PHLA10 exam review, December 2013 The exam will mostly cover the post-mid-term stuff but there

will be a few things on it from before too and so itll be worth reviewing some of that stuff. Not everything discussed here will be on the exam. Ill try to get through it all. I can stay as late as 1pm. Aquinass first two proofs (cosmological) 1. 2. 3. 4. There are motions. A motion requires a mover. If there were no first mover, there could be no second movers and so forth. Therefore, there was a first unmoved mover.

Why accept (3)? A causal chain cannot go back and back. Imagine train cars moving up a hill. If there were no engine, their motions would be inexplicable. And it wont help to posit further cars going back and back down the hill. Aquinass fifth proof (teleological) 1. Some things without minds act for ends. 2. A thing without a mind acts for an end only if directed toward that end by something with a mind. a. Example: An arrow moving toward its target is given its end by an archer. 3. Therefore, there is something with a mind that directs those things toward their ends. Paleys design argument 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Certain organisms are complex and purposive. There are two possibilities: (a) they are products of chance, or (b) they are products of design. If (a) the observation would be surprising. If (b) the observation would not be surprising. The surprise principle. Therefore (b) they are products of design.

Objection: Natural selection introduces an element of non-randomness. Although mutations occur by chance, their selection is not random. Thus there seems to be a third option. The problem of evil (suppositions added) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. God is all good. A good thing eliminates evil as far as it can. Therefore God eliminates evil as far as God can. God is all powerful. There are no limits to what an all-powerful being can do. God can eliminate all evil. Therefore, if God (as such) existed, there would be no evil. But there is evil.

9. Therefore, God (as such) does not exist. The above is the logical problem of evil. The idea is to show that the claims of theism are insufficient. This argument faces the freedom and soul-building objections. A second form is the evidential argument from evil. This is meant to overcome the freedom and soul-building. The idea is that theres more evil than is necessary for freedom and soul-building. A distinction to be made: Natural evil is evil not caused by human choices. Descartes and Knowledge D began with systematic doubt. He discovered that he could doubt at least all a posteriori propositions. He discovered that he could not doubt that he existed. He ran the skeptical argument (see above). But supposing that he was deceived by an evil demon, he could not be deceived about his own existence. I think, therefore I am. This claim is foundational. Its not based on other believes. D directly observes that he is thinking. An analysis of I am thinking reveals that it includes I am. He concludes that he is a thinking thing. This proposition is indubitable. Indubitable propositions are indubitable because they are clear and distinct (fully apprehended by the mind). Clarity: A proposition is clear when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind" Distinctness: A proposition is distinct when it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains within itself only what is clear" Descartess rule of truth: If I clearly and distinctly perceive that p, then p is true. Descartes believed that we can deduce a posteriori claims from foundational claims and arrive at knowledge about those claims.

Descartes believes that God would not deceive us with respect to clear and distinct propositions. If he were to create us such that we were systematically deceived about such things then there would be a defect in God. And there are no defects in God. Thus, Descartess proofs for God allow us to make deductive moves from clear and distinct propositions to a posteriori claims. The Cartesian circle is an objection to this strategy. Descartess proofs for God rely are based on the reliability of clear and distinct propositions. But it is precisely the reliability of such propositions that the proofs for God is supposed to secure. JTB Knowledge The JTB theory offers individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions for knowledge: a. b. c. S believes P. P is true. S is justified in believing P.

It seems that S must believe P and that P must be true. But this doesnt guarantee knowledge. Take the lottery case: S believes that his lottery ticket will lose. Its true that itll lose. But S doesnt know this. The justification condition is added. Justification is supposed to secure the truth of ones beliefs. But even justified true beliefs, it would seem, can be false. S believes that his lottery ticket will lose. Hes justified in believing that itll lose. And its true that itll lose. But does he know that itll lose? Perhaps he justified in believing not that itll loose but that itll probably lose. Or perhaps we are justified only where our reasons secure the truth of the belief. This leads to skepticism. Skepticism about knowledge The standard argument begins with a skeptical hypothesis: 1. 2. 3. 4. Possibly we are deceived with respect to the evidence we have for our a posteriori beliefs. Therefore, our a posteriori beliefs are not evidentially certain. Knowledge requires evidential certainty. Therefore, our a posteriori beliefs are not knowledge.

