6z

Heideggers

Hand (Geschlecht II)

Heidegger recalls us and in w h i c h he situates the proper place of Trakl has no other content and even no other language than that o f P l a t o n i s m and Christianity. It is simply that f r o m w h i c h something like metaphysics a n d C h r i s t i a n i t y b e c o m e possible a n d thinkable. B u t w h a t constitutes their archi-matinal [ archi-matinale ] origin and their ultra-Western horizon is nothing other than this hollow o f a repetition, in the strongest and strangest sense of the term. A n d the f o r m or "logic" of this repetition is readable not only in this text o n Trakl, b u t in everything that, after Sein und Zeit, analyzes the structures of Dasein, the fall ( Verfall), the call (Rufi, and care (Sorge), a n d regulates this relation o f the "most originary" w i t h w h a t is presumed to be less originary, notably Christianity. I n this text, the argument (especially the one used to demonstrate that Trakl is not a Christian poet) takes some particularly laborious and at times very simplistic forms, w h i c h I cannot reconstitute in this schema. Just as H e i d e g g e r requires a u n i q u e gathering place f o r Trakl's Gedicht, physique] and Christianity [LEchristianisme]. so m u s t he presuppose that mtaB u t does this gathering take there is a single place, u n i q u e and univocal, f o r M e t a p h y s i c s [LA

The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration

i Admirable Mandela. Period, no exclamation. I am not using this punctuation to moderate m y enthusiasm or to quell m y fervor. Instead o f speaking only in h o n o r o f Nelson M a n d e l a , I will say something about his h o n o r w i t h o u t s u c c u m b ing, if this is possible, to loftiness, w i t h o u t proclaiming or acclaiming. T h e h o m a g e will perhaps be m o r e just, as will its tone, if it seems to surrender its i m p a t i e n c e w i t h o u t w h i c h there w o u l d be no question o f a d m i r i n g t o the coldness o f an analysis. A d m i r a t i o n reasons, despite w h a t people say; it works things out with reason; it astonishes and interrogates: h o w can one be Mandela? W h y does he seem e x e m p l a r y a n d admirable in w h a t he thinks and says, in w h a t he does or in w h a t he suffers? A d m i r a b l e in himself, as well as for w h a t he conveys in his testimony, another w o r d f o r m a r t y r d o m , namely, the experience o f his people? " M y people and I , " he always says, w i t h o u t speaking like a king. W h y does he also force one to admire him? T h i s w o r d presupposes some resistance, for his enemies admire h i m w i t h o u t admitting it. U n l i k e those w h o love h i m a m o n g his people and along w i t h his inseparable W i n n i e , from w h o m they have always kept h i m separated in vain, these enemies This essay was first published in Pour Nelson Mandela ("Quinze crivains saluent Nelson Mandela et le combat dont sa vie porte tmoignage [Fifteen writers alute Nelson Mandela and the fight to which his life bears witness]" (Paris: Gallimard, 1986). I thank Antoine Gallimard for permission to reprint it here.

place? H a s it a place, a unity of place? T h a t is the question I will leave suspended thus, just before the chute. In French one sometimes calls the end of a text a chute. O n e also says, in place o f chute, the envoi.

Translated by John P. Leavey Jr. and Elizabeth Rottenberg

63

64

The Laws of Reflection

The Laws of Reflection

65

fear h i m . I f his m o s t h a t e f u l persecutors secretly a d m i r e h i m , this proves that, as o n e says, h e c o m p e l s a d m i r a t i o n . S o , this is the question: w h e r e does this f o r c e c o m e f r o m ? W h e r e does it lead? F o r w h a t is it used, or to w h a t is it applied? O r rather: w h a t does it cause to fold! W h a t f o r m is to be recognized in this fold? W h a t line? First o f all w e will see there, a n d let us say it w i t h o u t f u r t h e r premise, the line of a reflection. It is first o f all a f o r c e o f reflection. W h a t is o b v i ous right a w a y is that M a n d e l a ' s political experience o r passion can never he separated f r o m a theoretical reflection: o n history, culture, a n d a b o v e all, law. A n u n r e m i t t i n g analysis enlightens the rationality o f his acts, his d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , his speeches, his strategy. E v e n b e f o r e b e i n g c o n s t r a i n e d to w i t h d r a w [au rep It] b y p r i s o n a n d d u r i n g a q u a r t e r c e n t u r y o f incarc e r a t i o n , he has not ceased to act a n d direct the s t r u g g l e M a n d e l a has always b e e n a m a n o f reflection. L i k e all great politicians. B u t in " f o r c e o f reflection" there is s o m e t h i n g else that can be h e a r d , s o m e t h i n g that signals t o w a r d the literality o f the m i r r o r a n d the scene o f speculation. N o t so m u c h t o w a r d the physical laws o f reflection as t o w a r d specular paradoxes in the experience o f the law. T h e r e is n o law w i t h o u t mirror. A n d in this p r o p e r l y reversible structure, w e w i l l never a v o i d the m o m e n t of admiration. A d m i r a t i o n , as its n a m e indicates, o n e will say, a n d so o n . N o , n o m a t ter w h a t its n a m e or the f a c t that it always enables us to see, a d m i r a t i o n d o e s not o n l y b e l o n g to sight. It translates e m o t i o n , a s t o n i s h m e n t , surprise, interrogation in the f a c e o f w h a t oversteps the measure: in the f a c e o f the " e x t r a o r d i n a r y , " says Descartes, a n d he c o n s i d e r s it a passion, the first o f the six p r i m i t i v e passions, b e f o r e love, hate, desire, joy, a n d sadness. It enables u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O u t s i d e o f it, there is o n l y i g n o r a n c e , he mills, and in it resides "a great deal o f f o r c e " o f " s u r p r i s e " or o f " s u d d e n arrival | a r r i v e m e n t subii\." T h e a d m i r i n g l o o k is a s t o n i s h e d ; it questions its i n t u i t i o n ; it o p e n s itself to the light o f a q u e s t i o n , b u t o f a q u e s t i o n received no less than asked. T h i s experience lets itself b e traversed b y the ray o f a q u e s t i o n , w h i c h in n o w a y prevents its reflection. T h e ray c o m e s f r o m the very thing that forces a d m i r a t i o n ; it thus splits a d m i r a t i o n into a specular m o v e m e n t that seems strangely f a s c i n a t i n g . M a n d e l a b e c o m e s a d m i r a b l e f o r h a v i n g k n o w n h o w to a d m i r e . A n d what he has learned, he has learned in a d m i r a t i o n . H e fascinates too, as w c shall see, f o r h a v i n g been fascinated. In a certain w a y that w e will have to u n d e r s t a n d , he says this. H e says

