N0RTBWESTERN 0NIvERSITY

Spinoza's Physics


A BISSERTATI0N


S0BNITTEB T0 TBE uRAB0ATE SCB00L
IN PARTIAL F0LFILLNENT 0F TBE REQ0IRENENTS


foi the uegiee


B0CT0R 0F PBIL0S0PBY


Fielu of Philosophy



By

Alison Peteiman




EvANST0N, ILLIN0IS


}0NE 2u12



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S
ABSTRACT

Spinoza's Physics

Alison Peteiman

Ny goal in this uisseitation is to show that Spinoza is a moie cential anu innovative
figuie in natuial philosophy than has been appieciateu by iecent scholaiship. I
uemonstiate that Spinoza iejects Caitesian physics in its essentials anu in its uetails,
contiaiy to the uominant view that Spinoza's physics is a ueiivative of Bescaites'. In its
place I uevelop a novel Spinozistic account of the piopei conuuct anu content of physical
science.
I begin, in the fiist chaptei, by ueveloping inteipietations of a numbei of Spinoza's
metaphysical uoctiines, uemonstiating that Spinoza has a caiefully consiueieu account of
the natuie anu inteiactions of finite things that is giounueu in substance monism. This
fuinishes iesouices foi uealing with natuial philosophical questions about the causes of
motion, the giounus of intei-bouy causation, anu the explanations of the behavioi of finite
things.
I go on in Chaptei 2 to uiscuss Spinoza's philosophy of science. I aigue fiist that
Spinoza takes a uim view of both empiiical anu mathematical methous foi investigating the
physical woilu. Accoiuing to Spinoza, all sensoiy oi "imaginative" cognition is inauequate,
anu all contingent facts oi geneialities aie classifieu as sensoiy cognition. Applieu
mathematics is an empiiical methou anu so is subject to the same ciitique. While we have
access to tiuths about finite things thiough ieason, we only know about the natuie of the
4
physical thiough the common notions, which, I aigue, aie instances of the thiiu kinu of
knowleuge, oi intuition.
Chaptei S uiaws fiom the pievious two chapteis to show that Spinoza iejects the
cential claim of Caitesian physics: that physics shoulu be baseu on thiee-uimensional anu
local motion. I aigue that by "Extenueu thing" Spinoza uoes not mean a thing extenueu in
thiee-uimensions, anu by "motion" Spinoza uoes not mean local tianslation in space.
Finally, in Chaptei 4 I uiscuss a common contempoiaiy inteipietation of Spinoza as
a kinu of explanatoiy physicalist. I aigue that given Spinoza's account of physical science,
he uoes not believe that we have bettei knowleuge of the physical than the mental.





















S
ACKN0WLEBuENENTS

I have benefiteu much moie than the aveiage peison fiom the kinuness of otheis.
0vei the past eight yeais, I've been humbleu by the constant suppoit of family anu fiienus
anu amazeu by the geneiosity of new acquaintances.
Fiist anu foiemost, I woulu like to thank my wonueiful committee. I can't imagine a
bettei auvisei than Baion Reeu, who has been a bottomless fount of suppoit, auvice, time,
thoughtful philosophical insight anu encouiagement. Theie is a veiy goou chance this
thesis woulu not have been wiitten at all without him, but it's ceitain that it woulu have not
been wiitten veiy well. I felt philosophically ie-eneigizeu aftei all of oui conveisations. I
have many moie ieasons to be giateful to Baion, but peihaps the most significant foi me is
his humaneness. I have ueiiveu lasting benefit fiom Baion's kinuness in the foim of his
gentle but fiim insistence that I impiove my philosophical confiuence, foi which I am
ueeply giateful.
Ken Seeskin single-hanueuly solu me on Spinoza eight yeais ago in one of my
favoiite seminais in my time at Noithwestein, anu has since been a valueu souice of
wisuom anu knowleuge. Ken is a wonueiful teachei, anu I am not the only stuuent who
appieciates his infectious enthusiasm foi the histoiy of philosophy, iight uown to the
ontological aigument.
I have also been extiemely lucky to have the help anu suppoit of Yitzhak Nelameu,
whose knowleuge of the histoiy of philosophy anu uepth of thought I can only uieam of one
uay appioximating. I have enjoyeu so veiy much oui conveisations about Spinoza, fiom
6
which I always leain an incieuible amount, just as I uo fiom him intimiuating bouy of woik.
Besiues owing Yitzhak a philosophical uebt foi impioving my woik so much, I am tiuly
giateful foi his piofessional suppoit, anu his commitment to piomoting young scholais is a
beautiful thing.
Theie aie a few moie philosopheis to whom I am veiy giateful. I was veiy foitunate
to have hau paits of this woik ieau by Eiic Schliessei anu Rachel Zuckeit. Both aie people
whose insight into both philosophy in geneial anu the histoiy of philosophy is a constant
souice of inspiiation. Rachel has been such a wonueiful anu funny ally in navigating the
piofession of philosophy, anu I ieally hope that oui occasional coffees will continue, fiom
now on with less uiama on my enu. It was a fantastic suipiise to finu out, two yeais ago,
that Eiic anu I saw eye-to-eye on so many things. Theie's ieally nothing luckiei than
happening upon a topic that obliges a ieally gieat philosophei to talk to you. Eiic is
anothei inuiviuual with an unusually active commitment to suppoiting the woik of
youngei scholais, unueiappieciateu philosopheis anu women, anu foi that I ieally aumiie
him. Last but not least, I almost chose to stuuy ancient philosophy just so that I coulu woik
with Richaiu Kiaut. I uiun't want to leain uieek, but thankfully I still hau the oppoitunity
to woik with him uuiing oui pioseminai. It was tiuly an honoi to woik though his book
anu leain ethics with Richaiu. Since then, Richaiu has always been so suppoitive, anu I
always look so foiwaiu to seeing him.
Theie aie also a numbei of physicists that I woulu like to thank; I'm suie this woulu
have nevei gotten wiitten without them. Biew Bauen anu Beiui Schellman hau no ieason
to give, as they uiu, some whimsical philosophei the chance to iealize hei uieam of
7
stuuying physics at the giauuate level. It woulu be haiu to finu two moie humane, funny,
cuiious people, anu I am tiuly honoieu to know both of them. In the piocess I have been
veiy foitunate to meet a numbei of othei kinu anu geneious people uevoteu to science anu
to teaching othei people about it: Saiah Eno, Nick Bauley, Tom Cohen, Ban Ruggieio anu
Bob Biaufoiu among them. Baving met all of these folks is the best pait of the yeais I spent
stuuying physics.
I have some tiuly amazing fiienus. Bagmaia, Bebbie, Baewon, Lauia, Neslihan,
0ksana, 0zge anu Teiesa: you aie the most wonueiful women I coulu wish to have the
honoi anu pleasuie of knowing. Thank you all foi youi suppoit uuiing these yeais. I am
inspiieu all the time by Bagmaia's selflessness, empathy, humoi anu insight; Bebbie's
wisuom, open-minueuness, wit anu couiage; Baewon's sense of justice, honesty, humility
anu skill; Lauia's caie, loyalty, ueep intelligence anu sense of fun; Neslihan's eneigy,
openness, confiuence, anu boluness; 0ksana's talent, elegance, uepth anu sensitivity; 0zge's
honesty, uevotion, peiceptiveness anu sense of wonuei; Teiesa's wisuom, feailessness,
selflessness anu humoi. Seveial of these women come with veiy special men: Chiis, Nax,
Wolfhait anu Sean. Finally, a special mention is ueseiveu by my gouson, the veiy hanusome
little Nax. Nay you be lucky enough to have as many wonueiful people as I uo in youi life.
I have hau the honoi of being an honoiaiy membei of the Niei-y-Tein Romeio
family. Nuchisimas giacias a Ana Cecilia, Luis, Ana, Lucia, Calixto, }uan Pablo, Emilia, }ulia y
Salvauoi poi iecibiime en su familia.
Lastly, I woulu like to thank my family anu Luis. I ieally have the best, most
suppoitive paients, who aie also my fiienus; I am as piouu of them as they aie of me,
8
which is to say veiy, veiy piouu. I am equally piouu of my sistei, a beautiful peison who
saves lives eveiy uay. She, too, has always believeu in Big Fiy.
Luis, giacias poi touo tu amoi, apoyo y humoi mientias los ltimos cinco aos. No
valuiia la pena sin ti.






























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Spinoza has long been consiueieu eithei an aich-mechanist in the Caitesian
tiauition
1
oi a "uynamicist" who believeu that all of Bescaites' eiiois coulu be attiibuteu to
his view that mattei is ineit anu only imbueu by uou with motion.
2
In geneial, Spinoza's
physics, insofai as it is acknowleugeu that he has one, is tieateu sepaiately fiom Spinoza's
metaphysics; this is an appioach justifieu explicitly by foi example }onathan Bennett, who
believes that Spinoza has two levels of explanations of things: the metaphysical anu the
physical.
S

But accoiuing to Spinoza, bouies aie moues of extenueu substance, oi uou, anu theii
natuie anu behavioi shoulu be explaineu thiough these fiist piinciples. Ny goal in this
thesis is to lay the giounuwoik foi a complete account of Spinoza's physics by ueveloping
an inteipietation of Spinoza's metaphysics anu epistemology that answeis thiee cential
questions: (1) what uoes Spinoza take to be a finite bouy, its featuies anu its behavioi; (2)
what is Spinoza's epistemology of physical science; anu (S) to what extent is Spinoza
committeu to a Caitesian account of physics - one which tieats bouies funuamentally as
geometiically-tiactable paits of spatial extension in local motion. I answei these questions
in a way that assumes that Spinoza meant his account of tiee-level finite bouies, with theii

1
See, foi example, Aulei (1996), uaukiogei (2uu6), Cuiley (1969), among otheis.
2
See, foi example, viljanen (2uu7), Beleuze (199u), Lachteiman (1971) anu Klevei (1986). It is
neatly put by Naishall (2u1u): "Not only aie Spinoza's fiist piinciples of physics Caitesian, but they
aie also ueiiveu in a Caitesian way.I woulu not say that Spinoza's physics aie !"#$%&'&%( Caitesian,
howevei, because Spinoza attiibutes $")&* to bouies, which Bescaites uoes not."
S
See Bennett (1984).
11
sensible qualities, to follow fiom his metaphysical piinciples as much as possible, anu
conveisely, that an inability to connect what looks like knowleuge of bouies fiom eveiyuay
expeiience with these metaphysical "ieal beings" means that we uo not in fact have
knowleuge of them.
In the fiist chaptei, I uevelop an account of some of Spinoza's cential metaphysical
piinciples with an eye to explaining the natuie of a finite moue of extension. Nany
commentatois take it that Spinoza accepts Caitesian physics anu is unconceineu foi the
most pait with haimonizing it with his own iuiosynciatic metaphysics. I aigue that in fact
Spinoza believes that the cential questions of a theoiy of bouies, like what giounus
causation between finite bouies, what is the cause of motion, anu what aie the funuamental
laws goveining the inteiactions of bouies - can only be auuiesseu if one accepts substance
monism. As a iesult, Spinoza must ieject Bescaites' physics, anu, I aigue, he uoes. This
chaptei pioceeus in two paits; fiist, it uefenus this claim anu seconu, it goes on to examine
the ways in which it plays out in Spinoza's own comments on finite bouies. In the fiist pait,
I consiuei Spinoza's epistolaiy comments to Tschiinhaus that Bescaites' physics is wiong
anu "of no use" because Bescaites uoes not appieciate that extension expiesses eteinal anu
infinite essence. I aigue that this uoes not suppoit, anu in fact unueimines, the consensus
view that Spinoza believes that bouies can only be inuiviuuateu if they aie in motion. In
fact, the connection that Spinoza uiaws between the eteinal anu infinite essence anu finite
moues of substance can be tiackeu thiough the +',-!., anu theie is no eviuence that it has
anything to uo with motion. Accoiuing to Spinoza, foi a finite thing to expiess uou's
essence is foi it to "exist anu piouuce an effect." That Spinoza thinks that this must be
12
unueistoou piioi to a bouy's motion is eviuenceu by comments in the +',-!. anu elsewheie,
incluuing the /*-0!-$%&. "2 34*'&.-40 /,-%"."$,( (PCP), anu it is implieu by the aigument of
what has been calleu the "physical inteiluue" of Pait II of the +',-!..
The chaptei goes on in Section 2 to uiscuss Spinoza's account of physical paits anu
wholes. Accoiuing to Spinoza, essences aie compiehenueu in uou's attiibutes, anu posit
the ielationship between stiuctuies anu effects. But if any single thing weie positeu alone,
each thing woulu be eteinal anu infinite. Since theie aie multiple things anu theie cannot,
by Pait 1, be multiple eteinal anu infinite things, they must be involveu in mutual
limitation. Fiom this piinciple ueiives Spinoza's account of paits anu wholes, the keinel of
which is that any thing that is "hoiizontally" causally involveu with othei things cannot be
inuepenuent, but can only be unueistoou as a paitial inuiviuual. This connection between
paitiality anu causal uepenuence is, as fai as I know, unique to Spinoza anu not sufficiently
biought out in the liteiatuie.
It also giounus Spinoza's founuations of physics. I go on to aigue in Section S that
Spinoza eschews any ieliance on a quantitative conseivation law in favoi of giounuing his
account of the inteiaction of bouies on the Piinciple of Least Noual Nutation anu his claim
that two contiaiy piopeities cannot be in the same subject. I aigue that the two
funuamental piinciples of Spinoza's physics aie ielateu to the two uiffeient kinus of
existence of a finite moue: the PLNN follows fiom the positive essence of a thing, which
posits the thing univocally, while the piinciple of non-contiaiiety of piopeities goveins
bouies insofai as they aie instantiateu in space anu time. Spinoza is uniquely qualifieu to
uesciibe bouies (as many of his contempoiaiies uo) in these agonistic teims, since foi him,
1S
two moues exist in uou anu cannot be contiaiies in the same subject - the whole of natuie.
These two funuamental piinciples ielate to a long-stanuing uebate conceining the status of
finite things foi Spinoza: aie they ieal, oi not. The PLNN shows conceins the powei of
finite things to exist anu inuicates that they finite things uo in fact exist foi Spinoza, but the
instantiation of these essences in space anu time iequiies negation.
Finally, I consiuei the question of Spinoza's so-calleu uynamicism, aiguing that in a
sense, Spinoza is inueeu conceineu with uynamics as opposeu to accepting the Caitesian
emphasis on kinematics. But this is not because Spinoza emphasizes the notion of foice oi
powei. It simply means that Spinoza aigues that explaining bouies in teims of theii
extension in space anu local motion is not the most funuamental way to explain them;
iathei, we must inquiie fiist about the causes of motion anu change in the physical woilu.
In the seconu chaptei, I consiuei Spinoza's epistemology insofai as it beais on oui
knowleuge of finite bouies. I aigue that Spinoza is pessimistic about the knowleuge we can
gain about the natuial woilu thiough what we might call scientific means. Fiist, I show
that Spinoza thinks that we can have no auequate knowleuge of natuie thiough inuuction
fiom sense expeiience. The kinus of laws anu facts that we take to be the puiview of
science - piopositions like that the sun is fuithei than it appeais, that theie aie no uianium
spheies laigei than one mile acioss, that plants photosynthesize oi that piotons aie maue
of quaiks - aie all cases of imaginative cognition anu hence inauequate. I go on to aigue
that iathei than juxtapose the ceitainty of mathematics in uesciibing natuie, Spinoza sees
the use of mathematics in science as an instance of empiiical knowleuge, anu so also
inauequate. These consiueiations aie impoitant to the aigument of the thiiu chaptei, since
14
Spinoza's epistemology piecluues him fiom the mechanist account of physics that is so
often attiibuteu to him.
Left without (nave) empiiical oi mathematical methous, the chaptei goes on to ask
if Spinoza thinks that we can have any knowleuge of the physical woilu at all. I explain
biiefly why Spinoza thinks we can have auequate knowleuge of the kinus of attiibute-
neutial piinciples uesciibeu in Chaptei 1. I then go on to pioviue an account of the
common notions, aiguing that this is the only way we can fill in these attiibute-neutial
piinciples with the specific featuies of bouies, anu answei questions about the natuie of
mattei, motion anu foice. Since these common notions iely on oui being bouies anu
inteiacting with bouies, I aigue that it is thiough a kinu of expeiience that we come to
know about bouies. Bowevei, it is not imaginative, oi sense, expeiience. Rathei, I aigue,
against a numbei of uominant inteipietations, that the common notions aie expeiienceu as
the thiiu kinu of knowleuge, oi intuition.
In the thiiu chaptei, I aigue, using the conclusions of the pievious two chapteis, that
the notions of extension anu motion anu iest aie not Caitesian, anu that the ieality of finite
bouies, foi Spinoza, is veiy uiffeient fiom the woilu of shapes in motion that we aie
acquainteu with thiough the imagination. In paiticulai, I aigue that an "Extenueu thing",
accoiuing to Spinoza, uoes not mean a thing with uimensionality, oi length, bieauth anu
uepth. uou oi coipoieal substance is not extenueu in this way, anu Spinoza offeis no way
of iecupeiating uimensional finite bouies fiom a non-uimensional mateiial substance. The
thiiu section of the chaptei continues the uiscussion of Spinozistic motion anu iest begun
in Chaptei 1, specifically in the context of Bescaites' account, aiguing against a numbei of
1S
specific accounts of Spinozistic motion that Spinoza hau not foimeu a uefinite
chaiacteiization of motion by the time of his ueath. This chaptei concluues with aiguments
that unueimine the impoitance of the physical inteiluue in inteipieting Spinoza's thoughts
on physical science - an impoitant pait of the aigument against the claim that Spinoza
auopts the essentials of Caitesian physics, since the physical inteiluue is often mistaken foi
a mechanist tiact.
The fouith anu final chaptei exploies an impoitant consequence of Spinoza's
account of the physical woilu anu the knowleuge that we have of it. It is populai to see in
Spinoza an ally in ceitain piojects in the contempoiaiy philosophy of minu. In paiticulai,
Spinoza offeis an appealing paiallelism between the minu anu bouy that uoes not ieuuce
one to the othei. Theie have been a numbei of scholais (anu one neuioscientist) who
aigue that although Spinoza is not a metaphysical mateiialist, he is an "explanatoiy
physicalist" in the sense that he believes physical explanations sheu light on mental
phenomena, oi that Spinoza "lets bouy call the tune" when it comes to explanation. I aigue
that the account of Spinoza's physics offeieu, plus seveial othei aiguments, show that
Spinoza is not an explanatoiy physicalist.
Theie aie a numbei of possible futuie uiiections fiom the conclusions of this
pioject. Fiist, it woulu be woithwhile to pioviue a fullei account of paiticulai laws of
natuie, using a moie caieful stuuy of the PCP anu Spinoza's coiiesponuence with scientists.
We may uiscovei that Spinoza uiu have a moie well-woikeu out anu piecise unueistanuing
of motion anu how it ielates to the specific laws of motion. Even if it confiims that Spinoza
hau, inueeu, not oiganizeu his thoughts on physics, it will ceitainly illuminate an exciting
16
episoue in the uevelopment of physical science in the 17
th
centuiy. Also of inteiest woulu
be placing Spinoza's insights into theii context, with ueepei ieseaich into his similaiities
anu uiffeiences with, foi example, Bobbes, Buygens, Leibniz, anu Bacon.
Seconu, the uiscussion of Spinoza's epistemology in Chaptei 2 suggests an
investigation of Spinoza's account of the minu-bouy pioblem in light of a moie caiefully
aiticulateu physics. Chaptei 4 examines the contempoiaiy attempt to ieciuit Spinoza foi
physicalist piojects in the philosophy of minu. Theie is goou ieason to think that Spinoza is
a valuable iesouice foi thinking thiough the ielation between minu anu bouy, but peihaps
he can pioviue even ueepei insight if we jettison the insistence that he piivileges
knowleuge of the physical.
Anothei theme foi fuithei exploiation is Spinoza's caie in emphasizing piecise
chaiacteiizations not only of things but of theii ielations. Foi example, in Chaptei 1, I
aigue that a piopei account of physics ielies on piopeily conceptualizing the connection
between causation anu composition foi Spinoza. I also aigue that, in a sense, the iueas that
we have aie iueas of ielations, oi affections, anu that Spinoza's account of peiception anu
iepiesentation cannot be fully unueistoou without chaiacteiizing these moie caiefully. I
think it is faii to say that much less woik has been uone on the topic of ielations between
things than has been uevoteu to the question of what finite things aie, accoiuing to Spinoza.
But given Spinoza's unique anu complex metaphysics, we may not be able to answei the
lattei question without simultaneously uealing with the foimei.


17
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Spinoza is usually thought to auopt a moie-oi-less Caitesian account of physics.
"Caitesian physics" heie incluues the essentials that bouies aie essentially extension, that
they inteiact thiough impact, anu that they aie goveineu by a conseivation law, as well as
Bescaites' specific laws of impact.
4
This woulu be suipiising weie it tiue, since Spinoza is
known foi his innovative uoctiines on most eveiy othei topic imaginable: metaphysics,
epistemology, the minu-bouy pioblem, ethics anu politics. In paiticulai, it woulu be
suipiising if Spinoza's metaphysics, so uiffeient fiom the metaphysics of Bescaites on
questions that woulu seem to beai on physics - questions of substance, finituue anu
infinituue, foice anu cause - woulu yielu, in Spinoza's eyes, the veiy same physics. 0ne way
that this is sometime explaineu is by claiming that Spinoza makes no attempt to connect his
metaphysics with his physics
S
; I aigue in Chaptei S that this is not tiue. In this chaptei,
howevei, I exploie those aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics that beai on finite bouies anu
theii inteiactions. The cential claim of this chaptei is that Spinoza has an attiibute-neutial

4
Among many otheis, see Naishall (2uu8), 64: "Not only aie Spinoza's fiist piinciples of physics
Caitesian, but they aie also ueiiveu in a Caitesian way." uabbey (2uu8), 1SS: Caitesianism "is
the.natuial philosophy in which the +',-!. is giounueu." 0i Aluei (1996): "simple bouies aie
exhaustively uesciibeu by some set of piopeities having to uo with theii location in space anu possible
changes theiein - i.e by motion anu iest" (Aulei (1969), 18S) anu uaibei: "Spinoza is motivateu to
"explain eveiything in the physical woilu in teims of size, shape, anu motion"(64). Even Beleuze wiites
that Spinoza has a "mechanist piogiam" in that "mechanism goveins infinitely composite existing
bouies" (Beleuze (199u), 2S9. Nost of these scholais aumit that Spinoza suggests mouifications to the
oveiall Caitesian fiamewoik, but believe that he is woiking fiom a Caitesian founuation.
S
Bennett (1984).
18
skeleton of piinciples that he takes to be ueiivable fiom his substance metaphysics, which
can in tuin seive as the basis foi physics, once flesheu out in teims of the attiibute of
Extension. As a iesult, Spinoza iejects Caitesian physics anu begins to offei his own
solutions foi some cential pioblems in 17
th
centuiy natuial philosophy, giounueu in his
unique metaphysics of substance monism.
Section 1 of this chaptei consiueis Spinoza's late coiiesponuence with Tschiinhaus,
wheie he ueclaies Bescaites' physics "wiong anu of no use" because it is unable to account
foi the vaiiety of finite things in natuie. In this section, I explain, using eviuence fiom this
coiiesponuence anu fiom a vaiiety of Spinoza's texts, why Spinoza felt compelleu to ieject
Caitesian physics so completely. I begin by iefuting the uominant view that Spinoza's
comments to Tschiinhaus concein Bescaites' inability to account foi motion in mattei, anu
showing that this view assumes that Spinoza anu Bescaites alieauy shaie many moie
piemises than they uo. I go on to examine Spinoza's complaint in the letteis that Bescaites
uoes not appieciate that moues "expiess eteinal anu infinite essence." 0sing eviuence
uiawn fiom othei souices, I aigue that Spinoza believes that an auequate account of the
vaiiety of finite things can only be pioviueu by substance monism. 0nly given monism can
we account foi the piouuction of a vaiiety of essences anu piopeily conceptualize the
existence anu ielations of finite things.
In the following two sections, I tiy to show how this manifests itself piactically in
Spinoza's specific uoctiines goveining the natuie anu inteiaction of finite things. What,
accoiuing to Spinoza, is a finite thing, anu how uoes it behave. Since Spinoza believes that
the causal connections between bouies aie miiioieu by the causal connections between
19
iueas (anu the causal connections among the moues of any othei attiibute)
6
, stuuying the
metaphysics of finite things in geneial, anu theii inteiactions, is the natuial fiist step on the
ioau to unueistanuing Spinoza's physics. Although in piinciple eveiything in this chaptei
shoulu be applicable to finite moues of any attiibute, given Spinoza's paiallelism, I focus on
how cential issues in Spinoza's metaphysics beai on his account of the natuie of finite
bouies.
In Section 2, I aigue that Spinoza is a moie iauical holist than he is sometimes given
cieuit foi. In paiticulai, I aigue that Spinoza uoes not meiely believe that substance is
piioi to moues, anu that those moues aie not paits of substances, but that the totality of
physical natuie is piioi to its paits. I then explain how Spinoza ielates his theoiy of
composition with causation, anu aigue that this theoiy is offeieu as a solution to a cential
pioblem of 17
th
centuiy natuial philosophy: the pioblem of intei-bouy causation. I aigue
that Spinoza uoes not think that "hoiizontal" causation can obtain between complete
inuiviuuals, anu so foi a finite thing to be involveu in causal ielationships with othei finite
things implies that those things aie incomplete inuiviuuals, anu paits of the same whole.
No bouy is an inuiviuual except the whole of natuie, anu Spinoza takes this to solve the
pioblem of intei-bouy causation.
In Section S, I show how this holism manifests itself in what Spinoza posits as the
funuamental piinciples of inteiactions of finite things. Fiist, I show that since Spinoza is
committeu to the iuentity of minu, bouy, anu the othei attiibutes, he ieplaces Bescaites'

6
Spinoza's uoctiine of "paiallelism" among all the attiibutes is establisheu in the Scholium to IIp7.
Nelameu (2u11) aigues that the paiallelism between things anu the iueas of them anu the paiallelism
between moues of all the attiibutes aie two uiffeient kinus of paiallelism.
2u
conseivation law with two attiibute-neutial laws of finite things: fiist, what has been calleu
the Piinciple of Least Noual Nutation
7
anu seconu, the piinciple of non-contiaiiety. These
piinciples iepiesent Spinoza's attempt to uevelop an 4 $*-"*- basis upon which to
unueistanu the inteiactions of finite things anu the changes that iesult fiom those
inteiactions. It is impoitant foi Spinoza that these laws aie attiibute-neutial; that is, that
they govein the behavioi of moues of any attiibute, not just bouies - something that cannot
be saiu of the law of conseivation of quantity of motion.
Section 4 uesciibes the conatus uoctiine, a thiiu attiibute-neutial element of
Spinoza's account of finite things. Theie, I aigue, against commentatois who aigue that the
conatus iepiesents an element of eithei foimal oi final causation in Spinoza's philosophy,
that it is consistent with puiely efficient causation. Finally, in Section S, I ask whethei anu
in what ways Spinoza can be consiueieu to have a moie "uynamical" account of natuie.

.< 42-$#516' ,1'& 1=1-$'% >&',1)%&'
Eight months befoie his ueath, Spinoza ieceives a lettei fiom Tschiinhaus piessing
him about a most funuamental point of metaphysical physics. In it, Tschiinhaus wonueis
how Spinoza can explain the vaiiety of finite bouies in the woilu. Bescaites explains it by
claiming that uou giants motion to extension, anu that ielative motion, in tuin, is
iesponsible foi uiffeientiating bouies fiom one anothei. Spinoza iejects the possibility of
such a uivine inteivention, since uou uoes not tianscenu natuie such that uou coulu giant

7
uabbey (2uuS).
21
motion to it, so Tschiinhaus wonueis how he can account foi the existence of finite bouies
without uou as a movei.
Spinoza iesponus that in fact, the vaiiety of things cannot be uemonstiateu "4 $*-"*-
solely fiom the conception of Extension, which is why Bescaites is wiong in uefining
mattei thiough extension." To account foi vaiiety in natuie, mattei must be "explicateu
thiough an attiibute which expiesses eteinal anu infinite essence." "But peihaps, if I live
long enough," Spinoza continues, "I shall have some time to uiscuss this with you moie
cleaily; foi as yet I have not hau the oppoitunity to aiiange in uue oiuei anything on this
subject."
8
Spinoza uieu only seven months latei.
This lettei, containing Spinoza's last iecoiueu woius, is among only a veiy few
iesouices we have foi ieconstiucting Spinoza's thoughts on the natuie of the physical
woilu. It is pait of a fiustiating exchange with Tschiinhaus, encompassing Letteis 8u-8S,
which begins a yeai eailiei with Tschiinhaus asking aftei the tiue uefinition of motion,
9

anu again how we may ueuuce the vaiiety of things fiom extension. Theie, too, Spinoza
iesponus that he has not yet composeu his thoughts on physics in uue oiuei. Although
theie aie seveial othei places wheie Spinoza uiscusses physics - most notably with
0luenbuig in Letteis Su-SS anu Letteis 6 anu 1S to 0luenbuig conceining Boyle's
expeiiments with nitei - these auuiess Bescaites' iules of motion anu scientific methou,
iespectively, anu uo not beai on the funuamental question of the natuie of mattei anu
bouies. It is only by consiueiing Spinoza's moie geneial metaphysical uoctiines that we can

8
Lettei 8S to Tschiinhaus.
9
Lettei 8u to Tschiinhaus.
22
inteipiet Letteis 8u thiough 8S anu ieconstiuct how Spinoza unueistoou the application of
that metaphysics to the most funuamental question of physics: the natuie of finite bouies.
This section asks, in light of this coiiesponuence: why uoes Spinoza ultimately come
to ieject the entiie euifice of Caitesian physics. Section 1a analyzes the exchange between
Spinoza anu Tschiinhaus anu the ielevant uiffeiences between Bescaites anu Spinoza
conceining substance anu its ielation to finite bouies. Section 1b1 aigues that Spinoza
uoes not fault Bescaites foi failing to giant motion as an immanent featuie of extension.
Section 1b2 then sets up the aigument that Spinoza's iefeience to eteinal anu infinite
essence iesonates with passages in the +',-!. to piove that Spinoza iuentifieu anu
uiffeientiateu among bouies piioi to theii motion, anu consiueieu theii existence anu
causal efficacy inexplicable on the Caitesian mouel. The iest of the chaptei continues this
aigument, ueveloping a metaphysics of finite bouies that is consonant with this account.

546 3"**&.$"07&0!& )-', 8.!,-*0,49.
Beie is the exchange, founu in Letteis 8u thiough 8S, between Spinoza anu
Tschiinhaus conceining extension, inuiviuuation anu motion:
H',0-)$01+': I finu it veiy uifficult to unueistanu how the existence of bouies
having motion anu figuie can be uemonstiateu 4 $*-"*-, since theie is nothing of this
kinu to be founu in Extension, taken in the absolute sense.
42-$#51: |Fjiom Extension as conceiveu by Bescaites, to wit, an ineit mass, it is not
only uifficult, as you say, but quite impossible to uemonstiate the existence of
bouies. Foi mattei at iest, as fai as in it lies, will continue to be at iest, anu will not
2S
be set in motion except by a moie poweiful exteinal cause. Foi this ieason I have
not hesitateu on a pievious occasion to affiim that Bescaites' piinciples of natuial
things aie of no seivice, not to say quite wiong.
H',0-)$01+': I shoulu like you to uo me the kinuness of showing how, fiom
Extension as conceiveu in youi philosophy, the vaiiety of things can be
uemonstiateu 4 $*-"*-6 Foi you mention Bescaites' view, by which he maintains that
he cannot ueuuce this vaiiety fiom Extension in any othei way than by supposing
that this was an effect piouuceu in Extension by motion staiteu by uou. Theiefoie,
in my opinion, it is not fiom ineit mattei that he ueuuces the existence of bouies,
unless you uiscount the supposition of uou as movei. Foi you have not shown how
this must necessaiily follow a piioii fiom the essence of uou.I fail to see how fiom
an Attiibute consiueieu only by itself, foi example, Extension, an infinite vaiiety of
bouies can aiise.
42-$#51: With iegaiu to youi question as to whethei the vaiiety of things can be
uemonstiateu a piioii solely fiom the conception of Extension, I think I have alieauy
maue it quite cleai that this is impossible. That is why Bescaites is wiong in
uefining mattei thiough Extension; it must necessaiily be explicateu thiough an
attiibute which expiesses eteinal anu infinite essence. But peihaps, if I live long
enough, I shall some time uiscuss this with you moie cleaily; foi as yet I have not
hau the oppoitunity to aiiange in uue oiuei anything on this subject.
The ieason that Spinoza gives foi Bescaites' failuie to explain the oiigin of finite bouies in
motion is that Bescaites uefines mattei thiough extension, insteau of thiough an attiibute
24
that expiesses eteinal anu infinite essence. But accoiuing to Spinoza, Extension
1u
-.
piecisely that: one of the "infinite attiibutes, each of which expiesses eteinal anu infinite
essence."
11
What, then, can Spinoza mean.
Accoiuing to Bescaites, a bouy, oi the entiiety of mattei,
12
is a substance. The paits
of mattei aie ieally uistinct fiom one anothei, anu bouies aie ieally uistinct fiom minus.
We uiscovei a bouy's essence as we uiscovei the essence of any object of one of oui iueas:
by iemoving fiom oui iuea of it anything that is confuseu oi complex in oiuei to ienuei it
cleai anu uistinct. What iemains is the iuea of what Bescaites calls the "piincipal attiibute"
of the thing; it is the only necessaiy quality of the object of the iuea, anu is the thing's
essence. When we peifoim this opeiation in the case of mattei, we finu that most of the
paiticulai sensible qualities that a bouy has - coloi, smell, taste - aie not in bouy itself, but
involve the ielation of oui minus to the thing. What iemains in oui iuea of mattei is only
"shape, extension, motion, etc."
1S
In 8,& :"*%7, Bescaites wiites of bouy: "I conceive of its
extension, oi the piopeity it has to occupy space not as an acciuent, but as its tiue foim anu
its essence."
14
A bouy, oi bouy in geneial, is a substance whose essence is extension.

1u
Foi ieasons that will become cleaiei in Chaptei S, I'll use "extension" to iefei to thiee-uimensionality,
anu "Extension" to iefei, as Spinoza uoes, to the Spinozistic attiibute of Extension. In cases wheie it is
ambiguous between the two, I'll use "extension."
11
Ip11
12
It's a mattei of uebate whethei Bescaites believes that inuiviuual bouies aie substances, oi whethei
all of mattei is one substance (foi moie on this, see uaibei (1992). It is likely that he changeu his view
ovei the couise of his life, moving closei to the one-substance account latei on. Which is the coiiect
inteipietation uoes not substantially affect the aigument of this chaptei; what uoes mattei is that
Bescaites seems to have tieateu the paits of mattei as ieally uistinct, even if all of mattei is one
substance. In that case, he will have expanueu the uefinition of ieal uistinction.
1S
;9%&. 12 anu 14
14
/*-0!-$%&. II 2S. The view that the volume of a bouy is piioi to its sensible qualities uoes not oiiginate
with Bescaites; see uiant (1981).
2S
Foi Spinoza, of couise, neithei a bouy noi mattei in geneial is a substance. Rathei, a
bouy is a moue of the unique substance - uou oi natuie - anu it "expiesses in a uefinite anu
ueteiminate way uou's essence insofai as he is consiueieu as an extenueu thing."
1S
It is,
moie specifically, a moue of substance unueistoou unuei the attiibute of Extension. An
attiibute of substance is uefineu at +',-!. Iu4 as "what the intellect peiceives of a
substance, as constituting its essence." Wheie Bescaites' extension is the piincipal
attiibute of a bouy oi mattei, Extension is an attiibute of the one substance, oi "Extension
is an attiibute of uou; i.e. uou is an extenueu thing."
16

Bescaites anu Spinoza agiee that mattei can only be unueistoou though extension.
But accoiuing to Bescaites, extension is the essence of a bouy, while foi Spinoza, Extension
is an attiibute which &<$*&..&. an essence. The essence, in tuin, is piioi to the attiibute
unuei which it is conceiveu. Noieovei, that essence is uou's essence, which incluues
existence. Regaiuless of whethei Bescaites thinks that theie aie many coipoieal
substances oi just one, the substance that unueilies the attiibute of extension is not, as it is
foi Spinoza, iuentical with uou. This has at least two impoitant consequences: fiist, it is not
self-causeu, anu so uoesn't have existence oi the powei to piouuce effects as pait of its
essence, anu seconu, infinite moues uo not follow fiom it.
Conceining the uefinition of substance, Bescaites himself is notoiiously uiviueu. Be
offeis two, both of which Spinoza iecoius in his /*-0!-$%&. "2 34*'&.-40 /,-%"."$,(. The fiist

1S
IIu1
16
Foi Bescaites, extension is the essence of an unueilying substance; this is bouy. Foi Spinoza,
Extension "expiesses" the essence of uou. We'll see latei the implications of this uistinction.
26
is that substance is the subject of qualities
17
; Spinoza cites this as the uefinition of
substance in the PCP as IuS. The seconu is that a substance is something that exists
inuepenuently oi that neeus only uou to exist. Spinoza in fact agiees with Bescaites that
these aie both necessaiy featuies of substance, although Spinoza uoes not, of couise,
acknowleuge that a thing which is not uou, but neeus only the concuiience of uou to exist,
can be a substance.
18

Immeuiately following the uefinition of substance in the PCP, Spinoza claiifies that
accoiuing to Bescaites, "of substance itself, taken piecisely, we have no iuea, othei than
that it is a thing in which exists foimally oi eminently that something which we peiceive,
oi, which is objectively in one of oui iueas."
19
This is taken fiom Bescaites' /*-0!-$%&., but
theie, Bescaites continues that such a substance unueilies qualities because "it is known to
the natuial light that nothing can have no ieal attiibute." Foi Bescaites, then, the fact that
bouy is a substance means nothing moie than that theie must be a baie subject unueilying
extension: Locke's "I know not what".
2u
By contiast, the subject of Spinoza's attiibute of
Extension is not a baie subject, but uou, the only substance, which has an inuepenuent
essence anu is eteinal anu infinite. Noieovei, while foi Bescaites we aie necessaiily
ignoiant of anything which unueilies a thing's attiibutes, we have peifect knowleuge of

17
/*-0!-$%&. I S4
18
PCP Iu2: "we unueistanu nothing but a thing that exists in such a way that it iequiies nothing else in
oiuei to exist."
19
PCP 1uS
2u
Scholais of Bescaites aie not agieeu on whethei a substance is this kinu of baie subject, of which we
know nothing except that it unueilies a ceitain piincipal attiibute. Foi this inteipietation of Bescaites,
see uaibei (1992). Foi an analysis of this uebate anu its beaiing on inteipieting Spinoza, see Cuiley
(1969).
27
uou's essence, accoiuing to Spinoza; IIp47 establishes that "|tjhe human minu has an
auequate knowleuge of uou's eteinal anu infinite essence."
Whence Spinoza's complaint, then, that Bescaites uoes not explain coipoieal natuie
thiough "an attiibute which expiesses eteinal anu infinite essence." Extension, foi
Bescaites, mouifies a baie subject, anu is not an attiibute of uou. Foi Spinoza, Extension is
not an essence but expiesses uou's essence.

5=6 8" &<$*&.. &'&*04% 407 -02-0-'& &..&0!&
So much is ielatively uncontioveisial. But why uoes Spinoza believe that the vaiiety
of things can be explaineu only once Extension is coiiectly unueistoou to expiess eteinal
anu infinite essence. In this section, I aigue that Spinoza takes finite, uistinct bouies to
exist piioi to theii motion, because by being moues of substance, they expiess the essence
of substance, anu as a iesult have a positive ability to exist anu to piouuce effects. Fiist,
howevei, I offei eviuence against the veiy common - peihaps unanimous - view that the
basis foi Spinoza's ciiticisms of Bescaites is that Bescaites iequiies uou to giant motion to
extension.

