular thing,
or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another; which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so on, to infinity. (E I p28) Transitive causality interprets the
universe in terms of a mechanistic model and a system of finitude. As finite modes, men are externally determined. By immanent causality, Spinoza means that finite modes are derived from God as their immanent cause. So conceived, every
thing follows a logical principle of particularization. Immanent cau sality starts from God as substance through an attribute and a series of infinite modes and ends when the cause reaches and determines particular things. In Spinozas universe, infinite modes Those laws are manifestations of
are the locus of natural laws. Gods power.
As real and actual, those laws are the cause of all
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particular things. These laws not just describe but regulate how things should work. Immanent and transitive causalities are the same process described in two different ways - one in terms of logical character and the other in terms of external mechanism. T hey a re the same, for transitive causality translates the logical character into
external mechanistic terms. In discussing particular essences, Yovel raises an enigma of ideas and essences.1 6 As particular essences do not involve exis tence, they can either exist in time and place or not exist at all. If
they do not actually exist, they exist logically in the attribute of extension and their ideas are ideas of the infinite intellect. (E II p8) Considered in themselves, essences exist eternally in God, and they are contained in the attributes of God. immutable, they cannot be in time. objects. objects. Since essences are
Ideas are the same as their
Ideas which represent objects depend on the state of If objects exist in duration, their ideas reflect the same If objects exist logically in Gods attributes,
state and exist in time.
their ideas reflect the same state that they are not in time. Yovel contends that this theory of essences and their ideas does not work. T he reason is that it cannot sustain the parallelism between logical and mechanical particularization.1 7 The transitive
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causes which determine a thing to exist are taken to be equi valent to its essence: summing all the transitive causes will explain the essence of a thing. As stated, both transitive and How
immanent causalities explain the same essence of a thing. can Spinoza account for the difference that one
causality involves
involves time and the other does not?
If one causality
durational parameters and the other does not, then they are not equivalent. durational Yovel claims that Spinoza must either include in the essence, or omit them from
parameters
the causal explication or else abandon the equivalence.1 8 Since transitive and immanent causalities are two ways of expres sing the same essence, they are the same. sitive causality must involve time. By definition, tran
Yovel concludes that the only
option left is to include durational parameters in the essence. At the same time, Yovel admits that this is not the best solution to the issue. Yovel notes elsewhere the difference
between eternity and immortality. Eternity means timelessness, whereas immortality means indefinite existence within time.1 9
From this, an eternal essence must not be in time.
Since Gods
essence involves its existence, Gods existence must be eternal if his essence is eternal. eternal because it Moreover, the idea of God must be
reflects the state o f t he e ssence o f G od,
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which is eternal. I want to suggest another way of solving the above enigma. As discussed, the mind conceives things as actually existing in two ways. (E II p45s) Transitive causation can be linked to the first
way, in which things are conceived to exist in a certain time and place. The existence at issue involves an infinite series of mechanical causation; only God can have adequate knowledge things conceived under a species of
of it. The existence of eternality can
be explained
in terms of immanent causality.
The mind has adequate knowledge of things insofar as it re lates its ideas of things to God. More precisely, by means of reason, the mind knows the common notions of things, insofar as the mind knows the laws of nature in terms of common notions, it comprehends the nature of the thing. In other words, instead of apprehending the essence of the thing through
transitive causation which is impossible for humans, the human mind explains the things essence in terms of immanent causality. As noted, the essence of a finite mode does not involve existence; in this sense, the existence as such involves relative necessity because the existence of a finite mode does not follow from its essence. Through transitive causality, particular essences
of finite modes are translated into concrete things and caused to
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exist in a certain time and place.
Only God has access to the
essence of a finite mode, for the essence at stake involves an infinite series of causation. I claimed earlier that the causal axiom
(E I ax 4) is applicable to both adequate and inadequate ideas. Finite modes exist necessarily in an infinite chain of efficient cause. As the human mind is incapable of accounting for the whole causal history of a finite mode, it ends up conceiving the idea of the mode inadequately. However, a finite mode requires the essence of substance in order to exist. The eternal existence of finite things should be
understood as ontological dependence. By means of immanent cau sality, God sustains the eternal existence of finite things. So con
ceived, the (eternal) existence of a finite mode involves absolute necessity because it follows from the essence of God. Instead of
knowing the essence of finite modes through transitive causation, one knows the essence of finite modes immanently. In the third
kind of knowledge, the mind immanently knows the essence of the thing and experiences its eternal existence. In terms of the
causal axiom, God is the material and efficient causes of the adequate idea and the mind is the formal cause. The knowledge in question is the eternal essence and existence of the thing. Meanwhile, the mind conceives the object in relation to a
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certain
place and time.
Presumably, the
mind
cannot know
the object adequately in terms of transitive causality. At the su preme level of knowledge, other finite modes are still the
efficient cause of the active affect which is conceived spatially and temporally. Again, the analysis justifies the claim that the existence of the thing can be conceived in two ways, namely temporally and eternally. The human intellect cannot be the infinite intellect even though it can conceive ideas as adequately as the infinite intellect does. The mind conceives ideas in time. from another idea. More explicitly, an idea follows
An idea can be the adequate or inadequate In this causal thinking activity, the mind By forming ideas, the mind persists in its
cause of another idea. perseveres in its being. being through time.
On the other hand, the object of an idea is And the modification is the
always a modification of the body.
interaction between the body and some external objects. Summing up, an idea is the minds affirmation of its own existence. As the
mind conceives adequately, the idea in the mind represents the eternal essence of God. In that case, the adequate idea in the
mind has an eternal aspect: its ideatum must also exist eternally. The actual being of a mind is the idea of a singular thing which actually exists. (E II p11) In this respect, the idea in
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question, even if it is an adequate
idea, is always conceived
in relation to a certain time and place. The mind reflects the actual state of its body. In brief, existence can be understood eternally and temporally. The mind can grasp the things essence and existence under a species of eternity. Conceiving the same
essence temporally, the mind will never achieve adequate know ledge of the object. Hence, even from the human perspective, it is not necessary to include durational parameters in the essence. As far as the problems of existence are concerned, no one ever comes up with a satisfactory answer to them. exception. Spinoza makes no
Spinoza can sustain theparallelism between logical
and mechanical particualrizations if his intention is to explain on the one hand the genesis of things and on the other hand their mechanical immanent cause. In the eyes of God, logical and particularizations areone and the same. Time is
not a problem for God because the infinite intellect always conceives eternal things. For the sake of explanation, one can tentatively sustain the two particularizations. The essence of a
thing can be expressed in one way or the other. The finite human mind can only account or the objects essence im
manently. From the human minds perspective, the two particu larizations are not equivalent because one involves the elements
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of time and the other does not.
Concluding Remarks
Following Humes model, I reconstructed a theory of belief in Spinoza. Humes theory stresses the subjective or psychological In the case of
character of commitment, feeling, and necessity.
Spinoza, the same elements of belief can be identified, which are free from any psychological traces. Common notions are the
ontological grounds of knowledge, which carry the characteristics of universality and necessity. The belief involved is objectively valid
by virtue of those traits. The affirmation of the idea belongs to the essence of the (adequate) idea. cannot be or be conceived. Without the affirmation, the idea
Lastly, in the third kind of knowledge,
the feeling as the awareness of ones essence and the intellectual love of God derives from the adequate idea - the pure joy of intelligibility is the same joy that God feels when he conceives the same idea. The feeling so derived is no longer whimsical or
psychological; rather it is loaded with logical necessity, for it comes directly from Gods nature. Affirmation, feeling, and necessity,
which constitute the Spinozistic belief, are charged with universal characters; together they make the belief true and valid; the belief
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in the object necessarily entails its existence. In addition, I dis cussed the necessities of finite modes. I claimed that on the one hand, finite modes are governed by the absolute necessity of Gods nature; and on the other, they are determined by the relative necessity of other finite modes. I made a distinction between the temporal a nd the eternal existence of an object. Ideas are conceived by the finite human beings in time. In spite of their
temporal character, ideas as adequate designate the infinite and eternal essence of God, which necessarily involve Gods existence. Finite human beings exist and know things in time. In framing an
adequate idea, the mind instantiates Gods eternal essence as the things essence and grasps its eternal existence. The eternal
existence so conceived serves to ground the temporal existence of the thing as its ontological foundation. experience the things eternal existence? How can the mind
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6
Common Notions, The Third Kind of Knowledge And Self - knowledge
You would not find out the boundan'e of the soul, even by travelling along every path: so deep a measure does it have. Heraclitus
Spinoza is enlightened by Descartes insight that knowledge can only be grounded in the human subject. Endowed with the natural
light of reason, the Cartesian subject intuitively grasps truths, which follow the necessity of reason. In the eyes of Spinoza, the ex On account of its world-
perience of truth as such is still mystical.
less and disembodiment, the cogito does not have any object to perceive truths. One substantive difference between Descartes and Spinoza is that for Spinoza, common notions are the foundations of reason and they are in turn derived from the immutable laws of nature. Accordingly, objectivity, in the case of Spinoza, depends nature who substantially manifests his power in
on God as
the eternal and immutable laws of nature. What is the point of bringing up the issue of self-knowledge? And in what way is knowledge per se related to self-knowledge?
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It is a piece of common knowledge in Greek thought that individuality, either as it refers to ousia in Aristotles metaphysics or to the individuals in Greek polis, is not an independent piece of knowledge detached from everything else. Rather, individuality
and its knowledge should be derived from the universals. In the case of Spinoza, knowing the common notions of a thing is the prerequisite for intuiting its concrete essence. The essence of the thing is grounded on the knowing subjects as self-knowledge. As to the first question raised above, Humes discussions of personal identity and theory of ideas are pertinent. In short, Hume
denies the existence of personal identity and attempts to account for the genesis of the idea instead. Later, Hume observes that
his theories of persona identity and ideas contradict each other. Owing to this puncture, the whole system collapses and ends in a contradiction. Humes intention is to devastate all validity claims in human knowledge. Personal identity as a pseudo-claim of knowledge is meant to shake the belief in any true know ledge claim about the self. As the argument proceeds, it works
against its original intention and winds up in a contradiction; his notion of personal identity is incongruous with the whole system. Interestingly enough, because of this very existence of con
tradiction, Humes fault makes an insinuation that true knowledge is still possible. Briefly put, one can argue for a case that
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self-knowledge is viable, and that it is not incompatible with other knowledge claims. Rather, other knowledge claims can in turn be grounded on self-knowledge. Eventually, absolute know ledge will come to light.
Humes Paradox of Personal Identity
Generally speaking, the self is supposed to be an unchanging entity; any impression of the self must be constantly the same throughout life. However, looking within himself, Hume observes the following: There is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy....succeed each other....It cannot therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea.1 For Hume, the self is nothing but a bundle of perceptions. Hume
concludes that personal identity is a fiction and that the mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively
make their appearance ....There is properly no simplicity in it at one time nor identity in difference.2 Granted all these obser
vations, Hume is more interested in tracing the origin of the idea of personal identity. He goes to great lengths to explain
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the mechanism of the mind, which gives rise to the idea of personal identity. In the case of personal identity, the succession of perceptions is merely a succession of distinct related objects. In the succes sion, the objects are closely related. The similarity between the two actions of the mind, namely the action of imagination in sur veying the succession and the feeling of the action of imagina tion in considering an uninterrupted and invariable object, leads one to confound the two situations: taking the succession of related perceptions as really united by identity. That triggers the belief in the unity of the self. For Hume, resemblance and causation are the relations which link the successive per
ceptions so as to bring about the uninterrupted progress of the thought. Like Locke, Hume emphasizes the importance of memory in accounting for the resemblance of the successive perceptions. Memory not merely provides one with access to
ones past self, but also contributes to the bundles of per ceptions. As resemblance is a relation which enables the mind to slide smoothly along a succession of perceptions and the present perceptions resemble earlier perceptions, memory streng thens the propensity to believe in the fiction of a continuing self. However, memory alone, according to Hume, does not con There are events in the past which are
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stitute personal identity.
beyond the reach of memory. There must be something else which extends personal identity beyond memory. Hume appeals
to causality as the other source which constitutes identity. The idea of the human mind is for Hume a system of discrete perceptions, which are linked by causal relation: Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas: and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts.3 The causal links help fill up the missing gaps among a long series of discrete perceptions. Through the work of imagination, The causal links among
personal identity goes beyond memory.
perceptions, as well as their resemblance, constitute the belief in a continuing self, which exists in those periods of time in which the mind no longer recalls. When Hume goes deeper in his analysis of personal identity, he bumps into insurmountable difficulties, which jeopardize his whole edifice. Unlike the peccadillo of the missing blue discussed
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earlier in the Trestise, which might serve either as a stupid attack to his thought 4 or as a prescient warning that portends the oncoming floods which are likely to come as his system develops, Humes failure to resolve the problem about personal identity has an immanent and pernicious effect on his whole system. Interestingly, Hume never explicates his worries about his account on personal identity. All he says is: ....all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head....In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct erceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind ever perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. 5 From the wording, Hume seems to be extremely apprehensive about the enormous contradiction involved in his system. Hume
hesitates to assert that the belief-generating mechanism is suf ficient to generate the belief in a unitary self. Ironically, commen tators note that the two principles, which Hume claims that he cannot render consistent, are in fact very consistent. In his book,
Hume : The Argument of the Philosopher, Barry Stroud writes, It might look as if it is the difficulty of holding onto both the
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principles he mentions and rendering them consistent. But that is no difficulty at all, since the two principles obviously are not inconsistent with each other. In fact, Hume establishes them right whole at the beginning and they are at the heart of his of
philosophy.
There are obsurities in
Humes
notion
distinct perceptions, but he means by it at least that if two perceptions are distinct, then it is possible for the one to occur without the other. But then there could be no real connection
between them, since if there were it would be impossible for one of them to occur without the other. And if there is no real connection between them, the mind cannot perceive one. So
the two principles are perfectly compatible. 6 The analysis is clear that there is no contradiction involved in the two
principles.
But why does Hume claim that he cannot resolve the Unfortunately, Hume does
inconsistency of the two principles?
not say anything further about the problem, which preludes the possibility of understanding the heart of the matter. Admittedly, the problem of personal identity will remain a
subject for endless speculation. Everything said, some points are worth mentioning for present purposes. Humes words should
be taken seriously that the two principles are really inconsistent. It follows that if Hume cannot resolve the difficulty, his whole system will collapse. Accordingly, all the efforts, which Hume
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has been making to deconstruct metaphysics in general and true knowledge in particular, are of no avail. It also implies that under
Humes devastating attack, true knowledge will still be possible. Last but not least, if the key problem lies in personal identity which baffles Hume, the same problem will serve as the
turning point, from which one elicits the clues to true knowledge. What is at stake is whether the self exists. If it does not,
Hume would feel comfortable with his system and his skepticism against true knowledge. In case the self does exist, Humes whole edifice will collapse. While explicating Humes worries, Stroud writes, And in histreatment of personal identity Hume pushes the
theory of ideas up the edge of that abyss and finds that only the unacceptable notions of substance or a real connection among perceptions would save him. It is but a short step from there back to the Kantian idea that there must be something
about perceptions or representations - whether it is noticed or not which constitutes their belonging to a particular self or subject, even if it is only the apparently weak requirement tht it be
possible for one to think of these representations as belonging to oneself. But by then the classical theory of ideas would have been abandoned. 7 The following guesswork is about what Hume might have in mind concerning his wom'es. Hume seems to suspect that his
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theory of belief is not sufficient to produce the belief in a unitary self. On the other hand, the subliminal experience of
the self at this stage is so ineffable that it is difficult for Hume to put it down in exact terms what his wom'es are. From daily
experiences, Hume might have a vague but implicit feel for the existence of his own self. experience of which Nevertheless, it is only a feeling; the in words,
cannot be clearly articulated
nor is the feeling strong enough for Hume to treat it as a belief. This weak awareness of ones own self might be the clue to the contradiction mentioned about. In his book, Humes Intentions,
John Passmore writes, Now, of course, these principles are not, as they stand, inconsistent; but they are together inconsistent with a third principle - that the mind perceives a real connexion among our perceptions unless there is already a real connexion in existence. 8 among distinct Indeed, one never perceives any real connection perceptions simply because all distinct per
ceptions are distinct existences. The following. inconsistency to which Hume refers might be the
Humes theory of belief is insufficient to produce the In our daily lives, we all have a vague As noted earlier, this is a dim feeling As it is
belief in a unitary self. awareness of our selves.
that cannot be articulated in a clear and distinct manner.
just a vague awareness, this feeling cannot be compared with