w h a t h e d o e s a n d w h a t has h a p p e n e d to h i m . S u c h a light, its reflected passage, e x p e r i e n c e as the departure-return o f a q u e s t i o n , w o u l d thus also be the e r u p t i o n [eclat] o f a voice. N e l s o n M a n d e l a ' s v o i c e w h a t does it e v o k e , ask, enjoin? W h a t w o u l d it h a v e to d o w i t h sight, reflection, a d m i r a t i o n , I m e a n the e n e r g y o f this v o i c e b u t also o f w h a t sings in its n a m e ? (hear the c l a m o r o f his p e o p l e w h e n this p e o p l e d e m o n s t r a t e s in his n a m e : M a n - d e - l a ! ) . A d m i r a t i o n o f N e l s o n M a n d e l a , as w e m i g h t say the passion o f N e l s o n M a n d e l a . A d m i r a t i o n o f M a n d e l a , a d o u b l e genitive: the o n e h e inspires a n d the o n e he feels. T h e t w o h a v e the s a m e f o c u s , they are reflected in it. I h a v e already stated m y hypothesis: he b e c o m e s a d m i r a b l e f o r h a v i n g a d m i r e d , w i t h all his strength, a n d f o r h a v i n g m a d e a f o r c e o f his a d m i r a t i o n a n inflexible a n d irreducible fighting power. T h e l a w itself, the l a w above other laws. F o r in fact w h a t has he admired? In o n e w o r d : the Law. A n d w h a t inscribes it in discourse, in history, in the institution, n a m e l y Right. A first q u o t a t i o n a l a w y e r is s p e a k i n g , d u r i n g a trial, his trial, the o n e w h e r e he is also p r o s e c u t i n g , the o n e in w h i c h he prosecutes those w h o accuse h i m , in the n a m e o f the law: T h e basic task at the present moment is the removal of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the basis of the Freedom Charter. . . . From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression that communists regard the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a system. T h e Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world. I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the country's system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration.1

H e a d m i r e s the law, he says it clearly, b u t is this law, w h i c h c o m m a n d s c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d d e c l a r a t i o n s , essentially a t h i n g o f the West? D o e s its f o r m a l u n i v e r s a l i t y retain s o m e i r r e d u c i b l e l i n k w i t h E u r o p e a n o r e v e n A n g l o - A m e r i c a n history? I f it w e r e so, w e w o u l d o f c o u r s e still h a v e to c o n s i d e r this strange possibility: that its f o r m a l character w o u l d be as essential to the universality o f the law as the event o f its presentation in a

The Laws of Reflection

The Laws of Reflection

65

determined m o m e n t and place in history. H o w could w e conceive of such a history? T h e struggle against apartheid, wherever it takes place and such as M a n d e l a carries it on and reflects it, w o u l d this remain a sort of specular opposition, an internal w a r that the West w o u l d maintain in itself, in its own name? A n internal contradiction that w o u l d suffer neither radical alterity nor true dissymmetry? In this form, such a hypothesis still implies too m a n y indistinct presuppositions. W e will try to identify them later on. For the m o m e n t , let us retain an obvious, more limited but also more certain fact: what M a n d e l a admires and says he admires is the tradition inaugurated by the M a g n a C a r t a , the Universal D e c l a r a t i o n of the R i g h t s of M a n in its different forms (he frequently appeals to "the dignity of m a n , " to m a n "worthy of the name"); it is also parliamentary democracy and, still more precisely, the doctrine of the separation of powers, the independence of justice. B u t if he admires this tradition, does it mean that he is its heir, its simple heir? Yes and no, depending on what is meant here by inheritance. O n e can recognize an authentic heir in the one w h o conserves and reproduces, but also in the one w h o respects the logic of the legacy even to the point of turning it on occasion against those w h o claim to be its guardians, to the point of revealing, against the usurpers, w h a t has never been seen in the inheritance: to the point of giving birth, by the unheard-of act of a reflection, to what had never seen the light of day.

calls a truth: the establishment of this constitutional law had not only, in fact and as always, taken the f o r m of a singular coup deforce, the coup de force remained a coup deforce, thus, a bad blow the violent [coup]the act that both produces and presupposes the unity o f a nation. In this case, failure of a law that is unable to establish itself. Its authors and beneficiaries were only the particular wills of a part o f the population, a limited n u m b e r o f private interests, those of the w h i t e minority. T h e latter becomes the privileged subject, indeed the only subject of this anticonstitutional constitution. In fact, one might say that such a coup deforce marks the advent o f a nation, state, or nation-state. T h e properly always perfor-

mative act of such an institution must in effect produce (proclaim) that which it claims, declares, assures it is describing according to a constative act. T h e s i m u l a c r u m or fiction then consists in bringing to the light o f day, in giving birth to, that which one claims to reflect so as to take note o f it [en prendre acte], as though it were a matter of recording what will have been there, the unity o f a nation, the f o u n d i n g of a state, whereas one is in the act of producing that event. B u t legitimacy, indeed legality, becomes permanently installed; it recovers its originary violence, and is forgotten only on certain conditions. N o t all performatives, a theoretician of speech acts w o u l d say, are "felicitous." T h a t depends on a great n u m b e r of conditions and conventions that f o r m the context of such events. In the case o f S o u t h A f r i c a , certain "conventions" were not respected, the violence was too great, visibly too great, at a m o m e n t when this visibility extended to a n e w international scene, and so on. T h e white c o m m u n i t y was too much in the minority, the disproportion of wealth too flagrant. F r o m then

I
This inflexible logic of reflection was also Mandela's practice. Here are at least two signs of it. i. /'ifst sign- T h e African National Congress, of which he was one of the lenders alter having j o i n e d it in 1944, succeeded the S o u t h A f r i c a n N a tional Congress. Now, the structure of the latter already reflected that of the American Congress and the H o u s e of Lords. It included in particular a I ligh C h a m b e r . T h e paradigm was thus already the parliamentary democracy that Mandela admired. T h e Freedom Charter, which he promulgated in 1955, also enunciates those democratic principles inspired by the Universal Declaration of the Rights of M a n . A n d yet, with an exemplary rigor, Mandela nonetheless refuses a pure and simple alliance with the liberal whites w h o want to maintain the struggle within the constitutional framework, such at least as it was established then. Indeed, Mandela re-

on this violence remains both excessive and powerless, insufficient in its result, lost in its o w n contradiction. It cannot be forgotten, as in the case o f states f o u n d e d on genocide or quasi-extermination. Here, the violence of origin must repeat itself indefinitely and imitate right in a legislative apparatus whose monstrosity fails to allay suspicion: a pathological proliferation of juridical prostheses (laws, acts, amendments) destined to legalize d o w n to the smallest detail the most everyday effects of fundamental racism, of a state racism, the only and last state racism in the world. T h e constitution of such a state cannot, then, refer to the popular will with enough verisimilitude. As the Freedom Charter recalls: "South A f r i c a belongs to all its inhabitants, black and white. N o government can prevail over an authority that is not f o u n d e d on the will of the entire n a t i o n . " Referring to the general will, which cannot be reduced to the sum of the