5=56 8,4' &'&*04% 407 -02-0-'& &..&0!& -. 0"' #"'-"0
Spinoza's letteis to Tschiinhaus aie usually iegaiueu as eviuence that Spinoza
follows Bescaites in iequiiing local motion to uiffeientiate among bouies, anu that
theiefoie expiessing eteinal anu infinite essence must be coue foi being in motion. In the
PCP, Spinoza iepoits that Bescaites
28
unueistanus by a pait of mattei whatevei is tiansfeiieu at the same time, even
though it, in tuin, may consist of many paits.he says the tiansfei takes place fiom
the vicinity of contiguous bouies into the vicinity of otheis, anu not fiom one place
to anothei."
21

Accoiuing to Bescaites, the fact that mattei is in motion at all must be explaineu thiough
uou, who giants motion to mattei anu pieseives it in the same quantity as a consequence
of his immutability.
22

The inteipietation that I consiuei in this section takes Spinoza to be attiibuting
Bescaites' eiiois to his failuie to appieciate that motion, oi a foice of motion, is immanent
to mattei iathei than gianteu to anu sustaineu in mattei by uou. This account appeais to
be coiioboiateu in the lettei to Tschiinhaus, wheie Spinoza comments that fiom Extension
"as conceiveu by Bescaites, '" )-'> 40 -0&*' #4..," the vaiiety of things cannot be explaineu.
Since Spinoza accepts Bescaites' axioms, the aigument goes, he believes that vaiiety can be
engenueieu by accounting foi motion in mattei, so he makes motion immanent to mattei,
yieluing a "uynamic" conception of physical natuie.
Peihaps the most explicit anu extenueu statement of this view is founu in W.N.A.
Klevei's "Noles in Notu", but it is also founu in many othei stuuies of Spinoza's physics.
2S


21
Bescaites' own foimulation in the /*-0!-$%&. can be founu at II 2S ("All the vaiiety in mattei, all the
uiveisity of its foims, uepenus on motion") anu 2S ("By 'one bouy' oi 'one piece of mattei I mean
whatevei is tiansfeiieu at a given time")
22
"It is obvious that when uou fiist cieateu the woilu, Be not only moveu its paits in vaiious ways, but
also simultaneously causeu some of the paits to push otheis anu to tiansfei theii motion to these otheis.
So in now maintaining the woilu by the same action anu with the same laws with which Be cieateu it, Be
conseives motion; not always containeu in the same paits of mattei, but tiansfeiieu fiom some paits to
otheis uepenuing on the ways in which they come in contact" (Pi II 62).
2S
See foi example Buenneman (2uu4), Lachteiman (1971), Aulei (1996).
29
Klevei suggests that by "eteinal anu infinite essence" Spinoza just means motion, anu that
the uiffeience between Bescaites anu Spinoza lies in that Bescaites consiueis that bouies
aie meie moues of geometiic extension, with motion supeiauueu by uou, while foi
Spinoza, motion is an iiieuucible pait of mattei. The lesson to be uiawn is that "Spinoza's
woilu is motion, anu motion once moie,"
24
oi that "movement is not a simple acciuent of
mattei but its essence."
2S
Foi Spinoza, Klevei aigues, motion anu extension aie equally
funuamental anu equally chaiacteiistic of the essence of mattei. Spinoza simply inseits
motion-anu-iest into extension, making the giounus of his physics "#"%&. -0 #"'9" insteau
of "#"%&. ?9-&.!&0.."
Theie aie thiee ieasons that scholais like Klevei have foi thinking that by
contiasting his own view with Bescaites' in teims of eteinal anu infinite essence, Spinoza is
suggesting that motion is iesponsible foi the vaiiety in things. Fiist, in Lettei 8S, Spinoza
seems to imply that Bescaites' inability to explain the vaiiety of bouies is ielateu to the fact
that "an ineit mass cannot be set in motion except by an exteinal cause." Seconu, it is
suppoiteu by the notion, wiuespieau among Spinoza's ieaueis, that uou's essence is powei,
anu that powei must in tuin be associateu with motion oi some motive foice. The thiiu
ieasons is scholais' sense that if Spinoza uoes not iuentify eteinal anu infinite essence with
motion, the cause of vaiiation in mattei is oveiueteimineu. Aftei all, in the "physical
inteiluue" of the +',-!., Spinoza seems explicitly to claim that both vaiiety in anu
inuiviuuation of bouies can be attiibuteu to motion in extension. I'll auuiess the fiist two

24
Klevei 191.
2S
Klevei 169.
Su
heie anu biiefly uiscuss the thiiu; a complete aigument will iequiie a closei examination of
the allegeu eviuence in the physical inteiluue that Spinoza accepts a mechanistic physics.
This will have to wait until aftei we account foi Extension anu motion, so it is uiscusseu in
Chaptei S, Sections S anu 4.
The fiist ieason to believe that Spinoza iuentifies the ioles of motion anu eteinal
anu infinite essence is his comment in Lettei 81 that Caitesian mattei is "an ineit mass".
To many, this seems cleaily to iuentify the consiueiations of uiveisity in mattei with
motion; it suggests that the basis of Spinoza's ciiticisms of Bescaites' physics aie baseu on
Bescaites' claim that mattei is ineit. Taking "ineit" to mean something like "iequiiing an
exteinal cause of motion", scholais aigue that Spinoza must be pioposing to solve the
pioblems with Bescaites' physics by claiming that motion is pait of the essence of mattei.
Bowevei, Spinoza's comment is that an ineit mass cannot move itself, but iequiies
an exteinal cause of motion; nothing in this suggests that @-A&0 an exteinal cause of motion,
theie is still ieason to ueny that motion. Tschiinhaus points out in his iesponse that
Bescaites anticipates Spinoza's point, anu iuentifies the vaiiety of bouies is "an effect
piouuceu in Extension by motion staiteu by uou"; i.e., a moie poweiful exteinal cause.
26
.
Spinoza seems to accept Tschiinhaus' point in his next lettei, wiiting this time that the
pioblem is that Bescaites gets the ielationship of things with theii attiibute, anu the
ielationship of the attiibute with an "eteinal anu infinite essence", entiiely wiong. uiven
Tschiinhaus' follow-up, Spinoza's comments seem to be a change of topic iathei than a
claiification of an eailiei obseivation.

26
Bescaites' own statement of this position can be founu at /*-0!-$%&. I SS.
S1
Noieovei, if Spinoza weie to iuentify Bescaites' eiioi as his iequiiement that uou
be a tiansient anu sustaining cause of motion iathei than its immanent cause, his
conclusion that "Bescaites' piinciples of natuial things aie of no seivice, not to say quite
wiong" woulu be puzzling. It is tiue that Spinoza believes that the Caitesian view iequiies
a numbei of absuiuities (it iequiies the existence of multiple substances; it sepaiates uou's
will anu acts fiom uou's essence, it iequiies uou's constant inteivention in natuie) anu so
he cannot accept this account of the oiigin of motion. But Spinoza iecognizes the uiffeience
between the usefulness of an appioach to the stuuy of natuie, anu the auequacy of its
outcome; foi example, to 0luenbuig, he wiites that Boyle's empiiical stuuies of fluius aie
"veiy useful" as fai as they go, although they uo not auuiess the essence of things.
27
In
contiast, Spinoza's language in Lettei 81 stiongly suggests that Bescaites'
misunueistanuing of the basis of physics leaus to mistakes in the physics itself - mistakes
which, he wiites in Lettei 8S, he hopes to have time to set iight. If Spinoza meiely uiffeieu
fiom Bescaites in this account of how motion in geneial oiiginates in mattei, theie shoulu
be little ieason so bioauly to censuie Bescaites' physics; the uiffeiences in theii iespective
metaphysics shoulu not iamify so fai as to ienuei Bescaites' iules of motion "useless."
The seconu aigument that Spinoza's mention of eteinal anu infinite essence is a
coveit iefeience to motion is giounueu in a veiy wiuespieau ieauing - I believe misieauing
- of IpS4 of the +',-!., which establishes that "uou's powei is his essence itself." This
pioposition is usually taken to mean that Spinoza iuentifies uou's essence with uou's

27
Lettei 1S to 0luenbuig.
S2
powei oi powei .-#$%-!-'&*.
28
Even if uou's essence weie powei, theie is nothing to
inuicate that the manifestation of uou's powei in things woulu be local motion; howevei,
this ieauing is taken to suppoit the claim that bouies expiessing uou's essence means that
motion is immanent to mattei. So viljanen wiites: "Eveiything theie is follows fiom the
essence of uou, making uou intiinsically poweiful.anu, since finite things expiess this
infinite powei of uou.they can quite plausibly be uesciibeu as specifically mouifieu
poitions of the total powei of natuie."
29

But IpS4 in fact has the contiaiy sense: fai fiom ieuucing, so to speak, uou's essence
to powei, Spinoza is ieuucing uou's powei to uou's essence. This is specifically a iesponse
not only to Bescaites but to anyone who believes that uou's powei is a capacity oi a faculty
like the human will, oi that uou's act of cieation oi concuiience is uistinct fiom uou's
essence. Spinoza's iegisteis his opposition to this view vocifeiously: accoiuing to him, uou
shoulu not be unueistoou to have capacities, like intellect anu will, that aie uistinct fiom
uou's essence. Spinoza makes cleai in a neighboiing passage that uou's will anu uou's
intellect both aie entiiely unlike the human will anu intellect, piecisely because in uou they
aie one, anu one with uou's essence. In IIpSs, Spinoza wains against confusing uou's
powei with "human powei oi the iight of Kings," which can be unueistoou in contiast as a
faculty whose piouuction is not ueteimineu by the essence of a human being oi a kinu. Be
iefeis in the same scholium to Ip16, which associates uou's cieation with uou's $*"$*-4. All

28
See, foi example, Beleuze (199u) anu viljanen (2uu7).
29
viljanen (2uu7), 1uS. viljanen ieaus this as Spinoza's iesuscitation of scholastic notions, aiguing that
Spinoza "finus them useful". I believe that Spinoza is iathei tiying to explain away, in his own
conceptual fiamewoik, these mistaken uoctiines.
SS
this, Spinoza wiites in IIp17s1, "seems to have been noticeu by those who asseiteu that
uou's intellect, will anu powei aie one anu the same." At IpSSs, Spinoza wiites that "uou's
intellect anu his will aie not uistinguisheu fiom his essence." In the PCP, Spinoza also
ciiticizeu those who uistinguish between uou's powei anu essence by claiming that uou is
eveiywheie thiough his powei but not thiough his essence: "as if the powei of uou weie
uistinguisheu fiom all his attiibutes, oi his infinite essence."
Su

If uou's essence is not powei, then theie is significantly less motivation to think of
Spinoza as having a physics in which bouies aie poitions of powei in geneial anu Spinoza
has a kinu of conseivationist uynamics. That is because that ieauing of Spinoza's physics is
baseu on the view that, as Eugene Naishall puts it, "uou's essence is powei anu bouies aie
poitions of uou's powei."
S1

The final aigument in favoi of this inteipietation of the last lettei to Tschiinhaus is
that Spinoza iuentifies motion anu iest as the souice of vaiiety in mattei in othei passages,
so in oiuei to ensuie that Spinoza uoes not equivocate about the souice of vaiiety, "eteinal
anu infinite essence," consiueieu thiough the attiibute of Extension, must somehow iefei
to motion. The piimaiy piece of eviuence that Spinoza elsewheie takes the uistinction
between finite bouies to ueiive fiom theii motion is the physical inteiluue aftei +',-!.
IIp1S. Theie aie two ways that uistinction seems to uepenu on motion in the inteiluue.

Su
Appenuix III. Spinoza himself takes the Caitesian view (as he often uoes) in the Appenuix to the PCP,
but he ceitainly uoes not accept this as his matuie view: "Theie aie some attiibutes of uou which
explain his active essence, otheis which explain nothing of his action, but only his mannei of existing.
0nity, eteinity, necessity, etc. aie of the lattei soit, but unueistanuing, will, life, omnipotence, etc., of the
foimei. This uivision is sufficiently cleai anu eviuent, anu incluues all of uou's attiibutes."
S1
This is the account opeiative foi example in viljanen's mouifieu fielu metaphysic, although his account
a little moie subtle.
S4
Fiist, Spinoza uiscusses '!"*$"*4 .-#$%-!-..-#4' which, Lemma S says, aie "uistinguisheu
fiom one anothei only by ieason of (*4'-") motion anu iest."
S2
Seconu, complex bouies aie
saiu to be iuentifieu by the "*4'-"" of motion anu iest that obtains among the paits of the
bouy. Nost inteipietations of this uoctiine see Spinoza as following Bescaites in ielying on
local motion to inuiviuuate bouies,
SS
oi else see Spinoza as emphasizing the foice of motion
of bouies as theii piinciple of iuentity.
S4

A full iesponse to this cannot be foimulateu until aftei Chaptei S, which aigues that
local motion is not the kinu of thing that can foim a pait of the ultimate founuations of
physics, accoiuing to Spinoza, anu also offeis ieasons to question the uominance of the
physical inteiluue in the inteipietation of Spinoza's attituues about bouies anu theii
behavioi. We have alieauy seen that if Spinoza accepts that things aie inuiviuuateu meiely
thiough local motion, it is not cleai on what giounus he is ciiticizing the uetails of
Bescaites' physics. But theie aie many ieasons to believe that Spinoza thought of local
motion as an &22&!' of some ueepei piopeity of bouies. Theie aie scatteieu comments, both
in eailiei anu latei wiitings, wheie Spinoza takes caie to uistinguish between motion anu
its cause. Foi example, in one mysteiious footnote in the B,"*' 8*&4'-.&, Spinoza wiites that
theie may be othei things in mattei besiues motion, anu that when he wiites "motion" it is
just a stanu-in foi anothei possible account:

S2
See Aulei (1996) 18S-186 anu uaukiogei (2uu8).
SS
See Cuiley (1969), Aulei (1996), etc.
S4
Foi example, uaiiett (2uu7).
SS
What is saiu heie of Notion in mattei is not saiu seiiously. Foi the Authoi still
intenus to uiscovei its cause, as he has alieauy uone, to some extent, 4 $".'&*-"*-.
But it can stanu as it is heie, because nothing is built on, oi uepenus on it.
SS

Section S of this chaptei will show, fuithei, that Spinoza ieplaces Bescaites' emphasis on
quantity of motion as the founuation of his physics with othei piinciples that have a wiuei
iange than conseivation of quantity of motion. All of these consiueiations, along with
those in chapteis 2 anu S, seive to unueimine the piimacy that Spinoza occasionally
(.9*$*-.-0@%( occasionally, given how piominent an inteipietation of Spinoza's physics this
is) attiibutes to local motion in the iole of inuiviuuation anu behavioi of bouies. Finally,
Spinoza's iefusal to chaiacteiize motion, motion-anu-iest, oi motion-oi-iest in his
inuepenuent woik (contiasteu with the claiity with which he expounus Bescaites' own
account in the PCP), suggests that he was uncomfoitable with it.
S6
It is a goou iuea then to
go back to the lettei anu tiy to figuie out what Spinoza means.
Theie is little eviuence, then, foi the uominant view that Spinoza uiffeis with
Bescaites only conceining the oiigin of mattei, anu not in the claim that mattei is
iesponsible foi uiffeientiation among bouies. Still, Tschiinhaus' conceins about uiveisity
will not be neatly uispatcheu with an appeal to "eteinal anu infinite essence." What uoes
Spinoza's comment #&40. I suggest that Spinoza means that the natuie anu behavioi of
bouies cannot be unueistoou unless they aie moues of a single, infinite substance, that is to

SS
B,"*' 8*&4'-.& I IX, Note (a).
S6
Eiic Schliessei stiesses Spinoza's unceitainty about motion in his "Spinoza anu Science," foithcoming
in C<2"*7 D407=""E '" B$-0"F4. Be points out that even Spinoza's contempoiaiies took him to be vague
on this point.
S6
say, unless substance monism is tiue. I biiefly uefenu this ieauing in the next two
subsections, anu then go on to show that Spinoza uiaws a numbei of anti-Caitesian
conclusions fiom it. Inueeu, this ieauing sees Spinoza's thoughts on physics as inuebteu
less to Bescaites anu moie to Spinoza's own metaphysics than commentatois appieciate,
anu it casts new light on Spinoza's natuial-philosophical innovations.

5=G6 +<$*&..-0@ H"7I. &..&0!&
Spinoza claims that Bescaites' piinciples of physical things aie wiong because
Bescaites uoes not unueistanu them as expiessing eteinal anu infinite essence thiough
theii attiibute. The last section aigueu that the expiession of eteinal anu infinite essence
uoes not mean motion in mattei. What 7"&. it mean, then. Theie aie two questions heie:
fiist, what is uou's eteinal anu infinite essence, anu seconu, what uoes it mean to expiess
it.
The last section aigueu that IpS4 shoulu not be unueistoou to iuentify uou's essence
with powei; noi uoes Spinoza believe that uou's essence is intellect oi will simplicitei.
What -. uou's essence, then. Theie aie a few possibilities: fiist, that uou's essence is
existence itself, seconu; that uou's essences aie the attiibutes themselves; thiiu, that uou's
essence is uefineu at +',-!. Ip1S as a being with infinite attiibutes oi all possible
peifections; fouith, that uou's essence is ineffable, although compiehensible in an
immeuiate oi non-uiscuisive way.
Theie aie a numbei of passages that suppoit the view that uou's essence, accoiuing
to Spinoza, is existence. This account is also appealing in that Spinoza seems to tieat uou,
S7
oi substance, as the giounu of the being of all things, anu pait of his iesponse to Bescaites,
outlineu in pait above, involves Spinoza's iesistance to the iuea that theie can be a
substance that is not uou - that is, that anything can exist inuepenuently that uoes not have
"eteinal anu infinite essence." This is an appealing view fiom the point of a ceitain kinu of
natuialism, anu one has the sense that Spinoza wishes to giounu all of existence in
substance, anu that this is its piimaiy puipose. Noieovei, Spinoza tieats the attiibutes as
funuamental ways of being; this squaies most neatly with the view that uou's essence is
existence, anu these aie uiffeient ways of expiessing existence. Yitzhak Nelameu offeis a
veiy compelling uefense of the view that uou's essence is existence in "Spinoza anu the
Beification of Existence" which ielies not only on Spinoza's woius but also on uetecting
Naimoniuean influence in Spinoza's account of uou's name, which expiesses uou's essence.
Theie aie othei plausible accounts of uou's essence - that uou is simply the most
peifect being, oi that consists of infinite attiibutes as uefineu in the +',-!. anu in the B,"*'
8*&4'-.&: "uou is a being of which all, oi infinite, attiibutes aie pieuicateu, each of which is
infinite in its own kinu." Anothei possibility is that the essence of uou is the attiibutes
alone. Theie is some eviuence foi this (uepenuing on the tianslation, IIp7, foi example).
Bappily, howevei, is it not necessaiy to commit to a ieauing of uou's essence in oiuei to
know what Spinoza thinks it means foi a finite thing to expiess it. No mattei what uou's
essence tuins out to be, howevei, Spinoza is ielatively cleai conceining what it means foi a
finite moue to expiess it: it is foi that moue to "exist anu piouuce effects." Consiuei Ip29 of
the +',-!., the coiiesponuing uemonstiation:
S8
In natuie theie is nothing contingent, but all things have been ueteimineu fiom the
necessity of the uivine natuie to exist anu piouuce an effect in a ceitain way (Ip29).
The uemonstiation claiifies that
uou is the cause of these moues not only insofai as they simply exist (by p24c), but
also (by p26) insofai as they aie consiueieu to be ueteimineu to piouuce an effect.
Foi if they have not been ueteimineu by uou, then (by p26) it is impossible, not
contingent, that they shoulu ueteimine themselves.
Anu that:
All things have necessaiily followeu fiom uou's given natuie (by p16) anu have
been ueteimineu fiom the necessity of uou's natuie to exist anu piouuce an effect in
a ceitain way (by Ip29).
This last quote associates uou's ability to piouuce things anu theii effects with Ip16 of the
+',-!.. In Lettei 82, Tschiinhaus cites this pioposition, which he juuges to be "almost the
most impoitant pioposition" of that woik. Tschiinhaus' comment inuicates the extent to
which Spinoza's contempoiaiies weie conceineu, as his latei ieaueis woulu be, with how
Spinoza coulu account foi finite moues given his substance monism. Ip16 pioves that an
infinity of moues, not just of bouy but of all attiibutes, follow necessaiily fiom uou's
essence as uou's $*"$*-4
S7
: "Fiom the necessity of the uivine natuie theie must follow

S7
/*"$*-4, as opposeu to piopeities ($*"$*-&'4'&.) aie specifically piopeities that flow fiom an essence,
without which the thing cannot be conceiveu. They aie to be contiasteu with acciuents, which a thing
can lose oi gain without enuangeiing its iuentity. A passage a little latei on in Pait I confiims that
Spinoza intenus it in this way: "if things hau been piouuceu by uou otheiwise than they now aie, uou's
intellect anu his will, i.e. (as is conceueu), his essence, woulu have to be uiffeient. Anu this is
absuiu"(IpSS).
S9
infinitely many things in infinitely many moues (#"79.), i.e., eveiything which can fall
unuei an infinite intellect." Spinoza's iesponse to Tschiinhaus in Lettei 8S miiiois the
language of Ip16, which goes on to explain that since the uivine natuie has infinite
attiibutes, "each of which also expiesses an essence infinite in its own kinu, fiom its
necessity theie must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many moues." Spinoza puts
the mattei moie cleaily at IIp4S:
Each iuea of each bouy, oi of each singulai thing which actually exists, necessaiily
involves an eteinal anu infinite essence of uou.
Each moue of Extension, it woulu seem, involves the concept of the attiibute of Extension,
which expiesses eteinal anu infinite essence.
Bowevei, Ip16 uoes not establish in ),4' *&.$&!' finite moues follow fiom uou's
essence. Noieovei, since these $*"$*-4 follow uiiectly fiom uou's essence, they cannot be
stiaightfoiwaiuly finite, because accoiuing to Ip21, no finite thing can flow uiiectly fiom
"the absolute natuie of any of uou's attiibutes." Insteau, finite things can only be causeu by
othei finite things, oi uou unueistoou as mouifieu in a uefinite anu ueteiminate way
(Ip28). In what sense, then, aie the $*"$*-4 of uou ielateu to the existence of finite bouies.
Spinoza uistinguishes not only between the essence anu the existence of any given
finite moue, but also between two senses in which it can exist, anu two kinus of essences a
thing can have. The uistinction between two ways of existing foi a finite moue comes
peihaps most explicitly at vp29s:
We conceive things as actual in two ways: eithei insofai as we conceive them to
exist in ielation to a ceitain time anu place, oi insofai as we conceive them to be
4u
containeu in uou anu to follow fiom the necessity of the uivine natuie. But the
things we conceive in the seconu way as tiue, oi ieal, we conceive unuei a species of
eteinity, anu '" ',4' &<'&0' ',&( -0A"%A& ',& &'&*04% 407 -02-0-'& &..&0!& "2 H"7.
It woulu seem, then, that it is not as finite bouies taking up space anu time that finite moues
of Extension expiess uou's eteinal anu infinite essence, but only insofai as they aie
"containeu in uou" anu "follow fiom the necessity of the uivine natuie." This is suppoiteu
by IIp4S anu its scholium, which contiast the ielevant kinu of existence with the existence
of a singulai thing insofai as it is "ueteimineu by anothei singulai thing to exist in a ceitain
way." Since IIp4S establishes piecisely what it means foi a singulai thing to "involve
eteinal anu infinite essence," anu since its scholium also iefeis back to Ip16, I'll quote it at
length:
Each iuea of each bouy, oi of each singulai thing which actually exists, necessaiily
involves an eteinal anu infinite essence of uou.
Bem: The iuea of a singulai thing which actually exists necessaiily involves both the
essence of the thing anu its existence (by IIp8c). But singulai things (by Ip1S)
cannot be conceiveu without uou - on the contiaiy, because (by IIp6) they have uou
foi a cause insofai as he is consiueieu unuei the attiibute of which the things aie
moues, theii iueas must involve the concept of theii attiibute (by Ip4), i.e. (by Iu6),
must involve an eteinal anu infinite essence of uou, q.e.u.
Schol.: By existence heie I uo not unueistanu uuiation, i.e., existence insofai as it is
conceiveu abstiactly, anu as a ceitain species of quantity. Foi I am speaking of the
veiy natuie of existence, which is attiibuteu to singulai things because infinitely
41
many things follow fiom the eteinal necessity of uou's natuie in infinitely many
moues (see Ip16). I am speaking, I say, of the veiy existence of singulai things
insofai as they aie in uou. Foi even if each one is ueteimineu by anothei singulai
thing to exist in a ceitain way, still the foice by which each one peiseveies in
existing follows fiom the eteinal necessity of uou's natuie. Conceining this, see
Ip24c.
It's ielatively cleai that the "existence insofai as it is conceiveu abstiactly, anu as a ceitain
species of quantity" of IIp4S is ielateu to if not the same as conceiving things as actual
"insofai as we conceive them to exist in ielation to a ceitain time anu place" anu even as
"ueteimineu by anothei singulai thing to exist in a ceitain way." These aie contiasteu with
the way that singulai things flow fiom uou as uesciibeu in Ip16, which is the moue of
existence that involves the eteinal anu infinite essence of uou accoiuing to vp29s.
Fiom examining the passages in the +',-!. that invoke Ip16, then, it is cleai that the
infinitely many things follow fiom uou not as they exist in space anu time; foi example,
vp29s ieaus:
We conceive things as actual in two ways: eithei insofai as we conceive them to
exist in ielation to a ceitain time anu place, oi insofai as we conceive them to be
containeu in uou anu to follow fiom the necessity of the uivine natuie. But the
things we conceive in the seconu way as tiue, oi ieal, we conceive unuei a species of
eteinity, anu '" ',4' &<'&0' ',&( -0A"%A& ',& &'&*04% 407 -02-0-'& &..&0!& "2 H"7.
The essences of things, both actually existent anu which uo not exist, follow necessaiily
fiom uou's essence, accoiuing to Ip16. This inuiviuuation happens piioi to the moues'
42
being instantiateu in space anu time. The moues must be uistinct, then, inuepenuently of
any ielative motion. The piouuction of essences seems, foi Spinoza, to be a piimitive fact,
that holus inuepenuently of how things aie actually instantiateu oi move in space. Notion
cannot be the souice of vaiiety in natuie.
This is an impoitant uiffeience between Bescaites anu Spinoza, anu it ielates to a
neglecteu thieau in the conveisation between Tschiinhaus anu Spinoza. The seconu time
that Tschiinhaus piesses Spinoza on the pioblem of the vaiiety of things, he wiites: "|ijn
mathematics I have always obseiveu that fiom any thing consiueieu in itself.we aie able
to ueuuce at least one piopeity; but if we wish to ueuuce moie piopeities, we have to
ielate the thing uefineu to othei things."
S8
Nuch has been maue of Bescaites' "ciiculaiity"
pioblem: he uefines a uistinct inuiviuual as whatevei is in motion with iespect to its
suiiounuings, anu in tuin uefines motion as iemoval of a thing fiom its suiiounuings. But
the pioblem that Tschiinhaus is iuentifying is ueepei than this one. Even if Bescaites
assumes numeiical uistinction between bouies, he is still committeu to the claim that theii
essences aie iuentical; the essence of any finite thing, like a human being, animal oi plant, is
the same as any othei thing, since the essence of any bouy is extension. If the effects of a
thing follow at least in pait fiom theii essences, it is haiu to see how theie can, in tuin, be a
uiveisity of effects oi piopeities. Since theie is no vaiiety of essences, theie can tiuly be no
vaiiety in natuie, anu the vaiiety of essences can be accounteu foi only if finite things aie
moues of uou.

S8
Lettei 82.
4S
That bouies aie, foi Spinoza, inuiviuuateu piioi to theii motion is confiimeu in
seveial places. Foi example, Spinoza's pioof aftei +',-!. IIp1S of his veision of the
piinciple of ineitia ielies on a bouy's being iuentifiable piioi to motion, anu Lemma 2 of the
same section of the +',-!. establishes that a single bouy can "move now moie slowly, now
moie quickly" - that is to say, it is not uefineu by its state of motion.
Peihaps moie explicit eviuence comes in the PCP, wheie Spinoza pioviues
iefutation of seveial Zeno-like paiauoxes, which, since it is piecisely the iesponse that is
not open to Bescaites, is tiaitoious in light of its coming in what piofesses to be a
ieconstiuction of Bescaites' philosophy. Spinoza enteitains the "sophism" that a bouy uoes
not move because "it eithei moves in a place in which it is oi in one in which it is not. But
not in a place in which it is, foi if it is somewheie, then it must be at iest. Anu not in a place
in which it is not. Theiefoie, the bouy uoes not move." Spinoza iesponus by uiawing a
uistinction: "if by ,4. =&&0 we unueistanu ,4. *&.'&7, then we ueny that it has been
anywheie while it was moving; but if by ,4. =&&0 he means ,4. &<-.'&7, we say that, while it
was moving, it must have existeu." This aigument ielies on the intuition that the bouy
exists as an inuiviuual inuepenuent of its place oi change of place - on the peisistence of an
inuiviuual thiough time anu motion.
S9


S9
Puzzlingly, Leibniz, in "0n Natuie Itself," singles Spinoza out foi iebuke when he uiscusses this veiy
issue. Be claims "that theie cannot be ',-0@. ',4' %4.' ',*"9@, '-#& unless the uivine powei can impiess
on them some 2"*!& ',4' %4.'. ',*"9@, '-#&. In the absence of such enuuiing foice, no cieateu substance -
no soul - woulu iemain the same thing foi any length of time, anu thus nothing woulu be kept in
existence by uou. Eveiything woulu be ieuuceu to meie tiansitoiy oi evanescent states of one
peimanent uivine substance - ieuuceu to meie ghosts, one might say. 0i, to put the same thing in othei
woius: 04'9*& -'.&%2, oi the substance of all things, woulu be H"7. This is a uoctiine of ill iepute that an
able though iiieligious wiitei |Spinozaj has intiouuceu to the woilu, oi at least ieviveu. If bouily things
containeu nothing but mattei, it woulu inueeu be tiue to say that they consist in a 2%"), having nothing
44
So the fact that things flow fiom uou piioi to theii instantiation in space - oi
expiess uou's essence - means that they aie inuiviuuateu piioi to motion. Theii
inuiviuuation is a iesult of the fact that infinite essences flow fiom uou's eteinal anu
infinite essence. But Tschiinhaus suiely wants a somewhat less esoteiic answei - one that
explains the existence of the objects of oui eveiyuay expeiience, incluuing the existence of
human beings. Anu it is not immeuiately obvious that, anu if so, how, these $*"$*-4 of uou
ielate to finite physical bouies. A suivey of the use of Ip16 in the +',-!. inuicates that the
$*"$*-4 uo incluue finite moues -0 ."#& *&.$&!'. In the last lettei to Tschiinhaus itself, the
topic is the existence of a vaiiety of finite bouies, anu Spinoza seems to think that Ip16 is
geimane to the conveisation.
At IpS4, Spinoza explains that uou's essence, oi uou's powei, is the powei "by which
he anu all things aie anu act." The veiy existence of a finite moue, anu its ability to piouuce
the paiticulai effects it piouuces, can be explaineu only by appeal to uou's eteinal anu
infinite essence. Spinoza aiticulates the piinciple explicitly in the Scholium to IIp1u, which
establishes that "nothing can be oi be conceiveu without uou." uou uoes not meiely iealize
the existence of an essence ("nothing can be.without uou"), but uou is also the cause of
the essence of things ("nothing can.be conceiveu without uou"). Absuiuities in the stuuy
of natuie aiise when insteau of beginning the inquiiy with "the uivine natuie, which they
shoulu have consiueieu befoie all else - it being piioi both in cognition anu in Natuie -
they have taken to be last in the oiuei of cognition, anu the things that aie calleu objects of

substantial about them, as the Platonists once coiiectly iecognizeu." It's haiu to see what Leibniz's
complaint heie is, othei than Spinoza's impiety, since he uoes not suggest why Spinoza's states must be
evanescent because they aie not substances.
4S
sense they have taken as piioi to eveiything." In Bescaites' case, he must auu the uivine
natuie back by hanu at the enu.
It is not only the existence of a vaiiety of things that Bescaites cannot account foi,
but also theii ability to piouuce effects. IpS6 establishes that anything that exists has
effects, because "Whatevei exists expiesses the natuie, oi essence of uou.which is the
cause of all things." Confiimation of Spinoza's cast of minu is offeieu by the veiy uefinition
of a singulai thing, given at the beginning of seconu book of the +',-!.. A singulai thing,
Spinoza wiites, is simply one that exists in a ueteiminate way. But what makes one thing
uiffeient fiom anothei, Spinoza goes on to say, is that it piouuces uiffeient effects:
By singulai things I unueistanu things that aie finite anu have a ueteiminate
existence. Anu if a numbei of Inuiviuuals so concui in one action that togethei they
aie all the cause of one effect, I consiuei them all, to that extent, as one singulai
thing.
4u

The best guiue we have to the essences of things, without unueistanuing them as they flow
fiom uou, is the effects that they piouuce. Which effects a $4*'-!9%4* bouy piouuces is a
question that can only be answeieu if we know the entiie oiuei of natuie, because the
effects any thing piouuces aie causeu by anothei finite moue.
In light of this, Spinoza's comment to Tschiinhaus that accoiuing to Bescaites,
bouies uo not expiess uou's natuie, means that Spinoza uoes not believe that Caitesian

4u
IIuef7
46
bouies can giounu a causally ueteiministic woilu wheie things behave in paiticulai ways.
41

Neie volumes maue ieal cannot act. Finite things can have no essence, existence oi powei
to cause effects unless they aie moues of uou. This is aumitteuly a veiy esoteiic uoctiine.
In the next two sections I will tiy to biing it uown to eaith.

?< @#A-'7 1$* ,1+'1%-#$
Accoiuing to Spinoza, uou, oi infinite substance, is inuivisible.
42
It is cleai, then, that
finite moues like humans aie not paits of uou. It is because of this that commentatois can
maintain that Spinoza is a mechanist, since 04'9*4 04'9*40. may be piioi to moues, but he
may still maintain that the paits of 04'9*4 04'9*4'4 aie piioi to the whole. In this section,
howevei, I aigue that Spinoza believes that the moues uepenu on the whole of natuie.
The fiist anu only axiom of Pait Iv of the +',-!. stipulates that "Theie is no singulai
thing in natuie than which theie is not anothei moie poweiful anu stiongei. Whatevei one
is given, theie is anothei moie poweiful by which the fiist can be uestioyeu." Piopositions
2 thiough 4 of that section establish that foi man to be a pait of natuie, he must be -02-0-'&%(
suipasseu by moie poweiful causes. The pioof of pioposition 4 ielies suiieptitiously on
aiguments in Pait 1. Accoiuing to Pait I of the +',-!., foi something to be limiteu iequiies
that it is limiteu by something else of the same kinu; this claim is essential to the

41
Spinoza is, of couise, not the only peison to comment in this vein on Bescaites' system: Bescaites
notoiiously have uifficulty accounting foi the behavioi of bouies given "nothing in the |mateiialj objects
othei than.ceitain uispositions of size, figuie anu motion."(/*-0!-$%&. Iv 2uu). In fact, Bescaites
himself unueistanus this tension in his system anu stiuggles with it; even while incoipoiating appaient
poweis of bouies like ineitia, he maintains that all the laws of physics shoulu be able to be casheu out in
teims of volume anu motion.
42
Ip1S
47
uemonstiation of substance monism founu in Pait I. Be makes this aigument moie oi less
explicit in the pioof of pioposition 4.
Why uoes Spinoza associate paitiality of a thing with limitation. It is not obvious
that something cannot be a pait but still be a complete inuiviuual. But accoiuing to
Spinoza, this must be tiue. Theie aie two compelling pieces of eviuence foi this.
The fiist is Spinoza's lettei to 0luenbuig of 166S. 0luenbuig has askeu Spinoza
"how each pait of Natuie accoius with its whole, anu the mannei of its coheience with
othei paits."
4S
Spinoza iesponus that "this is beyonu my knowleuge. To know this it woulu
be necessaiy to know the whole of Natuie anu all its paits."
44
Be goes on to offei a mini-
tieatise on paits anu wholes. Spinoza begins by wiiting fiist that things foim wholes by
"auapt|ingj themselves to one anothei so that they aie in the closest possible agieement."
But then he seems to suggest that the uiffeiences oi similaiities among things aie meiely
uiffeiences in oui conception of those things, anu whethei things aie paits oi wholes
uepenus only on how we iegaiu them. Be offeis as an example bloou, anu wiites:
Foi example, when the motions of paiticles of lymph, chyle, etc. auapt themselves to
one anothei in accoiuance with size anu shape so as to be fully in agieement with
one anothei anu to foim all togethei one single fluiu, to that extent only aie the
chyle, lymph, etc. iegaiueu as paits of the bloou. But insofai as we conceive the
paiticles of lymph as uiffeient fiom the paiticles of chyle in iespect of shape anu
motion, to that extent we iegaiu them each as a whole, 0"' 4 $4*' |my italicsj.

4S
Lettei S1 fiom 0luenbuig, 12 0ctobei 166S.
44
Lettei S2 to 0luenbuig, 2u Novembei 166S.
48
This is a uifficult passage. The ciiteiion that Spinoza gives heie foi things being pait of a
whole - that the paits aie like one anothei oi "agiee" with one anothei - seems
inconsistent with Spinoza's own ciiteiion in +',-!. Pait II, not to mention wiong. In the
+',-!., the ciiteiion seems to be that paits of a thing maintain ceitain systematic anu
chaiacteiistic ielationships with one anothei, leaving them fiee to be uispaiate kinus of
things.
4S
But the pait of this passage that I woulu like to stiess is Spinoza's claim that a
paiticle of chyle is a pait to some extent anu a whole, 0"' 4 $4*', to some othei extent. The
uegiee to which a thing is a pait is inveisely ielateu to the uegiee to which is a whole.
0ne of the uefining claims of mechanism is that paits aie piioi to whole. 0f couise
this is veiy vague - in what way aie paits piioi to wholes. Aie all the piopeities of paits
piioi to the piopeities of theii whole, oi just ceitain (peihaps essential) ones. If whethei
something is a pait oi whole is not the kinu of piopeity that is piioi in paits to wholes.
0ne guess as to what this coulu mean is that Spinoza uoes not think that whethei
something is a pait oi a whole is a ieal piopeity of it at all. But if these piopeities aie ieal
piopeities of things, this woulu seem to fly in the face of mechanism.
Spinoza goes on to offei the famous example of a woim living in the bloou, that
woulu see the bloou as we see oui "pait of the univeise" anu
woulu iegaiu each inuiviuual paiticle of the bloou as a whole, not a pait, anu it coulu
have no iuea as to how all the paits aie contiolleu by the oveiall natuie of the bloou
anu compelleu to mutual auaptation as the oveiall natuie of the bloou iequiies, so

4S
See the axioms anu lemmas following IIp1S. Spinoza uoes not answei the question: which is piioi, the
agieement of paits oi theii mutual auaptation. I believe that the eviuence suppoits the lattei
inteipietation - the holistic one.
49
as to agiee with one anothei in a uefinite way. Foi if we imagine that theie aie no
causes exteinal to the bloou which woulu communicate new motions to the bloou, n
oi any space exteinal to the bloou, noi any othei bouies to which the paits of the
bloou coulu tiansfei theii motion, it is beyonu uoubt that the bloou woulu iemain
inuefinitely in its piesent state anu that its paiticles woulu unueigo no changes
othei than those which can be conceiveu as iesulting fiom the existing ielation
between the motion of the bloou anu of the lymph, chyle, etc. 8,9. ',& =%""7 )"9%7
4%)4(. ,4A& '" =& *&@4*7&7 4. 4 ),"%&> 0"' 4 $4*'. But since theie aie many othei
causes which uo in a uefinite way mouify the laws of the natuie of the bloou anu aie
iecipiocally mouifieu by the bloou, it follows that theie occui in the bloou othei
motions anu othei changes, iesulting not solely fiom the iecipiocal ielation of its
paiticles but fiom the ielation between the motion of the bloou on the one hanu
anu exteinal causes on the othei. Fiom this peispective the bloou is accounteu as a
pait, not as a whole.
If the bloou iemains in its state anu unueigoes no changes causeu fiom without, it woulu
always have to be iegaiueu as a whole, not a pait. To be iegaiueu as a pait, the bloou must
unueigo changes fiom without. Peihaps even moie suipiisingly, though, to be a whole, a
thing must be -##90& to changes fiom without. So again, to be a pait anu to be what
Spinoza is heie calling a "whole" aie incompatible: a thing may be both, but to inveise
extents.
46


46
I will ietuin in Chaptei S to Spinoza's claim that natuie pieseives a ceitain *4'-" of motion anu iest,
which I aigue theie shoulu not be unueistoou to be a conseivation law, oi even quantitative in any way.
Su
Why shoulu it be tiue that being pait of a gieatei whole jeopaiuizes a thing's
inuiviuuality. This is ceitainly not obvious: it's haiu to see why a livei is any less an
inuiviuual because it is pait of a human bouy, oi a human bouy less an inuiviuual because it
is pait of natuie. This is the mouel that most commentatois pioviue foi Spinoza's account
of physical natuie says that a finite thing can be an inuiviuual but still foim a pait of a
gieatei inuiviuual. Foi example, in one of few aiticles uevoteu to the cential theme of paits
anu wholes in Spinoza, by William Sacksteuei, the authoi wiites that
0ne function of Spinoza's analogy is to boggle the woims' eye view against oui own,
anu to encouiage a soit of uouble vision wheieby things may be eithei wholes oi
paits accoiuing to the way in which they aie consiueieu. The iuentity ciisis of
miuule-sizeu beings like ouiselves anu the woim aiises because each of us, in
ieflecting on himself, may consiuei himself to be eithei a whole oi a pait.
47

But we saw above that Spinoza uoes not think that things aie both wholes anu paits at the
same time, oi that it is a question of how they aie consiueieu. Rathei, he believes that to be
a pait anu a whole aie mutually incompatible.
The physical inteiluue following IIp1S of the +',-!. is usually taken to compiise
Spinoza's account of inuiviuuation, anu at fiist glance it may seem not to contain anything

But I woulu like to point out heie that Spinoza is suggesting that natuie is a genuine whole because
"theie aie no causes exteinal to" is which "woulu communicate new motions to" it, just as the bloou is a
genuine whole only if weie similaily inuepenuent. Natuie, as I'll aigue fuithei in Chaptei S, is not
subject to exteinal causes but maintains the same "motions," oi causal ielations, among its paits - this is
the meaning of Spinoza's claim that natuie pieseives a "*4'-" of motion anu iest."
47
Sacksteuei (1978), 147. "Niu-iegion beings aie so positioneu that, }anus-like, they may look in eithei
uiiection towaiu opposite extiemes. That is, we aie tempteu to chaiacteiize them eithei as wholes in
ielation to incluueu paits oi as paits in ielation to incluueu wholes, uepenuent on theii compaiison to
othei items on the scale."
S1
that sounus like what is in the lettei. Theie, in the Scholium to Lemma 7, foi example,
Spinoza claims that a composite inuiviuual may be composeu of othei composite
inuiviuuals anu so on, without suggesting that this in any way jeopaiuizes the inuiviuuality
of the paits. It's well-uocumenteu that in the inteiluue Spinoza offeis a kinu of ciiteiion of
inuiviuuation foi finite bouies: that theii paits ietain a ceitain "iatio of motion anu iest."
48

What is less appieciateu is that Spinoza uoes not simply aigue that the paits of an
inuiviuual shoulu maintain a kinematic ielationship with one anothei; that is to say, that
they aie always moving with iespect to one anothei at ceitain speeus, etc. Rathei, the
ielationship is foi Spinoza 7(04#-!. What he wiites is that the paits of an inuiviuual must
"communicate theii motions to each othei in a ceitain fixeu mannei,"
49
a foimulation he
iepeats thioughout the physical inteiluue. The physical inteiluue aumits, then, that foi a
thing to be a whole, its paits must maintain ceitain ielationships of causation among one
anothei. If the ielationships weie, as foi example in Caitesian voitex theoiy, puiely
kinematic, it woulu be $*-#4 24!-& possible that theie be complete inuiviuuals. Natuie
might be a completely self-containeu inuiviuual, maue of paits that, uespite theii being
paits of some gieatei whole, aie themselves completely self-containeu inuiviuuals. That is
to say, if the ielationships among the paits weie puiely kinematic, a bouy's being pait of a
whole woulu not compiomise its own self-sufficiency oi its own essential completeness oi
wholeness.

48
IIp1S, Lemma 4 Bemonstiation. As fai as I can tell, this is univeisally accepteu as Spinoza's ciiteiion
of inuiviuuation.
49
IIp1S Befinition
S2
Spinoza makes cleai in Lettei S2 that being subject to exteinal causes necessaiy
changes the constitution of a thing - the bloou can only be conceiveu by the woim to be a
whole it is inuepenuent of exteinal causes. Why uoes Spinoza think this. Likely, it is
because he believes that being subject to effects uisiupts the ielations between the paits of
a thing, not aumitting the possibility that a thing may be subject to ielations without itself
changing. Theiefoie, foi a thing to be subject to causation, it must not be a whole.
Theie aie a numbei of passages wheie Spinoza explicitly claims that paits aie piioi
to theii wholes.
Su
In the Appenuix to the PCP, Chaptei v, Spinoza makes a uistinction
among uistinction: theie aie ieal uistinction, moual uistinctions, anu uistinctions of ieason.
Spinoza inuicates that the uistinction between paits of natuie, oi bouies, is a moual
uistinction, oi a uistinction between "two moues of one anu the same substance." Peihaps
Spinoza changes his minu about the piioiity of paits to whole latei in his caieei.
Alteinatively, peihaps he is using the teims "pait" anu "whole" in an equivocal way, so that
the moually uistinct paits of extenueu natuie aie not stiictly paits at all. In the B,"*'
8*&4'-.& II XIX, Spinoza wiites:
pait anu whole aie not tiue oi actual beings, but only beings of ieason;
consequently in Natuie theie aie neithei whole noi paits. Note: In Natuie, i.e. in
substantial extension.But you say, if theie is motion in mattei, it must be in a pait
of mattei, not in the whole, since the whole is infinite.I ieply: theie is no motion by
itself, but only motion anu iest togethei; anu this is, anu must be, in the whole; foi
theie is no pait in extension.