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the one following from a Humean belief. The Humean feeling usually comes with impressive veracity and Also, the Humean mind is forever in the In the eyes they of are Hume, people by are all sharp verisimilitude. grip of imagination. leading a Reason dreamy is the
existence;
dominated
passions.
slave of passions;
reason never takesoffice in the
mind. That
also explains why the feeling of the selfis vague. As long as imagination holds sway, the Humean framework. Granted the existence of the self, in what way does it exist? In light of the above analysis, it can be inferred that the self exists in the form of combining and synthesizing discrete per ceptions. Subconsciously, Hume might notice a kind of synthesis going on in the mind, and he is sure that it is not the work of imagination. The work of imagination in this context manifests mind always works within the
itself in memory and causal inference. The work of synthesis is apparently not the fictitious magical work done by imagination; rather, Hume seems to have observed some real connections among perceptions which might point to the existence of the self that performs the work. If that is the case, Hume's theory The fact that the
of personal identity will go to rack and ruin.
self exists is incongruous with his bundle theory of perceptions, which is characterized by one perception chasing another.
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The
feeling
of the existence of the self, which
synthesizes
and
combines perceptions, arises from time to time in Humes mind. But this feeling of the self is so weak that Hume cannot classify it as a belief. Nor can Hume accommodate the self in his system. His theory of belief is applicable to all other perceptions, but not to the perception of the self. Presumably, it takes a grea ter effort to achieve the perception of the self. In short, Hume's
model of mind is incapable of accounting for the existence of the self. Out of intellectual honesty, Hume cannot be oblivious
to the dim feeling of the existence of the self either. It might be this ambivalent conception of the self which puzzles Hume. Self-knowledge for Spinoza is inextricably linked to know
ledge of a thing, and personal identity or the self really exists. In order to argue for a case that true knowledge is workable, a detailed discussion of the three kinds of knowledge is For
necessary.
In particular, common notions deserve attention.
Spinoza, the universals as common notions are the ontological foundations of knowledge, which constitute the objective certainty
of knowledge. In addition to identifying common notions as the universals needs to which make knowledge mind necessary and of valid, one a
show that the
is capable
performing
kind of synthesis that combines and joins discrete materials into a unique whole. To be sure, through the work of synthesis,
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the mind knows the essence of the thing. As the synthesis takes place in the cognitive subject and knowledge of a thing is identical with that of the body, the knowledge so obtained is also self-knowledge. feeling will stop the Finally, infinite I argue that self-awareness as regress involved in knowledge
claims. As the ultimate foundation of knowledge, self-awareness grounds all subsequent knowledge claims.
Sense Perception : the First Kind of Knowledge
In the First Meditation, Descartes argues at great length that upon careful examination there are many things in daily life which fleeting are and dubious. transient Sensible experiences, are because His of their
characters,
unreliable.
metho
dological doubt serves to detach the subject from the sensible world. By means of methodological doubt, Descartes suspends everything which is dubious as nonexistence. The cogito, whose
existence is absolutely certain, serves as the indubitable ground, from which he can reconstruct the whole world with certainty. Spinoza would agree with Descartes that the sensible world is the source of errors. In daily life, one can only form random experience which is mutilated, confused and without order
for the intellect.( Ell p 29 c)
Random experience deals with the

369
common order of always subject common order to
nature.
As a finite being, man is necessarily
passions, that he follows and obeys the and accommodates himself to it as
of nature,
much as the nature of things requires. ( E IV p4 c ) Spinoza refutes the existence of free will: the cognitive subject cannot detach itself from the world in which it is dwelling. their quest
Finite beings muststart with inadequate ideas in
for knowledge; accordingly, they cannot entirely be free from errors. when What they perceive and claim to exist is erroneous they conceive the thing abstractly in their imagination.
In the first kind of knowledge, things are conceived as existing in relation to a certain time and place. Thus one knows
things abstractly and imaginatively. Yet, humans are also ca pable of conceiving things which exist eternally and necessarily; we conceive them the necessity of to be contained in God and to follow from the divine nature....we conceive under a
species of eternity; and to that extent they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God.( E p27 s ) of all things whose essences necessarily God knows a priori involve existence.
Humans are able to know things adequately and inadequately. Inadequate knowledge means that things are known contin
gently, whereas adequate knowledge implies that they are known eternally and necessarily.
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One conceives things contingently because of the privation of knowledge. In Spinoza's system, there is nothing contingent. Only the lack of adequate knowledge causes one to believe that things exist contingently. Unlike Descartes who discards sensible experience tout court, Spinoza regards knowledge derived from random experience
only as inadequate. It is confused and mutilated knowledge of the human mind, of its body, and of external bodies. Confused and mutilated as they are, the sensible data so perceived are the stepping stones leading to the second and the third
kinds of knowledge. The ratio of
the second kind of knowledge
is concerned with the common properties of bodies. By cor recting the affections of the body, one is capable of reaching the second and third kinds of knowledge. As the order of causes is hidden from us (E I p33 s 1), it is unavoidable Therefore, in the first
that men perceive things as contingent.
kind of knowledge, things are not known as they really are. It is inevitable of that one commits perceptions errors. can Only one by gradual and
correction
fragmented
improve
remove errors. Inadequate knowledge requires endless rectification. Making use of the rational principle of correction, one changes inadequate knowledge into adequate one. Finite beings are
devoid of the infinite power of the infinite intellect. They have

371
to
start
with
inadequate
knowledge.
However,
humans
are
also endowed with ratio by means of which they correct errors. There is no affection of the Body clear and distinct concept. (E V p 4 ) According to Amihu Gilead, common notions of ratio in of which we cannot form a
dicate the possibility of correction.
However, no given fact can
be derived or deduced from the notions themselves. Empirical facts must come from imagination. kind of knowledge can be formed It is true that the third outof adequate ideas.
Nevertheless, the essence of any particular thing cannot be deduced from the common notions of ratio. What is common to all things....and is equally in the part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing.
(E II p37 ) All in all, it is imagination which perceives singular things as existing in time and place. Only after imagination has perceived the empirical data of singular things can scientific intuition perceive the eternal essences of these singular things, which are then purified of the dregs of time and place. 9 Indeed, the first kind of knowledge is indispensable. Not only
does it provide the empirical facts for correction in the second kind of knowledge, it also supplies the necessary data through which the essences of singular things can be intuited in the third kind of knowledge. Though mutilated and confused, the
372
first
kind of knowledge supplies further correction and
all the intuition.
necessary Knowledge
empirical of the
data for
supreme kind is unthinkable without jective data.
these fleeting and sub
In the first kind of knowledge, the mind conceives singular things as existing in relation to time and place. Knowledge
is confused and mutilated because it is conceived distractly. (EV p29s) But singular things are necessary when they are conceived by ratio. The necessary existence of a finite thing relies on God. Gods existence is self-caused; apriori. Finite modes are not self-caused, it can be known their existence is
not known apriori. It does not follows that the existence of finite modes must be contingent. In E II p8, Spinoza deals
with the eternal existence of finite modes; existence as such is necessary, but not in time. Contingency is a defect of knowledge. Since the mind knows things in a particular time and place, it does not possess the causal history of things. That is why knowledge of things is inadequate. By means of reason, the mind conceives things without any relation to time and place. It is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary and not as contingent As it perceives this necessity of things truly, that is, as it is in itself. But this necessity of things is the very necessity of
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Gods eternal nature. Therefore, it is of the nature of reason to regard things under this species of eternity. (E II p44 c 2d) Under a certain species of eternity, things exist eternally; things are not known in a certain time and place. Common notions are ideas of properties and relations which bodies share.
On that account, they must be conceived without any relation to time. (E II p44 c 2d) According to Spinoza, modes of particular time and place are products of imagination. to time and place. Imagination perceives things in relation
The first kind of knowledge is necessarily
inadequate because it involves a particular time and place and finite human beings are incapable of knowing the full causal history of things. It explains why the first kind of knowledge might lead to error. Despite its inadequate character, the first kind of know
ledge is necessary in the sense that it provides the mind with the sensible data of things, which can be corrected and
transformed into true knowledge. In fact, the mind needs those sensible data to begin with; eventually, it corrects those data by means of reason, making them into adequate ideas. Not only does the mind know things through affections of its body, it also knows itself and its body through the same
affections.(E II p23)
Furthermore, it relies on the affections to

374
obtain
knowledge of finite
modes;
knowledge
as such
must
be an isolated fragment. In order to know finite modes ade quately, the mind needs to consider the whole causal network in which finite modes are actually caused to exist. Therefore, fragmentation is unavoidable, and knowledge of things at the preliminary stages is necessarily defective. Errors elimination. can be removed through endless correction and
"There is no affection of the body of which we Through
cannot form a clear and distinct concept." (E V p4)
perceiving common notions, the mind discovers the connection between the affections of its body and external bodies. The affections bodies. of the body share the properties with external between
So it is possible to display the connection
the affections and the whole of nature. The sole function of the third kind of knowledge is to
produce the essence of the thing. ation is not the
The essence under consider but rather
pure essence as that of God, Intuition, however,
the things concrete essence.
cannot con
stitute by itself the essence of the thing; nor can it explain the essence according to the common notions. According to Spinoza, there is absolutely no way to deduce or infer any finite mode from the attribute alone. [W]hat is finite and has a determinate existence could
375
not
have
been
produced
by
the absolute nature of an attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God is eternal and infinite.... It had, therefore, to follow from, or be determined to exist and produce an effect by God insofar has a or an attribute of God which isfinite and
as it is modified by a modification
determinate existence. (E I p28 d) Only singular things
have determinate existence, and they exist in time.The actual being of the mind is the p11) idea of a singular thing which
actually exists. (E II
Thus, the concrete essence of the
thing can only be derived from the sensible data in the first kind of knowledge. intuits In the third kind of knowledge, the mind purified of
the concrete essence of the thing, which is
the dregs of all the fragmentary elements.
In Letter 10, Spinoza
says, The most it (empirical experience) can do is to deter mine our minds to think only things. (parenthesis added) about the certain essences of
Here Spinoza explains how sensible
data help one attain the essences of singular things. In short, even though the first kind the cause of falsity (E II p41), it is a ledge. of knowledge might be significant kind of know knowledge
Inadequate knowledge as error isincomplete
(E II p11 c); yet it is corrigible. So long as fragmented per ceptions are rectified, one is on the way to adequate knowledge.
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Common Notions and their Genesis
As for the inquiry into the ontological foundations of know ledge, a detailed treatment of common notions is both neces sary and pivotal.1 0 to the fundamental First, common notions are related directly laws of nature; they are the mental
representations of infinite modes. Second, in the second kind of knowledge, the formulation of adequate ideas is mainly
concerned with the grasping of common notions. understanding of common notions, their formation,
A thorough and their
genesis, will help immensely in the inquiry about true know ledge and its ontological grounds. Common notions as adequate ideas are expressions real of the of scaffoldings reality, of nature. refers to They the
manifest
the
structure
which
infinite mode and the natural laws of nature as inscribed in it. For Spinoza, God is nature. As Natura naturans, God is the How can we express identify it with them?
one;as Natura naturata, God is the many. the one (totality) as the many and
According to Spinoza,
God is infinite (E I p8) and his essence By contrast, the
necessarily involves his existence. (E I p7d, p20)
essences of finite modes do not involve their existence; they derive their existence from other finite modes and ultimately from God. (E I p24, p25) God dwells in each thing as cause of
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its existence and essence.
It belongs to the nature of God God as substance expresses mode and the one and the
to express himself (E I p16);
his essence in modes. For Spinoza, the infinite laws of nature serve to mediate between the
many. In El p28 and Ell p7, Spinoza discusses the causal chains and the order and connection of things. Specific ex
amples of physical laws are given in Ell p13 lemmas. Spinoza claims that certain things had to be produced by God imme diately, namely, those which follow necessarily from his absolute nature, and others, (which nevertheless can neither be nor be conceived without God) had to be produced by the mediation of those first things.... (E I p28 s) Those things (infinite modes),
which are derived immediately from Gods nature, can serve to mediate the one and the many. Gods power is his
essence. (E I p34) God manifests his power (essence) through infinite modes. By inner necessity, God must particularize himself. (E I p16) The particularization of God into modes is made possible only through the infinite mode and the laws of nature. In nature there
is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way. (E I p29) Everything, which exists, exists
necessarily. Similarly, infinite modes as modes exist necessarily.