The Laws of Reflection

The Laws of Reflection

65

wills o f the "entire nation," M a n d e l a often reminds us of Rousseau, even if he never quotes h i m . A n d he thus contests the authority, the legality, the constitutionality o f the constitution. H e refuses the proposal o f a n d the alliance w i t h t h e white liberals w h o w o u l d struggle against apartheid a n d yet claim to respect the legal f r a m e w o r k : " T h e credo o f the liberals consists in the use o f democratic and constitutional means, rejecting the d i f f e r e n t f o r m s o f totalitarianism: fascism a n d c o m m u n i s m . ' O n l y a people already e n j o y i n g democratic and constitutional rights has any grounds for speaking o f democratic and constitutional means. T h i s makes no sense for those w h o do not benefit f r o m t h e m . " 2 W h a t does M a n d e l a oppose to the coup de force of the white minority that has instituted a supposedly democratic law to the advantage o f a single ethnonational entity? T h e "entire nation," that is to say, another eth110national entity, another popular collectivity f o r m e d of all the groups, including the white minority, that inhabits the territory n a m e d S o u t h Africa. T h i s other entity could not have instituted nor in the future will it be able to institute itself as the subject o f the state or o f the constitution o f " S o u t h A f r i c a " except b y a performative act. A n d the latter will not appear to refer to any prior, f u n d a m e n t a l law, but only to the "convention" o f a geographic and d e m o g r a p h i c division [ dcoupage] effected, in large measure, b y white colonization. T h i s fact cannot be erased. T h e will o f the "entire nation," or at least the general will, should of course exclude all empirical determination. S u c h is at least its regulative ideal. A n d it seems no more attainable here than elsewhere. T h e definition of the "entire nation" registersand thus seems to reflectthe event o f the coup de force that was white occupation, followed by the f o u n d i n g o f the S o u t h African Republic. W i t h o u t this event, h o w could w e see even the slightest relationship between a general will a n d w h a t the F r e e d o m C h a r t e r calls the "will of the entire nation"? T h e latter finds itself paradoxically united by the violence done to it, w h i c h tends to disintegrate or to dstructur it forever, d o w n to its most virtual identity. T h i s p h e n o m e n o n marks the establishment of almost all states after decolonization. M a n d e l a knows that: no matter how democratic it is, and even if it seems to c o n f o r m to the principle of the equality of all before the law, the absolute establishment o f a state cannot presuppose the previously legitimized existence of a national entity. The same is true for a first constitution. T h e total unity of a people can only be identified for the first time by c o n t r a c t w h e t h e r formal or not. written or n o t t h a t institutes some f u n d a m e n t a l law. N o w

this contract is never signed, in fact, except by the s u p p o s e d representatives o f the supposedly "entire" people. T h i s f u n d a m e n t a l law cannot, either by right or in fact, simply precede that w h i c h at once institutes it and yet presupposes it: projects it and reflects it! It can in no w a y precede this extraordinary performative by w h i c h a signature authorizes itself to sign, in a w o r d , legalizes itself on its o w n initiative [de son propre fiction chef] without the guarantee o f a preexisting law. T h i s autographic violence a n d are to be f o u n d at w o r k just as surely in w h a t w e call individual autobiography as in the "historical" origin o f states. In the case o f S o u t h A f r i c a , the fiction lies in t h i s a n d it is fiction against fiction: the u n i t y o f the "entire nation" could not correspond to the division effected by the white minority. It should n o w constitute a w h o l e (the w h i t e m i n o r i t y + all the inhabitants o f " S o u t h Africa") whose configuration was only established, or in a n y case identified, on the basis of m i n o r i t y violence. T h a t such a unity m i g h t then oppose this violence changes nothing about this implacable contradiction. T h e "entire n a t i o n , " a unity o f "all the national g r o u p s , " will grant itself existence a n d legal force only by the very same act to w h i c h the F r e e d o m C h a r t e r appeals. T h i s C h a r t e r speaks in the present, a present that one supposes to be f o u n d e d on the description the future, a future that has the value of a prescription. of a past given that should be recognized in the future; and it also speaks in

South Africa belongs to all its inhabitants, black and white. N o government can prevail over an authority that is not founded on the will of the entire nation. T h e people will govern. All the national groups will enjoy equal rights. . . . All will be equal before the law.3 T h e C h a r t e r does not annul the f o u n d i n g act of the law, an act that is necessarily a-legal in itself, w h i c h finally institutes S o u t h A f r i c a and can only b e c o m e legal afterward, in particular if it is ratified by the law o f the international c o m m u n i t y . N o , the C h a r t e r refounds it, or in any case intends to refound it, by reflecting, against the white minority, the principles by which it claimed to be inspired, whereas in fact it never ceased to betray them. Democracy, yes, South A f r i c a yes, but this time, says the C h a r ter, the entire nation must include all the national groups, such is the very logic o f the law to which the white minority claimed to appeal. O n the territory thus delimited, all h u m a n beings, all h u m a n beings " w o r t h y of the n a m e , " will then effectively become the subjects o f law.

The Laws of Reflection

2. Second sign. T h e declared "admiration" for the m o d e l of parliamen-

The Laws of Reflection

65

in truth it does m o r e than reflect, because this law, in its p h e n o m e n o n , was invisible: had b e c o m e invisible or was still invisible. B y bringing the invisible into the visible, this reflection does not proceed f r o m the visible; rather it passes through understanding. M o r e precisely, it gives us to understand w h a t exceeds understanding and accords only with reason. T h i s was a first reason, reason itself. B . T h e s e c o n d reason seems m o r e problematic. It concerns precisely this p h e n o m e n a l apparition, the historical constitution o f the law, o f democratic principles, and o f the democratic model. Here again, the experience o f declared admiration, this time o f an admiration that is also said to be fascinated, follows the fold o f a reflection. Always a reflection on and the law: M a n d e l a perceives, he sees, others might say that he projects Even before "the arrival o f the white m a n . " In w h a t he himself says about this subject, I will underline three m o tifs: (a) that o f fascination, fixed attention o f the gaze transfixed, as if petrified by s o m e t h i n g that, w i t h o u t being s i m p l y a visible object, looks at y o u , already concerns you, understands y o u , and orders y o u to continue to observe, to respond, to m a k e y o u r s e l f responsible f o r the gaze that gazes at y o u a n d calls y o u beyond the visible: neither perception nor hallucination; (b) that o f the seed: it furnishes an indispensable schema for interpretation. It is on a c c o u n t o f its virtuality that the democratic m o d e l w o u l d have been present in the society o f ancestors, even if it was n o t to be revealed, developed as such for reflection, until afterward, after the violent irruption o f the "white m a n , " the bearer o f the same model; (c) that o f the South A f r i c a n homeland [patne], the birthplace o f all the national groups called u p o n to live under the law o f the new South A f r i can Republic. T h i s h o m e l a n d is not to be c o n f u s e d either w i t h the state or with the nation: Many years ago, when I was a boy brought up in my village in the Transkei, I listened to the elders of the tribe telling stories about the good old days, before the arrival of the white man. Then our people lived peacefully, under the democratic rule of their kings and their amapakati, and moved freely and confidently up and down the country without let or hindrance. Then the country was ours. . . . I hoped and vowed then that, among the treasures that

tary d e m o c r a c y of the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n k i n d a n d f o r the separation o f powers, the faithfulness o f the Charter to all the principles of such a democracy, the logic o f a radicalization that opposes these very principles to the Western defenders o f apartheid, all o f this m i g h t seem to resemble the coup deforce of a simple specular inversion: the struggle o f the "black" c o m m u n i t y (of n o n - " w h i t e " c o m m u n i t i e s ) w o u l d be undertaken in the n a m e o f an i m p o r t e d law a n d m o d e l a law a n d m o d e l that were betrayed, in the first place, by their first importers. A terrifying dissymmetry. B u t it seems to reduce itself, or rather to reflect itself to the point of w i t h d r a w i n g f r o m every objective representation: neither s y m m e t r y nor dissymmetry. T h i s is because there w o u l d be n o importation, no simply assignable origin for the history of law, only a reflecting apparatus, w i t h projections o f images, inversions of trajectories, mises en abme, effects o f history f o r a law whose structure and whose "history" consist in carrying o f f [emporter] the origin. S u c h an a p p a r a t u s a n d b y this w o r d I o n l y n o t natural (which does not necessarily define it as mean that this Xis

reflects without seeing, the very presence o f this law inside A f r i c a n society.