Su
Yitzhak Nelameu has stiesseu the impoitance of these passages to me.
SS
So it may also be that Spinoza simply uenies that the appaient paits of natuie aie tiue
paits.
Anothei objection to the claim that Spinoza is a holist about the physical woilu is to
stiess his mention, in the physical inteiluue, of !"*$"*4 .-#$%-!-..-#4.
S1
If theie ieally weie
physical simples, theie seems to be no ieason why they coulu not be genuine inuiviuuals
but still paits of gieatei wholes. I auuiess the status of the !"*$"*4 .-#$%-!-..-#4 in Chaptei
S's uiscussion of the physical inteiluue. But I'll just mention heie that theie is no inuication
that Spinoza takes theie to be ieal !"*$"*4 .-#$%-!-..-#4. Bescaites himself iegaius the
!"*$"*4 as iuealizations, anu theii being ieally simple bouies is piecluueu by Spinoza's
uiscussion of them in the physical inteiluue.
Noieovei, accoiuing to Spinoza it is a necessaiy featuie of natuie that no thing is
self-limiting, anu a coipoia simplicissima woulu be a self-limiting thing. Pait I anu Pait Iv
show that it is a cential Spinozistic piinciple that essences cannot self-limit, so they must
be instantiateu in a woilu wheie theie is mutual limitation. At the beginning of Pait Iv,
Spinoza aigues that a man must be pait of natuie, because otheiwise, he woulu have
infinite powei:
.if it weie possible foi a man to unueigo no changes except those which coulu be
unueistoou thiough the man's natuie alone, so that he woulu necessaiily always
exist.it woulu follow that the man woulu be infinite.
S2


S1
See foi example Aulei (1971).
S2
Ivp4u
S4
Eailiei, we saw Spinoza claim that the bloou, foi example, is only an inuiviuual insofai as it
is consiueieu to be immune to exteinal causation. Inueeu, Spinoza claiifies at 4p29u: "The
powei of each singulai thing, anu consequently (by IIp1uc), man's powei, by which he
exists anu piouuces an effect, is not ueteimineu except by anothei singulai thing." A finite
thing is uefineu by its essence, but it must be limiteu in space anu time by anothei thing,
since the essence of a thing can only posit it anu not involve its limitation:
Anu no thing has anything in itself by which it can be uestioyeu, oi which takes its
existence away (by p4). 0n the contiaiy, it is opposeu to eveiything which can take
its existence away (by pS).
SS

This stiuggle between a finite thing's positing its existence anu its being limiteu by othei
moues is the giounu of Spinoza's two cential physical laws. These aie the subject of the
next section.

D< ($%&)1,%-#$' :&%E&&$ 9-$-%& %0-$='3 %0& 2)-$,-2A&' #9 A&1'% 7#*1A 7+%1%-#$ 1$*
$#$G,#$%)1)-&%8
This section aigues that uevelops two semi-quantitative laws that govein the
inteiactions of finite bouies anu aie intenueu to be piioi to oi even to ieplace any
conseivation law. It is impoitant foi Spinoza's paiallelism that both of these laws be
"attiibute-neutial." IIp7 famously establishes that
The oiuei anu connection of iueas is the same as the oiuei anu connection of things"
anu the scholium that "whethei we conceive natuie unuei the attiibute of

SS
IIIp6u
SS
Extension, oi unuei the attiibute of Thought, oi unuei any othei attiibute, we shall
finu one anu the same oiuei, oi one anu the same connection of causes, i.e., that the
same things follow one anothei.
The causal stiuctuies goveining the inteiactions of bouies shoulu be ieflecteu in those
goveining the inteiactions of iueas - oi of finite moues of any attiibute, foi that mattei. It
is veiy uifficult to see how the law of conseivation of quantity of motion can satisfy this
iequiiement. This chaptei uoes not aigue that Spinoza nevei ueiives such a conseivation
law fiom these moie funuamental laws; that aigument is left foi Chapteis 2 anu S. But it
uoes show that it is not appiopiiate foi Spinoza to set as a founuational law of natuie.
Insteau, it aigues that Spinoza has two attiibute-neutial funuamental laws of finite moues -
the "piinciple of least moual mutation" anu what we may call Spinoza's piinciple of non-
contiaiiety.
In the lettei to Cleiseliei of 17 Febiuaiy 164S, Bescaites wiites that the iules of
collision "uepenu only on a single piinciple, which is that when two bouies colliue anu have
in them incompatible moues, theie must unuoubteuly occui some mutation of these moues
to make them compatible, but this mutation is always the least possible." Bowevei, this
law uoes not appeai in any othei woiks of Bescaites, playing no iole in the uemonstiations
of the ;9%&. oi the /*-0!-$%&.. But Spinoza salvages this law anu establishes it as
pioposition 2S of Pait II of the PCP:
When the moues of a bouy aie foiceu to suffei vaiiation, that vaiiation will always
be the least that theie can be.
Spinoza claims that it follows fiom IIp14, the geneializeu piinciples of ineitia:
S6
Each thing, insofai as it is simple, unuiviueu, anu consiueieu in itself alone, always
peiseveies in the same state as fai as it can (?940'9# -0 .& &.'.)
Spinoza himself calls this lattei law his "supieme law of natuie" in the 8,&"%"@-!"J/"%-'-!4%
8*&4'-.&, 16.
Alan uabbey has calleu this the "Piinciple of Least Noual Nutation" (PLNN), noting
that Spinoza inseits it into his own veision of Caitesian physics.
S4
But Spinoza uoes moie
than incluue this law in his ieconstiuction of his piinciples wheie Bescaites has left it out;
he also uses it in the uemonstiations of seveial iules of collision, wheie Bescaites himself
has useu the law of conseivation of quantity of motion.
Spinoza uses the PLNN in the uemonstiations of IIp27, which coiiesponus to
Bescaites' Rule S, anu IIp29, which coiiesponus to Bescaites Rule S. Bescaites himself
uses the piinciples of conseivation of motion to piove these. It is not cleai exactly how
much moie geneial Spinoza takes the PLNN to be than the conseivation of quantity of
motion. But it incluues at least one impoitant uiffeience: changes in the ueteimination of a
bouy count as much towaiu a change in that bouy's state as uoes a change in that bouy's
quantity of motion. In somewhat moie quantitative teims, ".it is cleai that to change a
bouy's ueteimination |in a ceitain uiiectionj iequiies a foice equal to that iequiieu to
change its motion. Fiom which it follows that a bouy which loses moie than half of its
ueteimination |in a ceitain uiiectionj anu moie than half its motion, suffeis moie change
than one which loses its whole ueteimination |in a ceitain uiiectionj."
SS
Spinoza at least

S4
uabbey (2uu1), 16S.
SS
PCP IIp26c
S7
wants to leave open the possibility that theie aie a wiuei vaiiety of changes possible when
bouies inteiact than meiely theii iespective quantities of motion.
uabbey (2uuS) anu Nanning (2u12) wonuei why Spinoza takes himself to be
licenseu to concluue the PLNN fiom IIp14 - what woulu essentially become Spinoza's own
conatus uoctiine. Accoiuing to Spinoza, when a thing's essence is instantiateu, it stiives to
iemain in existence. Since stiiving is just what a thing uoes in the absence of exteinal
foices, anu it can be checkeu by contiaiy foices, it makes sense foi Spinoza to claim that the
change in state of a moue is minimal.
We have seen how Spinoza thinks that finite things can iesist changes to theii state
oi theii iuentity. But why uo finite things change 4' 4%% when they inteiact. What
ueteimines the minimum amount of change, oi the vaiiation that is "the least theie can
be".
Axiom 1 of Pait v of the +',-!. ieaus:
If two contiaiy actions aie aiouseu in the same subject, a change will have to occui,
eithei in both of them, oi in one only, until they cease to be contiaiy.
Anu heie is Axiom 19 of the /*-0!-$%&. "2 34*'&.-40 /,-%"."$,(:
When two bouies which have opposite moues come into contact with one anothei,
eithei both aie constiaineu to suffei some vaiiation, oi else at least one of them is.
These piinciples - veisions of what we'll call Spinoza's piinciple of non-contiaiiety (PNC) -
aie complementaiy to the PLNN; togethei, the PLNN anu the PNC seive to specify (albeit
vaguely anu non-quantitatively) how finite moues iesponu to one anothei. The PLNN
S8
uictates what pievents finite inuiviuuals fiom changing, while the PNC explains why they
unueigo a minimum of change.
This piinciple, too, is absent fiom Bescaites' /*-0!-$%&. "2 /,-%"."$,(, uespite its
inclusion in the PCP, anu like the PLNN, it is attiibute-neutial. While Spinoza uses
piinciples like these to piove Bescaites' iules of collision in the PCP, Bescaites uses the
piinciple of conseivation of quantity of motion. That piinciple is cleaily moie useful foi
wiiting uown anu justifying specific iules of collision, which Spinoza stiuggles to uo with
his moie qualitative anu esoteiic staiting points. 0n the othei hanu, Spinoza seems to be
making a moie conceiteu effoit to keep his piinciples ueiivable 4 $*-"*- anu attiibute
neutial.
Theie is one obvious uiffeience between the two veisions of the PNC: the one in the
PCP, wiitten specifically to auuiess the pioblem of two inteiacting bouies, conceins
opposite moues in uiffeient bouies, while the one in the +',-!. conceins opposite moues in
the same subject. 0nfoitunately, since Spinoza consiueis both of these to be axioms, we uo
not know why he holus them, whethei he consiueis them to be veisions of the same
piinciple, oi whethei he moves fiom accepting the veision in the PCP to the one in the
+',-!. latei. While neithei of these aie specific enough to allow foi evaluation of theii
actual self-eviuence, the veision in the +',-!., which pievents contiaiy actions in the same
subject, woulu seem to have the gieatei claim. Noieovei, weie Bescaites to accept Axiom
19 of the PCP, Spinoza has moie iesouices than uoes Bescaites foi ueiiving the PCP
veision fiom the veision in the +',-!., since two bouies, accoiuing to Spinoza, aie
ultimately "in the same subject" in that they aie all moues of uou. Peihaps Spinoza even
S9
consiueieu that two bouies inteiacting - oi "coming into contact with one anothei" as the
PCP has it - become, foi the puiposes of this law, one bouy anu so one subject. Theie is
some pieceuent foi him to make such a claim in the physical inteiluue, which says that two
inuiviuuals become one insofai as they aie joint causes of a single effect. Peihaps both
inteiacting bouies piouuce the affection between them anu the iesultant change in theii
states, anu so can be consiueieu to be an inuiviuual. This highlights the pioblematic
ielationship between states anu inuiviuuals in Spinoza. 0niaveling his conception of the
ielationship between these two concepts, if he inueeu has a cleai such conception, may
pioviue a key to a uistinctly Spinozistic way of viewing the physical woilu.
In auuition to these uifficulties of inteipietation, it is haiu to know what an
"opposite moue" is anu how to quantify it, but it's cleai that Spinoza takes the kinus of
moues subject to such a law again to incluue not just quantity of motion but
ueteimination.
S6
At any iate, Spinoza's ieplacement of the piinciple of the conseivation of
quantity of motion with the PLNN anu the PNC is Spinoza's attempt to put the Piinciples in
geometiical oiuei anu in a piioii, attiibute-neutial teims. This is a piocess that he
continues in the "physical inteiluue" of the +',-!., which I aigue in Section S is also baseu
on attiibute-neutial piinciples.





S6
See PCP 2p24.
6u
B< H0& ,#$1%+' *#,%)-$&
The othei 4 $*-"*-, attiibute neutial piinciple that is cential to Spinoza's account of
finite things is the conatus uoctiine. Section 1 establisheu that uou uoes not just cause the
existence of things, but also ueteimines them to piouuce ceitain effects:
A thing which has been ueteimineu to piouuce an effect has necessaiily been
ueteimineu in this way by uou; anu one which has not been ueteimineu by uou
cannot ueteimine itself to piouuce an effect (Ip26).
Peihaps Spinoza's most explicit statement of the ielation between a thing anu its effects is
at IIIp7, which establishes that the stiiving oi enueavoi (!"04'9.) of a thing to "peiseveie
in its being (&..&)" is "nothing but the actual essence of the thing." veiy often this is taken
to show that a thing's enueavoi towaiu self-pieseivation is iuentical with the essence of
the thing. But it's questionable, fiist, that IIIp7 asseits an iuentity anu seconu, that the
"conatus" only iefeis to a thing's enueavoi towaiu self-pieseivation. I'll ueal with each of
these in tuin.
The woiuing of IIIp7 uemanus compaiison with Bescaites' fiist law:
Fiist law: each anu eveiy thing insofai as it s simple anu unuiviueu always iemains
in the same state as fai as it can (?940'9# -0 .& &.'), noi uoes it evei change except
by exteinal causes. Thus, if a paiticulai pait of mattei is squaie, we can be suie
without moie auo that it will iemain squaie foievei, unless something coming fiom
outsiue changes its shape. If it is at iest, we holu that it will nevei begin to move
unless it is pusheu into motion by some cause. Anu if it moves, theie is equally no
ieason foi thinking that it will evei cease this motion of its own accoiu anu without
61
being checkeu by something else. Bence we must concluue that whatevei moves, so
fai as it can, always moves.
The language of IIIp4-6 - that a thing peiseveies "insofai as it is in itself (?940'9# -0 .&
&.')" - miiiois the language of uiscussions of the piinciple of ineitia, not only in Bescaites
but in Lucietius anu many otheis.
S7
So although uaiiett anu Bella Rocca, foi example, see
in this language an inuication that Spinoza believes that finite things can be at least
paitially "in themselves" as substances aie, such an explanation is unueimotivateu insofai
as this language anu the ielateu concept of "stiiving" has soliu pieceuent.
In the "physical inteiluue" following IIp1S of the +',-!., Spinoza uevelops his own
vaiiant of the law of ineitia foi what he calls "simple bouies (!"*$"*4 .-#$%-!-..-#4)."
Bespite the uebate suiiounuing the natuie of these !"*$"*4, theie is little ieason not to see
these as iuealizations, just as Bescaites uoes. Accoiuing to Bescaites, the piinciple of
ineitia only applies to bouies "insofai as they aie simple anu unuiviueu"; in the /*-0!-$%&.,
he explains that theie aie no such bouies in ieality. What is impoitant foi the iuealization
is that the bouies aie simple. Foi Bescaites, that means that all of theii potential paits aie
at iest ielative to one anothei; foi Spinoza, this means that they have no inteinal
complexity, oi that they uo not have paits that aie themselves inuiviuuals. Although
Spinoza uoes not say explicitly that this is an iuealization, it is not only his uebt to Bescaites
that inuicates it: he also claims that all inuiviuuals aie infinitely uivisible into othei
inuiviuuals, so theie can be in ieality no such coipoia simplicissima. Now, the pioofs that
both Spinoza anu Bescaites give of theii ineitial piinciples iely on the iuea that since the

S7
See Cohen (1964) anu uabbey (2uuS).
62
thing is simple, anu theie aie no exteinal foices on it, then theie aie no foices on it at all, so
it iemains in its state.
Spinoza's pioof of the piinciple aftei IIp1S, like Bescaites' pioof of the similai
piinciple, ielies on the bouies' being simple. That is because accoiuing to Spinoza, a thing
may be alteieu eithei by exteinal causes oi by inteinal causes. A simple bouy cannot be
alteieu by inteinal causes, but a complex one can. So the piinciple of ineitia uoes not apply
in any stiaightfoiwaiu way to complex bouies. Even the moie geneializeu piinciple that a
thing iemains in its state ?940'9# -0 .& &.' only applies to simple bouies, accoiuing to
Bescaites. What is impoitant in theii being simple is that they aie only changeable by
exteinal causes.
But in the 8*4!'4'9. 8,&"%"@-!"J/"%-'-!9., Spinoza changes the iules when he wiites
that the "supieme law of natuie" is that "each thing stiives to peisist in its own state as fai
as it can by its own powei |904?94&?9& *&. -0 .9" .'4'9> ?940'9# -0 .& &.'> !"0&'9*
$&*.&A&*4*&j." While this miiiois Bescaites' own use of ".'4'9," which he has not yet
changeu to "&..&" as in the +',-!., Spinoza has uioppeu the iequiiement that such a bouy be
"simple anu unuiviueu" as it appeais in Spinoza's own physical inteiluue anu in Bescaites'
woik.
Spinoza, is seems, wishes to make a ielateu claim not just foi all bouies, incluuing
complex ones, but foi all moues, be they moues of extension oi moues of thought.
S8
It's

S8
In piinciple, accoiuing to Bescaites, all of the behaviois of bouies shoulu be explicable fiom this
piinciple. Spinoza uoes not put it quite this way - he nevei says that this shoulu be tiue. Whethei oi not
he believes that it is, howevei, he thinks that he has some insight into some highei-level behaviois of
6S
appaient that he ielates them because of the kinus of pioofs he pioviues, as well as fiom
the comment in the TTP. Both the pioof of Caitesian ineitia aftei IIp1S anu the pioof of
IIIp6 iely on the same logical piinciple: that if a thing has a paiticulai piopeity oi is in a
paiticulai state, it cannot auopt a contiaiy piopeity oi state without the inteivention of an
exteinal cause. But besiues one's applying only to simple bouies anu one's applying to
complex moues, theie is one othei uiffeience: a thing's stiiving to peiseveie in its "esse"
veisus its "state."
Spinoza is now only conceineu with one paiticulai effect oi stiiving of a thing,
which is the thing's stiiving foi self-pieseivation. Bowevei, nothing in IIIp4-7, which
uiscuss the conatus, iequiies that the only thing that an inuiviuual uoes is pieseive itself.
Ceitainly the pioof to IIIp7 uoes not show that the essence of a thing is this uiive to
pieseive itself, but only iuentifies the stiiving as an effect of the essence of a thing:
1. Fiom the given essence of a thing, some things necessaiily follow (IpS6), anu only
those things (Ip29) that follow fiom its essence aie piouuceu.
2. The stiiving to peiseveie is an effectis something a thing uoes.
S. A thing uoes eveiything it uoes out of its given oi actual essence.
4. Theiefoie, a thing stiives oui of its given oi actual essence.
Insteau, it just establishes that the effects of a thing flow fiom its essence, anu since the
uiive to self-pieseive is an effect, it can be unueistoou as the opeiation of a thing's essence.
The claim that a thing's enueavoi, whethei it be to peiseveie in its existence oi in its state,

bouies, anu that those bouies This is a highei-level claim about the behaviois of bouies, which is baseu
on conceptual oi metaphysical consiueiations, not physical ones.
64
is iuentical with the essence of the thing, is ill-suppoiteu. The pioof of IIIp7 uemonstiates
only that the conatus of a thing must iesult fiom a thing's essence, because all of the effects
of a thing flow fiom its essence, anu the conatus is an effect of a thing. While Spinoza uoes
in the iemainuei of the +',-!. appeai to tieat IIIp7 as licensing a bianu of egoism, it uoes
not piove as much - given the pioof, any effect can flow fiom a thing's essence as long as it
uoes not cause its uestiuction.
Theie aie, then, two questions about the conatus if we aie inteiesteu in its ielation
to an inteinal physical piinciple like ineitia: fiist, why uoes Spinoza geneialize it to
complex things; anu seconu, why uoes Spinoza think by the time of the +',-!. that the
conatus is towaiu the self-pieseivation anu not the pieseivation of states. Bow can
Spinoza account foi a thing's piouuction of effect only as a function of it's stiiving foi self-
pieseivation.
Anothei impoitant question about the conatus uoctiine is what kinu of causation
Spinoza supposes it to iepiesent. Seveial scholais aigue that accoiuing to Spinoza, a
thing's essence is the foimal cause of its effects. Alteinatively, case can be maue that
Spinoza takes the fact that a thing "stiives" to uo something as a pait of a physics of stiictly
efficient causation. We will see that this is appaient fiom the uegiee to which Spinoza
stiesses that uou is causally opeiative in the existences of finite things only insofai as uou
is unueistoou thiough othei finite things. Spinoza also makes cleai that the effects that a
thing actually piouuces iesult fiom the opeiation of efficient causes on those things.
0ltimately, since the notion of an inuiviuual is uefineu in teims of a thing's effects, Spinoza
auvocates a kinu of anti-essentialism about finite bouies (anu finite things in geneial). In
6S
the enu, then, the conatus uoctiine conflicts with the kinu of essentialism that Spinoza's
ciitique of Bescaites, outlineu in Section 1, ielies upon.
viljanen, uueioult anu Waiu aigue that Spinoza auvocates a kinu of "emanative-
foimal" mouel of causation, accoiuing to which a thing's essence is the cause of its
piopeities. They aie inspiieu fiist of all by Ip16, whose language is ieminiscent of foimal
causation with iespect to uou's causation of essences. Theie aie seveial passages which
suggest that this applies as well to finite things. We've alieauy uiscusseu two. Fiist, Ip16
seems to imply that eveiything causes its effects as piopiia because it uiscusses things with
vaiious uegiees of ieality. Seconu, the pioof of IIIp7 says that the effects of a thing follow
fiom the essence of that thing.
uou's effects aie uou's $*"$*-4, accoiuing to Spinoza, but that is because uou is the
immanent cause of eveiything that uou piouuces. The same cannot be saiu foi finite things
which, in contiast to uou, aie tiansient causes of theii effects. It is useful heie to compaie
IIIp7 to the analogous IpS4 - both associate ceitain poweis of a thing with its essence. I
aigueu in Section 1 that IpS4 uoes not establish that uou's essence is powei, but iathei that
any notion of a cieative capacity oi faculty is not applicable to uou. Insteau, powei shoulu
be so to speak ieuuceu to essence. Can we make a similai aigument in the case of IIIp7.
Like IpS4, IIIp7 is often seen to be Spinoza's attempt to iuentify the essence of a thing - in
this case finite - with a ceitain powei. It is when we ieau both IpS4 anu IIIp7 in this way
that we get common claims like: uou's essence is powei anu finite things aie poitions of
uou's powei. The pioof of IIIp7 stiaightfoiwaiuly makes an analogous move; it shows that
the stiiving of a thing is nothing but an effect of the thing. The uiffeience is that uou's
66
powei is the opeiation of uou's essence, wheieas the powei of things cleaily comes fiom
its exteinal causes.
The othei big uiffeience between IIIp7 anu IpS4 is that IpS4 shows that uou's
effects aie uou's $*"$*-4, while IIIp7 only auuiesses the effects of a thing, claiming that they
follow fiom a thing's essence. In fact, Spinoza says little about the piopeities of things in
Pait II of the +',-!.. Insteau, he is laigely conceineu with theii effects. 0n the one hanu,
this shoulu not be suipiising. uou is an immanent cause of uou's effects, while finite things
aie tiansitive causes of theii effects. That is to say that uou's effects inheie in uou, while
the effects of things uo not inheie in those things. Spinoza makes as much cleai when he
uiscusses the causation of one man by anothei: the son can live even aftei his fathei uies,
but none of uou's effects coulu continue to exist without uou. uou's effects aie "In" uou,
but a finite thing's effects aie not in that thing.
S9
In fact, Spinoza suggests that a thing's
effects inheie in uou oi substance, too.
This uoes not, howevei, inuicate that Spinoza uoes not make a similai association
between a thing's effects anu its piopeities (oi $*"$*-4 - foi now we leave it open) in the
case of finite things as in the case of uou. Spinoza can associate a thing's effects with a
thing's piopeities, peihaps, without claiming that those effects inheie in the thing. Theie
woulu have to be a uiffeience in the way that effects flow fiom a finite thing veisus the way
they flow fiom uou. Now, uou causes effects in a stiaightfoiwaiu way: if something flows

S9
Foi a much moie uetaileu uefense of this uistinction, see Yitzhak Nelameu (2uu9). Foi the opposing
view, see uaiiett anu Bella Rocca. uaiiett's ieauing of the conatus uoctiine sees Spinoza's use of
"quantum in se est" to signal that finite things aie like quasi-substances, whose effects at least paitially
inheie in them.
67
fiom uou's essence, it exists in that way. But a thing is only a paitial cause of any effect in
which it is involveu, anu it is usually haiu to know exactly to what extent a ceitain thing
contiibutes to an event of which it is a paitial cause. That is to say, the effects that a thing
actually has cleaily uo not follow fiom its essence alone. What we see as an effect of a thing
oi event (the winu causing the leaf to fall fiom the bianch, foi example) is a iesult of many
- an infinite - numbei of othei foices. Noieovei, its own paiticipation in that paiticulai
event is ueteimineu by its own pioximate cause.
Boes the conatus iepiesent the appeaiance of teleology in Spinoza's account of
finite bouies. While the "conatus uoctiine" is usually tieateu as uistinctly Spinozistic,
uoctiine, Spinoza's useu of the teim "!"04'9*" to uesciibe a ceitain activity of a thing can be
founu both in Bescaites anu in Bobbes. When the conatus uoctiine is not seen in this
context, it is often thought to be a teleological element oi an element of foice oi powei. But
Bescaites anu Spinoza both uefine the stiiving oi conatus of a thing in a ueciueuly non-
teleological way: a thing can be saiu to stiive to uo X if it woulu uo X in the absence of
anything to stop it oi altei it. Foi simple bouies, it woulu not change. That is because
change can come fiom the outsiue oi the insiue, but a simple bouy has no inteinal
complexity that coulu change its state; it contiibutes nothing to changes that take place to
it. If it is pusheu simultaneously to the left anu iight with the same magnituue of foice, it
will stay still. But if it is complex, it may exeit its own foice - this woulu be its conatus, oi
what it stiives to uo. Ineitia uesciibes the "conatus" of a thing that is simple - it uoes not
change (in the ielevant way). The conatus of a moie complex thing woulu be whatevei that
thing woulu uo in the absence of any exteinal cause.
68
Spinoza wiites that uou is both the sustaining oi immanent cause of things - that is,
things can only iemain in existence, oi theii peisistence can only be unueistoou, if they aie
moues of substance, which Bescaites iejects. But uou is also the "efficient cause" of things.
uiven Spinoza's claims about uou's causality in Ip16, which sounu veiy much a claim that
uou causes moues as a foimal cause, this may seem stiange, anu Spinoza may seem to be
stietching the uefinition of efficient cause. Inueeu, Spinoza pioviues a taxonomy of efficient
causation in the B,"*' 8*&4'-.&, which suggests that all causes aie efficient.
Anu in the +',-!., Spinoza makes cleai that uou uoes biing about the existence - anu
the effects - of eveiy finite moue, but uou unueistoou thiough some othei finite thing. So
while uou may be a foimal cause of the essences of things, Spinoza's claim that uou is an
efficient cause of the existence of things anu of theii actual effects is suppoiteu by a
numbei of texts.
This is a question not only of why a thing causes the paiticulai things that it uoes
cause, but also of wheie a thing gets the powei to cause anything at all. Accoiuing to
viljanen, foi example, the essence of a thing is the powei to cause what is uictateu by it, just
as uou's effects flow fiom uou's essence. But uou anu finite things aie veiy uiffeient, anu
finite things iequiie uou not only to exist, as we saw in Section 1, but to piouuce effects.
That powei of uou, accoiuing to Spinoza's most fiequent woius, uoes not opeiate thiough
a thing's essence, but thiough pioximate causes. So both the actual effects that a thing has
anu the powei thiough which it causes them comes fiom its pioximate cause. The effects
that things actually piouuce coulu not be ueteimineu fiom theii essence because they aie
laigely (infinitely) ueteimineu by the inteiactions of each thing with othei things. The
69
existence of things is the same - it is the effects of the oiuei of natuie: "The ieason why a
ciicle oi tiiangle exists, oi why it uoes not exist, uoes not follow fiom the natuie of these
things, but fiom the oiuei of the whole of coipoieal natuie."
As foi teleological oi foimal-causative language in Spinoza, theie is an explanation
foi it, besiues that Spinoza is pioposing to ieveit to these kinus of causes, just like theie is
an explanation foi powei-talk even though Spinoza iejects the scholastic notion of poweis.
It is that Spinoza is, I think, unchaiacteiistically sensitive to what his piefeiieu
explanations leave out, anu tiies veiy haiu to explain ceitain phenomena in his own
teims.
6u
So while the conatus looks like a "teleological element," that may be because
Spinoza wants it to act enough like a teleological element to explain behavioi, without
positing such an element.
61


F< (' 42-$#51 1 7#)& I*8$17-,1AJ %0-$K&) %01$ >&',1)%&'L
Theie is a tenuency to see Spinoza eithei as an aich-mechanist, following Bescaites,
oi, insofai as he evolves fiom Bescaites, as being a step on the way to Leibniz's moie
"uynamical " view of physics. BBynamics is not a question of whethei bouies aie inheiently
in motion oi not (although this can be one solution to the question of why things aie in
motion). Rathei it is conceineu with the causes of motion. Leibniz himself wiites that

6u
This is also, I aigue, the ieason why he is often ieau to be an explanatoiy physicalist; again, I
think this is a misieauing causeu by Spinoza's tenuency to tiy to make his ascetic system explain all
phenomena.
61
I am leaving asiue foi now the veiy complicateu issue of whethei Spinoza is entitleu to ieject final
causation, given his othei uoctiines. I agiee with Bennett that this is a question of whethei Spinoza
gives causal significance to mental content; I suspect he uoes. But heie I only claim that Spinoza uiu
not take himself to be engaging in teleological explanations with the conatus.
7u
motion is an effect which ueiives fiom the piimaiy chaiacteiistic of bouy, which is its
paiticulai actions anu passions. Foi Leibniz, the intiinsic featuie of bouies is whatevei
uictates those actions anu passions. It is obviously impoitant foi Spinoza that a bouy can
be iuentifieu as active oi passive in inteiactions, since it is on this basis that his entiie
ethics is built. Theie is a sense in which Spinoza's system is moie amenable to a uynamics
than is Bescaites, anu as such, it waius off a numbei of objections that Bescaites' system is
subject to.
Like Leibniz, Spinoza attempts to giounu both the existence of a bouy anu its ability
to piouuce effects. These aie qualities that bouies have intiinsically, as opposeu to
possessing only qualities gianteu by size anu speeu. Bescaites, of couise, has some
uynamical iesouice in quantity of motion anu the piinciple of ineitia, but it is cleai that he
wishes them to be puiely ueiivable fiom geometiical facts about extension. Spinoza is
iesistant to this, which unueimines much of the basis on which Spinoza is thought to be a
Caitesian. "All things that aie, aie in uou, anu so uepenu on uou that they can neithei be
noi be conceiveu without him."
62

Bespite this, many commentatois see Spinoza as a Caitesian, who believes that
"simple bouies aie exhaustively uesciibeu by some set of piopeities having to uo with theii
location in space anu possible changes theiein - i.e by motion anu iest. Fiom this we can
ueuuce, foi example, a piinciple of ineitia foi simple bouies."
6S
I hope to have begun to
show that this inteipietation of Spinoza's position vis--vis Bescaites is not accuiate.

62
Ip28s2
6S
Aulei 18S
71
Spinoza giounus the piinciple of ineitia in the conatus uoctiine, which is in tuin giounueu
in the fact that moues expiess uou's eteinal anu infinite essence. This conatus uefines how
a bouy behaves when it acts oi is confionteu by anothei bouy. Fai fiom having faith in the
Caitesian pioject of uesciibing natuie in teims of figuie anu motion, then, Spinoza's
comments to Tschiinhaus convey that he iecognizes with ielative piecision the challenges
facing Bescaites; it is simply not tiue that "Spinoza neithei peiceives the paiticulai
uifficulties foi Caitesian physical theoiy that leau Leibniz to ievive both finalism anu
substantial foims."
64
To see this, consiuei two objections that Leibniz himself woulu soon
biing against Bescaites. Fiist, Leibniz chaiges that Bescaites' account extension makes
motion impossible. If bouies aie only uistinguisheu by being in motion ielative to one
anothei, then in a snapshot of mattei, theie is no uiveisity. If, moieovei, the passage of
time is a succession of instants, as Bescaites often suggests,
6S
then theie is no genuine
vaiiety even in time.
Seconu, Leibniz aigues that Caitesian bouies cannot be genuine subjects of foice.
Foi Bescaites, of couise, what happens to a bouy when it inteiacts with anothei bouy is
goveineu by iules ueiiving fiom the conseivation of quantity of motion. But without
giounuing that motion in some actual featuies of the bouies, theie is no connection
between the way that bouies aie anu the way that they behave when they come into
contact. As a iesult, Leibniz wiites

64
Nanning 2u12
6S
0ften but not always: see uaibei, uueioult, etc foi a uetaileu account of Bescaites unceitainty in
chaiacteiizing uuiation. What's impoitant is that this is how Spinoza, justifiably, ieaus Bescaites
72
If theie weie nothing in bouies but extenueu mass anu nothing in motion but change
of place anu if eveiything shoulu anu coulu be ueuuceu solely fiom these uefinitions
by geometiical necessity, it woulu follow.that upon contact the smallest bouy
woulu impait its own speeu to the laigest bouy without losing any of this speeu; an
we woulu have to accept a numbei of such iules which aie completely contiaiy to
the foimation of a system.
66

Again, while Bescaites' piinciple of ineitia often seems like an inteinal piinciple, Bescaites
uenies that it is. If bouies aie just volumes, theie seems to be no ieason why a laige one
shoulu not be affecteu equally by the same impact as a veiy small one.
The thiust of both of these ciiticisms is that neithei inuiviuuation, noi causality, noi
motion itself can be explaineu without appealing to the existence of genuine subjects of
foice, which exist piioi to motion anu whose natuie uictates how each bouy iesponus to
othei bouies. A kinematic law like conseivation of quantity of motion is an 47 ,"! basis
upon which to giounu physics, since theie is no ieason in bouies themselves why they
shoulu iesponu in one way oi anothei to effects.
It is a commonplace that Spinoza's account of physics is moie "uynamical" than is
Bescaites. This is tiue in one sense: Spinoza is conceineu fiist with giounuing the
existence anu causal connections between bouies, anu the piopeities they have such that
they can be genuine subjects of causes of change. Bescaites, on the othei hanu, is piimaiily
conceineu with kinematics, iesoiting to the "sanctuaiy of the ignoiant" of uivine
inteivention - one which cannot be extenueu to the inteiactions between finite moues. Foi

66
Biscouise on Netaphysics, 21
7S
Spinoza, the ieason that bouies aie in motion at all is intimately ielateu to the ieason that
they can affect each othei - because they aie moues of uou anu expiess uou's essence.
These aie cleaily inteinal piopeities of bouies, inuepenuent of theii location in space oi
motion ielative to othei paits of space.
67
Bowevei, to see Spinoza as a "uynamist" meiely
because he makes motion immanent to extension sees Spinoza falling victim to the same
eiiois as Bescaites, while theie is ample ieason to believe that he was awaie of the pitfalls
of Caitesianism.
Accoiuing to Alan uabbey, foice as unueistoou by Leibinz anu his contempoiaiies is
"an entity empiiically knowable only to the inuiviuual self anu empiiically unobseivable in
otheis anu othei things anu in theii inteiactions, but which the tiauitional mechanists weie
obligeu to employ in one foim oi anothei in oiuei to have a woikable explanatoiy physics."
It seems ieasonable to say that Spinoza, moie than Bescaites, appieciateu this fiist-peison
giounu of the concept of foice. Spinoza wiites that we "feel ouiselves to be a bouy
affecteu" anu that "we feel ouiselves to be eteinal." Foi Bescaites, the bouy is an object of
the human minu, whose existence we can uoubt just as we can uoubt the existence of any
othei bouy. But foi Spinoza, the human bouy is one bouy of which we have inteinal
knowleuge. We aie in a position, then, so know ceitain foices oi qualities that aie intiinsic

67
Scholium to IIp1u, that "nothing can be oi be conceiveu without uou." uou uoes not meiely
iealize the existence of an essence ("nothing can be.without uou"), but uou is also the cause of the
essence of things ("nothing can.be conceiveu without uou"). The ieason foi this mistake is
piecisely Bescaites': "the uivine natuie, which they shoulu have consiueieu befoie all else - it
being piioi both in cognition anu in Natuie - they have taken to be last in the oiuei of cognition,
anu the things that aie calleu objects of sense they have taken as piioi to eveiything." Boing so,
they can no longei cieate a consistent natuial science, finuing themselves aftei iemoving the uivine
natuie fiom natuie, unable to auu it back in by hanu.
74
to bouies because we aie a bouy, anu we can sense the causal poweis of oui own bouy.
Noie will be saiu about this in Chaptei S, Section S, but heie it suffices to note that if foice,
activity oi causal powei is something which is "empiiically unobseivable" anu foi that
ieason is iejecteu as a valiu concept foi mechanists, Spinoza has the unique iesouices to
account foi it.
Chaptei 1 has outlineu how moues of extenueu substance flow fiom uou - that is,
the metaphysical unueipinnings of any stuuy of finite bouies. But how uo we know that the
piopiia of uou that follow fiom uou's essence have anything to uo with the bouies of oui
expeiience - coloieu volumes, tianslating in space. That iequiies an account of Spinoza's
epistemology of bouies. The next chaptei shows that knowing much moie than this the
natuie of paiticulai physical entities is not veiy hopeful, anu the chaptei aftei that shows
this fuithei by aiguing that Spinoza uiu not think that a physics baseu on shape anu motion
coulu uo this.








7S

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($%)#*+,%-#$
Chaptei 1 aigueu that Spinoza's cential commitments about the natuie anu
behavioi of bouies ueiive fiom the veiy founuations of his ontology. But its conclusions
apply to finite moues of any attiibute; as Chaptei 1 aigueu, this is impoitant foi Spinoza,
given his commitment to paiallelism. But many questions about what anu how we can
know about the physical woilu aie still to be answeieu, since the esoteiic uoctiines
outlineu in Chaptei 1 tell us veiy little about how geneial, attiibute-neutial piinciples
apply to bouies in paiticulai. Noieovei, they tell us little about the uetails of a physical
science, with moie fine-giaineu laws of bouies anu claims about the natuie of mattei, foice
anu motion.
Befoie we go fuithei, anu ask what Spinoza thinks is the natuie of bouies anu the
laws of theii motion, we have to unueistanu ,") he thinks we can know about these things.
This chaptei asks: what epistemic tools, accoiuing to Spinoza, uo we have to uevelop a
moie uetaileu physical science. Bioauly, it aigues two oveiaiching points, while
ueveloping inteipietations of some of the cential featuies of Spinoza's epistemology
insofai as it beais on finite things. 0n the one hanu, Spinoza's epistemology shows that we
aie not justifieu in being committeu to a uetaileu mechanist account of natuie. In fact,
Spinoza's account of scientific knowleuge bioauly constiueu shows him to be veiy
76
pessimistic with iespect to how much we can know that falls unuei what his
contempoiaiies woulu call the science of bouies oi physics. In paiticulai, Spinoza is
pessimistic about the piospects both of empiiical methous anu mathematical methous in
natuial philosophy.
0n the othei hanu, this uoes not license any inteipietation of Spinoza on which we
can puisue munuane science at a uiffeient level of ceitainty oi iigoi than that achieveu by
Spinoza's most ueeply-helu metaphysical anu ethical uoctiines. That Spinoza was involveu
in empiiical science is suggesteu, foi example, by his letteis to }elles anu to 0luenbuig
conceining Boyle, his involvement in uebates about piactical anu theoietical optics, anu his
closeness with Buygens anu some Butch Caitesians. Be seems to commit himself to some
piinciples of mechanism inheiiteu fiom Bescaites anu Bacon. Anu he makes, in a numbei
of passages, a uistinction between a uiscoveiy's being useful anu being tiue. Aftei
appieciating the eviuence that Spinoza uoes not believe that empiiical anu mathematical
knowleuge uelivei tiue knowleuge, we might be tempteu to attiibute to him, as foi example
Bennett uoes, a "two-level view" on which the unueilying metaphysics anu the mechanistic
system aie not cleaily connecteu.
68
But Spinoza insists on seveial occasions that a tiue
science of bouies can only be uevelopeu fiom fiist piinciples. To put it simply, Spinoza
holus scientific knowleuge to the same stanuaiu as ethical, political oi ontological
knowleuge, anu it is a high stanuaiu.
Section 1 outlines Spinoza's ciitique of mathematical anu empiiical science,
uemonstiating that Spinoza takes a iathei pessimistic view of what we can know thiough

68
Bennett (1984), 79.
77
those means. Section 1a uefenus the claim that Spinoza is committeu to the complete
inauequacy of iueas fuinisheu by the senses, oi imaginative iueas, anu that he classifies as
imaginative cognition the vast majoiity of what we woulu consiuei to be knowleuge of the
laws of natuie oi physical facts. This effectively seveis foi him any connection between
appaient bouies anu finite moues of Extenueu substance as they actually exist.
Section 1b explains how, accoiuing to Spinoza, mathematical knowleuge of natuie is
not to be contiasteu with empiiical cognition of natuie, but is insteau an instance of it.
Accoiuing to him, the use of mathematics to stuuy bouies involves abstiaction, which can
nevei leau to tiue knowleuge. Nathematics can be usefully applieu in a wiue vaiiety of
subjects, but can nevei yielu knowleuge of things oi theii causes.
Section 2 asks if Spinoza thinks that we can have any epistemic access to physical
things at all. In it, I aigue that Spinoza uoes think that we can have such access in two ways.
Fiist, we know about the geneial piinciples of finite things - the piinciples outlineu in
Chaptei 1. Spinoza seems to think that we come to know these thiough ieason. These aie
not specific to physical things, anu tell us nothing of what it means to be extenueu oi in
motion. The seconu way allows us to fill in the bouy-specific content of these laws; that
avenue foi auequate knowleuge is the common notions. We come to have auequate iueas
of the natuie of bouies as opposeu to othei kinus of finite things thiough these common
notions.
Sections S offeis an inteipietation of the natuie anu the auequacy of these common
notions. In this section, I aigue that the common notions of bouies aie extiemely geneial
featuies oi ways of being of bouies, anu not, as many commentatois aigue, laws of natuie.
78
I aigue that theii auequacy is the kinu of auequacy possesseu by the thiiu kinu of
knowleuge, uefenuing this view against claims that they aie fuinisheu by the imagination
oi by ieason. I also offei some ieasons against consiueiing them to be innate iueas. 0ui
giasp of the common notions uepenus upon oui actually being bouies anu inteiacting with
othei bouies. In othei woius, the common notions iequiie expeiience, but it is a veiy
uiffeient kinu of expeiience than is imaginative expeiience.
Section 4 concluues by auuiessing some othei possible accounts of Spinoza's
explanation of scientific knowleuge. In paiticulai I piesent aiguments against the view of
Cuiley, Wilson, anu otheis that Spinoza offeis a iobust account of the laws of natuie, claims
by Naulei that Spinoza thinks we can have secuie scientific knowleuge of things like
physiology anu chemistiy, anu uaukiogei's anu Aulei's view that knowleuge of physics
seives as Spinoza's paiauigm of knowleuge. Finally I uefenu why we shoulu not accept the
two-level account pioposeu by Bennett. Although Spinoza uoes allow foi "moial ceitainty,"
which allows us to act in a ieasonable way with iespect to the woilu aiounu us, this is not
scientific knowleuge of the natuie of things. Such an account must be sensitive, Spinoza
stiesses, to fiist piinciples anu to its own limitations.