378
The laws of nature are regular manifestations of Gods power; they directly come from Gods infinite nature. In these respects, infinite modes are both necessary and infinite. As laws, infinite modes govern all things in the world. For
Spinoza, infinite modes are real individuals, but they share the character of universals in the sense that they govern all things in a law-like manner. Unlike the abstract universals advocated by the empiricist, infinite modes are real entities: they are a series of fixed and eternal things. (TdlE 100) In short, the natural laws are real universal structures, representing real
aspects of the universe. God is infinite and necessary; infinite modes, which are
directly derived from Gods nature, are also infinite and necessary. But they cannot be strictly identical in these respects, for one is substance and the others are modes. How can we diffentiate the one from the many? What is the difference between the
laws of Natura naturans and those of Natura naturata? According to Yovel, God and infinite modes are both necessary and infinite, but in a different sense. God as extension is infinite
in the sense that God is present in all bodies. The laws of nature are present in all bodies as well. From the law of
motion and rest down to the specific laws of mechanics, the laws govern all bodies, regardless of their qualitative differences.
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So conceived, the infinite character of infinite modes is similar to that of the attribute of extension. Gods attributes are infinite in another sense; they are eternal or timeless. Considered in this sense, infinite modes are not timeless; they have indefinite duration. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any of Gods attributes have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite. (E I p21) The word always suggests a temporal dimension. Spinoza has in mind, infinite modes If that is what in the
are not eternal
absolute sense, but in the sense of indefinite duration. Without lowering to move his conception of infinity, it is from naturans) the timeless impossible and finite for Spinoza its attributes
substance and
(Natura naturata).
to durational
modes (Natura
Spinoza has to make the concession in order to
account for the manifoldness of nature. As for necessity, God is self-caused and his essence involves his existence. Infinite modes are modes caused by God; their
essences do not involve existence. of an infinite
The essence and existence The laws
mode are caused by something else.
of nature are necessary
in the sense that they follow directly
from Gods nature; they are determined by Gods nature as lo gical necessity. a Apart from certain their logical necessity, they are they are
contingent to
extent because
380
not self-
sustained things (they are caused
by God). For the same reason
with which Spinoza can explain nature as the many, Spinoza needs to make a leap with respect to the status of necessity. The necessity of infinite modes is merely relative, not absolute. Infinite modes serve to transmit Gods presence, power, and necessity to every being in the universe. Substance and its attributes provide the finite beings with ontological support.
Through infinite modes, God engenders a thing horizontally in time by means of other finite things. Meanwhile, God con Hori its
stitutes the essence of the thing in a timeless
manner.
zontal causality manifests the vertical causality by translating logical character into mechanistic character.1 1
By the same token, there is a whole realm of laws which governs the function of the mind. First and foremost, the in
finite intellect is the immediate infinite mode. The infinite intellect can be understood as the totality of all adequate ideas. Another
candidate for infinite modes is the psychological law of associ ation. For Spinoza, the law of association is the supreme law
in psychology. Thoughts and ideas belong to the same attribute. Thought stresses the psychological side of the mind, whereas idea refers the logical aspect of the infinite intellect. Yovel argues that in the acquisition of common notions, the
mind passes from imagination to reason.

381
Logical thinking is
the product of common notions, which are naturalistic in the mind. As a natural process of the mind, logical thinking in the form of common notions is subject to the law of association. Association connected with imagination is distortive and mis
leading; whereas, association, insofar as it is related to reason, becomes regular and uniform, it produces results that are
equal in the part and in the whole. 1 2 Since all bodies agree in certain things (E II p13 L2), the law of motion and rest as the most general law of nature deter mines all bodies in the universe. The specific laws of mechanics
apply to certain bodies. The laws of nature, general and specific alike, are regular manifestations of Gods power. Moreover, Gods
power of thinking is equal to his actual power of action. (E II p7 c) As manifestations of Gods essence, those natural laws are real entities. They must have their ideas in the attribute of thought.
Given that the body is affected by external bodies, at some point the mind forms notions of general properties and common relations, which are shared by the body and external bodies. Common notions so formed are adequate ideas; they are
conceived by the mind in the way as God percieves them. Hence, common notions are the epistemological counterparts
of the fundamental laws of nature. They are the mental repre sentations of all the laws of nature. Man does not understand
382
the series of singular changeable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal things. (TdlE 100) Things as becoming are
incomprehensible. He understands instead the fixed and eternal things, i.e. infinite modes, which order singular things. modes in things are the subject matter of The infinite
knowledge. It follows
that common notions have their metaphysical (ontological) founda tions in infinite modes. Common notions are charged with
ontological insignificance; they act like law-like universals, struc turing and ordering the world. Humans are endowed with ratio and capable of perceiving these universals and forming ideas of them as common notions. The objects of imagination are singular things which are actually existing. The objects of intuition are the essences of singular things. Reason serves to mediate between imagination and
intuition. Hence, the objects of reason are properties and relations which are common to things. As ideas of properties and re lations of things, common notions are the first principles of all
sciences, such as metaphysics, logic, psychology, physics, etc. By means of its inborn notions in the way that power, the mind forms common Common
it forms
adequate ideas.
notions are necessarily adequate in a twofold sense. First, they are explained by the power of thinking. Since the mind is in
possession of reason, it grasps the notions as God comprehends

383
them.
In this sense, all common notions are adequate in re mind explains Gods nature in the form of or God constitutes directly its essence.
lation to God. The common notions,
Second, they express the idea of God and necessarily involve the essence of God. Common notions are adequate because they express the common relations among bodies. Common
notions as formed by the mind must allow a certain degree of adequacy. In a more precise way, understanding a thing means
forming an adequate idea of it. In the course of understanding a thing, the mind has to go through all the stages so as to reach the adequate common notions. tasks, idea of the thing. At each stage, From simple tasks to increasingly it forms complex most
it generates different common
notions from the
specific ones to the most general one. That means, the adequate idea of a thing consists of numerous common notions. The more common notions the mind forms with respect to an idea, the more adequate the idea becomes. In brief, common notions can be more or less universal according to their degree of generality; whereas an idea can be more and more adequate. How do common notions represent the real structures of things? Reason, though spontaneous, does not form common For reason to work properly, there must
notions out of nothing.
be a world and a body. In the case of Descartes, concepts come

384
from the natural light of reason
in a mysterious way. It is not
the case in Spinoza. The natural light of reason must stick to and work with nature; it must through the use of the body. the causal network of nature. between the body attribute they share, perceives. Reason draw its material from nature
The body is interwoven with Because of this causal network common
and the physical world and the
the body can be affected by the thing it as spontaneous reflects truths in nature. repre
The truths as common notions
arein fact the mental
sentations of infinite modes and laws of nature that exist objec tively in nature. The general causality of nature affects mind and body as a whole in uniform patterns. These uniform patterns are the same in the part and in the whole. ( E II p 37-39 ) Common notions dwell in the sensible world; they causally
determine the formation of ideas from the body onment. In sum, there are uniformities
and its envir changing
underneath
appearances. The perceiving body is interwoven with the causal network Reason, of nature,thus because making the transmission can perceive possible. directly
of its inborn
power,
those uniformities. Through reflection, reason shapes them into common notions. Common notions are ideas of a similarity of composition in existing modes. More explicitly, common notions are
385
ideas of
things common to all bodies.
In E II P40 s2, Spinoza defines
reason as consisting of common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things. In E II p39, Spinoza further argues
that what is common and proper to the human body and to certain external bodies by which the human body is wont to be affected, and which is equally in the part of each of these as well as in the whole, there will also be an adequate idea in
the mind. It is because God, when affected by the same things, has precisely the same ideas. In knowing a thing, the mind is internally determined by Gods nature. There are two main varieties of common notions. organized in terms of the greater or lesser generality. They are The less
universal ones are those which represent a similarity of com position between bodies that directly agree. from their own viewpoint. The agreement is
The common notions in question re
present things which are common to a human body and to certain external bodies. Through thesenotions, the mind under stands agreement between modes. (E II p39) The other type is the most universal one. It represents a similarity of composition among bodies that agree from a general viewpoint, and the agreement is not from their own viewpoint. This type of common notions represents what is common to all things, for example extension, movement and rest. (E II p38)
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In the eyes of Spinoza, abstract ideas as expounded by the empiricist are all inadequate ideas. Without exception, abstract ideas are abstracted from sensible data. formed by imagination. As such they are
Spinoza is against all forms of abstraction.
As inadequate, abstract ideas are images which originate in imagination. In forming abstract ideas, the mind leaves aside
gross sensible differences among things and chooses a sensible characteristic which is confusedly taken by the mind as common to things. The mind passes over minor differences of individual things as the number of things exceeds the power of imagin ation, and keeps the characteristics which are shared, it
supposes, by the things. (E II p40 s1)
Furthermore, the common
character varies from individual to individual. But it should be noted that those notions (abstract ideas) are not formed by all in the same way, but vary from one to another, in accordance with what the body has more often been affected by, and
what the mind imagines or recollects more easily. (E II p40 s1) One person defines man as an animal of erect stature, other people take it as an animal capable of laughter, or a featheriess biped or a ration animal. (E II p40 s1) The definition as such is purely accidental and extremely variable, depending on the way things affect different individuals. As images, abstract ideas
are not explained by the actual power of the mind; they do not
387
refer to general and common properties of things.
By contrast, In
common notions are general. They are necessarily adequate.
the case of the less universal notions, what is common to the body and to certain external bodies is the same in each of these bodies. Owing to this sameness, God has the same idea
of the body and the external bodies. Alternatively put, since there is something in common between the body and certain external bodies, the mind, accordingly, forms the idea of that thing which is common to the body and certain external bodies. Initially, the human mind is doomed to form inadequate ideas. It has ideas of affections, indicating the effects of some exter nal joy; bodies some on its body. Some and affect cause positively and sadness. pain, The cause mind
affect
negatively
tends to accumulate pleasure and avoid
selecting the
affections which are favorable. Because of those joyful affec tions, the mind forms the first common notions. Deleuze, it is the only way by which According to
the mind can form an
adequate idea.1 3 On forming the first common notions, the mind is in the realm of reason. The very activity of reason consists in
understanding agreements and disagreements. The forming of common notions is the effect of organizing encounters with
respect to agreements and disagreements. As a common notion is formed, it will directly lead
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to
another
common
notion.
Having formed the first common notions, the mind starts its deductive reasoning, which eventually leads to Gods knowledge. With respect to bodies, common notions are formed from
the most universal one (extension) to the least universal one (similarity of composition between bodies) according to the
order of generality. This is the logical order of common notions: they are all adequate ideas, which are causally linked to one another. The cause and order of their formation have some thing to do with breaking the concatenation of inadequate
ideas, to which all humans are condemned. What are the psycho logical factors which make possible the formation of common notions? No thing can be evil through which it has in
common with our nature; but insofar as it is evil for us, it is contrary to us. ( E IV p30 e ) If there really is something which is evil for us or that thing and us. in us, there is nothing in common between But a thing like this does not exist. is, there and the is still body something because No in
matter how different a thing common between the thing
they
belong to the same attribute. The only way in which the mind knows external bodies is through affections. External bodies affect the body, and the An affec
mind forms adequate or inadequate ideas accordingly.
tion is bad when it does not agree with us. An affection is