an artifact b r o u g h t f o r t h b y h u m a n h a n d s ) c a n n o t be represented in objective space. For at least two reasons that I will relate to the case that concerns us here. A. T h e first reason concerns the structure of the law, o f the principle, or the model being considered. Whatever the historical place of its f o r m a tion or f o r m u l a t i o n , o f its revelation or presentation, a structure of this kind tends toward universality. H e r e we have, as it were, its intentional content: its m e a n i n g requires that it i m m e d i a t e l y exceed the historical, national, geographical, linguistic, a n d cultural limits o f its p h e n o m e n a l origin. Everything s h o u l d begin w i t h uprooting. T h e limits w o u l d then appear to be empirical contingencies. T h e y might even dissimulate what, it seems, they let appear. T h u s one might think that the "white minority" of South Africa occults the essence o f the principles to w h i c h it claims to appeal; it privatizes them, particularizes them, appropriates them, and in this way subjects them to the inspection o f reason [les arraisonne] against apartheid, against their very reason for being, against reason itself. Whereas, in the struggle the "reflection" o f w h i c h w e are speaking here makes visible what was no longer even visible in the political p h e n o m e n a l i t y dominated by whites. It obliges us to see w h a t was n o longer seen or was not yet to be seen. It tries to open the eyes of whites; it does not reproduce the visible, it produces it. T h i s reflection makes visible a law that

The Laws of Reflection

The Laws of Reflection

65

life might offer me, would be the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their freedom struggles. The structure and organization of early African societies in this country fascinated me very much and greatly influenced the evolution of my political outlook. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the whole tribe, and there was no individual ownership whatsoever. There were no classes, no rich or poor, and no exploitation of man by man. All men were free and equal and this was the foundation of government. Recognition of this general principle found expression in the constitution of the council. . . . There was much in such a society that was primitive and insecure and it certainly could never measure up to the demands of the present epoch. But in such a society are contained the seeds of a revolutionary democracy in which none will be held in slavery or servitude, and in which poverty, want, and insecurity shall be no more. (149-50) It is common knowledge that the conference decided that, in place of the unilateral proclamation of a republic by the white minority of South Africans only, it would demand in the name of the African people the calling of a truly national convention representative of all South Africans, irrespective of their color, black and white, to sit amicably round a table, to debate a new constitution for South Africa, which was in essence what the government was doing by the proclamation of a republic, and furthermore, to press on behalf of the African people, that such a new constitution should differ from the constitution of the proposed South African Republic by guaranteeing democratic rights on a basis of full equality to all South Africans of adult age. (148) W h a t fascination seems to bring into view here, what mobilizes and immobilizes Mandela's attention, is not only parliamentary democracy, whose principle presents itself for example but not exemplarily in the West. It is the already virtually accomplished passage, if one can say this, f r o m parliamentary democracy to revolutionary democracy: a society without class and without private property. W e have just encountered, then, a supplementary paradox: the effective accomplishment, the fulfillment of the democratic form, the real determination of the formality, will l'rsphr\ only have taken place in the past of this non-Western society, in the form [sous of virtuality, in other words, of "seeds." M a n d e l a lets himself be what he sees being reflected in advance, by what is not yet to fascinatedhy

of the most Western West, he also declares his "admiration," and this is still his word, always the same word, for the "structure and organization of early African societies in this country." It is a question o f "seed" and of preformation, according to the same logic or the same rhetoric, a sort of genoptics. T h e figures of African society prefigure; they give one to see in advance what still remains invisible in its historical phenomenon, that is to say, the "classless" society and the end of the "exploitation of m a n by man": " T o d a y I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction that springs in part f r o m Marxist reading and, in part, f r o m my admiration o f the structure and organization of early African societies in this country. T h e land, then the main means of production, belonged to the tribe. T h e r e were no rich or poor, and there was no exploitation o f man by man" (150).

3
In all the senses of this term, Mandela remains, then, a man of law. H e has always appealed to right even if, in appearance, he had to oppose himself to this or that determinate legality, and even if certain judges made of him, at certain moments, an outlaw. A man of law, he was this first by vocation. O n the one hand, he always appeals to the law. O n the other hand, he was always attracted, called by the law before which he was asked to appear. H e accepted moreover to appear before the law, even if he was also forced to do so. H e seized the occasion, not to say the chance. W h y chance? Let us reread his "defense," which is in truth an indictment. We will find in it a political autobiography, his own and that of his people, indissociably. T h e " I " of this autobiography founds itself and justifies itself, reasons and signs in the name of "we." H e always says " m y people," as we have already noted, especially when he raises the question of the subject responsible before the law I am charged with inciting people to commit an offence by way of protest against the law, a law that neither I nor any of my people had any say in preparing. The law against which the protest was directed is the law which established a republic in the Union of South Africa. . . . But in weighing up the decision as to the sentence which is to be imposed for such an offence, the court must take into account the question of responsibility, whether it is I who am responsible or whether, in fact, a large measure of the responsibility does not lie 011 the shoulders of the government which promulgated that law,

IK seen, what he fore-sees: the properly revolutionary democracy of which the Anglo-American West, in sum, would have delivered only an incomplete, formal, and thus also potentialimage. Potentiality against potentiality, power against power, b'or if he "admires" the parliamentary systems

The Laws of Reflection

knowing that my people, who constitute the majority of the population of this country, were opposed to that law, and knowing further that every legal means of demonstrating that opposition had been closed to them by prior legislation, and by government administrative action. (148) T h u s he himself presents himself. H e presents himself, himself in his