Skepticism about reason David Hume believed not only that we cannot know inductive claims but also that we have no reason to believe them. 1. The sun has risen every day in the past. 2. Therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow. This inference he thinks is irrational unless another premise is accepted: PUN: Nature will behave in the future as it has in the past. But this premise he thinks is unsupportable by argument. It is not observable. Nor is it discoverable by deduction. And it cant be got by induction without running a circle: 1. PUN has always held true in the past. 2. PUN. 3. Therefore, PUN. Sober doesnt think you need PUN to run the argument. Rather than PUN he suggests: Induction is a reliable path to knowledge. But again, this is not observable, nor can it be deduced, nor can it be got by induction without running a circle. The mind-body problem Substance dualism Descartes believed that mind and body are distinct substances. Mind is mental substance and body is extended substance. This is called substance dualism Mind appears to be very different from body: Mind seems to be non-spatial, private etc. (Can a thought be divided? How heavy is a belief?) To the unprejudiced mind, mind and body have distinct properties. Given Leibnizs law, therefore, they are distinct. Although intuition may be on Ds side, there is the problem of interaction. How can an immaterial substance move a material substance and vice versa? Opposing substance dualism is materialism. We discussed three forms of this: behaviorism, mind-body identity and functionalism. Behaviorism Logical behaviorism This is the view that ones mind consists solely in ones behavioral dispositions. There are no internal mental states. To say that one believes it will rain, for example, is on this view just to say that one will take an umbrella should one go out. Methodological behaviorism

This is the view that explanations of behavior are possible solely in terms of dispositions to behave. MB does not assert that there are no internal mental states just that theyre not needed for explanation. Mind-body identity This is the view that mental states are type identical with brain states. On this view the feeling of pain just is, say, c-fibers firing. Both behaviorism and mind-body identity solve the problem of causal interaction and the problem of other minds. The problem of other minds is this: We cannot know whether or not others have minds. This is especially a problem for views on which mental items are not identical to observable items (as in the case of substance dualism). Functionalism According to functionalism mental states are identical to functional states. For instance, pain is realized whenever a physical state functions such that the organism cries, swears and tends to its wounds. Pain is thus multiply-realizable. In certain respects functionalism is much like behaviorism. But the functionalist identifies mental states not with dispositions to behave but with the states that produce the behaviors (as well as any non-behavioral changes are associated with the mental states). Freedom and determination The distant causation argument 1. Agents are not responsible for actions that are caused by factors outside of their control. a. An agent is responsible for an action only if it is in the agents power to do otherwise. 2. Every action is caused by distant factors outside of the agents control. a. Our choices are caused by our psychological states which in turn are caused by nonpsychological factors and back and back. 3. Therefore, agents are not responsible for any of their actions. Causal determination Causal determinism is the view that the total state of the world at any one time together with the laws of nature causally ensures the total state of the world at any subsequent time. If causal determinism is true, then all human actions are determined by prior factors. Is causal determinism true? Causal indeterminism Causal indeterminism is the view that at least some events are not causally determined. Causal determinism appears to be incompatible with responsible action. Does causal indeterminism help?

If our actions are not determined by prior events, does it follow that our doing this or that comes down to a matter of luck? And if so, can we be held responsible for our actions? Compatibilism vs. incompatibilism Compatibilism is the view that free action/choice is compatible with causal determination. Both can be true. Incompatibilism is the view that free action/choice is not compatible with causal determination.

Determinism is True Compatibilism Incompatibilism Soft Determinism Hard Determinism

Determinism is False Sober Libertarianism

The hard determinist believes that we do not have free will. Notice that the soft determinist may or may not think we have free will. The top right corner (I guess) consists in the view that freedom is compatible with causal determination but that it doesnt matter because causal determination is false. Some incompatibilist think that free action is also incompatible with indeterminism. They offer a third option: agent causality. On this view the agent is the uncaused cause of his or her own actions. Sobers compatibilism A weather vane is free when its functioning properly (doing what it was designed to do / selected for)), even if its choices are determined. The Desire Generating Device (DGD) and Belief Generating Device (BGD) are functioning properly when it produces desires that are typically good for the organism and beliefs that are usually true. Freedom = acting on the basis on ones own beliefs and desires in situations where ones own DGD and BGD are functioning properly (obsessive desires, say, involve malfunction). Some final points relevant to the free will debate The propositional attitudes that govern our behaviors are beliefs and desires. I believe that P (I have money) I want P (I have money) to be true. Sometimes we have second order desires. The drug addict may not want his desire to take the drug to be effective. He may want to resist it. Second order desires are desires about desires.