389
good joyful
or joyful affection
when
thing
agrees
with
our
nature.
induces the
mind to form the
corresponding
common notion. (E V p10) The first common notions so formed are the least universal ones because those objects agree directly with the body.
The most universal one comes last because one needs to exert great efforts in order to form the inductive principle between the bodies and ones body. object, the mind is joyful In understanding the cause of an and active.The mind is using its
power of action which depends on its essence. are explained from within. by the power of understanding
Adequate ideas which comes
The mind is in possession of reason when it avoids all sad passions which hinder the power of action. In fact, allpassions, Still the
including joyful ones, originate from inadequate ideas. mind has to accumulate joyful
passions, which facilitate the
formation of adequate ideas.
It is active only when aided by
the joyful passions. A mind becomes active when it forms an adequate idea. It is active in the sense that it is the adequate cause of that idea. Being active, the mind forms the idea of Thereafter, the mind
what is common to that body and its own.
has an idea of the affection which is an active feeling. In brief,
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the formation of a clear and distinct idea induces an active feeling. For Hume, feeling is subjective and passive. Because of this,
Hume is confident in asserting that all knowledge claims are subjective and fictional. Once Hume shows that causality is just a
subjective feeling, the search for validity in knowledge flounders. While anticipating Humes notion of subjective feeling in his
theory of belief, Spinoza succeeds in arguing for a case that a feeling may come from an adequate idea, which explains the power of thinking. Since the feeling originates from an adequate idea, it possesses validity. The Humean feeling, which has its source in inadequate ideas, is passive, groundless, and fictional. Feelings coming from adequate ideas carry validity.
Commom Notions: the Relations between Body and External Bodies
The first kind of knowledge is tainted with errors. kind of knowledge is immune from errors.
The second
It derives from our
possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the pro perties of things. (E II p40 s2) As common notions are ideas of
properties which are common to all bodies and are equal in
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the part and in the whole, the perceived characteristics are common to both external bodies and the body. Spinoza states some of the characteristics of bodies, the ideas of which are common notions. ( E II ax2 L2 ) These charac
teristics are: all bodies are modes of extension; all bodies can move sometimes more slowly, sometimes more quickly; and all
can be moved or can come to rest. The nature of common notions is spelled out implicitly in this and the next set of axiom, which are concerned with the properties of bodies in general. At bottom, common notions turn out to be the ideas of the properties of things. (E II p40 s2 ) It implies that the adequate
ideas at stake mean ideas of the characteristics that belong exclusively to the human body and to external bodies which interact with it. Spinoza concedes that common notions come from experience, but they are not derived from experience. The experience of external bodies occasions these common notions to arise in us. Therefore, common notions are not strictly a priori - there is an empirical element in them. Since common notions all come from
experience, how can they carry the characteristics of universality and necessity? As all bodies involve the conception of one and the same attribute, they agree in certain respects. All bodies express the nature
392
( E II p13 L2 ) in a certain
of
extension
determinate fashion - they may move
less or more quickly, and
may be absolutely in motion or at rest. ( ibid ) Accordingly, it is viable to found a general science concerning bodies, which is purely based on mathematical principles. deal The science does not Rather, it is con It follows as all
with any singular thing or its existence.
cerned with characters which are common to all bodies. that such science the carries same universality characters and and necessity obey
bodies
share
the
same
physical laws. Common notions are the representations of the relations of all bodies.The relations are equally in a part and in the whole. The relations apply to all bodies; therefore, common notions do not deal with the essence and the existence of any particular thing. (E II p37) The mind perceives and extracts common notions through corporeal affections. Indeed, the mind is on a par with nature; it is always affected by its environment. The sensory imprints reflect neither the actual state of the external bodies nor the perceiving body, but their conflation. (E II p16 c2). More precisely, sensible experience gives rise to imaginations and memories. In what way can the mind perceive the realm of fleeting sensible data? I think that it is through the cooperation of the mind and the body that one perceives the essence of God as common notions.
393
common
notions within
The mind reflects the truth from within nature.Unlike imagination, reason is autonomous; it is not affected by the fleeting sensible data. Reason draws its ideas from nature not by abstracting ideas from particulars, but by intuiting directly the laws of nature as inscribed in the infinite modes. As noted, joyful affections
agree with reason. The accumulation of joyful affections enhances the work of reason. Because of the positive effect of those
affections, at some point reason will take office. The mind is no longer affected by particulars as in the case of imagination. Rather, it is affected directly by the laws of nature. Spinoza discusses how one forms abstract universals through imagination. (E II p40 s1, s2) The universals so formed are abstract, empty, and inadequate. In contrast, common notions formed by reason have validity. I t is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary and not as contingent. And it perceives this necessity of things truly, But this necessity of things is the very
that is, as it is in itself.
necessity of Gods eternal nature. Therefore, it is of the nature of reason to regard things under this species of eternity.
(E II p44 c2 d) By means of reason, the mind perceives the laws of nature. Through the actual power of thinking, it per ceives underneath the fleeting, transient sense data the
common notions as adequate ideas.
394
What role does the body play in perceiving common notions? The itinerary of the second kind of knowledge starts with forming common notions of the less universal ones. The first common notions are ideas of properties which are common to the body The ideas so derived
and to certain external bodies. (E II p39)
are adequate with respect to those properties which the body and certain external bodies share. yet fully determined. The idea of the object is not
The mind needs to grasp all the common
notions involved, from the less universal to the most universal, ....its idea will also be adequate in the mind. (E II p39) Note the future tense used here, which refers to the journey an idea has to make before it becomes fully adequate in the mind. The common notions, which are the easiest ones to form,
are the less universal ones.
For those notions, the body agrees
directly with certain external bodies; not much work needs to be done for deriving the corresponding common notions. In moving up the hierarchy of common notions, the mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately as its body has many things in common with other bodies. (E II p39 c) The more active the body is, the better the mind perceives. In E II p13 s, Spinoza relates in what sense a mind (a body) is superior to other minds (bodies). The excellence of one
mind over the other minds is a function of the excellence of

395
its body over the other bodies. The more active the body is, the more complex the body becomes and the more external bodies with which the body will agree. Consequently, the mind perceives more and more adequately. Insofar as the body can be disposed in a great many ways, the mind is capable of perceiving a great many things. How well the mind functions is directly related to how efficiently the body works and vice versa. The formation of common notions relies on the fact that something is common to external bodies and the body, and is equal in the part and in the whole of each of them. (E II p39)
The body has something in common with an external body, which is equal in the part and in the whole; thebody is said
to agree with the external body. When the body can be dis posed in many ways, it implies that the body agrees with many external bodies. As the body has more and more things which are in common with external bodies, the mind will form more and more common notions corresponding to those common
properties. On account of the disposition and activity of the body, the mind perceives more clearly and distinctly. Whatever so disposes the body that it can be affected in a great many ways is useful to us. (E IV p38) Man is virtuous He
insofar as he understands and acts.(E IV def 8, E IV p23)
becomes active when he possesses more joyful passions. At

396
a certain point, he understands the cause of his action and forms common notions as adequate ideas. Once the first common
notions are formed, they will link to other common notions. By virtue of the body which can be affected in a great many ways, one ends up forming a lot of adequate ideas. He who has a body capable of a great many things whose greatest part is eternal. (E V p39) has a mind
In that case, the mind
has the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. (E V p39 d) Owing to the disposition and the activity of the body, the mind
can form common notions from the least general ones (the ones in which the body agrees with certain bodies) to the most general one (the one in which the body agrees with all bodies).
From joyful passions to active joys, eventually the mind forms active affects; it knows the cause of its action. lizing its power of thinking, the mind an While actua form common
notions of the more general ones even circumstances.
in the less favorable
The Perception of Common Notions
The itinerary of propositions 37, 38, and 39 proceeds from the determination of that which is common to all to the knowledge
397
of certain ideas or notions common to all men. ( E II p38 c ) Starting from the objective commonality of external bodies,
Spinoza wants to show how these common characters which exist in all bodies can be perceived by the body and con ceived by the mind as common notions. The ideas must be
adequate and they must be universal and necessary because they all correspond to the reality of the physical world. Common notions deal with general and common properties of things; they do not constitute the essence of any partiuclar thing. (E II p37) movement and though common These notions deal with the general laws of rest, which concern all bodies in general. notions do not concern Even
particular essences,
one cannot
know the
particular essence of a thing without
grasping the common notions of the thing. All bodies agree in certain things.(E II L2 d) Apart from their
particular existence, all bodies present some common properties. AH bodies involve the concept of one and the same attribute (E II L2 d); that is, all bodies express the nature of extension in a determinate way. They move now more slowly, now more quickly. Absolutely, now they move, now they are at rest.
(E II L2 d) As they are all under the attribute of extension, they are all governed by the same physical laws of motion and rest. God produces infinite modes, which internally determine all
398
bodies. Gods power of thinking is equal to his actual
power of
acting. That is whatever follows formally from Gods infinite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in the same order and with the same connection. (E II p7 c) manifestations of Gods power. All infinite modes are
He is the immanent cause of
all things in the universe(E I p18); he transmits his power from infinite modes through the infinite causal chain to individual
finite modes. Since all
bodies are determined by the same
physical laws of nature, the properties they share have nothing to do with the particular essences of individual things. Detached from the influence of imagination, the mind leaves behind the sensible qualities of things and comes to observe the common properties underneath. In grasping common notions of things, the mind unlashes the tie of the actual existence of individual things and knows the structures which govern those things. Only after the mind has grasped all those structures of
things can it intuit the concrete essences of things. As long as the mind detaches itself from the consideration of individual things, it no longer borders events of individual existence. A new function dawns on the mind; it apprehends things from another viewpoint, looking at things which is pure and "without relation to the bodys existence."(E V p40 s)
Those things which are common to all,

399
and are equally in the
part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately. (E II p38) The proof of this proposition is straightforward. bodies. whole.
Spinoza takes A as the commonproperty shared by all So A is equally in the part of each body and in the
As A is a common property, it is independent of indivudual essences. First, the idea of A must be adequate in God.
Gods power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting. (E II p7 c) As physical laws of nature, infinite modes, which are the direct products of God, transmit Gods power to every individual mode. which There must be a corresponding idea in God property. Hence, the idea of
represents the common
A must be adequate in God. How can the mind have the same adequate idea? Insofar
as the mind leaves the realm of imagination, new cognitive function. The mind will
it assumes a pro On and
observe common
perties of things, which are manifestations of Gods power. account of the laws ofnature which govern all bodies
determine them in the same way, God manifests his essence and produces God things which has adequate idea of the are common to all bodies. Now of its
Meanwhile,
ideas
of those things.
God has the
human
body and....ideas
affections, which involve in part both the nature of the human body and that of external bodies. (E II p38 d)
400
The idea
will be adequate in God insofar as God constitutes the human mind. (E II p38 d) modifications. The mind perceives its body and all its
In perceiving A, the mind must conceive A ade
quately, for God constitutes directly the essence of the mind. In conceiving the ideas of common notions, the mind or the body has to go through several stages. It is a process
through which the mind gradually consolidates its ideas and renders them more and more adequate. At first, the idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies,
must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the external body. (E II p16) Under the sway of imagi nation, the mind individual is trapped things as in spontaneous actually experiences. paying It no
perceives
existing,
attention to their common properties. By means of ratio, it is able to detach itself from present circumstances. The mind is no longer determined by the fortuitous play of circumstances. It
considers several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference and contrast. (E II p29 c) perceiving the common It comes to see relations
things anew,
properties and
among things. Following the itinerary of inductive reasoning, the mind, instead of perceiving individual things, recognizes some thing general and relational among things through progressive
401
abstraction
from
actual
individuals.
The
ideas
so
conceived
must necessarily be adequate. The perceiving body and the thing perceived must have some thing in common as "all bodies agree in certain respects." All
bodies are modes of the attribute of extension. That which is common to the two bodies is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them. ( E II P39 ) As there are certain
ideas, or notions, common to all men (E II p38 c), it follows that all men are, in principle, capable of forming adequate ideas. While forming adequate ideas, all men would see things as
God does. What is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them will be reflected by the mind as a common notion. And it must be clearly and distinctly perceived by
all men. In brief, the formation of common notions as adequate ideas is a fact of reason, which applies to all men.
The Third Kind of Knowledge
The highest rank of knowledge, for Spinoza, is the third kind of knowledge. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence
402
of things.
(E II p40 s2 IV)
By itself, the definition does not
reveal much the nature of this kind of knowledge. Adequate though it is, the second kind of knowledge is
concerned with what is common to all things. reason to perceive
It is the nature of
things under a certain species of eternity.
(E II p44 cor 2) Note here Spinoza specifies the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain (quadam) species of
eternity. In contrast, when Spinoza talks about the third kind of knowledge, he uses the pharse under the (a) species of eternity. (E V p22) (Note: there is no article in Latin; one needs
to supply the article required. seems to be more appropriate.) following in mind. the mind
In this case, the definite article Spinoza seems to have the
In the second kind of knowledge, even though
knows the essence of God as common notions, the it does not
knowledge from reason is abstract and general concern the concrete essence of the thing.
Only when the
mind comprehends the concrete essence of the thing does it know the thing under the species of eternity. All things said, the not yet clear at this point. Knowing the
nature ofthe thing is
things nature implies understanding its first causes. The second kind of knowledge deals with common and
general properties
among bodies.
Reason is the sequence of general and specific common
adequate ideas following from the

403
notions. (E II p40) In the second kind of knowledge, the mind perceives things and forms universal notions. (E II p38c, p39, p40) The adequate ideas of what of the properties and of things form the
understanding
is common
particular to
certain
sorts of things. That explains why reason allows the mind to perceive things under a certain species of eternity. The perception in the second kind of knowledge presents things as necessary consequences. One is supposed to know, not the concrete causal
link, but the general common notions. Alternatively, reason explains things on the basis of general notions such as extension,
motion, and rest, and the general laws related to them such as laws of nature. The third kind of knowledge trades on the singular idea of a particular thing, which actually exists. Spinoza means the concrete Each idea of each
essence of a thing, not the abstract essence.
body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God. (E II p45) Spinoza further remarks that knowledge as such is adequate and perfect. He attributes this adequate and perfect knowledge to a singular thing which actually exists. The present indicative used here can be understood in the following ways. First, it refers to the eternal now, and the content of know ledge points to the being of a singular thing as an eternal and
404
infinite essence of God. The idea of existence one forms through imagination refers to something which exists in a certain time and place. Anything actually existing does not refer to that which Rather, a thing which actually
exists in a certain time and place.
exists owes its existence to a modification of Gods power, which makes it into a force. For even if each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of Gods nature. (E II p45 s) power that something exists necessarily. actual existence of something power. More interestingly, the present indicative can be understood as the present moment in which the concrete essence of a thing is being conceived. In fact, Spinoza uses the same ex It is due to Gods
In other words, the of Gods
is the manifestation
pression things which actually exist in the beginning of part II of the Ethics, where he talks about imagination and the actual state of the body and its affections.(p11, p17, p19) cases, the experiences are both immediate, In both
but in different
perspectives, namely, one governed by imagination, the other by intuition. Accordingly, the essence of God is materialized as the
essence of a thing whose existence (eternal and temporal) is being visualized and confirmed. (E II p8 c) It is the most immediate
405
experience of a thing, for the idea agrees in every respect with its (physical) ideatum. It follows that the knowledge is
absolutely certain because of its perfection and adequacy. Thus, the third kind of knowledge must take place in time even
though time is not a constitutive element in that knowledge. There are other differences between the second and the third kinds of knowledge. I agree with Henry E. Allison that knowledge
from general principles remains ungrounded. Spinoza gives an example to illustrate the three kinds of knowledge, saying that there are three numbers and one needs to find the fourth which is to the third as the second is to the first. (E II p40 s2) In the
second kind of knowledge, the conclusion is inferred correctly from the principle. However, the status of the principle remains unknown. This One needs a grounding of principles and consequences. only can be achieved ground the deduces in the third principle in the its whereas conclusions intuition kind of
grounding can
knowledge, for one of God.14 Lastly, given
nature from grasps
reason
previously
general
principles,
the truth in an immediate manner. The third kind of knowledge serves as the absolute condition for all possible knowledge. And since all things are in God and
conceived through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge a great many things which we know adequately....
406
(E II p47 s)
Attached to the infinite and eternal essence of God,
the third kind of knowledge raises a determination, which is absolutely objective. In this sense, it is the ultimate condition of
possibility in all knowledge. Up to this point, I have explained the first part of the
definition of the third kind of knowledge. The idea of a thing which actually exists involves the concept of the attribute. In other words,
it involves an eternal and infinite essence of God. 'The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but can indeed arise from the second." ( E V p28) Indeed, reason makes the first step to adequate knowledge as it allows the mind to perceive things under a certain species of eternity. insight into what is common to certain things. I agree with Yovel that as far as knowledge of the object isconcerned, reason provides all the information required.1 5 In Reason gives an
this respect, there is nothing new in the third kind of know ledge. Yet something new happens. What the mind knew of the
object is internalized; in an act of intuition, it grasps the particular essence of an object. the thing in a new way. It changes the perspective and looks at Through a synthesis, the mind has a In the second kind of knowledge,
deeper insight into the object.
the object is known in terms of common notions, a set of