The Laws of Reflection

65

ways moved, by their consciencer, I will still be moved by my dislike of the race discrimination against my people when I come out from serving my sentence, to take up again, as best I can, the struggle for the removal of those injustices until they are finally abolished once and for all. (159) It was an act of defiance of the law. We were aware that it was, but, nevertheless, that act had been forced on us against our wishes, and we could do no other than to choose between compliance with the law and compliance with

people, before the law. B e f o r e a law he i m p u g n s , certainly, but that he impugns in the name o f a higher law, the one he declares to admire and before w h i c h he agrees to appear. In such a presentation o f self, he justifies himself b y gathering his h i s t o r y t h a t he reflects in a single focal point, a single a n d double focal p o i n t , his history and that o f his people. A p pearance: they appear together, he gathers himself b y appearing before the law that he s u m m o n s as m u c h as he is s u m m o n e d b y it. B u t he does not present himself in view of a. justification that w o u l d follow. T h e selfpresentation is not in the service o f law; it is not a means. T h e u n f o l d i n g o f this history is a justification-, it is possible and has m e a n i n g only before the law. H e only is w h a t he is, N e l s o n M a n d e l a , he and his people, he has presence only in this m o v e m e n t o f justice. M e m o r i e s a n d c o n f e s s i o n s o f an a t t o r n e y - a d v o c a t e . T h e a d v o c a t e "avows" a fault f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of legality, even as he justifies it, even to the point of assuming it proudly. T a k i n g as his witness h u m a n i t y as a whole, he addresses himself to the universal justice over the heads of those w h o are but his judges f o r a day. W h e n c e this paradox: one can perccivc a sort of joyous trembling in the narrative o f this m a r t y r d o m . A n d at times one can make out the inflexion of Rousseau in these confessions, a voice that never ceases to appeal to the voice of conscience, to the i m m e diate and unfailing feeling o f justice, to this law o f laws that speaks in us before us because it is inscribed in our heart. In the same tradition, it is also the place of a categorical imperative, o f a morality incommensurate with the hypotheses and conditional strategies o f interest, as it is with the figures o f this or that civil law: I do not believe, Your Worship, that this court, in inflicting penalties on me lor (he crimes for which I am convicted, should be moved by the belief that penalties deter men from the course that they believe is right. History shows that penalties do not deter men when their conscience is aroused. (158) Whatever sentence Your Worship sees fit to impose upon me for the crime lor which 1 have been convicted before this Court, may it rest assured that when my sentence has been completed, I will still be moved, as men are al-

our consciences. (151)

[We] were faced with this conflict between the law and our conscience. In the face of the complete failure of the government to heed, to consider, or even to respond to our seriously proposed objections and our solutions to the forthcoming republic, what were we to do? Were we to allow the law, which states that you shall not commit an offence by way of protest, to take its course and thus betray our conscience? . . . [I]n such a dilemma, men of honesty, men of purpose, and men of public morality and of conscience can only have one answer. They must follow the dictate of their conscience irrespective of the consequences which might overtake them for it. We of the Action Council, and I particularly, as Secretary, followed our conscience. (153-54) C o n s c i e n c e a n d consciousness o f the law, these two m a k e o n l y one. Presentation o f oneself and presentation o f one's people, these two m a k e only a single history in a single reflection. In both cases, as w e have said, a single a n d d o u b l e focus. A n d it is that o f admiration, since this c o n science presents itself, gathers itself, collects itself by reflecting itself before the law. T h a t is to say, let us not forget, before w h a t is admirable. T h e experience o f admiration is also doubly internal. It reflects reflection and draws f r o m it all the strength that it turns against its Western judges. For it proceeds, dramatically, f r o m a double internalization. M a n dela first internalizes, he takes into h i m s e l f an ideal t h o u g h t o f the law that m a y appear to c o m e f r o m the West. M a n d e l a also interiorizes, at the same time, the principle of inferiority in the figure that the Christian West has given to it. All its traits are to be f o u n d in the philosophy, the politics, the right and morality that d o m i n a t e in Europe: the law o f laws resides in the most intimate conscience; w e must in the final instance j u d g e the intention, goodwill, and so on. B e f o r e a n y juridical or political discourse, before the texts o f positive law, the law speaks in the voice o f conscience or is inscribed in the furthest reaches of the heart. A man o f law by vocation, then, M a n d e l a was also a m a n o f law by profession. We k n o w that he first studied law on the advice o f Walter Sisulu,

The Laws of Reflection

The Laws of Reflection

65

the then secretary of the A f r i c a n National Congress. I n particular, it was a matter of mastering Western law, this w e a p o n to turn against the oppressors. T h e latter misrecognize, in the end, in spite of all their legal ruses, the true force of a law that they manipulate, violate, and betray. T o inscribe himself in the system, and above all in the faculty o f law, M a n d e l a takes courses by correspondence. H e w a n t s to obtain first a decorrespondence. gree in letters. Let us stress this episode. Since he c a n n o t have i m m e d i ate access to direct, "live" exchanges, he has to begin by M a n d e l a will complain about this later on. T h e context will certainly be different, but it will always be about a politics of voice and writing, of the difference between w h a t is said "aloud" and w h a t is written, between the "live voice" a n d "correspondence." Wc have been conditioned by the history of White governments in this country to accept the fact that Africans, when they make their demands strongly and powerfully enough to have some chance of success, will be met by force and terror on the part of the government. This is not something we have taught the African people, this is something the African people have learned from their own bitter experience. . . . Already [1921-23] there are indications in this country that people, my people, Africans, are turning to deliberate acts of violence and of force against the government, in order to persuade the government, in the only language which this government shows, by its behavior, that it understands. I'.lscwhere in the world, a court would say to me, "You should have made representations to the government." This Court, I am confident, will not say SO. Representations have been made, by people who have gone before me, time and time again. Representations were made in this case by me; I do not want again to repeat the experience of those representations. The court cannot expect a respect for the process of representation and negotiation to g m w amongst the African people, when the government shows every day, by its conduct, that it despises such processes and frowns upon them and will not indulge in them. Nor will the court, I believe, say that, under the liiuimstances, my people are condemned forever to say nothing and to do nothing. (155-56) In order not to hear, not to understand, the white government requires that one write to it. B u t it intends thereby not to answer and first of all not to read. M a n d e l a reminds us o f the letter that A l b e r t L u t h u l i , then the president o f the A N C , addressed to Prime M i n i s t e r J . G . Strijdom. It was a lengthy analysis o f the situation, a c c o m p a n i e d by a request for

a consultation. N o t the slightest response. " T h e standard o f behavior o f the South A f r i c a n government towards m y people, and its aspirations, has not always been w h a t it should have been, and is not always the standard w h i c h is to be expected in serious high-level dealings between an a c k n o w l e d g m e n t f r o m the Prime Minister's office" (153). W h i t e p o w e r does n o t t h i n k it has to respond, does n o t h o l d itself responsible to the black people. T h e latter cannot even assure itself, b y return mail, by an exchange o f words, looks or signs, that any image o f it has been f o r m e d on the other side, an image that might then return to it in s o m e way. For white power does not content itself with not answering. It does worse: it does not even acknowledge receipt. A f t e r Luthuli, M a n dela experiences it himself. H e has just written to V e r w o e r d to i n f o r m h i m o f a resolution voted on by the N a t i o n a l A c t i o n C o u n c i l , o f w h i c h he is then the secretary. H e also requests that a national c o n v e n t i o n be c o n v o k e d before the deadline determined by the resolution. N o answer, no a c k n o w l e d g m e n t o f receipt: In a civilized country one would be outraged by the failure of the head of government even to acknowledge receipt of a letter, or to consider such a reasonable request put to him by a broadly representative collection of important personalities and leaders of the most important community of the country. Once again, government standards in dealing with my people fell below what the civilized world would expect. N o reply, no response whatsoever, was received to our letter, no indication was even given that it had received any consideration whatsoever. Here we, the African people, and especially we of the National Action Council, who had been entrusted with the tremendous responsibility of safeguarding the interests of the African people, were faced civilized peoples. C h i e f Luthuli's letter was not even favored with the courtesy o f

with this conflict between the law and our conscience. (153)
N o t to acknowledge receipt is to betray the laws o f civility but first o f all those o f civilization: a primitive behavior, a return to the state o f nature, a presocial phase, before the law. W h y does the government return to this noncivilized practice? Because it considers the majority o f the people, the "most i m p o r t a n t c o m m u n i t y , " to be noncivilized, before or outside the law. B y acting in this way, by interrupting the correspondence in a unilateral fashion, the white man is no longer respecting his o w n law. H e is blind to the evidence: a letter received signifies that the other is appeal-