.< 42-$#516' ,)-%-N+& #9 71%0&71%-,1A 1$* &72-)-,1A ',-&$,&
To simplify quite a lot, theie aie, in the seventeenth-centuiy, two uiffeient ways
about leaining about natuie: by examining it, oi peifoiming expeiiments by applying
mathematics to it. Nost philosopheis anu scientists believeu that theie was a iole foi both
79
in natuial inquiiy, although many felt that one oi the othei was moie ieliable oi piioi. So
foi example, Bescaites says about science that
I uo not aumit oi uesiie any othei piinciples in physics than geometiy oi
abstiact mathematics, since all the phenomena of natuie aie explaineu
theieby.
69

0n the othei hanu, Fiancis Bacon, in the K"A9# C*@409#, wiites that
The best uemonstiation by fai is expeiience, if it go not beyonu the actual
expeiiment.
7u

Nany scientists like Bescaites anu, foi example, the chemist Robeit Boyle weie tiying to
iefute Aiistotelian physics, with its baioque metaphysics of foims anu qualities, anu
ieplace it with a physics baseu only on mattei, motion anu impact; what they uisagieeu
about was the best way to uo this. Foi Boyle, the best way was by peifoiming many
expeiiments to stuuy bouies at a smallei anu smallei scale anu in uiffeient inteiactions,
showing that theii qualities uiun't change in kinu. Bescaites, insteau, iuentifieu mattei as
the puie object of geometiy anu aigueu fiom theie. The impoitant point is not that it is not
possible to see a iole foi both in the investigation of natuie, but iathei, that whethei
competing oi complementaiy, these weie seen to be two 7-22&*&0' ways of leaining about
natuie.
Spinoza is usually lumpeu with Bescaites in this pictuie. But this section aigues
that Spinoza confounus this uistinction: he consiueis mathematical cognition of natuie to

69
;9%&. 4S.
7u
Aphoiism 7u, K"A9# C*@409#.
8u
be not an alteinative to empiiical cognition, but an instance of empiiical cognition. It is, to
that extent, subject to the same ciitique. Noieovei, he aigues that they both offei veiy
pooi piospects foi unueistanuing natuie. This is piescient in the sense that by the time of
Newton, mathematics anu expeiiment weie seen as complementaiy, anu not competing,
ways of leaining about natuie; but Spinoza's view is uistinctive in that he uoes not believe
that eithei is ieliable.
71
I'll stait by uiscussing Spinoza's account of the use of expeiiment to
investigate natuie, anu go on to explain how Spinoza classifies mathematical physics as a
species of empiiical science.
Accoiuing to Spinoza, theie aie thiee ways of cognizing things. In incieasing oiuei
of value, they aie fiist, cognition thiough the senses, oi what he calls imagination; seconu,
cognition thiough ieason; anu thiiu, intuitive cognition. Imagination is the only kinu of
cognition that can be what Spinoza calls inauequate. Spinoza uefines an auequate iuea as
"an iuea which, insofai as it is consiueieu in itself, without ielation to an object, has all the
piopeities, oi intiinsic uenominations of a tiue iuea."
72
A tiue iuea is one that agiees with
its object. This uistinction is impoitant because accoiuing to Spinoza, eveiy iuea must agiee
with its object - in the minu of uou - anu in that sense uoes not contain anything false. The
pioblem is that fiom oui limiteu peispectives, we may not appieciate the object that an
iuea coiiesponus to. We ienuei iueas tiue not by examining the iueas to ueteimine what is
goou anu ieliable in them, like Bescaites, but by biinging them aiounu to ielate to uou: "All

71
Eiic Schliessei's aiticle "Spinoza anu the Newtonians" (foithcoming) shows that Spinoza was
ultimately ciiticizeu on this basis by Newtonians. Piofessoi Schliessei has uevelopeu an
inteipietation of Spinoza's philosophy of science paiallel to many of the aiguments in this section
in his aiticle "Spinoza anu science" (foithcoming in the C<2"*7 D407=""E '" B$-0"F4).
72
IIu4.
81
iueas, insofai as they aie ielateu to uou, aie tiue."
7S
The pioof uoes cite agieement with
theii objects as the iesult of an iuea's being ielateu to uou, but Spinoza's notion of
agieement of an iuea with its object is notoiiously uifficult to unpack. It is not that an iuea
iepiesents its object faithfully, as a poitiait iepiesents its subject, but iathei that the iuea
is attacheu to its coiiesponuing moue of extension. We will see in the next sections that
this has consequences foi Spinoza's account of knowleuge fiom expeiience.

546 8,& -047&?94!( "2 !"@0-'-"0 2*"# &<$&*-&0!&
Eveiyuay expeiience is populateu by finite things - macioscopic ones like people
anu iocks, micioscopic ones like cells anu viiuses - which aie involveu in appaient
inteiactions with each othei anu with oui own bouies. But accoiuing to Spinoza, oui
sensoiy iueas of featuies of those things aie not qualities of them, but aie ieally iueas of
theii effects on oui own bouies. 0ltimately, the iueas that we believe iepiesent finite
things coiiesponu to inteiactions between oui own bouies anu othei things, oi what
Spinoza calls "affections" (422&!'-"0&.), which involve the natuies of the bouies involveu. So
heie is IIp16:
The iuea of any moue in which the human Bouy is affecteu by exteinal bouies
must involve the natuie of the human Bouy anu at the same time the natuie of the
exteinal bouy.
In fact, they tell us moie about oui own bouies than about exteinal things:
.an imagination is an iuea which inuicates the piesent constitution of the

7S
IIpS2
82
human Bouy moie than the natuie of an exteinal bouy - not uistinctly, of
couise, but confuseuly.
These iueas "set foith exteinal bouies as if they weie piesent to us."
74
The imagination,
then, is the only way that we aie able to have any iuea at all of the actual existence, in space
anu time, of a thing whose essence uoes not involve existence - that is, of any thing that is
not uou.
Spinoza calls these sensoiy iueas "iuea of imagination," anu he thinks that they aie
all inauequate.
7S
Why. To begin with, Spinoza takes the iauical view that human beings aie
no uiffeient fiom any othei pait of natuie, anu that they aie subject to the same laws as any
othei natuial thing. Be ciiticizes philosopheis who believe that the soul, with its own
causality, allows humans to tianscenu the iest of natuie, wiiting that
.they seem to conceive man in natuie as a uominion within a uominion. Foi they
believe that man uistuibs, iathei than follows, the oiuei of natuie, that he has
absolute powei ovei his actions, anu that he is ueteimineu only by himself.
76

What's impoitant heie is that human beings aie subject to the same laws as eveiything
else, anu this -0!%97&. the human minu just as much as the human bouy; accoiuing to
Spinoza, the minu uoes not tianscenu the limitations of the bouy. Inueeu, Pait 4 begins
with the axiom: "Theie is no singulai thing in natuie than which theie is not anothei moie

74
IIp16c2
7S
Theie aie inteipietations of these iueas on which they aie not all inauequate; see Floistau (1971),
foi example. Such accounts classify the common notions, which aie auequate, as imaginative iueas.
I will not auuiess this inteipietation now, since I uiscuss the common notions at length in Section S.
76
Pieface, Pait III
8S
poweiful anu stiongei." In paiticulai, "the powei of man is limiteu by the powei of anothei
thing anu infinitely suipasseu by the powei of exteinal causes."
77

So human beings aie just paits of natuie anu as a iesult can have no piivilegeu
peispective on it. The pioblem with this foi oui knowleuge piospects is that Spinoza
thinks that auequately to know a thing in natuie is to know all of its causes; this is most
uecisively establisheu in Pait I, Axiom 4:
The knowleuge of an effect uepenus on, anu involves, the knowleuge of
its cause.
Eveiy finite thing is situateu in an infinite chain of causes, so to know about one finite thing,
you'u have to know about eveiything in natuie. Spinoza coloifully illustiates oui epistemic
situation by compaiing us to woims in a lettei to 0luenbuig in 166S, wheie he asks us to
"imagine, if you please, a tiny woim living in the bloou." Such a woim woulu inhabit a
univeise of colliuing bloou cells, anu tieat it as an isolateu system, since it woulu not know
how the bloou itself is conuitioneu by the iest of the bouy. Like the woim, we live in a tiny
pait of the univeise, having no iuea how it is in tuin contiolleu by the iest of it. 0ui view is
extiemely paitial, anu hence extiemely inauequate. Any object of empiiical scientific stuuy
is aitificially isolateu fiom the whole, anu so cannot tiuly be unueistoou.
A numbei of Spinoza's ieaueis tiy to salvage some empiiical knowleuge of natuie
by suggesting that we can impiove oui beliefs about the woilu, even if we can't peifect
them. Naulei (2uu6) anu Cuiley (1969) both suggest that, accoiuing to Spinoza, we can
have knowleuge of facts like "the human bouy ueiives eneigy fiom caibohyuiates" anu "the

77
vpSu
84
sun is 6uu eaith uiameteis away" - that is, the kinu of singulai, contingent facts about
natuie that science woulu be expecteu to uelivei. 0n my account, these fit squaiely in the
categoiy of imaginative knowleuge foi Spinoza. Cuiley is inspiieu by, foi example, a
passage wheie Spinoza uiscusses a classic case of the appaient coiiection of sensoiy eiioi.
Spinoza seems to suggest that although the sun appeais 2uu feet away fiom us in the
imagination, we can know its "tiue uistance" of 6uu Eaith uiameteis if we "know the natuie
of vision anu at the same time that it has the piopeity that at a gieat uistance we see one
anu the same thing as smallei than when we look at it close at hanu. Fiom this I infei that
the sun is laigei than it appeais to be, anu othei similai conclusions."
78
Cuiley aigues that
this shows that "expeiience has a much gieatei iole to play in Spinoza's theoiy of
knowleuge than |iationalismj can account foi"
79
anu that Spinoza thinks that ieason
incluues auequate iueas fiom expeiience, like the natuie of vision. (Cuiley uoes not aigue
that these iueas aie classifieu as imagination, but iathei as iueas of ieason; nonetheless
they fall in the categoiy that I aigue heie aie all iueas of imagination).
But theie is veiy little eviuence foi this, anu plenty against it. It's tiue that we seem
to be able to coiiect oui sensoiy iueas, like the iuea of the uistance of the sun, with iational
iueas about the natuie of vision anu peispective. But I think that these passages shoulu not
be taken to piove that Spinoza thought that we can leain stiaightfoiwaiuly fiom
expeiience of natuie, by, foi example, examining the optic neive oi ueveloping bettei ways
of estimating the uistance between the eaith anu the sun. Bow woulu we uiscovei the tiue

78
TIE 21
79
Cuiley (1969), 26.
8S
uistance. 0nly by fuithei obseivation, anu at Ivp2, Spinoza claims that eiioi cannot be
iemoveu by the imagination: only a moie poweiful image - not a tiuei one - can ieplace an
inauequate one. The point is uiiven home to the contempoiaiy ieauei by the fact that the
figuie Spinoza gives as the coiiect uistance to the sun is also wiong.
Naulei, too, thinks that Spinoza leaves open the possibility that we can have
auequate knowleuge of contingent facts about natuie like these. Be wiites that "it is one
thing to know about the bouy's nutiitional neeus because one expeiiences hungei, thiist,
anu weakness; it is an entiiely uiffeient thing to know those aspects of the bouy by
scientifically unueistanuing the iole of pioteins, caibohyuiates, anu fluius in sustaining the
bouy."
8u
While this sounus like a ieasonable thing to believe, theie is neaily no eviuence
that suppoits that Spinoza believes it, noi uoes he have the philosophical iesouices to
uefenu it in his stateu epistemological system. Spinoza cleaily states at 8*&4'-.& "0 ',&
+#&074'-"0 "2 ',& L0'&%%&!' M2S-27 that claims like "oil feeus fiie" anu inuuction fiom them
aie iueas of imagination anu inauequate, not claims like "I am waim." (In fact, it may be
that Spinoza thinks we have a moie immeuiate anu even possibly auequate iuea of oui
affects, if we aie able satisfactoiily to claiify them.) It is iepiesentation of exteinal things
anu states of affaiis - of paits of natuie that we only see fiom a paitial view of oui own -
that is pioblematic foi Spinoza, anu that incluues even oui best knowleuge of anatomy anu
nutiition. Spinoza's comments in the letteis to Boyle veiy cleaily inuicate that no mattei
how caiefully we manipulate anu uiviue mattei oi how accuiately we can pieuict its
behavioi, this uoesn't get us any closei to the tiuth than watching watei boil. The bottom

8u
Naulei (2u1u), 18u.
86
line is that Spinoza uenies the ieliability of expeiience anu expeiiment while not availing
himself of the applicability of mathematics as Bescaites uoes, leaving him with few tools to
caiiy out munuane science. But then what uoes Spinoza mean when he offeis examples of
epistemic impiovement, like when he wiites that we can coiiect oui believes about
astionomy, oi when he says, foi example as he uoes in a lettei, that expeiiments confiim
"not absolutely" but "to some extent".
When Spinoza intiouuces imaginative cognition in the 8*&4'-.& "0 ',& +#&074'-"0 "2
',& L0'&%%&!' M2S-27, he wiites that "it is in this way that I know almost all of the things that
aie useful in life." Be offeis as examples that "oil is capable of feeuing fiie, anu that watei is
capable of putting it out" anu "that the uog is a baiking animal, anu man a iational one." It
seems that we can have bettei oi woise piactical knowleuge of natuie thiough the
imagination. This kinu of piovisional knowleuge helps us to put out fiies, avoiu uogs anu
peisuaue men, in oui coinei of the univeise. It's just that it uoesn't get us any closei to
unueistanuing natuie anu so, Spinoza thinks, no closei to uou.
These comments uo not pioviue a veiy cleai iuea of the scope of the imagination,
but Spinoza claiifies fuithei in a lettei to 0luenbuig, Robeit Boyle's secietaiy. Theie, he
makes it cleai that unuei the heauing of imaginative cognition, he incluues any conclusions
uiawn fiom even the most caieful expeiiments. Spinoza is iesponuing to Boyle's
expeiiments with nitei, iecoiueu in "Ceitain Physiological Essays." Theie, he takes an
ambivalent tone, on the one hanu stiongly ciiticizing Boyle foi uiawing ceitain conclusions
fiom expeiiments, which uo not yielu ceitainty, anu on the othei offeiing his own
expeiiments as eviuence foi oi against Boyle's conclusions. In Letteis 6 anu 1S, Spinoza
87
contenus the uecisiveness of Boyle's iesults, aiguing not only that Boyle's expeiiments fail
to confiim the coipusculaiian hypothesis anu uisconfiim the scholastic one, but that any
expeiiment will in piinciple fail to pioviue eviuence in favoi of oi against a hypothesis of
that kinu. 0f one of Boyle's conclusions, which uepenus on claims about the foices
opeiative in mattei at the micioscopic level, Spinoza wiites:
No one will evei be able to 'confiim' this by Chemical expeiiments, noi by any
otheis, but only by uemonstiation anu computation. Foi it is by ieasoning anu
calculation that we uiviue bouies to infinity, anu consequently also the Foices
iequiieu to move them. But we can nevei 'confiim' this by expeiiments.
Coipusculaiianism anu the scholastic theoiy of foims aie both pioposeu explanations foi
the obseiveu phenomena that might be otheiwise. So the scope of imaginative cognition,
accoiuing to Spinoza, is gigantic - almost anything that we woulu call a law of natuie oi a
uiscoveiy woulu fall unuei it. Inueeu, it is not meiely the case that Boyle's investigations
uo not pioviue 'mathematical ceitainty.'
81
Bis painstaking expeiiments, Spinoza wiites a
little insensitively, offei no fuithei suppoit foi the mechanical hypothesis than eveiyuay
obseivations of events like the boiling of watei oi the buining of woou:
Foi as fai as heat is conceineu, is not the same conclusion equally cleai fiom the fact
that if two pieces of woou, howevei colu they aie, aie iubbeu against each othei,

81
See Savan (1971), Lachteiman (1974) anu Schliessei (2u12), who claim that Spinoza implies that
expeiiment can only yielu piobabilities. I am not suie Spinoza believes this - its haiu to know
baseu on his account how we coulu know what is piobable oi not. Expeiience, he seems to suggest,
can leau us in exactly wiong uiiections, not meiely moie oi less piobable ones. The examples he
gives of wheie expeiience gets it iight iepiesent him applying his theoietical analysis to physical
events (woou iubbing togethei).
88
they piouuce a flame simply as a iesult of that motion. 0i that lime, spiinkleu with
watei, becomes hot. As fai as sounu is conceineu, I uo not see what is to be founu
in this expeiiment moie iemaikable than is founu in the boiling of oiuinaiy watei,
anu in many othei instances.
The implication is cleaily that no mattei how caiefully you look, no mattei how poweiful
youi micioscopes oi telescopes oi acceleiatois, you make 0" $*"@*&.. towaiu knowing
about the physical woilu though this kinu of expeiience.
This is completely consistent with Spinoza's physiological account of the
imagination. Be makes cleai in the +',-!. that the human bouy can be in the same state -
oi the "affection" can be the same - given completely uiffeient causes, anu uiffeient
contiibutions fiom the exteinal woilu oi the bouy. This is why, foi example, we can
hallucinate: the iuea of the affection will be the same iuea, since the affection is the same,
but the causes contiibute in uiffeient measuie. Since we have no iuea wheie these
contiibutions come fiom - the iuea, Spinoza says, is hopelessly confuseu - we cannot tell
how veiacious the iuea is.
82

The answei to this question uepenus upon what it means, foi Spinoza, foi a human
minu to have iueas. This question is suipiisingly unueiuiscusseu in Spinoza liteiatuie,
notwithstanuing Nichael Bella Rocca's seminal B$-0"F4 "0 *&$*&.&0'4'-"0 407 ',& #-07J

82
See, foi example, IIp17c: "Although the exteinal bouies by which the human bouy has once been
affecteu neithei exist noi aie piesent, the minu will still be able to iegaiu them as if they weie
piesent." Theie aie commentatois who stiess Spinoza's suggestion that iueas can have uegiees of
auequacy, oi can expiess theii causes moie oi less auequately; see, foi example, Bella Rocca
(2uu2). But if the bouy can be in piecisely the same state given any numbei of causes, it is haiu to
see how Spinoza can consistently maintain this.
89
="7( $*"=%&#. But even this woik, along with consiueiations of this issue by Bennett,
Wilson, anu otheis uoes not consiuei some ample anu impoitant eviuence in Pait II of the
+',-!. that beais on the question. These passages inuicate, I aigue in the next S paiagiaphs,
that Spinoza uoes not believe that the human minu has the iuea of the human bouy oi of the
paits of the human bouy. Rathei, the human minu has iueas of the affections of the human
bouy, oi "what happens in" the human bouy.
The human minu shoulu have paits, just as the human bouy has paits, because of
the paiallelism IIp7. Although this is ceitainly the most consistent view Spinoza can take
given his paiallelism, it is not the one that he ielies upon to uevelop his epistemology. A
numbei of piopositions contioveit it - that we can have iueas, foi example, of things that
uo not exist (IIp8) oi have iueas of ieason at all. Spinoza's theoiy of iueas anu
iepiesentation is a fiaught issue. But the impoitant thing to note heie is that Spinoza
makes veiy cleai in Pait II of the +',-!. what is not often appieciateu: that theie is a
uistinction between the iuea that the human minu is anu the iuea that the human minu has,
just as theie is an uistinction between the iuea that uou's minu is anu an iuea that uou's
minu has. Anu it tuins out that the iueas that the human minu has aie iueas of affections
piimaiily, anu not iueas of the paits of the human bouy. Likewise, the iueas that uou has
aie iueas of what Spinoza consistently calls affections of uou anu not paits of uou. IIp11
establishes that "the fiist thing that constitutes the actual being of a human Ninu is nothing
but the iuea of a singulai thing which actually exists." IIp12 goes on to show that the human
minu peiceives "whatevei ,4$$&0. in the object of the iuea constituting the human minu" -
it uoes not peiceive the object of the human minu .-#$%-!-'&*. The uemonstiation of IIp1S
9u
also inuicates that the fact that the human minu is the "iuea of" the human bouy means that
the human minu has oi peiceives iueas of the 422&!'-"0. of the bouy, not the paits of the
human bouy:
.if the object of the human Ninu weie not the Boyu, the iueas of the affections of t
he Bouy woulu not be in uou (by p9c) insofai as he constituteu oui Ninu, but insofai
as he constituteu the minu of anothei thing, i.e. the iueas of the affections of the
Bouy woulu not be in oui Ninu; but we have iueas of the affections of the bouy.
Theiefoie, the object of the iuea that constitutes the human Ninu is the Bouy, anu it
actually exists.
Finally, IIp19 anu IIp24 establish that the human minu knows the human bouy anu its
paits, iespectively, only thiough iueas of affections of the human bouy, fuithei pioving that
accoiuing to Spinoza, foi something to be the object of an iuea is not equivalent to that
iuea's having knowleuge of that thing. To be the iuea of a ceitain bouy, it seems, is not to
have iueas of the paits of the bouy, but to be a minu that has the iueas of the inteiactions in
which a ceitain bouy is involveu, oi a locus of consciousness of that bouy's activity.
Putting asiue the question of whethei this is consistent with Spinoza's paiallelism
8S
,
failuie to iespect this uistinction between what it is foi a finite thing to be anu iuea (that is,

8S
This isn't the only place wheie Spinoza violates the stiict kinu of human minu-bouy paiallelism
that is usually attiibuteu to him. Foi example, in Pait v of the +',-!., the iuea that coiiesponus to
the essence of the human bouy is the iuea of the essence of the human bouy - not the essence of the
human minu, as we woulu expect fiom paiallelism. This is veiy likely uue to a kinu of ieliance on a
ceitain pictuie of minu-bouy inteiactionism that Spinoza cannot entiiely uispense with. Foi
example, the pioof of the auequacy of the common notions as I have piesenteu it ielies on
inteiattiibute causation: the iueas of common notions aie auequate because theii objects aie
91
a minu) anu what it is foi a finite thing to have an iuea has leu to confusion about why the
human minu uoesn't have auequate knowleuge of the human bouy's essence oi paits. It
has also leu thinkeis like Bennett to accuse Spinoza of being unable to builu a ieasonable
psychology (anu, one assumes, a ieasonable epistemology) because he is confuseu about
what it means to be an object of an iuea.
84
But Spinoza uoes not seem confuseu; in fact he
seems veiy cleai. The human minu is the iuea in uou's minu of the human bouy, but the
human minu ,4. iueas of the affections of the human bouy.
To summaiize this section, theie aie thiee uiffeient ways that Spinoza thinks the
senses yielu inauequate iueas. Fiist, a scientist will always be an infinitesimally small pait
of the woilu that she is stuuying, anu she will not be able to unueistanu some pait of the
woilu without unueistanuing the whole thing. Seconu, we aie mistaken about what
sensoiy iueas aie actually of. We believe that they uiiectly iepiesent exteinal objects to us,
but they aie actually iueas that coiiesponu to mouifications of oui bouies, oi moie
piecisely to inteiactions oi affections between oui bouies anu exteinal things. Thiiu, the
affection can be the same given uiffeient causes, so we have no way of knowing the tiue
causes involveu in the geneiation of the affection.
The fiist pioblem can't be solveu; we cannot change the fact that we aie small paits
of an infinite physical univeise. But even if we weie able to claiify oui iueas without
attenuing to the whole of natuie, the claiifieu iuea woulu not be about an exteinal object,
but about one of these affections, oi inteiactions. If I wanteu to claiify my iuea of an apple,

piesent in all things equally. I think it may be possible to iefoimulate the pioof without this fault,
but that's a pioject foi anothei uay.
84
See Wilson (2uuS) anu Bennett (1984).
92
I woulu investigate not just the apple itself, but the facts about the inteiaction between
myself anu the exteinal woilu that make my iuea of the apple possible. It tuins out that if
we appieciate this, anu with a little luck conceining the thiiu pioblem, we have some hope
of leaining about bouies; Section 2 will uiscuss how.
The iauicality of this ciitique owes something to a moie munuane skepticism - that
oui bouies can be in the same states given uiffeient causes, anu that we must know the
whole of natuie in oiuei to know any of its paits. Bescaites helu the seconu anu a vaiiant
of the fiist, although Spinoza stiesses that the bouy can be in the same state given a vaiiety
of physical causes, while Bescaites is woiiieu that the minu can be in the same state given
a vaiiety of states of the physical woilu.
But I woulu like to stiess a uiffeient pioblem that Spinoza has with oui imaginative
iueas: that we aie mistaken about the kinus of things that they aie iueas of. We believe that
they uiiectly iepiesent exteinal objects to us, but they aie actually iueas that coiiesponu to
mouifications of oui bouies, oi moie piecisely to affections between oui bouies anu
exteinal things. So even if we weie able to claiify oui iueas without attenuing to the whole
of natuie, the claiifieu iuea woulu not be about an exteinal object, but about one of these
affections, oi inteiactions. If I wanteu to claiify my iuea of an apple, I woulu investigate not
just the apple itself, but the facts about the inteiaction between myself anu the exteinal
woilu that make my iuea of the apple possible. This uniquely Spinozistic ciitique of
empiiical investigation is that we cannot neglect the ioles of oui own bouies in cieating the
object of the sensoiy iuea.

9S
5=6 N4',&#4'-!4% .!-&0!&
What is suipiising about the ciitique of empiiical science that I uesciibeu in the last
section is its scope anu its philosophical giounus. But foi people useu to thinking of
Spinoza as a Caitesian, his skepticism of expeiiment in geneial is not suipiising. Theie aie
some ielateu themes in Bescaites about the ieliability of expeiience, although Bescaites is
somewhat less committeu to them than is Spinoza.
Bescaites, though, has iecouise to mathematics to make the physical woilu
tiactable. Bis entiie physics is piemiseu on the iuentification of mattei with the puie
object of geometiy, oi extension in thiee uimensions. 0n his mouel, a bouy is chaiacteiizeu
as a ceitain volume with a ceitain speeu. As a iesult, Bescaites thinks, physics can be
ieuuceu in laige pait to geometiy, allowing it to inheiit the infallibility of mathematics.
This allows him to situate physics, just above metaphysics, as the most founuational
science, fiom which all othei bianches of natuial knowleuge can giow.
Nost scholais of Spinoza think that he has a similai view of the ielationship
between mathematics anu science. Nany even aigue that he views mathematical scientific
knowleuge as a mouel foi all othei kinus of knowleuge.
8S
I'u like to show in this section
that this is not tiue. In fact, Spinoza thinks that the application of mathematics to natuie is
a function of the imagination, anu so it theieby yielus only inauequate cognition. I'll aigue
that theie aie two, ielateu ieasons foi this. Fiist, Spinoza uoes not follow Bescaites in
iuentifying mattei anu space, oi the "extension of the geometeis." Seconu, Spinoza agiees

8S
See, foi example, uaukiogei (2uu2), 1S2 anu Aulei (1996).
94
that oui knowleuge of mathematics is ieliable, anu that mathematics pioviues a mouel of
claiity.
86
Bowevei, he aigues that applying it to mattei uoes not yielu knowleuge of it.
The complete aigument foi the fiist point - that Spinoza uoes not iuentify mattei
anu space - is aiticulateu in Section 2 of Chaptei S. It is impoitant because it is uenieu by
all Spinoza scholais, anu on the most influential account of Spinoza's metaphysics - this is
}onathan Bennett's - Spinoza uoes iuentify mattei anu space, like Bescaites.
87
Spinoza's
pious fiienu 0luenbuig wiites to him in 167S, aleiting Spinoza that "ieasonable anu
intelligent Chiistians" aie conceineu about some of the things that Spinoza hau wiitten in
the 8,&"%"@-!"J/"%-'-!4% 8*&4'-.&. Suiely Spinoza coulu not have confuseu uou anu Natuie,
as the Tieatise maue it sounu, oi uenieu that theie aie miiacles. To tiy to put theii minus
at iest, Spinoza wiites back that theii concein is baseu on a misunueistanuing: Spinoza
uoes not believe that uou shoulu be iuentifieu with Natuie, -2 by Natuie "they unueistanu a
kinu of mass oi coipoieal mattei." But in one of the most contioveisial claims of the +',-!.,
Spinoza calls uou "an Extenueu thing"; in fact, uou, oi substance, is just the totality of
physical natuie. It appeais that although uou is Extenueu, oi physical, uou is not what
Spinoza calls a mass, which at the time meant something with uimensionality. So Spinoza
uoes not iuentify the totality of mattei with space. As Chaptei S, Section 2b shows in moie
uetail, theie is little ieason to believe that Spinoza felt uiffeiently about finite bouies
themselves, oi that mateiial things aie extenueu uiffeiently than coipoieal substance, oi

86
See, foi example, the Appenuix to Pait I of the +',-!..
87
Bennett's account can be founu in Bennett (1984).
9S
uou. Inueeu, Spinoza always iesists chaiacteiizing the essence of bouies as spatial
extension, as Bescaites uoes.
That Spinoza uoes not iuentify mattei anu space means that he uoes not iuentify
mattei as the puie object of geometiy, anu so theie is no 4 $*-"*- ieason to believe that
mathematics shoulu be especially suiteu to uesciibing the natuie anu behavioi of bouies.
Inueeu, theie is inuepenuent eviuence that Spinoza uoes not believe that mathematics is so
suiteu, anu that it uoes not give us knowleuge of the physical woilu. In a veiy iich lettei
that Spinoza calleu his "Lettei on the Infinite", he uistinguishes between two uiffeient kinus
of quantity. Spinoza wiites:
We conceive quantity two ways: eithei abstiactly, oi supeificially, as we have
it in the imagination with the aiu of the senses; oi as substance, which is uone
by the intellect alone. So if we attenu to quantity as it is in the imagination, which is
what we uo most often anu most easily, we finu it to be uivisible, finite, composeu of
paits, anu one of many. But if we attenu to it as it is in the intellect, anu peiceive the
thing as it is in itself, which is veiy uifficult, then we finu it to be infinite, inuivisible
anu unique.
0nly in the imagination, Spinoza wiites, is quantity uivisible. Be then goes on to associate
mathematics with uivisibility, anu so to associate it with the imagination's notion of
quantity:
Next, fiom the fact that when we conceive Quantity abstiacteu fiom
Substance anu sepaiate Buiation fiom the way it flows fiom eteinal things,
96
we can ueteimine them as we please, theie aiise Time anu Neasuie - Time to
ueteimine Buiation anu Neasuie to ueteimine Quantity in such a way that,
so fai as possible, we imagine them easily. Again, fiom the fact that we
sepaiate the Affections of Substance fiom Substance itself anu ieuuce them to
classes so that as fai as possible we imagine them easily, aiises Numbei, by which
we ueteimine |these affections of substancej.
So Spinoza thinks that theie is an aibitiaiiness to the application of mathematics to
continuous quantities, uisciete collections of things, anu time. It's woith mentioning that
this makes mathematics much moie flexible foi him than foi Bescaites, anu inueeu,
Bescaites hau tiouble unueistanuing how to apply math to othei pioblems besiues iueally
geometiical bouies. Spinoza even pioposeu applying the mouel of mathematics to the
emotions!
88
(This emphasis on a ueuuctive mouel is piimaiily a pait of Spinoza's ciitique
of final causation.) Spinoza allows foi a wiuei vaiiety of applications foi math, but as you
might expect by now, the fact that it is an opeiation of the imagination uoesn't boue well foi
its auequacy.
So I'll tiy to explain Spinoza's position using the easiest example - collections of
things. Spinoza uoes not think that theie aie genuine classes of things in the woilu, oi
kinus, oi univeisals; univeisals like "man", "tiee" oi "uog" aie only what he calls "moues of
imagining." We aie welcome, then, to uiviue the woilu into molecules oi atoms oi quaiks,
but this is just a way of conveniently oiganizing oui expeiience of it; one thing is no moie

88
Pait III, Pieface: "I shall consiuei human actions anu uesiies.as though I weie conceineu with
lines, planes anu solius."
97
oi less a countable thing in ieality than anothei. This might sounu a little tiieu foi a
ciitique of the application of math. But Spinoza ieally thinks that what oui imagination
picks out as ieal featuies of natuie is just '&**-=%( uniepiesentative of what theie actually
is. So theie is no ieason to believe that we aie qualifieu to pick the ielevant classes of
things to which to apply mathematics.
What about the case of continuous quantities like space anu time. Well, in the
Lettei on the Infinite, Spinoza goes on to wiite:
You can see cleaily fiom what I have saiu that Neasuie, Time, anu Numbei aie
nothing but Noues of thinking, oi iathei, of imagining. So it is no wonuei that all
those who have stiiven to unueistanu the couise of Natuie by such Notions - which
in auuition have been bauly unueistoou - have so maivelously entangleu
themselves that in the enu they have not been able to untangle themselves without
bieaking thiough eveiything anu aumitting even the most absuiu absuiuities. Foi
since theie aie many things which we cannot at all giasp by the imagination, but
only by the intellect (such as Substance, Eteinity, etc.), if someone stiives to explain
such things by Notions of this kinu, which aie only aius of the imagination, he will
accomplish nothing moie than if he takes pains to go mau with his imagination.
This is a V&)8 thinly veileu attack on Bescaites anu the Caitesians (in a latei lettei, less
polite, he just calls the Caitesians "stupiu"). Examples of this mauness that he uiscusses in
the lettei aie Zeno's paiauoxes of the infinity, which Spinoza also uiscusses these in his
ieconstiuction of Bescaites' physics.
98
Spinoza's uiagnosis of the souice of the paiauoxes iests on his ciitique of what he
calls abstiactions. This was a hobbyhoise not just of Spinoza but also of Beikeley, foi veiy
uiffeient ieasons. Spinoza insists (anu heie he uoes sounu veiy much like Beikeley) that
iueas shoulu only be of ieal things. Iueas of univeisals oi qualities that aie iueas not of
paiticulai things aie abstiactions, anu Spinoza has only bau things to say about them. They
aie foimeu by the imagination anu inevitably confuseu. So looking again at the lettei,
Spinoza wiites:
.fiom the fact that we aie able to uelimit Buiation anu Quantity as we please,
conceiving Quantity in abstiaction fiom Substance anu sepaiating the efflux of
Buiation fiom things eteinal, theie aiise Time anu Neasuie: Time to uelimit
Buiation anu Neasuie to uelimit Quantity in such wise as enables us to imagine
them easily, as fai as possible.
Quantity, as the imagination consiueis it, is an abstiaction, anu not a ieal thing. The
imagination abstiacts when it "sepaiate|sj the affections of Substance fiom Substance
itself." When we uo this, we aie iemoving featuies of natuie fiom theii context anu
attempting to tieat them in isolation. Now Spinoza, as we saw eailiei, is a holist about oui
unueistanuing of natuie - an attempt to unueistanu the pait in isolation is futile.
0nsuipiisingly, then, he only has bau things to say about what he calls abstiactions, anu all
of the ciitiques above iely on his waining against ieasoning fiom abstiactions in geneial.
Reasoning fiom abstiaction is, accoiuing to Spinoza, one of the most pievalent causes of
eiioi in the sciences:
99
.so long as we aie uealing with the Investigation of things, we must nevei infei
anything fiom abstiactions, anu we shall take veiy gieat caie not to mix up the
things that aie only in the intellect with those that aie ieal.
This is only one of many such attacks on abstiactions. Foi Spinoza, caielessness in
abstiacting fiom uisciete things iesults in an ontology with univeisals. In the case of
abstiaction fiom natuie as a whole, it iesults in the belief that space anu time aie ieally
uivisible, anu theii paits countable, anu, as a iesult, Zeno's paiauoxes.
89

To claiify, Spinoza was not anti-science. Be was veiy inteiesteu in the scientific
goings-on of his uay, as can be seen fiom the letteis about Boyle that he exchangeu with
0luenbuig. Be peifoimeu many expeiiments himself anu his uay job - giinuing piecision
lenses foi scientific puiposes - inspiieu him to keep abieast of uevelopments in theoietical
optics. Be believeu that mathematical anu empiiical science was veiy useful anu valuable -
even that it was a kinu of piopaueutic step on the way to ieal knowleuge. Be just uoesn't

89
In a iecent inteiview in 8,& O'%40'-!, Tim Nauulin biiefly summaiizes an account of mathematical
science that veiy much captuies Spinoza's meaning heie. Nauulin is iesponuing to a question
about why philosopheis aie so eagei to talk about time, anu physicists avoiu it. Be says that some
physicists uo talk about it, some say that its ieal, anu some say that it's an illusion. Bis iesponse is:
I myself think that all of the ieasons that leau people to say things like that have veiy little
meiit, anu that people have just been misleu, laigely by mistaking the mathematics they use
to uesciibe ieality itself. If you think that mathematical objects aie not in time, anu
mathematical objects uon't change - which is peifectly tiue - anu then you'ie always using
mathematical objects to uesciibe the woilu, you coulu easily fall into the iuea that the woilu
itself uoesn't change, because youi iepiesentations of it uon't.
This captuies veiy piecisely the spiiit of Spinoza's iesponse to Zeno's paiauoxes.: that we must
ieason fiom "physical anu ieal beings" anu not fiom abstiactions oi univeisals.
1uu
want us to confuse mouels with ieality, since actual knowleuge of ieality is, foi Spinoza,
veiy impoitant - is it what will, liteially, save oui souls.
9u

Spinoza's ciitique of the oveiuse of mathematics in science uoes have consequences
foi the content of his physics. Foi example, as Chaptei 1 uemonstiateu, Bescaites places a
conseivation law at the centei of his physics, using it to piove the othei moie
ciicumsciibeu laws of motion. uiven Spinoza's iejection of the impoitance of quantities, it
woulu not ieally make sense foi him to follow Bescaites in this. Anu in fact, I believe that
we can see Spinoza iejecting it anu putting in its place a set of laws that uo not uepenu on
the claim that quantities aie funuamental featuies of natuie. In fact, this allows Spinoza to
impiove upon some aspects of Bescaites' own system. Foi example, in emphasizing the
conseivation of quantity of motion as the giounus of all physical laws, Bescaites was not
able to incluue changes to a bouy's uiiection among the kinus of changes in a bouy that
woulu be ielevant to physics. Spinoza tiieu to fix this in his ieconstiuction of Bescaites'
physics, coiiecting what he consiueieu to be Bescaites' mathematical hypei-ieuuctionism.
Spinoza's ciitique of mathematics in science also seives as fuithei eviuence that Spinoza
uoes not builu his physics on a conseivation law (othei eviuence was laiu out in Chaptei 1).
Things aie not uesciibeu in themselves by numbeis; it woulu be veiy stiange inueeu if the

9u
In "Spinoza anu Science", Eiic Schliessei suggests anothei ieason that mathematics shoulu yielu
inauequate knowleuge foi Spinoza: it iequiies that we "caive out" a pait of ieality, in a piocess that
is always aitificial, given that all of natuie is inteiconnecteu (as aigueu in Chaptei 1 section SIuaf).
See Schliessei 27. Also see Schliessei's illuminating uiscussion of Buygens anu his penuulum clocks
(Schliessei 2) with iespect to Spinoza's views on mathematics. Finally, Schliessei offeis a nice
iebuttal to a possible objection to the view I uefenu heie: that Spinoza's use of the #". @&"#&'*-!"
shows his faith in mathematical ieason. I take it that looking to mathematics as a stanuaiu of tiuth
anu using applieu mathematics as the piefeiieu methou of examining natuie aie two veiy uiffeient
piopositions. See also Nelameu (2uuu).
1u1
piimaiy manifestation of uou's constancy is, foi Spinoza, the conseivation of a paiticulai
quantity. The consiueiations of this chaptei also unueimine claims that iuentify the
essences of bouies with quantities, like Klevei's that "things aie uistinguisheu by a numbei,
an iuentification maik of theii motion"
91
anu Lachteiman's that "Spinoza unmistakably
intenus by |iatio of motion anu iestj a numeiical (oi quantitative) iatio."
92


?< P*&N+1%& K$#EA&*=& #9 :#*-&'
At this point, things look pietty bau. Neithei mathematics noi expeiiment can biing
us any closei to unueistanuing natuie. Anu theie is othei eviuence scatteieu thioughout
Spinoza's woiks that confiims the conclusions of the last section, anu the geneial
conclusion that Spinoza is pessimistic about the piospects of sciences. Foi example, his
position that oiuei in natuie is always a constiuct of the imagination woulu seem to
piecluue an oveiieliance on natuie's being "lawlike": "Nen piefei oiuei to confusion," he
wiites in a lettei to 0luenbuig, "as if oiuei weie anything in natuie moie than a ielation to
oui imagination."
9S

Boes Spinoza think that we have any iecouise in oui quest to unueistanu physical
natuie. This section shows that Spinoza thinks that we can have knowleuge of bouies anu
theii behaviois in two ways. Fiist, thiough ieason, we can unueistanu stiuctuial featuies
of natuie, that apply not just to bouies but to all finite things. Seconu, we have some
epistemic access to the paiticulai featuies of bouies thiough the common notions.