407
abstract common properties. one synthesizes them into
In the third kind a new item. The
of
knowledge, intuits
mind
the concrete essence of a thing which follows immanently from God. As perfect and complete, the third kind of knowledge
possesses the highest certainty.
What one knows already implies The act of knowing
that one knows that one knows. (E II p43)
here refers not to an external mark, but to an intrinsic property, which is necessarily attached to the particularity of an idea. This is an intellectual experience, procession of a true idea in its most Error is the privation of knowledge. designating the mind's
concrete form. From this it follows that
the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God.... And when we say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but also in so far as he has, simultaneously with the human mind, the idea of another thing, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing partially, i.e. inadequately. (E II p11c) In conceiving an
idea, the divine intellect constitutes the nature of the human mind and simultaneously words, a part of the the nature of another thing. In other mind. human
idea is produced in the human
Something is produced in the human mind, notby the
mind itself. Consequently, the mind has an inadequate idea,

408
for it expresses only part of the idea as its nature. "An idea true in us is that which is adequate in God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind." (E II p43 d) An idea comes to its fruition in us when it is adequate in God. At that critical moment, God is explained through the nature of the human mind. There is in God an idea of the mind, i.e. the knowledge of the mind. (E II p20) Here, the mind is taken as an ideatum. Insofar as the mind is part of the infinite intellect, God has knowledge of the mind, and of what the mind is capable of knowing. But idea A is supposed to be related to God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind; therefore the idea of idea A must also be related to God in the same way, that is (by the same p11c), this adequate idea of idea A will be in the mind itself which has the adequate idea A. (E II p43 d)
As long as the mind is part of the infinite intellect, the reflection of a true idea must also be adequate in the mind as it is in God. One who knows that one has a true idea cannot doubt the truth of the thing. (E II p 43) mind reflects on the No matter how many times the
idea, it has the same degree of certainty. in the same The
This idea of the mind is united to the mind
way as the mind is united to the body. (E II p21)
idea of an idea and the idea are united exactly in the same
409
way as the idea of an object must agree with its object.
and
the object. A true idea
At the supreme level of knowledge, the mind grasps all the intrinsic characters of the idea, or the idea becomes adequate. Adequacy is itself a mark of truth; it who knows how suffices to distinguish to distinguish between
truth from falsity. He, true and false, must
have an adequate idea of true and false.
(E II p42 d) The intrinsic characters of an adequate idea are themselves the criteria that serve to tell the true from the false. Reflecting on the idea, one has the idea of an idea which is nothing other than the form of the idea insofar as the idea is
considered as a mode of thinking without relation to its object. (E II p21 d) The idea of an idea and the idea share the
same form, or the same representational content. Even if the reflection ideatum. goes on ad infinitum, it grounds on the same
Conceiving an idea in its most perfect form, one is
certain that one attains the truth. As far as the third kind of knowledge is concerned, there is no room for doubt. A true idea involves the highest certainty, for the idea in question is complete and perfect.
The Mind at Work
Under the sovereignty of imagination, the mind does not function properly - it is determined from without and it perceives things inadequately. As soon as the mind follows the lead of reason, In E II p40, Spinoza
it becomes autonomous and thinks rationally. is concerned with makes profit from
the aptitude of the mind, with which the mind adequate ideas. Functioning in its proper way,
the mind can enter a system of rational knowledge. Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind are also adequate. (E II p40) Having gone through all the from itself the
stages of selftransformation, the mind can elicit power to link and finally to
adequate ideas, to draw all the consequences, make good use of all the effects of truth. In gene
rating a system of adequate knowledge, the mind is determined internally, from the fact that "it regards a number of things at
once, to understand their agreements, differences and oppo sitions." (E II p29 s) The mind proceeds causally, linking ideas in such a way that they follow one another in a strict and
necessary manner. In the demonstration of proposition 40, Spinoza makes reference to E II 11c. As is formed in the the mind forms an adequate idea, the idea same condition under which it isconceived
411
by the infinite intellect. The idea conceived by the mind as adequate signifies at the same time the actuality of the mind. Furthermore, when the mind joins necessarily the idea to another adequate idea as its consequence, it is God who causes the formation of the new idea. And God connects the idea to another adequate idea insofar as he constitutes the nature of the mind. Alternatively put, not only does the mind manifest the essence of God in forming adequate ideas, it also expresses the power of the infinite intellect in linking ideas in a necessary manner. In a similar vein, Spinoza says, There is nothing from which some effect does not follow, and we understand clearly and distinctly whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in us; hence each of us has - in part, at least,if not absolutely - the power to understand himself and his effects.... (E V p4 s) By
virtue of reason, the mind engenders in itself the power to understand itself (self-knowledge) and the effects (knowledge of things). Again, making reference to E II p40, Spinoza claims that it conceives its bodys essence under a species of eternity, that is, except insofar as it is eternal. So insofar as it is eternal,
it has knowledge of God, knowledge which is necessarily adequate. And therefore, the mind, insofar as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all those things which can follow from this given know ledge of God (by II p40), that is, of
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knowing things by the third
kind of knowledge; therefore, the mind,insofar as it is eternal, is the adequate, or formal, cause of the third kind of knowledge. cause of the that the mind
(E V p31) Note here the mind is the formal adequate idea. It can be inferred as well
is also the formal cause of conceiving an adequate idea and linking the idea so formed to another adequate idea as its consequence. Once the mind renders itself adequate to the
infinite intellect, it connects ideas and draws consequences from them. The mind expresses Gods nature when it thinks logically and necessarily; adequate it actualizes ideas. With can, its this real potential, forming and of
joining the
revolutionary conception shed
mind,
Spinoza
in my opinion,
new light on
Humes paradox concerning personal identity.
The Intellectual Love of God
Pleasure and pain are related to both the body and the mind. We feel pleasure when our power of acting is increased and we pass to a greater perfection; we feel sad when our power of acting is diminished and we pass to a lesser perfection. (E III pi 1 s) All passions are accompanied by inadequate ideas.
We might feel pleasure without knowing the adequate cause of our action. Despite its passivity, the pleasure is favorable to us
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because it faciliates our action and it agrees with our reason. Favor is not contrary to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it. (E IV p51) When the mind considers itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and does so the more, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting. (E III p53) Simply by imagining the
presence of an object, the mind rejoices and feels pleasure. The body is affected randomly. with the body. Things might or might not agree
We feel pleasure when things agree with us, sad Generally speaking, the mind will avoid pain In cases where the mind has things that
when they do not.
and cling to pleasure.
diminish the bodys power of acting, the mind strives to think of things which exclude their existence. (E III p13) As the mind is
closely related to its body, the mind strives to imagine only things which enhance its power of acting. The reason is
that it is supposed to pass to a greater perfection, that is (by E III p11 s); to be affected with joy and with greater joy the more distinctly it can imagine its power of acting. (E III p53 d) The joy directly affects the power of acting, and the power of acting goes hand in hand with the power of understanding. While possessing more and more power of acting, the mind perceive (imagine) clearly and distinctly. can
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In the acquisition of knowledge, one begins by accumulating passive, but joyful, affections. The power of acting is increased, even though the cause of action is unknown. Joy agrees with our action and reason. The more one accumulates joyful affec At a certain point, the In fact, one needs to
tions, the more powerful one becomes. mind is capable of forming active affects.
call into reason to distinguish between the adequate idea of affection (active affect) and the (passion). inadequate idea of affection
A passion is a confused idea; if we should form a
clear and distinct idea of the affect itself, this idea will only be distinguished by reason from the affect itself, related only to the mind.(E V p3 d) insofar as it is power of
The enlightening
reason helps transform passive joy into active joy
(active affect).
The mind becomes the formal cause of the action and knows the cause of the passive joy. Toward the end of part III of the
Ethics, Spinoza introduces and describes the notion of active affect, ....apart from the joy and desire wihich are passions,
there are other affects of joy and desire which are related to us insofar as we act. ( E III p58) Active affects are necessarily joyful; there is no active sadness. These affects are grounded in the
adequate ideas that the mind forms. While conceiving an adequate idea, the mind is at the same time aware of itself. The aware
ness of its own activity gives rise to an active affect, which

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consists of pleasure and nothing else. the pure affection of the mind.
The source of pleasure is
Moreover, the pleasure is related
to the minds consciousness of its own activity, not to the nature of the object. The desire as active affect is the endeavor to preserve ones being insofar as the endeavor is guided by
adequate ideas. The pleasure is the result of the minds acti vities, or adequate ideas considered as acts. For Spinoza, the ultimate remedy against passions is the love of God. Through this love alone, the mind is able to conquer its passions and assume control over itself. Spinoza
believes that there is no affection of the body of which the mind cannot form an adequate idea. (E V p4) In comprehending these
things in relation to God, the mind grasps them in terms of their concrete essences, the very source of their intelligibility. It is the The
highest level of understanding and the most perfect one.
understanding expresses the highest and most perfect activity of the mind. satisfaction. clearly and Therefore, it ends up in the greatest intellectual He who understands himself and his affects
distinctlyloves God, and does
so the more, the Spinoza
more he understands himself and his affects. (E V p15)
links the love of God to understanding itself. The more we understand ourselves,the more we know things and God.
(E V p24) Knowledge of
the third kind is explained by ones

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essence. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as on a formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal. (E V p31) As eternal, the mind conceives everything adequately - it is the formal cause of things in the sense that it knows their first
causes. It explains knowledge of things and God in terms of its own essence. As the formal cause of all knowledge, the mind, under the species of eternity, is at its full potential of thinking. Spinoza defines love as follows: Love is a joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. (E III def VI) The intellectual
love of God is a particular case of love. In this case, the satis faction of love is accompanied by the idea of God as its exter nal cause. One of the aims of the Ethics is to offer an alternative to thetraditional way of religious salvation. The adequate under standing of a thing is intrinsically satisfying pure joy. it will end up in
Whatever we understand by the third kind of know
ledge we take pleasure in, and our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as a cause. (E V p32) As the essence of
the mind is the formal cause of things, it explains formally all knowledge claims. But the idea of ones essence is the idea of God. While the mind is completely determined from within,
it knows the essence of the thing and takes pleasure in the knolwedge. The joy is accompanied by the idea of God. So
considered, the idea of God serves as the material cause of

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the pleasure. The pleasure is the pure joy of understanding accompanied by the idea of God directly the essence of the as its cause. God constitutes know
mind. In the third kind of
ledge, the mind is part of the infinite intellect; it is aware of its intellectual power. The mind understands and explains the nature
of God in terms of the things essence. One is as joyful as God is; one feels the same pure joy as God feels. The joy at issue by the
is the greatest and purest because it is accompanied idea of God.
As the joy derives from ones essence and it is In
accompanied by the idea of God, it is the love of God.
short, the mind understands the thing in relation to God. As the ultimate object of knowledge and the only source of the intelligibility of things, God becomes the pure object of love and the cause of joy. The mind delights in the intelligibility of things and recognizes its own cognitive power; consequently it has the highest satis faction. And it is this satisfaction that constitutes human blessed
ness. It is the minds love of God; it is also the love of God through which Godloves himself. (E V p36) On grasping the same in the
innermost essence of a thing, the mind knows at the time theintelligibility of God. form of human knowledge. God's nature is expressed
The intellectual love of God is the
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last intrinsic denomination of a true idea, signifying the minds possession of a complete and adequate idea of God.
Self-Knowledge and Self-Awarenes
Knowledge of the second kind involves grasping the causal con nections of a thing. The thing is not just causally related to laws of nature that
other things, but to Gods attribute and the
follow immediately from them. The mind understands how the thing is ultimately determined by the nature that it instantiates. For instance, in the adequateidea of a body is embedded not only in its particular thing, relations the to
mechanistic
other bodies, but also in the laws of motion and rest and the nature of matter. The mind knows the thing through the
external causes and universal
laws; it understands
how
thing instantiates a set of common properties from which it derives the common notions. In the third kind of knowledge, intuition takes what is known by reason and grasps it in a comprehensive act. Whereas reason
moves discursively through different stages, from causes through intermediate steps to the final effect; intuition synthesizes into an essence of the thing which reason knows only discursively. In the third kind of knowledge, the mind knows the necessity of
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a thing and the way
it depends on its first causes. Consequently,
the mind has a deep causal understanding of the thing. The mind synthesizes all the previous information into a new item. Instead of knowing the thing through transitive causality, it intuits the essence of the thing such that its essence follows immanently from Gods attribute. (E II p40 s2 IV) However, it is
necessary for the mind to go through all the deductive reasoning in the second kind of knowledge before it is capable of intuiting the particular essence of the thing. The striving, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, (E V p28) but can indeed arise from the second.
Admittedly, the mind cannot fortuitously intuit the
essence of a thing with a single glance. The third kind of knowledge involves an elaborate form of mediate knowledge. There is no direct intuition of the things essence. To arrive at the
immanent essence of an object, one needs to follow step by step the chain of deductive reasoning, which explains the object externally. In each step, one intuits the simple truths, axioms, general laws, and common notions involved. One can intuit the one reaches a
immanent essence of the object only when
point of saturation in which one grasps all the mediate forms of knowledge. Then, in a new synthesis, one intuits the particular
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essence of the object and knows the way in which the object follows the logical necessity of one of Gods attribute. The aim of the third kind of knowledge is to know the innermost essence of a singular thing. essence of a thing is the highest For Spinoza, to know the achievement of human
knowledge. This is because when one knows the thing adequately, one not only knows the essence of the thing, but also the essence of ones body. The nature of reason is to conceive things with respect to general and common properties; this is the major concern of the second kind of knowledge. It belongs to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of its own body. (E V p29 d) The mind knows external things through the affections of its own body. On knowing the essence of a thing, the mind has
the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. (E V p10) completely instantiates the As the body
essence of a thing, the essence The adequate idea is a At the same time, the While rendering
turns out to be the bodys essence. true idea, which agrees with its object.
idea was the idea of the affection of the body.
the idea into an adequate one, the mind turns the ideas of bodily affections into adequate ideas. There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct concept. (E V p4)
Accordingly, the mind knows the essence of its body as well.