The Laws of Reflection

The Laws of Reflection

65

ing to the law of the community. B y scorning his own law, the white man makes law contemptible: Perhaps the court will say that despite our human rights to protest, to object, to make ourselves heard, we should stay within the letter of the law. I would say, Sir, that it is the government, its administration of the law, which brings the law into such contempt and disrepute that one is no longer concerned in this country to stay within the letter of the law. I will illustrate this from my own experience. The Government has used the process of law to handicap me, in my personal life, in my career, and in my political work, in a way which is calculated, in my opinion, to bring about contempt of the law. (156) T h i s contempt for the law (the symmetrical inverse of the respect for the moral law, as K a n t w o u l d say: Achtung/Verachtung) is not his, is not Mandela's. B y accusing, by responding, by acknowledging receipt, he reHccts, in a sense, the contempt of the whites for their own law. It is always a reflection. T h o s e w h o , one day, made him an outlaw simply did not have the right: they had already placed themselves outside the law. B y describing his own outlaw condition, M a n d e l a analyzes and reflects the bei ng-outside-the-law of the law in the name of which he will have been not judged but persecuted, prejudged, taken for a criminal beforehand, as if, in this endless trial, the trial had already taken place, before the investigation, whereas it is being endlessly adjourned: I was made, by the law, a criminal, not because of what I had done, but because of what I stood for, because of what I thought, because of my conscicncc. Can it be any wonder to anybody that such conditions make a man an outlaw of society? Can it be wondered that such a man, having been (inlawed by the government, should be prepared to lead the life of an outlaw, as I have led for some months, according to the evidence before this court? . . . But there comes a time, as it came in my life, when a man is denied the right to live a normal life, when he can only live the life of an outlaw because the government has so decreed to use the law to impose a state of outlawry upon him. (157) Mandela thus accuses white governments of never answering, while at the same time d e m a n d i n g that blacks be quiet and make written representations: resign yourself to correspondence and to corresponding all alone. T h e sinister irony of counterpoint: after his conviction, M a n d e l a is

kept in solitary confinement twenty-three hours a day in Pretoria Central Prison. H e is employed in sewing mailbags.

4
A man o f law by vocation, Mandela submits the laws of his profession, the professional code of ethics, its essence and its contradictions, to the same reflection. T h i s lawyer, enjoined by that code o f ethics "to observe the laws of this country and to respect its traditions," h o w could he have conducted a campaign and incited others to strike against the politics of this same country? H e himself raises this question before his judges. T h e answer requires nothing less than the story o f his life. T h e decision to conform or not to conform to a code of ethics does not depend on ethics as such. T h e question of what to do about the professional code of ethics, "should one respect it or not?" is not of a professional order. T h e response is a decision that engages one's whole existence in its moral, political, and historical dimensions. In a way, one has to recount one's life to explain or rather to justify the transgression of a professional rule: "In order that the court shall understand the frame of m i n d which leads me to action such as this, it is necessary for me to explain the background to m y own political development and to try to make this court aware of the factors which influenced me in deciding to act as I did. M a n y years ago, when I was a boy brought up in m y village in the T r a n s k e i . . . " (149). Is Mandela treating his professional obligations lightly? N o , he is trying to think his profession, which is not just one profession among others. H e reflects the deontology of deontology, the deep meaning and the spirit of deontological laws. A n d once again, out of admiring respect, he decides to c o m e d o w n on the side of a deontology of deontology that is also a deontology beyond [ au-del ] deontology, a law beyond [ par-del] legality. But the paradox o f this reflection (the deontology o/deontology), which carries beyondvvAX. it reflects, is that responsibility takes its meaning again from inside the professional apparatus. It is reinscribed within it, for M a n dela decides, to all appearances against the code, to exercise his profession exactly when they want to stop him from doing so. A s an "attorney worth his salt," he sets himself against the code in the code, by reflecting the code and thereby m a k i n g visible what the code in force makes unreadable. O n c e again his reflection exhibits what phenomenality still dissimulates. It does not re-produce, it produces the visible. T h i s production o f light

10

The Laws of Reflection

The Laws of Reflection

65

is j u s t i c e m o r a l or political. For p h e n o m e n a l dissimulation must not be c o n f u s e d w i t h a natural process; there is nothing neutral about it, nothing innocent or fatal. It translates here the political violence o f the whites; it holds to their interpretation o f the laws, to that proliferation o f juridical purviews whose letter is destined to contradict the spirit of the law. For example, because o f the color o f his skin and his membership in the A N C , M a n d e l a cannot o c c u p y any professional premises in the city. H e must therefore, unlike any white lawyer, have a special authorization f r o m the government, in accordance w i t h the U r b a n Areas Act. Authorization refused. A n d then a waiver that is not renewed. M a n d e l a must f r o m then on practice in a "native location," accessible only w i t h difficulty to those w h o need his counsel in the city: This was tantamount to asking us to abandon our legal practice, to give up the legal service of our people, for which we had spent many years training. No attorney worth his salt Wi\\ agree easily to do so. For some years, therefore, we continued to occupy premises in the city, illegally. The threat of prosecution and ejection hung menacingly over us throughout that period. It was an act of defiance of the law. We were aware that it was, but, nevertheless, that act had been forced on us against our wishes, and we could do no other than to choose between compliance with the law and compliance with our consciences I regarded it as a duty which I owed, not just to my people, but also to my profession, to the practice of law, and to justice for all mankind, to cry out against this discrimination which is essentially unjust and opposed to the whole basis of the attitude towards justice which is part of the tradition of legal training in this country. (151) A man o f the law b y vocation: it w o u l d be greatly s i m p l i f y i n g things to say that he places respect for the law and a certain categorical imperative above professional ethics. T h e "profession o f attorney" is not just any job. It professes, one m i g h t say, that to w h i c h w e are all b o u n d , even outside the profession. A n attorney is an expert in respect or admiration; he judges himself or submits to j u d g m e n t w i t h a d d e d rigor. O r in any case he should. M a n d e l a must then find, inside professional deontology, the best reason for failing a legislative code that was already betraying the principles of every good professional deontology. A s if, through reflection, lie also had to repair, supplement, reconstruct, add something to a deontology where the whites in fact showed themselves to be deficient. Twice, then, he confesses to a certain " c o n t e m p t f o r the law" (this is