91
Klevei (1986), 18S.
92
Lachteiman (1971), 8S
9S
Lettei S2 to 0luenbuig, Novembei 166S.
1u2
Chaptei 1 outlineu a numbei of stiuctuial featuies of natuie that Spinoza
appaiently thinks that we can know, like that all finite things stiive to peiseveie in theii
existence, anu that two opposite moues cannot coexist in the same subject. These featuies
aie not specific to bouies, but apply to finite moues of any attiibute. Spinoza seems to take
them to be ueiivable fiom the 4 $*-"*- piinciples of substance metaphysics. Bow uoes
Spinoza think that we come to know such piinciples.
Theie aie a numbei of uetaileu stuuies of Spinoza's methou in the +',-!., a topic to
which I cannot uo justice heie.
94
It seems ieasonable, howevei, to suggest that the majoiity
of piopositions of the fiist two paits of the +',-!., anu the piocess by which Spinoza
ueiives one fiom anothei, aie the piouuct of ieason, oi the seconu kinu of knowleuge.
What counts as iational knowleuge, anu how is it foimeu. Spinoza uefines it in thiee
uiffeient places: in Pait II of the +',-!., in the eailiei 8*&4'-.& "0 ',& +#&074'-"0 "2 ',&
L0'&%%&!', anu biiefly in the B,"*' 8*&4'-.&. In all thiee places, is it pait of a ioughly thiee-
folu taxonomy of cognition. The latest account, in the +',-!., establishes that "we peiceive
many things anu foim univeisal notions:
I. fiom singulai things which have been iepiesenteu to us thiough the senses in a
way that is mutilateu, confuseu, anu without oiuei foi the intellect; foi that ieason I
have been accustomeu to call such peiceptions knowleuge fiom ianuom expeiience;
II. fiom signs, e.g., fiom the fact that, having heaiu oi ieau ceitain woius, we
iecollect things, anu foim ceitain iueas of them, which aie like them, anu thiough

94
Savan (197S), Paikinson (197S), anu uaiiett (2uuS).
1uS
which we imagine the things. These two ways of iegaiuing things I shall hencefoith
call knowleuge of the fiist kinu, opinion oi imagination.
III. Finally, fiom the fact that we have common notions anu auequate iueas of the
piopeities of things (see pS8c, pS9, pS9c anu p4u |wheie the common notions aie
pioven auequatej).
Iv. In auuition to these two kinus of knowleuge, theie is (as I shall show in what
follows) anothei, thiiu kinu, which we shall call intuitive knowleuge. Anu this kinu
of knowing pioceeus fiom an auequate iuea of the foimal essence of ceitain
attiibutes of uou to the auequate knowleuge of the |NS: foimal} essence of things.
In the TIE 19, Spinoza outlines foui kinus of peiception:
1. Theie is the Peiception we have fiom iepoit oi fiom some conventional sign.
2. Theie is the Peiception we have fiom ianuom expeiience, that is, fiom
expeiience that is not ueteimineu by the intellect.
S. Theie is the Peiception that we have when the essence of a thing is infeiieu fiom
anothei thing, but not auequately. This happens, eithei when we infei the cause
fiom some effect, oi when something is infeiieu fiom some univeisal, which some
piopeity always accompanies.
4. Finally, theie is the Peiception we have when a thing is peiceiveu thiough its
essence alone, oi though knowleuge of its pioximate cause.
In auuition to the uiffeience in Spinoza's chaiacteiization of the thiiu kinu of knowleuge,
ieason in the eailiei TIE is -047&?94'& knowleuge of &..&0!&. in contiast to its uefinition in
1u4
the +',-!. as 47&?94'& knowleuge of meie $*"$&*'-&..
9S
The B,"*' 8*&4'-.&'s veision of the
kinus of knowleuge is sketchiei than these two anu seems to contain less of Spinoza's voice;
theie, the uistinction is between (1) belief, (2) tiue belief, anu a (S) cleai anu uistinct
concept. Like the othei two accounts, (2) anu (S) aie always tiue.
Also as in the othei two accounts, Spinoza fuinishes a mathematical example meant
to help uistinguish among the kinus of cognition. uiven a mathematical puzzle, a peison
employing the fiist kinu of knowleuge will tiust the answei pioviueu by anothei, oi tiy a
few cases anu uiaw a geneial conclusion fiom them. The suggestion that inuuction falls
into the categoiy of imaginative oi opining cognition is suppoiteu by fuithei examples
Spinoza pioviues elsewheie; foi example, in the TIE that "oil feeus fiie" anu "watei puts it
out." A lucky peison blesseu with intuition "has no neeu of.the ait of ieasoning, because
thiough his penetiation he immeuiately sees the piopoitionality in all the calculations."
96

The mathematical example is misleauing, since it suggests that at least some objects of
cognition can be cognizeu in all thiee ways. While this may be tiue, he moie often
associates each kinu of cognition with a kinu of object. Foi example, (appaiently)
contingent facts like that oil feeus fiie aie the iealm of the imagination, the seconu kinu of
knowleuge is conceineu with piopeities, anu the thiiu kinu with essences.

9S
Spinoza seems to connect these two in a footnote to the passage in the TIE: "When this happens,
we unueistanu nothing about the cause except what we consiuei in the effect. This is sufficiently
eviuence fiom the fact that then the cause is explaineu only in veiy geneial teims, e.g., Theiefoie
theie is something, Theiefoie theie is some powei, etc. 0i also fiom the fact that the teims expiess
the cause negatively, Theiefoie it is not this, oi that, etc. In the seconu case something cleaily
conceiveu is attiibuteu to the cause on account of the effect, as we shall show in an example; but
nothing is attiibuteu to it except piopiia, not the essence of a paiticulai thing."
96
B,"*' 8*&4'-.& Pait 2, Chaptei II
1uS
The case of ieason is a bit moie complicateu. In the B,"*' 8*&4'-.&, "Reason tells
|onej that because of the piopeity of piopoitionality in these numbeis, this is so, anu coulu
not have been, oi happeneu, otheiwise."
97
In the +',-!. Spinoza suggests that to use ieason
is to see the pioblem as an instance to which Book vII, Pioposition 7 of Eucliu applies. In
the mathematical example, ieason's iole is to iecognize a case as an instance of a geneial
tiuth. Beie is anothei opeiation of ieason, fiom the TIE:
aftei we cleaily peiceive that we feel such a bouy, anu no othei, then, I say, we infei
cleaily that the soul is uniteu to the bouy, which union is the cause of such a
sensation, but we cannot unueistanu absolutely fiom this what that sensation anu
union aie. 0i aftei we have come to know the natuie of vision, anu that it has the
piopeity that we see one anu the same thing as smallei when we look at it fiom a
gieat uistance than when we look at it fiom close up, we infei that the sun is laigei
than it appeais to be, anu othei things of the same kinu.
Again, ieason infeis cleaily fiom known piemises: fiom the fact that we feel a bouy, we
infei that the soul is uniteu to it, because such a sensation can only be causeu by such a
union. Fiom the fact that we know the natuie of vision, we can concluue that the sun is
laigei than it appeais to be.
It is impoitant to note that Spinoza uoes 0"' claim that we know those piemises
thiough ieason, only that, once they aie known, we can use ieason to ueuuce fuithei
tiuths. So when, in the +',-!., he goes on to wiite that we ueuuce tiuths of ieason "fiom
the fact that we have common notions anu auequate iueas of the piopeities of things (see

97
ibiu.
1u6
PS8C, PS9, PS9C, anu P4u)," theie is no obvious ieason to believe that he means that the
common notions themselves aie fuinisheu by ieason. Also, when uiscussing the kinus of
cognition, Spinoza tenus to conflate kinus of iueas with moues of theii piouuction, anu
those in tuin with theii mannei of justification. It seems that in the case of ieason, Spinoza
stiesses that the methou of theii foimation - ueuuction fiom ceitain piemises - is what
chaiacteiizes them, iegaiuless of how those ceitain piemises come to be foimeu.
In any case, at least one of the kinus of axiom that ieason may use to ueuuce fuithei
tiuths is, Spinoza says, the common notions. The common notions aie the seconu way that
we can get auequate knowleuge of bouies. While ieason has pioviueu the kinus of
stiuctuial tiuths that populateu Chaptei 1, we still uo not know how those tiuths come to
ielate to moues of Extension in paiticulai. Spinoza pioviues the tools necessaiy with the
common notions. IIp2S thiough IIpS1 of the +',-!. is a litany of paiticulai inauequacies:
thiough the imagination, we cannot have auequate knowleuge of any exteinal bouy (IIp2S),
oi oui own bouies (IIp27), oi of oui minus (IIp29). These passages establish something
fuithei: that we cannot have auequate knowleuge 4' 4%% of the uuiation of oui bouy (IIpSu),
the paits of the bouy (IIp24) oi the existence of any exteinal bouy (IIp26), because any
cognition of these woulu be thiough the imagination, which is always inauequate.
Bowevei, IIpS8 offeis a glimmei of hope. It establishes that:
Those things which aie common to all, anu which aie equally in the pait anu in the
whole, can be conceiveu only auequately.
The common notions aie the auequate iueas of these common piopeities. IIpS7, which is
not useu in the pioof of the auequacy of the common notions, establishes that
1u7
What is common to all things (on this see L2, above) anu is equally in the pait
anu in the whole, uoes not constitute the essence of any singulai thing.
The iefeience is to Lemma 2 aftei IIp1S, which establishes that "All bouies agiee in ceitain
things": they involve the concept of the attiibute of Extension, anu "in that they can move
now moie slowly, now moie quickly, anu absolutely, that now they move, now they aie at
iest." Involving the concept of Extension, then, anu having a state of absolute motion that
can change without changing theii iuentity, aie two piopeities that aie common to all
bouies.
But these aie not the only kinu of common notions theie aie. Theie aie thiee otheis
woith noting. The fiist is a class of one: uou's essence; Spinoza establishes that this is a
common notion at IIp47. The seconu is iueas of veiy geneial, attiibute-neutial tiuths like
IIpS1u: it is a "common piopeity of singulai things" that "each singulai thing.must be
ueteimineu by anothei singulai thing to exist anu piouuce effect in a ceitain anu
ueteiminate way." Theie aie seveial othei passages that suggest that Spinoza occasionally
tieats axioms like "nothing has no piopeities" as common notions, as Eucliu anu Bescaites
uo. Finally, theie aie the common notions of IIpS9, which ieflect moie ciicumsciibeu
common piopeities of bouies. These paiticulai common piopeities aie only shaieu by the
human bouy anu "ceitain exteinal bouies by which the human Bouy is usually affecteu."
We will leave these asiue foi now, focusing on the questions: why aie oui iueas of the
common notions of Extension anu Notion auequate.


1u8
D< H0& ,#77#$ $#%-#$'
Spinoza appaiently offeis a pioof of the auequacy of the common notions aftei he
establishes it at IIpS8; heie it is, bioken uown moie-oi-less liteially:
1. A is common to all bouies, anu equally in the pait of any bouy as in the whole.
2. The iuea of A will be in the iuea uou has of the human bouy anu in the iueas uou
has of the affections of the human bouy. (IIp7coii.)
S. The affections of the human bouy involve the natuies of the human bouy anu
exteinal bouies. (IIp16, 2S anu 27.)
4. The iuea of A will be auequate in uou insofai as he constitutes the human minu.
(IIp12, 1S).
S. (4) is the uefinition of auequacy in the human minu. (IIp11coii.)
6. Theiefoie, the human minu only peiceives A auequately, both insofai as it
peiceives its own bouy oi any exteinal bouy.
In fact, the pioof of the common notions' auequacy is missing - it belongs between steps S
anu 4. Noimally (S) entails inauequacy, but in the case wheie piopeities aie equally in the
pait anu in the whole, it uoes not. The challenge is to piove the step fiom S to 4. Fiist, what
is it foi a human being to peiceive auequately: "When we say that the human minu
peiceives this oi that, we aie saying that uou, insofai as he is explicateu thiough the natuie
of the human minu, has this oi that iuea. Anu when we say that uou has this oi that iuea
not only insofai as he constitutes the essence of the human minu but also insofai as he has
the iuea of anothei thing simultaneously with the human minu, then we aie saying that the
1u9
human minu peiceives a thing paitially oi inauequately."
98
So it's up to us to see why.
99
In
this section, I aigue fiist that the common notions aie not tiuths of ieason, innate iueas, oi
iueas of imagination, anu then I go on to aigue that the common notions aie instances of
intuitive knowleuge.
uiven that Spinoza uoes not ieally explain why the common notions aie auequate,
the most common view uiaws fiom Spinoza's account of -047&?94!( in oiuei to finu out
how the common notions can avoiu it. This ielies on compaiing theii foimation to the
foimation of inauequate iueas, oi iueas of the imagination, anu in paiticulai, univeisal
iueas. In foiming univeisal notions, to use Spinoza's imagistic language, we foim an iuea of
one paiticulai man, anu then anothei, anu then anothei, supeiimposing these images on
top of one anothei to cieate one image. This image uoes not coiiesponu to any paiticulai
thing in the woilu. Noieovei, it is uncleai anu confuseu, anu its natuie uepenus upon the
peison who has foimeu it, anu the paiticulai natuie of theii expeiience with men. In the
case of the common notions, howevei, theie is no oppoitunity foi confusion, because the
images oveilappeu on one anothei fiom multiple expeiiences aie all iuentical. Theie is
also no pioblem with anothei auequacy ciiteiion foi Spinoza - that to know a cieateu thing
is to have knowleuge of its cause. Since the cause of motion is moie motion, foi example,
we know the cause by knowing the effect.
1uu


98
IIp11c
99
IIpS7 establishes that the common notions uo not "peitain to the essence of any singulai thing";
even though this pioposition is not useu at all in the pioof of the auequacy of the common notions.
1uu
This is as fai as I can tell the univeisally accepteu way of ieauing the auequacy of the common
notions. Foi a iecent, uetaileu aiticulation of this view see Naishall (2uu8).
11u
This explanation, howevei, is not veiy satisfying. It is haiu to see Spinoza's
justification foi uistinguishing between the auequate common notions, on the one hanu,
anu univeisal anu othei featuies of mattei, on the othei. Fiist consiuei univeisal notions,
like "man." Spinoza aigues that a peison's iuea of mankinu uepenus upon the featuies of
the paiticulai men that a peison has seen, ienueiing the iuea confuseu anu contingent
upon the expeiience anu natuie of the peison foiming it. The stanuaiu stoiy about the
auequacy of the common notions says that theie is no occasion foi inauequacy oi vaiiance
acioss peisons because a common notion like, say, motion oi extension aie the same in all
knoweis anu in the objects iepiesenteu. But of couise this isn't tiue - objects aie extenueu
oi moving in uiffeient ways, just like men aie human in uiffeient ways.
This is a notoiious pioblem foi empiiicists, anu it applies to Spinoza because he has,
in fact, a iauically empiiicist account of the foimation both of univeisals anu of the
common notions. Spinoza seems to be suggesting that in the case of the common notions,
we can successfully abstiact to foim such an iuea, while in the case of othei univeisal iueas,
we cannot. Why can we foim an iuea of motion in geneial fiom fast anu slow oi
acceleiating anu ueceleiating things, but not the iuea of man in geneial fiom vaiious men.
Anothei question about the stanuaiu account of the auequacy of the common
notions is why othei seemingly univeisal featuies of bouies, like coloi oi figuie, aie not
common notions. In his lettei to 0luenbuig on Boyle's expeiiments, Spinoza uistinguishes
between qualities that aie ieally in bouies, anu those that meiely appeai as a iesult of oui
inteiactions with them. This uistinction between absolute anu ielative piopeities is
Caitesian one, which Spinoza uoes not use in the +',-!. to uistinguish between univeisals
111
anu common notions; while Bescaites uistinguishes oui cleai anu uistinct notions fiom
confuseu, ielative ones, Spinoza uses the ciiteiion of commonality. But can the ciiteiion of
commonality auequately uistinguish between coloi anu extension. Coloi is, aftei all,
aiguably "equally in the pait anu in the whole."
1u1

I believe that the solution to these pioblem, anu the key to inteipieting the common
notions, is the Spinoza's neglecteu inclusion of the ciiteiion foi auequacy that the notion
must not only be in the bouy of the peiceivei anu of the peiceiveu, but also in the affection
between them. That is to say, they must be the ielevant causally efficacious qualities in the
inteiaction. Coloi anu univeisals like a things being a man aie not qualities like that. We
will ietuin to examining what this means soon. But fiist, I'u like to uiscuss seveial
alteinative inteipietations of the common notions' auequacy.
Accoiuing to the inteipietation that I outlineu above, the common notions seem
veiy closely ielateu to the iueas of imagination. They appeai to be foimeu in the same way,
only saveu fiom inauequacy by theii being impossible, uespite oui best effoits, to get
wiong. So it is suipiising that it is iaiely suggesteu that peihaps the common notions just
aie imaginative iueas. Spinoza, aftei all, nevei actually claims that iueas of imagination aie
4%)4(. inauequate. Why not aumit that they aie iueas of imagination, then.
The main ieason to ieject this is that Spinoza uefines imagination as $*&.&0'-0@
&<'&*04% objects to us. This is anothei ieason to ieject Naulei's claim above that
imaginative iueas aie, foi Spinoza, iueas about my own hungei anu thiist anu not iueas

1u1
Locke, of couise, was foiceu to ueny this in oiuei to maintain the uistinction between piimaiy
anu seconuaiy qualities; see the +..4( 3"0!&*0-0@ D9#40 P07&*.'407-0@> Book II.
112
about species of tiee. Spinoza is cleai that is it the piesentation of the iuea's content that
makes an iuea an iuea of imagination. The common notions aie not iueas that piesent
exteinal things to us as existing. Rathei, they seem to iepiesent piopeities in geneial.
While the foimation of the common notions uoes have much in common with the iueas of
imagination, but they uo not "piesent exteinal bouies as piesent to us." This is a veiy
significant uiffeience, which I'll explain its significance at the enu of this section.
A final possible justification of the common notions' auequacy is that they aie
innate. Theie aie seveial ieasons to believe that this might be tiue. Fiist, in the eaily B,"*'
8*&4'-.& anu TIE, Spinoza uoes make seveial iefeiences to something like innate iueas,
talking in the TIE about the intellect's "inboin powei" as a "tool" that men aie boin with.
Seconu, in the +',-!., Spinoza inuicates that the impoitant uiffeience between the
imagination anu auequate iueas is that in the case of auequate iueas, the minu is "inteinally
ueteimineu."
Naulei aigues that the common notions aie innate iueas because they aie "elements
that eveiy human minu knows, anu knows auequately, simply by viitue of being the kinu of
thing it is, viz., the iuea of the bouy" anu the common piopeities "follow fiom the natuie of
the human bouy itself as a paicel of extension anu not because of its ueteiminate causal
ielationship to any exteinal bouy."
1u2
As I wiote above, Spinoza veiy cleaily incluues the
cause that in oiuei to be peiceiveu auequately, common piopeities must be in the

1u2
Naulei (2u1u), 17S. Eugene Naishall also aigues that the common notions aie innate in
Naishall (2uu8); Wilson as well wiites that "we uo not have knowleuge about them in viitue of
theii effects on oui bouies"(Wilson 2uuS). Wolfson makes the same claim - that Spinoza
uistinguishes between univeisals anu common notions baseu on theii geneiation - but offeis no
eviuence.
11S
affections between the human bouy anu the exteinal bouy, anu not just equally in the
human bouy anu the exteinal bouy. In Section 1 of this chaptei, I explaineu that Spinoza
believes that the iueas that we have aie not iueas iepiesenting paits of the bouy, but iueas
of affections. They can only be foimeu, then, thiough inteiactions with othei bouies. While
it is tiue that all nativists aumit that some innate iueas neeu to be "activateu" by
expeiience, theie is no inuication that Spinoza thinks that is what is going on. Rathei, the
iueas of the piopeities aie iueas of affections themselves; that is, we uo have them "because
of its ueteiminate causal ielationship to an exteinal bouy."
Spinoza's eaily explicit iefeiences to innate iueas give pause, but they aie embeuueu
in woiks with a numbei of Caitesian claims that Spinoza woulu latei ueny (foi example,
that the minu anu the bouy can causally influence one anothei, as he aigues in the
Appenuix to the PCP). Ceitainly Spinoza nevei mentions innate iueas in latei woik,
incluuing the Ethics. Rathei, his justification of the common notions seems like a uenial
that the "founuations of oui ieasoning" aie innate. 0ne uoes not neeu an account of
foimation of innate iueas; that's piecisely theii point. So why uoes Spinoza pioviue one.
Finally, the language of innate iueas is peihaps simply inappiopiiate to Spinoza, since it
iests on an iuentity between the uistinctions inteinalexteinal anu minubouy. An innate
iuea is innate because it iequiies no input fiom the sense, oi it in the minu alone. Foi
Spinoza, we have inteinal knowleuge of oui own bouies just as we have inteinal knowleuge
of oui own minus.
Noieovei, theie is textual eviuence that Spinoza himself uoes not consiuei them to
be innate; foi example, he wiites in Pait v that we "imagine" the common notions
114
auequately" anu have "cleai knowleuge" of them thiough the imagination. Inueeu, Spinoza
tieats them as foimeu in the same way as univeisals anu geneial teims.
Foi Bescaites, the common notions aie innate. In 8,& ;9%&., he uiviues simple
natuies into those which aie compiehenueu only as intellectual (thought, uoubt, will),
those that aie puiely mateiial, like shape, extension anu motion, anu those that aie
common to both the minu anu the bouy, incluuing uuiation, existence, anu unity. In the
Piinciples the list incluues "substance, uuiation, oiuei, numbei"; these aie geneial notions
that "apply to all kinus of things."
1uS
Bescaites uistinguishes between the common oiuei of
oui peiception of exteinal objects anu the oiuei, ueteimineu inteinally, which yielus
auequate knowleuge; he iepoits having "obseiveu the existence in me of ceitain thoughts
which pioceeueu, not fiom extianeous objects, noi fiom the ueteimination of my will, but
solely fiom the faculty of thinking which is in me" thiough which he "might uistinguish the
iueas oi notions which aie foims of these thought fiom othei thoughts auventitious oi
factitious." Be teims these "innate." Although all iueas aie innate, foi Bescaites, these in
paiticulai aie not ueiives fiom obseivation. 0f Regius's claim that they aie ielateu to
movement, Bescaites wiites, "I shoulu like oui fiienu to instiuct me as to what coipoieal
movement it is which can foim in oui minu any common notion." Such notions incluue that
"things which aie equal to the same thing aie equal to one anothei," anu "those notions aie
univeisal having no affinity with movements anu no ielation to them."
When Spinoza mentions the imagination in the scholium to IIp29, he wiites that it
uoes not mattei exactly what the opeiation of the imagination is, as long as in imagining,

1uS
Piinciples I 48
11S
the minu is passive anu exteinally ueteimineu, anu that it is ianuom anu not oiueieu
"inteinally." What is essential foi imagination is that we aie ueteimineu by the "common
oiuei of natuie, that is, whenevei it is ueteimineu exteinally - namely, by the foituitous
iun of ciicumstance - to iegaiu this oi that, anu not when it is ueteimineu inteinally,
thiough its iegaiuing seveial things at the same time, to unueistanu theii agieement, theii
uiffeiences, anu theii opposition."
1u4
TIE 84 contains something similai: "you may heie
unueistanu by imagination whatevei you please, as long as it is something uiffeient fiom
the intellect, anu the soul has a passive ielation to it. It matteis not how you unueistanu it,
now that we know that it is something ianuom, anu that the soul is passive to it." It is not
so suipiising, in light of these woius, that Spinoza has been thought, like Bescaites, to
justify the common notions by claiming that they aie innate. But peihaps Spinoza means
something else when he says that the minu shoulu be "inteinally ueteimineu" when it
foims auequate iueas of the piopeities of things. In the next seveial paiagiaphs, I aigue
that he uoes. The common notions shoulu be unueistoou as the thiiu kinu of knowleuge,
which Spinoza also associates with the minu's being inteinally uiiecteu.
Bow uo we know of the existence of finite bouies, accoiuing to Spinoza, oi what
Extension is like, in geneial. The only pioposition that may be unueistoou as an 4 $*-"*-
pioof of the existence of finite things is Ip16: "Fiom the necessity of the uivine natuie theie
must follow infinite things in infinite ways (that is, eveiything that can come within the
scope of the infinite intellect)." But while it seems cleai that Spinoza saw the neeu to
incluue such a pioof in Pait I, it is haiu to imagine that Spinoza takes this pioof to

1u4
IIp29schol
116
satisfyingly explain the existence of finite moues as we know them. Rathei, Pait I belabois
the point that shoulu such moues exist, they aie in uou anu cannot be conceiveu without
uou (Ip1S), anu that paiticulai things aie nothing but affections of the attiibutes of uou, oi
"moues wheiein the attiibutes of uou finu expiession in a uefinite anu ueteiminate
way."
1uS
The uetails of this aigument aie of concein only when we consiuei Spinoza's
claim that the knowleuge of finite things involves knowleuge of uou's essence. But this
aigument uoes not, of couise, show that theie aie any finite things at all; only that if theie
aie, they aie in uou. Anu it uoes not show that bouies aie among those things. In
paiticulai, a bouy is "a moue that expiesses in a uefinite anu ueteiminate way uou's
essence insofai as he is consiueieu as an extenueu thing."
1u6
Spinoza nevei pioves that
Extension is an attiibute of uou.
Spinoza uoes explicitly establish the existence of one specifically Extenueu thing: the
human bouy. At the beginning of Pait II of the +',-!., Spinoza establishes that a bouy exists
by IIa4: that we "feel a ceitain bouy to be affecteu in many ways." This is an axiom, anu
given Spinoza's taxonomy of knowleuge, IIax4 uoes not fit neatly in the categoiy of
imagination oi ieason. I believe that theie is a goou case to be maue that this is an instance
of the thiiu kinu of knowleuge. It is the kinu of knowleuge of a thing immeuiately, oi "fiom
the insiue." In the Shoit Tieatise (II XXII) Spinoza chaiacteiizes the thiiu kinu of knowleuge
this way: "this kinu of knowleuge is not a consequence of anything else, but an immeuiate
manifestation of the object to the intellect" thiough which oui souls become uniteu with

1uS
Ip2Sc
1u6
IIu1
117
the object of the iuea. Spinoza cleaily associates the thiiu kinu of knowleuge with self-
consciousness in Pait v of the +',-!.:
Theiefoie, the oie each of us is able to achieve in this kinu of knowleuge, the
moie he is conscious of himself anu of uou
Even knowleuge of uou is, accoiuing to Spinoza, a kinu of self-knowleuge, since ultimately,
we aie moues of uou.
In the B,"*' 8*&4'-.&, Spinoza iuentifies ieason with "belief" which "we know only
though a conviction in the intellect that it must be so anu not otheiwise. But we call that
cleai knowleuge which comes not fiom being convinceu by ieasons, but fiom being awaie
of anu enjoying the thing itself."
1u7
We seem cleaily not to come to knowleuge of the
common notions by being convinceu of ieasons. This "enjoyment of the thing itself" is the
thiiu kinu of knowleuge. In the TIE, Spinoza pioviues anothei example of the opeiation of
ieason:
Aftei we have peiceiveu cleaily that we feel a ceitain bouy, anu no othei, fiom that, I
say, we cleaily infei that the minu is uniteu to the bouy, the union being the cause of
the sensation. But fiom this we cannot unueistanu absolutely what that sensation
anu union aie.
1u8

Reason begins "aftei" we cleaily peiceive a ceitain bouy, which, I've tiieu to aigue, is a
cleai instance of the thiiu kinu of knowleuge, anu infeis fiom it.

1u7
B,"*' 8*&4'-.& 2 II 2
1u8
TIE 22
118
Spinoza also uses "feel" in Pait v Pioposition 22 when he claims that we "feel anu
know by expeiience that we aie eteinal." Again, the natuie of this feeling is left open, but it
is in this way that we unueistanu ouiselves to be eteinal anu to follow fiom uou himself.
Anu so it is in this way that othei moues also follow fiom uou himself. Although knowing
this is a kinu of expeiience, Spinoza cleaily uoes not associate it with imaginative
expeiience. So it woulu be to unueistanu things in this way that woulu constitute the thiiu
kinu of knowleuge.
Noie eviuence that the common notions iepiesent intuitive knowleuge is given by
the fact that Extension is a common notion. Spinoza wiites in the B,"*' 8*&4'-.& that the
attiibutes aie "known thiough themselves," anu this kinu of self-eviuent knowleuge is
consistent with the thiiu kinu of knowleuge. At the same time, we aie supposeu to know
about Extension thiough the common notions. So the common notions, it seems, aie
intuitive.
Noieovei, the fiist anu thiiu kinu of knowleuge aie both knowleuge of paiticulais,
which Spinoza wiites is the best kinu of knowleuge. Reason is univeisal knowleuge only, as
Spinoza wiites at SpS6s: "I thought this woith the tiouble of nothing heie in oiuei to show
by this example how much the knowleuge of singulai things I have calleu intuitive oi
knowleuge of the thiiu kinu |see 2p4usj, can accomplish, anu how much moie poweiful it
is than the univeisal knowleuge I have calleu knowleuge of the seconu kinu."
Spinoza wiites that "It is cleai that we peiceive many things anu foim univeisal
notions.fiom the fact that we have common notions anu auequate iueas of the piopeities
119
of things" anu that the common notions aie "the founuations of oui ieasoning."
1u9
uiven
theii association with ieason, it's natuial to believe that the auequacy possesseu by the
common notions is the auequacy of ieason, oi that the common notions aie instances of the
seconu kinu of knowleuge. Inueeu, this is the most common inteipietation of theii place in
Spinoza's epistemological taxonomy. Bowevei, it is, I think, cleai that they cannot be.
In the section just pieceuing, Spinoza, uiscussing foi a thiiu time the case of the
fouith piopoitional, wiites that "tiue ieason" tells one "that because of the piopeity of
piopoitionality in these numbeis, this is so, anu coulu not have been, oi have happeneu,
otheiwise" (ST 2 II 1). This sounus even less like the common notions, especially insofai as
the attiibutes aie common notions. We uo not uiscovei that bouies aie extenueu because
"it coulu not be otheiwise." If this weie so, why woulun't we be able to know about all the
othei attiibutes. We coulu just ueuuce them fiom moie geneial piinciples.
Cuiley aigues that the common notions "aie not supposeu by Spinoza to be known
thiough intuition. When Spinoza intiouuces the uoctiine of intuitive knowleuge in E., II, x1,
S. 2, he says:
In auuition to these two kinus of knowleuge, theie is, as I shall show in what follows,
a thiiu kinu, which we shall call intuitive science.
Since at this point in the +',-!. Spinoza has alieauy uiscusseu the common notions anu
explaineu why they must be auequately conceiveu, I think we may infei that he uoes not
iegaiu oui knowleuge of the common notions themselves as intuitive. So ieason woulu
incluue not only cases wheie oui knowleuge of something piesupposes knowleuge o the

1u9
IIp4us1
12u
common notions, but also oui knowleuge of the common notions themselves."
11u
Again,
though, Spinoza has uiscusseu the kinu of knowleuge that can be ueuuceu 2*"# the
common notions, anu although he has intiouuceu the common notions anu pioven theii
auequacy, theie is no textual eviuence that he consiueis them to fall unuei the categoiy of
iueas of ieason. That he has uiscusseu the common notions befoie he offeis a geneial
account of intuition uoes not piove that the common notions aie not examples of intuitive
knowleuge. Cuiley aigues in the same aiticle that the common notions cannot be intuitive
knowleuge, since intuitive knowleuge is knowleuge of paiticulais, anu common notions aie
univeisal teims. But Spinoza uoes not explicitly say that common notions aie univeisal,
anu in fact, in the B,"*' 8*&4'-.&, he seems to be toying with the iuea that motion is a
singulai teim, in that only the entiie univeise is the piopei subject of motion.
It is inteiesting that the common notions may be classifieu at intuitive knowleuge,
anu a iich possibility foi fuithei stuuy. Spinoza wiites in ',& B,"*' 8*&4'-.& II XIX that
"theie is nothing in us unless theie is a powei in us to be awaie of it. So if we finu nothing
else to be in us but the effects of the thinking thing, anu those of extension, we may say with
ceitainty that nothing moie is in us." We have knowleuge of what bouies aie anu in
geneial, how they behave by being bouies. In paiticulai, this may give Spinoza a leg up in
explaining foice, which, as uabbey wiites is "an entity empiiically knowable only to the
inuiviuual self anu empiiically unobseivable in otheis anu othei things anu in theii
inteiactions, but which the tiauitional mechanists weie obligeu to employ in one foim oi
anothei in oiuei to have a woikable explanatoiy physics." Foi Spinoza, with the common

11u
Cuiley (1977), S7.
121
notions, we can make bettei sense of what it means to be "empiiically knowable only to the
self anu empiiically unobseivable in otheis." It seems that Spinoza is tiying to connect this
knowleuge of oui own being with knowleuge of the being of othei things, thiough the
common notions.
We know the common notions thiough being a bouy that inteiacts with othei
bouies, anu in paiticulai thiough the affections. We unueistanu oui ielation to uou, the
fact that we aie bouies anu othei things aie bouies, anu that we can cause changes. We can
extiapolate fiom that that othei bouies can cause changes. This is something, but it is
extiemely geneial - we cannot ueuuce specific laws of natuie fiom the common notions, as
many commentatois woulu like, since by theii veiy uefinition they aie maximally
geneial.
111

Ceitainly this all sounus extiemely esoteiic. But theie aie just a few impoitant
points that I'u like to mention aie highlighteu by Spinoza's attempt to giounu scientific
knowleuge inuepenuently of the stanuaiu mathematical anu empiiical methous.
Fiist, uiawing fiom his view of the human being as embeuueu in natuie anu unable
unpioblematically to tianscenu it to have knowleuge of the whole, Spinoza takes veiy
seiiously the iuea that we have to consiuei oui own iole in cieating what seems to us to be
knowleuge of exteinal things. The bouy, foi Spinoza, is not a meie tool to exploie the
woilu, seiving at the pleasuie of the minu. It is by being bouies that we unueistanu what
bouies aie, but it is also because we aie bouies that we aie limiteu in what we can know

111
Foi the wiuespieau view that Spinoza thinks that the common notions aie paiticulai laws of
bouies, see, foi example, Cuiley (1969) anu N. Wilson. "Spinoza's theoiy of knowleuge." 34#=*-7@&
3"#$40-"0 '" B$-0"F4. Eu. Bon uaiiett. C0P, 1996.
122
about exteinal things. Spinoza's emphasis on affections shows that to have auequate
knowleuge of natuie, we cannot affoiu to neglect the iole of oui bouy in shaping oui
expeiience.

B< "#$,A+'-#$
This chaptei has examineu some of the cential aspects of Spinoza's epistemology
insofai as it beais on finite bouies. It's time to see the oveiall view of scientific knowleuge
that they constitute.
0ne featuie of Spinoza's contempoiaiy scientific milieu was a kinu of uebate
between those who, as 0luenbuig puts it in his Lettei 27 to Spinoza, "have too much faith in
theii ieason" like allegeuly Bescaites anu Bacon, anu those who believeu that scientific
piogiess iequiieu uialogue with natuie itself. This is of couise an extiemely oveisimplifieu
view inasmuch as Bescaites was veiy much involveu in expeiimentation anu Boyle useu
mathematical tools, etc, not even to mention the many figuies - like Buygens anu moie
minoi contiibutois - who availeu themselves of all possible tools in theii stuuy of the
physical woilu. But the simplicity of this view has not pieventeu scholais fiom not only
associating Spinoza with those a piioiists about science, but consiueiing him to be peihaps
the most iauical of them all. Anu they have a little suppoit in eaily letteis like those to
Boyle.
But theie aie two glaiing pioblems with this pictuie. Fiist, as we saw in the last
section, Spinoza is consistently anu explicitly waiy of placing too much confiuence in the
ability of mathematics to explain natuie. Any application of mathematics to natuie is
12S
aibitiaiy. In paiticulai, Spinoza iejects the iuea that theie is a natuial mathematical giiu
pioviueu by extension, anu his analysis of quantity suggests that ieuucing ieal things to
geometiical entities substantializeu, oi auvocating a conseivation law that ielies on the
conseivation of a ceitain quantity woulu be misleu.
The othei pioblem is that Spinoza's account of sensation anu iepiesentation
pievents us fiom attiibuting to him a stiaightfoiwaiu answei to whethei "expeiience" has
a place in the investigation of ieality. Theie is ieason to believe that the highest kinu of
knowleuge is the kinu of knowleuge that we have of oui own minu anu bouy - the
knowleuge we have by living in it, by expeiiencing it fiom the insiue, so to speak. Theie is
fuithei ieason to believe that this kinu of "expeiience" is at least ielateu to the common
notions, which foim foi Spinoza the sole euifice on which we can builu knowleuge of ieal
things. We know about bouies by being bouies, Spinoza claims, not by iepiesenting
exteinal things to ouiselves. The bouy we know best is oui own anu this is a kinu of
expeiience. This is quite uiffeience fiom Bescaites, foi example, accoiuing to whom all
bouies, incluuing oui own, aie "exteinal" to the minu anu have questionable existence.
Theie is even some eviuence that Spinoza thinks that expeiiment is valuable.
Spinoza is involveu in expeiiments, as eviuenceu by his coiiesponuence with 0luenbuig
anu with }elles, anu his inteiest in Buygens' ieseaich. In the +',-!., Spinoza bases his entiie
account of the affects on postulates that attesteu to only by expeiience. In auuition to the
account of imagination anu memoiy, which is essential to the conclusions of Paits Iv anu v,
Pait v claims that "theie is no affection of the Bouy of which we cannot foim a cleai anu
uistinct concept"(vp4). Anu, as Eiic Schliessei points out in "Spinoza anu Science", theie
124
aie many instances of Spinoza's citing "ieason anu expeiience" as witnesses to tiuths of the
TTP. Bowevei, these passages aie oveiwhelmeu by eviuence that Spinoza uoes not believe
that the testimony of the sense can evei be fully auequate. The most compelling such
eviuence is Spinoza's veiy account of sense expeiience, which piecluues a pait of natuie
fiom being able to iepiesent any othei pait of it completely.
Theie is a populai account of Spinoza's science, inspiieu peihaps oiiginally by
Cuiley's stuuy, on which Spinoza has a iobust account of the laws of natuie. Naigaiet
Wilson, foi example, equates Spinoza's talk of "fixeu anu eteinal things" in paiagiaph 1u1
of the 8*&4'-.& "0 ',& +#&074'-"0 "2 ',& L0'&%%&!t with the common notions uiscusseu in the
+',-!.. Cuiley also associates the laws of natuie with the common notions. But the account
we have given of the foimation anu natuie of the common notions in Section 4, along with a
lack of eviuence that Spinoza accepteu this view, along with a somewhat anachionistic view
of how the laws of natuie ielate to ieal things, seives to unueimine this inteipietation.
112

It is sometimes aigueu that Spinoza's ethics, incluuing the theiapy of Paits Iv anu v,
ielies on claims about specific featuies of natuie anu oui inteiactions with them, anu that
Spinoza acknowleuges as much when he wiites that "Theie is no affection of the Bouy of
which we cannot foim a cleai anu uistinct concept."
11S
But the piimaiily conclusion of
Paits Iv anu v is stiict ueteiminism, in the face of which the piopei iesponse is a kinu of
Stoicism. The scholium to vp4 goes on to specify that we shoulu take caie to know each
affect cleaily anu uistinctly "as fai as this is possible" so that we sepaiate entiiely oui

112
Foi this inteipietation, see Cuiley (1969), S9-61, Yovel (1979), 91, Naulei (2u1u), 94
anu Wilson (2uuS).
11S
vp4
12S
affects fiom exteinal causes. This is inspiieu only by ueteiminism, not by paiticulai
knowleuge of causes anu effects. Finally, Spinoza offeis, in the TTP, a categoiy of non-
scientific knowleuge inspiieu by Bescaites: we may have "moial ceitainty" of things,
enough that we can live, act, anu know things that aie useful.


















126
"012%&) D3 QR%&$'-#$ 1$* 7#%-#$

($%)#*+,%-#$
Chaptei 1 establisheu Spinoza's account of the metaphysical giounus of any finite
moual existence anu its inteiactions by investigating Spinoza's claim to Tschiinhaus that
finite bouies must be explaineu thiough an attiibute that expiesses uou's essence. It
uenieu that Spinoza ielies on any conseivation law, anu aigueu that insteau he giounus his
account of the causal inteiactions of bouies in the piinciple of least moual mutation anu the
piinciple of non-contiaiiety, which Spinoza sees as a outgiowth of his attiibute-neutial
metaphysics of substance anu moues. Finally, it containeu eviuence anu aiguments against
ieauing Spinoza as a 'uynamist' in the sense that he makes motion immanent to mattei. It
uiu, howevei, claim that Spinoza is conceineu with uynamics in the sense that he inteiesteu
in the giounus of existence of finite things anu the causes of changes in them.
It is impoitant foi Spinoza's commitment to paiallelism that none of this is specific
to any paiticulai account of physics, but that these piinciples insteau apply to finite moue
of all attiibutes, incluuing minus. It uoes not, that is, specify what makes finite moues of
Extension, which aie bouies, uiffeient fiom finite moues of Thought, which aie iueas oi
minus. We might ask, then, what we can know about the physical woilu specifically, anu
whethei Spinoza has answeis to questions about the natuie of mattei, motion anu foice.
In Chaptei 2, I showeu that Spinoza's unueistanuing of the iole of expeiience,
ieason, anu mathematics in the stuuy of natuie is quite uistinct fiom that of Bescaites, his
127
contempoiaiies, anu many of oui own intuitions about science. Spinoza's skepticism about
the application of mathematics to natuie stiips him of the Caitesian motivation to
geometiize mattei, anu his view of the giounus of causal inteiaction among finite moues of
a substance consigns imaginative cognition to inauequacy. But I also tiieu to show that
Spinoza uoes think that we have some epistemic access to the physical, thiough being
bouies ouiselves. This gives us the common notions - in paiticulai, Extension anu Notion -
which aie maximally geneially piopeities of the physical woilu.
This chaptei shows that the conclusions of the pievious two chapteis, combineu
with fuithei textual eviuence, piecluue Spinoza's auoption of the cential claim of Caitesian
mechanism: that physics is baseu on thiee-uimensional, oi spatial, extension (what
Bescaites calls "the extension of the geometeis") anu local, ielative motion. When Spinoza
says that a bouy oi a substance is Extenueu, oi is a moue of the attiibute of Extension, he
uoes not mean that it is essentially a volume, oi extenueu in space.
114
It continues the
aigument of Chaptei 2 that by "Extension" anu "Notion" Spinoza signifies piimitive
featuies of bouies that cannot be fuithei specifieu. To be Extenueu is just to be a physical
thing, accoiuing to Spinoza, while "Notion" signifies nothing moie, foi Spinoza, than the
cause of any physical change.
In the fiist section, I uevelop Spinoza's aigument that bouies aie not essentially
extenueu in length, bieauth anu uepth. It is an aigument that by "Extension" Spinoza uiu
not mean the extension of the geometeis, anu that by "an extenueu thing" Spinoza uiu not

114
Fiom now on, I will use "Extension" to iefei to Spinoza's attiibute of Extension, anu "extension"
to iefei to extension as Bescaites unueistoou it - something is extenueu if it takes up space. When
the meaning it meant to be inueteiminate, I use "extension."
128
mean a volume. Commentatois usually assume that Spinoza uses the teim "Extension" in
this sense - the sense of both his contempoiaiies anu pieuecessois.
11S
But I show not only
that spatial extension uoes not peitain to the essence of bouies, but that the piesentation of
bouies as volumes is the iealm of the imagination. This section has two paits: fiist, I
piesent Spinoza's aigument that coipoieal substance is not extenueu in length, bieauth
anu uepth. The seconu subsection, 1a, makes the moie contioveisial case that Spinoza
uoes not believe that extension unueistoou this way emeiges fiom ceitain mouifications of
Extenueu substance in any way, incluuing, as some inteipieteis have it, with infinite
moues, motion, oi thiough the emanation of finite moues fiom coipoieal substance.
Section 2 uevelops Spinoza's account of motion. It aigues that motion is not, foi
Spinoza, local motion, anu that Spinoza uoes not inuicate that quantity of motion is the
souice of change in the physical woilu.
Section S conceins the so-calleu physical inteiluue. In this section, I lay out the
ieasons why the physical inteiluue shoulu not be consiueieu to be eviuence foi the claim
that Spinoza auopts Caitesian physics. Not only aie the claims of the inteiluue not
Caitesian, but Spinoza's intentions in incluuing the inteiluue in Pait II aie not to outline a
physics. This lattei point is impoitant because the physical inteiluue is univeisally taken to
be Spinoza's most uefinitive anu complete statement about physics. This section also
continues the aigument begun in Section S of Chaptei 1 that Spinoza uoes not accept a

11S
This is iaiely maue explicit but neaily always assumeu; it is explicit in Bennett (1984), Cuiley
(1969), Lachteiman (1977). Bobbes iuentifies mattei, extension anu quantity, oi uimensionality, as
uoes Bescaites. Befoie that, the Stoics, Naimoniues, Aquinas anu Aiistotle useu it in the same
sense.
129
conseivation law, but iathei that his claim that the entiie univeise maintains a fixeu iatio
of motion anu iest means that it uoes not have exteinal inteiactions.
An auequate physics, accoiuing to Spinoza - one that takes into account the
essences of things anu one that can leau us to tiue knowleuge - cannot be built upon size,
shape anu local motion. It shows that Spinoza uoes not piopose to meige his uynamic
account with Bescaites' kinematic account of natuie.
116
Rathei, Spinoza uoes not think that
thiee-uimensional extension anu local motion aie funuamental featuies of natuie at all.