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The body incorporates the essence of the thing as its own essence. Owing to the fact that the mind understands the of eternity and
essence of its own
body under a species
the essence of a singular thing, the understanding as such is the highest achievement of the mind. thing and Beyond the essence of the
the essence of its body, nothing else belongs to the
essence of the mind. (E V p29 d) . While knowing the essence of a thing and therefore the essence of its body, the mind
knows its essence as well. The particular essence of the thing so perceived in the third essenceof the mind.The
kind of knowledge is also the particular
network of transitive causes defines the body and its affections. In an act of intuition, the mind avoids the network of transitive causes of the bodies, synthesizes all causal information, and immanently knows the essence of the thing as its first causes. Spinoza claims that the third kind of knowledge brings us pleasure of an unpresidented kind. (E V p31) The grestest stri
ving of the mind is understanding things by the third kind of knowledge. (E V p25) As mans virtue consists in the pursuit
of knolwdge, he possesses the greatest virtue when he has knowledge of God. Power is virtue; he is most powerful when
he has knowledge of God. lesser to a greater perfection.
Joy is a mans passage from a (E III def Aff. II) Man is perfect
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because he is united with God. He objectifies Gods essence as his essence. The moment one attains the third kind of know
ledge, one is (in terms of conatus) in oneself as God is in himself; one is as infinitely free as God is. In the supreme kind of knowledge where the object of knowledge is oneself, the kind of affective response is so overwhelming that it takes up the whole of ones being and transforms it. No wonder, Spinoza can compare the psychological powers of joy and
blessedness to those of religious mysticism. The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body, but also the ideas of these affections. (E II p22) While
knowing its body and external bodies inadequately, the mind is aware of its body and of everything that happens to it. In the
third kind of knowledge, the mind not only knows the external body adequately, it also apprehends its own bodys essence. By then the mind is aware of its body in the sense that it has an immediate contact with its body. The adequate idea agrees in every respect with its ideatum, which was
the confused affection of the body; the affection becomes a clear and distinct image because the idea of the affection
is now related to the idea of God. (E V p14)
The physical
(corporeal) affect, which is now clear and distinct, corresponds in all aspects to the external object.
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That means, one has a
perfect image of the object the moment one intuits the concrete essence of the object. The mind is always conscious of its own
body. Under a species of eternity, the essences of mind and body are one and the same. (E V p30) Consequently, the
mind has an adequate idea of everything, namely, the object, God, the body, and itself. Knowledge of these things is one and the same piece of and complete. From knowledge of the essence of a thing, one discovers knowledge of one's body. On knowing the essence of ones body, one is immediately and directly aware of ones body, (cf. E II p22) One has self-knowledge when one has knowledge knowledge, which is absolute, perfect,
of ones body (cf. E II p23); similarly, one has self-awareness when one has immediate awareness of ones body. At this point, I need to make a refined distinction between self-knowledge and self-awareness. If knowledge is confined to propositional or conceptual knowledge, then awareness is different from know ledge in the sense that it is non-propositional or non-discursive. Alternatively put, whereas knowledge is related to reason, content, argument, or proposition; awareness is connected with intuition, feeling, or emotion. The mind intuits and knows the simplest truths, axioms,
mathematical truths, general laws of nature, and common notions.

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Intuition is invovled in each act of knowing. Intuition consists not just of the insight, but of the logical necessity, which compels the Hence, there is
mind to give assent to what is being conceived.
some compelling force in all kinds of intuition. The compelling force increases from ordinary ones to the most intellectual one. The increase in force implies the increase in power, which is mind as joy orsatisfaction. It is understandable
interpreted in the
why the greatest satisfaction arises only in the third kind of knowledge. In the supreme kind of knowledge, the mind knows God is. The is boundless
as adequately as God knows; it is as powerful as pleasure derived from this kind of knowledge
because it is caused by the infinite and eternal idea of God. (E V p32) Granted the distinction between knowledge and aware ness, the feeling can be linked to the awareness of the self (the body). The blissful feeling is an empirical sign, indicating
that one attains the goal in the quest for absolute knowledge. According to Deleuze, joy and satisfaction can be derived from both the second and the third kinds of knowledge. The joy is However, as regards the degree of satis The joy
active in both cases.
faction, there is a great difference between the two.16
from the second kind of knowledge indicates that one knows the adequate idea and the cause of ones action. The mind has knowledge of the common and general properties of the
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thing. But knowledge of the thing, though adequate, is abstract. Because of this, there is some distance between the mind and the thing; the mind has not reached the innermost essence of the thing, in other words, the idea of the thing is not ones
proper idea; there is some mediation between the mind and the idea. By contrast, in the third kind of knowledge, the mind knows the things concrete essence. It has complete knowledge
of the thing. The relationship between the thing and the mind is immediate. It knows the thing inside out; there is no
more mediation between the two. The idea thus becomes ones proper idea. In the third kind of knowledge, the mind achieves
a state of transparency, not just with respect to the thing in question, but to its body and itself as well. At one stroke, the mind knows the essence of the thing, its body, and itself. Additionally, the mind knows God in the sense that God clusively its essence. constitutes ex
God then becomes the object of ones
love. One derives from this love the greatest satisfaction. Again, because the essence of our mind consists only in knowledge,
of which God is the beginning and foundation, it is clear to us how our mind, with respect both to essence and existence, follows from the divine nature, and continually depends on God. (E V p36 s) At the supreme level of knowledge, both the mind and the body are totally transformed; they follow strictly from
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the divine nature. At that moment, they are one and the same under the species of eternity, and they instantiate the eternal essence and existence of God. Indeed, Spinoza shows us how much the knowledge of singular things....can accomplish, and how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge.... of the second kind. (E V p36 s) Thus the joy of the third kind the words of
of knowledge is enormous and unsurpassable. In
Deleuze, avec le troisieme genre de connaissance, nous formons des idees adequates de nous-memes et des autres choses
telles quelles sont en Dieu et sont congues par Dieu. Les joies actives qui decoulent des idee du troisieme genre sont done dune autre nature que celles qui decoulent du deuxieme.1 7 For Descartes, knowledge of the cogito as a thinking thing is indeed indubitable. Descartes evinces rigorous efforts and des idees
Promethean insights, attempting to found knowledge on an in vincible ground. However, in the eyes of Spinoza, this is not
an unqualified success. This piece of self-knowledge is by no means faultless, for it is susceptible to an infinite regress. First, knowledge of the cogito is propositional. That means, it can be
grounded by another proposition, which in turn can be explained by another and so on ad infinitum. As the inquiry never reaches bottom, the self-knowledge claim in Descartes involves an infinite
All
regress.
Epistemologically, the cogito is the first piece of know
ledge of which Descartes can claim validity. All other know ledge claims before the discovery of the cogito are subject
to doubt. Only the cogito survives all kinds of doubt, including the hypothesis of the evil genius. ciple based. of knowledge on which The cogito is the first prin knowledge claims are
further
Because of its indubitability, the cogito is claimed by
Descartes to be the examplary model of clear and distinct ideas, from which Descartes can proceed and establish knowledge of God and the external world. From Spinozas perspective, the
cogito, in spite of its indubitability, is not yet a well-founded piece of knowledge. Insofar as it involves an infinite regress, the
cogito cannot be absolutely certain. If that is the case, all other knowledge claims in Descartes suffer the same fate. In part V of the Ethics, the discussions of overcoming emotion and the intellectual love of God are the finishing touches with
which Spinoza unpacts the ultimate problem of knowledge. As noted, knowledge of the essence of a thing amounts to an element of self-knowledge. And that element of self-knowledge is
accompanied by a joyful feeling - the intellectual love of God. In contrast to Descartes, self-knowledge in the hands of Spinoza is not grounded on another piece of knowledge, which is by definition propositional; rather, it is founded on an intuition as feeling.
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This
feeling, to be sure, is non-propositional.
At base, the feeling as
such is rather an awareness of the self (or the body). That blissful feeling is the ground on which all propositional knowledge is based. With the occurrence of this feeling, infinite regress comes All at once, one has knowledge of the thing, God, the
to a halt.
body, and the mind; all these are one piece of knowledge founded on a joyful feeling as self-awareness. The quest for absolute reality leads Spinoza to adopt a different approach to the self such that knowledge of the self becomes the ultimate foundation for all other knowledge claims. The acquisition of the supreme kind of knowledge is accom panied by a feeling. This feeling in turn forms the ultimate foun
dation, on which all other knowledge claims are based. This interpretation of Spinozas theory of self-knowledge is perfectly in line with Jacobis understanding of Spinoza. Manfred Franks presentation of how Jacobi Here I follow reads the third
kind of knowledge in Spinoza.1 8 According to Frank, there are two ideas expounded by Jacobi in the second edition of his Spinoza Booklet, which are extremely influential. understands of reality. Spinozas monistic In the first place, Jacobi as the sum total
substance
(This is in line with the understanding of Gods
essence as eternal and infinite.) Jocobi first idea relates this understanding of substance with the notion of being.
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Like
substance,
being is something singular;
being so understood All thoughts
is characterized by a unitary meaning of being.
about a determined existence presupposes an understanding of this unitary being. unitary meaning of In other words, the understanding of the being is prior to all thoughts of a de
termined existence. In contrast with substance, being understood in the unitary sense cannot be grasped through concepts; it is merely the object of experience. Being as such is identified with Position
(Setezung). Jacobi distinguishes between two senses of the copula is, namely one is absolutely posited and the other is relatively posited. A concept is posited absolutely if its object exists; for The am does not express a new content that
example, I am.
would be added to the concept I. It only claims that the subject I exists. In case if the subject does not really exist, the positing A concept is relatively posited,
is considered as an imagination. say A is B.
A stands for the object and B is the concept When something is posited
under which A is being explained.
relatively, the positing takes place through the relational par ticle is. Kant calls such relations judgments. One judges an object as something conceptual. Absolute positing reveals itself
through perception or intuition. In his Booklet, Jacobi says, Even of our own existence we have only a feeling, not a concept.1 9
430
In contrast, relative positing is present in predicative judgment and deductive reasoning. The two senses of existence are related. For Jacobi, existence
and identity are the same in the case of the unitary of being. In the predicative judgment, the synthetic force of the relational particle is comes from the identity or existence of the unitary being. Jacobi believes that one must never put the sum after It means that as far as unitary The thought The
the cogitio. (emphasis added) 20 being is of sum is
concerned, one grasps a thought as sum.
closer to one than the thought of the cogito.
thought of the cogito is intentional - it presupposes the thought of something, whereas the thought of sum is merely an act of experience - it cannot be grasped through concept. In the seventh supplement to the second edition of the Booklet, Jacobi comes up with another interesting idea. Jacobi claims that The demon
the definition of knowledge leads to infinite regress. stration is the following.
If what one knows are states of affairs,
the states of affairs are facts which can be grounded or stated in a proposition. In turn, the proposition can be grounded in another proposition, and so on ad infinitum. Owing to an infinite Were
regress, one can never arrive at an instance of knowledge.
there be an instance of knowledge, one proposition must be held unconditionally. It means that no further proposition is needed
431
to ground that proposition. This brings us to the concept of an immediate certainty which is not only not in need of a grounding but altogether exclude all grounds. 2 1 Jacobi calls this unconditional propositions. proposition Feeling feeling, which a grounds fact with subsequent certainty,
means
intuiting
without further justification. Jacobi then brings the two ideas together. The idea of the
unitary being, which is presupposed in every determined exis tence, is identified with the idea of the unconditional grounding. Briefly put, in each and every representation which is con One has
ditioned, the unconditional grounding is presupposed.
the experience of the conditioned only in the presence of the representation of the unconditional. Moreover, in the experience
of the unconditional, we have of its existence the same and even a higher certainty than regarding our own conditioned
existence. 22 Considered as an instance of knowledge, the repre sentation of the conditioned needs a certainty. The certainty can
only be derived from the unconditional grounding; otherwise, the knowledge claim will involve an infinite regress. From the above analysis, the unconditional proposition, namely intuition as feeling, can be equated with self-awareness and the conditional proposition with self-knowledge. A question arises: How can self-awareness be linked to the experience of the unitary
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being?
At first sight, they seem to be totally unrelated.
Spinoza
holds that the mind must perceive everything that happens in the body, ....nothing can happen in that body which is not per It is unthinkable that the mind
ceived by the mind. (E II p12)
perceives something which goes beyond the experience of its body. As soon as God directly constitutes the essence of the This idea of the mind is
mind, the mind relates its idea to God.
united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body. (E II p21) in the mind as an idea. What happens to the body is reflected Reflecting on this idea will give the idea
of the idea. In the third kind of knowledge, the idea of the idea becomes Gods idea. At the supreme level of understanding, the
mind intuits the concrete essence of the thing, which involves its eternal existence. As discussed earlier, any thought of a de termined existence ontologically presupposes knowledge of the unitary being. Put it otherwise, the experience of the unitary being Being pure and non-
comes before any thought of a determined existence. experience, conceptual. the knowledge at issue is intuitional
Therefore, it is the unconditional
positing of being,
which is presupposed by all conditioned positings. The mind experiences the unconditional positing before any experience
of conceptual thoughts.
With no exception, all experiences take It follows that this un-
place first and foremost in the body.