always his expression) in order to h o l d o u t to his adversaries the mirror in w h i c h they will have to recognize and see their o w n scorn f o r the law reflected. B u t w i t h this supplementary the law. A n d yet he does not accuse his j u d g e s , not immediately, at least n o t at the m o m e n t he appears before them. Certainly, he will have begun by challenging them: on the one h a n d , there was not a single black o n the court a n d thus the court could not guarantee the necessary impartiality ( " T h e S o u t h A f r i c a n G o v e r n m e n t affirms that the Universal Declaration o f the R i g h t s o f M a n is applied in this c o u n t r y but, in truth, equality before the law in no w a y exists in relation to the concerns o f our people"); on the other h a n d , the presiding j u d g e remained, between sessions, in contact w i t h the political police. B u t once in f r o n t o f his judges, these objections not h a v i n g been sustained, o f course, M a n d e l a n o longer accuses the tribunal. First, he continues to observe his deeply respectful admiration f o r those w h o exercise a f u n c t i o n that is exemplary in his eyes and f o r the dignity o f a tribunal. Moreover, the respect f o r the rules allows h i m to c o n f i r m the ideal legitimacy o f an instance before w h i c h he also must appear. H e wants to seize the occasion, and I dare not say once again the chance, o f this trial in order to speak, to give to his w o r d a space o f public a n d virtually universal resonance. His judges must indeed represent a universal instance. H e will thus be able to speak to them, while speaking over their heads. T h i s double opportunity permits h i m to gather together the m e a n i n g o f his history, his a n d that o f his people, in order to articulate it in a coherent narrative. T h e image o f w h a t ties his story to that o f his people must be f o r m e d in this double focal point, w h i c h at the same time welcomes [accueilli it, takes it in [recueilli by gathering it, and preserves [garde] it, yes, preserves it above all: the judges here present w h o are listening to M a n d e l a , and behind them, rising high and far above them, the universal court. A n d in a m o m e n t we will rediscover the m a n and the philosopher o f this tribunal. For once, then, there will have been the spoken discourse and the correspondence, the written text o f his plea, w h i c h is also an indictment: it has c o m e d o w n to us, here it is, w e are reading it at this very m o m e n t . inversion-, on Mandela's side, the apparent c o n t e m p t signifies an added respect [un surcrot de respect] f o r

11

The Laws of Reflection

The Laws of Reflection 65

B u t one could say the opposite: his reflection lets us s e e i n the most

5
T h i s text is b o t h unique a n d exemplary. Is it a testament? W h a t has bec o m e of it in the past twenty years? W h a t has history done, w h a t will history do w i t h it? W h a t will b e c o m e of the example? A n d N e l s o n M a n d e l a himself? H i s jailers dare speak of exchanging h i m , o f negotiating f o r his freedom! O f bargaining f o r his freedom and that of Sakharov! T h e r e are at least two w a y s o f receiving a t e s t a m e n t a n d two meanings o f the w o r d , two ways, in short, of acknowledging receipt. O n e can inflect it toward w h a t hears witness only to a past a n d k n o w s itself cond e m n e d to reflecting that w h i c h will not return: a k i n d o f West in general, the end of a race that is also the trajectory f r o m a luminous source, the close o f an epoch, f o r example that o f the Christian West ( M a n d e l a speaks its language, he is also an English Christian). B u t , another inflection, if the testament is always m a d e in front o f witnesses, a witness in front o f witnesses, it is also so as to open and to enjoin, it is to confide in others the responsibility o f a future. T o testify, to test, to attest, to contest, to present oneself before w i t n e s s e s f o r M a n d e l a , it was not only to show himself, to give himself to be k n o w n , himself and his people, it was also to re-institute the law f o r the future, as if, at b o t t o m , the law had never taken place. A s if, having never been respected, it had remained, this archancient thing that had never been present, the future itselfstill invisible, ' l b be reinvented. T h e s e two inflections o f the testament are not opposed: they meet in the cxemplarity of the example w h e n it concerns respect for the law. Respect for a person, K a n t tells us, is first addressed to the law o f w h i c h this person only gives us the example. Strictly speaking, respect is only due the law, which is its sole cause. A n d yet, it is the law, w e must respect the other for himself, in his irreplaceable singularity. It is true that, as a person or a reasonable being, the other always testifies, in his very singularity, to the respect for the law. H e is exemplary in this sense. A n d still reflecting - a c c o r d i n g to the same optic, that of admiration and respectthese figures of the gaze. S o m e might be tempted to see in M a n d e l a the witness or the martyr of the past. H e let himself be captured (literally, imprisoned) in the perspective [optique] of the West, as in the machination of its reflecting apparatus; he not only internalized the law, as w e were saying, he internalized the principle o f inferiority in its testamentary tradition (Christian, Rousseauist, Kantian, etc.).

singular geopolitical situation, in this extreme concentration o f all h u m a n history that are today the places or the stakes called " S o u t h A f r i c a , " or "Israel," for e x a m p l e t h e promise o f w h a t has never yet been seen or heard, in a law that only presented itself in the West, at the Western border, in order to disappear immediately. W h a t will be decided in these so-called " p l a c e s " w h i c h are also f o r m i d a b l e m e t o n y m i e s w o u l d decide everything, if there were still that; they w o u l d decide the whole. T h u s the exemplary witnesses are o f t e n those w h o distinguish between the law and laws, between the respect f o r the law that speaks immediately to conscience a n d submission to positive law (historical, national, instituted). C o n s c i e n c e is not only m e m o r y but promise. T h e exemplary witnesses w h o make us think about the law they reflect are those w h o , in certain situations, do not respect the laws. T h e y are sometimes torn between their conscience and the laws; at times they let themselves be c o n d e m n e d by the tribunals o f their country. A n d there are witnesses o f this k i n d in every country, w h i c h proves that the place o f appearance or f o r m u l a t i o n is f o r the law also the place o f the first uprooting. In every country, thus, for example, yet again, in E u r o p e , f o r example in E n g l a n d , f o r example, a m o n g philosophers. T h e example chosen b y M a n d e l a , the most exemplary o f the witnesses he seems to call to the bar is an English philosopher, a peer o f the realm (still this admiration f o r the most elevated f o r m s o f parliamentary democracy), the "most respected philosopher in the Western w o r l d " w h o k n e w how, in certain situations, not to respect the law, h o w to put "conscience," "duty," "belief in the morality o f the essential Tightness o f the cause" before the "respect f o r the law." It is out o f respect that he did not s h o w respect: (no) more respect. Respect f o r the sake o f respect. C a n w e regulate s o m e optical m o d e l on w h a t such a possibility promises? A d m i r a t i o n of M a n d e l a f o r Bertrand Russell: Your Worship, I would say that the whole life of any thinking African in this country drives him continuously to a conflict between his conscience on the one hand and the law on the other. This is not a conflict peculiar to this country. The conflict arises for men of conscience, for men who think and who feel deeply in every country. Recently in Britain, a peer of the realm, Earl Russell, probably the most respected philosopher of the Western world, was sentenced, convicted for precisely the type of activities for which I stand before you today, for following his conscience in defiance of the law, as a protest against a nuclear-weapons policy being followed by his own government. For