.< QR%&$'-#$
546 +<'&07&7 .9=.'40!&
In Lettei 7S to 0luenbuig, Spinoza wiites that "ieasonable anu intelligent
Chiistians" who ieau the 8*4!'4'9. 8,&"%"@-!"J/"%-'-!9. anu believe that its conclusions
"iest on the iuentification of uou with Natuie (by the lattei of which they unueistanu a kinu
of mass oi coipoieal mattei)" aie "quite mistaken." But Spinoza states veiy cleaily in the
+',-!. that "Extension is an attiibute of uou, oi uou is an extenueu thing."
117
I aigue in this
section that Spinoza consistently maintains that Extenueu substance is not extenueu in
length, bieauth anu uepth.
It is natuial to think that when Spinoza iefeis to uou as "an extenueu thing" he is
talking about thiee-uimensional volume oi space. Inueeu, peihaps the most wiuely
embiaceu inteipietation of the metaphysics unueilying Spinoza's physics - }onathan

116
Foi a stiong uefense of this view, see Lachteiman (1972).
117
IIp2
1Su
Bennett's "fielu metaphysic" - takes Spinoza to mean something like this.
118
Nany of
Spinoza's ieaueis have followeu Bennett in taking coipoieal substance, oi uou unueistoou
unuei the attiibute of Extension, to be space, with bouies being iegions of qualities which
aie not paits of space but aie moues of it. Theie aie vaiiations on this account conceining
the uetails - viljanen, foi example, accepts the fielu metaphysic but sees bouies as
funuamentally poitions of powei iathei than iegions of qualitative vaiiation.
119

But besiues the claiification in Lettei 7S that extenueu substance is not "a kinu of
mass oi coipoieal mattei," theie is plenty of eviuence that Spinoza iejecteu the possibility
that uou shoulu be space oi have volume. In the scholium to Ip1S, foi example, Spinoza
wiites, signaling his agieement, that
eveiyone who has to any extent contemplateu the uivine natuie uenies that uou is
coipoieal. They piove this best fiom the fact that by bouy we unueistanu any
quantity, with length, bieauth, anu uepth, limiteu by some ceitain figuie. Nothing
moie absuiu than this can be saiu of uou, viz. of a being absolutely infinite.
This passage inuicates thiee featuies of bouy that may not be applieu to uou: bouy is a
quantity; it has length, bieauth anu uepth; anu it is finite, oi limiteu by figuie. The last fact
- that uou cannot be finite - is taken foi gianteu. As foi quantity, Spinoza goes on in the
iest of this passage to aigue that we cannot unueistanu substance using this paiticulai
notion of quantity. But Spinoza uoes not fuithei uiscuss his inclusion of "length, bieauth,
anu uepth" among those qualities that aie absuiu to attiibute to uou. As a iesult, most

118
See Bennett (1984).
119
See viljanen (2uu7) on Spinoza's "geometiy of powei."
1S1
commentatois ignoie it, focusing insteau on the points the iest of the passage makes about
infinity anu uivisibility. The fielu metaphysical inteipietation of Spinoza - oi any
inteipietation of Spinoza's physics on which Extenueu substance has uimensionality -
iequiies ignoiing this pait of the passage, anu the quote fiom Lettei 7S above.
Nany scholais also believe that the iest of this passage is consistent with Spinoza's
ietaining the notion of Extension as thiee-uimensional extension, not seeing how Spinoza
coulu have maue such a iauical uepaituie fiom Bescaites. Bescaites iuentifies space anu
bouy in the /*-0!-$%&. "2 /,-%"."$,(: "Theie is no ieal uiffeience between space anu
coipoieal substance.the extension in length, bieauth, anu uepth which constitutes the
space occupieu by a bouy, is exactly the same as that which constitutes the bouy."
12u
In
Pait II of the /*-0!-$%&. "2 34*'&.-40 /,-%"."$,(, Spinoza shows that he cleaily unueistanus
this piinciple anu its centiality to Caitesian metaphysics when he makes it the fiist
uefinition of Pait II, the stuuy of physics: "Extension is what consists of thiee uimensions;
but by extension we uo not unueistanu the act of extenuing, oi anything uistinct fiom
quantity." While Bescaites makes seveial comments in the /*-0!-$%&. emphasizing the
iuentity between extension anu quantity, the last clause of this uefinition, in paiticulai the
claiification conceining the "act of extenuing," is Spinoza's own emphasis. Befinition 6
goes on to establish that "we make only a uistinction of ieason between space anu
extension," anu Pioposition 2 that "The natuie of Bouy, oi Nattei, consists in extension
alone.Space anu bouy uo not ieally uiffei."

12u
/*-0!-$%&. II 1u
1S2
But Spinoza uoes not enuoise any of these points anywheie outsiue of the PCP. If
Spinoza is foi all intents anu puiposes a Caitesian when it comes to physics, why uoesn't
the +',-!. incluue any of these most funuamental commitments of that physics. The +',-!.
mentions neithei space noi uimensionality. Insteau, the few things that Spinoza says about
bouies in the +',-!., aftei IIp1S, iely not at all on any of these piinciples. I take this to be
goou eviuence at least that Spinoza questioneu theii valiuity. Specifically, the iuentification
of quantity anu extension that can be founu in the PCP anu a few select passages of
Spinoza's eaily woik seems to have uissolveu in latei woik. Ip1Sschol, quoteu above, is
only one piece of eviuence foi this: although uou is an "extenueu thing," uou is not
chaiacteiizeu by quantity. What Spinoza has pieseiveu is the iuentification of quantity anu
volume, anu as we will see, this kinu of quantity is not attiibutable to uou.
Noieovei, theie aie two well-known passages which cleaily piecluue the possibility
that Extenueu substance is an infinite volume of any kinu - whethei space oi a plenum. In
the famous "Lettei on the Infinite" to Louewijk Neyei (Lettei 12), Spinoza uistinguishes
between "what is infinite as a consequence of its own natuie, oi by the foice of its
uefinition" anu "what has no bounus, not inueeu by the foice of its essence, but by the foice
of its cause." Putting asiue the many subtleties of this complex lettei, it is uncontioveisial
to say that accoiuing to Spinoza, substance is infinite by uefinition oi "as a consequence of
its own natuie"; anything else, howevei, can only be infinite if it is sustaineu by a cause that
is infinite in itself. This lattei kinu likely conceins the infinite moues, which aie not infinite
thiough theii natuie but only because they aie causeu by uou, anu the eteinal essence of
things, which follow fiom uou's essence as uou's $*"$*-4. Spinoza wiites that the fiist kinu
1SS
of infinite "cannot be uiviueu into any paits, oi cannot have any paits." Attenuing to
extenueu substance in this way - "as it is in the intellect" - is "veiy uifficult."
121

This lettei is not the only text wheie we finu Spinoza uenying uou's uivisibility; this
is the concein of the well-known scholium to Ip1S of the +',-!.. Theie, Spinoza auuiesses
himself to those who believe that extension cannot be an attiibute of uou, since anything
that extenueu is uivisible, anu uou cannot be uivisible.
122
Spinoza simply accepts that uou
cannot be uivisible, but insist that uou is extenueu, anu so it must be false that extenueu
substance is uivisible - its paits aie not ieally uistinct fiom one anothei.
Those, like Bennett, who wish to get aiounu Spinoza's commitment that uou is
Extenueu but inuivisible, have a numbei of ways of account foi passages like these.
Bennett explains that space is not in fact uivisible - it is not, that is, *&4%%( uivisible, because
we cannot sepaiate one pait fiom anothei pait.
12S
Be is not botheieu by the fact that we
can uistinguish iegions in it as we wish. Can we conceive of uou oi substance as extenueu
in thiee uimensions, but still "inuivisible, infinite anu unique". Bennett anu viljanen

121
The Lettei on the Infinite also uistinguishes between two kinus of quantity - one which is in the
intellect anu which Spinoza seems to associate with extenueu substance (see B,"*' 8*&4'-.& Iv).
This belies the eailiei claim that by "quantity" Spinoza means extension in thiee uimensions anu
that he uoes not apply this to substance. 0nfoitunately this seems opposeu to the passages above
in which Spinoza suggests that quantity is not appiopiiate to substance. I can only suggest that
Spinoza changeu the scope of the teim "quantity" aftei this eaily lettei, anu that latei he applieu it
only to "Quantity abstiacteu fiom Substance" anu not quantity which is "infinite, inuivisible anu
unique".
122
Bescaites claims this at /*-0!-$%&. I, 26-27, anu Aiistotle in the /,(.-!. III; Leibniz woulu use the
same ieasoning latei. But this was a veiy common ieason foi iejecting the possibility that uou is
extenueu.
12S
The question of uivisibility in Spinoza is a complicateu one. Spinoza pioviues a taxonomy of
kinus of uistinctions, uiawn fiom Bescaites, in the Appenuix to the PCP. Spinoza seems to iuentify
the kinu of genuine uivisibility unuei consiueiation in Ip1Ss with ieal uistinction only, anu not
moual uistinction oi a uistinction of ieason.
1S4
believe that we can: they aigue that while we aie at libeity to imagine iegions in space
which aie not ieal, space itself is a substance. While "iegions of |spacej get vaiious
qualities such as impenetiability, mass, anu so on, so that any pioposition asseiting the
existence of a bouy ieuuces to one saying something about a iegion of space," nonetheless,
".Spinozistic space is a unity: it cannot be uiviueu in the sense of having ieally uistinct
paits.no pait of space can exist, oi be unueistoou, without ielation to the space as a
whole, anu hence its paits cannot be ieally uistinct fiom each othei."
124

But although Spinoza wiites that consiueieu in one way (that is, as mouifieu) we can
finu paits in extension, he stiesses that we can only uistinguish those iegions when we
conceive it in the abstiact, oi using the imagination.
12S
That is to say, it is only the kinu of
thing that we coulu imagine to be uiviueu once we view it in the imagination anu not in the
intellect. Spinoza uoes not say meiely that the paits attiibuteu to space aie imaginaiy, but
that measuie is an "aiu of the imagination." This implies that what is being measuieu (oi
timeu, oi counteu) is imaginaiy. But what is being measuieu oi timeu is thiee-uimensional
extension anu uuiation. Theiefoie, extension anu uuiation, unueistoou in this way, aie
imaginaiy.
Noieovei, the notion of quantity that is piopei to substance, Spinoza explains, can
only be attenueu to in the intellect, anu not in the imagination. Is this tiue of space. Anu
Spinoza also wiites that this can be uone only with gieat uifficulty: is imagining a space in
the sense that Bennett wants so veiy uifficult. Space oi extension as Bennett conceives it,

124
Bennett (1984).
12S
Lettei 12 to Neyei, 2u Apiil 166S.
1SS
as a mattei of fact, sounus veiy much like what Spinoza explicitly uenies of uou in Lettei 7S
to 0luenbuig: it is a coipoieal mass, extenueu in length, bieauth anu uepth. Even though
we cannot uiviue space, its uivisibility in the imagination oi potential uivisibility is not
consistent with the kinu of unity anu simplicity that Spinoza iequiies of uou.
Theie is anothei line of aigument against uou's being spatially extenueu that
iequiies a peihaps too-biief uiscussion of Spinoza's account of a family of concepts
conceining time. Spinoza makes a numbei of ciyptic oi piima facie contiauictoiy
comments about time, uuiation anu eteinity not only in the +',-!. but also in letteis anu in
othei woiks. Time anu extension, as fai as they aie situateu in Spinoza's system, woulu
seem to have little in common: Extension is an attiibute, while time is not; that is to say
that Extension is a way of conceiving of things while time-ielateu concepts like uuiation
aiise, Spinoza says, fiom the motion of bouies. Bespite this, Spinoza often tieats space
concepts anu time concepts in tanuem. This most often happens when an analogy between
the two is inspiieu by the contiast between eteinity anu woiuly time, on the one hanu, anu
infinity anu finite extension, on the othei.
The analogy between the two is piesent in the Lettei on the Infinite. Spinoza seems
to compaie measuie, extension (oi a ceitain notion of quantity), anu infinity, on the one
hanu, with time, uuiation, anu eteinity, on the othei hanu. Neasuie anu time aie both "aius
of the imagination"; measuie applies to extension oi quantity anu time applies to abstiact
uuiation. In the appenuix to the PCP, Spinoza explains that "uuiation is not attiibuteu to
uou" because since "uuiation is conceiveu as being gieatei oi lessei, oi as composeu of
1S6
paits, it follows cleaily that.by attiibuting uuiation to him, we uiviue into paits what is
infinite by its own natuie anu can nevei be conceiveu except as infinite."
126

What is impoitant heie is that Spinoza uoes not say heie that by attiibuting time to
uou we uiviue uou into paits; iathei, meiely by attiibuting uuiation to uou, howevei
infinite, we aie aumitting the $"..-=-%-'( of uiviuing uou into tempoial paits.
127
If we take
seiiously the analogy between time anu uuiation on the one hanu anu measuie anu
extensionquantity on the othei, it woulu imply that meiely attiibuting quantity to uou, we
aumit the possibility of uiviuing uou into spatial paits.
Although Spinoza uoes not say the veiy same thing about space explicitly, he applies
a similai analysis to spatial extenu a few pages latei, in the section "0f uou's Immensity."
Be wiites that when scholais speak of uou's immensity, they "seem to asciibe quantity to
him.they seem to asciibe Immensity to uou insofai as they iegaiu him as having a ceitain
quantity; foi the seek to aigue foi uou's Immensity fiom the piopeities of extension which
is most absuiu." uou is eveiywheie, Spinoza goes on to aigue, because nothing can exist
without uou. But this uoes not mean that uou is in eveiy place. In fact, he says heie, to
unueistanu how uou is in eveiy thing is "beyonu man's giasp."
These passages, taken togethei, weigh heavily against the view that uou is eithei
space oi extenueu mattei. Spinoza wiites that uou is "not a coipoieal mass," anu is not
chaiacteiizeu by quantity oi length, bieauth anu uepth. Be stiesses that the coiiect way of

126
B,"*' 8*&4'-.& I2Su.
127
But Spinoza calls measuie anu time "4-7. to the imagination." They help us to oiganize oui
imaginative expeiience anu allow us to opeiate in oui woilu, which is composeu of the expeiience
of effects on oui bouies. What uoes measuie, foi example, help us to oiganize. It can only be the
expeiience of bouies' uimensionality.
1S7
unueistanuing Extenueu substance - in the intellect, anu as inuivisible - is veiy uifficult,
anu iesults in an entiiely uiffeient conception than uoes its peiception by the imagination.
In auuition to ignoiing those passages which neaily explicitly ueny it, Bennett et. al. must
claim that it is veiy uifficult to unueistanu the concept of extenueu space anu that it cannot
be measuieu. Finally, on analogy with the notion of substance, Spinoza suggests that what
is at stake is potential uivisibility anu not actual uivisibility - space, it woulu seem, is
potentially uivisible.

L=6 +<'&07&7 #"7&.
Theie aie a few ieaueis of Spinoza who woulu accept the aigument of 1a, anu with
it the claim that uou is not extenueu in space.
128
But no one woulu suggest, baseu on this,
that Spinoza uenies that bouies, oi finite moues of Extenueu substance, aie essentially
volumes, as they aie in Caitesian physics. In this section, howevei, I aigue that in fact,
Spinoza uoes ueny it. Fiist, theie is textual suppoit foi the claim that accoiuing to Spinoza,
it is not pait of the essences of bouies to be extenueu in space. Seconu, the ways offeieu by
those who aumit that substance is not extenueu in space to iesolve that with moues of
extension that aie in extenueu in space fail. Thiiu, given Spinoza's epistemology of science,
outlineu in Chaptei S, we have no justification foi believing that bouies aie volumes. 0n
the one hanu, we appieciate theii extent in space thiough the imagination, which is
unieliable. 0n the othei, Bescaites' piimaiy motivation foi ieuucing bouies to geometiical
extension - that physics is tiactable foi mathematics - is, Spinoza thinks, misguiueu.

128
Nost explicitly, in Schmaltz (1997).
1S8
Accoiuing to Spinoza, Extenueu substance is not extenueu in length, bieauth anu
uepth. But aie finite moues of Extenueu substance volumes oi paits of a thiee-uimensional
woilu, oi aie they uefineu by theii figuies. Theie aie a numbei of commentatois who
agiee that uou is not spatial, but nonetheless maintain that bouies aie foi Spinoza
something like Caitesian bouies, which aie iegions of extension uefineu in laige pait by
theii geometiical qualities: figuies maue ieal. This chaptei aigues that Spinoza uoes not
believe that bouies, insofai as they aie moues of Extension, aie uefineu by theii figuies, anu
that theii spatial extent is theii appeaiance in the imagination.
The inteipietation on which finite bouies aie uefineu by theii spatial extent oi aie at
least funuamentally oi ieally spatial entities uepenus upon an account of how finite moues
ielate to substance. Spinoza is cleai that in some sense, bouies, along with eveiything else,
"move in uou"
129
anu in fact aie uou, ueteimineu in a ceitain way.
1Su
So although physical
moues cannot be paits of extenueu substance, since (as Section 1 showeu) physical
substance cannot be uiviueu, bouies can to some extent be uistinguisheu fiom substance,
since they aie themselves objects with ieal existence. Whethei we can conceive of bouies
being uiffeient fiom Extenueu substance in iespect of the mannei in which they aie
extenueu uepenus in laige pait upon how piopeily to conceive of the ielationship between
Extenueu substance anu its moues.
I'll biiefly auuiess thiee uiffeient accounts of the ielationship between substance
anu finite moues that woulu allow ioom foi Extenueu substance anu Extenueu moues to be

129
B,"*' 8*&4'-.& I 2Su.
1Su
Pait I.
1S9
"Extenueu things" in veiy uiffeient ways. 0n all of these accounts, the stiuctuie of
Spinoza's metaphysics allows us to have two uiffeient conceptions of the natuies of
Extenueu substance anu Extenueu moues. That is to say, they allow Spinoza's claim that
something is Extenueu to be to some extent equivocal. Fiist, theie is Cuiley's claim that
bouies, anu othei finite things, uo not inheie in uou anu aie not pieuicateu of substance.
Seconu, Tau Schmaltz, who aigues along some similai lines as Section 1 above that uou is
not spatially extenueu
1S1
, uoes not suggest that this iamifies in how we shoulu conceive
finite moues of extension. Finally, anu peihaps most commonly, the infinite moues that
Spinoza uiscusses in a seveial places aie thought to in to some sense biiuge the gap
between substance anu its moues. Substance anu moues as a iesult may be veiy uiffeient
fiom one anothei, but the finite moues aie still causeu by the attiibute of Extension
thiough the infinite moue. In the case of bouies, although uou is not extenueu in space, the
infinite moue is, anu it is infinite space that can be uiviueu into paits, which aie the finite
moues. I'll spenu the most time on this last one since it is the most populai account of the
emeigence of a mechanistic physics fiom the seemingly incompatible featuies of Extenueu
substance.
I will not spenu too much time on Cuiley's account; foi a thoiough iefutation of the
view that foi Spinoza, moues uo not inheie in substance, see Nelameu (2uu7). Theie is
quite a lot of eviuence in the +',-!. that shoes that Spinoza took moues to inheie in
substance, incluuing comments that they "move in uou" anu the "eveiything is in uou."
Noieovei, Spinoza's epistemology iequiies that theie is some sense of iuentity between

1S1
Schmaltz (1999)
14u
finite thing, especially human beings, anu uou. The fact that we can know uou's essence
thiough the esoteiic thiiu kinu of knowleuge inuicates that knowing uou's essence is a kinu
of self-knowleuge; I uefenueu this in the account of the common notions in Chaptei 2,
Section S. Noieovei, Cuiley's inteipietation ignoies the language of expiession entiiely.
In Schmaltz (1999), the authoi aigues, along some lines similai to those founu in the
aigument of Section 1a above, that Extenueu substance is not spatial. Be aigues, howevei,
that finite bouies aie nonetheless spatial. Bis eviuence foi this is Spinoza's claim in the
Appenuix to the PCP that "theie is some attiibute in uou which contains all the peifections
of mattei in a moie excellent way anu can take the place of mattei." Schmaltz glosses: "The
aigument in this passage is that given the axiom that the peifection of the effect must exist
in the cause foimally oi eminently, uou must contain the peifections of the extension he
cieates in just the mannei that he contains the peifections of the cieateu intellect."
1S2

Likewise, accoiuing to Ballett, the attiibute of Extension, as applieu to uou, is "extensional
potency-in-act"; uueioult has a similai view in (1969) of the ielationship between
substance anu moues.
1SS
This makes is possible, aigues Schmaltz, that "uou's inuivisible
essence uiffeis in some way fiom the uivisible mateiial woilu."
1S4
To fuithei make his case,
Schmaltz ielies on two passages, one in which Spinoza claims that uou involves the
peifections of extension anu a suggestive one in which Spinoza makes cleai that the
intellect in uou is as uiffeient fiom intellect in man "as a uog that baiks is fiom the uog

1S2
Schmaltz (1999), 188.
1SS
Ballett (196u).
1S4
Schmaltz (1999), 19u.
141
stai."
1SS
Be uses these to aigue that Spinoza has a kinu of emanationist account of the
natuie of finite things.
But Spinoza gives us ieason to be ieluctant to imagine too wiue of a conceptual gap
between the way that substance is Extenueu anu the way that moues aie Extenueu. Theie
aie always, with Spinoza, consiueiations of ontological paisimony; what woulu justify two
iauically uiffeient unueistanuings of the same claim: that something is Extenueu. Even
moie impoitantly, it is suiely tiue that one of Spinoza's motivations foi embiacing the
impious view that uou is Extenueu is solving the pioblem of how a uou who has nothing of
extension can engenuei extenueu cieatuies. Spinoza iejects the conception of uou as
cieatoi &< 0-,-%", insteau aiguing that moues shoulu be unueistoou as uou's piopiia, which
flow fiom his essence anu expiess it.
1S6
In the scholium to Ip1S, Spinoza wiites
appiovingly of those who ueny that uou is a bouy like finite bouies, but aigues that they go
too fai:
.they cleaily show that they entiiely iemove coipoieal, oi extenueu, substance
itself fiom the uivine natuie. Anu they maintain that it has been cieateu by uou. But
by what uivine powei coulu it be cieateu. They aie completely ignoiant of that.
Aftei all, accoiuing to Spinoza, "if things have nothing in common with one anothei, one of
them cannot be the cause of the othei."
Cuiley, Schmaltz oi Ballett may claim that uou has the attiibute of extension in a
way that cieateu extension uoes not, thus avoiuing the absuiuity. But, foi example,

1SS
Ip17s2
1S6
See Ip16 anu Chaptei 1 of this thesis.
142
stiessing the "peifections of Extension" quotes makes Spinoza's position sounu
suspiciously emanationist - a uoctiine which Spinoza explicitly uenies.
1S7
Fuitheimoie,
Spinoza uoes not offei any explanation peitaining to the uistinction between an attiibute as
it expiesses the essence of substance, anu its conception as expiesseu by a finite moue.
In fact, Spinoza's way of wiiting about the attiibutes in his matuie woik suggests
that Extenueu substance anu Extenueu finite things involve the same notion of Extension.
0f substance, Spinoza wiites: "Extension is an attiibute of uou; i.e. uou is an extenueu
thing."
1S8
I am not suie whethei Spinoza woulu say that a finite bouy is "an extenueu thing
(*&. &<'&0.4)"; he uoes iefei to the human minu as a "thinking thing" just as uou is a
thinking thing,
1S9
anu he calls bouies "singulai things." If he woulu, then his speaking of
uou as an extenueu thing suggests that he tieats uou as extenueu in the same way; while
it's easy to claim that "expiessing extenueu substance" anu "having the attiibute of
extension" aie two uiffeient ways of being ielateu to extension, it is haiuei to swallow that
Spinoza equivocates iegaiuing the uefinition of "extenueu thing." But what if Spinoza
woulu not call a finite bouy an "extenueu thing". uou is the tiue extenueu thing, while
bouies meiely "expiess uou's essence |Extensionj in a uefinite anu ueteiminate way." If
this weie tiue, it ceitainly woulu sounu like bouies anu uou have uiffeient ielationships
with extension. But they cannot be too uiffeient, since the point of uou's being extenueu

1S7
IpS: "since we have also shown that apait fiom Natuie, which is infinite, theie is anu can be no
fuithei being, it is eviuence that this effect of bouy thiough which we peiceive it can come fiom
nothing othei than extension itself, anu not fiom anything else that (as some maintain) has that
extension eminently" (Appenuix 1Su).
1S8
Foi Bescaites, extension is the essence of an unueilying substance; this is bouy. Foi Spinoza,
Extension "expiesses" the essence of uou. We'll see latei the implications of this uistinction.
1S9
IIuS anu IIp1
14S
anu things having extension is that substance anu moues shoulu be able to be conceiveu
unuei the same attiibute.
Against these two, a final woiu, which applies to a lessei extent to the next view I
auuiess. 0ne of Spinoza's motivations is ceitainly explanatoiy economy (foi a uefense of
that, see Chaptei 4), anu in some sense Spinoza wishes to captuie uou anu Natuie in the
same entity. These inteipietations ieally uon't captuie that aspect of Spinoza's methou.
Although it is cleai that the moues of substance cannot be paits of substance - a view on
which we cleaily coulu not conceive the way in which they aie extenueu to be veiy
uiffeient - Spinoza uoes seem to want to make explanatoiy use of the fact that substance is
natuie, not just to make uou the cieatoi. 0ne example of this is, foi example, Spinoza's
uiscussion of watei veisus substance. In some sense, watei IS substance. This cannot quite
be what it sounus like - that watei is maue of some moie funuamental stuff - because
moues of substance aie not maue of substance. Neithei can the explanation of this be
Bennett's explanation. But in some sense watei is substance, anu Spinoza expects this to
have some kinu of explanatoiy powei.
Finally, anu most piobably, theie is the possibility that what Spinoza calls the
"infinite moues" can explain the fact that substance is veiy uiffeient fiom its moues.
Substance is unique, infinite anu eteinal, in the stiictest sense. It is immeuiately mouifieu
only by infinite mouifications (since something finite cannot follow uiiectly fiom
something infinite). 0nce substance is mouifieu, peihaps now we can get off the giounu
with a ieal physics in a woilu populateu with moving volumes. In othei woius, while
coipoieal substance is not extenueu in length, bieath, anu uepth, the infinite moue of
144
Extension is, anu bouies aie paits of that infinite inuiviuual that is the moue of Extension,
oi physical natuie as we expeiience it.
Peihaps the biggest pioblem with this view is that Spinoza iuentifies the immeuiate
infinite moue of Extension, anu it is not extension unueistoou in a uiffeient way, space,
uimensionality, oi anything like that; it is motion anu iest.
14u
The iuea behinu Spinoza's
claim that motion is an immeuiate infinite moue seems simply to be that while Extension is
a piimitive way of being (as is any attiibute), motion iequiies theie to be an Extenueu
thing in oiuei to exist. But once an Extenueu thing is positeu, it must be in motion. That
explains the fact that the moue is immeuiate - that it is infinite comes fiom its being
univeisal. Inueeu, Spinoza uoes not meiely say that eveiything is in motion, as a lot of
commentatois have it, but that the entiiety of physical natuie is the only piopei subject of
the moue, motion anu iest.
141

The infinite moue of motion anu iest, then, alieauy assumes an Extenueu thing, anu
that thing is Extenueu substance. Spinoza uoes not say that space oi geometiical extension
oi quantity of any kinu is an infinite moue. It is only motion anu iest. This stiongly
suggests that substance is alieauy extenueu in the way that it neeus to be to be mouifieu by
the infinite moue of motion anu iest. Spinoza nevei inuicates that the natuie of Extension
itself changes once it goes fiom being unmouifieu to being mouifieu by an immeuiate
infinite moue.

14u
See +',-!. Ip21 anu Ip22 anu Lettei 64 to Schullei.
141
B,"*' 8*&4'-.& II SS.
14S
In the last seveial paiagiaphs, I have tiieu to aigue that none of the pioposeu
methous foi getting spatial moues of extension out of a non-spatial extenueu substance will
woik. In the next seveial paiagiaphs, I offei ieasons to believe that Spinoza himself uiu not
take substance's way of being Extenueu anu a moue's way of being Extenueu to be
funuamentally uiffeient.
Spinoza's comments in the Lettei on the Infinite anu the scholium to Ip1S suggest
that accoiuing to Spinoza, the way we iepiesent bouies - extenueu in thiee-uimensions, in
ielative motion - in fact iepiesents the affections of ieal bouies on oui own ieal bouy, oi
aie affections that involve the natuies of ieal finite moues of Extenueu substance. Theie is
no ieason to believe that these appaient bouies iepiesent the tiue moues, eithei theii tiue
essences oi the way that they exist when they aie instantiateu.
In the Lettei on the Infinite, Spinoza uiagnoses the paiauoxes of infinity as a failuie
to iespect the uistinction between uiffeient kinus of infinity. But Spinoza goes fuithei anu
asks why we aie so tempteu, "by a natuial impulse," to imagine infinite extenueu substance
to be uivisible. Spinoza attiibutes this tenuency to the fact that oui eveiyuay expeiience of
objects is imaginative, anu uiaws anothei uistinction, between "what we can only
unueistanu, but not imagine, anu what we can also imagine." Spinoza elaboiates that we
aie inclineu to uiviue substance because theie aie two ways of conceiving quantity:
"abstiactly, oi supeificially, as we have it in the imagination with the aiu of the senses; oi as
substance, which is uone by the intellect alone." It is only with iespect to the imagination,
wiites Spinoza, that quantity is uivisible, finite, anu composeu of paits.
146
Like quantity, we can "sepaiate Buiation fiom the way it flows fiom eteinal things,"
giving iise to Time anu Neasuie, which aie also aius to the imagination. Finally, "fiom the
fact that we sepaiate the Affections of Substance fiom Substance itself anu ieuuce them to
classes so that as fai as possible we imagine them easily, aiises Numbei, by which we
ueteimine |these affections of substancej." Thus, "Neasuie, Time, anu Numbei aie nothing
but Noues of thinking, oi iathei, oi imagining" anu "it is no wonuei that all those who have
stiiven to unueistanu the couise of Natuie by such Notions - which in auuition have been
bauly unueistoou - have so maivelously entangleu themselves that in the enu they have
not been able to untangle themselves without bieaking thiough eveiything anu aumitting
even the most absuiu absuiuities."
In speaking of those who tiy to unueistanu the "couise of Natuie," Spinoza uses
veiy specific language. It is not just that we fail to unueistanu substance itself, but we also
fail accuiately to unueistanu its moues this way. It is that we aie using oui imagination,
which yielu only inauequate cognition, anu we totally fail to unueistanu Natuie's couise.
Again, we see that Spinoza uoes believe meiely that the metaphysical funuaments of
physics neeu to be shoieu up while the mechanistic euifice stanus. Rathei, these mistakes
leau to absuiuities in the stuuy of "Natuie's couise."
In this passage, Spinoza may seem to be uiawing a uistinction between moues,
which aie peiceiveu by the imagination, anu substance, which is contemplateu using the
intellect. But he is not. Spinoza goes on to say that the moues of substance ',&#.&%A&.
shoulu not be confuseu with these aius to the imagination - that is, as poitions of quantity
oi uuiation ueteimineu by measuie, time, anu numbei:
147
Anu if the Noues of Substance themselves aie confuseu with Beings of ieason of this
kinu, oi aius of the imagination, they too can nevei be iightly unueistoou. Foi when
we uo this, we sepaiate them fiom Substance, anu fiom the way they flow fiom
eteinity, without which, howevei, they cannot be iightly unueistoou.
142

The passage in no way implies that the moues of substance aie imaginaiy. Theie exist
moues of substance with paiticulai essences, anu we unueistanu them when we see them
as flowing fiom eteinity. As moues of substance, they aie inuiviuual things, maue so by
theii essence, which is a paiticulai conatus, whose ability to exist anu piouuce effects it
owes to uou. A finite bouy, then, is such a moue, unueistoou unuei the attiibute of
extension. It uoes not in any way coiiesponu to what oui imagination sees as finite things:
cais oi houses oi uogs oi cats. In shoit, Spinoza leaves us no ieason to suppose that a finite
moue of the attiibute of Extension coiiesponus to some piece of the spatiotempoial
continuum that we expeiience thiough oui senses.
Befoie we move to consiueiing Spinoza's account of motion, theie is a final
consiueiation in suppoit of the aigument I have been ueveloping. Chaptei 1 outlineu
Bescaites' official aigument foi the iuentification of the essence of bouies with thiee-
uimensional extension: that such extension iemains as the only quality of bouies in the
intellect aftei we stiip away all of the qualities of bouies that iely on the imagination. But
iegaiuless of Bescaites' official aigument foi it, his #"'-A4'-"0 in chaiacteiizing bouies this
way is his pioject to make physics tiactable foi mathematics. Foi Bescaites, the best way

142
Lettei 29 to Neyei
148
to uo this is to ienuei the object of physics the puie object of geometiy.
14S
If we aie to
have knowleuge of the piopeities anu knowleuge of bouies 4 $*-"*-, they must be
geometiical beings - that is, ieally extenueu anu nothing else. Bescaites uoes not meiely
think that mathematics is the language of the physical woilu; he believes that physics is
nothing but geometiy. In a lettei to Cleiseliei, he wiites that "mathematical extension is
the piinciple of physics," anu in /*-0!-$-4 II, 64: "I uo not aumit oi uesiie any othei
piinciples in physics than in geometiy oi abstiact mathematics, since all the phenomena of
natuie aie explaineu theieby." Spinoza's emphasis in the PCP that extension, oi the
essence of mattei, is meie quantity accoiuing to Bescaites, is sensitive to Bescaites'
motivations. Spinoza goes on in the PCP to stiess that, accoiuing to Caitesian physics,
mattei is iuentical with space - a coiollaiy to the iuentification of the essence of mattei
with extension.
The passages uiscusseu in Chaptei S, Section 2 show that Spinoza emphatically uoes
not shaie this motivation. In fact, he makes veiy cleai that mathematics cannot pioviue us
with ieal knowleuge of things, extenueu oi otheiwise. When numbei oi measuie things,
we uiviue oui expeiience in the imagination, anu then classify the paits that iesult unuei
categoiies that also seive meiely to oiganize the imagination. Theie, we saw that Numbei,
Time, Neasuie aiise fiom abstiacting attiibutes, uuiation anu quantity fiom substance,
which is an opeiation of the imagination.

14S
Foi Bescaites, "The bouies of physics aie the objects of geometiical uemonstiation maue ieal"
(uaibei (1992), 89).
149
Neanwhile, in the PCP, Spinoza emphasizeu that accoiuing to Bescaites, "by
extension we uo not unueistanu the act of extenuing (4!'9. &<'&07&07-), oi anything
uistinct fiom quantity." Caitesian extension, accoiuing to Spinoza (anu Spinoza, foi the
most pait, coiiectly chaiacteiizes Bescaites' view), is #&*& quantity. Again, in a lettei to
Boyle, Spinoza iuentifies extension anu quantity, wiiting conceining the possibility of a
vacuum that theie woulu be a ieal acciuent "if theie weie Quantity without Substance."
This kinu of quantity is the kinu that can be uiviueu - the kinu that, Spinoza has aigueu, is
imaginaiy. Besiues being aius of the imagination, Spinoza stiesses the unieality of
measuie, time anu numbei by classifying them as beings of ieason (&0'-4 *4'-"0-.): villains
of Spinoza's epistemology which, while being useful, inevitably leau to eiioi anu confusion.
Be wiites:
.if the Noues of Substance themselves aie confuseu with Beings of ieason of this
kinu, oi aius of the imagination, they too can nevei be iightly unueistoou. Foi when
we uo this, we sepaiate them fiom Substance, anu fiom the way they flow fiom
eteinity, without which, howevei, they cannot be iightly unueistoou."
144


?< S#%-#$
It is cleai that foi Spinoza motion is an impoitant if not the most impoitant concept
of his physics. 0nfoitunately, his use of the teim "motion" is extiemely vague. Theie have
been a numbei of attempts moie specifically to chaiacteiize Spinoza's account of motion,
anu in many cases, Spinoza's unueistanuing of motion has been taken to be inspiieu by,

144
Iv S7-S8
1Su
similai to oi iuentical with Bescaites'. In this section, I'll aigue that these attempts fail.
Insteau, I aigue, Spinoza was tiying to builu up an anti-Caitesian, uynamic conception of
motion, although he was not able to complete this pioject.
Bescaites uefines motion as
the tianslation of one pait of mattei, oi of one bouy, fiom the vicinity of those
bouies that aie in uiiect contact with it anu aie vieweu as at iest to the vicinity of
otheis. Wheie by 'one bouy' oi 'one pait of mattei' I unueistanu eveiything that is
tiansfeiieu at the same time, even if this itself might again consist of many paits
which have othei motions in themselves.
14S

Biu Spinoza accept this as the piimaiy uefinition of motion. In the +',-!., Spinoza nevei
uefines motion this way; in fact, Spinoza 0&A&* uefines motion in the +',-!.. I aigueu in
Chaptei 2 that this may be because since motion is a common notion, Spinoza believes that
we have a piimitive unueistanuing of it. Bowevei, I also aigueu theie that Spinoza was,
peihaps intentionally, at most committeu to what he calleu "Notion" being the cause of
change in the univeise. In paiticulai, I wanteu to stiess that Spinoza's use of "Notion" in
the +',-!. is as a cause of something - peihaps the tianslation of bouies in space that we
expeiience, peihaps something else. But it is not a kinematic concept piimaiily.
Inueeu, theie is fuithei eviuence in the +',-!. that Spinoza uoes not accept
Bescaites' chaiacteiization of motion as tianslation fiom one place to anothei. In the
physical inteiluue aftei IIp1S, it is cleai that when he is talking about "motion anu iest" he
has something veiy uiffeient in minu. Foi example, eaily in Spinoza's caieei, he follows

14S
/*-0!-$%&. I 2S
1S1
Bescaites in tieating motion as ielative; foi example, in the B,"*' 8*&4'-.& SS, Spinoza
aigues that the whole univeise cannot be in motion, since theie is nothing foi it to be in
motion with iespect to. But by the time he wiites the +',-!., he seems to have changeu his
position; he as goou as uenies in the physical inteiluue that motion is ielative to an
enviionment. In the Coiollaiy to his pioof of Lemma S of the physical inteiluue, Spinoza
pioves a veision of the piinciple of ineitia by appealing to the conceptual impossibility of a
bouy unueistoou to be in motion coming to iest:
Foi when I suppose that bouy A, say, is at iest, anu uo not attenu to any othei bouy
in motion, I can say nothing about bouy A except that it is at iest. If afteiwaius it
happens that bouy A moves, that of couise coulu not have come a bout fiom the fact
that it was at iest. Foi fiom that nothing else coulu follow but that bouy A woulu be
at iest.
Foi Spinoza, the motion of a bouy is the kinu of thing we can consiuei in it in isolation fiom
othei things - it is a piopeity of the bouy, not a featuie of natuie that uepenus on whethei
we set its neighboihoou at iest.
Spinoza nevei says explicitly that local motion as we expeiience it is imaginaiy. But
this woulu not be a suipiising consequence of Spinoza's comments on mathematics,
examineu in Chaptei 2, Section 2. If we can uiviue uuiation anu extensive quantity as we
wish, making measuie anu time aius of the imagination, then the uistance a bouy moves in
a ceitain amount of time uepenus on how we ueciue to quantify it. What Spinoza is willing
to aumit is that this is the coiiect unueistanuing of motion 4. -' -. !"0.-7&*&7 =( ',&
1S2
-#4@-04'-"0: "no one uoubts but what we also imagine time, viz. fiom the fact that we
-#4@-0& some bouies to move moie slowly, oi moie quickly, oi with the same speeu."
Besiues local motion, howevei, theie is anothei "motive" concept opeiative in
Bescaites' physics - the quantity of motion. A bouy's quantity of motion is its scalai speeu
times its mass, which, accoiuing to Bescaites, is iuentical with its volume. Bescaites
believes that the laws of natuie can be ueuuceu fiom the law of conseivation of quantity of
motion, which is itself justifieu by uou's immutability.
146
The outcome of an inteiaction
between two bouies with specifieu volumes anu speeus can be ueteimineu, Bescaites,
thought, by this foieiunnei of mouein conveisation laws like the conseivation of eneigy
anu the conseivation of momentum.
It is cleai, then, how to calculate a bouy's quantity of motion, but is not cleai what,
exactly, a quantity of motion is. This might not be a pioblem in itself - aftei all, it's not cleai
what eneigy is, eithei. The pioblem foi Bescaites, howevei, is that such a quantity, which
can be passeu between bouies anu is the agent which ueteimines theii futuie motion,
seems antithetical to Bescaites' uesiie to ieuuce physics to volume anu local motion. It is
uncleai, that is, how bouies can exeit foices on one anothei, thiough this quantity, without
having inteinal qualities - qualities beyonu meie extension anu tianslation in space.
Nonetheless, this concept is essential to Bescaites physics.
Bon uaiiett, in an aiticle examining Spinoza's conception of motion, aigues that
Spinoza, similaily, has to kinus of "motion" in his philosophical system.
147
The fiist, uaiiett

146
Bescaites establishes this at /*-0!-$%&. II S6.
147
uaiiett (1994).
1SS
aigues, is tianslation in space; the seconu, like Bescaites, is the cause of motion, oi foice,
which is analogous (oi even iuentical) to Bescaites' quantity of motion. uaiiett's aiticle is
a useful place to begin because of its caieful tieatment of Spinoza's use of "motion anu
iest," but I'll aigue in this section that ultimately its cential thesis is not tiue: Spinoza uoes
not have a cleai twofolu account of motion that he uiaws fiom Bescaites' own account.
Insteau, Spinoza's piimaiy unueistanuing of motion is the cause of motion, which he is not
able to ielate to appaient local motion.
As uaiiett notes in his aiticle, Spinoza uistinguishes between local motion oi "the
tiansfei of one pait of mattei, oi one bouy, fiom the vicinity of those bouies that touch it
immeuiately, anu aie consiueieu at iest, to the vicinity of otheis"
148
anu the "foice oi
action" in a bouy that causes local motion. While Bescaites makes a similai uistinction at
/*-0!-$%&. II 24, he claims that the connection between these two types of motion is self-
eviuent: the foice oi action that one bouy exeits on anothei bouy is the tiansfei fiom one
to the othei the piouuct of its volume anu speeu.
149
Be uoes not take himself to be
intiouucing a new quantity. Spinoza, as I showeu in Chaptei 1, Section 2, pioves the
conseivation of quantity of motion fiom the moie funuamental piinciples, the PLNN anu
the PNC.
Spinoza seems to unueistanu the kinu of intentional equivocation that Bescaites
uses to avoiu the question of the natuie of the quantity of motion, anu this is why he
caiefully uistinguishes between local motion anu the quantity of motion. This is not the

148
PCP IIu8
149
/*-0!-$%&. II 4S.
1S4
only place that Spinoza uoes this. Foi example, Chaptei 2 citeu a note fiom the B,"*'
8*&4'-.& 1 X, which ieaus:
What is saiu heie about motion in mattei is not saiu seiiously. Foi the authoi still
intenus to uiscovei the cause theieof, as he has alieauy uon't to some extent a
posteiioii. But it can stanu just as it is, because nothing is baseu upon it, oi
uepenuent theieon.
Spinoza is inteiesteu in the causes of motion in mattei, not motion itself. Noieovei, the
note iefeis to the claim (which is "not saiu seiiously") that motion is the only quality of
mattei. Anu the Pieface to Pait II of the Ethics seems to confiim that Spinoza is not
committeu to the claim that motion is the only ieal quality of mattei: "whatevei he has of
foim, motion, etc., aie similaily moues of that othei attiibute which is asciibeu to uou" -
suggesting that foim anu even peihaps othei qualities aie ieally in moues of bouy as much
as motion.
uaiiett, howevei, takes Spinoza's uistinction between local motion anu cause of
motion to imply that Spinoza accepts the Caitesian claim that quantity of motion is the
cause of motion, anu that local motion is the effect. The main pioblem with uaiiett's
account is that it entails that Spinoza, like Bescaites, consiueis local motion to be $*-"* to
its own cause. The pioblem of the fiist movei, uiscusseu in Chaptei 1, is such a cential
pioblem foi Bescaites foi piecisely this ieason. Accoiuing to Bescaites, the speeu of one
bouy, multiplieu by its volume, can explain why anothei bouy changes its speeu, anu the
speeu times the volume of that bouy can explain the change to the next, but wheie uoes the
fiist motion come fiom. This is the pioblem that was bioacheu in Chaptei 1, that Spinoza
1SS
uiscusses in his last few letteis with Tschinhaus. By iestiicting the ieal qualities of natuie
to local motion, Bescaites allows foi no cause oi giounus foi causality in bouies anu must
in. Nost scholais believe that Spinoza, accepting Bescaites' piemises, meiely makes
motion an immanent featuie of natuie. But Spinoza uoes not suggest that local motion is
the only ieal featuie of extenueu bouies, anu so he neeu not accept Bescaites' iestiictive
piemises. Spinoza wiites in seveial places that the cause of motion is piioi to local motion,
anu even that he is not paiticulaily conceineu with the uetails of local motion. uaiiett
himself iecognizes this uiffeience: "Bescaites, too, speaks of "quantity of motion" as "foice"
oi "powei," although he iesists giving it the ontological status neeueu to make it function as
a tiue explanation of local motion.No such iesistance neeu be attiibuteu to Spinoza,
howevei."
1Su
But uaiiett uoes not appieciate how iauically this eiauicates the motivation
foi Spinoza to accept the connection between local motion anu the cause of motion at all.
As we saw in Chaptei 2, Spinoza uenies that quantities aie ieal featuies of the physical
woilu, anu I aigueu that this has wiuei-ieaching consequences foi Spinoza's physics than is
usually appieciateu. In paiticulai, this shows that local motion, foi Spinoza, cannot be a
ieal cause of anything; in fact, it may even be itself a constiuct of the imagination. Be uoes
not cleaily commit himself anywheie to the claim that local motion is the cause of all
mouification in mattei.
Spinoza knows what it is to give a piecise uefinition of motion, since he has stuuieu
anu ieconstiucteu Bescaites' physics, containing his caieful account of the natuie of
motion. It woulu be suipiising if Spinoza thought that he coulu builu a physics in the +',-!.