433
conditional positing of the mind is the very experience of its bodys existence. At this level of consciousness, it is con
sciousness of the body pure and simple. I designate this ex perience as awareness of the body, for nothing conceptual is involved. By virtue of this consciousness, one has self-awareness. By E II p22, the mind perceives not only the affection of the body, but also the idea of this affection. By the same token, in
the third kind of knowledge, the mind perceives not only the affect of the body (self-awareness), but also the idea of this affect (self-knowledge). In short, at the supreme kind of know ledge, the mind fuses with its own body; they are one under the species of eternity. The fact that I am aware of my existence {sum) grounds my self-knowledge (cogito). In addition to the unconditional positing which is tantamount to awareness of the self, knowledge of the self is the essence of God, which necessarily involves existence. one As essence and existence of God imply each other, simultaneously se/f-knowledge (essence) and From certainty
experiences
self-awareness (existence), which are infinite and eternal. the intuitive perception of my self, I assert with
knowledge of the things essence.
I can assert that what is being
intuited necessarily exists because it is absolutely grounded in the awareness of my eternal existence.
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For Hume, the belief in the unity of a person cannot be subjected to reason. A self that has perfect identity and sim Hume denies any
plicity is merely a metaphysical speculation.
invariable and uninterrupted identity, and he offers instead a psychological account of how the mind comes to believe in the existence of the self. Despite his ingenuity, the theory itself is
inconsistent with his whole system. This inconsistency between Humes theories of the self and ideas can be corrected. To overcome Humes problem of personal identity, one needs a theory of mind which can accomplish two things. First, the mind can perform a kind of synthesis. Second, the mind can
combine discrete perceptions. Additionally, one needs to show that there is an awareness of the self, which serves not only to stop an infinite egress of knowledge claims found in the case of Descartes, but also to account for the mysterious, ineffable, and intuitional feeling of the self as related by Hume. In the third kind of knowledge, by means of scientific intuition, the mind gathers all the information that reason has accumulated, synthesizing it into a new item. By so doing, the mind intuits the
concrete essence of the thing and forms the adequate idea. As long as the mind renders itself adequate to the infinite intel lect, it is a part of the infinite intellect. The mind not just can
form adequate ideas, it can also draw consequences from the

435
adeqaute
ideas and
connect them to other adequate
ideas.
The essence of the thing turns out to be the essence of the body. It follows that the mind has knowledge of itself. Moreover, the mind is aware that it is identifical with its body and essence is the same as the essence of its body. Knowledge for Spinoza is knowledge of God, which is complete and perfect. Knowledge of God entails absolute certainty which that its
can be understood in two ways, namely objective and subjective certainties. Grasping the universal structures and physical laws of nature as common notions guarantees that perception per se is objectively certain simply because it has objective validity based on those structures and laws. In the second kind of knowledge, by means of reason, one perceives the common notions which lie underneath the transient sensible data. As argued before, common notions are ideas of immutable structures and the physical laws of nature. To a certain extent, these structures and laws are similar
to the Kantian categories as they both share the characters of universality and necessity. For Kant, the categories belong to the
faculties of the mind. They are a priori and inherent in all judg mental activities. In a similar vein, common notions as immutable
structures and laws of nature are grasped and conceived by the mind. These structures and laws are the cement of the world; through the perception of which the mind intuits the essence of
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a thing.
In this sense, they are the condition for the possibility
of the actual experience of an object (a la Kant). In what sense is knowledge of the third kind subjectively as feeling. The
certain? It refers to the intuition of ones being feeling as such is
intuitional and immediate.Unconditionally, ones very being, ....it is of the nature of things under a species of eternity (the
one is aware of reason to conceive
second kind of knowledge), and it also pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the bodys essence under a species of eternity (the third kind of knowledge), and beyond these two, nothing else pertains to the minds essence, this power of con ceiving things under a species of eternity pertains to the mind only insofar as it conceives the bodys essence under a species of eternity. (E Vp29 d , parenthesis added) The intuition of ones existence is logically prior to that of the existence of the thing, even though they refer to one and the same act. It implies
that self-knowledge comes essence and its existence.
prior to the grasping of the things The feeling as intuition of ones very
existence is not a capricious feeling, a fictitious Humean feeling. According to Jacobis analysis, this feeling as unconditional positing enjoys the utmost certainty, for it is the source of certainty of other propositional claims. all
437
Indeed, the certainty at issue is far more certain than that of the Cartesian cogito. The reason is two-fold. First, it is a feeling where all knowledge claims converge. Being the unconditional proposition, intuition as feeling grounds all subsequent know ledge claims, making them into intuitional knowledge. Consequently, infinite regress comes to halt. For Descartes, intuitional know
ledge is absolutely certain.
It is really the case in Spinoza as and accompanied by a Second, the perception of
intuitional knowledge is grounded on feeling as the intectual love of God.
common notions comes along with a feeling. Derived from an adequate idea, the feeling is also an adequate idea; therefore, it has its validity and certainty. The experience of the intellectual
love of God designates that in the inquiry of absolute know ledge, one beats the bottom line, on which all other adequate ideas are based. The target being reached, such a feeling
designates the utmost certainty.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I intented to solve two problems. The first problem is the paradox of personal identity in Hume. The second problem
is the infinite regress in all knowledge claims. The keys to the first problem are: (1) to show the proper function of the mind that it
438
synthesizes and combines discrete ideas; and (2) to argue that the self really exists. As for the second problem, the solution lies in
the fact that all propositional knowledge needs to be grounded on an unconditional positing, which is non-propositional. I discussed Humes paradox of personal identity, showing the incompatibility of his theories of ideas and personal identity. In
light of this paradox, I considered the three kinds of knowledge in Spinoza. I claimed that the first kind of knowledge is indis pensable, for it supplies the raw materials with which one In the
proceeds to the second and the third kinds of knowledge.
second kind of knowledge, all the contingent characters as found in the first kind of knowledge are removed. The common pro perties and relations of bodies are a-temporal. Common notions are the epistemological counterparts of the eternal properties of things. God. These things have their origin in the infinite modes of The laws of nature inscribed in the infinite mode are modes
manifesting Gods infinite power of acting. The mind, while forming common notions, expresses Gods power of acting. Accordingly, everything perceived by the mind follows by necessity, for God acts out his power by necessity. from the less general ones In conceiving to the most common notions general one,
the mind demonstrates its combining power that one adequate idea necessarily follows by another. In the third kind of know439
ledge, having acquired all the information of the thing, the mind is able to synthesize the data and intuit the concrete essence of the thing. Once again, the mind manifests its proper function in synthesizing and combining ideas. This is one of the keys to
Humes paradox. In addition, having apprehended all the common notions of the idea, the intellect can proceed to intuit the things essence. infinity In the chapter on spatiality, I discussed the virtual of Gods essence. Here the grasping of all the common
notions of the thing is tantamount to the attainment of the virtual infinity of Gods essence. On possessing all the information, the intellect is in the position to grasp the actual infinity of Gods
essence as substance. At the supreme level of understanding, the mind has selfknowledge through knowing the essence of its body. The two
kinds of knowledge are the same under a species of eternity. Furthermore, self-knowledge is achieved through the unconditional positing of the existence of the self (which is at the same time the intuition of Gods infinite essence as substance). The intuition at
stake is understood as feeling: the awareness of the self as actually existing. By then, Gods eternal essence is instantiated In the previous chapter, I made a
as an adequate idea in time.
distinction between the eternal existence and temporal existence. Here lies the experience of the things eternal existence, which
440
serves to ground its temporal existence.
The bottom line of
knowledge being attained, infinite regress comes to a halt. Intui tion as the unconditional positing of self-knowledge stop infinite regress. The feeling as pure joy is a sign designating that one has knowledge of God. The mind, the body, and the thing are
all known under the species of eternity; they turn out to be one and the same piece of knowledge. Lastly, the awareness of
the self as the source of all knowledge claims entails in itself absolute certainty. The two problems being resolved, absolute knowledge as Gods knowledge comes to light.
Conclusion
The truth cannot force its way in when something else is occupying its place. To convince someone o f the truth, it is not enough to state it, but one must find the path from error to truth. Wiggenstein.
Spinoza certainty.
and
Descartes
would
agree
that
knowledge
needs
For Descartes, the concept of certainty requires not just
to rule out ordinary grounds, but also radical grounds for doubt. Spinoza, while rejecting the method of doubt as the way to certainty, avers that certain knowledge is absolute knowledge.
Certainty must derive from knowledge of God and nothing else; knowledge as certain must involve the infinite and eternal es sence of God. Admittedly, it is one thing to define knowledge of God as infinite and eternal; how one can attain knowledge as such is quite another matter. My aim is to delineate the viability of absolute knowledge, showing the way that is accessible to finite humans. Still under the
influence of Descartes philosophy, the early Spinoza conceives truth as the immediate recognition of clear and distinct ideas. Spinoza identifies God with nature; therefore, to know the essence of the thing suffices to know God. Absolute certainty is achieved From the
instantaneously, with no other mediation in between.

442
TdlE to the Ethics, Spinoza has been struggling with the problem of certainty. For the late Spinoza, truth is no longer the minds
immediate recognition of clear and distinct ideas; rather, the re cognition of truth is mediated by quite a number of steps in which the body, corporeal affections, the laws of association, In addition,
imaginations, errors, and common notions are involved.
knowing the adequate idea as truth requires avoiding an infinite series of causal chain and grasping intuitively the actual infinity of Gods essence as substance. Last but not least, grasping the
adequate idea involves experiencing the eternal aspect of the idea. To achieve absolute certainty, knowledge needs to be ontologically grounded. I regard common notions as the ontological
foundations of knowledge, for they proxy for the infinite mode and the laws of nature as Gods infinite essence. However, merely by
conceiving common notions, the mind knows only the abstract and general properties of the thing. between the knower and the known. There is still some mediation To attain absolute knowledge, Knowing the One
one needs to know the things concrete essence.
things concrete essence implies grasping its first causes.
understands the things first causes by intuiting the actual infinity of Gods essence as substance and by experiencing the things eternal existence as the ultimate ground of knowledge. In the third
kind of knowledge, the mind is filled with pure joy because it

443
knows as the infinite intellect knows.
The idea agrees with its
ideatum in all aspects. The mind and the object are one, for it fully grasps the infinite and eternal aspects of the idea the object's concrete essence. I paid particular attention to the notion of the body, arguing that it is the bridge that leads one from inadequate to adequate knowledge. In the course of showing the viability of absolute as
knowledge, I highlighted the cognitive function of the body with re spect to corporeal affects, the conatus of the body, and personal identity. These three aspects reveal the same motive of the Descartes activities.
body that it heads toward actualizing its own essence. relegates the body as insignificant in all cognitive
However, without the aid of the body, the cogito ends up knowing nothing. True enough, the cogito knows that it exists; but from
Spinozas perspective, the cogito as an element of self-knowledge is by no means absolutely certain. sparent to itself. At its best, the cogito is tran
Without having an immediate experience of Apart
God, the cogito is trapped in the realm of immanence. from the cogito, nothing exists for sure.
In contrast to what Descartes asserts that the body is always passive, I showed that the Spinozistic body plays a constitutive role in the attainment of adequate ideas. further elucidates this point. The chapter on spatiality
While being active, the extended