12

The Laws of Reflection

him, his duty to the public, his belief in the morality of the essential Tightness of the cause for which he stood, rose superior to his high respectfor the law. He could not do other than to oppose the law and to suffer the consequences for it. Nor can I. Nor can many Africans in this country. T h e law as it is applied, the law as it has been developed over a long period of history, and especially the law as it is written and designed by the Nationalist government, is a law which, in our view, is immoral, unjust, and intolerable. Our consciences dictate that we must protest against it, that we must oppose it, and that we must attempt to alter it. (152) T o oppose the law, to then try a n d transform it: once the decision is

The Laws of Reflection

65

it was neither through "adventurism" n o r through a n y "love o f violence in itself." O n the contrary, he w a n t e d to interrupt w h a t is so o d d l y called the cycle o f violence, one entailing the other because first o f all it answers, reflects, sends it back its image. M a n d e l a meant to limit the risks o f explosion by controlling the actions o f the militants and by constantly devoting himself to w h a t he calls a "reflective" analysis of the situation. H e was arrested f o u r months after the creation o f U m k o n t o , in A u g u s t 1 9 6 2 . In M a y 1 9 6 4 , at the conclusion o f the R i v o n i a Trial, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. P.S. T h e postscript is f o r the f u t u r e i n w h a t is most undecided about it today. I w a n t e d to speak, o f course, o f Nelson Mandela's future, o f w h a t does not allow itself to be anticipated, caught, captured b y a n y mirror. W h o is Nelson Mandela? W e will never stop admiring h i m , h i m a n d his admiration. B u t w e do not yet k n o w w h o m to admire in h i m , the one w h o , in the past, will have been the captive o f his admiration or the one w h o , in a future anterior, will always have been free (the freest m a n in the w o r l d , let us not say that lightly) for having had the patience o f his admiration and having k n o w n , passionately, w h a t he had to admire. G o i n g so far as to refuse, again yesterday, a conditional freedom. W o u l d they thus have i m p r i s o n e d h i m , f o r almost a quarter c e n t u r y now, in his v e r y admiration? Was that n o t the v e r y objectivel mean that in the sense o f p h o t o g r a p h y and o f the optical m a c h i n e t h e right to oversee [le droit de regard^. D i d he let himself be imprisoned? D i d he get himself imprisoned? Was it an accident? Perhaps w e must place o u r selves at a point where these alternatives lose their meaning and b e c o m e the justification and the starting point f o r n e w questions. T h e n w e must leave these questions open, like doors. A n d what remains to c o m e in these questions, w h i c h are not only theoretical or philosophical, is also the figure o f M a n d e l a . W h o is it? W h o is c o m i n g there? W e have looked at h i m through words that are sometimes the devices f o r observation, or can in a n y case b e c o m e that if w e are n o t careful. W h a t we have described, while trying precisely to escape speculation, is a kind o f great historical mirador or watchtower. B u t there is n o t h i n g that permits us to rest assured o f the unity, still less o f the legitimacy o f this optic o f reflection, o f its singular laws, o f the Law, o f its place o f institu-

made, the recourse to violence should not take place w i t h o u t measure and w i t h o u t rule. M a n d e l a explains in m i n u t e detail the strategy, the limits, the progress reflected u p o n a n d observed. First, there was a phase during the course o f which, all legal opposition being f o r b i d d e n , the infraction had nevertheless to remain nonviolent: "All l a w f u l modes o f expressing opposition to this principle h a d been closed by legislation, a n d w e were placed in a position in w h i c h w e had either to accept a permanent state o f inferiority or to d e f y the government. W e chose to d e f y the law. W e first broke the law in a w a y w h i c h avoided any recourse to violence" (162). T h e i n f r a c t i o n still m a n i f e s t s the absolute respect f o r the supposed spirit o f the law. B u t it was impossible to stop there. For the government invented new legal devices to repress these nonviolent challenges. T o this violent response, w h i c h was also a nonresponse, the transition to violence was in its turn the o n l y possible response. Response to the nonresponse: " W h e n this f o r m was legislated against, and then the government resorted to a show o f force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did w e dceide to answer violence w i t h violence" (162). lint there again, the v i o l e n c e remains subject to a rigorous law, "a strictly controlled violence." M a n d e l a insists, he underlines these words at the point where he explains the genesis o f U m k o n t o w e Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) in N o v e m b e r 1961. In f o u n d i n g that c o m b a t organization, lie intends to submit it to the political directives o f the A N C , whose statutes prescribe nonviolence. In front o f his judges, M a n d e l a describes in detail the rules o f action, the strategy, the tactics, a n d above all the limits imposed 011 the militants charged with sabotage: to w o u n d or kill n o one, cither in the preparation or the execution o f the operations. T h e militants must not bear arms. If he recognizes "having prepared a plan o f sabotage,"

86

The Laws of Reflection

tion, o f presentation or o f revelation, for example, o f w h a t w e gather too quickly under the n a m e o f the West. B u t does this presumption o f unity not produce something like an effect (I am not attached to this word) that so m a n y forces, always, try to appropriate for themselves? A n effect visible and invisible, like a mirror, hard also, like the walls of a prison. Everything that still hides N e l s o n M a n d e l a f r o m o u r sight.

No (Point of) Madness Maintaining Architecture

Translated by Mary Ann Caws and Isabelle Lorenz

1. Maintenant,

this French w o r d will not be translated. W h y ? F o r rea-

sons, a w h o l e series o f reasons, that will perhaps appear along the way, or even at the end o f the road. For I a m setting out on a road, or rather course, a m o n g other possible and concurrent ones: a series o f cursive notations through the Folies o f Bernard T s c h u m i , f r o m point to point, notations that are hazardous, discontinuous, aleatory. W h y now, w h y maintaining, w h y maintenant? I put away or place in reserve, I set aside the reason f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the seal or stamp o f this idiom: it recalls the Parc de la Villette in F r a n c e a n d that a pretext there gave rise to these Folies. O n l y a pretext, n o doubt, along the way, a station, a phase, or a pause in a trajectory, b u t the pretext was o f f e r e d in France. In French, w e say that une chance est offerte, a chance is o f f e r e d , but also, let us not forget, offrir une rsistance, "to o f f e r resistance." 2. Maintenant, the w o r d will not flutter like the banner o f actuality; it

will not lead to burning questions: W h a t about architecture today? W h a t are w e to t h i n k about the current state o f architecture? W h a t is n e w in this field? For architecture no longer defines a field. Maintenant neither a modernist signal n o r even a salute to postmodernity. T h e "posts" a n d posters that proliferate t o d a y (poststructuralism, p o s t m o d e r n i s m , etc.) This text is devoted to the work of the architect Bernard Tschumi, and more precisely to the Folies project, which was then under construction at the Parc de la Villette in Paris. It was first published in a bilingual edition in Bernard Tschunii's l.a Case vide: La Villette, a boxed set containing essays and plates (London: Architectural Association, 1986).

87