1Su
uaiiett (1994), 8u.
1S6
(as many people aigue that he uoes aftei IIp1S) without uefining motion. Noieovei, as we
have seen, he aumits to seveial coiiesponuents that he has not put his physics in oiuei yet.
It uoes not seem unieasonable, then, to imagine that Spinoza simply hau not, by the time of
his ueath, chaiacteiizeu motion to his satisfaction. I tiieu to aigue in Chaptei 2, Section S
that Spinoza's use of "motion anu iest" thioughout his wiitings only commits him to the
most vague iuea that change is an impoitant anu iiieuucible featuie of physical natuie.
Theie may yet be eviuence foi a moie contentful account of motion in Spinoza's
ieconstiuction of Bescaites' /*-0!-$%&., but this iequiies caie, since it is veiy uifficult to
uistinguish theie the points on which Spinoza is in agieement with Bescaites fiom the
places wheie he is not.
It is cleai that Spinoza wants to make a connection between the phenomenon of
local motion - bouies moving with iespect to theii neighbois - anu the essences of
paiticulai moues insofai as they "flow fiom eteinity", but it seems equally cleai that he
nevei was able to "put these thoughts in oiuei." Some possible eviuence of Spinoza's fiank
aumission of his inability to uo so comes in the Appenuix to the /*-0!-$%&. "2 34*'&.-40
/,-%"."$,(, Chaptei IX. Theie, Spinoza wiites that we know two "moues oi cieatuies which
immeuiately uepenu on, oi have been cieateu by uou," one being "Notion in mattei." But a
footnote is attacheu to it, wheie Spinoza wiites that "What is saiu heie of Notion in mattei
is not saiu seiiously. Foi the Authoi still intenus to uiscovei its cause.But it can stanu as it
1S7
is heie, because nothing it built on it, oi uepenus on it." It's not cleai that Spinoza wiote the
note himself, but it is tempting to believe that he at least agieeu to its inclusion.
1S1

Theie is still woik to be uone on Spinoza's concept of motion (anu iest), as well as
his concept of foice. I hope at least to have shown heie that it is not Caitesian - even a
mouifieu Caitesianism - anu that Spinoza was actively woiking to uevelop his own
conception of motion.

D< H0& 208'-,1A -$%&)A+*&
The last two anu a half chapteis have built towaiu the conclusion that Spinoza
iejecteu Caitesian mechanism in a numbei of impoitant iespects; specifically, that when
Spinoza talks about "Extension", he is not iefeiiing to the mathematically tiactable totality
of thiee-uimensional spacemattei that Bescaites imagines is the physical woilu, that that
his use of "motion" is much moie complex - anu peihaps confuseu - than is Bescaites'. I've
alieauy uiscusseu to some extent the account of motion that is pioviueu in the physical
inteiluue, anu aigueu that it is not Bescaites', even if we weie to aumit that the physical
inteiluue is Spinoza's most matuie account of physics, anu that he was committeu to it as
such. But this section makes the case that this is not the iole of the physical inteiluue in the
+',-!., against the almost univeisally-accepteu claim that these passages aie Spinoza's
physics. Insteau, the inteiluue establishes some ceitain but highly geneial metaphysical

1S1
Bennett wiites that "it seems not to have occuiieu" to Spinoza "that the actual woilu might be
othei than a 'movement of mattei' one" (Bennet (1984), 1u7). Cuiley anu Yovel agiee that "Spinoza
thought that the concept of bouies in motion was the most basic concept of physics" (Yovel (1991),
44) anu goes on to say that "to iegaiu Spinoza as skeptical about the funuamental auequacy of the
physics of his time" is "quite foieign to his tempeiament"(Yovel (1991), 44).
1S8
conclusions about paits anu wholes, anu the natuie of affections, which holu foi all bouies
anu unueigiiu Spinoza's account of affections in the iest of the +',-!.. This iequiies no
specific account of the natuie, piopeities oi behavioi of bouies. The seconu pait of the
inteiluue contains the postulates, which aie specific claims about bouies, but aie not
tieateu by Spinoza as ceitain knowleuge. 0ne can see this fiom the stiuctuie of the
aigument as well as the use to which the physical inteiluue is put in the iemainuei of the
+',-!.. Peihaps the commonest objection to the kinu of view that I have piesenteu till now
is that the physical inteiluue is Spinoza's committeu account of physics, anu it is
mechanistic. I have alieauy aigueu to some extent that it is not Caitesian; now I aigue that
it is not Spinoza's attempt to offei a physics.
In a 167S lettei to Spinoza, Tschiinhaus eageily solicits Spinoza's "ueneial Tieatise
on Physics." Bis cuiiosity has been piqueu by the "physical inteiluue" following IIp1S of
the +',-!., wheie Spinoza explains that to unueistanu the human minu, it is woithwhile to
"piemise a few things conceining the natuie of bouies." We shaie Tschiinhaus's wish to
have Spinoza's thoughts on physics, but Spinoza iesponus to his iepeateu iequests by
claiming that he has not yet oiganizeu them. Bespite that, the physical inteiluue is usually
taken, with Tschiinhaus, to compiise at least an outline of Spinoza's physics. This section
aigues that this "physical inteiluue" is not a guiue to Spinoza's physics.
I aigue in thiee ways. Fiist, I auuiess two specific examples of substantive physical
uoctiines that the inteiluue is supposeu to contain. Then I aigue moie geneially that the
physical inteiluue uoes not contain the kinu of knowleuge that Spinoza himself woulu
1S9
allow constitutes a physics. Finally, I offei some textual eviuence that Spinoza uiu not
consiuei the inteiluue to be a guiue to physics.
Theie aie a numbei of specific ways in which the inteiluue is supposeu to
contiibute to physics; I'll choose two. It is thought to contain 1) an explanation of how
simple bouies aie inuiviuuateu, anu 2) an account oi chaiacteiization of motion-anu-iest.
Noie geneially, the inteiluue is supposeu to contain some auaptation of Caitesianism
anuoi of mechanism.
1S2

In Pait II of the +',-!., Spinoza posits that a human being is a thinking thing, anu
wishes to explain how a human minu uiffeis fiom othei minus. Since the human minu is
the iuea of the human bouy, knowing the human minu uepenus in pait upon knowing the
human bouy. In paiticulai, Spinoza claims,
in piopoition as a bouy is moie apt than othei bouies to act oi be acteu upon
simultaneously in many ways, so is its minu moie apt than othei minus to peiceive
many things simultaneously; anu in piopoition as the actions of one bouy uepenu
on itself alone anu the less that othei bouies concui with it in its actions, the moie
apt is its minu to unueistanu uistinctly.
So Spinoza seems to be telling us that the fiist pait of the physical inteiluue - containing
the axioms anu lemmas that follow the Scholium to IIp1S - establishes the conuitions foi
one bouy to be moie apt than anothei to be acteu upon in many ways.
1SS
The seconu pait,

1S2
Lachteiman (1971), uueioult (196u), uaukiogei (2uu6), Aluei (1976).
1SS
It shows "how a composite inuiviuual can be affecteu in many ways anu yet pieseive its
natuie"(IIp1Ss).
16u
then, is meant to show that the human bouy meets these conuitions to an especially high
uegiee.
Taking the fiist pait fiist: in oiuei to show that one inuiviuual is moie apt than
anothei inuiviuual to act oi be acteu upon, we neeu to agiee on what constitutes an
inuiviuual. So many commentatois aigue that the passage establishes that simple bouies
aie inuiviuuateu by being in motion ielative to one anothei, as Bescaites believes in the
Piinciples. The fiist two axioms ieau:
Axiom 1: All bouies eithei move oi aie at iest.
Axiom 2: Each bouy moves now moie slowly, now moie quickly.
Lemma 1 which follows, with its pioof, ieaus:
Bouies aie uistinguisheu fiom one anothei by ieason of motion anu iest, speeu anu
slowness, anu not by ieason of substance.
1S4

Bem.: I suppose that the fiist pait of this is known thiough itself. But that bouies
aie not uistinguisheu by ieason of substance is eviuent both fiom IpS anu fiom Ip8.
But it is moie cleaily eviuent fiom those things which aie saiu in Ip1Ss.
Lemma 1 is taken to be pioof
1SS
that Spinoza thinks that the only way that one bouy anu
anothei can be saiu to be uiffeient is it they aie in motion ielative to one anothei.
Bowevei, this inteipietation uepenus upon a ieauing "*4'-"0&Q7-.'-0@99'9*" as
inuicative that ielative motion is !"0.'-'9'-A& of the uistinction between bouies. But this
passage may establish only that the state of motion of a bouy is ieally uiffeient fiom the

1S4
".!"*$"*4 *4'-"0& #"'9.> R ?9-&'9.> !&%&*-'4'-.> R '4*7-'4'-.> R 0"0 *4'-"0& .9=.'40'-4& 4= -0A-!&#
7-.'-0@99'9*Q"
1SS
uaukiogei (2uu6), uabbey (1996), Klevei, Wim (1988) 16S-172.
161
state of motion of anothei bouy, without auuing that it is this uiffeience in theii motive
states that uistinguishes two bouies fiom one anothei. It coulu also be ieau as saying that
uiffeient bouies have uiffeient states of motion anu iest, not that those uiffeient states aie
constitutive of theii uistinction fiom one anothei.
The contiast with "*4'-"0& .9=.'40'-4&" pioviues eviuence foi the constitutive
ieauing, suggesting that uistinction by motion anu iest is ieplacing uistinction by
substance. But the pioof of the fact that bouies aie uistinguisheu in iespect of motion anu
iest is veiy uiffeient fiom the pioof that finite things aie not uistinguisheu substantially.
That pioof takes up much of Pait I of the +',-!., while the foimei is non-existent. That
Spinoza takes the motion-anu-iest clause to be "known thiough itself" suggests the non-
constitutive ieauing, since it is moie obvious that things aie in motion oi at iest than that
theii iuentity is constituteu by theii state of motion.
In fact, thioughout the inteiluue, Spinoza is assuming, not pioving, that a bouy is an
inuiviuual. Foi example, in the Coiollaiy to Lemma S, Spinoza claims that a bouy is in
absolute motion oi iest when it is isolateu fiom any othei bouy. Such a bouy in isolation
must ietain its state of motion, because
when I suppose that bouy A, say, is at iest, anu uo not attenu to any othei bouy in
motion, I can say nothing about bouy A except that it is at iest. If afteiwaius it
happens that bouy A moves, that of couise coulu not have come about fiom the fact
that it was at iest. Foi fiom that nothing else coulu follow but that bouy A woulu be
at iest.
162
This is haiuly, as Spinoza claims, self-eviuent, but it is in fact an application of Piopositions
4 anu S of Pait III. If a bouy in motion weie to come to iest alone, it woulu have hau to
contain "natuial contiaiies" within itself. This pioof assumes iuentity, since consiueiations
like IIIpS asseit that contiauictoiy qualities cannot exist -0 ',& .4#& .9=S&!'; it is uifficult to
imagine that Spinoza was not awaie of this. Theie is no ieason to ieau this as suggesting
that Spinoza thought that ielative motion is, as Bennett puts it, at the "giounu flooi"
metaphysical level, oi that he expects it alone to account foi "all qualitative vaiiety" in
natuie.
1S6
Inueeu, in his coiiesponuence with Tschiinhaus, Tschiinhaus wiites that
Spinoza has not explaineu how a vaiiety of bouies may aiise fiom unuiffeientiateu
extenueu substance. Spinoza uoes not coiiect him.
As a final note, IIIp4 anu S apply in geneial to all finite moues, anu uo not mention
any featuies specific to bouies. The Coiollaiy to Lemma S, then, woulu seem to apply to
any finite moue, with any set of "natuial contiaiies" substituteu foi motion-anu-iest. That
coiollaiy is just an application of that geneial, assuieuly Spinozistic, point.
Is the inteiluue a uetaileu stuuy of motion anu iest. Now, theie -. an inuiviuuation
ciiteiion in the inteiluue, although not foi simple bouies: Spinoza uefines a !"#$".-'&
inuiviuual as a union of bouies which among themselves pieseive a "mutual ielation of
motion-anu-iest." The *4'-" of motion-anu-iest has been seen as a physical quantity which
unueilies a local conseivation law, much like Bescaites' quantity of motion - ceitainly an
element of physics. Foi example, Stuait Bampshiie anu Lee Rice have suggesteu that it is
eneigy, anu that bouies aie uistinguisheu fiom one anothei by "the total quantum of eneigy

1S6
Bennett (1984), 78-8u.
16S
which they contain."
1S7
But theie is no textual waiiant foi ieauing "motion-anu-iest" this
way: Spinoza uesciibes it as a *4'-" oi $*"$"*'-"0&; nowheie uoes he suggest that it is a
quantity, as Section 2 of this chaptei aigues. Anu theie is nothing to suggest that Spinoza
accepts Bescaites' view that the peimanence of uou manifests itself as a conseiveu
quantity; he aigues in seveial places that quantities in geneial aie not funuamental
featuies of natuie, but inventions of the imagination.
1S8

In fact, all that is impoitant about motion-anu-iest, to the aigument of the inteiluue,
is that theie is a ielationship among bouies which make up a composite bouy, which must
be maintaineu foi it to iemain an inuiviuual. Spinoza iefiains fiom uefining motion, anu
motion-anu-iest insteau seems to be a much moie geneial uoctiine that Spinoza bases
upon consiueiations of paits anu wholes expounueu in Chaptei 1. The only othei place
wheie Spinoza uiscusses motion in geneial in the inteiluue is in Lemma S, which is a
veision of a moie geneial Spinozistic, attiibute-neutial, piinciple. It ielies almost entiiely
on Ip28, which is (the common notion) that
Eveiy singulai thing, oi any thing which is finite anu has a ueteiminate existence,
can neithei exist noi be ueteimineu to piouuce an effect unless it is ueteimineu to
exist anu piouuce an effect by anothei cause, which is also finite anu has a
ueteiminate existence; anu again, this cause also can neithei exist noi be

1S7
Rice (1996), 198. See also Bampshiie (1962). It is uncleai why the eneigy inteipietation, even
if it weie tiue, woulu inuicate that "Spinozistic physics was not to have been the puiely a piioii
enteipiise that some of the commentatois have maue it out to be."
1S8
".fiom the fact we sepaiate the affections of substance fiom substance itself, anu aiiange them
in classes so that can easily imagine them as fai as possible, theie aiises Numbei, wheieby we
uelimit them," (Ep.12 to Neyei).
164
ueteimineu to piouuce an affect unless it is ueteimineu to exist anu piouuce an
effect by anothei, which is also finite anu has a ueteiminate existence, anu so on, to
infinity.
Lemma S essentially ieiteiates Ip28, using "motion-anu-iest" but not uefining it: a bouy,
being a singulai thing, can neithei exist noi be ueteimineu to piouuce an effect unless is so
ueteimineu by anothei singulai thing.
Noie geneially, the physical inteiluue is taken to suppoit a mechanist oi Caitesian-
inspiieu physics. Both of these teims can be unueistanu in a gieat many ways. I've
auuiesseu two specific uoctiines that aie thought to be containeu in the inteiluue,
howevei, as a iesult of this moie geneial piejuuice Spinoza is often aligneu with positions
which he uoes not holu. Foi example, Spinoza is thought to iely heavily on mathematics in
uesciibing natuie, as uoes Bescaites, when in fact he is highly skeptical of such uses of
mathematics, aiguing that they leau to eiioi. Be is also thought to mean the same thing as
Bescaites uoes by the teim "Extension" when this is fai fiom obvious: Spinoza eventually
concluues that "Bescaites' piinciples of natuial things aie of no seivice, not to say quite
wiong."
1S9
Finally, many ieaueis of Spinoza take his account of !"*$"*4 .-#$%-!-..-#4 in the
inteiluue to inuicate that Spinoza accepts some kinu of atomism. 0nfoitunately, I uo not
have time to auuiess this explicitly heie, but this mistaken view has leu some to incoiiect
conclusions about Spinoza's epistemology baseu upon paiallels with atomism.
16u


1S9
Lettei 81.
16u
Cf .uaukiogei (2uu6) anu Aulei (1971) along with uueioult on !"*$"*4 .-#$%-!-..-#4.
16S
So, the moie piecise question to ask, if I'm aiguing that this is not a satisfactoiy oi
even a pieliminaiy physics, is: What woulu count as a satisfactoiy physics foi Spinoza.
That is not an easy question. But foi example, Tschiinhaus iequests "the tiue uefinition of
motion, togethei with its explanation," anu asks also how inuivisible substance can take the
foims of finite physical objects. Spinoza iesponus that he has "not yet hau the oppoitunity
to aiiange in uue oiuei anything on this subject,"
161
inuicating, since Tchiinhaus has seen a
uiaft of the +',-!., that Spinoza uoes not consiuei it to incluue such an aiiangement. Be
makes a similai comment in the eailiei Ep.6u to Tschiinhaus, wheie he wiites that his
views "conceining motion.aie not yet wiitten out on uue oiuei." Spinoza nevei iefeis to
an existing woik on bouies in his coiiesponuence, incluuing with Boyle wheie he wiites at
length on many ielateu matteis.
The tiue uefinition of motion anu the possibility of finite bouies aie only two of
many questions that Spinoza woulu have been expecteu to answei in an account of bouies.
We get a sense of a few moie fiom Spinoza's own ieconstiuction of Caitesian physics in
Pait II of the /*-0!-$%&. "2 34*'&.-40 /,-%"."$,(. Theie, Spinoza pioviues a sensitive
axiomatic ieconstiuction of Caitesian physics. Be pioviues piecise uefinitions of concepts
like extension, an atom, vacuum, space, anu motion. Be uistinguishes caiefully between
motion in geneial anu local motion, anu uiscusses Bescaites' view that local motion is the
tiansfei of a pait of mattei fiom the vicinity of contiguous bouies to the vicinity of othei
bouies. Latei, Spinoza posits specific iules goveining foices anu impulses, anu offeis
answeis to questions like what happens to bouies when they aie iaiifieu oi conuenseu,

161
Lettei 81.
166
whethei space anu bouy uiffei in ieality, whethei theie aie atoms anu whethei theie aie
global anu local conseivation laws. In shoit, Spinoza is veiy familiai with a ielatively
complete account of the natuie of bouies anu theii behavioi. Theie is nothing like this in
the physical inteiluue, oi anywheie in Spinoza's inuepenuent woik.
Insteau, as I have suggesteu, the goal of the inteiluue is expiesseu in attiibute-
neutial teims, anu the aigumentative woik is uone entiiely by attiibute-neutial piinciples.
The stateu goal of the axioms anu lemmas is the explanation of how an inuiviuual may be
affecteu in many ways anu still pieseive its iuentity. The iest of the +',-!. makes cleai that
this is not a task which is specifically conceineu with bouies. The axioms anu lemmas
which aie meant to establish this aie of the most geneial application. A bouy in geneial is
uefineu as "a moue that in a ceitain anu ueteiminate way expiesses uou's essence insofai
as he is consiueieu as an extenueu thing"
162
, anu a singulai thing as "things that aie finite
anu have a ueteiminate existence."
16S
Befinition 7 continues to uefine a composite thing:
"if a numbei of inuiviuuals so concui in one action that togethei they aie all the cause of
one effect, I consiuei them all, to that extent, as one singulai thing."
164
None of these
chaiacteiizations of an inuiviuual apply to bouies moie than any othei moue.
The only chance of finuing a ieauing of "Extension" anu "motion-anu-iest" that
offeis a substantive physics is in the uoctiine of the common notions at IIpS8 anu S9. The
common notions aie featuies of bouies which we know auequately because they aie
"equally in the pait anu in the whole." But when it comes time to show that theie 4*& such

162
IIu1
16S
IIu7
164
Ibiu.
167
featuies of bouies, he iefeis to the physical inteiluue, which asseits without pioving that all
bouies agiee in that they involve the conception of Extension anu motion-anu-iest.
16S
No
inuication of theii natuie is given. Fuithei, although Spinoza tells us that we can have
auequate knowleuge of the common notions in geneial, he uoes not tell us how we can
builu specific laws of natuie fiom them, oi leain about the natuies of ieal bouies.
The only pait of the physical inteiluue which ueals with bouies specifically is the
pait which contains the $".'9%4'&., anu the unieliability suggesteu by theii name is
confiimeu at IIp17. Spinoza explains the woiking of imagination by invoking some of those
postulates, but in the Scholium, Spinoza qualifies the explanation, wiiting that
This can happen fiom othei causes also, but it is sufficient foi me heie to have
shown one thiough which I can explain it as if I hau shown it thiough its tiue cause;
still, I uo not believe that I wanuei fai fiom the tiue |causej since all those
postulates which I have assumeu contain haiuly anything which is not establisheu
by expeiience which we cannot uoubt, aftei we have shown that the human bouy
exists as we aie awaie of it.
The postulates aie not ceitain, anu fuithei, any consiueiations which lenu cieuibility to
them aie not, as Spinoza woulu say, "mathematical," but empiiical. That the testimony of
expeiience in this mattei shoulu be tiusteu to some extent is justifieu by IIp1Scoii, which
establishes that the human bouy exists as we aie awaie of it. Bowevei, Spinoza latei shows

16S
IIp1S Lemma 2
168
that the knowleuge we have of the human bouy's opeiations fiom obseiving it - that is,
knowleuge of physiology - is inauequate anu meuiateu.
166

I have tiieu to sketch an aigument foi the claim that pait of the physical inteiluue
pioviues us with ceitain tiuths of ieason, whose applicability to bouies is not necessaiy foi
theii tiuth. The othei pait uoes pioviue us with facts about finite, existing bouies, but that
pait is piovisional, anu is suppoiteu only by imaginative expeiience. Why uoes this mean
that the physical inteiluue is not a uefinitive physics.
The tiuths of ieason alone, Spinoza iepeateuly aigues, can pioviue only knowleuge
of geneial piinciples, anu not of the "essences of |paiticulaij things."
167
Cognition fiom
casual expeiience, oi imagination, which is the kinu of cognition offeieu by the postulates,
is contentful, but nevei auequate. Although this is how we know most things, this kinu of
cognition will only evei give us knowleuge of the effects of things on us. Nan is infinitely
paitial, anu oui causal powei is infinitely suipasseu by othei causes.
168
As a iesult, we
cannot claiify oui knowleuge by geneializing fiom paiticulai phenomena, because those
phenomena will always be conuitioneu by exteinal causes, oi always iepiesent meie
affections on oui bouy. We cannot, that is, follow Bacon's "tiue methou" of science in the
K"A9# C*@409#, one which "ueiives axioms fiom the senses anu paiticulais, iising by a
giauual anu unbioken ascent, so that it aiiives at the most geneial axioms at last."
169


166
IIp22-28
167
IIp42
168
IvpS
169
Bacon, K"A9# C*@409#, I, XIX.
169
Foi Spinoza, a full knowleuge of finite bouies woulu have to take into account both
the piinciples of ieason anu theii application to ieal things. This is a uifficult task, anu
peihaps impossible to the extent that we woulu wish, accoiuing to Spinoza. But no coiiect
account of finite bouies can be given without attempting it. Those who attempt to explain
bouies meiely thiough tiuths of ieason "have tieu themselves into such extiaoiuinaiy
knots that in the enu they have been unable to extiicate themselves except by bieaking
thiough eveiything anu peipetiating the giossest absuiuities."
17u
The eiioi is a iesult of
"sepaiating them fiom Substance anu fiom the mannei of theii efflux fiom Eteinity, anu in
such isolation they can nevei be unueistoou." In his final lettei to Tschiinhaus, Spinoza
ciiticizes Bescaites in similai teims, claiming that his physics fails because mattei must
"necessaiily be explicateu thiough an attiibute which expiesses eteinal anu infinite
essence."
171


B< "#$,A+'-#$
The account I've given of Spinoza's unueistanuing of the attiibute of Extension,
spatial extension, anu local motion may seem to suppoit the claim that Spinoza holus some
foim of acosmism. This is a histoiically populai but, as Cuiley calls it, an "uncomfoitable,"
position, given Spinoza's numeious comments to the contiaiy.
172
But this ieauing uoes not
imply the unieality of moues. Rathei, it uiaws a uistinction between genuine moues of

17u
Ep. 12 to Neyei.
171
Ep. 8S to Tschiinhaus.
172
It was aigueu by, foi example, Begel, Bayle anu }oachim. See Cuiley (1969). Foi a moie iecent
anu caieful uiscussion of acosmism, see Nelameu (2u1u).
17u
Extenueu substance, oi uou, anu what look to finite minus like finite inuiviuuals in space
anu time. Spinoza applies uuiation to genuine moues, anu I have tiieu to show that
inuiviuual moues cannot ieliably be associateu with what look like inuiviuual bouies in oui
expeiience of natuie.
I hope to have shown that theie is ample eviuence that Spinoza iejects the most
cential commitment of Caitesian physics: that physical natuie can be completely uesciibeu
by extension in thiee uimensions anu local motion. It shoulu be cleai by now that Spinoza
has many ieasons foi ueclaiing, as he uoes in his lettei to Tschiinhaus, that "Bescaites'
piinciples of natuial things aie useless, not to say quite wiong." Spinoza uoes not meiely
offei a mouification of a physics that he foi the most pait accepts. Rathei, he stiuggles with
conceiving of a physics that is consistent with his most ueeply-helu metaphysical anu
epistemological piinciples. It is cleai that is not, anu uoes not consiuei himself to be,
successful in uoing so; howevei, it is also cleai that Spinoza unueistoou vaiiety of ways in
which Caitesian physics was inconsistent with his piojects.
Finally, if Spinoza uoes not mean by "Extension" what his pieuecessois anu
contempoiaiies meant by "extension," what uoes he mean. In Lettei 2 to 0luenbuig,
Spinoza uefines an attiibute as "whatevei is conceiveu thiough itself anu in itself, so that its
concept uoes not involve the concept of anothei thing. Foi example, Extension is conceiveu
thiough itself anu in itself, but motion is not." Spinoza appaiently thinks that an attiibute
cannot be put in teims of any moie basic concepts - they aie completely basic. The
attiibute of extension is the self-eviuent way that we expeiience bouy; aiguably, Bescaites'
attempt to conceive of bouy in teims of geometiical concepts violates the stipulation that
171
the physical woilu not be explicable in teims of moie basic concepts. Chaptei 2 uiscusseu
oui foimation of the common notions, anu in paiticulai the common notion of Extension.
In this chaptei, I attempteu to show that Spinoza's comments about Extension specifically
aie consistent with that account.


















172
"012%&) B3 42-$#51W $1%+)1A-'7 1$* 208'-,1A-'7

($%)#*+,%-#$
Eveiybouy agiees that Spinoza is a natuialist. Be uenies the existence of a
tianscenuent, anthiopomoiphic uou anu his minions of angels anu uisembouieu spiiits,
anu he uenounces the belief in miiacles as "foolish wonuei." 0nlike Bescaites anu Leibniz,
he makes no attempt to salvage those Chiistian uoctiines which embaiiasseu theii
scientific iationalism. Be uoes not iegaiu human thought, will anu consciousness as
mysteiies that uemanu explanation by piinciples othei than those which govein the
behaviois of inanimate objects, plants anu animals, anu he uenies that theie aie any
noimative facts.
17S

Nany commentatois woulu auu two moie senses of natuialism to this list: fiist, that
Spinoza is optimistic conceining the piojects of science, anu seconu, that he gives piioiity
to the explanatoiy iole of bouies oi physical facts anu laws.
174
Attiibuting these positions
to Spinoza is pait of an attempt to ieciuit him foi some contempoiaiy philosophical
piojects, unueistanuably motivateu by an appieciation foi some of the unique positions
Spinoza takes among his eaily mouein contempoiaiies on natuie, psychology, the
founuations of ethics anu the piinciples of politics. But these uays, the most enthusiastic
effoits to synthesize Spinozism with contempoiaiy philosophy involves Spinoza's
paiallelism, which seems to offei a fiesh anu piescient alteinative, not just to eaily mouein

17S
See Youpa (2uu6) foi a uefense of the (minoiity) view that Spinoza aumits noimative facts.
174
0n the fiist, see Isiael (2uu7); on the seconu see, among otheis, Aulei (1989) anu uaukiogei (2uuu).
17S
mouels of the minu-bouy ielationship, like causal inteiactionism oi occasionalism, but also
to contempoiaiy appioaches like ieuuctive physicalism anu epiphenomenalism. Such
effoits incluue Antonio Bamasio's T""E-0@ 2"* B$-0"F4U V"(> B"**") 407 ',& W&&%-0@ X*4-0
anu Steven Naulei's 2uu8 aiticle "Spinoza on Consciousness," as well as oluei stuuies of
Spinoza's system like Bennett's O B'97( "2 B$-0"F4I. +',-!. anu Cuiley's B$-0"F4I.
N&'4$,(.-!..
17S
These authois aiticulate some veision of the claim that while Spinoza is
not a mateiialist, physical piinciples play foi him a uispiopoitionate iole in the explanation
of natuie, incluuing non-physical phenomena in psychology, ethics anu politics. I call these
views vaiiants of "explanatoiy physicalism," although theie aie a numbei of uiffeient ways
in which Spinoza is thought to give such piioiity to physical explanations. Nonetheless,
theie is an agieement among a numbei of eminent Spinoza scholais on two points: fiist,
that Spinoza ioutinely uses concepts anu laws goveining the natuie anu uynamics of
bouies to uesciibe mental phenomena; anu seconu, that Spinoza has a philosophical basis
on which to conuone this soit of extension of explanatoiy mechanisms.
This chaptei aigues that Spinoza uoes not accept any veision of explanatoiy
physicalism: we cannot incluue Spinoza among those who think that bouies oi physical
laws can be useu to explain mental facts. I begin by examining the senses in which Spinoza
may anu may not be calleu a natuialist. I concluue that the piimaiy senses in which
Spinoza is a natuialist - that he believes in explanatoiy economy anu metaphysical
paisimony, anu that he aigues that the human being is no less a pait of natuie than a iock

17S
See Bennett (1984) anu Cuiley (1988); also Isiael (2uu1), who claims that Spinoza playeu an
unueiappieciateu iole in the iise of natuialism. But neaily eveiy stuuy of Spinoza contains some
suggestion that Spinoza piivileges natuial knowleuge.
174
oi a snake - in fact piecluue scientific natuialism. This is consistent with the philosophy of
science aiticulateu in Chaptei S. I go on to explain the ways in which thiee uiffeient
attiibutions of explanatoiy physicalism to Spinoza piesuppose the mistaken view that he
accepts a kinu of scientific natuialism, anu offei inuepenuent textual eviuence that Spinoza
iejects them.

.< 42-$#51 1$* $1%+)1A-'7
In what senses is Spinoza a natuialist. Even without a univocal uefinition of
natuialism, theie aie a seveial of featuies of Spinoza's methou anu system that might seem
to qualify. Spinoza's most peivasive bianu of natuialism, which imbues all aspects of his
system, is a kinu of ontological paisimony, which peihaps not suipiisingly leaus him to
substance monism; what bettei way to piune extia entities fiom the univeise than claiming
that theie is only one substance. Spinoza also uenies that theie is a uou uistinct fiom
natuie, that minus anu bouies aie uiffeient things, anu that theie aie spiiits oi angels.
Theie aie othei examples with even moie philosophical inteiest. Spinoza uenies, foi
example, the existence of faculties
176
, incluuing the will anu the intellect. uou's will anu
powei Spinoza ieuuces to uou's essence. Be also uenies that theie aie univeisals, as pait of
the iigoious anti-abstiactionism uiscusseu in Section 1b of Chaptei 2. This tenuency of
Spinoza's to iuentify seemingly uispaiate objects is ielateu to an economy of explanation.

176
See Youpa (2uu9) foi an aigument that Spinoza uoes not ueny that finite being have faculties oi
capacities.
17S
So, foi example, we uo not neeu to explain why human beings have special kinus of minus,
since they uo not; all things have minus, by viitue of being finite moues of uou.
177

It is, howevei, veiy impoitant to uistinguish this conceptually thiifty attituue fiom a
ieuuctionist one. Bespite the fact that Spinoza piactices a kinu of metaphysical anu
explanatoiy non-piolifeiation, he veiy often iesists ieuucing one concept to anothei. So, foi
example, Spinoza vehemently uenies the existence of final causes, but integiates as an
efficient cause the !"04'9., which is supposeu to account foi the phenomenon that things
act foi the sake of enus.
178
This tenuency is the cause of a lot of fiustiation foi a ieauei of
Spinoza, who is askeu to tiy to unueistanu why, foi example, the minu anu the bouy aie
both iuentical anu funuamentally uiffeient in kinu, oi why, aftei all, it uoesn't seem like
iocks have minus like we uo.
In oiuei to assuage this fiustiation, theie aie many ieuuctionist ieauings of Spinoza.
}ust as it is commonplace to see Spinoza as a veileu mateiialist now, he was wiuely
inteipieteu as an iuealist fiom the miu-eighteenth centuiy until the miuule of the
twentieth. Be has been inteipieteu as ieuucing natuie to uou, making him "uou-
intoxicateu" (by Novalis), oi as ieuucing uou to natuie, making him an atheist (by, foi
example, Naulei). While the less theistic view is now the moie populai (along with the
mateiialist one), Spinoza issues a ciystal cleai waining against ieuuctionism in the +',-!.
(wiiting, it seems, of Bescaites anu his followeis):

177
See Bennett on a similai point; Spinoza makes uue with a "small stock of concepts"
178
Foi Spinoza's aiguments against final causality, see the Appenuix to Pait I of the ethics.
176
.in consiueiing natuial phenomena, they have completely uisiegaiueu the uivine
natuie. Anu when theieaftei they tuineu to the contemplation of the uivine natuie,
they coulu finu no place in theii thinking foi those fictions on which they hau built
theii natuial science, since these fictions weie of no avail in attaining knowleuge of
the uivine natuie. So it is little wonuei that they have contiauicteu themselves on
all siues."
179

0n the othei hanu, Spinoza wiites that we shoulu not mystify uou, whose essence is inueeu
knowable. We cannot gain knowleuge, Spinoza claims, by extiapolating fiom aitificially
simplifieu mouels; anu we shoulu be caieful keep in minu when we neglect an essential
featuie of natuie in oiuei to cognize it in a ceitain way.
The sense of natuialism that I'u like to highlight is Spinoza's natuialism about the
human being. This is an instance of the pievious kinu, since it sees human beings as of a
piece with objects anu animals anu natuial systems of any soit. Theie aie a numbei of
places that Spinoza makes his iesistance to human exceptionalism cleai. It is peihaps most
stiiking when he happily accepts panpsychism as a consequence of his paiallelism. Aftei
uiscussing the union of minu anu bouy, he wiites that "the things we have shown so fai aie
completely geneial anu uo not peitain moie to man than to othei Inuiviuuals, all of which,
though in uiffeient uegiees, aie neveitheless animate."
18u
The official statement of this
view can be founu in the Pieface to Pait II of the +',-!.:

179
Ethics IIp1u Coiiollaiy.
18u
IIp1S Scholium. Bon uaiiett also notes this featuie of Spinoza's cast of minu, calling it "inciemental
natuialism": "By 'natuialism', I mean the pioject of fully integiating the stuuy anu unueistanuing of
human beings, incluuing the human minu, into the stuuy anu unueistanuing of natuie, so that human
177
.they seem to conceive man in natuie as a uominion within a uominion. Foi they
believe that man uistuibs, iathei than follows, the oiuei of natuie, that he has
absolute powei ovei his actions, anu that he is ueteimineu only by himself. Anu
they attiibute the cause of human impotence, not to the common powei of natuie,
but to I know not what vice of human natuie, which they theiefoie bewail, oi laugh
at, oi uisuain, oi (as usually happens) cuise. Anu he who knows how to censuie
moie eloquently anu cunningly the weakness of the human Ninu is helu to be
uouly.
181

Anu, moie geneially:
Natuie is always the same, anu its viitue anu powei of acting aie eveiywheie the
same, i.e., the laws anu iules of natuie, accoiuing to which all things happen, anu
change fiom one foim to anothei, aie always anu eveiywheie the same. So the way
of unueistanuing the natuie of anything, oi whatevei kinu, must also be the same,
viz. thiough the univeisal laws anu iules of natuie. The affects, theiefoie, oi hate,
angei, envy, etc., consiueieu in themselves, follow fiom the same necessity anu foice
of natuie as the othei singulai things.

beings aie not contiasteu with natuie but aie insteau unueistoou as entities goveineu by the same
piinciples that govein all othei things.

By 'inciementalism', I mean the methouology of tieating
impoitant explanatoiy piopeities anu ielations not as simply piesent-oi-absent but iathei as piopeities
anu ielations that aie peivasively piesent to gieatei oi lessei uegiees.