444
body is capable of perceiving different modes of space. spatial perception, the body offers a way to cross
Through over the
unbridgeable gap between the finite and the infinite. lack of an explicit proof, I argue that the body can attain virtual infinity. mind is capable of
Despite the practicably
Thereafter, with the aid of the intellect, the grasping the actual infinity of God as sub
stance and intuiting the concrete essence of the thing. In short, with the aid of its body, the mind can reach the innermost
essence of the thing. The reconstruction of Spinozas theory of belief is meant to redeem the validity of belief. I discussed at some length the natural From the realm of imagination a process of self
and universal laws of association. to that of reason,the mind
undergoes
transformation and renders itself adequate to the infinite intellect. As a result, it makes possible the transition from the natural Following ideas
law of association to the universal law of association. the universal law, the mind is capable
of associating
according to the order of the intellect. placeable element in any theory of belief. ation as part of the things essence affirmation.
Affirmation is an irre Spinoza takes affirm every idea involves its
At the supreme level of knowledge, what the mind
affirms is the essence of the thing.
445
On the one hand, a true belief refers to the objective reality of the object. On the other hand, beliefs as ideas necessarily in elements; accordingly, knowledge of the
volve some temporal
things existence is also temporal.
For a human mind, knowledge However, humans are
as such can never be rendered adequate. capable of perceiving things in two ways.
They can perceive things
as existing temporally, and they can perceive them as existing eternally. I argue that in the third kind of knowledge, humans are in touch with two kinds of reality. As temporal, ideas refer to the
temporal existence of things; as infinite and eternal, they point to the eternal existence of things. Indeed, knowledge of an
infinite series of causal actions as transitive causality is inaccessible to humans. Instead, the mind knows the things essence through immanent causality. By means of this, the mind knows the things
essence as its first causes. Thus, the problem concerning an indefinite series of causal actions is resolved. of knowledge, the mind of In the third kind kinds
instantaneously experiencestwo
existence of the thing. Accordingly, the subjective belief in the
thing's existence grounds itself on the eternal aspect of the idea (belief) as its ontological foundation. Knowledge of the things
eternal existence consolidates knowledge of its temporal existence. As the epistemological counterparts of the infinite mode and the laws of the nature, common notions are the infinite and eternal
446
essence ofGod. in common common
On
account of its body which has
something
withexternal bodies, the mind is capable of forming as adequate ideas. Determined by its own
notions
nature, the mind becomes the formal cause of the adequate idea. Having grasped all the common notions of the thing, the mind intuits its concrete essence. The essence so conceived turns out to be the bodys essence. While knowing the essence of its
body (the thing), the mind is aware of the eternal existence of its body (the thing). The awareness of the self comes in the form of feeling. In virtue of this direct awareness, there is no mediation between the mind and the object. At the mediation the known, in the best supreme level of understanding there mind, the is no more
between the
body and the
knower and the thing
and finally God and us. The mind knows and most perfect way.
It has immediate knowledge
of the thing as the idea and its physical ideatum agree in every respect. It follows that knowledge as such entails absolute certainty.
447
Notes
Chapter O ne: 1 . Margaret D. Wilson : Spinozas Theory of Knowledge. In The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett, pp. 132. 2 . Jorge Secada : Cartesian Metaphysics, pp. 133. 3 . Ibid, pp. 132. 4 . Margaret D. Wilson : Descartes, pp. 92. 5 . John Cottingham : Descartes, pp. 80. 6 . Geoffrey Gorham : Causation and Similarities. In New Essays on the Rationalists, pp. 302 - 306. 7 . John Cottingham : Descartes, pp. 127 - 132. 8 . Marleen Rozemond : Descartess Dualism, pp. 191. 9 . Ibid, pp. 202. 10. E.J. Ashworth : Descartes Theory of Clear and Distinct Ideas. In Cartestian Studies, ed. R.J. Butler, pp. 105. 11. Alan Gewirth : Clearness and Distinctness. In Descartes ed. John Cottingham, pp. 79 -100. 12. Ibid, pp. 85. 13. Ibid, pp. 92 -93. 14. Martial Gueroult: Descartes, v.1, pp. 41 -42. 15. Dalia Judovitz : Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, pp. 180-183. 16. Dennis Sepper: Descartes and the Eclipse of Imagination. In Journal of the History of Philosophy, v.27,1987, pp. 379 - 403. 17. Peter A. Schouls : Descartes and the Possibility of Science, pp. 92-114. 18. Ibid, pp. 106. 19. Jean-Luc Marion : u Aporias and Spinozas Theory of Adequate ideas. In Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind, v. 2, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel.pp. 139. 20. Ibid, pp. 139, note 19. 21. Ibid, pp. 141. 22. Ibid, pp. 142 -143.
448
Chapter Two 1 . Margaret D. Wilson : Descartes, pp. 41. 2 . Ibid, pp 41 - 42. 3 . Spinoza : Principles of Descartes Philosophy, in the collected works of Spinoza, ed. & trans. E. Curley, v.1, pp. 236. 4 . Ibid, pp. 236. 5 . Ibid, pp. 237. 6 . Ibid, pp. 237. 7 . Ibid, pp. 238. 8 . Ibid, pp. 238. 9 . W. Doney: Spinoza on Cartesian Doubt. In Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, ed. Eugene Freeman & Maurice Mandelbaum, pp. 140-149 10. Ibid, pp.145 -146. 11. Richard V. Mason : Ignoring the Demon? Spinozas Way with Doubt. In Journal of the History of Philosophy, v. 31 (1993), pp. 561. 12. Ibid, pp. 551 - 558. 13. Douglas Odegard : Spinoza and Cartesian Scepticism. In Spinoza : The Enduhng Questions, ed. Graeme Junter, pp.128. 14. Ibid, pp. 128-136. 15. Yirmiyahu Yovel: Intuitive knowledge in the Korte Verhandeling and the Ethica. In Dio, LUomo, La Liberia, ed. Filippo Mignini, L.U. Japadre deitare 1990, pp. 277 - 284. 16. Principles , Curleys collected works of Spinoza, v.1 pp. 231. 17. Pierre Macherey: Introduction a LEthique (La deuxieme partie), Press Universitaires de France, 1997, pp. 299. 18. Yirmiyahu Yovel: The Second Kind of Knowledge and the Removal of Error. In Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind, ed. Y. Yovel. pp. 99. 19. Ibid, pp. 98. 20. Ibid, pp. 103-110. 21. S. Paul Kashap: Spinozas use of Idea. In Spinoza: New Perspective, ed. Robert W. Shahan and J. I. Biro, pp. 58. 22. Ibid, pp. 58. 23. Ibid, pp. 60. 24. In this section, I am indebted to Alexandre Matherons analysis in his paper Ideas of Ideas and Certainty in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione and in the Ethics. In Spinoza: On Knowledge and the Human Mind, v. 2 ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel, pp. 83-91. 25. Daisy Radner: Spinozas Theory of Ideas. In The Philosophical Review, v. 80 (1971), pp. 346. 26. Ibid, pp. 346.
449
27. Thomas C. Mark: Truth and Adequacy in Spinozistic Idea. In Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, v. 8 (1977), pp. 20. 28. Ibid, pp. 16. 29. Ibid, pp. 16. 30. Ibid, pp. 16. 31. Ibid, pp. 15. 32. Alan Hart: Spinozas Ethics Part I and II, Leiden E. J. Brill 1983, pp. 98. 33. Ibid, pp. 99. 34. Ibid, pp. 118-125.
Chapter Three 1 . Pierre Macherey : Introduction a LEthique (La deuxieme partie), pp. 14. 2 . For example : Cogitationes Phvatae (1859), Compendium Musicae (1618), Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, etc. 3 . Dennis Sepper: Descartes and the Eclipse of Imagination. In Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1987, v.27, pp. 382. 4 . Dennis Sepper: Descartess Imagination, pp. 92. 5 . Dennis Sepper: Descartes and the Eclipse of Imagination. pp. 391. 6 . Ibid, pp. 398-400. 7 . M. Gueroult: Spinoza: Dieu, v. 1, pp. 251. 8 . Margaret D. Wilson : Spinozas Causal Axiom. In God and Nature :Spinozas Metaphysics, v. 1, ed. Y. Yovel, pp. 133 -160. 9. Briefly, I follow Margaret D. Wilsons analysis in Spinozas causal Axiom. 10. Jean-Marie Beyssade : Nostri Corporis Affectus Can an Affect in Spinoza be of the Body. In Desire and Affect - Spinoza as Psychologist, v.3, ed. Y. Yovel, pp. 113. 11. Ibid, pp. 115. 12. Ibid, pp. 115-116. 13. Ibid, pp. 119. 14. Ibid, pp. 122. 15. Ibid, pp. 123. 16. Edwin Curley: Behind the Geometrical Method, pp. 107. 17. I follow Yovels analysis in his paper Transcending Mere Survival: From Conatus to Conatus Intelligendi." In Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, ed. Y. Yovel, pp. 47 - 54. 18. David Hume :: A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.H. Selby-Bigge, pp. 261 25. James C. Morrison : Spinoza on the Self, Personal Identity and Immortality. In Spinoza: the Enduring Question, ed. Graeme Hunter,
450
pp. 31 - 47. 20. Ibid, pp. 38. 21. Ibid, pp. 39. Chapter Four
1 . Laura Byrne : Reason and Emotion in Spinozas Ethics: the Two Infinities. In Spinoza : the Enduring Questions, ed. Graeme Hunter, pp. 115. 2 . Ibid, pp .115. 3 . Ibid, pp. 115. 4 . Ibid, pp. 115. 5 . Ibid, p p .115. 6 . Richard Mason : The God of Spinoza, pp. 31. 7 . Ibid, pp. 32. 8 . Y. Yovel: Transcending Mere Survival: From Conatus to Conatus Intelligendi. In Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, ed. Y. Yovel, pp. 47 - 49. 9 . Ibid, pp. 50-51. 10. Ibid, pp. 52-53. 11. In his essay Spinozas Conatus Argument, Don Garret offers his own argument on conatus, which is based on the theory of inherence. Garret takes individual things as finite approximations of the infinite substance. With this reading, Garret thinks that it is no more problematic to see how the striving to persevere can be derived from E III p4. I agree with Garrets argument. In general, I follow Garrets argument. Moreover, Garrets interpretation will help us understand better why singular things appropriate the substance, striving for freedom and the infinite. 12. C. De Deugd : The Significance of Spinozas First Kind of Knowledge, pp. 202. 13. Ibid, pp. 205. 14. Pierre Macherey: Introduction a 'Ethique de Spinoza, la deuxieme partie. pp. 189. 15. Martin Heidegger: Being and Time, sections 22 - 24. 16. C. De Deugd: The Significance of Spinozas First Kind o f Knowledge, pp. 205. 17. Spinoza: The Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley, pp. 192. 18. Ibid, pp. 193. 19. Ibid, pp. 193. 20. Ibid, pp. 193. 21. Ibid, pp. 193 -194. 22. In his essay - The Cogito and its Importance, Markie writes, Descartes claim to certainty about his thought and existence is
451
extremely important for both his epistemology and his metaphysics, and, once we get beyond a superficial reading of the text, his account of how he gains this certainty turns out to be one of the most confusing aspects of his philosophy. pp. 34 Yet, while Descartes seems to make clear and distinct perception a sufficient condition for certainty in the Rules, he seems to change his mind when he subjects his faculties to a more critical examination in the Meditations and Replies. pp. 43. His concept of clear and distinct perception is the least clear and distinct concept in his philosophy. In Descartes Meditations, Critical Essays, edited by Vere Chappell, pp. 53. 23. Gille Deleuze: Spinoza etle Probleme de LExpression. pp. 137. 24. Ibid, pp. 137.
Chapter Five 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. David Hume : A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 86. Ibid, pp. 265. Ibid, pp. 92. Ibid, pp. 96. Jonathan Bennett: A study o f Spinozas Ethics, pp. 162. Ibid, pp. 167. Ibid, pp. 163. Ibid, pp. 165. See Y. Yovels essay The Infinite Mode and Natural Laws in Spinoza. In God and Nature: Spinozas Metaphysics, v. 1, ed. Y. Yovel, pp. 95 - 96, notes 7 and 8. 10. Gilles Deleuze : Spinoza e tle Probleme de LExpression, pp. 273. 11. Ibid, pp. 275. 12. Charles Huenemann: The Necessity of Finite Modes and Geometrical Containment in Spinozas Metaphysics. In New Essays on the Rationalists, pp.226. 13. Ibid, pp. 231 -234. 14. Ibid, pp. 234-238. is. Guttorm Floistad : Knowledge and the Part-Whole Structure of Nature. In Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind, v. II, ed. Y. Yovel. pp. 42. 16. Y. Yovel: Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason, pp. 169, note 14. 17. Ibid, note 14. 18. Ibid, note 14. 19. Ibid, note 16.
452
Chapter Six 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. David Hume : A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 251 - 252. Ibid, pp. 253. Ibid, pp. 261. Ibid, pp. 5 - 6 . Ibid, pp. 635 - 636. Barry Stroud : Hume The Argument of the Philosopher, pp. 128. Ibid, pp. 140. John Passmore : Humes Intension, pp. 83. Amihud Gilead : The Indispensability of the First Kind of Knowledge. In Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind v. 2, ed. Y. Yovel, pp. 213 - 228. 10.1agree with Yovel that common notions have their origin in the infinite mode and the laws of nature. In this section, I am indebted to both Yovels and Deleuzes analysis on common notions. See Yovels essay, The Second Kind of Knowledge and the Removal of Error. In Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind v. 2, ed. Y. Yovel, pp. 9 6 - 103. For Deleuzes analysis, see the chapter on Common Notions in Spinoza et le Probleme de IExpression. 11. See Yovel The Infinite Mode and Natural Laws in Spinoza. In God and Nature: Spinozas Metaphysics, v. 1, ed. Y. Yovel, pp. 85 - 87. 12. Ibid, pp. 95 - 96, notes 7 and 8. 13. Gilles Deleuze: Spinoza etle Probleme de IExpression, pp. 270 - 275. 14. Henry E. Allison : Spinoza: An Introduction, pp. 118. 15. Y. Yovel: Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason, All the information we need and can possess of the object of our inquiry has already been supplied by ratio, the scientific investigation which subjects the object to a network of mechanistic natural laws. pp. 156. 16. Gilles Deleuze : Spinoza etle Probleme de LExpression, pp. 284 - 285. 17. Ibid, pp. 285. 18. Manfred Frank: Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism. In The Modem Subject, ed. Karl Ameriks & Dieter Sturma, pp.66 - 68. 19. Jacobi: Clber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herm Moses Mendelssohn, Breslau: Lowe, 1789, pp. 420 n. Here noted as Spinozas Booklet. 20. Ibid, pp. xv. 21. Ibid, pp. 215. 22. Ibid, pp. 423 ff.
453
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The Ontological Foundations of Knowledge in Spinoza by Yiu Hung Tsap

Dissertation Committee: Dr. D. Nikulin Dr. Y. Yovel Dr. A. Heller

UMI Number. 3109779

Copyright 2002 by Tsap, Yiu Hung All rights reserved.

2002, Yiu Hung Tsap

capable of forming only inadequate ideas.

aspect of Gods essence?

Things subsist in time; they come into existence and go out

things, they have to conceive things under eternity.

conceives essence as eternal in two ways.

One knows essence either We feel

For the mind feels those

plained within the same attribute.

The Problems of the Cartesian Body

we see and touch. (AT VII, 30)

Despite the sudden disappearance of its sensory

pertain to the formal concept of the wax itself. (AT VI1175)

guishes between bodies and space.

In the case of the wax example, one might con

By means of methodological doubt,

those assumptions. The discussion of the wax example

highlights this intention.

mediately judges the

concepts or some cognitive

Descartes approach to sense perception Quite convincingly,

Descartes argues that all sensible experiences established by the under

have their structures and frameworks

standing long before the objects are being perceived.

Rather, he uses the term

causal power to produce thoughts through its faculties. It can produce

ideas voluntarily in thinking ideas involuntarily.

and imagining. Moreover, it can produce

In the presence of an external object, the senses

allow for some interaction between mind and body.

(CSM II, 55, 99, 118-119)

Because of the affinities between finite

On the other hand, God is the cause of matters

shape, motion, and other physical qualities. (CSM II 55, 99)

pineal gland. (CSM I 340)

However, as substances, minds can eminently contain motion and all

other modes of material things. (CSM II 31)

Hence, Descartes would

of sensory ideas, for they

Sensation The union

account for the ontological status of sensations.

problem of Cartesian trialism, arguing that if Descartes

He claims that it is Descartes interest which lies

of modes, namely thought,

extension, and sensation. The union of

Nevertheless, it makes sense to keep cannot strictly be taken as

Rozemond confesses at the end that from a philo

truth in every clear and distinct perception.

The Problems of Certainty

Ideas represent things;

For Descartes, ideas of These ideas are said to

criterion for truth?

For Descartes, finite

A clear idea is one which is present and open to the mind.

The direct content of a perception refers to the

become normative characters.1 2

What one An idea can

takes to be clear and

attributes of the same thing. (AT VII, 33) integral and