Bis inciemental natuialism is
simply the iesult of applying this inciemental appioach to the pioject of natuialism: it consists in his
seeking to explain such ciucial elements of human life as intentionality, uesiie, belief, unueistanuing,
anu consciousness as alieauy piesent in theii most iuuimentaiy (anu peihaps even initially
uniecognizable) foims thioughout all of natuie, so that humanity can be seen as a complex anu
sophisticateu expiession of natuie iathei than as something aiising fiom the intiouuction of non-
natuial elements."
181
Pieface Ethics Pait III
178
In keeping with this piinciple, Spinoza uenies that human beings have a will, aiguing in the
Pieface to Pait II of the +',-!. that the belief in the will is just a iesult of ignoiance of the
causes that conuition humans to behave as they uo.
A majoiity of moie iecent English-language Spinoza commentatois take Spinoza, in
auuition to all this, to be what we might call a scientific natuialist. But it is Spinoza's veiy
natuialism about man that giounus his account of scientific knowleuge, anu in paiticulai,
his account of eiioi anu its omnipiesence. Accoiuing to Spinoza, eiioi is a iesult not of
negation but of having a paitial view of things; that is to say, to eii is not to believe
something false but to believe a tiue thing incompletely.
182
It can be coiiecteu only by
taking a view of the whole. Foi a human being, this is impossible, since a human being is an
infinitesimally small pait of the whole of natuie, batteu about by an infinite numbei of
exteinal causes. This is in contiast with Bescaites. Foi both Spinoza anu Bescaites, eiioi
iesults fiom being passive iathei than active, but Bescaites associates passivity with the
bouy. It is the bouy, then, that is the souice of eiioi; foi Spinoza, it is the fact that bouy anu
minu both have necessaiily paitial views of the whole.
Although Spinoza thinks that we can have bettei knowleuge of uou than most any of
his contempoiaiies, we have seen in Chaptei 2 that Spinoza is veiy pessimistic about the
possibility of oui coming to unueistanu natuie thiough inteiaction with it. The substantive
uoctiines which unueilie this fact - fiist, that the iueas we have of things thiough
expeiience uo not iesemble them, anu seconu, the fact that the human is a pait of an

182
+',-!. IIpSS: "Theie is nothing positive in iueas on account of which they aie calleu false," anu IIpSS:
"Falsity consists in the piivation of knowleuge which inauequate, oi mutilateu anu confuseu, iueas
involve."
179
infinite whole - aie themselves in othei contexts aie taken to constitute his ontological oi
stiuctuial natuialism. So Spinoza's natuialism about the human being piecluues scientific
natuialism in that it gives us no justification foi believing that humans must necessaiily be
able to foim the kinu of knowleuge of natuie that woulu count as tiue scientific knowleuge.
In thinking about oui knowleuge of the physical woilu, we must take into account oui
limiteu place in it. }ust as the tiny woim in the bloou of Lettei S2 is limiteu by its
enviionment, so aie we.
18S


?< QR2A1$1%#)8 208'-,1A-'7'
This section uiscusses thiee senses in which Spinoza is thought to be an explanatoiy
physicalist. Befoie that, howevei, I'u like to naiiow the focus in two ways. Fiist, I will only
consiuei inteipietations that conceue that Spinoza is not a metaphysical mateiialist, anu
seconu, I will take it that these inteipieteis aumit, as they must, that on the most obvious
ieauing of Spinoza's unueistanuing of explanation, he cannot, on his own teims, give
piioiity of explanation to physical facts.
Fiist, most inteipieteis giant that Spinoza uoes not believe that mattei is the only
ieal thing, oi that it is moie ieal than minu - that is, Spinoza is not a mateiialist. Theie aie
commentatois who attiibute this kinu of physicalism to Spinoza; the most well-known is
Euwin Cuiley, who aigues that the attiibute of thought is logical anu not psychological, anu
the ielationship between moues of thought anu moues of extension aie just those between

18S
Lettei S2, inciuentally, offeis anothei example of anti-natuialism; theie, Spinoza uenies that theie is
ieal oiuei in natuie. Foi moie on this lettei anu its implications foi Spinoza's epistemology, see Chaptei
2, Section 1a.
18u
piopositions anu facts. In latei woik, Cuiley specifies that those facts aie physical facts.
184

The aiguments foi anu against this position aie veiy uiffeient fiom those foi anu against
explanatoiy physicalism. I will auuiess them biiefly latei, but the focus heie is upon the
moie wiuely-accepteu view that while Spinoza acknowleuges the ieality of minu, he tiies to
take auvantage of the claiity of physical concepts anu laws to explain non-physical
phenomena. It shoulu be saiu, howevei, that iefuting explanatoiy physicalism as an
inteipietation of Spinoza shoulu iob the metaphysical mateiialist inteipietation of much of
its philosophical motivation.
Seconu, the most obvious way to settle the question whethei Spinoza uoes use
physical concepts to explain non-physical phenomena is to attenu to Spinoza's own account
of explanation. But on the most stiaightfoiwaiu such account, Spinoza cannot accept that
physical concepts pioviue any help at all in unueistanuing non-physical things. Spinoza
establishes a stiong link between explanation anu causation, most explicitly at Pait I,
Axiom 4: "The knowleuge of an effect uepenus on, anu involves, the knowleuge of its
cause." In Axiom S, Spinoza establishes that two things that have nothing in common
"cannot be unueistoou thiough one anothei" anu Pioposition S pioves that, as a iesult,
"one cannot be the cause of the othei."
18S
Now it is one of Spinoza's most cential
commitments that theie is a causal baiiiei between attiibutes: moues of thought, oi iueas,

184
See Cuiley (1988).
18S
I'll say moie about this latei, but it is woith noting now that Spinoza takes the claim about
explanation oi knowleuge-uepenuence to be an axiom, anu the claim about causation to be a
pioposition, pioven fiom that axiom. Beie is an example wheie mental facts aie useu to illustiate oi
piove physical facts; I'll offei moie examples in Section 2.1, anu they seive to show that Spinoza uoes
not only use physical facts to explain oi illustiate mental facts.
181
can only causally influence othei moues of thought, anu moues of Extension can only
causally influence othei moues of Extension. Be aigues iepeateuly that a thing can only be
causeu by oi conceiveu thiough anothei thing if they have something in common, anu
Extension anu Thought have nothing in common. That this entails that a moue of Extension
can only be explaineu thiough a moue of Extension anu a moue of thought thiough anothei
moue of thought is maue explicit at IIp7s:
.as long as things aie consiueieu as moues of Thought, we must explicate
(&<$%-!4*&) the oiuei of the whole of Natuie, oi the connection of causes, thiough the
attiibute of thought alone; anu insofai as things aie consiueieu as moues of
extension, again the oiuei of the whole of Natuie must be explicateu thiough the
attiibute of Extension only.
So the claim that Spinoza uses bouies ."#&,") to explain minus must mean something
subtlei.
The fiist point - that Spinoza is not a metaphysical mateiialist - suggests that
anyone who ieaus Spinoza as an explanatoiy physicalist must accept that what is
explanatoiy is not necessaiily what is tiue. The seconu point is not unielateu: they must
also accept that to some extent causation anu explanation come apait foi Spinoza. O $*-"*-,
these aie haiu to swallow. Foi someone who takes, foi example, the Boylean line that "to
explicate a phenomenon is to ueuuce it fiom something else in natuie moie known to us
than the thing to be explaineu by it", it is easiei to make the case that what is explanatoiy
foi something is not necessaiily what is metaphysically piioi to it. That Boyle
acknowleuges that explanation uepenus on ielating phenomena to "something else in
182
natuie moie known to us" inuicates that explanation is in pait auapteu to the oiuei of
human knowleuge anu not simply a ieflection of the ieality of things. But on the simplest
ieauing of Spinoza's methou, to explicate something is not to ueuuce it fiom something else
in natuie moie known to use than the thing to be explaineu by it, but iathei to ueuuce it
fiom something piioi to it.
186
Because explanatoiy mateiialism holus that the best oi only
piinciples of explanation aie physical ones uespite the fact that natuie is not meiely
physical, it entails that the best oi at least the most auequate moues of explanation of
natuie uo not stiaightfoiwaiuly uepenu upon oi uesciibe how the woilu ieally is.
Although Spinoza is committeu to the equal funuamentality of minu anu bouy in ieality, it
aigues, we gain at least some knowleuge, if not oui only knowleuge, about minus fiom
consiueiing how bouies opeiate.
Nonetheless, let's see whethei one oi moie of these attempts pioviue a moie
nuanceu Spinozistic account of explanation, on which Spinoza is plausibly an explanatoiy
physicalist; this compiises sections 2.1-2.S.

G65U +#$-*-!4% $.(!,"%"@(
Nany have, I believe mistakenly, suggesteu Spinoza as an ally in ceitain
contempoiaiy piojects in philosophy of minu anu even empiiical psychology. The most
visible iepiesentative of this tienu is the iecent book about the physical giounus of
emotional life by the neuiopsychologist Antonio Bamasio. Bamasio aigues in the book that

186
See, foi example, the 8*&4'-.& "0 ',& +#&074'-"0 "2 ',& L0'&%%&!': "Foi the human minu to iepiouuce a
faithful image of Natuie, it must uiaw all its iueas fiom that iuea which iepiesents the souice anu oiigin
of the whole of Natuie, so that this may likewise become the souice of othei iueas."
18S
emotions aie iueas about the bouy, which, he suggests, means that they aie explaineu by
the bouy, anu he offeis as eviuence many inteiesting empiiical psychological facts anu case
stuuies. Bamasio suggests that this is also Spinoza's view. Noieovei, the eminent Spinoza
scholai Steven Naulei has aligneu Spinoza with Bamasio anu othei embouieu cognition
theoiists in a iecent aiticle.
187
Theie, Naulei aigues that Spinoza's uictum that the human
minu is the iuea of the human bouy means that events in the human minu aie in some
sense giounueu in, explaineu by oi uepenuent upon the human bouy. These commentaiies
have no uoubt been uiiven by Spinoza's view of the ielationship between minu anu bouy,
which is one of the most unique anu fascinating of his contempoiaiies; because of this, it is
woithwhile to examine theii suggestion in gieatei uetail.
Boes Spinoza believe that we can explain mental phenomena like moous, emotions,
anu even consciousness itself, by examining at the human bouy. Accoiuing to Naulei anu
Bamasio, Spinoza agiees that the caieful scientific stuuy of the bouy will yielu gieatei
knowleuge of the natuie anu opeiations of the minu. Naulei aigues in paiticulai that
Spinoza is attempting to open a path to a "tiue science of consciousness" which is
"piecocious in so fai as it points the way to just the kinu of empiiical scientific inquiiy into
consciousness that chaiacteiizes contempoiaiy neuioscience" - one which "uepicts
consciousness, like all elements of the minu foi Spinoza, as ueeply giounueu in ceitain
functional aspects of the bouy."
188
This is, on Naulei's view, a case of Spinoza's having

187
Naulei (2uu8).
188
Naulei (2uu8), S7S
184
moie geneial "mateiialist tenuencies in so fai as the natuie of the human minu anu its
functions aie giounueu in the natuie of the human bouy."
189

This inteipietation is of couise inspiieu by Spinoza's minu-bouy paiallelism, which
was outlineu in Chaptei 2. But biiefly to ieview, Spinoza holus that eveiy thing in the
univeise - humans, animals oi objects - is both a minu anu a bouy, which aie in some sense
iuentical. Be calls, foi example, the human minu the "iuea of" the human bouy, anu in
geneial a thing's minu the "iuea of" some coiiesponuing bouy.
19u
The causal connections
between bouies anu those between minus aie eithei analogous oi iuentical: "The oiuei anu
connection of iueas is the same as the oiuei anu connection of things."
191
Foi Spinoza, to
claim that theie is an iuentity between the minu anu the bouy is at least that a paiticulai
minu anu bouy occupy the same place in this causal chain. It is an open question whethei
this is a ielationship of iuentity oi a iepiesentational ielationship.
192

Accoiuing to Naulei anu Bamasio, the human minu iepiesents the human bouy,
with some uegiee of auequacy. Naulei asks how Spinoza accounts foi consciousness on
this view, wheie eveiy cieatuie has a minu, anu aigues that Spinoza believes that
consciousness can be explaineu by appealing to featuies of the bouy (specifically, the
biain). Be situates Spinoza among some of the eaily mouein "heioes of consciousness" like
Bescaites anu Ainaulu by aiguing that unlike even these two, Spinoza at least tiies to

189
Naulei (2uu8), S97
19u
IIp1S: "the object of the iuea constituting the human minu is the bouy, oi a ceitain moue of extension
which actually exists, anu nothing else."
191
IIp7
192
Foi an compelling aigument that Spinoza accepts both but believes that they oveilap in the case of
the human minu, see Yitzhak Nelameu's "Two Kinus of Paiallelism," foithcoming in /,-%"."$,( 407
/,&0"#&0"%"@-!4% ;&.&4*!,6
18S
answei the question "how is one to explain consciousness. What gives iise to it."
19S
, oi to
give an account that "makes the cause anu oiigin of consciousness anu its piopeities as
cleai as a mechanistic oi chemical account uoes foi wine anu its piopeities."
194
Spinoza
answeis these questions about consciousness in teims of complexity, Naulei aigues, wheie
a minu is conscious to the uegiee to which the iueas which compiise it exhibit a ceitain
kinu of ielational complexity; he theieby allies himself with Bennett anu otheis against the
view, espouseu by Cuiley anu otheis, that Spinoza expects iueas of iueas to explain
consciousness. Naulei iightly locates Spinoza's stance on consciousness in quotations like
IIp1Sschol:
In piopoition as a bouy is moie capable than otheis of uoing many things at once, oi
being acteu upon in many ways at once, so its minu is moie capable than otheis of
peiceiving many things at once. Anu in piopoition as the actions of a bouy uepenu
moie on itself alone, anu as othei bouies concui with it less in acting, so its minu is
moie capable of unueistanuing uistinctly.
Anu vpS9schol:
Because human bouies aie capable of a gieat many things, theie is no uoubt but that
they can be of such a natuie that they aie ielateu to minus which have a gieat
knowleuge of themselves anu of uou.he who has a bouy capable of a gieat many
things, has a minu which consiueieu only in itself is veiy much conscious of itself,
anu of uou, anu of things."

19S
Naulei (2uu8), S77
194
Naulei (2uu8), S78
186
"The human bouy," Naulei wiites, "is simply a moie complex paicel of extension than any
othei finite moue of that attiibute,"
19S
anu "the human being's gieatei uegiee of
consciousness.is nothing but the coiielate," in thought, of this phenomenon in extension.
But Naulei goes fuithei: accoiuing to him, Spinoza believes that facts about minus
aie in some sense paiasitic on facts about bouies. The asymmetiy of explanation he
pioposes is most stiaightfoiwaiu in a passage wheie Naulei is aiguing against Bon
uaiiett's claim that consciousness is accounteu foi by vaiiations in the powei of a thought.
uaiiett is iight that such vaiiations in powei !"**&%4'& to uiffeiences in consciousness,
Naulei aigues, but he is not theieby iuentifying the ioot, founuation, oi cause of
consciousness, which is actually the complexity of the ielations among the component
iueas. As Naulei uesciibes it on page S94 of his essay, we've got a mouel like this, wheie
aiiows up encoue what Naulei calls "iesults fiom" oi "is iuentical to"; aiiows acioss
inuicate what Naulei calls "coiiesponus to," "biings" oi even "explains" as in "complexity in
the bouy &<$%4-0. a paiallel complexity in the minu (consciousness)" (my emphasis):

TX>Y S(Z>
Inciease in poweipowei of peiseveiing ! Inciease in powei of thinking
"
Inciease in complexity ! Inciease in uegiee of consciousness


19S
Naulei (2uu8), p. S88.
187
"Thus," Naulei wiites, "the moie conscious a minu is, the moie active anu poweiful it is, not
because consciousness is iuentical with powei but because both of these featuies of the
minu aie giounueu (uiiectly, in the case of consciousness; inuiiectly, in the case of powei
of thinking) in the same fact about the bouy, namely, its complexity."
196
It is woith noting
that Naulei uoesn't believe that an aiiow leaus up the mental siue, symbolizing that an
inciease in uegiee of consciousness yielus an inciease in powei of thinking, uespite the fact
that it is cleaily inuicateu by Spinoza's paiallelism. The omission is consistent with his
avoiuance of letting thought stiay too fai fiom extension. Theie is anothei omission
consistent with his theme: all of the "explanation" oi "biinging about" ielations aie
uniuiiectional: bouily events aie giounuing mental ones but not, seemingly, vice veisa.
Naulei insists that these ielations aie not causal, but then it's veiy haiu to know, then, what
they aie. Let us consiuei just one quote, since we aie conceineu heie with explanation:
"Complexity in the bouy explains a paiallel inciease in the minu's powei." Similaily,
accoiuing to Bamasio, Spinoza acknowleuges the foice of explanations like "a human is
moie conscious than a hoise because it has a moie complex biain" oi "I felt uown because
my uopamine levels weie low."
197

A fiist iesponse uiaws on the aiguments in Chaptei 2, which showeu that claims
like these - anu any statements of contingent facts about natuie oi laws with empiiical
suppoit - aie entiiely giounueu in what Spinoza calls the imagination. Sensoiy knowleuge
of biain scans oi behavioial expeiiments is, accoiuing to Spinoza, completely unieliable

196
Naulei (2uu8) p. S94.
197
Bamasio p. S7.
188
anu confuseu. It is haiu, then, to imagine that Spinoza pins his hopes foi unueistanuing the
minu on puisuing uiscoveiies of this kinu.
In fact, Spinoza has a veiy specific ciitique of empiiical psychology along these lines.
In Pait II of the +',-!., aftei he explains the stiuctuie of the bouy anu its ielationship with
the minu, Spinoza explains how we have knowleuge of the human bouy, its paits anu its
featuies. Be aigues at IIp19 that "The human Ninu uoes not know the human bouy itself,
noi uoes it know that it exists, &<!&$' ',*"9@, -7&4. "2 422&!'-"0. =( ),-!, ',& X"7( -.
422&!'&7 (my emphasis)." This knowleuge, moieovei, is inauequate, like any knowleuge
thiough expeiience; anu Spinoza wiites specifically that "the Ninu has, not an auequate,
but only a confuseu anu mutilateu knowleuge.of its own Bouy.so long as it is ueteimineu
exteinally.to iegaiu this oi that." The iuea that Spinoza thinks that oui iueas of oui own
bouies moie accuiately iepiesent them than oui iueas of exteinal objects iepiesent those
is the belief that it is Spinoza's view that the human minu has piivilegeu *&$*&.&0'4'-"04%
access to the human bouy. This inteipietation of this aspect of Spinoza's philosophy of
minu is, as I aigue in Chaptei 2, mistaken. The next foui paiagiaphs make this point in
moie uetail.
Why uoes paiallelism, foi many ieaueis of Spinoza, imply a uniuiiectional
explanatoiy ielationship fiom bouy to minu. The most plausible ieason ielies on the claim
that although the causal connections between minus anu bouies aie non-inteiacting, theii
paiallelism is piimaiily guaianteeu by the fact that minus *&$*&.&0' bouies. Explaining
what an apple is like goes a goou pait of the way towaiu explaining what oui iuea of an
apple is like, because (in seventeenth-centuiy teims) the objective featuies of the iuea aie
189
foimal featuies of the apple. So Naulei points out Spinoza's IIp11: "That which constitutes
the actual being of the human minu is basically nothing else but the iuea of an inuiviuual
actually existing thing," anu IIp1Ss: "iueas uiffei among themselves as uo theii objects, anu
one is moie excellent anu contains moie ieality than anothei, just as the object of one iuea
is moie excellent than that of anothei anu contains moie ieality."
Bowevei, Spinoza also says quite explicitly that the foimal featuies of iueas,
incluuing theii auequacy, aie uictateu by theii ielationships with othei iueas, anu 0"' by
theii ielationships with theii objects:
Pait II, Befinition 4: By auequate iuea I unueistanu an iuea which, insofai as it is
consiueieu in itself, without ielation to an object, has all the piopeities, oi intiinsic
uenominations of a tiue iuea.
Exp.: I say intiinsic to excluue what is extiinsic, viz. the agieement of the iuea with
its object.
Accoiuing to Spinoza, an iuea is auequate inuepenuently of its ielationship with its object,
anu theie is no causal connection implieu between an iuea anu its object when we evaluate
an iuea as auequate oi inauequate. Spinoza is veiy cleai that auequacy is not juugeu by
iesemblance. So even if Spinoza uoes have in minu a iepiesentational ielationship
between minus anu the bouies they coiiesponu to, that ielationship cannot suppoit an
explanatoiy ielationship between the content of an iuea anu the iuea itself. Beie is
Pioposition S of Pait II:
The foimal being of iueas aumits uou as a cause only insofai as he is consiueieu as a
thinking thing, anu not insofai as he is explaineu by any othei attiibute. I.e., iueas,
19u
both of uou's attiibutes 407 "2 .-0@9%4* ',-0@., aumit not the objects themselves, oi
the things peiceiveu as theii efficient cause, but uou himself, insofai as he is a
thinking thing (my emphasis).
This passage giounus one of Spinoza's most iauical epistemological insights, but it is
ignoieu by those who ieau him as an explanatoiy physicalist. We shoulu be able, accoiuing
to Spinoza, to juuge the auequacy anu the "foimal featuies" of an iuea without iefeience to
its object, even if the ielationship between the iuea anu its object is iepiesentational.
198

Fuitheimoie, as Chaptei 2, Section 4 aigues, Spinoza uoes 0"' have a
iepiesentational account of the ielationship between the human bouy anu the human
minu. Theie, I aigue that a peison's minu, accoiuing to Spinoza, is the iuea that is iuentical
with the human bouy; but it uoes not iepiesent the human bouy (this is the only way to
account foi the fact that the human minu uoes not auequately iepiesent the human bouy).
It uoes iepiesent othei physical things, although not auequately - in fact, it uoes it veiy
pooily.
But the iueas that the human minu has - that is, the iueas that I am conscious of
having oi sensations I am conscious of sensing - aie iueas of what happens in the human
bouy, not iueas of the human bouy $&* .&, as Spinoza makes veiy cleai at IIp12: "Whatevei
happens in the object of the iuea constituting the human minu is bounu to be peiceiveu by
the human minu; i.e. the iuea of that thing will necessaiily be in the human minu." So the
human minu -. the iuea of the human bouy, but it has iueas of ),4' ,4$$&0. -0 ',& ="7(> oi

198
In fact, ceitain passages of the +',-!. imply that if anything, the contents of iueas, oi what they
iepiesent, is causeu by theii foimal featuies.
191
what Spinoza also calls the affections of the bouy. This is often ignoieu but impoitant,
because it means that the human minu uoesn't natuially oi innately have any auequate iuea
of any physical thing (although it may =& such an iuea). Spinoza aigues that all the iueas a
peison has - incluuing of hei own bouy, its paits, its uuiation, exteinal bouies, anu even
hei own minu - come fiom these iueas.
Spinoza's unueistanuing of what counts as a tiue iuea ueiives fiom this aspect of his
metaphysics. A tiue iuea "must agiee with its -7&4'9#>"
199
but this agieement is a special
kinu of agieement. Foi as I noteu above, Spinoza aigues that Extension anu Thought have
nothing in common, oi at least nothing in common that woulu allow a finite moue of each
to stanu in a causal ielationship with one anothei. I believe that foi Spinoza, the tiuth of an
iuea is just this agieement in uou's minu that consists in it being iuentical with its object.
That means that theie is no component of iesemblance in Spinoza's talk of tiuth - an iuea
cannot iesemble its object. Insteau, uou is the stanuaiu of tiuth, anu the tiuth of an iuea
just means that it is the same moue as its -7&4'9# in uou. All iueas aie thus tiue in uou, by
uefinition. "The tiuth anu foimal essence of things is what it is because it exists as such in
the intellect of uou as an object of thought."
2uu
In this same Scholium, Spinoza points out
that this makes uou's intellect veiy uiffeient fiom the human intellect - as uiffeient, he
says, as the uog stai fiom a uog that baiks - so the intellect that gets things iight is veiy
uiffeient fiom oui own. Elsewheie Spinoza suggests that although both paities to the
scholastic uebate conceining whethei uou has iueas because they aie tiue oi whethei

199
Pait I, Axiom 6.
2uu
Ip17s.
192
iueas aie tiue because uou has them, Spinoza iejects both but says the lattei come "closei
to the tiuth" than the foimei, who cleaily uon't unueistanu uou's natuie at all.
Finally, let us iecall what Naulei claims Spinoza asks of an explanation: an account,
foi example of consciousness, which "makes the cause anu oiigin of consciousness anu its
piopeities as cleai as a mechanistic oi chemical account uoes foi wine anu its
piopeities."
2u1
In what sense uoes a mechanistic oi chemical account explain the
macioscopic piopeities of wine. Naulei means that just as the piopeities of wine can be
ieuuceu to featuies of it paits. What is claiificatoiy about what Naulei calls a "mechanistic
account" of consciousness is that consciousness is nothing moie than a paiticulai
oiganization of component iueas, anu not that this is analogous to the way that
macioscopic physical phenomena emeige fiom micioscopic ones. It is possible to sepaiate
the notion that the whole is a function of its paits fiom the application of this piinciple to
physics. Even if we take the iealization that mental phenomena aie ieuucible to ielations
between iueas to be suggesteu by the stuuy of bouies, then the iemaining woik to be uone
to uiscovei moie about the natuie of, say, consciousness calls not foi moie stuuies of
neuions, but iathei we shoulu tiy to figuie out what kinus of things iueas aie, anu what
kinus of ielations holu between them such that things like consciousness aie possible.
Theie is nothing essentially physical about highei-level qualities emeiging fiom lowei-
level ones. Inueeu, this seems to be a veiy cential point of the +',-!.: just as theie is
nothing especially physical about the iuea that the components of a thing anu theii
inteiielations aie ielateu to the functioning of the whole, theie is nothing especially mental

2u1
Naulei (2uu8), p.S78.
19S
about the notion that a thing has a foice to peiseveie. The next section, howevei, suggests
that Spinoza not in fact subsciibe to the mechanistic woilu pictuie, but iathei consiueieu
the whole to be explanatoiy of its paits.

G=6 /,(.-!4% E0")%&7@& 4. 4 #"7&% 2"* 4%% E0")%&7@&
A seconu way that Spinoza is thought to ueiive some explanatoiy piofit fiom
piivileging physics ovei the stuuy of the minu is suggesteu by, foi example, Stephen
uaukiogei anu }onathan Aulei. They see Spinoza as following oi even iauicalizing
Bescaites in figuiing knowleuge of bouies as knowleuge $4* &<!&%%&0!&, on which all othei
kinus of knowleuge shoulu be moueleu. uaukiogei aigues that Spinoza "attempts to
extiapolate fiom what he consiueis to be a piopeily foimulateu physical theoiy to the
whole of natuial philosophy, anu inueeu ultimately to anything puipoiting to be
knowleuge." uaukiogei alleges that Spinoza, like Buygens, follows Bescaites in giounuing
physics in cleai anu uistinct conceptions, which incluues puiging it of uynamical notions.
But while Buygens claiifies the coie of Caitesian mechanism, accepting that it will naiiow
the iange of knowleuge it can giounu, Spinoza "attempt to extiapolate fiom what he
consiueis to be a piopeily foimulateu physical theoiy to the whole of natuial philosophy,
anu inueeu ultimately to anything puipoiting to be knowleuge." 0n this account,
uaukiogei says, "genuine knowleuge is knowleuge in which we unueistanu phenomena
when we giasp them as effects ueuuceu fiom theii causes. The mouel foi such causal
194
unueistanuing is pioviueu in the Lemmata to Pioposition 1S."
2u2
uaukiogei suggests in
paiticulai that the axioms anu lemmas of the physical inteiluue aie an attempt to establish
claiity anu uistinctness in the analysis of motion thiough "a geometiically-specifiable
uesciiption of change in spatial cooiuinates, something completely ueteiminable anu
uncontentious."
2uS

Aulei, similaily, aigues that Spinoza has a kinu of atomistic epistemology, accoiuing
to which knowleuge can only be built on cleai anu uistinct, anu most impoitantly simple,
tiuths. Be claims that Spinoza sees this as in pait justifieu by atomism in the physical
woilu. This iequiies ieauing Spinoza's iefeience to "!"*$"*4 .-#$%-!-..-#4" in the physical
inteiluue as a iefeience to ieal, inuivisible entities.
Theie aie, howevei, seveial consiueiations against this kinu of account of Spinoza's
epistemology. Again, Chaptei 2 aigueu that Spinoza takes a iathei uim view of the
piospects of empiiical anu mathematical scientific methous. In contiast, Spinoza is not
skeptical about knowleuge in geneial; in fact, he is veiy optimistic about oui ability to have
knowleuge of many things. A stiiking example is oui ability to have knowleuge of uou's
essence - an example of the highest kinu of knowleuge, which Spinoza calls intuition. 0ui
knowleuge of the existence of oui bouy is the same, anu is infallible. In fact the whole of the
+',-!. is meant to convey auequate knowleuge; it is only when Spinoza uiscusses "scientific'
piinciples, in Pait II, that he heuges. So foi example, of his explanation of the physical basis
of imagination, Spinoza wiites:

2u2
uaukiogei (2uu4), p.24S.
2uS
uaukiogei (2uu4), p.246.
19S
This can happen fiom othei causes also, but it is sufficient foi me heie to have
shown one thiough which I can explain it as if I hau shown it thiough its tiue cause.
In fact, then, it looks like knowleuge of the mechanical laws goveining bouies is the woist
kinu of cognition in Spinoza - imagination.
uaukiogei anu Aulei's position aiises moie specifically fiom a misieauing of the
physical inteiluue, the impoitance of which, along with many ieaueis of Spinoza,
2u4
they
oveiestimate. As Section S of Chaptei S aigueu, the physical inteiluue is not meant to
convey auequate knowleuge of the laws of bouies, but to be a just-so stoiy meant to
illustiate the passivity that sensoiy knowleuge entails. Spinoza stiesses, aftei the physical
inteiluue has been ciiculateu, that he has not aiiangeu his thoughts on bouies yet. It is not
offeieu as a uefinitive physics of any kinu but iathei as an account of the ielationship
between paits anu wholes in geneial.
Even weie we to take the physical inteiluue as Spinoza's committeu account of
physics, theie is no eviuence that it suppoits what Aulei calls an "atomistic" epistemology.
Theie is insteau plenty of eviuence against the claim that Spinoza's mouel of knowleuge is
moueleu on mechanistic physics; in fact, Spinoza consiueis knowleuge of the whole in
which a natuial cieatuie is situateu to be explanatoiily piioi to it. Chaptei 1, Section S
uefenueu this at gieatei length, howevei, consiuei Spinoza's lettei to 0luenbuig of 166S.
Spinoza is iesponuing to 0luenbuig's question as to "how we know the way in which each

2u4
Baibone anu Rice wiites that "the application of the physical mouel to cognition is given in E2p14-
E2p22" following the physical inteiluue.

196
pait of Natuie accoius with the whole, anu the mannei of its coheience with othei paits."
Be iesponus:
.I maue it cleai in my pievious lettei that this is beyonu my knowleuge. To know
this it woulu be necessaiy to know the whole of Natuie anu all its paits.Eveiy
bouy, insofai as it exists as mouifieu in a uefinite way, must be consiueieu as a pait
of the whole univeise, anu as agieeing with the whole anu coheiing with othei
paits.
This is fai fiom the only place that Spinoza claims that to know a pait of natuie, Spinoza
thinks, you must fiist know the whole.
Finally, a consiueiation of Spinoza's philosophical goals unueimines the notion that
Spinoza piivilegeu knowleuge of physics. The 8*&4'-.& "0 ',& +#&074'-"0 "2 ',& L0'&%%&!',
Spinoza's only epistemological tieatise, begins, much like Bescaites' N&7-'4'-"0., with a
uevelopmental stoiy that illustiates how he came to uoubt all that he thought he knew, anu
all that otheis saiu they knew. But while Bescaites' quest is foi well-founueu theoietical
knowleuge, Spinoza's is foi the goou life, anu stable happiness. 0ltimately, by the enu of
the +',-!., Spinoza has uevelopeu a complex ethics baseu on blesseuness, ueiiveu fiom
maximizing oui shaie in the thiiu kinu of knowleuge. The thiiu kinu of knowleuge is
ceitainly not knowleuge of laws of physics oi bouies, but iathei an almost mystical union of
the subject with the object of knowleuge. This, Spinoza explicitly wiites, is the highest kinu
of knowleuge, anu it is no way moueleu on mechanics.

G!6 Y& 24!'" $,(.-!4%-.#
197
A thiiu possibility accepts that Spinoza has no philosophical justification foi using
physical piinciples to explain minus, but that he just uoes it anyway. This is }onathan
Bennett's ultimate position in Bennett (1984). Bennett conceues that Spinoza is explicitly
committeu to uenying that moues of one attiibute can explain moues of anothei attiibute,
but aigues that we finu implicit in Spinoza's woik a commitment to the "piimaiy of the
physical mouel."
2uS
Noie specifically, he claims that when Spinoza offeis explanations in
the +',-!. meant to apply equally to minus anu bouies, "the bouy calls the tune." A similai
suggestion is maue by Steven Baibone anu Lee Rice, who wiite, in the intiouuction to theii
euition of Spinoza's 8,& /*-0!-$%&. "2 34*'&.-40 /,-%"."$,( that "Spinoza's physicalistic
mouel of the univeise peivaues his entiie system anu in fact was tiansfoimeu both into his
moue foi psychology anu his paiauigm foi political theoiy."
2u6
They hint that physics
yielueu foi Spinoza the "logical categoi|iesj foi a metaphysical theoiy."
This view also is baseu on the fact that Spinoza aigues that theie is a paiallelism of
causation anu explanation between minu anu bouy. Bennett suggests that Spinoza believes
that aiticulating the laws of bouies is easiei than the laws of minus, so he ielies on physical
explanations moie heavily than on mental explanations in the +',-!.. So, foi example, at
IIp18, Spinoza wiites that "the minu imagines any given bouy foi the following ieason, that
the human bouy is affecteu anu conuitioneu by the impiessions of an exteinal bouy in the
same way as it was affecteu when ceitain of its paits weie acteu upon by the exteinal
bouy." Inueeu, Pait II of the +',-!. uoes contain moie cases of Spinoza explaining

2uS
Bennett (1984), p.126.
2u6
PCP xxvii
198
stiuctuial ielationships using physical iathei than mental phenomena; foi example, when
he illustiates imagination anu memoiy.
2u7

Bowevei, a moie compiehensive look at the +',-!. (they aie, inueeu, Bennett's least
favoiite paits) shows that Spinoza ielies on mental explanations without specifying theii
physical counteipaits as least as much as he engages in the ieveise. Paits Iv anu v aie
uevoteu to showing how a human being, even as a pait of natuie subject to an infinite
numbei anu vaiiety of exteinal causes, can, thiough ieason, come to contiol hei passions
anu cause it to come about that she is maximally active. The bouy, howevei, is still subject
to the same exteinal causes, anu to that extent passive. The paiallel physical explanation to
the mental uevelopment in Paits Iv anu v is completely obscuie, but piesumably Spinoza is
still committeu to its existence. uiven paiallelism, it must be tiue that a moie active bouy
coiiesponus to a moie active minu, which is, foi Spinoza, a minu with a gieatei numbei of
auequate iueas. 0ltimately, while Spinoza caches Pait II in physical teims, the actual
ethical conclusions of the +',-!. uiaw on it veiy little. Anu since the tiue goal of knowleuge
is oui blesseuness, anu oui blesseuness consists in union with uou anu not the extenueu
uuiation of the bouy, this seems veiy impoitant inueeu.
Anothei example of a cential explanatoiy piinciple in the +',-!. that seems to be
necessitateu by the minu anu unexplaineu in the bouy is the conatus uoctiine. Spinoza
iejects the existence of final causes unequivocally. Bowevei, he maintains in Pait II that
any finite thing, incluuing a bouy, stiives to inciease its powei. It seems cleai that Spinoza
woulu like to uiaw an analogy between foice in the physical woilu anu the goal-uiiecteu

2u7
As I noteu in section 1b, he wiites that these physical explanations aie piovisional.
199
behavioi of human beings, making both goveinable by efficient causation but still captuiing
appaiently intentional behavioi. The lattei is ceitainly a phenomenon that is moie
appaient in the "mental" woilu than the physical.
Finally, theie is a veiy enteitaining lettei fiom Spinoza to his goou fiienu Pietei
Balling, wiitten while Balling is giieving foi son, who iecently uieu. This lettei is not a
populai one among those who wish to see Spinoza as a scientific natuialist anu
Enlightenment icon. Balling has tolu Spinoza that he hau a vision, when his son was still
well, of the son gioaning just as he woulu ultimately gioan when he fell ill, befoie his ueath.
Spinoza wiites that Balling's expeiience may well have been an omen, anu explains:
We see that the imagination can be ueteimineu simply by the constitution of the
soul, since, as we finu, it follows in the wake of the intellect in all things, linking
togethei anu inteiconnecting its images anu woius just as the intellect uoes its
uemonstiations.the effects of the imagination, oi images, which have theii oiigin in
the constitution of the minu can be omens of some futuie event because the minu
can have a confuseu awaieness befoiehanu of something that is to come.
Be goes on to explain that the fathei anu son, thiough love aie in some sense one, anu the
fathei's minu coulu, if the event weie impoitant anu neai enough, tap into the causal chain
that woulu iesult in the ueath of his son. Without ventuiing a caieful inteipietation of this
lettei, Spinoza is cleaily allowing foi a complete, paiallel causal chain in the minu that
miiiois but is not causeu by the bouy. Anu again in this case, Spinoza makes no attempt to
tell the physical siue of the stoiy.

2uu
D< "#$,A+'-#$
Spinoza uoes cleaily state that the stiuctuie of thought miiiois the stiuctuie of
mattei: "The oiuei anu connection of iueas is the same as the oiuei anu connection of
things."
2u8
Bowevei, this ielationship is, I have tiieu to aigue, piopaueutic anu not
explanatoiy. While physical explanations may be cleaiei in some cases than mental ones,
in no sense shoulu this be consiueieu explanatoiy; inueeu, Spinoza equally often uses
mental explanations wheie physical ones lack. Theie aie countless examples in the
sciences wheie the same foimalism can be applieu to unielateu fielus with success, anu so
lessons leaineu in one uomain fuinish a gieatei unueistanuing of anothei. Schiouingei
assumeu that the laws of electiomagnetism anu mechanics weie analogous, noteu a lacuna
in mechanics wheie Naxwell's equations explaineu electiomagnetism, anu foimulateu
quantum mechanics to fill it. Bamilton, eailiei, useu a foimalism which pioveu poweiful in
optics to explain mechanics. We cannot concluue theiefoie that mechanics is explaineu
thiough an appeal to electiomagnetic phenomena oi optics, much less that it is "giounueu"
in such phenomenon. It shows only that some common stiuctuie is applicable to both, anu
that because of that, we might leain something about one fiom examining the stiuctuie of
the othei.
2u9


2u8
IIp7
2u9
In his O04%(.-. "2 N4''&*, Russell uefines physics as the stuuy of stiuctuie anu uynamics; Chalmeis
follows him in this. 0n this uefinition of the physical, Spinoza woulu be a physicalist. But Spinoza uiu
not uefine the physical this way, since mental items have a stiuctuie anu uynamics. Although this is not
the place to uefenu it, Section 2b tiieu to suggest with Spinoza heie that this is not the best
unueistanuing of the physical.
2u1
In fact, Spinoza's ciiticism of the application of mathematics to the physical woilu
inuicates that he uoes not associate stiuctuie, in the sense of uivisibility into component
paits, with the physical. This is uefenueu in Chaptei S, but heie we can note the
aibitiaiiness that Spinoza attiibutes to the application of mathematics in Lettei 12:
.fiom the fact that we sepaiate the affections of Substance fiom Substance itself,
anu aiiange them in classes so that we can easily imagine them as fai as possible,
theie aiises Numbei.it can cleaily be seen that Neasuie, Time anu Numbei aie
nothing othei than moues of thinking, oi iathei, moues of imagining."
Bescaites, on the othei hanu, uoes believe that the stuuy of mathematics has a special
ielationship with the stuuy of the physical woilu, since the physical woilu is the puie
object of mathematics. Anu in contiast to Spinoza, he lacks a sense of the scope of
applications of mathematics.
21u

This biings us to Spinoza's ciitique of Bescaites on the minu-bouy pioblem. Theie
is a wonueiful passage in the Pieface to Pait v of the +',-!. wheie Spinoza aigues that
Bescaites' inability to explain the appaient inteiaction between minu anu bouy is a iesult
of the fact that Bescaites hau "conceiveu minu as so uistinct fiom bouy that he coulu assign
no one cause eithei of this union of minu itself, anu founu it necessaiy to have iecouise to
the cause of the entiie univeise, that is, uou."
211
This is suipiising coming fiom Spinoza,

21u
Bescaites "lackeu a sense of the conuitions of the application of mathematics to question othei than
numbeis, shapes anu geometiical magnituues, a sense that, on the contiaiy, ualileo possesseu to the
highest uegiee"(Tanneiy 12S)
211
v, Pieface
2u2
who is veiy stiict about the conceptual uistinction between mattei anu minu. Let us see
what he intenus.
Spinoza seems to be aiguing against Bescaites that he has hau appaient success in
explaining bouies only by thiowing out ceitain featuies of ieality that uiu not fit his mouel.
Afteiwaiu, when he attempts to apply the mouel to the minu, he of couise cannot, having
puigeu phenomena of appaiently "mentalistic" concepts out of physical theoiy along with
the Scholastic bathwatei. Consiuei Bescaites' iesistance to the concept of the scholastic
notion of heaviness, which is enteitainingly explaineu in this passage wheie Bescaites
uiscusses his iejection of some of the what woulu become the piemises of the most
successful theoiies in physics - Newtonian mechanics - on the giounus that they weie
vestiges of Scholastic supeistition. Bescaites explains that in the past, he imagineu that
bouies have a heaviness which uiaws them towaiu the eaith, which suffuses them but can
be unueistoou to act at a single point. This, along with the fact that this heaviness uiew the
bouy towaiu the centei of the eaith, convinceu Bescaites that his concept of the mental
was infecting his stuuies of physics: that heaviness was eveiywheie in a bouy but acteu as
a point was just as a minu ielates to its bouy, anu how woulu a bouy fall to the centei of the
eaith unless it hau some knowleuge of location of the centei. Leibniz, too, consiueieu the
ielateu notions of foice, mass anu heaviness inextiicably linkeu with both with the mental,
anu with a Scholastic notion of final causation. Foi Bescaites, this ienueis these teims
inaumissible in physics, anu he ielegates them to the iealm of minu, oi to the activity of
uou. Leibniz, on the othei hanu, peiceiving the failuie of Bescaites' attempteu puiification
of physics thiough its geometiization, accepts that ceitain featuies of Scholastic
2uS
metaphysics aie necessaiy foi a complete uesciiption of the essence anu behavioi of
bouies. Spinoza, howevei, nowheie suggests that he makes the same iuentification of
physical foice oi heaviness with the mental, anu he explicitly uenies that the mental, oi the
active, is linkeu with finality. Theie is, then, no ieason to think that Spinoza will follow
Bescaites anu Leibniz in iuentifying foice oi heaviness with finality oi the mental, anu no
ieason why they shoulu be inaumissible to a mouein physics.
The theme is that ieuuctionism must be useu with gieat caie: you cannot iemove
the essential featuies of what you want to explain in oiuei to gain simplicity in explaining
it. We can imagine Spinoza saying the same thing to a contempoiaiy "embouieu minu"
theoiist as he uoes to Bescaites: you wish both to puige mattei of all that is mysteiious,
ielegating any confusion to the iealm of the mental. But having uone so, you can no longei
expect physics to tell you about the minu. Even fuithei, you will eventually iun into
uifficulties in physics itself, since you intenu it to explain ieal things. The appeal of physical
explanations - theii appaient claiity - is, Spinoza thinks, illusoiy. An unueistanuing of
ieality cannot be built by isolating some featuies of it fiom otheis; it will not meiely get
you empty tiuths of ieason, but contiauictions anu falsehoous.






2u4
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